M.CT.MUTHIAH & 2 OTHERS versus THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS &, ANOTHER
Supreme Court of India | Decided 20 December 1955 | [1955] 2 S.C.R. 1247 | 1955 INSC 80
Key facts
- Decided
- 20 December 1955
- Bench
- SUDHI RANJAN DAS*, VIVIAN BOSE, NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI, B. JAGANNADHADAS, BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 646/1954
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1955] 2 S.C.R. 1247
- Neutral citation
- 1955 INSC 80
Text of the judgment
2·s.c.R.
·1247
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
this purpose in juxta-position with section 47 of. the
Travancore Act XXIII of 1121 cannot be held to be
discriminatory and violative of the fondamental right
guaranteed under article 14 of the Constitution. The
proceedings which took place in the course of investigation by the Commission up to the 26th January
1950 were valid and so also were the proceedings
during. the course of investigation which took place
after the inauguration of the Constitutiol). on the 26th
January 1950 under which the petitioner, as a citizen
of our Sovereign Democratic Republic acquired inter
alia .guarantee of the fundamental right under article
14 of the Constitution.
The result, therefore, is that .all the contentions
urged on behalf of the petitioner fail and Civil Appeal No. 21 of 1954 must be ·dismissed with costs.
Civil ·Appeals Nos. 21 and 22 of 1954 wil~ accordingly be diSlllissed with costs. There
be a set off
for costs.
1955
A. Thangal Kunju
Musaliar
V•
M. Vmliit°'halam
Polti and anothlr
Bhagwati].
wm
M. CT. MUTHIAH & 2 OTHERS
1955
ti •.
D1umbu 20.
THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,
MADRAS &, ANOTHER;
[S. R.
DAs~
ACTING
C.J,
V1vr:rn BosE,
JAGANNADHADAS and B. f. SINHA JI.)
BHAcrWAn,
Constitution of India, Art. ]'/--Taxation on Income (Investigation Commisiion) Act, 1947 (Act XXX of 1947), s. 5(1)-'Whetil~
.ultra vires 'lhe· Constitution in vie1v of s. 34 of Indian lncome-Ta1r
Act, 1922 (Act XI of 1922) as amended by the 'Income-Tax and Bu1iness Profits .Tax (Amendment) Act, 1948 (Act XLVlll tif 1948) and
the Indian· Income-Tax (Amendment) Act, 1954 (Act X!XXW uf
1954).
H~ld (Per S..R. DAs, .A,cTING C.J., V1v1AN iBoSE, .BHAcwATI
and B. P. SINHA, JJ . .}AGANNAoHADAS J., dissenting) that s. 5.(1) of the
T<1xation on .. Income (Investigation Commission) Ac~,· .1947 (Act
XXX of 1947) iis ultra vires the Constitution as it ii discriminawry
and violative of the fundamental .right guaranteed by .Art. l4 of
the Constitution by reason of two amenc;lments which were made in
,s. 34 of thf: Indian In~omc-Tax Act, 1922 (Act XI afl922) one ia
.1948 by the .c:nac[ment of the Income-T.u: and Busine$& Profit$ Ta
1248
SUPREME COURT REP.ORTS
r19s51
1955
(Amendment) Act, 1948 (Act XLVIII of 194~) and·the other in 1954
.M. Ct. Mutkiah
by the enactment of the Indian Income-Tax (Amendment) Act,
a.ti 2 otlrns
V·
Thi c....,;.,ioner
qf ltlcomrtax,
Ma,Jrasand
anot/rn.
1954 I Act XXXIII of 1954).
If the provisions of s. 34(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act
as it stood before its amendment by Act XLVIII of 1948 had
been the only provisions to be considered, the .Court would have
reached the same conclusion as it did in A. !hangal. Kunju Mu.
saliar v. M. Venkitai:halam Potti & Anr., (rl955] 2 S.C.R. 1196),
but the position was materi~lly ·affected by reason of two amend·
ments made in that section by two Acts, one in 1948 atid the
other in 1954.
Amended s. 34(1) of the Indian Income-tax Ace was substantially different fwm the old s. 34(1) which was in operation up to the
8th September 1948. The words "if in consequence of definite in·
formation which has come_ into his possession the lncome·tax Officer
discovers that income, profits or gains cP.argeable to incbme·tax have
escaped assessment irt any yea1 ........ " which appear in the old
section were substituted by the words uif the Incom~-rax Officer has
reason to \>elieve that by reason of the omission or failure on the
part of the :assessee ........ income, profits or gains chargeable to
income-tax ·have escaped assessment ........ ". The requisites of
(i) 14 definite" information (ii) which had ucome into" possession of
the Income-tax Officer and in consequence of which (iii) he "discovers" that income, profits or gains chargeable to income-tax had
escaped assessment,. were no longer necessary a.nd the only thing
which was required to enable the Income-tax Officer to take proceedings under s. 34(1) as amended was that he should have reason to
believe that by reason of the omission or_ faiiu·rc on .the part of the
as!iessee income, profits qr gains chargeable to income-tax had escaped
assessment for a particular year. Whereas before this amended
s. 34(1) came to be substituted for the olds. 34(1) there was no comparison between the provisions of .s. 5(1) of Act XXX of 1947 and
s. 34( I) of the Indian Income-tax Act as it then stood, the provisions
of s. 34(1) as amended after the 8th September 1948 could stand
comparison with the provisions of s, 5(1) of Act XXX of 1947 and
the cases which were covered by s. 5 ( 1) of Act XXX of 194 7 could
be dealt with under the procedure laid down in s. 34(1) of the Indian
Income-tax Act. After the 8th September 1948, therefore, even ·in the
case of substantial evaders of income-tax who were a distinct class
by themselves intended to be treated by the drastic and summary
procedure laid down 1'Y Act XXX of 1947, some c:;tses that were
already referred by the Central Government !or investigation by the
Comm'ission could be dealt with under that Act _arid other cases,
though falling within the sam~ class or category, could be dC:alt
With tinder the procedure prescribed in the amended s. 34( 1) of the
Indian .Y.ncome-~x Act; The persons who were thus dealt with under
s, 34( 1) of the Indian Income-tax Act had available to them the
whole oroeedure laid down· in that Act including the right to inspect
document< and the nght to question the findings of fact arrived at
1249
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
2S.C.R.
by the Income-tax Officer by the procedure of appeal and revision
and ultimate scrutiny by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal which
was denied to those persons whose cases had been referred by the
Central Government for investigation by the Commission under
s. 5(1) of Ac.t XXX of 1947.
Different persons, though falling under the same class or category of substantial evaders of income-tax, would, therefore, be subject to different procedures, one a summary and drastic procedure
and the other a normal procedure which gave to the assessees various
rights which were denied to those who were specially treated under
the procedure prescribed in Act XXX of 1947.
Pe1· JAGANNADHADAS J.-The class of persons falling under
s. 5(1) of the Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act,
1947 (Act XXX of 1947) is totally different from that which falls
within amended s. 34 of the Indian Income-Tax Act 1922 (Act XI
of 1922) and therefore s. 5( 1) of Act XXX of 1947 is not unconstitutional as offending Art. 14 of the Constitution.
Suraj
Mall
Mohta v. A. V. Visvanatha
Sastri
and
Another
(f 19551 1 S.C.R. 448), Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. A. V. Visvanatha Sastri and Another (f 1955] 1 S.C.R. 787), A. Thangal Kunju
Musaliar v. M. Venkitachalam Patti & Anr. and M. Venkitachalam
Patti & Anr. \', A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar, ([1955] 2 S.C.R.
1196), Syed Qasim Razvi v. The State of Hyderabad and Others
(f1953] S.C.R. 581), Habeeb Mohamed v. The State of Hyderabad (f 1953] S.C.R. 661) and Gangadhar Baijnath and others v. Income-tax Investigation Commis,:ion, etc. (A.LR. 1955 All. 515),
referred to.
ORIGINAL
Petition
India.
JuRISDICTION :
under
Petition
No.
646 of
1954.
Article 32 of the Constitution of
C. R. /agadisan, Nattnit Lal and T. V. Balakrishnan, (T. V. Balakrishnan. with the permission of
the Court) for the petitioners.
C. K. Dapluary, Solicitor-General of India, ( G. N.
Joshi, R. Ganapathy Iyer and R. H. Dhebar, with him)
for the respondents.
1955.
December 20.
BttAGWATI
J.-This pet1t1on under Article 32 of
the Constitution also raises the question about the
constitutionality of section 5 ( 1) of the Taxation on
Income Investigation Commission Act, 1947 (XXX
of 1947).
1955
M. Ct. Muthiah
and 2 others
V•
The Commissioner
qf Income-tax,
Madras and
another.
I
1250
1955
M. Ct. Muthiah
and 2 others
V•
The ·Commissioner
of Income-tax,
Madras and
aMther
Bhagwati J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1955]
The facts which led to the filing of this petition
may be shortly stated.
Sir M. Ct. Muthiah Chettiar who carried on a flourishing banking business in India and foreign countries died in or about 1929 leaving behind him two
sons M. Ct. M. Chidambaram Chettiar (since deceased)
and M. Ct. M. Muthiah Chettiar, petitioner 3, and his
widow Devanai Achi. M. Ct. M. Chidambaram
Chettiar continued the ancestral banking business
and also started several commercial enterprises. He
died by an accident while travelling in a plane in the
· year 1954 leaving behind him his two sons, the petitioners 1 & 2. Devanai Achi had predeceased him.
The petitioners 1 & 2 are the legal representatives
of the deceased M. Ct. M. Chindambaram Chettiar and
also the representatives of their grandmother Devanai
A chi.
The Central Government, in exercise of its powers
under section 5 ( 1) of Act XXX of 1947, referred to
the Income-tax Investigation Commission R. C. Nos.
