KARANPURA DEVELOPMENT CO., LTD. versus RAJA KAMAKSHYA NARAIN SINGH.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 10 April 1956 | [1956] 1 S.C.R. 325 | 1956 INSC 22
Key facts
- Decided
- 10 April 1956
- Bench
- SUDHI RANJAN DAS*, NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI, T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 191/1953
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1956] 1 S.C.R. 325
- Neutral citation
- 1956 INSC 22
Text of the judgment
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
325
KARANPURA DEVELOPMENT CO., LTD.
v.
RAJA KAMAKSHYA NARAIN SINGH.
[S. R. DAS, C.J., BHAGWATI and VENKATARAMA
AYYAR JJ.]
Court of Wards-Powers-Transactions by Court of WardsCourt's power to review-Court of Wards acting on behalf of a ward
and a guardian acting on behalf of a minor-Difference in the legal
position of-Licences extending beyond the period of the minority of
the ward-Validity-Sanction-Requirements-Ooitrt of Wards Act,
1879 (Bengal Act IX of 1879), s. 18-Guardians and Wards Act,
1890 (VIII of 1890), s. 29(a).
Section 18 of the Court of Wards Act, 1879, provides that the
Court of Wards "may sanction the giving of leases or farms of the
whole or part of any property under its charge, and may direct the
mortgage or sale of any part of such property, and may direct the
doing of all such other acts as it may judge to be most for the benefit
of the property and the advantage of the ward".
In exercise of the power conferred by this section the Court of
Wards sanctioned a deed of prospecting license in favour of l3, the
predecessor in interest of the appellant, and the same was executed
on 26-3-1915. Subsequently, on 23·11·1917 the manager of the
Court of Wards executed a deed modifying the terms of the deed
dated 26-3· 1915, by. virtue of which the period of license could be
extended up to 26-3-1951 under certain conditions. On 10-8-1937
the respondent having become major assumed management of the
estate and thereafter repudiated the aforesaid deeds and contested
their validity on the grounds, inter alia, (1) that the deed dated
26-3-1915 was not for the benefit of the ward as the clause therein
relating to the payment of the cess was less advantageous to him
than the corresponding clause in the prospecting license executed
by the then proprietor of the estate on 26-11-1907 in respect of
another property known as the Bokaro license, and that the Court
of Wards executed the deed in question without bestowing any
thought to it, (2) that the Court of Wards had no power to enter into
the transaction dated 23-11-1917 as it had the effect of preventing
the ward from dealing with his estate for over a period of 32 years
after he attained majority, (3) that in granting the deed dated
23-11-1917 the Court of Wards considered only the benefit of the
grantee and not that of the ward and (4) that the deed was void because no sanction had been given to it by the Court of Wards, as
required bys. 18 of the Court of Wards Act, 1879.
Held, (1) that the Court of Wards is not in the same position
as a guardian of the properties of a minor. It is a statutory body
with powers defined by the Court of Wards Act, 1879. Under s. 18
~3
1956
April 10
326
1956
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956)
of the Act the Court of Wards is given the power to jndge for itself
whether a transaction entered into by it on behalf of the ward ·is
Karanpura
for the benefit of the property and the advantage of the ward and
Develo.Ptnent Co., its a.ct cannot be impugned in a court of law by the ward on attainUd.
ing majority unless he shows that it did not act bona fide and in the
v.
interests of the ward and that its action amounted to a fraud
Raja K aniakshya on the power, or that it did not, in fact, apply its mind to the
Narain Singh
question whether the act was for the benefit of the property or
the advantage of the ward, and that though it purported to exercise the power under s. 18, it did not, i~ fact, come to a judgment as required by the section. Its decision cannot be questioned on the ground that it was erroneous on the merits, or
that it was reached without considering some aspects which
ought to have been considered, unless the failure to consider them
was of such a character as to amount to there being no exercise
of judgment at all;
Allcroft v. Lord Bishop of London: Lighton v. Lord Bishop
of London, ([189i] A.O. 666), relied on.
(2) that assuming that the cess clause in the deed dated
26-3-1915 was less advantageous to the ward than that in the
Bokaro license, as the Court of Wards had applied its mind to
the question and formed its own judgment on it, its decision is
not open to question;
(3) that the Court of Wards was competent to enter into the
transaction dated 23-11-1917 and extend the period of license so
as to enure for a period beyond the date of the ward coming of
age, as s. 18 of the Act which confers authority on the Court of
Wards is genera.I and unqualified in terms and there is no provi·
sion in the Act such as there is in s. 29(b) of the Guardians and
Wards Act, 1890, that a lease by the Court of Wards was to
enure for a period related to the minority of th'e ward;
(4) that assuming that the words in s. 18 that the act should
be "for the benefit of the property and the advantage of the ward"
should he read cumulatively and not disjunctively, the deed dated
23-11-1917 satisfies the requirements of the section inasmuch as the
benefits which the transaction conferred on the estate in the form of
minimum ground rent, salami and royalty must also enure to the
advantage of the ward who will be the person who will receive this
revenue;
(5) that the requirements as to sanction under s. 18 of the Act
must be held to he satisfied if the transaction in all its essential
particulars had been sanctioned by the Court of Wards, even though
there were details to be worked out in furtherance of the sanction
and the document as finally drafted had not been submitted again
for its approval. A mere recital in the deed that the transaction
was sanctioned is not conclusive and it must be shown that,
as a matter of fact, sanction was given, and as the order of the Court
of Wards dated 9-10-1917 contained the sanction to the proposal in
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
327
all its essential particul&rs it was sufficient compliance with the re·
1956
quirements of the section;
Karanj>l4ra
Gulabsingh v. Seth Gokuldas, (40 I.A. 117) and Ramkanai Singh DeTJeloj>ment Co.,
Deo Darpashaha v. Mathewson, (42 I.A. 97), relied on.
Ud.
and (6) thats. 18 only requires that the transaction should be
v.
entered into with the sanction of the Court of Wards and if the Raja Kamakshya
transaction subsequently turns out to be bad on the merits, either Narain Singh
in part or in toto, it does not render the sanction originally given
ineffective.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals
Nos. 191 & 192 of 1953.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated the
27th October 1949 of the Patna High Court in Appeals
from the Original Decrees Nos. 127 & 125 of 1943
arising out of the decrees dated the 30th day of April
1943 of the Court of Additional Subordinate Judge,
Hazaribagh in Suits Nos. 28 & 82 of 1940 respectively.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, N. C.
Chatterjee, S. Chaudhry, S. N. Mu.khe1ji and B. N.
Ghosh, for the appellant.
Atul Chandra Gupta and Ganpat Rai, for respondents Nos. 1 & 12.
Atul Chandra Gupta and I. N. Shroff, for respondents Nos. 2, 4, 5, 6 & 13.
Lal Narain Sinha, Bajrang Sahai and R.C. Prasad,
for respondent No. 9.
Sanjib Chaudhry and R.R. Biswas, for respondent No. 10.
Sanjib Chaudhry and Ganpat Rai, for respondent
No. 11.
Ganpat Rai, for respondents Nos. 3, 7 & 8.
1956. April 10. The Judgment of the· Court
was delivered by
VENKATARAMA AYYAR J.-These appeals raise
questions as to the validity of a prospecting license
granted on 26-3-1915 in favour of Messrs Bird and
Co., by the Court of Wards as representing the Ram-
328
1956
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1956]
garb Estate and of two deeds dated 23-11-1917 and
1-6-1937 executed by the Court of Wards modifying
KaranPura
the
terms of the license dated 26-3-1915.
Develo:Pment Co.,
The Ramgarh Raj is an ancient principality situate
Ud.
v.
in Bihar. It has three coal-fields, Bokaro Jharia,
Raja Kamakshya Bokaro Ramgarh and Karanpura. Of these, the
Na rain Singh
Karanpura coal-fields are the largest being of the
extent
of 550 sq. miles, of which about 415 sq. miles
Venkata,.ama
belonged to the estate. On 26-11-1907 Raja RamAyyarJ.
narain Singh, the proprietor of the estate, granted
in favour of Messrs Anderson Wright & Co., a prospecting license in respect of the Bokaro Ramgarh
coal-fields, referred to in these proceeding as the
Bokaro license. He was also negotiating for a similar
license in respect of the Karanpura coal-fields ( vide
Exhibit 155-b dated 1-12-1912), but before anything
was concluded, he died on 26-1-1913 leaving him
surviving his widow, Rikinath Kaur, and a minor son,
Lakshminarain Singh. At the time of his death, the
debts owing by the estate amounted to about Rs. 9
lakhs.
