AHER RAJA K.HIMA versus THE STATE OF SAURASHTRA
Supreme Court of India | Decided 22 December 1955 | [1955] 2 S.C.R. 1285 | 1955 INSC 81
Key facts
- Decided
- 22 December 1955
- Bench
- N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR*, VIVIAN BOSE, T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 64/1955
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1955] 2 S.C.R. 1285
- Neutral citation
- 1955 INSC 81
Text of the judgment
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPO~TS
1285
report of the Income-tax Investigation Commission
dated the 26th August 1952 and the assessment orders
of the Income-Tax Officer for the y.ears . 1940-41,
1941"42 and 1943-44 to 1948-49, and that a writ of
prohibition do i$sue against the resP,ondents restraining them from implementing the findings. of the Investigation Commission with r~g;µ-~ to the year
1942-43. The respondents do pay the peritioners'
costs of their petition.
AHER RAJA K.HIMA
v.
THE STATE OF SAURASHTRA[VIVIAN BosE, VENKATARAMA AYYAR and
CHA:NDRASEKHARA ArrAR
JJ l
Appeal against Acqu#tal....-Scqpe of-PoU}ers of Court-Guiding
principles-Code .of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), s. 417
Pel"' BosE and OitANDRAsEKHARA A1YAll JJ, (VENKATARAMA
AYYAR J. dissenting). It is well settled that the High' Court should not
set aside an order of acquittal under s, 417 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure simply because it differs from the trial Court as to the
appreciation of the evidence ; there must be substantial and compelling reasons for doing so. · Whete the trial Court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case, interference is not justifiable unless there are really· strong reasons for holding otherwise.
Amar Singh v; State of Punjab ([1953] S.C.R. 418) and Surajpal
Singh v. State ( f19521 S.C.R. 193), referred t,o.
The accused in a criminal case must be given the benefit of every
reasonable doubt and, therefore when he offers a reasonable explanation of his conduct, althougl;i he cannot prove it, that explanation
should ordinarily be accepted unless the circumstances indicate that
it is false.
Conseq11ently,. in a case where an accused person, charged under
ss. 302 and 447 of the lndian Penal Code, repudiated his confession
at the earliest opportunity as having been made under Police threats
administered to l>im at night while in, jail custody and there was
evidence to show that the Police had access to hiru there, and there
was nothing to displace his statement that he was threatened by
them, the finding of the Sessions Judge that the t:onfession was not
voluntary in character was fair and reasonaok and in the absence
of auy compellihg reason the High Court shotild not have set aside
the order of acquittal.
1955
M- Ct. Mulhiah
and 2 others
·v.
The' Commission.,
of ltu:of/14-tax,
Madras and
another
Jaganlladhadas J.
1955
Decmiher 22.
1286
1955
Ahtr Raja Khima
v.
The State of
Saurashlra
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
As the evidence otherwise was insufficient to warrant a conviction the accused was acquitted.
Per VENKATARAMA AYYAR J. This is not a case in which the
Supreme Court should interfere under Art. 136 of the Constitution.
The Consti.tution by specifically providing for an appeal on facts
under Art. 134( 1) intended to exclude it under Art, 136 and like the
Privy Council this Court will not function as a further Court of appeal on facts in criminal Cases.
The fact that the appeal in the High Court was one against an
order of acquittal makes no difference as the powers of an appellate
Court are the same in all appeals, whether -against acquittal or
against conviction.
Pritam Singh v. The State ([1950] S.C.R. 453), Shea Swarup v.
King-Emperor ([19341 L.R. 61 I.A. 398) and Nur Mohammad v.
Emperor (A.LR. 1945 P.C. 151), relied on.
The expression "compelling reasons"
used in Surajpal Singh's
case should be read only in the context of that case and should not
be treated as a rigid formula so as to restrict the powers of the
Court, or the right of appeal conferred on the State by s. 417 of the
Code or to place a judgment of acquittal in a l'osition of vantage and
give the accused a protection which the law does not afford to them.
Such a formula can be of use only as guiding principle for the appellate Courts in determining questions of fact.
Surajpal Singh v. The State ([1952] S.C.R. 193), considered.
Consequently, the findings arrived at by the High Court were
not open to review by this Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution
and as there was evidence apart from the retracted confession to
support the view it had taken on merits, the appeal must be diSmissed.
Criminal
CRIMINAL
.APPELLATE
JURISDICTION :
Appeal No. 64 of 1955.
On appeal by special leave from the judgment
and order dated the 27th February 1954 of the
Saurashtra High Court at Rajkot in Criminal Appeal
No. 108 of 1953 arising out of the judgment and order
dated the 5th March 1953 of the Court of Sessions
Judge, Halar Division in Sessions Case No. 26 of 1952.
V. N. Sethi, for the appellant.
R. Ganapathy Iyer and R. H. Dhebar, for the
respondent.
1955. December 22.
BoSE J.-The only question in this appeal is
whether the High Court had in mind the principles
•
2S.C.R.
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1287
we have enunciated about interference under section
417 of the Criminal Procedure Code when it allowed
the appeal field by the State against the acquittal of
the appellant. It is, in our opinion, well settled that
it is not enough for the High Court to take a different
view of the evidence; there must also be substantial
and compelling reasons for holding that the trial
Court was wrong: Amar Singh v. State of Punjab( 1 ) ;
and if the trial Court takes a reasonable view of the
facts of the case, interference under section 417 is not
justifiable unless there are really strong reasons for
reversing that view: Surajpal Singh v. State( 2 ).
The appellant was prosecuted under sections 302
and 447 of the Indian Penal Code for the murder of
Aher Jetha Sida. It is not necessary at the moment
to set out the facts. It is enough to say that the
High Court based its conviction on a retracted confession plus certain circumstances which the learned
Judges regarded as corroborative.
,
The learned Sessions Judge excluded the confession
on the ground that it was neither voluntary nor true.
The learned Judge's reasoning about its falsity is
weak. We do not think there is material on which a
positive finding about its falsity can be reached but
when he savs that he is not satisfied that it was made
voluntarily .we find it impossible to hold that that is
a view which a judicial mind acting fairly could not
reasonably rea~h.
Th·e facts about that are as follows. The offence
was committed during the night of the 18th/19th
May 1952. The police were informed on the 19th
morning at 9-30. The police station was only 4 miles
distant and they started investigation immediately.
The appellant was arrested on the 20th. He says in
his examination under section 342, Criminal Procedure
Code, that three other persons were also arrested but
were later released. They are Bhura, Dewayat and
Kana. The investigating officer was not examined,
so he could not be asked .about this and the point
could not be developed further. But the appellant
did cross-examine some of the prosecution witnesses
(I) [1953] S. C.R. 4-18, 4-23.
(2) [1952] S. C.R. 193, 201.
1955
Aker Raja Khimo.
v.
The State of
Saurashtra
Bose].
1288
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
\
1955
Aher Raja Khima
v.
The State of
i.Saurashtra
Bose].
about this and elicited contradictory replies. Kana,
P. W. 4, said"! was not arrested. Dewayat, Barat Lakhmansingh was arrested first ...... All the three of us were
released the same evening. We were not put under
arrest at all".