516, 517 and 518 relating to M. Ct. M. Chidambaram
Chettiar, M. Ct. M. Muthiah Chettiar, petitioner 3,
and Devanai Achi. The Commission, after holding an
enquiry in all the three cases, recorded their findings
and held that an aggregate sum of Rs. 10,07,322-4-3
represented the undisdosed income during the investigatjon period and directed . distribution of this sum
over the several years in the manner indicated by
them in Schedule A to their report. This report was
submitted by the Commission to the Government on
the 26th August 1952. The Central .3overnment considered the report and, purporting to act under section 8(2) of the Act, directed by their order No. 74
(26) I.T·/52 dated the 16th September 1952 that
appropriate action under the Indian Income-tax Act
be taken against the assessees with a view to assess
or re-assess, the income which had escaped assessment
for the years 1940-41 to 1948-49.
In pursuance of the said directions of the Central
Government the Income-tax Officer, City Circle I,
Madras, issued notices under section 34 of the Indian
Income-tax Act and made the re-assessment for the
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1251
years 1940-41,
1941-42 and 1943-44 to 1948-49 based
upon the findings, of the Commission which were
treated as final and conclusive. The assessment
orders for the years 1940-41, 1941-42 and 1948-49 were
served on the assessees on the 20th February 1954.
Assessment orders for the years 1943-44 to 1947-48
were served on the 12th May 1954. The re-assessment
order for the year 1942-43 was not made thaugh
notices under section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act
had been issued by the Income-tax Officer on the assessees on the 19th March 1954. It appears that these
re-assessment proceedings for the year 1942-43 are
yet pending and no assessment order in respect 'Of
that year has yet been served on the petitioners.
In regard to , the assessment orders which were
served on the 20th February 1954, the petitioners
preferred on the 18th May 1954 applications to the
Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras, under section
8(5) of the Act for references to the High Court on
questions of law arising out of those re"assessment
orders passed by the Income-tax Officer. Similar
applications were preferred thereafter in respect of
the re-assessment orders which were served on the
petitioners on the 12th May 1954. These applications are still pending.
On the 6th Decernber 1954, the petitioners filed the
present petition contending that the provisions of
the Act XXX of 1947 were illegal, ultra vires and unconstitutional mainly on the ground that they were
violative of the fundamental right guaranteed under
article 14 of the Constitution.
The grounds urged in support of this contention
were not felicitously expressed. The petitioners appear to have mixed up the contentions which could
be urged as a result of our judgments in Sw:aj Mall
Mohta v. A. V. Visvanatha Sastri and Anvther(1) and
Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. A. V. Visvanatha Sastri
and Another( 2 ). They contended in the first instance
that after the amendment of section 34 of the Indian
Income-tax Act by Act XXXIII of 1954, which inter
(l) [1955] I S.C.R. 448.
(2) (1955] l S.'C.R. 7e7.
M ..Ot. Muthiaiz
l1lld 2 ·olMr>
,,.
ThlCommi.si....,
of lncume-1/Jx,
Madrssallii
llll!lthrr
.Bhtrgwati J.
1252
1955
M. Ct. MuJhi.h
and 2 others
V•
The Commissioner
of Income-tax,
MadrD> and
another
Bhagwati].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
alia, added sub-seetions (1-A) to (1-D) to section 34,
the provisions of section 5 ( 1) of the Act became discriminatory, as on a reading of both the enactments,
Act XXX of 1947 and the Income-tax Act as amended in 1954 showed that they ~pplied to the same
category of persons and there was nothing in section
5(1) of the Act or any other provision of the said Act
disclosing any valid or reasonable classification. The
provisions of Act XXX of 1947 could not, therefore,
be sustained 011 the ground of classification to avoid
the mischief of article 14 of the Constirution. The
petitioners obviously relied upon our decision in Shree
Meenakshi Mill's· case, supra, in support of this contention.
The petitioners thereafter proceeded to set out
their alternative contention based upon our decision
in Suraj Mall Mohta's case, supra, though it was not so
stated in express terms. They contended that Act
XXX of 1947 enabled the Central Government to
discri.minate between one person and another inasmuch as they were authorised to pick and choose cases
of persons who fell within the group of those who had
substantially evaded taxation on income, that the act
of the Government in rekrring· some evaders to the
Commission was wholly arbitrary and there was nothing to eliminate the possibility of a favouritism or a
discrimination against an individual by sending or
not sending cases to the Commission as between two
persons both of whom might be within the group of
those who have evaded the payment of tax to a substantial extent. They further
contended that the
procedure prescribed under the impugned Act was
substantially more prejudicial and more drastic to the
assessee than the procedure prescribed under the
Indian Income-tax Act. There was no reasonableness
or justification that one person should have the·
advantage of the procedure prescribed by the Indian
Income-tax Act while another person similarly
situated should be deprived of it.
They, therefore, contended that section 5(1) of the
Act was discriminatory and violative of article 14 of
the Constitution and asked for the issue of a writ of
2!5.0.Jt
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1253
rertiorari or any other appropriate writ, direction. or
order quashing the report of the Income-tax Investigation Commission dated the 29th August 1952 en- ·
closed as Annexure A to the ·petition and the assessment orders of the Income-tax Officer for the years
1940-41, 1941-42, and 1943-44 to 1948-49 as being
unconstitutional, null and void and also of a writ of
prohibition calling upon the Commissioner of Incometax, Madras; respondent 1 and the Income-tax Officer,
City Circle I, Madras, respondent 2 or their subordinate officers to forbear from implementing the findings of the Investigation Commission with regard to
the year l942-43.
This petition was heard a:long with Civil Appeals
Nos. 21 and 22 of 1954, A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar
M. Venkitachaalam Patti & Another and M. VenkitaMusaliar (1), which also raised inter alia the cognate
question about the constitutionality of section 5 ( 1)
of the Travancore Act XIV of 1124 which was in
pari materia with section 5 ( 1) of Act XXX of 1947.
In regard to the question whether there is a rational basis of cla~sification to be found in the enactment of section 5(1) of the Act, the preamble and the
relevant provisions of Act XXX of 1947 are the same
as were considered by us in considering this question
in r~lation to the Travancore Act XIV of 1124. The
words "substantial extent" also have been used in
both the Acts and in the present case as in the cases
of the Travancore petitioners concerned in .the Evasion Cases Nos. 1 and 2 of 1125 (M.E.), Gauri Shanker,
Secretary,
Income-tax
Investigation
Commission
made an affidavit dated the 21st September 1955
wherein he set out the events and circumstances under
which Act XXX of 1947 came to be passed. In paragraph 4 of that affidavit he stated:
v.
"It was found that during the period of the last
war large fortunes . had been made by businessmen.
Controls· imposed by Government on prices and distribution, were · often evaded and secret profits ~re
made and. kept outside the books and often kept invested ia shares and real property acquired in the
(I) [1955] 2 S. C.R. 1196.
1955
M. Ct; Muthiah
and 2 others
V•
The-Commissioner
of Ineome-tax,
Madras and
another
.Bhagwati ].
1254
1955
M. Ct. Muthiah
and 2 others
V•
The Commissioner
of Income-tax,
Madras and
another
BhagwatiJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
names of benarnidars or in cash purchases of gold,
silver and jewellery. The machinery of Income-tax ·
administration was unable to cope with the large
number of complex cases that had to be dealt with,
during the war years and a few years after its termination. As there had been a large scale evasion of
tax during this period, it became necessary in the
public interests to investigate cases .of evasion of income-tax and bring under assessment huge profit that
had escaped assessment. As a preliminary step in
this direction, a demonetisation Ordinance was passed
in January 1946 sterilising the High Denomination
Notes in which secret profits earned during the war
years had been partly kept and calling for a statement
regarding the source of such profits. This was followed by the Income-tax Investigation Commission Bill.
In view of the prolonged and complicated enquiries
that had to be made to unearth these secret war
profits and bring them under assessment a special
Commission was constituted to enquire into the profits made since 1939 but which had escaped assess.ment.
I say that what is intended to in.,estigate is evasion
of payment of taxation
which could reasonably be
the classification
called "Substantial" and therefore
is real classification. The statute merely leaves the
selective application of the law to be made by the
executive authorities in accordance with the standards indicated in the Act itself"
This affidavit
furnished the background and the
surrounding circumstances obtaining at the time
when
Act XXX of 1947 was enacted and if this background is taken into account it would be obvious that
the substantial evaders of pavment of income-tax
whose cases were referred by the Central Government
to the Commission formed a class by themselves and
there was a rational basis of classification in the
enactment of section 5 ( 1) of the Act.
The argument
that
the terms
of section 'i(l)
enabled the Central Government to pi<:k and choose
the cases of p"articular individuals falling within thot
category leaving the cases of other persons falling
within the same category to be dealt with in accord-
2S.CR.
SUPREM'E C()U:RT REPORTS
1255
ance
with the provisions of section 34(1) of the
Indian Income~tax Act as. it stood prior to the amendment of 1948 has been already dealt with in our
judgment in A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar v· M. Venkitachalam Patti & Another, supra; while dealing with
the corresponding provisions of section 5 ( 1) of the
Travancore Act XIV of 1124 and section 47 of the
Travancore Act XXIII of 1121 and we have pointed
out that so far as the Indian Income-tax Act as it
was in existence on the 18th April 1947 which was
the date on which Act XXX of 1947 received the
assent of the Governor-General) stood unamended by
Act XLVIII of 1948, the cases of persons who fell
within the· category of substantial evaders of incometax within the meaning of section 5(1) of the Act
could not have been dealt with under the provisions
of section 34(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act and,
therefore, there was no discrimination and no violation of the fundamental right guaranteed under article 14 of the Constitution.
The other argument that the selection of the persons whose cases were to be referred by the Central
Government for investigation to the Commission was
left to the unguided and uncontrolled discretion of
the executive or the administrative officials also has
been dealt with in that j_udgment and we need not
repeat our reasons for rejecting the same.