On 20-5-1913 the Court of Wards took over the
management of the estate, and its first concern was
to relieve it from the pressure of creditors, and for
that purpose, to arrange for a loan on easy terms. It
was at this juncture that Messrs Bird and Co., made
an application for a prospecting license for the
Karanpura coal-fields, and in reply thereto, the
manager of the Court of Wards informed them on
4-9-1913 that "the estate being involved and anxious
to pay off the debts, one of the conditions of the lease
would be an advance of about Rs. 8 to Rs. 11 lakhs
including salami, etc., to the estate on the same terms
as advanced by the Bokaro and Ramgarh Company".
Then, there were negotiations extending over several
months, a good deal of correspondence and personal
discussions, and eventually on 29-7-1914 the_ terms
were finally agreed upon, and on 26-3-1915 the deed
of prospecting license was actually executed. Its
main terms were as follows: It was to be in force for a
period of six years. A sum of Rs. 1,00,000 was paid
as salami. The licensees were to pay a minimum
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
329
1956
ground rent of Rs. 8,000 per annum commencing from
the second year of the license, and if the leases were
Karanpura
actually taken by the licensees, this amount was Development Co.,
to be adjusted towards royalties payable thereunder.
Ltd.
v.
The terms of the leases which were to be granted in
pursuance of the license were firstly, the lessees• were Raja Kamakshya
to pay a salami at Rs. 40 per bigha, the payment to Narain Sing/1
commence either when railway facilities were avai- Venkatarama
lable for transport of coal from the mouth of the pit
AyyarJ.
or after a lapse of six years after the period of the
license, that is to say, after 26-3-1927, whichever was
earlier; secondly, royalty was to be paid on coal, dust
and coke at rates specified therein, subject to a minimum of Rs. 5 per bigha payable after the first year
of the lease; and thirdly, the lessees were to pay the
ceases payable under the law by the occupier or tenant
of the land. As consideration for the grant of the
license, Messrs Bird and Co., were to advance Rs. 9
lakhs as loan to the estate. This amount was not to
carry interest and was to be discharged by adjusting
the royalties which would become payable under the
leases. If no. leases were taken and the license was
abandoned, then the amount of the loan was to carry
interest at 4! per cent per annum from that date and
it had to be repaid in half-yearly instalments such
that the entire debt would be discharged within a
period of six years. A mortgage bond was executed
on the same date as the prospecting license embodying these terms.
The next phase of the transaction begins on 3-8-1915
with Messrs Bird and Co., applying to the Court of
Wards for extension of the period of the license on
the ground that as the result of war conditions, new
and unexpected difficulties had cropped up and that
to achieve the purpose of the license, is was necessary to extend the period of six years fixed therefor.
This proposal was subjected to close scrutiny, and
there was prolonged correspondence between Messrs
Bird and Co., ·and the Court of Wards on the expediency of extending the period of license and on the
terms on which such extension should be granted.
Ultimately, on 23-11-1917 the manager of the Court
330
1956
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
of Wards executed a deed modifying the terms of the
deed dated 26-3-1915. Under this deed, the period
/{aranjura
Dc.vclojnne1tt Co., of license was extended in the first instance from 6
to 12 years; that is to say, it would expire on 26-3-1927
Ud.
v.
instead of on 26-3-1921 as originally fixed. It was
Rrrja /{a111aksliya then provided that if within this extended period the
Narai1i Singh
licensee took a lease or leases of mines of the extent
of
at least 10,000 bighas, then the period of the
Vt.'11katara1na
license would be extended by a second term of 12
AyyarJ.
years; i.e., up to 26-3-1939. There was a further provision that if before 26-3-1939 the licensees took
leases of at least 20,000 bighas, the period of the
license would be extended by another term of 12
years, i.e., up to 26-3-1951. While under the prospecting license dated 26-3-1915 a minimum ground
rent of Rs. 8,000 was payable from the second year,
under the deed dated 23-11-1917 a minimum ground
rent of Rs. 50,000 per annum at Rs. 5 per bigha on
the covenanted number of 10,000 bighas was payable
from the seventh to the twelfth year. These are the
salient features of the license as revised by the
document dated 23-ll-1917.
Raja Lakshmina.rain Singh, the ward, became a
major on 6-4-1919, and died shortly thereafter on
10-4-1919 leaving him surviving a minor son, Raja
Kamakshya Narain Singh, the main respondent in
these appeals. The Court of Wards accordingly continued in management of the estate on behalf of the
Raja until 10-8-1937, when he became a major. On
14-7-1920, the appellant Company was registered
under the provisions of the Indian Companies Act,
and it took over the interests of Messrs Bird & Co.,
under the license dated 26-3-1915 as modified by the
deed of variation dated 23-11-1917. In pursuance
of these deeds, the Company took six leases covering
in all an area of 17,539 bighas on divers dates between 17-7-1922 and 17-7-1933. Under the terms of
the deed dated 23-ll-1917 the appellant would be
entitled to extension of the licence from 26-3-1939
for the third period of 12 years only if it had taken
lease of at least 20,000 bighas before 26-3-1939.
Accordingly, it applied for and obtained three leases
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
331
1956
on 2-8-1937 covering an area of 2,461 bighas, thus
making up along with the six leases mentioned above,
Karanpura
the minimum area of 20,000 bighas.
Development Co.,
There is one more deed to which reference must
Ud.
now be made. Clause 6 of the deed dated 23-11-1917
v.
provides that the minimum royalty on areas in excess Raja Kamakshya
of 10,000 bighas taken on lease would not be payable Narain Singh
till 26-3-1939. Thereafter, the appellant would under Venkatarama
this clause become liable to pay a minimum royalty
Ayyarj.
for an area in excess of 10,000 bighas. The appellant
applied to modify this term by postponing the date
of payment by a further period of 12 years. This
proposal was accepted by the Court of Wards, and
on 1-6-1937 a deed was executed providing in modification of clause 6, as it stood in the deed dated
23-11-1917, that the minimum royalty for the areas
in excess of 10,000 bighas was not to become payable
by the company until railway facilities for transport
of the coal from the mouth of the pit were available
or from 26-3-1951, whichever happened earlier. These
are the three transactions, which form the subjectma tter of this litigation.
On 10-8-1937 the Raja became, as already stated,
a major, and assumed management of the estate. On
9-3-1939 he sent a notice to the appellant repudiating
the license dated 26-3-1915 and the two deeds of variation dated 23-11-1917 and 1-6-1937 as not binding on
him. The appellant in turn sent a notice on 14-5-1940
calling upon the Raja to execute a lease in respect of
250 bighas in accordance with the deeds dated
26-3-1915, 23-11-1917 and 1-6-1937, and followed it
up by instituting on 8-6-1940 Title Suit No. 28 of
1940 in the court of the Subordinate Judge of Hazaribagh for compelling specific performance thereof. On
9-8-1940 the Raja filed Title Suit No. 82of1940 in
the Sub-Court, Hazaribagh, and therein, he pleaded
that the deed dated 26-3-1915 was void, because the
Court of Wards had no power to grant a prospecting
license and also because it had acted with gross negligence in granting the same; and that the deeds dated
23-11-1917 and 1-6-1937 were bad, because there was
no sanction therefor as required by section 18 of the
332
1956
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956)
Bengal Court of Wards Act IX of 1879, hereinafter
referred to as the Act, and also because they were not
f{aranjiura
for
the benefit of the estate. He accordingly prayed
Development Co.,
for
a
declaration that the three deeds aforesaid were
Ltd.
v.
void, and for possession of the properties comprised in
Raja Kamakshya the leases, with mesne profits, past and future.