Dewayat, P. W. 5, denied that either he or any of
the others were arrested and Maya, P. W. 15, said the
same thing but Meraman, P.W. 11, insisted that
Dewayat was arrested. In the absence of the SubInspector it is difficult to say definitely that the
appellant is wrong. It is evident that the others were
at least suspected, especially as one of the points made
against the appellant is that he was seen sharpening
an axe on the evening of the murder and Meraman,
P.W. 11, says that not only was the appellant sharpening an axe but so was Dewayat. If this was a
matter of suspicion against the appellant it must
equally have been so against Dewayat and accord'ingly there is nothing improbable in the appellant's
statement about these other arrests; and as the SubInspector was not there to clear up the matter it is
only fair to accept what the appellant says.
The appellant was sent to a Magistrate at 8 p.m.
on the 21st for the recording of a confession but the
Magistrate did not record it till the 3rd of June. He
was examined as P.W. 21 and explained that he gave
the appellant ten days for reflection. The length of
time is unusual but no objection about· its fairness to
the accused could reasonably have been raised had it
not been for the fact that the
judicial lock-up is in
charge of a police guard which is under the direct
control, orders and supervision of the very SubInspector who had conducted the investigation and
had earlier suspected and, according to the accused,
actually arrested three other persons; and two of them
are now called as prosecution witnesses to depose
against the appellant about a matter on which the
prosecution lay great importance, namely the sharpening of an exe.
The danger that they might exaggerate their stories or give false evidence in their
anxiety to avert further suspicion from themselves is
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1289
one that cannot be overlooked.
But apart from that.
This is the description of
the judicial lock-up which the Magistrate who recorded the confession (P. W. 21) gives us:
"A police guard is on 24 hours duty at the Bhanwad Judicial lock-up. The prisoner is so placed
within the compound wall that he can see the police
all the 24 hours through the bars and can talk. These
police officers are under the police Sub-Inspector. A
peon is working as warder. He stays there on duty
by day. At night he is not there.
Clerk Jailor
does. not remain present there. The
police lock-up is within· the jail itself. Inside the jail
gate is the police lock-up. The police can go into the
police lock-up when they choose".
Now the appellant repudiated his confession at the
earliest opportunity. He told the Committing Court
on 12-12-1952 in a written statement that"After my arrest by the police I was sent to
jail. At night time the police, having arrived at the
jail, threatened me to make confession before Court
as they
directed. The police frightened me with
beating if I did not confess. As a result of which
through fright, I have made a false confession as
directed by the police and which I now deny".
And in his examination under section 342, Criminal
Procedure Cod.e, he said"I have made the confession because the police
were threatening to beat me in the jail.
He repeated these statements in the Sessions Court.
He said he was beaten at the time of his arrest and
then after he had been sent to the jail he said"I was daily threatened. They said 'confess the
offiehce of murder. We shall get you on remand. You
will live as an importent man'. On the morning of
the 3rd date, they took me to a big police officer after
Only
now I
administering extraordinary threats.
come to know that he is the Magistrate".
Now it may be possible to take two views of this
statement but
there are two important factnrs in
every criminal trial that weigh heavily in favour of
an accused person: one is that the accused is entitled
1955
Aher Raja Khima
v.
Tm State of
Saurashtra
Bose.].
1290
1955
Aker Raja Khima
v,
The State of
Saurashtra
BOse J.
·sUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
to the benefit of every reasonable doubt and the
other, an off-shoot of the same principle, that when
an accused person offers a reasonable explanation of
his conduct, then, even though he cannot prove his
assertions, they should ordinarily be accepted unless
the circumstances indicate that they are false. What
the appellant said in this case is not impossible ; such
things do happen and it is understandable that the
police, frustrated in their endeavour to find the culprit among three other persons, should make an all
out endeavour to make sure of the fourth.
We do
not say that that happened here. But that it might
have happened is obvious, and when the police absent
themselves from the witness box and forestall
attempts at cross-examination, we find it impossible
to hold that a judge acting judicially, and bearing in
mind the important principles that we have outlined
above, can be said to have reached an unreasonable
or an unfair conclusion when he deduces from these
circumstances that there is a reasonable probability
that the appellant's story is true and that therefore
the confession was not voluntary.
The only reason that the learn<:d High Court Judges
give for displacing this conclusion is that
"in Saurashtra .... though
judicial and police
lock-ups are placed under a common guard the judicial lock-ups are in charge of Magistrates and are
looked after by their clerks and peons, who are assigned the duties of jailors and warders respectively"
and they conclude"It is therfore difficult to say that the police
could have effectively threatened him".
But what the learned Judges overlook is the fact that
this control is only effective during the day and that
at night neither the peon nor the clerk is there; and
even during the day the "clerk-cum-jailor does not
remain present there". The appellant said in his
written statement that "at night time the police, having arrived at the jail, threatened me, etc". There is
nothing on th_e record to displace this statement.
Had the Sub-Inspector or some policeman been examined as a witness and had the appellant omitted to
f
.
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1291
cross-examme him about this, that might have raised
an inference that what the accused said was only
an afterthought. But here we find that this defence
about the involuntary nature of the confession due to
threats by t:1e police was; raised at the outset, even
in the Committing Magistrate's Court, and was
persisted in throughout and the appellant did what
he could to build up this part of his case by cross
examining the only official witness who did appear,
namely the Magistrate who recorded the confession;
and he succeeded in establishing that there was ample
opportunity for coercion and threat. The fact that
this defence was raised in the Committal Court should
have put the prosecution on its guard and the absence of refutation in the Sessions Court is a matter
that can legitimately be used in the appellant's
favour. In the circumstances, we do not think the
High Court has squarely met the learned Sessions
Judge's reasoning and shown that there are compelling reasons for holding that he was wrong; on the
contrary, the learned Sessions Judge's hesitation is
grounded on well established judicial principles.
Now the law is clear that a confession cannot be
used against an accused person unless the Court is
satisfied that it was voluntary and at that stage the
question whether it is true or false does not arise. It
is abhorrent to our notions of justice and fair play,
and is also dangerous, to allow a man to be convicted
on the strength of a confession unless it is made
voluntarily and unless he realises that anything he
says may be used against him; and any attempt by a
person in authority to bully a person into making a
conf~ssion or any threat or coercion would at once
invalidate it if the fear was still operating on his mind
at the time he makes the confession and if it "would
appear to him reasonable for supposing that by
making it he would gain any advantage or avoid any
evil of a temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against him": section 24 of the Indian Evidence
Act. That is why the recording of a confession is
hedged around with so many safeguards and is the
27-85 S. C. India/59
1955
Aher Raja Khims
v.
The Staie of
Saurashtra
1292
1955
Ahtr Raja Khima
v.