If th~ provisions of section 34(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act as it stood unamended by Act XLVIII
of 1948 (which corresponded with the provisions of
section 47 of the Travancore Act XXIII of 1121) had
been the only provisions to be considered we would
have reached the same conclusion as we did in
A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar v. M. Venkitachalam Patti
& Another, supra.
The position, however, in the
present case· is materiaHv affected by reason of the
two amendments which were made in section 3.4 of
the Indian Income-tax Act, one in 1948 by the enactment of Act XLVIII of 1948 and the other in 1954
by the enactr.11'..ltl of: Act XXXHL of 1954~
See1!ion 34 as amended by Act Y..LVJII of 1948
read as uruler;
!955
M. Ct. Muthiah
and 2 othen
V•
The Commissicner
of IncoT111J·tax,
MadraJ and
arwther
Bhagwati].
1256
1955
M. Ct. Muthiah
and 2 others
v.
The Commissionu
of Income-tax,
Madras and
another
BhagwatiJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
"Section 34(1) : If( a) the Income-tax Officer has reason to believe
that by reason of the om1ss10n or failure on the part
of an assessee to make a return of his income under
section 22 for any year or to disclose fully and truly
all material facts necessary for his assessment for
that year, income, profits or gains chargeable to income-tax have escaped assessment for that year, or
have been under-assessed or assessed at too low a
rate, or have been made the subject of excessive
relief under the Act, or exces.siv~ loss or depreciation
allowance has been computed, or
(b) notwithstanding that there has been no omission or failure as mentioned in clause (a) on the p1rt
of the assessee, the Income-tax Officer has in consequence of information in his possession reason to
believe that income, profits or gains chargeable to
income-tax have escaped assessment for any year, or
have been under-assessed, or assessed at too low a
rate, or have been made the subject of excessive relief
under this Act, or that excessive loss or depreciation
allowance has been computed,
he may in cases falling under clause (a) at any time
within eight years and in cases falling under clause
(b) at any time within four years of the end of that
year, serve on the assessee, or, if the assessee is a
company, on the principal officer thereof, a notice
containing all or any of the requirements which may
be included in a notice under sub-section (2) of section 22 and may proceed to assess or re-assess such
income, profits or gains or recompute the loss or
depreciation allowance; and the provisions of this
Act shall, so far as may be, apply accordingly as if
the notice were a notice issued under that sub-section :
"
Act XXXIII of 1954 introduced into section 34
sub-sections (1-A) tu (1-D).
Section 34(I-A) which is
material for our purposes provided:
"Section. 34 (1-A) : If, in the case of any assessee,
the Income-tax Officer has reason to be!ieve'(i) that income, profits or gains chargeable to
income-tax have escaped assessment for any year in
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1257
respect of which the relevant previous year falls
wholly or partly within the period beginning on the
1st day of September, 1939, and ending on the 31st
day of March, 1946; and,
(ii) that the income, profits or gains which
have so escaped asses,sment for any such year or years
amount, or are likely to amount, to one lakh of
rupees or more;
he may, notwithstanding that the period of eight
years or, as the case may be, four years specified in
sub-section ( 1) has expired in respect thereof, serve
on the asses,see, or, if the assessee is a company, on
the principal officer thereof, a notice containing all
or any of the requirements which may be included
in a notice under sub-section (2) of section 22, and
may proceed to assess or re-assess the income, profits
or gains of the asse~see for all or any of the years
referred to in clause (i), and thereupon the provisions
of this Act (excepting those contained in clauses ( i)
and (iii) of the proviso to sub-section (1) and in subsections (2) and (3) of this section) shall, so far as
may be, apply accordingly:
Provided that the Income-tax Officer shall not
issue a notice under this sub-section unless he has
recorded his reasons for doing so, and the Central
Board of Revenue is.' satisfied on such reasons recorded
that it is a fit case for the issue of such notice:
Provided further that no such notice shall be
issued after the 31st day of March, 1956".
Amended section 34 ( 1) of the Indian Income-tax
Act was substantially different from the old section
34(1) which was in operation up to the 8th September
1948. The words "if in consequence of definite information which has come into his possession the
Income-tax Officer discovers that income, profits or
gams chargeable to income-tax have escaped assessment in any year .......... " which appear in the old
section were substituted by the words "If the Incomethat by reason of
tax Officer has reason to believe
the omission or failure on the part of the assessee
....... , .. income, profits or gains chargeable to in:come-ta'x have
escaped
assessment ....... ; " . The
1955
M. Ct. Muthiah
and 2 others
V•
The Commissioner
of Income-tax,
Madras and
another
Bhagwati].
1258
1955
M. Ct. Muthiah
and 2 others
V·
The Commissiontr
of lncome-.ttzx,
Madras and
another
Bhagwati].
SDPREME C'OORT REPORTS
[19551
requmtes of (i) "definire" information (ii) which had
"come into" possession of the Income -tax Officer and
in consequence of which (iii) he "discovers" that income, profits or gains chargeable to income-tax had
escaped assessment, were no longer necessary and the
only thing which was required to enable the Incom~
tax Officer to take proceedings under section 34 (1)
as amended was that he should have reason to believe that by reason of the omission or failure on the
part of the assessee income, profits or gains chageable to income-tax had escaped assessment for a particular year. Whereas before this amended section
34( 1) came to be substituted for the old section 34 ( 1)
there was no comparison between the provisions of
section 5(1) of Act XXX of 1947 and section 34(1) of
the Indian Income-tax Act as it then stood, the provi~ons of section 34(1) as amended after the 8th
September 1948 could stand comparison with the provisions of section 5 ( 1) of Act XXX of 1947 and the
cases which were covered by section 5( 1) of Act XXX
of 1947 could be dealt with under the procedure laid
down in section 34(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act.
After the 8th September 1948, therefore, even in the
case of substantial evaders of income-tax who were a
distinct class by themselves intended to be treated
by the drastic and summary procedure laid down by
Act XXX of 1947, some cases that were already referred by ' the Central Government for investigation
by the Commission could be dealt with under that
Act and other cases, though falling within the same
class or category, could be dealt with under the procedure prescribed in the amended section 34(1) of the
Indian Income-tax Act. The persons who were thus
dealt with under section 34(1) of the Indian Incometax Act had available to them the whole pmcedure
laid down in that Act including the right to inspect
documents and the right to question the findings of
fact arrived at by the Income-tax Officer by the procedure of appeal · and revision and ultimate scrutiny
by the
Income~tax Appellate Tribunal which was·
denied tt> those persons whose cases had been. refeued
by the Central Government for investigation by the
-
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1259
Commission under section 5(1) of Act XXX of 1947.
The juxta-position of dates is also very instructive.
It may be noted that in Act XXX of 1947 as it was
originally enacted, the period up to which the
Central Government could make the references to the
Commission for investigation was laid down in section
5(1) of the Act to be 30th June 1948. This period
was extended to the 1st September 1948 by the Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Second
Amendment Act, 1948 (XLIX of 1948). Act XLIX
of 1948 was passed by the Central Legislature and
received the assent of the Governor-General on the
8th September 1948, the s,ame day on which Act
XL VIII of 1948 which amended section 34(1) of the
Indian Income-tax Act also received the assent of the
Governor-General. Both these Acts, viz., Act XLVIII
of 1948 and Act XLIX of 1948 were passed simultaneously and obviously with a view to bring the provisions of section 5(1) of Act XXX of 1947 and section
34(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act in tune with each
other.
It appears to have been realized that the
substantial evaders of income-tax in respect of whom
the Central Government had prim a facie reasons for
believing that they had to a substantial extent evaded
payment of taxation on income could not have their
cases referred for investigation
by the Commission
after the 30th June 1948, that having been the time
limit originally prescribed in section 5(1) of the Act.
It also appears to have been felt that the period
could . not possibly be extended beyond the 1st
September 1948 with the result that apart from
the cases of sustantial evaders of income-tax which
were referred by the Central Government for investigation to the Commission up to the 1st September
1948 there would be a large number of such cases
which though they could not be referr.ed for investi- ·
gation to the Commission would have to be dealt with
under the ordinary provisions for taxation of income
that had escaped assessment available in section 34
and the cognate sections of the Indian Income-tax
Act. As section 34(1) then stood, the requisites of
25-85 S. C. India/59.
1955
M. Ct. Muthiah
and 2 others
V•
The Commissioner
of Income-tax,
Madras and
another
Bhagwati].
126C
I9D5
M. Ct. Muthish
and 2 oth1rJ
v.
Tiu Commissioner
of Income-tax,
Madras and
atroth~
Bhsgwali].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
definite information coming into the possession of the
Income-tax Officer in consequene of which he discovered that income, profits or gains chargeable to
income-tax had escaped assessment would certainly
net have availed the Government in tracking down
these substantial evaders of income-tax and it appears, therefore, to have been thought necessary that
section 34( I) of the Indian Income-tax Act should be
amended so as to enable the Income-tax Officer to take
proceedings thereunder if he had reason to beli:ve
that by reason of omission or failure on the part of
the assessee ........ income, profits or gains chargeable
to income-tax had escaped assessment for the relevant period. An amendment of section 34(1) in this
manner would enable Government to pass on the requisite information which they had obtained in regard
to the substantial evaders of income-tax to the Income-tax Officers concerned and ask the Income-tax
Officers to take proceedings against those evaders of
income-tax under the amended section 34(1) of the
Indian Income-tax Act. That appears to have been
the real object of the amendment of section 34(1) of
the Indiau Income-tax Act with effect from the 8th
September 1948. The Commission would proceed
with the references which were made to them up to
the 1st September 1948 and the Income-tax Offi.;ers
concerned would take the requisite proceedings under
section 34(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act as amended after the 8th September 1948 against all persons
whose income, profits or gains had escaped assessm·ent
including substantial evaders of income-tax whose
casrs would certainly have been referred by the
Central ·Government for investigation to the Coµ1mission if it had been possible for them to do so before
the first September 1948.. After the 8th September
1948, there· were two procedures simultaneously in
operation, the one under Act XXX of 1947 and the
other under the Indian Income-tax Act with referenc.c
to persons who fell within the same class or category
viz~ that of the substantial evaders of income-tax.