Narain Singh
Both these suits, which were really cross-actions
involving
the determination of the same points, were
Vtnkataratua
heard
together
by the Subordinate Judge of HazariAyyarJ.
bagh, and by his judgment dated 30-4-1943 he held
that the deeds dated 26-3-1915 and 23-11-1917 were
intra vires the powers of the Court of Wards, that
they were beneficial to the estate, and were therefore
valid, and he accordingly upheld the six leases granted pursuant to those deeds. He, however, held that
the deed dated 1-6-1937 was not valid, both because
the Court of Wards had not sanctioned it and also
because it was not for the benefit of the estate. In
view of this finding, he held that the clause in the
lease deeds dated 2-8-1937 based on the deed dated
1-6-1937 postponing the payment of minimum royalty
was bad, but that the leases themselves were otherwise valid. As a result of these findings, he granted a
decree for specific performance in Title Suit No. 28
of 1940 and in Title Suit No. 82 of 1940 he awarded
reliefs consequential on the invalidity of the deed
dated 1-6-1937.
Against this judgment, the Raja preferred appeals
to the High Court of Patna, F. A. No. 125 of 1943
against the decree in Title Suit No. 82 of 1940 and
F.A. No. 127 of 1943 against that in Title Suit No. 28
of 1940. The company also filed cross-objections
in F.A. No. 125 of 1943. The learned Judges agreed
with the Subordinate Judge that the Court of Wards
was competent to grant a prospecting license, but
they were of opinion that it had not applied its mind
to certain important aspects of the transaction, that
the interests of the ward had suffered in consequence,
and that the deed dated 26-3-1915 was therefore not
valid. Dealing next with the deed dated 23-11-1917,
they held that it was void, because the Court of
Wards had not sanctioned it. They also held that it
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
S.C.R.
-
333
1956
was not binding on the Raja, firstly because its terms
were not beneficial to him, secondly because it had been
Karanpura
obtained by Messrs Bird and Co., on false representa- Development Co.,
tion, and thirdly because Mr. MacGregor, the then
Ud.
v.
manager of the Court of Wards, was acting in his
own interests and adversely to those of the minor Raja Kamakshya
ward, and the Court of Wards had been misled by him Narain Singh
into entering into the transaction. For these reasons, Venkatarama
the learned Judges held that the deed dated
AyyarJ.
23-11-1937 was void and inoperative as against the
ward. Then, as regards the deed dated 1-6-1937, the
learned Judges agreed with the Subordinate Judge
that it was invalid on both the grounds given by him.
In the result, in Title Suit No. 82 of 1940 a declaration was made that the deeds dated 26·3-1915,
26-ll-1917 and 1-6-1937 as well as the leases granted
pursuant thereto were void and a decree passed in
favour of the Raja for possession of the demised properties with mesne profits, past and future. Title Suit
No. 28 of 1940 instituted by the appellant for specific performance and the cross-objections filed by it in
F.A. No. 125 of 1943 were dismissed.
Against this
judgment, the present appeals have been preferred
by the company, C.A. No. 191 of 1953 being directed
against the decree in F.A. No. 127 of 1943 and C.A.
No. 192 of 1953 against the decree in F.A. No. 125 of
1943. The first respondent in these appeals is the
Raja of Ramgarh, the other respondents being transferees from him, and he will be referred to in this
judgment as the respondent.
Though the questions that were agitated by the
parties in the courts below ranged over a wide area,
many of them have been abandoned in the argument
before us, and the scope of the controversy in these
appeals has been considerably narrowed down. Thus,
the appellant does not challenge the correctness of
the decision of the courts below that the deed dated
1-6-1937 is not binding on the estate.
Mr. Atul
Chandra Gupta, learned counsel for the Raja, has
limited his attack on the deed dated 26-3-1915 to the
ground that it was not for the benefit of the ward,
because the clause therein relating to the payment of
H
334
1956
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
cess, or more compendiously, the cess clause was less
advantageous
to him than the corresponding clause in
Karanj>Ura
Deoeloj>ment Co., the Bokaro license, and the Court of Wards executed
Ud,
the deed in question without bestowing any thought
v.
to it. He attacked the deed dated 23-II-1917 on the
Raja Kamakshya following grounds: (1) The Court. of Wards had no
Narain Singh
power to enter into a transaction, which had the
effect of preventing the ward from dealing with his
Venkatara1na
estate for over a period of 32 years after he attained
AyyarJ.
majority, and which bound him to grant leases down
to the year 1951 at the rates of salami and royalties
fixed in the year 1915. (2) In granting the deed
dated 23-ll-1917, the Court of Wards considered only
the benefit of Messrs Bird and Co., and not of the
ward. (3) The deed is void, because no sanction had
been given to it by the Court of Wards, as required
by section 18 of the Act.
Before dealing with these contentions on their
merits, it is necessary to consider the question which
was discussed at the Bar as to the grounds on
which the deeds dated 26-3-1915 and 23-11-1917 are
open to attack in these proceedings. A transaction
entered into by a guardian on behalf of a minor will
be valid and binding on the latter, only if it is for
When a transaction is
proved necessity or benefit.
entered into by a Court of Wards on behalf of the
ward, is its validity to be judged on the same considerations, and is it open to the ward on attaining
majority to challenge it on the ground that it was
not beneficial to him? The Court of Wards is not in
the same position as a guardian of a minor. It is a
statutory body, and its powers are those which are
conferred on it by the statute, which creates it. Section 14 of the Act provides that the Court of Wards
may, acting through its manager, do all such things
requisite for the proper care and management of the
property as the proprietor of such property might
do, if not disqualified. Section 18 enacts that:
"The Court may sanction the giving of leases or
farms of the whole or part of any property under its
charge, and may direct the mortgage or sale of any
part of such property, and may direct the doing of all
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
335
1956
such other acts as it may judge to be most for the
benefit of the property and the advantage of the
Karanpura
ward".
De<Jelopmenl Co.,
It was in exercise of the power conferred by this secUa.
tion that the Court of Wards executed the two imv.
pugned deeds dated 26-3-1915 and 23-11-1917. Now, RajaKamakshya
what is the true scope of section 18? Is the exercise Narain Singh
of the power conferred by that section conditioned Venkatarama
on the act being in fact for the benefit of the ward,
AyyarJ.
or is it sufficient that the Court of Wards judges it to
be for the benefit of the property and the advantage
of the ward?
The contention of Mr. Gupta for the respondent is
that the words "as it may judge" do not signify that
the judgment could be made without reasonable
grounds therefor, that they should be construed as
meaning "as it may on reasonable grounds judge",
and that it is therefore open to the Court to consider
whether the decision of the Court of Wards was a
reasonable one to come to, and that if it came to the
conclusion that it was not, then to hold that it fell outside the ambit of the authority conferred by section 18.
In support of this contention, he relied on certain observations in Nakkuda Ali v. M. F. De. S.Jayaratne( 1 ).
There, the Board was considering the meaning of the
words "where the Controller has reasonable grounds
to believe" occurring in a Regulation of Ceylon. In
an application for certiorari to quash an order of the
Controller made under this enactment, it was argued
for him that the words of the Regulation left the
matter to his subjective satisfaction, that his decision
therefore was not liable to be questioned on the
ground that, in fact, there existed no reasonable
ground therefor; and the decision in Liversidge v. Sir
John Anderson(2 ) was relied on as establishing that
position. In negativing this contention, Lord Rad. cliffe observed that the words "where the Controller
had reasonable grounds to believe" might mean either
"where it is made out to his subjective satisfaction"
or "where there are reasonable grounds on which he
could believe", and that whether the words were
\1) [1951] A.C. 66, 76.
(2) [1942] A.C. 206.
336
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1956
[1956]
used in the one sense or the other in the enactment
in
question must depend upon the context. The quesKaranpura
De'PeloJment Co, tion then is ultimately one of construction of the
words of the particular statute.
Ud.
v.
Now, what do the words "as it may judge" in secRaja Kamaksh,a tion 18 mean? Do they confer on the Court of Wards
Narain Singh
a power to be exercised if the act is, in its judgment,
for the benefit of the property or the advantage of
Venkatarama
the ward, or do they confer a power to be exercised
AyyarJ.
only if, in fact, the act is for the benefit of the property or the advantage of the ward? In Liversidge v.
SirJohn Anderson(1), Lord Atkin who held that the
words of Regulation 18-B of the Defence Regulations
1939 that "if the Secretary of State has reasonable
cause to believe" meant "if, in fact, there was reasonable cause for the belief", discussed what words were
susceptible of importing an objective standard as contrasted with subjective satisfaction, and observed:
"It is surely incapable of dispute that the words
'if A has X' constitute a condition the essence of
which is the existence of X and the having of it by A
.... And the words do not mean and cannot mean 'if
A thinks that he has'. 'If A has a broken ankle' does
not mean and cannot mean 'if A thinks that he has
a broken ankle'. 'If A has a right of way' does not
mean and cannot mean 'if A thinks that he has a
right of way'. 'Reasonable cause' for an action or a
belief is just as much a positive fact capable of determination by a third party as is a broken ankle or a
legal right".