Th~ State of
Saurashtra
Rose
J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
reason why magistrates ordinarily allow a period for
reflection and why an accused person is remanded to
jail custody and is put of the reach of the investigating police before he is asked to make his confession. But the force of these precautions is destroyed
when, instead of isolating the accused from the investigating police, he is for all practical purposes sent
back to them for a period of ten days. It can be
accepted that this was done in good faith and we also
think that the police acted properly in sending the
appellant up for the recording of his confession on
the 21st; they could not have anticipated this long
remand to so-called "jail custody". But that is
hardly the point. The fact remains that the remand
was made and that that opened up the very kind of
opportunities
which the
rules and prudence say
should be guarded against; and, as the police are as
human as others, a reasonable apprehension can be
entertained that they would be less than human if
they did not avail themselves of such a chance.
If the confession is excluded, then there is not, in
our opinion, sufficient evidence against the appellant
on which a conviction can be based.
It will now be necessary to set out the facts.
The murdered man is one Jetha. He married
Sunder, P.W. 3, about three years before he was
killed, but we gather that she had not gone to live
with her husband; any way, she was living in the appellant's village Shiva with her people at the time of
the occurrence and this afforded the pair opportunities for a long continued course of illicit amours,
chances which it seems they were not slow to seize.
The husband lived in a village Kalawad which is three
miles distant. At the time of the murder arrangements
were being made for Sunder to go to her husband and
preparations for the ceremonial appropriate to such
occasions were in the course of progress. The prosecution case is that this was resented by the appellant
who wanted the girl for himself; so he went to the
husband's village Kalawa<l on the night of the 18th/
19th and murdered. him with an axe which the prose-
.
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1293
cution say belongs to him and which they say he later
produced.
Both Courts hold that the motive is proved; and
that can be accepted.
Next comes the evidence about the sharpening of
the axe on the evening of the 18th at Kana's house
in the village Shiva. The axe was produced in Court
and DewiJ.yat (P.W. 5) tells us that it was blunt.
Now there is nothing suspicious or unusual in a
villager sharpening a blunt axe and, as we have pointed cmt, Meraman (P. W. 11) says that Dewayat was
also sharpening an axe at the same time and place ;
and Dewayat is one of the other three against whom
suspicion was directed; also, the fact that the axe was
sharpened in this open way in the presence of a number of persons, including two strangers to the village,
(the two Satwara witnesses, P.Ws. 9 and 10), points
to innocence rather than guilt.
But the prosecution do not rely on this alone. Their
witnesses say that when the appellant was asked why
he was sharpening his axe (Dewayat does not seem to
have been put a similar question though he was doing
the same thing) he replied that he wanted to offer a
green cqconut to Lord Shanker. All the witnesses
are agreed that this has no special significance and
that they attributed no sinister meaning to it at the
time. It has acquired significance only in the light
of after events.
Even here, there seems to us to be some danger
that what the appellant really said has got mixed up
with what these witnesses say and, no doubt, honestly believe he said. We say this because Sunder, P~W.
3, and her mother Vali, P.W. 2, tell us that the appellant came to the mother that evening and offered her
eight annas in lieu of a coconut. It seems that this
is a customary offering given by relatives when a
daughter leaves her parents' home for her father-inlaw's place. The appellant is distantly related to
Sunder and s6 such an offering would be normal, and
as it was made the same evening, apparently shortly
after the other incident, we think there is a strong
probability that his remark about the offering of a
'_,
1955
Alier Rqja Khima
v.
Thi State of
Saurashlra
. Bose].
1294
1955
,jhn Raja Khima
v.
The State of
Saurashtra
Bose].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
coconut had reference to this and was later thought to
have reference to a vow: the sort of mistake that
persons reconstructing a crime might easily make and
then honestly believe; and we are the more prone to
think that this was what probably happened because
the conduct attributed to the appellant is so unlike
that of a murderer deliberately planning a cold blooded crime while, on the·other hand, it is wholly consistent with innocence. A reasonable doubt arises
and the appellant is entitled to its benefit.
Next comes the evidence of Samant, P.W. 16, who
says that he saw ·the appellant that night on the outskirts of Kalawad where the murder was committed.
He was wearing a false beard and a mask. That of
course is an important piece of evidence but the
danger of mistaking the identity of a man so disguised
at night cannot be disregarded, especially as this
witness qualified his statement at the end of his crossexamination by saying: "The person was just like
him". It is evident to us that his statement about
identity is not based on his recognition of the appellant but on the fact that he saw a man who looked
like the appellant and so, when he found that tbc
appellant was under suspicion, he inferred that the
man must have been the appellant. But that is -the
very question that the Court has to decide. The only
fact that this witness can be said to prove is that he
saw a man that night wearing a false beard and mask
who looked like the appellant.
Then we come to the recoveries. The false beard
and mask were found buried in the grounds of
Dewayat's house and the appellant is said to have recovered them in the presence of panchas. But those
discoveries are inadmissible in evidence because the
police already knew where they were hidden. Their information was not derived from the appellant but from
Dewayat (one of the other suspects). The way the
police came to find this out was this. Dewayat says
that the appellant confessed the murder to him and
told him that he had gone there wearing a false beard
and a mask and that he had buried th ~se articles
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1295
under the Shami tree in the grounds of Dewayat's
bada. Dewayat says"Next the police called me to go to Kalawad. At
that time Raja had been arrested ........ I was interrogated. I spoke about the beard at that time. Then
the police came to my field with Raja".
If Meraman (P. W. 11), read with the confused statement of Kana (P. W. 4), is to be believed, Dewayat
was also under arrest either at the time or on the day
before. As the Sub-Inspector was not examined, we
are unable to clear this up and so are bound to give
weight to the criticism of the Sessions Judge where
he says"However, Dewayat confesses that his statement was not recorded on the 19th of May 1952 but
was recorded on 20-5-1952 only after he was questioned by the police".
In our opinion, not only is this evidence about recovery not admissible but the danger that Samant
(F'. W. 16) mistook Dewayat, who was also under
strong suspicion or someone else who looked like the
appellant, for the appellant, has not been excluded.
Lastly, there is the recovery of the axe. But this
was not hidden. It was kept behind an earthen jar
in the appellant's house just, as an axe might be normally kept in any average household. The only
point of suspicion is that the axe had stains of
human blood on it. But the difficulty we are faced
with there is that the extent of the stains and their
position is
not disclosed. We have had occasion to
comment before on the very slovenly and ineffective
way in which some Chemical Analysers do their dury.
This is another case in which what might otherWise
have been a valuable piece of evidence has to be disregarded. The axe was not recovered till the 21st
and was standing where it could have been handled
by other members of the household. In any case,
villagers frequently have slight cuts or scratches or
a prick from a thorn on their persons and a few drops
of blood could easily be transferred to an article like
an axe without anybody noticing or knowing. The
important thing in a case like this, where everything
1955
Ahtr Raja Khima
.v.
TheStauof
SaUTashlra
Bose].
1296 1955
Aluir Raja Khima
v.
Th•Slaltof
Saurashtra
Bose].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
is now seen to hang on this one fact, would be the
extent of the blood and its position. The post-mortem
reveals that the injuries were incised and that the
bleeding . was profuse. If therefore there was blood
all along the cutting edge and around it, that would
have been a strong circumstance; but if there was
only a small smear of blood, say, on the back of the
axe and none on or near the edge, then that would
have been a circumstance for complete exoneration.
When everything hangs on this one point, we cannot
assume without proof that stains which might be
compatible with either guilt or innocence must have
been of what we might term the guilty kind.