After the 8th September 1948, therefore, some persons
who fell within the class of substantial evaders of
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1261
income-tax were dealt with under the drastic and
summary procedure prescribed under Act XXX of
1947, while other persons who fell within the same
class of substantial evaders of income-tax could be
dealt with under the procedure prescribed in the
Indian Income-tax Act after service of notice upon
them under the amended section 34(1) of the Act.
Different persons, though falling under the same class
or category of supstantial evaders of income-tax,
would, therefore, be subject to different procedures,
one a summary and drastic procedure and the oth~r a
normal procedure which gave to the assessees various
rights which were denied to those who were specially
treated under the procedure prescribed in Act XXX
of 1947.
The l_egislative competence being there, these provisions, though discriminatory, could not have been
challenged before
the advent of the Constitution.
When, however, the Constitution came into force on
the 26th January 1950, the citizens obtained the
fundamental rights enshrined in Part III of the Constitution including the right to equality of laws. and
equal protection of laws enacted in article 14 thereof,
and whatever may have been the position before the
26th January 1950, it was open to the persons alleged
to belong to the class of substantial evaders there;
after to ask as to why some of them were subjected
to the summary and drastic procedure prescribed in
Act XXX of 1947 and others were subjected to the
normal procedure prescribed ip section 34 and the
cognate sections of the Indian Income-tax Act, the
procedure prescribed in Act XXX of 1947 bemg
obviously discriminatory and, therefore, violative
the fundamental right guaranteed under article 14 of
the Constitution.
of
It would be no answer to suggest that those substantial evaders whose. cases were referred by the
Central Government for inves;tigation by the Commission before the 1st September 1948 formed a class
by themselves leaving others though belonging to the
same class or category of substantial evaders of
1955
M•·OI. Mrilllidh
and2 othm
V•
Thr Go1nmwio111r
of1mo~,
MadrM arid
anothlr
Bhagwati J•
1262
1955
M; Ct. Muthiah
and 2 others
v.
TM Commissioner
Qf Income-tax,
Madras and
another
Bhagwati J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
income-tax to be dealt with by the ordinary procedure
prescribed
in the Indian Income-tax Act without
infringing the fundamental right guaranteed under
article 14 of the Constitution. A similar argument
had been advanced before us by the learned AttorneyGeneral appearing for the Commission in Shree
Meenakshi Mills' case, supra. The ground which he
had urged was "that the class of persons dealt with
under section 5(1) of Act XXX.of 1947 was not only
the class of substantial tax dodgers but it was a class
of persons whose cases the Central Government, by
1st September, 1948, had referred to the Commission
and that class had thus become determined finally on
that date, and that that clas$ of persons could be
dealt with by the Investigation Commission under
the drastic pz:ocedure of Act XXX of 1947 while section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act as amended
empowered the I11come-tax Officer to deal with cases
other than those whose cases had been referred
under section 5(1) to the Investigation Commission
...... " Mahajan, C. J. who delivered the judgment
of the Court dealt with this argument at page 795 (')
as under:
"As regards the first contention canvassed by the
learned Attorney-General it seems to us that it cannot stand scrutiny. The class of persons alleged to
have been dealt with by section 5 ( 1) of the impugned
Act was comprised of those unsocial elements in
society who during recent years prior to the passing
of the Act and made substantial profits and had
evaded payment of tax on those profits and whose
cases were referred to the Investigation Commission
before 1st September, 1948. Assuming that evasion
of tax to a substantial amount could form a basis of
classification at all for imposing a drastic procedure
on that class,, che inclusion of only such of them whose
cases had been referred before 1st September, 1948,
into a class. for being dealt with by the drastic procedure, leaving other tax evaders to be dealt with
under the ordinary law will be a clear discrimination
for the reference of the case within a particular time
(!) [1955] l $.C.R. ·787, 795.
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1263
has no special or rational nexus with · the necess.ity
for drastic procedure ...... "
These observations were made to repel the particular
argument of the learned Attorney-General but they
did not lay down that in fact section 5(1) was confined to such a limited class.
We are further supported in this view by the fact
that by the later amend111ent of section 34 of the
Indian Income-tax Act effected by Act XXXIII of
1954, the· time limit for the issue of notice under section 34(1-A) of the Indian focome~tax Act has been
fixed as the 31st day of March 1956. It is, therefore,
clear that the period miginally fixed for the reference
of the cases of substantial evaders of income-tax for
investigation by the Commission, viz., 30th June, 1948
or the extended period, viz., 1st September, 1948 provided in section 5(1) of Act XXX of 1947 or the
period fixed by the new section 34(1-A) of the Indian
Income-tax Act., viz., 31st day of March 1956 was not
a necessary attribute of the class of substantial
evaders of income-tax but was merely an accident and
a measure of administrative convenience and was not
an element in the formation of the particular class of
substantial evaders of income-tax.
It follows, therefore, that after the inauguration of
the C,onstitution on the 26th January, 1950, the persons whose cases were referred for investigation by
Central Government to the Commission up to the 1st
September, 1948 could, to use the words of Mahajan,
C. J. in Shree Meenakshi Mills' case, supra, at page 794
ask:
" ...... why are we now being dealt with by the
discriminatory and drastic procedure of Act XXX of
1947 when those similarly situated as ourselves can
be dealt with by the Income-tax Officer under the
amended provisions of section 34 of the Act? Even
if we once bore a distinctive label that distinction no
longer subsists and the label now borne by us is the
same as is borne by persons who can be dealt with
under section 34 of the Act as amended; in other
words, there is nothing uncommon either in properties
or in characteristics between us and those evaders · of
1955
M. Ct. Muthiah
and 2 others
"·
T ht Gommissiontr
of Income-tdx,
Madras and
another
Bhagwat. J.
1264
-
1955
M. Cl. Mulhiah
ad2 oU-1
. ~.
TM Commi1,;o,,,,
of I11eonu-lax,
Madra10nd
QMJ/ur
Bhagwali].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
income-tax who are to be discovered by the Incometax Officer under the provision~ of amended section
34".
We may also add, adopting the same phraseology,
that in our judgment, no satisfactory answer can be
returned to this query because the field on which the
amended section 34(1) operated from and after the
26th fanuary 1950 induded the strip of territory
which was also occupied by section 5 ( 1) of Act XXX
of 1947 and two Siubstantially different laws of pr<>cedure, one being more prejudicial to the assessee
than the other, could not be allowed to operate on
the same field in view of the guarantee of article 14
of the Constitution.
·
The result, therefore, is that barring the cases of
persons which were already concluded by reports
made by the Commission and the directions given by
the Central Government under section 8(2) of Act
XXX of 1947 culminating in the assessment or reassessment of the escaped income, those .cases which
were pending on the 26th January 1950 for investigation before the Commission as also the assessment or
re-assessment proceedings which were pending on, the
26th January 1950 before the Income-tax Officers
concerned in pursuance of the directions given by the
Central Government under section 8(2) of the Act
would be hit by article 14 of the Constitution and
would be invalidated. The R. C. Cases 516, 517 and
· 518 relating to M. Ct. M. Chidambaram Chettiar, M.
Ct. Muthiah Chettiar and Devanai Achi were pending
before the Commission on the 26th January 1950, the
report therein not having been made by the Commission till the 26th August 1952 and the Commission
had, after the 26th January 1950, no jurisdiction to
complete the investigation and make their report, the
whole procedure . being violative of the fundamental
right guaranteed to the petitioners under article I4
of the Cons ti tu tio n.
This position was not in terms argued before us by
the learned counsel for the petitioners. It Was. urged
in th!' first in;tance that the case was governed by
our decision in Shree Meenakshi Mjl/s' case, supra, 011
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
11.65
the basis that by reason of the applications to the
Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras, made by the
pet1t10ners under section 8(5) of the Act for reference
to the High Court on questions of law arising out of
the Income-tax Officer'.s re-asses3ment orders above
referred to, the proceedings under Act XXX of 1947
had not become final and the petitioners were, therefore, entitled to relief on the ratio of our judgment in
that case. Reliance was placed in support of this
position on the provisions. of section 8(4) of the Act:
"In all assessme.nt or re-assessment proceedings
taken in pursuance of a direction under sub-section (2), the findings recorded by the Commission
on .the case or on the points referred to it shall, subject to the provisions of sub-sections (5) and (6), be
final; but no proceedings taken in pl,lTsuance of such
direction shall be a bar to the initiation of proceedings under section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act,
1922 (XI of 1922)".
Sub-section (5) has reference to the applicacion made
by the assessee to the Commissioner of Income-tax
to refer to the High Court any question of law arising
out of the assessment or re-'assessment orders and
sub-section (6) has reference to the power of the
Commission either of their own motion or on the application of the person concerned or of the Central
Government to cmrect clerical or arithmetical mistakes in their report or errors therein arising from
any accidental slip or omission ........... These provisions contained in sub-sections (5) and (6), however,
would not make the findings recorded by the Commission any less final. These findings were invested with finality subject to this that if the High
Court, on reference under sub-section
(5), gave any
opinion which would require a revision of those findings or if any clerical or arithmetical mistakes were
found or errors were detected arising from accidental
slip or omission within the meaning of $Uh-section (6)
which also required some aiterations in the findings,
these findings would be divested of their finality and
would have to be revised accordingly. The' assess··
ment or re-assessment orders made by the Income-
1955
M. Ct. Muthiala
llff(f 2 othet•
v.
The CorrrmiJsi11111r
of ~w-lllx,
Mllllruad
antJlhtr
Bha11111oli J.
1266
1955
M. Cl. MuJhiah
and 2 othlrs ·
v.