Examining the language of section 18 in the light of
these observations, we are unable to construe the
words "as it may judge most for the benefit of. the
property and the advantage of the ward" as equivalent to "as may be for the benefit of the property and
the advantage of the ward" or "as might be judged
to be most for the benefit of the property and the advantage of the ward". The statute confides in clear
and unambiguous terms the authority to judge whether the act is beneficial to the estate, to the Court
of Wards and not to any outRide authority.
1
(1) (1942] A.O. 206.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
337
7956
That being the true scope of the power conferred
by section 18, what are the grounds on which the
Kat'anjJura
exercise of such a power could be impugned in a court DeoelojJment Co.,
of law?. It can be attacked on the ground that the
Ud.
v.
Court of Wards did not act bona fide and in the interests of the ward, and that its action amounted to Raja [{ amakshya
a fraud on the power. It can also be attacked on the Narain Singh
ground that the Court of Wards did not, in fact, Venkatarama
apply its mind to the question whether the act was
Ayyar J,
for the benefit of the property or the advantage of
the ward, and that though it purported to exercise the
power under section 18, it did not, iri fact, come to a
judgment as required by the section. But where it
bas applied its mind and given thought to the question whether the act is for the benefit of the property
or the advantage of the ward and comes to an honest
judgment in the matter, its decision is not liable to
be questioned on the ground that it was erroneous
on the merits, or that it was reached without considering some aspects which ought to have been considered, unless the failure to consider them is of such
a character as to amount to there being no exercise
of judgment at all.
The question as to the limits within which courts
could interfere with the exercise of a power of the
nature now in question was considered at some length
in Allcroft v. Lord Bishop of London: Lighton v. Lord
Bishop of London(1). There, the statute provided for
certain action being taken "unless the Bishop shall
be of opinion that proceedings shall not be taken".
Acting under this section the Bishop of London decided not to take proceedings, and the correctness of
this decision was challenged in an application for
mandamus. It was held by the House of Lords that
the Bishop having acted within his jurisdiction and
exercised his judgment honestly, his decision was
not liable to be questioned on the ground that it was
erroneous or that he had not considered all the aspects of the matter. The following observations of
Lord Bramwell may be quoted:
"Then it was said that there was something' he
(1) [1891] A.O. 666.
338
1956
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956)
had considered which he ought not to have considered,
and something he had not considered which
l<aranpura
to have, and so he had not considered the
he
ought,
Development Co.,
whole
circumstances
and them only. It seems to me
Ud.
v.
that this is equivalent to saying that his opinion can
Raja J{amakshya be reviewed. I am clearly of opinion it cannot be. If
Narain Singh
a man is to form an opinion, and his opinion is to
govern, he must form it himself on such reasons and
Venkatarama
grounds as seem good to him".
Ayyar J.
And Lord Herschell observed:
"It is impossible to read the bishop's statement
without seeing that he has honestly considered what
appeared to him to be all the circumstances bearing
on the question whether the proceedings should be
allowed to go on. That being so, it is not for your
Lordships, on this application for a mandamus; to
consider whether the bishop's reasons are good or bad;
whether they ought or ought not to have led him to
form the opinion he did".
Bearing these principles in mind, the question to
be considered is whether the Raja has, the burden
thereof being on him, established any grounds on
which the deeds entered into by the Court of Wards
on 26-3-1915 and 23-11-1917 could be held to be outside the power conferred on it under section 18. That
leads us to a consideration of the four contentions
on which Mr. Atul Chandra Gupta attacked the two
deeds aforesaid as not binding on the estate. The first
is directed against thedeeddated26-3-1915, the point
of the attack being that the clause relating to the
payment of cess in that deed is less advantageous to
the ward than the corresponding clause in tbe Bokaro
license dated 26-11-1907. To appreciate this contention, it must be stated that when Messrs Bird and
Co., applied to the Court of Wards for a prospecting
license, negotiations were carried on on the understanding that the Bokaro license granted by Raja
Ramnarain Singh was to be the basis for the contract,
subject to any variation on which the parties might
agree. Pursuant to this understanding, there wa.s a
discussion of the terms of the license between the
representatives of Messrs Bird and Co., and the
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
339
1956
officers of the Court of Wards on the 1st and 2nd
April 1914. Exhibit 130(i) is a record of those dis[{ ara1'pura
cussions in the handwriting of the Deputy Commis- Development Co.,
sioner, Mr. Lister. On 11-4-1914 Messrs Bird and Co.
Ltd.
v.
were informed that the Board had generally approved
of the proposal, and there was a further communica- Raja: J{amakshya
tion to them on the 17th ..April 1914 that "formal Narain Singh
sanction cannot be given until the terms are embodied Venkatara1na
in a formal document." On 12-5-1914 Messrs Bird
Ayyar J.
and Co. sent a draft agreement for the approval of
the Court of Wards, and on that, there was further
correspondence and personal discussion, and ultimately, the Board gave its final sanction on 29-7-1914,
and the deed which was executed by the manager on
26-3-1915 is in accordance with the draft as approved.
This deed, however, differs from the Bokaro license
in one respect. Schedule A to that license contains
a draft of the mining lease to be granted in pursuance
thereto, and one of the covenants contained therein
is that the lessee "will also pay all Government and
other cesses, taxes and other imposition which now
are or may at any time hereafter during the continuance of this lease be assessed or imposed on the
said lands." In the deed dated 26-3-1915 the corresponding clause runs as follows:
"The lessee covenants to bear, pay and discharge
all existing and future Government and other rates,
cesses, taxes, assessments, duties, impositions, outgoings and burdens whatsoever imposed or charged
upon the demised premises ........ which may be payable
by the occupier or lessees thereof."
Thus, while under the Bokaro license the lessee had
to pay all the cesses imposed on the land, under the
deed dated 26-3-1915 the lessees had to pay only the
cesses payable by the occupier or lessee of the property.
Now, the contention of the respondent is that as
it was the intention of both parties that Messrs Bird
and Co. should have a license on the same terms as
were contained in the Bokaro license unless otherwise
agreed, and as Exhibit 130(i) shows that there was
no special agreement with reference to this matter,
340
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1956]
the Court of Wards must be held not to have applied
its mind to the cess clause when itdagreed to its incluKaranJura
Developmrnt co., sion in its present form in the dee
of 1915, and that
u.i.
as it related to a matter of substance going to the
v.
root of the transaction, the deed was in its entirety
Raja Kamakshya void. The basic notion on which this contention rests
Narain Sing/I
is that the cess clause in the deed dated 26-3-1915 is
Vmkatarama
as compared with that in the Bokaro license, dis-'
Ayyar J.
tinctly disadvantageous to the ward. But this, however, is controverted by the appellant, which contends
that the difference between the two deeds with reference to the cess clause is one of form rather than of
substance.
To appreciate this contention, it is necessary to
refer to the provisions of the Bengal Cess Act IX of
1880. Under sections 80 and 81 of that Act, where
there is a lease of a mine, the cess payable thereon is
to be borne equally by the owner and the lessee. The
Government, however, is entitled to realise the whole
of it from either of them, in which case the person
who pays the cess has a right to recover from the
other his share of it. The cess clause of the 1915
license is in accordance with the rights of the parties
as declared in section 81 of the Act. The contention
of Mr. Gupta is that it was open to the parties to
contract themselves out of their rights under section
81, and he relied on the decisions in Ashutosh Dhar v.
Amir Mollah(1) and Mahanand Sahai v. Mussmat
Sayedunissa Bibi(") in support of this position. There,
the question related to section 41 of the Act; but it
is argued that the principle underlying those decisions is equally applicable to section 81 and that, in
our opinion, is correct. The next step in the argument
is that the cess clause in the Bokaro license embodies
a contract modifying the rights declared by section
81 of the Act by throwing the liability for the cess
wholly on the tenant; but that the clause in the 1915
deed restricts it to the obligation as declared in section 81 and has therein resulted in serious disadvantage to the proprietor. For the appellant, it is
contended that the clause in the Bokaro license could
1956
(1) (1900] 3 Cal. u J. 337.