On a careful examination of the evidence in this
case, we are not satisfied that the circumstances disclose "strong and compelling reasons" to set aside
the acquittal.
·
The appeal is allowed. The conviction and sentence
are set aside and the appellant is acquitted.
VENKATARAMA AYYAR J.-I regret I am unable to
agree with the judgment just delivered.
The appellant belonged to the village of Katkora,
and developed intimacy with an unmarried woman
called Sunder in the neighbouring village of Shiva.
Subsequently, Sunder was married to one Jetha of
Kalawad, a village about 3 miles distant from Shiva.
It had been arranged to take Sunder to her husband's
house on the 19th May 1952, and for that purpose,
Sida, the father of Jetha, had come to Shiva on the
18th. The case of the prosecution was that the appellant was determined to prevent Sunder from joining
her husband, and with that object he went to Kalawad
on the night of the 18th, and killed Jetha with his
axe, when he was asleep. The murder came to light
next morning, and the matter was reported to the
police.
The appellant was arrested on
20-5-1952.
On his information the police recovered from his
house at Katkora an axe, and the panchnama discloses that it then had stains of blood which was
subsequently found by the Chemical Analyst to be
human. The appellant next showed to the police
•
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1297
a false beard, which was buried under a tree in the
village of Shiva. It is alleged that this was worn by
the appellant at the time of the murder.
On 21-5-1952 the police sent the appellant to the
First-Class Magistrate (P.W. 21), with a letter stating
that he wanted to make a confession. The Magistrate,
however, decided to give him time "to cool down'',
and put him in judicial lock-up. He then went on
duty to another place, and on his return, recorded
the confession of the appellant, which is as follows :
"I, having gone to his Wadi, have killed him.
I have killed him with axe. I have killed him for the
sake of Sunderbai. Sunderbai is the wife of Jetha.
I had illicit connection with her. I have murdered
Jetha Sida with the idea of marrying Sunderbai. I
gave him an axe-blow on the neck. At that time I had
put on a tunic and a ·pair of trousers. I had a turban
on my head. I had worn artificial beard. After the
murder, the artificial beard buried in the field of
Dewanand Mope. I took the axe to my house".
The appellant retracted this confession before the
Committing Magistrate, as made under police beatings and threats. He was then sent up to the Sessions
Court, Halar, to take his trial, which took place with
the aid of four assessors.
There was no direct evidence that the appellant
had committed the murder. The circumstantial
evidence on which the prosecution sought to establish his guilt consisted of a confession made by him
to the Magistrate, the recovery of the axe and the
false beard, and the existence of strong motive. There
was, besides, a considerable body of evidence that on
the 18th May the appellant was haunting the village
of Shiva where Sunder was residing, with an axe in
his hand and threats in his tongue. The assessors
were unanimously of the opinion that the appellant
was guilty, but the Sessions Judge disagreed with
them, and held that the confession was neither true
nor voluntary, and that though there were strong
grounds for suspecting him, the evidence was not
sufficient to convict him, and so acquitted him.
There was an appeal against this judgment by the
1955
Aher Raja Khima
v.
TheStateef
Saura•hlra
Venkalarama
A•yar J.
1298
1955
Aher Raja Khima
v.
Th1Stakof
Saurashtra
Venkatarama
AyyarJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
State to the High Court of Saurashtra. The learned
Judges, differing from the Sessions Judge, held that
the confession was true and voluntary, that there
was ample
corroboration thereof in the evidence,
and that even apart from it, the other facts proved
by the prosecution were sufficient to establish
the guilt of the appellant. They accordingly set
aside the order of acquittal passed by the Sessions
Judge, convicted the appellant under section 302 and
sentenced him to transportation for life. It is against
this judgment that the present apptal by special leave
has been brought.
The question is whethet having regard to the
principles on which this Court exercises its jurisdiction under article 136, there are grounds for interference in this appeal. Those principles are well-settled
and may briefly be recapitulated. Prior to the abolition of the jurisdiction of the Privy Council, the law
in general provide for
of · this country did not
appeals against judgments of the High Courts in criminal matters. Indeed, the policy of the legislature
as expressed in sections 404 and 430 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure and departing in this respect from
that adopted in the Civil Procedure Code, has been
that decisions of courts passed in criminal appeals
should be final and subject to specified exceptions, not
open to 11 further appeal on facts. So far as judgments of the High Courts are concerned, the limitation on further appeal imposed by the Indian statures
could not affect the jurisdiction of the Privy Council
to entertain appeals against them in the exercise of
the prerogative of the Crown. That was a power
which the Privy Council possessed in respect of orders
passed by the courts all over the Dominions. and th~
limits within which the Judicial Committee exercised
that power were thus stated by Lord Watson in In re
Abraham Mallory Dillett( 1 ):
"The rule has been repeatedly laid down, and has
been invariably followed, that Her Majesty will not
review or interfere with the course of criminal proceedings, unless it is shown that, by a disregard of
(1) [1887] 12 A.C. 459, 467.
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1299
the forms of legal process, or by some violation of the
principles of natural justice, or otherwise, substantial
and grave injustice has been done".
These principles were followed in quite a number of
appeals against judgments of Indian courts in criminal matters. In Dal Singh v. King-Emperor(1), the
Privy Council, stating the practice of the Judicial
Committee in dealing with an appeal in a criminal
case, observed:
"The general principle is established that the
Sovereign in Council does not act, in the exercise of
the prerogative right to review the course of justice
in criminal cases, in the free fashion of a fully constituted Court of criminal appeal. The exercise of the
prerogative takes place only where it is shown that
injustice of a serious and substantial character has
occurred. A mere mistake on the part of the Court
below, as for example, in the admission of improper
evidence, will not suffice if it has not led to injustice
of a grave character. Nor do the Judicial Committee
advise
interference merely because they themselves
would have taken a different view of evidence admitted. Such questions are, as a general rule, treated
as being for the final decision of the Courts below".
In Taba Singh v. Emperor(2), Lord Buckmaster observed that the responsibility for the administration
of criminal Justice rested with the courts in India,
and that the Board would not interfere "unless there
has been some violation of the principles of justice or
some disregard of legal principles". In George Gfeller
v. The King(3), which was an appeal from the Supreme
Court of Nigeria, Sir George Rankin observed :
"Their Lordships have repeated ad .nauseam the
statement that they do not sit as a Court of Criminal
Appeal.
For them to interfere with a criminal
sentence there· must be something so irregular or so
outrageous as to shock the very basis of justice: per
Lord Dunedin in Mohindar Singh v. Emperor('). Cf.
Muhammad Nawaz v. Emperor(")".
(I) [1917] L.R. 44 I.A. 137, 140.
(2) [1924] I.LR. 48 Born. 515.
(3) A.I.R. 1943 P.C. 2' l.
(4) [1932] L.R. 59 I.A. 233, 235.
(5) [1941] L.R. 68 I.A. 126, 129.
1955
Aher Raja Khima
v.
The State of
Saurashtra
V enkataramo,
Ayyar].
1300
1955
Aher Raja Khima
v.