The Commissio1t1r
of Income·t~,
Madras and
another ·
Bhagwati J.
SUBREME COURT REPORTS
[1955}
tax Officers
based upon those. findings would also be
binding on the assessees subject only to the result of
the reference, if any, made to the High Court on
questiofl.I ()f law arising out of such orders;
If this was the true position it could not be urged
that by rn:J$bn of the. pendency of the applications for
reference to the High Court the proceedings under
Act XXX of. 1947 had not been concluded against the
petitioners and it could not· also be urged that when
Act XXXIII of 1954 was enacted introducing section 34(1-A) in the Income-tax Act with effect from
the 19th July 1954, the R.C. Cases ·516 to 518 were
pending and the whole proceedings under Act XXX
of 1947 against the petitioners were invalidated.
As
a matter of fact the report had been made by the
Commission against the petitioners as early as the
26th August 1952, the Central Government had given
the directions under sectior 8(2) for re-assessment of
the petitioners on the 16th September 1952 and the
re-assessment orders for all the years except the year
1942-43 had been made by the Income-tax Officer
against them by the 12th May 1954 which was long
before the Act XXXIII of 1954 came into operation.
All these re-assessments had thus become binding on
the petitioners and were not affected by the mere
pendency of the applic;ations for reference to the High
Court made by them to the Commissioner of lncometax, Madras, under section 8(5) of the Act .
. There is also a further point to be considered
in
this c.onnection and it is that whatever discriminatory
procedure the petitioners were subjected to by reason
of the reference of their cases by the Central Government to the Commission under section 5(1) of the Act
had been completed long before the Act XXXI!l of
1954 came into operation and the only further procedure which they would be subjected under the provisions of Act XXX of 1947 would be that of a reference to the High Court on questions of law arising
out of the orders of re-assessment if these applications were granted either by the Commissioner of
Income-tax, Madras, or by the High Court on further
application.
In the event of such reference being
,_.
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1267
1955
made, the petitioners had the additional advantage
of ·having their references heard by the High Court M~ Cl. Muthiah
an1f2 o•Mr•
in a Bench constituted of not less than three Judges
V'
as contrasted with the normal procedure obtaining T lie· Commissioner
of Income-tax,
under seGtions 66 and 66-A of the Indian lncome-taX
Madras and
another
Act under which the references could be heard by a
Division
Bench of the High Court. Whatever was,
BMgwati'J.
therefore, the procedure to which the petitioners
would be subjected under Act XXX of 1947, after
the coming into operation of Act XXXIII of 1954 it
was, in~tead of being prejudicial to them, really advantageous to them, and following our decisions in
the cases of Syed Qasim Rawi v. The State of Hyderabad and Others(1) and Habeeb Mohamed v. The State of
Hyderabad{2), we are of the opinion that the further
proceedings, if any, which could be taken under the
provisions of Act XXX of 1947 would not be at all
discriminatory and violative of the fundamental right
guaranteed under article 14 of the Constitution.
The only relief which the petitioners would have
been entitled to in that event would have been one
in regard to the re-assessment proceedings for the
year 1942-43 which were pending before the Income- ·
tax Officer by . virtue of the notice under section 34
issued by him to the petitioners on the 19th March
1954. Reliance was placed up9n a decision of the
Allahabad High Court reported in .Gangadhar Baijnath and others v. Income-tax Investigation Commission,
.etc.(3) in support of this position. The learned Solicitor-General did not contest .this position but undertook on behalf of the Income-tax authorities that
they will not proceed against the petitioners for the
re-assessment for the year 1942-43 in pursuance of
the notice under section 34 served upon them in that
behalf.
This would have been the only relief to which the
petitioners would have become entitled on the main
contention urged by them in their petition. The
petitioners are, however, entitled to succeed on the
:alternative contentions which were raised by them as
(!) [1953] S.C.R. 589.
(2) [1953] S.C.R. 661.
!3) A.LR. 1955 All. 515.
1268
1955
M. Ct. MuJbiaJi
and 2. others
v.
The CommilsioM
of lncomt.J4X,
Madras01J4
"""'""
Bhagwati ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
the result of the conclusion whicl'. we have reached
above in regard to the proceedings pending before the
Commission having become discriminatory after the
26th January 1950 by reason of, section 5 ( 1) of the
A.ct having become unconstitutional after the inauguration of the Constitution on that date.
In the result, the petitioners will be entitled to the
issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the report of the
Income-tax Investigation Commission dated the 29th
August 1952 and the ~ssessment orders of the Incometax Officer for the years 1940-41, 1941-42 and 1943-44
to 1948-49 as being unconstitutional, null and void,
and also to the issue of a writ of prohibition against
the respondents from implementing the findings of
the Investigation Commission referred to above with
regard to the year 1942-43 and we do order that such
writs do issue against the respondents accordingly.
The respondents will pay the petitioners' costs of this
petition.
]AGANNADHADAS
J.-This petition raises the question whether section 5(1) of the Taxation on Income
(Investigation Commission) Act, 1947 (Act XXX of
1947)
(here:nafter referred to as the Investigation
is
unconstitutional as offending
Commission Act)
article 14 of the Constitution and has therefore become void on the coming into force of the Constitution ·on the 26th January, 1950. This question was
specifically left open in the two previous decisions of
this Court, -.·'.z. in Suraj Mall Mohta & Co. v. A. V.
Visvanatha Sastri(') and S/zree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v.
A. V. Visvanatha Sastri('). Almost the identical question arose in the Travancore Appeals(") .in which judgment has just now been delivered. The provision
with which we were concerned in those appeals is
section 5(1) of Travancore Act XIV of 1924 which is
almost in identical terms as section 5(1) of the Investigation Commission Act.
·we have held that this
section of the Travancorc Act did not, on the coming
(!) [1955] I S.C.R. 448.
(2) [19.oSJ ! S.C.R. 787.
(3) A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar v. Aul~orised Official, J:T., [1955] 2
S.C.R. 1196.
25.C.R.
SUPREME COURT· REPORTS
1269
into · opcraticti ' of . the, Constitution, 'Tiolate : article · ,14
therrof , and that. :it; accdrdinglr continued to ' .be valid.
This rault· was· based on; the: .following. conclusions. · ·
(a) The: apre.ssion•.t'a.personwho. has ,fo a snl:istantial cxte1it;:•cva0ed payment of<,taii:ation ·.on income" has' to .be. interpreted ·. having regard · ·to the
batkground ·; .•Or· ,. the; i. circumstances ., that,.': preceded at
the time thel section.> came< to· be. enacted ' and .which
were~discloscd .in .the :i.Jlidavit."filed·"in this Cotirt by
the Secretary of. ·the! Investigation"· Conhnission ·and ·so
interpreted• ,. the 1word,1. ''.s'ubstantial'"; .:indicates. with
reasonable certainty the class of persons intended .to
be subjected to·•the·dra!tic:· procedtm! .-of the: Act.'
(b) ·The 'selective :application 'of1the·law•to.'•persons
in this: class .. canribt be .. considered .invalid since the
selection is • guided by .. the 'very objective·' set• out · iri
section.5(1)itself.:. "'"•· ·• "'"'
"" .......
. (c),The fact" that some persons may Csc:ape·the.:ipplication .. of .. the law ·,fa not necessarily .. destructive of
the dlicicy of •the provision;" .i." ·>.
·" "'. · .·.' ·
It was also: held, on :i. •comparison with·.section-47:.of
the Travancore ·Act XXIII of. 1121; corresponding' to
section.· 34 '.of·the>.Indian1·Income'.tax .:Act;• 1922,.(XI.
of ·1922) as it stood 1prior to 'its',:iniendment· in•'.1948,
that ..the persons ; wbo fall under the ..class of sub-.
stantiab evaders of. income-tax within the , meaning •·of
section 5 ( l) · of the 1 • Investigation ·Commission cAct: were
not .interided .. ,,to '' be·1and. could not have i: been ·'.:dealt
with· under the'.prcivisions ... of,isection 47 of.the T;avan.i
core 'Act -.XXIIL.of,,.1~21. and ·that I therefore: there
would be no.-discriminatory· · :ipplieatiorr of: ·two parallel
•
t:-statu:~ryg~o;~=;,'.'c~~Lr h~~~e~:: •t~~· ~aj~rl~ ~f th~
-<
Court has;;;taken.1 the•.vlew~: that section:, 5(1) of.the
Investigation '·'"Commission .. , Act· . his,,] :become'. unconstitutianal ' by' the" date of the;" Constitution' in compa-.
rison ,.:·with•: 'section·;.,34, ·of· ·the .Incotrie,taxL.-Act. as
amended. in:~1 ·l948;;" Itw'as .. poirlted 1out.• that· section· 47.
of :i•the i Travancore• i Act' XXIII ·.of' 112hwhich' rwas.the
same ... 'as sectionl3-Lof1•the""1ncome-tax 'Actc:•as it:stood
from, 1939,, tD• 1943 ,,;did1 not'' undergo •'any·:!' amendmmt
by ·tho· date 1coftlie ... Constitutioll'" ·bubmritiriuedr.,·as brio
•
195.i
M. Cl.MuJ/iia4
...
a>rd 2 •'""'
Tu CommisJ;.,,,,,.
ofl=-taz,
.&!a<l=a>rd
OJWl/1n
jag""1U1dNiJas ].
1270
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
1955
'fore and it is said that this makes a difference. I feel
M. Ct. MuJhiall
and 2 others
constrained, howevei, with the utmost respect, to
hold, on a careful ,consideration that there is no room
for making any such distinction which is relevant for
the purposes of this question. Undoubtedly it is true
that section 34 of the Income-tax Act as it stood prior
to 1948 is more restrictive i.n its operation than the
same section as amended in 1948. But I am unable to
see how the class falling under sec!ion 5(1) of the
Investigation Commission Act is still not different
from that which falls within amended section 34 of
the Income-tax Act.