(2) (1907] 12 C.W.N. lM.
'
i
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
341
1956
not be construed as modifying the rights declared
under section 81, because it merely provides for payKaranj>ura
ment by the lessee of the entire cess, which must Deve/oj>mcnt Co.,
mean that they had to pay it in the first instance and
Ltd.
v.
then reimburse themselves from the proprietor, and
that that was how the clause was understood by the Raja Kamakshya
Court of Wards when it was in management. If that Naraiu Si11gh
was the true scope of the cess clause in the Bokaro Venkatarama
license, it cannot be said that the cess clause in the
Ayyar J.
deed of 26-3-1915 differs in substance from it.
On the question as to the interpretation to be put
on the cess clause in the Bokaro license, the principle
applicable thereto was thus stated in Mahanand
Sakai v. Mussmat Sayedunissa Bibi(1):
"It is indisputable that when an exemption is
claimed from statutory liability, the contract under
which exemption is claimed, must be strictly construed
against the claimant and it must appear from its
terms, beyond the possibility of any dispute, that the
parties intended to vary the liability as imposed by
the statute. This rule is especially applicable where
exemption is claimed from taxation imposed by the
State".
It was accordingly held that no contract to the contrary could be spelt from the clause providing generally for payment of cess, and this view has been
adopted in Balwantrao Naik v. Biswanath Missir( 2 )
and Rarnkumari Devi v. Hari Das(3). The contention
of the appellant, therefore, that the cess clause in the
Bokaro license cannot be construed as a clear expression of an intention on the part of the parties to contract themselves out of the statute is not without
force. It is, however, unnecessary to decide this
question, as assuming that the cess clause in the deed
dated 26-3-1915 is less advantageous to the ward than
that in the Bokaro license, the respondent, has, before
he can succeed on this contention, still to establish
that the Court of Wards did not apply its mind to
this matter. And what is the evidence which he has
adduced to establish it? In the pleadings, he raised
(1) (1907] 12 C W.N. 154.
. (21 A.I.R. 1945 Patna 417.
t3) A.LR. 1952 Patna 239.
45
342
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1956]
no such question. At a late stage, however, he applied to ame.nd the plaint so as to raise the contentKaranj>ura
tion
that the deed dated 26-3-1915 was not in accordDevcloPtnent Co.,
ance
with the Bokaro license, but that application
Ud.
v.
was dismissed by the Subordinate Judge on
Raja Kantakshya 24-12-1942.
It was contended for the appellant that
Narain Singh
the question now sought to be argued should not be
allowed to be raised at this stage as it is purely one
Venkatarania
of
fact, especially in view of the order <lated
Ayyar J.
24-12-1942 refusing amendment of the plaint. But it
is unnecessary to say more on this objection, as we
are satisfied on the evidence on record that the Court
of Wards did apply its mind to the cess clause and
did adopt it after giving thought to it. The clause
in its present form appears in the draft prepared by
Messrs Bird and Co. and sent to the Court of Wards
for approval on 12-5-1914. Among the officers of the
Court of Wards who examined the draft was Mr.
Lister, the Deputy Commissioner, who took the leading part in settling the terms of this transaction, and
there is an alteration, though formal, in his hand in
this very clause. It is also in evidence that the draft
was sent for scrutiny to Sri Sarada Charan Mitra, a
retired Judge of the Calcutta High Court, who was
also the legal adviser of the Ramgarh Estate, and
there is an endorsement of approval in his hand. And
finally, the Board gave sanction on 27-7-1914 not
only to the agreement but to the very draft which
was sent by Messrs Bird and Co., with the cess clause,
as it appears in the deed of 1915. It is idle in the
face of all this to argue that the Court of Wards gave
no thought to it.
It should be observed that the stand which the
respondent took with reference to the cess clause in
the courts below was different from that taken in
this Court. There, his contention was that the Court
of Wards had acted with gross negligence in agreeing
to a term so manifestly disadvantageous to the estate.
In other words, the argument was not that the Court
o(Wards failed to apply its mind to the cess clause but
that it failed to realise the full implications thereof,
and that the minor had consequently suffered. That
1956
'
\
\\
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
343
1956
would have been a good ground of attack, if the
Court of 'Vards was in the position of a guardian of
/(ara11jm1'a
the properties of the minor, but, as already stated, Dct:etoj;111c11t Co.,
lid.
that is not its true character. It is a statutory body
v.
with powers granted to it by section 18, and its action
thereunder cannot be attacked on the ground that it Raja Ka1naJ;slI:;a
Na-rain Singh
had erred or was mistaken in its conclusion. As we
have held that the Court of Wards did apply its mind Ve11kata1·a1na
to the question and formed its own judgment on it,
Ayyar J.
its decision is not open to question, and the attack
on the deed dated 26-3-1915 must in consequence fail.
Coming next to the deed dated 23-11-1917, it was
attacked on three grounds. It was firstly contended
that it was, on the very face of it, beyond the competence of the Court of Wards, and was therefore
void.
In support of this contention, Mr. Gupta
argued that at the time of the transaction the ward
had only about a year and four months to become a
major, that by extending the period of the license
from 6 to 36 years the agreement in question operated to tie his hands and to prevent him from dealing
with his estate for a period of 32 years after he became a major, that the coal mines ofKaranpura were
known to be very valuable and the transaction had
the effect of binding the proprietor to grant leases
down to 1951..and on the rates of salami and royalty
fixed in 1907 in the Bokaro license and adopted in the
deed of 1915 and that such a transaction was not
within section 18. It was urged that that section
afforded protection to a transaction entered into by
the Court of Wards only if it was of such a character
that it was possible on the facts to take the view that
it was for the benefit of the property or the advantage of the ward, but where such a possibility is ruled
out as when the transaction was manifestly not for
the benefit of the estate, as for example, a gift of the
properties of the minor, then the section would have
no application. The agreement dated 23-11-1917 was,
it was contended, in substance a gift to Messrs Bird
and Co., of a license for a period of 30 years, and that
therefore section 18 could not be invoked in support
of it.
344
1956
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1956]
We are unable to agree that the transaction in question
was beyond the competence of the Court of
f{aranpura
Wards
for any of the above reasons. It has to be reDevelopment Co.,
membered
that the action now in question is that of
Ltd.
v.
a statutory body, and that its powers and limitations
Raja J{a1nakshya with reference thereto must be found within the four
Narain Singh
corners of the Act. Section 18 which confers authority on the Court of Wards to enter into the transVenkatara1na
action is general and unqualified in its terms. There
AyyarJ,
is no provision in the statute such as there is in section 29(b) of the Guardians and Wards Act (VIII of
1890) that a lease by the Court of Wards was to enure
for a period related to the minority of the ward.
Such a limitation cannot be read into section 18 for
the obvious reason that the wards whose estates are
to be administered under the Act, may, under section
6 of the Act, be females including majors declared incompetent to manage the properties or lunatics or
persons who themselves apply that their estates
might be taken over by the Court of Wards. Nor is
there any substance in the contention tlrat as the
ward would shortly be attaining majority, no transaction should be entered into so as to tie his hands or
prevent him from dealing with his estate after he
becomes sui jnris. The Court of Wards has not only
the power but is under a duty to manage the estate,
so long as it continues to be in its charge in the same
manner as a prudent owner will manage his own
estate, and the fact that the ward would be coming
of age cannot operate to divest it of its powers and
du.ties under the Act, though it might enter as an
element in judging under section 18 whether the
transaction should be entered into.
We are also
unable to see any force in the contention that the
transaction of 1917 was incompetent because it had
the effect of binding the ward to grant leases up to
1951 at the rates of salami and royalty fixed in the
deed dated 26-3-1915. It is not in dispute that mining leases have to be and usually are for Jong terms,
and the respondent concedes that the terms of the
1915 license providing for the grant of a lease for 999
years on the rates of salami and royalty fixed therein
S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
345.
1956
are not themselves open to attack. That being so, it
is difficult to see how it would make any substantial
K aranjmra
difference when the lease for 999 years runs from 1951 Development Co.,
and not from 1921 as provided in the deed of 1915.
Ud.
v.
It was argued for the respondent with reference to Raja Kamaksliya
certain sub-leases granted by the appellant in 1922 Narain Singh
and thereafter that the rates of salami and royalty
fixed therein were much higher than those settled Venkatarama
AyyarJ.
under the 1915 deed, and that the extension of the
license period under the 1915 deed must have consequently resulted in prejudice to the ward.