The State of
Saurashtra
Venkatarama
;lyyar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
On these principles, the Privy Council refused m
M acrea, Ex parte( 1 ) leave to appeal on the ground of
misdirection to the jury and in Mohindar Singh v.
Emperor( 2) on the ground that a wrong yiew had been
taken of the law.
Thus, the law was well-settled that the Privy
Council would not entertain appeals against iudgments in criminal cases, unless there was an error of
procedure or disregard of legal principles amounting
to a denial of fair trial and resulting in grave mjustice. Under the Constitution, the position of the
Supreme Court which has taken the place of the
Privy Council is this. Its jurisdiction as that of the
Privy Council in respect of criminal appeals may be
classed under two categories, cases where a right of
appeal is expressly granted by the Constitution or by
the statutes, as for example, articles 132( 1) and 134
(1) of the Constitution or section 411-A(4) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, in which the scope of
the appeal would depend upon the terms of the en-·
actments which confer the right; and cases where it
is called upon to exercise its powers under article B6,
which corresponds substantially to the prerogative
jurisdiction exercised by the Privy Council with reference to which the practice of the Judicial Committee
might usefully be referred to for indicating the ~rea
of interfereni:e.
The question was considered by this Court in Pritam Singh v. The State('), where the law was thus
laid down:
"On a careful examination of article 136 along
with the preceding article, it seems clear that the
wide discretionary power with which this Court is
invested under it is to be exercised sparingly and in
exceptional
cases only .... The Privy Council have
tried to lay down from time to time certain principles for granting special leave in criminal cases, which
were rev;ewed by the Federal Court In Kapildeo v.
The King('). It is sufficient for our purpose to say
that though we are not bound to follow them too
(1) [1893] L.R. 20 I.A. 90.
(3) [1950] s.c.R. 453, 458.
(2) [1932] L.R. 59 I.A. 233, 235.
(4) A.l.R. 1950 F.C. 80.
.....
,.
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1301
rigidly since
the reasons, constitutional and administr::.tive, which sometimes weighed with the Privy
Council, need not weigh with us, yet some of those
principles are useful as furnishing in many cases a
sound basis for invoking the
discretion of
this
Court in granting special leave. Generally speaking,
this Court will not grant special leave, unless it is
shown
that exceptional and special circumstances
exist, that substantial and grave injustice has been
done. and that the case in question presents features
of sufficient gravity to warrant a review of the decision appealed against".
The preceding article referred to in the opening passage is clearly article 134. Article 134(1) confers a
right of appeal to this Court in certain cases, in terms
unqualified, on questions both of fact and of law, and
if the scppe of an appeal under article 136 is to be
extended likewise to questions of fact, then article
134(1) would become superfluous. It is obvious that
the intention of the Constitution in providing for an
appeal on facts. under articles 134 ( 1) (a) and (b) was
to exclude it under article 136, and it strongly supports the conclusion reached in Pritam Singh v. The
State(') that like the Privy Council this Court would
not function as a further court of appeal on facts in
criminal cases.
Hav;ng regard to the principles enunciated in this
decisic,n, the question is whether there are sufficient
grou;1ds for interfering with the judgment of the
High Court in the present appeal. The point which
the learned Judges had to decide in the appeal was
whether it was the appellant who had murdered Jetha.
ThJ.[ is a pure question of fact turning on appreciation of evidence. The High Court has gone into
the mJ. tter fully, examined the entire evidence exhaustive! y, and in a judgment which is as closely
reasone<l as it is elaborate, has come to the conclusion
that the guilt of the appeliant has been established
beyond all reasonable doubt. Does that decision call
for our interference in special appeal? No, unle~s this
CoLirt is to function as a court of appeal on facts.
IJ) [!950] S.C.R. 453, 458.
1955
Aher Raja Khima
v.
The State of
Saurashtra
Venkatarama
Ayyar ].
1302
1955
Aher Raja Khima
v.
The State of
Saurashtra
Venkatarama
A';JflT ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1955]
But then, it is argued that the appeal before the High
Court was one against acquittal, that such an appeal
was subject to the limitation that there should be
compelling reasons for reversing an order oi acquittal,
and
that it would be open to this Court in special
appeal to consider whether that limitation nad been
du! y observed. On this contention, two questions arise
for determination: (1) what are the powers of a court
which hears an appeal against an order of acquittal ?
And (2) what are the grounds on which the decision
of that court can be reviewed by this Court under
article 136?
The right to appeal against an order of acquittal is
conferred on the State by section 417 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, and is in terms unqualified.
Nevertheless, the view was taken at one time in some
of the decisions that appeals
against acquittals were
in a less favoured position than appeals against convictions, and that an .order of acquittal should not be
interfered with in appeal except "where through the
incompetence, stupidity or perversity of certain tribunal such unreasonable or distorted conclusions
have been drawn from the evidence so as to produce
a positive miscarriage of justice", or where "the lower
court has so obstinately blundered or gone wrong as
to produce a result mischievous at once to the administration of justice and the interests of the public".
Vide Empress v.
Gayadin(' ), Queen-Empress v.
Robinson('), Deputy Legal Remembrancer v. Amttlya
Dwan(') and King-Emperor v. U. San Win('). In
Sheo Swarup v. King-Emperor('), the question was
raised .for determination by the Privy Council whether
there was any legal basis for the limitation which the
above decisions had placed on the right of the State
to appeal under section 417. Answering it in the
negative, Lord Russell observed that there was "no
indication in the Code of any limitation or restriction
on the High Court in the exercise of its powers as an
appellate tribunal", that no distinction was drawn
(I) [1881] 1.L.R. 4 All. 148.
(2) [1894] l.L.R. 16 All. 2·2.
13) [!914] 18 C.W.N. 666.
(4J [<932] l.L.R. JO Rang. 312.
(5) 1934 L.R. 61I.A.398, 403, 404.
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1303
"between an appeal from an order of acquittal and
an appeal from a conviction'', and that "no limitation should be placed upon that power unless it be
found expressly stated in the Code". He went on to
remark at page 404 that,
"the High Court should and will always give
proper weight and consideration to such matters as
(1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility
of the witnesses, (2) the presumption of innocence in
favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not
weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at
his trial, ( 3) the right of the accused to the benefit of
any doubt, and (4) the slowness of an appellate Court
in disturbing a finding of act arrived at by a Judge
who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses".
These observations, however, do not mean that the
scop:: of appeals
against acquittals is different from
that of other appeals.
They merely embody the
principles applicable to all appeals, civil and criminal,
to appeals alike against conviction and
acquittal.
Thus, if A files a suit on a promissory note against
B and the latter denies execution, the burden is on
the plaintiff to establish its genuineness. If the trial
Judge does not accept the evidence adduced by him
and dismisses his suit and he appeals, he has the
burden still on him to prove on the evidence adduced
that the promissory note is. genuine, and in discharging that burden he has to show that the judgment
appealed against is clearly wrong. In Naba Kishore
Manda/ v. Vpendra Kishore Manda/(1) Lord Buckmaster stated:
"The only further observation that their Lordships desire to make is to call attention once more to
the fact - that in appeals the burden of showing that
the judgment appealed from is wrong lies upon the
appellant.