Under section 5( I) of the Investigation Commission
Act the requirement is that .the Central Government
has "pr.ima fade reasons for believing that a person
has to a ,substantial extent evaded payment of taxation on income". This is quite different from the
criteri0n applicable under the amended section 34
of the Jn,,otne-tax Act. In the first place, section 34
of the Income-tax Act relates to cases of evasion however small, while section 5(1) of the Investigation
Commission Act relates only to large-scale evaders
comprised within the terl}1 "substantial evasion".
Secondly, the belief of the Government as to the existenc~ of
evasion need not satisfy any rigorous
standard because it need not be based on any material
directly connected with the suspected evasion. It is
enough if it is a "prima facie reason to believe" which
having regard to the scheme of the Act would cover
cases m which
tell-tale appearances may call for
probing and effective investigation. This may well
be no more than "well-grounded reason io suspect".
This is quite different from the standard to "reason
to believe" required of the Income-tax Officer under
section 34 of the Income-tax Act. "Prima facie reason
to believe" and "reason to believe" are as different
from each other as "prim a facie proof" and "proof".
therefore "reason to believe" is something definitely
higher than "reason to suspect". Indeed, it is difficult to compare the standards required under the two
sections. Though no doubt the power exercisable by
the Central Government under section 5 ( 1) of the
V'
The Commissioner
of /tuom8"-tax,
Mlldras and
another
Jagannadhadas J,
2S.C.R.
.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1271
Investigation Commission Act and that exercisable
by the Income-tax Officer under section 34 of the Income-tax Act have this in common that both have
reference to "reason to believe", the standard of
belief and the basis of belief is expressed in such
different terminology that it is not possible to compare
the two and equate the two as being the same. Nor
indeed can it be posited that every case of the class
comprised in section 5(1) of the Investigation Commission Act must necessarily fall within section 34 of
the Income-tax Act.
Apart, however, from any question as to the comparison between the two sections and as to the standards and basis of the belief required, once it is
accepted (as has been done in the Travancore
Appeals(1) that substan'tial evasion is a definite legal
standards determinative of a distinct class, it is clear
that the class comprised thereunder is not identical
with the class comprised under section 34 of the Income-tax Act. In the alternative, it is a select, group
of a wider class. If the smaller grouping is on a
rational basis relevant to the policy of the Act, it
would form a distinct class by itself for purposes of
article 14.
It is necessary at this stage to bear in mind the
entire scope of the Investigation Commission Act in
order to determine what the class is which is contemplated and covered by it. Five main features
may be noticed of the scheme of the Investigation
Commission .Act.
(1) It relates only to those in respect of whom
the Government have "prima facie reason to believe
that there has been substantial evasion of tax".
(2) The belief does not result straightaway in
proceedings .for reassessment (unlike under section 34
of the Income-tax Act) but the question of reassessment (i.e., reopening of the assessment) depends on
investigation into the correctness of that belief. The
first step in the scheme is section 5(2) which contemplates that the investigation may result in substantial
([) A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar v. Authorised Official, I.T., [1955] 2
S.C.R. 1196.
1955
M. Ct. Muthiah
and 2 others
v.
The CommiJSioner
of Income-tax,
Madras and
another
Jagannadhadas J.
1272
1955
M. Ct. Muthiah
and 2 other1
v.
The Commissioner
of Income-tax,
Madras and
another
agannadhadas J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
evasion not being revealed. If so the further proceedings would be dropped on a report by the ComHence no reassessment starts
mission to that effect.
in such a case.
(3) An effective procedure for investigation is
provided to bring out all the necessary and relevant
facts and material to substantiate the evasion and
quantum thereof.
( 4) Proceedings for reassessment are taken on! y
on the emergence of such material and on a report to
that effect and that too on a further direction by the
Government as to the exact nature of the proceedings
to be taken and as to the exact period to be covered
falling within the limits of 31st December, 1938 and
1st September, 1948. (See sections 8(2) and 5(3) of
the Investigation Commission Act).
(5) A reference could be made by the Gover'1ment
to the Commission only up to a specified date line
statutorily determined.
If all these facts which are essential part of the
scheme under the Investigation Commission Act are
borne in mind it becomes apparent that the class
contemplated under section 5(1) of the lnvestigz.tion
Commission Act for reassessment is totally different
from that which could be got at either under section 34 of the Income-tax Act as it stood between
1939 and 1~48 or as it stands since 1948. One has
only to compace the provisions in the Income-tax
Act relating to the means by which the normal income-tax authorities can get information or obtain
material which might lead to a reopening "of the assessment under section 34 of the Income-tax Act to appreciate that
the class contemplated under section
5(1) of the Investigation Commission Act cannot be
the same. The only provisions in the income-tax law
for the purpose are sections 37, 38 and 39 of the Incometax Act. The primary scheme of the Income-tax Act
is that the basic materials for the assessment are ibe
returns and the accounts or other evidence to be furnished by the 1Ssessce himself (sections 22 and 23 of
the Income-ta.•: Act) or the checking material that
may be availa'.ile from the returns and the accounts
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1273
1955
of other assessees who have transactions with this
assessee. It may also consist of information received
M. Ct. Mitthiah
arid 2 others
from
other public authorities, etc., as well as the
v.
examination of persons appearing to have intercon- The Commissioner
of Income-tax,
nected
transactions.
The Income-tax Officer has
Madras and
not the power to probe into suspecious features or
another
obtain and seize material in verification or support
Jagannadhadas J.
thereof. All that normally he can do, where there is
room for grave suspicion is to reject the accounts and
make his assessment on the basis of "best judgment"
(see section 23(4) of the Income-tax Act) which cannot be sustained if it is a wild guess based on mere
susp1C1on. Now, the whole scheme of the Investigation Commission Act is obviously inspired by the
realisation that the normal machinery available to
the Income-tax Officer for the reassessment of large
scale suppressed income is not adequate. All the
same, the Legislature realising that drastic investigation into the affairs of assessees on seemingly wellgrounded suspicions might . result in serious encroachment of personal liberties, has not chosen to vest the
Income-tax Officer with any such powers of investigation and has confined this drastic procedure to evasion of income during the period commencing 1st
January, 1939 to the 1st September, 1948 ( vide sections 8(2) and 5(3) of the Investigation Commission
Act) and limited the same to cases of substantial
evasion.
In considering, therefore, what is the ambit
of the class contemplated by section 5 ( 1) of the Investigation Commission Act, it is necessary to remember these features of the scheme. It would follow that the class comprised in. section 5(1) is the
class of substantial evaders whose evasion appeared
to the Government to call for a high-powered machinery for effective investigation, not available to
an ordinary Income-tax Officer functioning under
section 34 of the Income-tax Act. So understood it
is quite dear, to my mind, that section 5(1) of the
Investigation Commission Act relates to a class
totally different from what can be brought in under
section 34 of the Income-tax Act as it, either stood
before; or stands after,. 1948. That this .class was
1274
1955
M. CJ. MuJhiak
and 2 others
v.
The Commis;ioner
of Income-tax,
Madras and
another
Jaganr.adhadas J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
really contemplated to be distinct is also indicated
by the following provision of section 8(4) of the
Investigation Commission Act.
"No proceedings taken in pursuance of such
direction (direction made under section 8(2) for reassessment) shall be a bar to the initiation of pmceedings under section 34 of the Indian Income-tax
Act".
This seems to indicate the possibility of concurrent
assessment proceedings as against any particular assessee under section 34 of the Income-tax Act as also
under section 8(2) of the Investigation Commission
Act. The idea appears to be that section 34 proceedings may go on in respect of such income of the assessee the escaping of which comes to the knowledge
of the officer by the normal procedure, and that the
reassessment under the Investigation Commission Act
is expected to be in respect of such evaded income
which is to be discovered only as a result of regular
and effective investigation.
It has been suggested in the course of arguments
that no objection could be taken to Government
taking only sufficient powers for investigation in
appropriate cases, without any question arising as to
discrimination or classification but that this cannot
justify discriminatory procedure as regards
actual
reassessment. That raises a different aspect of the
matter which will be presently dealt with.
Assuming however that substantial evaders contemplated under section 5(1) of the Investigation
Commission Act fall also within the larger class of
evaders who fall within the class contemplated by
section 34 of the Income-tax Act as it stands, what
follows? The selective group under section-5(1) of the
Investigation Commission Act is determined with
reference to the criteria ( 1) that they are substantial
evaders of income-tax, and (2) that they are assessees
within the period 1939 to 1948 which is well-known
to be the period of war profits and black-marketing
and in respect of whom the Government get information before 1st September, 1948, justifying investigation. This is by itself a well-defined class and the
•
2 S.C.'R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1275
classification has a reasonable relation to the object
to be achieved, viz., the catching up of the escaped
black-market war profits, for assessment. It is to be
assumed that the Government would have made their
references to the Investigation . Commission of all the
cases of persons about whom they have the requisite
belief or information before 1st September, 1948. If
there are any war profiteers of that period against
whom there was no information by then and against
whom information becomes available later, it will be
probably found -that the information so received is
not such as to enable the ordinary Income-tax Officer
to rope him in. It may turn out that he has evaded
once for all. But even if, in some cases, the Incomeby the ordinary process get the estax Officer could
caped income of such assessees for rea&sessment, that
by itself is no ground for thinking that a classification of substantial war profiteers who have evaded
iI).come-tax and against whom there was
information
up to a specified date is not in itself a valid classification. It is well-recognised that a classification otherinvalid by reason of the classiwise reasonable is not
fication not being comprehensive.
Jn Joseph Patsone v. Commont11ealth of Pennsylvania (1) the Supreme Court of the United States of
America laid down that"a state may classify with reference to the evil
to be prevented, and that if the class discriminated
against is or .reasonably might be considered to define
those from whom the evil mainly is to be feared, it
properly may be picked out. A lack of abstract
symmetry does not matter. The question is a practical one dependent upon experience ........ It is not
enough to invalidate the law that others may do the
same thing and go unpunished, if, as a matter of fact,
it is found that the •danger is characteristic of the
class named".