But
then, those leases were mostly of open mines, and
stand on a different footing from prospecting licenses,
and e\Ten where there was a prospecting license, there
was no payment of prospecting salami or advance of
a loan without interest as under the deed dated
26-3-1915, and it appears that there was some prospecting by the appellant itself with reference to the
areas covered by the license. There is accordingly
no evidence on which it could be held that the terms
settled in 1915 were disadvantageous to the estate.
It must be observed in this connection that no
contention was raised by the respondent in his pleadings that the transaction was bad for the reason
that the rates of salami and royalty fixed therein
were less than the current market rates.
No issue
was framed on that question, and no evidence was
directed towards it, and there is nothing about it in
the judgment of the trial court. The respondent did
not take this point even in his grounds of appeal in
the court below, and he raised it only in the course of
his argument there. The appellant objects to this
point being raised at this stage, as it is essentially
one of fact on which evidence would have to be
adduced and it had no opportunity to do so.
This
objection must, in our opinion, prevail. (Vide Connecticut Fire Insurance Co. v. Kavanagh(1) and M. E . .
Moolla Sons Ltd. v. Burjorjee( 2 )).
The contention that the extension of the period of
license was in the nature of a gift of a period of 30
(1) [1892] A.O. 473.
(2) (1932] L.R. 59 I.A. 161.
346
1956
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1956]
years, and was therefore outside the power of the
Court of Wards is clearly untenable. Under the deed
/{ aranp11ra
Develop1nent Co., dated 23-ll-1917, Messrs Bird and Co. were, in consideration of the extension of the period granted
Ud.
v.
under the deed dated 26-3-1915, laid under certain
Raja Ka11iakshya obligations.
They had to pay a minimum ground
Narain Singh
rent of Rs. 50,000 per annum from the seventh to the
twelfth year, and successive extensions of the period
Vc'nkataran1a
were made to depend on their having taken leases of
Ayyar J.
a minimum area of 10,000 bighas in each period,
which of course meant payment of royalties with a
minimum fixed. The deed dated 23-11-1917 created
mutual rights and obligations and cannot be regarded
as a deed of gift either in form or in substance. In
the result, the deed of 1917 cannot be held to be
incompetent on any of the grounds put forward by
the respondent.
It is next contended for the respondent that the
deed dated 23-II-1917 was bad, because in granting
an extension of the period fixed in the deed dated
26-3-1915 the Court of Wards considered only the
benefit of Messrs Bird and Co., and not that of the
ward, and that .therefore its act was not within the
protection of section 18. The facts on which this
contention is sought to be supported are these: When
Messrs Bird and Co. applied on 3-8-1915 to the Court
of Wards for extension of the period of the license,
they gave as a reason therefor that the conditions
created by war bad greatly upset their arrangements
and calculations, that in consequence they were unable to raise or transport capital to India, that they
had paid under the license salami of Rs. 1,00,000 and
advanced a loan of Rs. 9 lakhs without interest, and
that it was therefore just that the period of license
should be extended so as to enable them to carry out
their venture. In his note dated 13-8-1915 Mr. Lister,
the Deputy Commissioner, considered that this stand
was "justifiable", and on 21-6-1916 he forwarded the
proposal to the Commissioner observing that "extension. of the period could not equitably be refused".
In sending this application on to the Board of Revenue
on 26-6-1916, the Commissioner endorsed this opinion,
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
347
1956
and also added that the extension would be in the
interests of the public and of the State. On these
/( aranp,.ra
facts, it is argued that the Court of Wards had Development Co.,
throughout been considering the proposal from the
Ltd.
v.
point of view of Messrs Bird and Co., and also from
the point of view of the State, but that the interests Raja Kamakshya
of the minor ward did not as such figure directly and Narain Singh
prominently in judging of the propriety of the tran- Venkatarama
saction, and that however equitable it might be to
AyyarJ.
show concessions to Messrs Bird and Co. in view of
their previous services to the estate, that was not a
ground on which the Court of Wards standing in the
position of trustee to the ward could legally bind his
estate, as it did by the deed dated 23-11-1917.
There would have been considerable force in this
contention, if the facts had been as stated by the l'espondent; but they, however, were not so. The correspondence makes it abundantly clear that the Court of
Wards was considering at all stages and in all its
aspects the benefit of the estate as to _whether there
should be at all an extension, and if so, for what
period and on what terms. In their application dated
3-8-1915, Messrs Bird and Co., apart from recounting
their difficulties and the services they had done to the
estate by advancing the loan, also stated that as the
area covered by the license was very extensive consisting of about 415 sq. miles, it would require a much
larger period of time than that fixed in the 1915
document to survey the area and work the mines in
full, that if the license was to expire in 1921, they
would have to work the best and the most profitable
mines, leaving the other areas to be exploited under
fresh licenses, and the return to the estate from them
must be poor by reason of the unprofitable and uneconomic character of the mines which had been left
unopened, and that it was accordingly in the interests
of the estate to have long term licenses on the same
rates. Referring to this aspect, the Deputy Commissioner stated in his note dated 13-6-1916 that the
'experience gained in the Katras and Jharia coal
mines pointed to the wisdom of granting long term
license, so that the mines could be worked in the best
348
1956
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956)
interests of the proprietor and the Jessee. On
21-6-1916 when he forwarded the proposal to the
f{aranpura
DJveloP1nent Co., Commissioner, he stated:
"We are convinced that the interests of the estate
Ud.
v.
and of the public are equally involved in the exploitaRaja Ku1nakshya tion of this field on broad principles.
And we see no
Na rain Singh
prospect of this being done except by a firm prepared
to take long views and undertake the heavy prelimiVenkatarama
nary burdens".
Ayyar J.
The Commissioner stated in his memorandum dated
26-6-1916 that he agreed "with the Deputy Commissioner and the manager that this is essential not only
in the interests of the estate but also of the public''.
In view of this evidence, it is impossible to contend
that in entering into the transaction dated 23-11-1917,
the Court of Wards had failed to consider the interests
of the estate.
In their application dated 3-8-1915, Messrs Bird
and Co. also stated that if the period of the license
was not extended, it would be impossible for them or
for others, in view of the war conditions, to work the
mines and that the license would have to be abandoned by them. In dealing with this aspect, the
Commissioner observed in his note dated 26-6-1916 as
follows:
"If they were to give up the agreement, the estate
would not obtain such advantageous terms from
others, both on account of the present conditions
arising from the war and which will continue for some
time after the war, and also owing to the fact that
the Geological examination of the northern portion
of the Coalfied has proved disappointing and not up
to previous expectation".
This again shows that the Court of Wards did apply
its mind to the question whether the extension was
for the advantage of the estate. The value of a mine
to an owner lies not in his abstract ownership thereof
but in its being worked, so that coal and coke might
be sold or royalties obtained. The estate itself was
not in a position to work the mines, and it had to get
it done by others. If, therefore, there was a license
in force for the prospecting and leasing of the mines,
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
349
it would certainly be to the advantage of the estate
1956
to extend the life of that license on such terms as
might be for the benefit of the estate and the lessee, DeveKza,:anf>utrac
or111cn
o.J
and it was this aspect that was considered b y t h e
Ltd.
Commissioner in his note. It may be mentioned that
v.
there was some difference of opinion among the officers Raja I<amakshya
of the Court of Wards whether if the period of the Naraiu Singh
license was to be extended from 6 to 12 years, the Vmkatarama
minimum royalty from the 7th to the 12th year should
Ayyar J.
be fixed at Rs. 5 per bigha or Rs. 2-8-0 per bigha. In
that connection, Mr. MacGregor, the manager, wrote
a note in which he emphasised that they were dealing
with the estate of a minor, that their position was
that of trustees, that considerations based on equitable grounds or public interest and the like would be
out of place, and that the minimum royalty should
be fixed at Rs. 5 per bigha. Thus, the attention of
the Board was pointedly drawn to the very aspects
which the respondent contends ought to have been
considered by it, and it decided on a consideration of
all the materials to grant extension on the terms set
out in the deed dated 23-11-1917. We are unable to
see any ground on which its propriety could be
challenged.