If all he can show is nicely balanced
calculations which' lead to the equal possibility of the
judgment on either the one side or the other being
right, he has not succeeded".
Adapting these observations to criminal trial, when
the State appeals against an order of acquittal, it
(I) [1921] 42 M.L.J. 253, 257 (P.C.).
1955
Ahe7 Raja Khim
v
The Stat< of
Saurashtra
Venkatarama
Ayyar J.
1304
1955
A.htr Raja Khima
v.
The State of
Saurashtra
Venkatarama
Ayyar].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
has to establish on the evidence that the accused is
guilty, and to establish it, it has to satisfy the court
that the judgment of the trial court is erroneous. The
oft-repeated observation that on acquittal the presumption of innocence becomes reinforced is merely
this principle stated in terms of criminal law. Likewise, the weight to be attached by an appellate court
to a finding of the trial court based upon appreciation of oral evidence is the same whether it is given
in a civil litigation or a criminal trial. Dealing with
the position of an appellate court hearing a civil
appeal, the Privy Council observed in Bombay Cotton
Ma11ufacturi11g Co. v. Motilal Shiv/al(') :
"It is doubtless true that on appeaJ the whole
case, including the f;icts, is within the jurisdiction of
the Appeal ·Court. But generally speaking, it is
undesirable to interfere with the findings of fact of the
Trial Judge who sees and hears the witnesses and
has an opportunity of noting their demeanour,
especially in cases where the issue is simple and
depends on the credit which attached to one or other
of conflicting witnesses ...... .In making these observations their Lordships have no desire to restrict the
discretion of the Appellate Courts m India in the
consideration of evidence".
It is clearly these principles that Lord Russell had in
mind when he made the observations at page 404 in
Sheo Swarup v. King-Emperor(') quoted above, and
that will be clear from the observation next following:
'To state this, however, is only to say that the
High Court in its conduct of the appeal should and
will act in accordance with rules and principles well
known and recognized m the administration of
justice".
The scope of the decision in Sheo Swarup v. KingEmperor(') with special reference to the observations
discussed above was thus explained by the Privy
Council in Nur Mohammad v. Emperor(') :
"Their Lordships were· referred, rightly enough,
to the decision of this Board in the case in Sheo
(I) [1915] L.R. 4Z I.A. 110.,·l J3.
12) [i934] L.R. 61 I.A. 398.
(3) A.I.R. 1945 P.C. 151.
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1305
Sruamp v. Ki11g-Emperor(1),
and in particular to the
passage at p. 404 in the judgment delivered bv Lord
Russell.
Their Lordships do not think it n~cessary
to read it all again, but would like to observe that
there really is only one principle, in the strict use of
the word, laid down there; that is that the High
Court has fuli power to review at large all the evidence
upon which the order of acquittal was founded, and
to reach the conclusion that upon that evidence the
order of acquittal should be reversed".
These authorities establish bevond all controversy
that an appeal against acquittal under section 417
stands as regards the powers of :rn appelbte court,
on the same footing as appeals against conviction.
If that is the true scope of an appeal under section
417, where then does the doctrine of "compelling
reasons" come in? And how do we fit it among the
that section? The
words
powers
of a court under
"conwelling reasons" are not a legislative expression.
They are not found in section 417. As far as I have
been able to discover, it was first used in Surajpal Singh
a11d others v. The State("), wherein it was observed :
"It is well established that in an appeal under
section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High
Court has full power to review the evidence upon
which
the order of acquittal was founded, but it is
equally well-settled that the presumption of innocence
of the accused is further reinforced by his acquittal
by the trial court, and the findings of the trial court
which had
the advantage of seeing the witnesses and
hearing their evidence can be reversed only for very
substantial and compelling reasons".
Do the words "compelling reasons" in the above
passage import a limitation on the powers of a court
hearing an appeal under section 417 not applicable to
a court hearing appeals against conviction? If they do,
then it is merely the old doctrine that appeals against
acquittal are in a less favoured position, dressed
m a new garb, • and the reasons for rejecting it as unsound are as powerful as those which found favour
with the Privy Council in Shea Swarup v. King-Em(1) [1934] L.R. 61 I.A. 398.
(2) [195~] S.C.R. !93, 201.
1955
Aher Raja Khima
\'.
The State of
Sa.urashtrtJ
Venkatarama
Ayyar].
1306
1955
Aher Raja Kkima
v.
The State of
Saurashtra
Venkatarama
AyyarJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1955]
peror(') and Nur .Mohammad v. Emperor('). But it
is probable that these word~ were intended to express,
as were the similar words of Lord Russell in Sheo
Swarup v. King-Emperor( 1 ), that the court hearing
an appeal under section 417 should observe the rules
which all appellate courts should, before coming to a
conclusion different from that of the trial court. If
so understood, the expression "compelling reasons"
would be open to no comment. Neither would it be
of any special sigruficance in its application to appeals
again~t . acquittals any
more than
appeals
against conv1ct1on.
But the expression has been
quoted in later judgments, especially of the courts
below, as if it laid down that in appeals against
acquittal, the standard of proof required of the appellant was far higher than what the law casts on
appellants in other appeals, and as the words "compelling reasons" are vague and indefinite to a degree,
the result has not seldom been that even when Judges
hearing appeals under section 417 were convinced of
the guilt of the accused, they refrained from setting
asid~ the order of acquittal owing to the dark and
unknown prohibition contained in the expression.
That is the impression which I have formed in the
appeals which have come before me in this Court.
There is always a danger in taking a phrase, attractive and telling in its context, out of it, and erecting
it into a judicial formula as if it laid down a principle
universal in is application. And this danger is all
the greater when the phrase is of undefined import,
and relates to appreciation of evidence. It is in the
interests of the public that crimes should be punished,
and it is with this object that section 417 confers on
the State a right to appeal against acquittal. To
fetter this right through such expressions as "compelling reasons" would not merely be to legislate but
to defeat the plain intention of the legislature that
an accused in · lln. appeal against acquittal should
have only those rights which the state in an appeal
against conviction or a respo\ld$ht¥ in a civil appeal
has, and that he is to enjoy ·no' $pecial protection.
(I) [1934] L.R. 61 I.A. 398.
(2) A. I. R. 1945 I>. C. 151.
,
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1307
The fundamental objection to regarding the expression "compelling reasons" as a rigid formula governing the decision of an appeal under section 417 is
that it puts a judgment of acquittal, however
rendered, in a position of vantage which the law did
not accord to it, and throws around the accused who
gets an order of acquittal in the trial court a protection which the law did not intend to give him. In
my judgment, this is a situation in which great mischief must result, and the interests of the public
must suffer.
If the expression "compelling reasons" does not
impose a restriction on the powers of a court hearing
an appeal under section 417, and if its true scope
is to guide it in arriving at a decision, the question
whether this Court can interfere with that decision
on the ground that it is erroneous presents no difficulty. The decision would then be one on a question
of fact depending upon the appreciation of evidence,
and this court cannot, on the principles. enunciated
in Pritam Singh v. The State( 1 ) interfere with it. This
position is, in fact, concluded by the decisions in Sheo
Swarup v. King-Emperor( 2 ) and Nur Mohammad v.