Again in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Ernest Parrish(') the
same Court stated"This Court has frequently held that the legisla(1) 232 U.S. 138 144; 58 L. Ed. 539, 543.
(2) 300 U.S. 379, 400; 81 L. Ed. 703, 713.
26-85 S.C. India/59
1955
M. Ct. Muthiah
and 2 othm
v.
The Commissioner
of Income-ta.'<,
Madras and
another
Jagannadhadas J.
1276
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
1955
tive authority, acting within its proper field, is not
bound to extend its regulation to all cases which it
and 2 others
might possibly reach. The legislature 'is free to
v.
The Commissiotrlf
recognize degrees of harm and it may confine its
of Income-tax,
restrictions to those classes of cases where the need is
Madras and
another ·
deemed to be clearest'. If 'the law presumably 11its
the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be overthrown
Jagannadhadas .7·
because there are other instances to which it might
have been applied'. There is no 'doctrinaire requirement' that the legislation should be couched in all
embracing terms".
It is substantially the above view of permissible
classification for the purposes of article 14 that has
been recognised by this Court in Sakhawat .1li v. The
State of Orissa( ') where this Court laid down as follows:
"Legislation enacted for the achievement of a
particular object or purpose need not be all embracing.
It is for the legislature to determine what
categories it would embrace within the scope of legislation and merely because certain categories which
would stand on the same footing as those which are
covered by the legislation are left out would not
render legislation which has been enacted in any
manner discriminatory and violative of the fun<la, mental right guaranteed by article 14 of the ConstiM. Ct. Muthiah
tution".
Even if therefore section 34 of the IncomNax Act
as amended in 1948 is wide enough in its ambit to
catch up any and every case which could be dealt
with under section 5(1) of the Investigation Commission Act, it is still a distinctive and selective group. out
of a larger group and is a class by itself determined
with reference to the criteria above indicated. It is no
objection to the constitutionality of that classification
that some out of them who may have been left out
may be taken up later for being proceeded against
under the amended section 34 of the Income-tax Act.
The Class falling within the scope of the Investigation
Commission Act is a class closed with reference to
the date-line, 1st September, 1948, and it appears to
me difficult to envisage the possibility of any member
(I) (1955] i S. C.R. 1004, 1010.
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1277
1955
of that class being available to be dealt with by the
Income-tax Officer under the amended section 34 of
M. Ct. Muthiah
and 2 others
the Income-tax Act which came into operation from
v.
after that date-line except by imputing mala ft.des to The Commissioner
-of Income-tax,
the Government in the selective application of section
MatlraJ and
5(1)- of the Investigation Commission Act. It is true
another
that the date-line was changed by legislature from Jagannatlhatlas J.
30th June, 1948 to 1st September, 1948. But it was
an essential part of the whole scheme of the legislation that there was to be no reference beyond a dateline to be fixed by the legislature, so as to limit the
application of the Act. Hence it is also an attribute
of the class contemplated by the Act.
I am aware that there are observations in Surai
Mall Mohta's case<1) and Shree Meenakshi Mills' case( 2 )
which appear not to have accepted the idea of the
class being with reference to a date-line. But the
actual decision in Suraj Mall Mohta's case( 1 ) was based
on the distinction between section 5 ( 4) and section
5(1) of the Investigation Commission Act and the
consequential parallelism between the class falling
under section 5(4) of the Investigation Commission
Act and section 34(1) of the Income-tax Act. In
Meenakshi Mills' case(2) the decision was rested on the
parallelism between section 5(1) of the Inve3tigation
Commission Act and section 34(1) of the Income-tax
Act as amended in 1954. The decision in neither of
these cases was based on any final determination of
the scope of the class contemplated by section 5(1) of
the Investigation Commission Act. The actual decisions in those cases are of course binning but not
necessarily all the reasoning therein. Besides, with
great respect, the relevancy of the date-line in section
5(1) as having been related to the then contemplated
date for the lapse, in 1948, of the controls under the
Essential
Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946
(Act XXIV of 1946) was not noticed. The principle
of Sakhawat Ali's case( 8 ) was not also by then laid
down by this Court (that case having been decided
later in November, 1954).
( ) [1955) I S. C.R. 448;
(2) [1955] I S~ C.R. 787.
(3) [J9551:1 S. C.R. !004, 1010.
1278
1955
M. Ct. Muthiah
aM 2 others
v.
The Commissioner
of Jncome·la:t,
Madras and
another
JagannodhaJas J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
Further, even if the date-line is not an essential
part of the classification under section 5 ( 1) of the
Investigation Commission Act, the other four essential
features of the scheme of the class contemplated in
section 5(1) as set out by me above are by themselves
enough to constitute a complete and rational differentiation of the class comprised under section 5(1) of
the Investigation Commission Act from
that under
section 34(1) of the Income-tax Act as amended in
1948. If on such a classification some cases of substantial evasion happen to have escaped the machinery of the Investigation Commission Act, that would
not
invalidate
the classification on the principle
accepted in Sakhawat Ali's case( ). I am in any case
unable to visualise the reasonable possibility of any
person falling within the category contemplated under
section 5 ( 1) of the Investigation Commission · Act, being taken up for reassessment under section 34 of the
Income-tax Act as amended in 1948 and consequently
of two parallel reassessment proceedings relating to
such persons remaining pending by the 26th January,
1950, so as to bring about discriminatory operation
between them and to render section 5(1) of the Investigation Commission Act ultra vires in respect of
such pending matters. It appears to me, therefore,
that section 5(1) of the Investigation Commission Act
and the other sections following thereupon cannot be
declared unconstitutional on the ground of absence
of reasonable classification.
One other matter has been relied upon as beirig
relevant. It was pointed out that the amendment of
section 34 of the Income-tax Act in 1948 was simultaneous with the amendment of section 5(3) of the
Investigation Commission Act, extending the time
for a reference under section 5 ( 1) by the Central Government up to the 1st September, 1948. It has been
suggested that this clearly shows the intention
of the legislature to the effect that after the 1st
September, 1948, all cases which might have fallen
under section 5 ( 1) of the Investigation Commission
Act are left to be dealt with under section 34 of the
(l) [1955] I S. C.R. 1004, JOJO.
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1279
Act as amended. It appears to me with respect that
there is no basis for this inference. On the other -hand
it appears to me (if what I have said above as being
the scheme of the Investigation Commission Act is
correct) that the legislature deliberate! y limited the
application of the Investigation Commission Act by
a date-line, realising the seriousness of its continued
operation. It did not want to perpetuate the drastic
provisions thereof to any new cases in view of the fact
that the official war period ended and controls had
been lessened by the above date-line, if not totally
abolished. It may be mentioned that by proclamation,
the war situation was formally terminated as from
the 1st April, 1946, and that the Control Orders under
the Defence of India Act ceased to be operative from
the 1st October, 1946, and that the Essential Supplies
(Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, was passed in substitution thereof. This 1946
Act was intended originally to be in operation only until March, 1948. (See
/oyal Agarwala v. The State( 1 ). The date-line of 1st
September, 1948, in section 5(1) seems to be related
to this situation. It appears to me that with the full
consciousness that any new cases of the same category,
if any, are not likely to be caught up under the
normal procedure, the legislature merely purported
by virtue of the amended section 34 of the Incometax Act to remove certain lacuna in the normal
machinery, which had been noticed and reported upon
by the income-tax administration and by the Investigation Commission, with reference to section 34 as it
stood between 1939 to 1948. (See paragraph 22 of the
General Report of the Income-tax Investigation
Commission issued in 1948 making its recommendations for the improvement of the machinery at page
8 of that report and Appendix A thereto which would
show that amendment of section 34 was not connected
with the extension of the date for making references
under · section 5 ( 1) of the Investigation Commission
Act). I am unable, therefore, to assume that the
simultaneous enactment of section 34 of the Incometax Act and the amendment of Investigation Com(\) [\952) S. C.R. 127, 130.
1955
M. Ct. Muthiah
and 2 others
.v.
The Commissioner
of Income-tax,
Madras and
·anothnJagannadluzdas J.
1280
1955
M. Ct. Mulhian
and 2 othtrs
v.
TM Commis!ioner
ef Income-tax,
Madras and
"""'""
JagOllllad/iadas J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
mission Act in 1948 have a bearing on the question
at issue.
Undoubtedly the re-assessment proceedings under
the Investigation Commission Act appear to deprive
the assessee of certain procedural advantages. He
is deprived eif an appeal on facts to the Appellate
Assistant Commissioner and to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. He is given the right of appeal only
on points of law by means of a reference to the
High Court. But such reference is to be heard by a
Bench of not less than three Judges. Now, once there
is a valid classification the nal:Ure and extent of the
actual discrimination which results under the scheme
of legislation relating thereto is largely a question of
policy, which the courts have nothing to do with,
except possibly where the discrimination has no
reasonable relation to the policy and purpose of the
classification. The policy underlying the Investigation Commission Act is, as already stated, to catch
up for reassessment large scale evasions of income-tax
of the war period. It is obvious that having regard
to the magnitude of the interests that would be involved therein, it was quite legitimate that the
matters concerned
therewith, should be
entrusted
to a highly-qualified and high-powered authority,
and not to the ordinary machinery. No grievance
can be made if the legislature tought fit not to entrust
the responsibility for fact-finding to the normal machinery involving lesser qualifications and experience.