It was also contended by Mr. Gupta that section 18
required that the act should be for the benefit of the
property and the advantage of the ward, that these
conditions were cumulative and should both of them
be satisfied and that even if the license dated
23-11-1917 was for the benefit of the property, it was
not for the advantage of the ward, and that therefore
it was not valid under section 18.
The fallacy in
this argument lies in thinking that the reference to
property in section 18 is by way of antithesis to the
ward. For this, however, there is no justification. If
a transaction is for the benefit of the property, the
person who would reap the advantages thereof must
be the owner of the property. It is difficult to conceive of a transaction which is for the benefit of the
property but not to the advantage of its owner. If
the deed dated 23-11-1917 is for the benefit of the property by reason of the fact that it yields revenue in
4G
350
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
the form of minimum ground rent, salami and royalty,
it must equally be to the advantage of the ward who
K aranpura
JJ be the person who will receive this revenue. AsDeoeloftment Co., wi
Ltd.
suming that both the parts of the clause in section 18
v.
have to be read cumulatively and not disjunctively,
Raja Kaniakshya even so the deed dated 23-11-1917 satisfies the reNarainSingh
quirem~nts of the section, and is consequently valid.
Venkatarama
In the result, we must hold that the deed is not open
Ayyar J.
to attack on the ground that in entering into the
transaction, the Court of Wards did not consider the
interests of the ward.
The last ground of attack on the deed of 1917 is
that it was not sanctioned by the Board as required
by section 18 of the Act, and was therefore void. It
will be remembered that the application of Messrs
Bird and Co. for extension dated 3-8-1915 was the
subject of considerable correspondence and discussions, and that on 26-6-1916 the Commissioner forwarded the proposal as finally settled for sanction to
the Board of Revenue. On this, an order was passed
by the Board on 3-7-1916 that it "accepts generally
the recommendations of the Deputy Commissioner"
and t.hat "the draft deeds embodying the proposed
terms should be submitted to it in order that they
may be scrutinised by the Legal Remembrancer". In
communicating this order to Messrs Bird and Co.,
the manager wrote to them on 12-7-1916 to send a
draft of the agreement, and stated the terms on which
it might be drafted. Messrs Bird and Co., then prepared a draft and sent it on for approval to the
manager. It was then examined by the officers of
the Court of Wards and by Sri Barada Charan Mitra,
and on 24-4-1917 the Commissioner sent it to the
Board for sanction. By his letter dated 13-7-1917
the Secretary to the Board wrote to the Commissioner that "the agreement however is one of such
importance that the Board agrees with the Additional
Legal Remembrancer that it should be referred to
the Solicitor to the Government of India before final
acceptance and before it can be so referred, it is
necessary to clear up the four points within the extract enclosed from a note recorded by the Additional
1956
S.C.R.
.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
351
1956
Legal Remembra.ncer", and the note with the four
points was enclosed.
Karanpura
Pausing here, the question is whether the letter De'fleloPment Co.,
dated 3-7-1916 constitutes sanction as contemplated
Ltd.
v.
by section 18 of the Act. It is recited in the deed
Raja
Kamakshya
dated 23-11-1917 that the agreement was sanctioned
by the letter dated 3-7-1916. Is that correct? It is Narain Singh
argued for the appellant that section 18 does not Venkatarama
prescribe any form in which sanction has to be given,
AyyarJ.
and that further, the sanction to be given is to the
transaction, not to the document embodying it and
that the letter dated 3-7-1916 sanctioning generally
the grant of extension is sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of section 18, even though there may be
details remaining to be worked out. The decision in
Gulabsingh v. Seth Gokuldas(1) was relied on in support
of this position. There, the Deputy Commissioner
had sent to the Commissioner a proposal to borrow
Rs. 1,00,000 from the plaintiff's firm, and on 28th
January 1891 the Commissioner was informed by the
secretariat that the Chief Commissioner had accepted
the proposals for the liquidation of the debt. On the
authority of this letter, the Court of Wards executed
a mortgage on the 10th December 1891. In rejecting
the contention that there was no proper sanction for
the mortgage as required by section 18 of Act XVII
of 1885, the Privy Council observed:
"It was not in their Lordships' opinion necessary
under section 18 of Act XVII of 1885 that the actual
mortgage to be made by the Court of Wards should
be submitted to the Chief Commissioner for his sanction, nor was it necessary that the Court of Wards
should have his sanction to the precise terms of the
mortgage. The sanction which is to be inferred from
the letter of January 28, 1891, empowered the Court
of Wards to mortgage the property under section 18
of Act XVII of 1885".
In Ramkanai Singh Deb Darpashaha v. Mathewson( 2),
the Commissioner had sanctioned a patni lease, but
the lease deed which was actually executed had
not been submitted to his approval. In holding
(1) [1913) L.R. 40 I.A. 117.
(2) [1915] L.R. 42 I.A. 97.
352
1956
Karanpura
Development Co.,
Ude
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
that the sanction was sufficient, the Privy Council
ob~erved:
" ........ their Lordships are of opinion that when
it is affirmatively established that a transaction itv.
self in all its essential particulars has obtained the
Raja Ka1nakshya sanction of the Commissioner, and when it is requisite
Narain Sing Ii
that the transaction be carried in to effect by the preparation
of the appropriate deeds, a challenge merely
Venkatarama
on
the
ground
that the document ultimately prepared
AyyarJ,
had not been submitted for sanction cannot be
sustained".
The position in Jaw, therefore, is that the requirements as to sanction must be held to be satisfied if
the transaction in all its essential particulars had
. been sanctioned, even though there are details to be
worked out in furtherance of the sanction and there
is no further sanction given to the deed as finally
settled. On these principles, there is much to be said
in favour of the view contended for by the appellant
that the communication dated 3-7-1916 is sufficient
sanction for purposes of section 18. But such a conclusion would be inconsistent with the letter of the
Secretary of the Board dated 13-7-1917 aforesaid. It
was certainly open to the authorities to indicate the
lillJls on which the document would have to be drafted
and reserve the grant of sanction until they shall
have had a full picture of the transaction, as might
appear on the document. The Board might have, if
that was their intention, sanctioned the transaction
unconditionally by its letter dated 3-7-1916, but it
chose to make it conditional on the document being
again approved by them. Under the circumstances,
the letter dated 3-7-1916 cannot be construed as a
final sanction of the transaction, notwithstanding
that it was so recited in the deed dated 23-11-1917.
·To continue the narration, in accordance with the
note of the Secretary dated 13-7-1917, the draft deed
was again taken up by Messrs Bird and Co., alterations were made therein, and the revised draft was
submitted to the authorities for examination. They
in their turn scrutinised the document, and sent it
for the opinion of the Legal Department, and obtained
'
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
353
1956
its suggestions. And on 9-10-1917 the revised draft
with the suggestions made in the Legal Department
K aranjmra
were returned by the Board to the authorities con- Dc.,elofment Co.,
cerned "for information and such action as may be
Ud.
v.
considered necessary". It should be noted that the
Raja
Kamakshya
Board did not again require the document to be sent
to them for scrutiny, as they did by their letter Narain Singh
dated 3-7-1916. In due course, the suggestions of Venkatarama
the Legal Department which were four in number,
AyyarJ.
were examined; three of them were formal in
character, and were carried out. As regards the
fourth, which related to the question of payment of
the minimum royalty of Rs. 8,000 during the first
year, it was found that under the agreement to which
the parties had come, it was not payable during the
first year. The deed having been amended suitably
to the suggestions made by the Law Department, it
was executed as amended on 23-11-1917.
The contention of the appellant is that the order
of the Board dated 9-10-1917 is a sanction to the proposal in all its essential particulars, and that this is
sufficient compliance with the requirements of section
18. The respondent contends that even on the letter
dated 9-10-1917 there were four matters reserved to
be considered before the deed could be engrossed,
that it was only after these matters were settled that
there would be a completed agreement, and that as
no sanction had been given to it after it had finally
shaped itself, the requirements of section 18 had not
been satisfied. We are unable to uphold this contention. It is not disputed that three of the four matters
were merely formal ones, and that with reference to
the fourth, the suggestion of the Legal Department
proceeded on a misapprehension of what had really
been agreed to by the parties. Thus, all the essential
terms of the agreement must be held to have been
sanctioned by the Board by its letter dated 9-10-1917,
and it is of no consequence, as laid down in Gulabsingh
v. Seth Gokuldas(1) and Ramkanai Singh Deb Darpashaka v. Matkewson(il) that the document as finally
drafted had not been submitted again .for its appro(1) (1913] L.R. 40 I.A. 117.