Em;>eror(3). In Shea Swarup v. King-Emperor(2),
the Sessions Judge had characterised the prosecution
witnesses as liars, and disbelieving their evidence had
acquitted the accused. On appeal, the High Court
reviewed the evidence, and differing from the trial
court as to the weight to be attached to it, convicted
the accused. Declining to interfere with this judgment, the Privy Council observed that even though
there was no express mention in the judgment of the
High Court that it had considered all the particulars
which an appellate court should consider in deciding
an appeal, there was "no reason to think that the
High Court had failed to take all proper matters into
consideration in arriving at their .conclusions of fact".
In Nur Mohammad v. Emperor(3), the judgment of
the High Court did not disclose that it had considered
the matters mentioned by Lord Russell at page 404
-
(I) [1950] S. C.R. 453.
(2) [1934] L.R. 61 I.A. 398.
(3) A.I.R. 1945 P.C. 151.
28-85 S. C. India/59.
1955
-+-
Aker Raja Khima
y.
The State of
Sauroshtra
Venkataratna
Ayyar J.
1308
1955
AMT Raja Khima
v.
Th!Stattof
f:Jaurashlra
VenkalaTama
A.J1ar J,
-_:SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
in Sheo Swarup v•. King-Emperor('). Nevertheless,
the Privy Council dismissed the appeal observing:
"In the present case the High Court judgment
shows that they have been at pains to deal in detail
. with the reasons given by the Sessions Judge for dis- (
1
believing the group of witnesses, the. Patwari ·and the '
other three alleged eye-witnesses. . They have dealt
in detail with them, showing on the face of their
judgment .. that there is no necessity to presume in this ___ ~
case that they have not done their duty .... "
_•
These decisions are authorities ·for the position
that when in an appeal under section 417 tlie court
considers .the evidence and comes to its own conclusion, the findings recorded .by it are not, even when
they result in a reversal of the order of acquittal;
open to interference in . special appeal. · Different
considerations would - have arisen if the law had pm·
vided a further appeal on facts against those orders
of reversal, in which -case the appreciation of the evidence by the- ·appellate court would be .a .matter open
to review in the superior court. That, as already
stated, would be ·the position in an appeal under articles 132(1) and 134(1) (a) and (b), but where, as in
ihe present, no ·appeal on facts is provided, . the decision of the ·.High Court is not open to review by
this court urider .article 136 on the ground that there
were no: compelling reasons for the learned Juoges to
reverse an· order of acquittal.
·
This is sufficient to entail the dismissal of this
appeal. But, having gone through the evidence, 'I
am
opinion that even . on the merits the decision
....
of the High ,Court is correct. The evidence against
ihe . appellant is wholly circumstantial, and consists
._.
mainly of (1) the existence of a strong motive, (2)
,
the conduct .: of .the . appellant on ·the day when the
murder was committed, (3) the .recovery . of a bloodstained axe :and. a false beard at the. instance of the /
appellant, and (4) ·.a confession. made by·him br..-;_ •'
fore_- the Magistrate, _· P. W. 21, on 3-6-1952. · Taking"-. the above items seriatim it is the ·case of :therprosc- ·
·cution. ·that the appellant was living . on: terms of inti- \
of.
(1) [1934] L.R. 61 I.A: 398.
~-
°\.
2S.C.R.
'-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1309
1955
macy with Sunder, and as she was to be taken on the
19th May 1952 to Kalawad to join her husband, he
Aher Raja Khima
v.
wanted to do away with him.. hTe appelant admitThe State of
ted that he had illicit connection with Sunder for
Saurashtra
some years, and the Sessions Judge also found, basVenkatarama
ing himself on the prosecution evidence, that the
Ayyar].
appellant was very much agitated on the night of
the 18th. A number of witnesses deposed that
they saw him on 18-5-1952 at Shiva sharpening his
axe, and that when questioned, he stated that he
was going to offer a green coconut to Mahadevji,
"an expression" say the learned Judges "which in
common parlance means sacrifice of a head". The
appellant denied that he went to Shiva on the 18th,
but his statement was disbelieved by the Sessions
Judge who was impressed by the quality and number of the prosecution witnesses, and both the courts
have concurred in accepting their evidence on this
point.
As for the recovery of the axe, the appellant admitted it, but he stated in his examination under
section 342 that there was no blood on it when he
showed it to the police. The Sessions Judge was not
prepared to accept this statement and observed:
"Accused admits that this is his axe. In light of
chemical analysis, there is no doubt that there were
stains of human blood on the axe. It is also mentioned in the Panchnama, Ex. 21 itself that the Panch
had suspected that there were marks of human blood _
on this axe".
But all the same, he discounted the value of this evidence, because according to him, in view of certain
circumstances "the presence of human blood on the axe
is by no means conclusive", and that "at best it r;::ises
a suspicion against the accused". Those circumstances are t):u-ee: Firstly, the panch who witnessed
the recovery at Katkora belonged to Kalawad, and
the criticism is that a local panch ought to have been
got to witness the same. The learned Judges of the
High Court did not think JT':Kh of this criticistr. as
the recovery at Katkora had to be amde in purst'' 1ce
0£ the statment given by the appellant at Kaia.vad,
1310
1955
Aber Raja Khima
v.
The State of
Savrashtra
Vtnkatarama
Ayyar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
and the police might have reasonably thought that
the same panch should be present at both the places.
As the Sessions Judge has accepted the evidence of
the panch that there were blood stains at the time of
the recovery of the axe, his criticism on this point
lacks substance. Secondly, though the recovery was
made on 21-5-1952, it was sent to the medical officer
for report only on 27-5-1952, and the delay is suspicious. It is difficult to follow this criticism. When
once the conclusion is reached that there was blood
on the axe when it was recovered, this criticism has
no meaning unless it is intended to suggest that the
police required some time to wash the blood which
was on the axe at the time of its recovery and to substitute human blood therefor. There is nothing in the
evidence to support a suggestion so grotesque, and
as observed by the learned Judges, if the police
wanted to substitute blood, they would not have
taken so much time over it.
Thirdly, in despatching the blood to the Chemical
Analyst, the medical officer sent the parcel containing
the blood scrapings to the railway station, not through
his own peon or the compounder in the hospital but
through the local police, and that, according to the
Sessions Judge, is a suspicious circumstance. As the
parcel was received intact by the Chemical Analyst
at Bombay, it is difficult to see what the point of the
criticism is. The Sessfons Judge himself observes:
"I do not believe that the police have intercepted
this parcel and they deliberately sent an axe with
human blood. However, there is no doubt that the
procedure adopted by the doctor is wrong, and JS
capable of mischief".
It has not been explained and it is not possible to
divine what that mischief could have been in this
case. And who could have been the mischief-maker
unless it be the police? The Sessions Judge stated that
he did not believe the suggestion made against the
police, but that nevertheless is the assumption underlying his comment. "Anxious to wound, afraid to
strike" would appropriately described the situation.