It is true that the investigation might have been
placed in the hands of one authority and the factfinding on the material so gathered in the hands of
another authority or that at least there might have
been provided one appeal on facts also to a highplaced authority like the High Court. It may also
appear somewhat disquieting that the same body is
invested both with the power of investigation and
the power of fact-finding and that there is no appeal
provided as against its findings on facts. But these
are all matters of policy and cannot be, said to be
either unreasonable or unrelated to the purpose and
policy of the classification. Investigation is a com-
l
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1281
prehensive term and it will be seen that the investigation procedure itself under the Act is in two
stages, one before the authorised official a:t which the
assessee is not entitled to be represented and the
other before the Investigation Commission at which
the assessee is entitled to .be represented by a pleader,
a registered accountant of an authorised employee
(vide section 7(3) and the proviso thereto). These
two stages may be taken roughly, though not necessarily, to indicate two parts of the investigation, (1)
the process of probing into the evasion and collecting
the material in support of it, and (2) arriving at conclusions with reference to the material so collected
and presented. The latter is the judicial part at
which the Commission is directed under section 7(2)
to follow the principles of the Indian Evidence Act
and to give the assessee a reasonable opportunity of
rebutting evidence and generally to act in accordance
with the principles of natural justice. The procedure
relating to this stage is assimilated to a judicial enquiry in a larger measure than is the procedure before
the Income-tax Offi,cer or the Appellate Assistant
Commissioner, in respect of whose proceedings there
is no provision that thev must follow as far as
practicable the principles of the Indian Evidence Act.
(See section. 23 of the Income-tax Act). It is wellsettled that the assessment proceedings by the
Income-tax Officer under section 23 of the Incometax Act-and hence also under section 34 thereofare not regulated by the technical standards of evidence though
of course they cannot be based on
caprice or suspicion. It would, therefore, appear that
accor.ding to the scheme of the Investigation Commission Act, the judicial part of it approximates
much more to judicial standards than the assessment
proceedings by the income-tax authorities and that
though in theory there is a combination of the functions of an investigator and the judge in the Investigation Commis~ion, in normal practice it is likely to
be kept .distinct by the appointment of an authorised
official to conduct the first porticn. It is also to be
remembered that the combination of the investigator
1955
M. Cl. Muthialr
tllft/ 2 others
v.
Thi CommisswMr
of Income.tax,
Madras and
another
Jagannadhadas ].
1282
1955
M. Ct. Muthiah
and 2 others
v.
The Commisii<mer
of lncome·tmt.
Madras and
"""'""
]agannad/uJdas ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
and judge is inherent even in the normal income-tax
machinery where the Income-tax Officer and the
Assistant Income-tax Commissioner are in the nature
of Judges interested in their own cause.
It has been suggested that there is something
opposed to ordinary canons of judicial procedure or
natural justice in the matter of making relevant documents available to the assessee in the proceedings
before the · Investigation Commission. It appears to
me, with respect, that this is based on a misapprehension. It is true that section 7 (4) of the Investigation Commission Act says:
''No person shall be entitled to inspect, call for,
or obtain copies of, any documents, statement or
papers or materials furnished to, obtained by or produced before the Commission or any authorised official in any proceedings under this Act; but the Commission, and after the Commission has ceased to exist
such au\hority as the Central Government ·may in
this behalf appoint, may, in its discretion, allow such
·
inspection and furnish such copies to any person."
and section 6(8) of the Investigation Commission Act
says:
"All material gathered by the Commission or the
authorised official and materials accompanying the
reference under sub-section ( 1) of section 5 may be
brought on record ;it such stage as the Commission
may think fit".
But these provisions have to be read subject to the
proviso to section 7 ( 4) and to the opening part of
section 7(2) of the Investigation Commission Act. The
proviso to section 7 ( 4) is as follows:
"Provided that, for the purpose of enabling the
person whose case or points in whose case is or are
being investigated to rebut any evidence brought on
the record against him, he shall, on application made
in this behalf and on payment of such fees as may be
prescribed by Rules made under this Act, be furnished with certified copies of documents, statements,
papers and materials brought on the record .by the
Commission''.
Further, the opening part of section 7(2) says:
2 S.C.R.
I
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1483
1955
"In making an investigation under clause (b) of
section 3, the Commission shall act in accordance M. Ct. Muthiah
and 2 others
with the principles of natural justice, shall follow as
v.
far as practicable the principles of the Indian Evi- The Commissio•er
dence Act, 1872, and shall give the person whose case
of Income-tax,
Madras and
is being investigated a reasonable opportunity of reanothlr
butting any evidence adduced against him ........ ".
The above provisions preclude the possibility of the Jagannadhadas J.
Commission. pushing in into the final record on which
the report is to be based any ex parte material to which
the assessee has had no access. These also preclude
the possibility of depriving him of the use of any
relevant material in the Commission's possession
which the assessee may call for. All that section
7 (4) implies is that the assessee is not entitled to a
roving inspection of the material gathered by the
Investigation Commission in the course of investigation, which may relate to the affairs of various other
persons. Such a provision is not opposed to natural
justice for even in the mai.ter of criminal judicial
trials the accused is not entitled to a roving inspection of the material gathered by the police during
investigation. (I may notice, with very great respect,
tha.t the observation in Suraj Mall Mohta's case( 1 ) at
page 464 that "the proceedings before the Income-tax
Officer are judicial proceedings and (that therefore)
all the incidents of such judicial proceedings have to
be observed, i.e., in other words, the assessee should
be entitled to inspect the record and all relevant
documents'' seems to have failed to note that section
37 ( 1) specifically limits the judicial character of the
proceedings to the purposes covered by sections 193,
196 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code and also that
the said section vests in the Income-tax authorities,
the powers of a court only for specified purposes). If,
therefore, in view of all these circumstances the
Legislatlire thought fit to entrust the combined responsibility for investigation and fact-finding to a
single high-powered and highly-qualified body · consisting of three members of whom one is or has been
a Judge of the High Court and made their findings of
(I) [19551 1 s. c. R. 448.
1284
1955
M. Ci, Mlllhioh
and 2 olJierj
v.
The Commissioner
of [lt;omd-ltvt,
Mi>irasand
"""'""
Jaganmrd/iadat J•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
fact final, without pmviding for access to the regular
heirarchy of appeals to the Assistant Commissioner
and a Bench of two members of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, there appears to I:..: nothing unreasonable therein. On the other hand cii.ere are counterbalancing featw-es with reference to the composition
of the Commission and the statutory standards by
which the judicial part of its proceedings have to be
governed. I am, therefore, unable to feel that the
discriminati9n brought about in the procedure relating ~o assessment calls for any such adverse reaction
as to be. a reasonable basis for founding thereon an
inference of unconstitutional inequality. However,
as I have already said above, this appears to be ultimately a question of policy. Once the classification
is found to be justified and reasonably related to the
clearly under!y.ing policy of the Investigation Commission Act, I am unable to feel that section 5{1) of the
Investigation Commission Act can be struck down as
ultra vires in relation to its supposed concurrent
operation with sectior. 34 of the Income-tax Act as
ameuded in 1948, I hold, therefore, that section 5(1}
of the Investigation Commission Act was not hit by
article 14 of the Constitution notwithstanding amendment of section 34 of the Income-tale Act in 1948 and
that it continued to be valid.
On all other points urged on behalf of the petitioners, I agree with the view expressed in the judgment delivered by my learned brother Justice Bhagwati on behalf of the majority of the Court. It is,
therefore, unnecessary for me to deal with them.
In the result, in my opinion, this petition must be
dismissed with costs except as regards the incomplete
reassessment for 1942-43 for which the learned
Solicitor-General has given an undertaking not to
proceed. with it under the provisions of the Investigation Commission Act, as stated in the judgment of
my le:i.rned brnther.
ORDER
Bv THE CoURT : In accordance with the Judgment
of the majority the petition is allowed and. it is
ordered that a writ of certiorari do issue quashing the
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPO~TS
1285
report of the Income-tax Investigation Commission
dated the 26th August 1952 and the assessment orders
of the Income-Tax Officer for the y.ears . 1940-41,
1941"42 and 1943-44 to 1948-49, and that a writ of
prohibition do i$sue against the resP,ondents restraining them from implementing the findings. of the Investigation Commission with r~g;µ-~ to the year
1942-43. The respondents do pay the peritioners'
costs of their petition.
AHER RAJA K.HIMA
v.
THE STATE OF SAURASHTRA[VIVIAN BosE, VENKATARAMA AYYAR and
CHA:NDRASEKHARA ArrAR
JJ l
Appeal against Acqu#tal....-Scqpe of-PoU}ers of Court-Guiding
principles-Code .of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), s. 417
Pel"' BosE and OitANDRAsEKHARA A1YAll JJ, (VENKATARAMA
AYYAR J. dissenting). It is well settled that the High' Court should not
set aside an order of acquittal under s, 417 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure simply because it differs from the trial Court as to the
appreciation of the evidence ; there must be substantial and compelling reasons for doing so. · Whete the trial Court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case, interference is not justifiable unless there are really· strong reasons for holding otherwise.
Amar Singh v; State of Punjab ([1953] S.C.R. 418) and Surajpal
Singh v. State ( f19521 S.C.R. 193), referred t,o.
The accused in a criminal case must be given the benefit of every
reasonable doubt and, therefore when he offers a reasonable explanation of his conduct, althougl;i he cannot prove it, that explanation
should ordinarily be accepted unless the circumstances indicate that
it is false.
Conseq11ently,. in a case where an accused person, charged under
ss. 302 and 447 of the lndian Penal Code, repudiated his confession
at the earliest opportunity as having been made under Police threats
administered to l>im at night while in, jail custody and there was
evidence to show that the Police had access to hiru there, and there
was nothing to displace his statement that he was threatened by
them, the finding of the Sessions Judge that the t:onfession was not
voluntary in character was fair and reasonaok and in the absence
of auy compellihg reason the High Court shotild not have set aside
the order of acquittal.
1955
M- Ct. Mulhiah
and 2 others
·v.
The' Commission.,
of ltu:of/14-tax,
Madras and
another
Jaganlladhadas J.
1955
Decmiher 22.
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