(2) [19111] L.R. 42 I.A. 97.
354
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1956)
1956
val. We should accordingly construe the letter dated
9-10-1917
as sufficient sanction under section 18.
J{af'anpura
The
learned
Judges of the High Court were of the
Deoeloj>tnent Co,
opinion that Rule 242 framed under section 70 of the
Ud.
v.
Act required that the sanction should be recited in
Raja Kamakshya the deed, and they referred to the deed dated 26-3-1915
Narain Singh
where that had been done. But Rule 242 applies only
to
leases, and is in terms inapplicable to the deed
Venkatarania
dated 23-11-1917 which is an agreement. And both
Ayyar J.
sides have argued the case on the footing that the
deed in question is governed by the last clause of
section 18. We have no hesitation in holding that
the Board directed by its letter dated 9-10-1917 the
execution of the agreement dated 23-11-1917, and
that it was validly executed under section 18. The
result, therefore, is that the deed dated 23-11-1917 is
not open to attack on any of the grounds urged by
the respondent, and must be upheld.
One other contention of the respondent remains to
be considered, and that arises on the statement of
the appellant that it does not contest the finding of
the High Court that the deed dated 1-6-1937 is void.
It will be recal1ed that under the deeds dated 26-3-1915
and 23-11-1917 the licensees would be entitled to an
extension of the period for 12 years from 26-3-1939
to 26-3-1951 provided that they had taken on lease a
minimum area of 20,000 bighas, and that the appellant had, in fact, taken on lease only a total extent
of 17,539 bigh"as under six leases during the years
1922 to 1933. It was also provided in those deeds
that for the areas taken in excess of 10,000 bighas,
the minimum royalty would become payable after
26-3-1939. The appellant applied to the Court of
Wards sometime in 1934 for amendment of the deeds
dated 26-3-1915 and 23-11-1917 so as to provide that
the payment of minimum royalty was to commence
from 26-3-1951, unless railway facilities were available earlier. This was sanctioned by the Board, and
the deed dated 1-6-1937 incorporates this amendment
in the deeds dated 26-3-1915 and 23-11-1917. As a
condition of the grant of this concession, the Board
required the appellant to take a lease of 2,461 bighas
1
}-
S.C.R.
355
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
'
1956
to make up the covenanted extent of 20,000 bighas.
The appellant accordingly applied for three leases of
Karanpura
the total extent of 2,461 bighas, and the Board gave Develoj>mmt Co.,
sanction to the same on 15-7-1937, and on 2-8-1937,
lid.
v.
the lease deeds were actually executed. One of them,
that relating to Mauza Saunda, contained, in accord- Raja Kamakshya
ance with the terms of the deed dated 1-6-1937, the Narain Singh
following covenant:
Venkata1·ama
"Provided always that no minimum royalty shall
AyyarJ.
be payable until the expiration of 36 years from the
said 26th day of March 1915 or until railway facilities
shall be available as aforesaid, whichever event shall
first happen".
There is some dispute as to whether the other two
leases contained similar covenants, but that is
immaterial for the present discussion, because if the
lease of Mauza Saunda is bad on account of the aforesaid clause as contended by the respondent, then the
total area taken on lease will be less than the minimum 20,000 bighas, and the appellant will have no
right to the benefit of the third extension, and the
suit for specific performance must fail.
Now, the contention of the respondent is that the
leases dated 2-8-1937 arc bad on two grounds. He
firstly argues that as the deed dated 1-6-1937 has
been held to be bad, the clause in the lease providing
for the postponement of payment of minimum royalty
based thereon must also be held to be bad-and
that is conceded by the appellant-a"nd that as a
deed cannot be held to be partly good and partly bad,
the whole of it must be held to be void. The fact that
a clause in a deed is not binding on the ground that
it is unauthorised cannot ipso facto render the whole
deed void, unless it forms such an integral part of
the transaction as to render it impossible to sever the
good from the bad. That is not the position here.
The effect of declaring the proviso void will leave the
rest of the deed whole and intact. The leases without
the proviso are perfectly valid, and indeed, they will
be more advantageous to the ward.
Secondly, it is contended that the sanction that
was accorded by the Board was to the lease with the
-'
356
1956
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956)
covenant which has been held to be void, and that
the
deed without that covenant has not been sanc. Karanpura
This contention again is clearly untenable.
tioned.
Development Co.,
Section 18 only requires that the transaction should
Ud.
v.
be entered into with the sanction of the Board. When
Raja Kamakshya that has been done, the force of the section is spent.
Narain Singh
Whether the transaction turns '!mt to be good or bad
on
the merits can have no effect ·On the sanction,
Venkata,·ama
which had been granted before it was entered into.
Ayyar J,
If the deed is bad on the merits, it will fail on that
ground and not on the ground that by reason thereof,
the sanction becomes ineffective. And the result is
the same whether the deed is bad in part or in toto.
The contention therefore that the lease deeds dated
2-8-1937 are inoperative must be rejected. The result
is that the deeds dated 26-3-1915 and 23-11-1917 are
valid but not the deed dated 1-6-1937, and that the
leases granted to the appellant are valid, but the
clause postponing the payment of minimum royalty
in the lea~e ·deed or deeds of 2-8-1937 is inoperative.
The appeals must accordingly be allowed, the
decrees of the court below set aside, and thc.se of the
trial court restored. In Civil Appeal No. 191 of 1953,
the appellant will have its costs both here and in the
courts below. In Civil Appeal No. 192 of 1953, the
parties will bear their own costs throughout.
It must be mentioned that during the pendency of
these appeals, by virtue of notifications issued under
sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Bihar Land Reforms
Act XXX of 1950, the Estate of Ramgarh became
vested in the State of Bihar, which thereafter intervened in these appeals.
At the hearing, the State
filed a memo in the following terms:
"State ofBihar recognises and accepts as valid the
leases granted to the appellant Company whether
granted by the Court of Wards or the Raja under the
license of 26th March 1915 (as extended by the supplementary documents of 1917 and 1937).
Nothing in this compromise shall preclude the
State of Bihar in future from modifying the terms·
and conditions of the leases in accordance with law
empowering the State Government to do so".
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
357
1956
The respondent raised the contention that the State
had no locus standi to intervene in these proceedings
Karanpura
and at the stage of appeal, but in the view which we Development Co ,
have taken of the rights of the parties, a discussion
Ltd.
of this point is purely of academic interest. It is
v.
sufficient to direct that the above memorandum be Raja Kamaksliya
N araill Singh
filed and included as part of the record.
Appeals allowed.
BANARSI DAS & OTHERS
v.
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & OTHERS.
[S. R. DAS, C.J., BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA AYYAR,
B. P. SINHA and JAFER IMAM JJ.]
Constitution of India, Arts. 14 and 16-Government's right to
lay down certain qualification /01· new recruits for any appointment
or employment 1mder the Governnz.ent-Candidates not possessing any
fundamental right for employment.
The petitioners-Ex-patwaris under the State of Uttar Pradesh
-brought the present petition under Article 32 of the Constit.ution
in the Supreme Court alleging that the ·Provisions of arts. 14 and
16 of the Constitution had been violated because they had been
denied equality before the law and equal opportunity for employment
under the State.
Patw:i.ris numbering about 28,000 in the whole State of Uttar
Pradesh had organized themselves into "The U.P. Patwaris Associa·
tions" with a view to improving their prospects and emoluments.
The association passed resolutions demanding increase in pay and
allowances etc. The Government was considering these matters
when a large number of pn.twaris went on a "pen-down strike" with
the result thl\t the Government withdrew the recognition of the
Association. The Government further published the new "Land
Records Manual" embodying new amended rules regarding recruit·
ment, conditions of service and duties of patwaris. The Associ11tion
protested against the revised Land Records Manual and passed 11
resolution that all patwaris should submit their resignations on the
2nd February, 1953 requesting that they should be relieved of their
duties by the 4th Much, 1953 after which date they will consi<ler
themselves as free from all obligations to work under the Govern·
ment. About 26,000 patwaris actually resigned with a view to pa.·
ralyse the whole revenue administration in the State and to coerce
i7
Venkatarama
AyyarJ.
1956
APril 16
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