The learned Judges disagreed with the reasoning of
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1311
the Sessions Judge, and held that as the appellant had
admitted
the recovery of the axe and as there was
human blood on it at that time, it was clear and
cogent evidence pointing to his guilt. I am unable
to find any answer to this reasoning.
Pausing here, it will be seen that in discussing the
question of the recovery of the blood-stained axe, as
indeed throughout the judgment, the learned Sessions
Judge has taken up an attitude of distrust towards
the police for which it is difficult to find any justification in the evidence-an attitude which, I regret
to say, is becoming a growing feature of judgments
of subordinate Magistrates. When at the trial, it
appears to the court that a police officer has, in the
discharge of his duty, abused his position and acted
oppressively, it is no doubt its clear duty to express
its stern disapproval of his conduct. But it is equally
its duty not to assume such conduct on the part of
the officer gratuitously and as a matter of course,
when there is, as in this case, no reasonable basis for
it in the evidence or in the circumstances. The presumption that a person acts honestly applies as much
in favour of a police officer as of other persons and
it is not a judicial approach to distrust and suspect
him without good grounds therefor. Such an attitude
could do neither credit to the magistracy nor good to
the public. It can only run down the prestige of the
police administration.
It is the case of the prosecution that the appellant
unearthed a false beard, which he had buried underneath a shami tree in Shiva, and that he had worn it
at the time of the murder. The appellant did not
deny the recovery, but stated that it was not he that
had uncovered it but the jamadar. Both the courts
below have accepted the version of the prosecution as
true, but while the Sessions Judge held that it was
not sufficient to implicate the appellant, the learned
Judges held otherwise. P.W. 16 deposed that he saw
the appellant at midnight on the 18th May on the
outskirts of Kalawacl wearing a false beard, and the
comme11t of the Sessions Judge on this evidence ·is:
"I do not see how this evidence will prove the
1955·
Ahtr Raja Khima
v.
Tiu Stale of
SDUlashtra
1312
1955
~RajaKhif'lllJ
....
Tl1' Stale of
Saurashtra
Vmkalorama
Ayyar].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt. At best
it will suffice to raise suspicion against the accused".
But if the beard was discovered by the appellant,
then surely it is a valuable link in the chain of
evidence against him.
Then we come to the confession made by the appellant to P. W. 21. The Magistrate has deposed that
he had satisfied himself that it was voluntary, before
he recorded it. The Sessions Judge did not discredit
his testimony, but was of opinion that in view of
certain circumstances the confession was not voluntary. Now, the facts relating to this matter are these:
· The appellant was, as already stated, arrestetd on the
20th May and discoveries of the axe and the false
beard were made through him, and on the 21st he
was sent to the Magistrate with a letter that he
desired to make a confession. The Magistrate has
given evidence that he did not record the confession
at once, as he wanted the appellant "to cool down'',
and accordingly gave him ten days to reflect, and
committed him to judicial lock-up. There is nothing
improper in this, and indeed, it is a commendable
precaution for ensuring that the confession was made
voluntary. From 21-5-1952 to 3-6-1952 the appellant
continued in judicial lock-up, and this is a circumstance which normally should negative the possibility
of there having been a threat or inducement.
But
the Sessions Judge declined to attach any weight to
it, because both the police lock-up and the judicial
lock-up were situated in the same compound, separated by a distance of 20 feet, and were guarded by
the same police officers, and though the judicial lockup had its own warder and clerk jailor, they kept
watch only during daytime, and therefore · even
though the police could have had no access inside the
lock-up, they had "every opportunity to
threaten
and bully the accused". The Sessions Judge accordingly held that the confession was not voluntary. On
appeal, the learned Judges came to a different conclusion.
They considered that the possibility
of
threats having been uttered through the bars was to
remote and unsubstantial to form the basis for any
,
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1313
conclusion, and that all the circumstances indicated
that the confession was voluntary. These are the
salient pojnts that emerge out of the evidence.
The position may be thus summed up:
(1) No special weight attaches to the findings of
the Sessions Judge on the ground that they are based
on the evidence of witnesses whom he had the advantage of seeing in the box, and believed. The oral
evidence was all on the side of the prosecution, and
.that was
substantially accepted by the Sessions
Judge. His judgment is based on the probabilities
of the case, and of them, the learned Judges were at
least as competent to judge, as he.
(2) The finding of the Sessions Judge in so far as
it related to the recovery of bloodstained axe was
clearly erroneous, as it did not follow on his reasoning.
(3) As regards the confession, the conclusion of
the Sessions Judge rests on nothing tangible, and is
largely coloured by a general distrust of the police,
not based on evidence or justified by the circumstances.
(4) The learned Judges were of the opinion that
even excluding the confession, the other evidence in
the case was sufficient to establish the guilt of the
appellant.
(5) All the four assessors were of the opinion
that the appellant was guilty.
Now, returning to the two questions which have
formed the basis of the preceding discussion, (1) what
is it that the High Court has to do in exercise of its
powers under section 417, having regard to the findings reached by it and set out above, and how does
the doctrine of "compelling reasons" bear upon it?
(2) What are the grounqs on which we can interfere
with its decision? A court hearing an appeal under
section 417 might be confronted with three possibilities: (i) It might come to the same conclusion as the
trial court on the questions in issue, in which case,
of course, it should dismiss the appeal; (ii) It might
consider
that the evidence was not clear and conclu. si;e one way or the other, in which case its duty
1~55
Airer Raja Khima
v.
Thi 5'.taJIOf
Saurashtra
Vnikatarama
AJJar J.
1314
1955
Aher Ra.fa Khima
v.
The State of
SauraJhtra
Venkatarama
4,_,.,. J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
as an appellate court would be not to interfere with
the judgment appealed agaimt; and (iii) it might come
to a conclusion on an appreciation of the evidence
opposite to that reached by the court of first instance,
in which case it would clearly be its duty in exercise
of its powers under section 417 to set aside the order
of acquittal. Wherein does the theory of "compelling
reasons" come in the scheme? There is no need for it
in the second category, because even apart from it,
the same result must, as already stated, follow on the
principles applicable to all courts of appeal. Then,
there remains the third category of cases. If the High
Court comes to the conclusion on an appreciation of
the evidence that the appellant is guilty, has it,
nevertheless, to confirm the order of acquittal on the
basis of this theory? Surely not, as that would render
the right .conferred by sectio•1 417 illusory. Thm,
the doctrine of "compelling reasons" would appear
to have use only as a guide to the appellate court in
determining questions of fact. It has no independent
value as bearing on its powers under section 417.
If that is the true position, it follows on the principles laid down in Sheo Swarup v. King-Emperor(') and
Nier Mohammad v. Emperor(') and in Pritam Singh v.
The State(•) that this Court cannot interfere with the
orde.rs passed under section 417 merely on the ground
that the findings of fact were not justified, having
regard to the doctrine of "compelling reasons".
In my opinion, this appeal ought to be dismissed.
ORDER.
Bv THE CouRT.-ln accordance with the Judgment
of the majority this Appeal is allowed. The conviction and sentence are set aside and the Appellant is
acquitted.
II) [1934] L·R. 61I.A.398.
(2) A.LR· 1945P.C•151.
(3) [1950] S.C.R. 453.
•'
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