A.THANGAL KUNJU MUSALIAR versus M. VENKITACHALAM.POTTI AND ANOTHER
Supreme Court of India | Decided 20 December 1955 | [1955] 2 S.C.R. 1196 | 1955 INSC 79
Key facts
- Decided
- 20 December 1955
- Bench
- SUDHI RANJAN DAS*, VIVIAN BOSE, NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI, B. JAGANNADHADAS, BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 21/1954
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1955] 2 S.C.R. 1196
- Neutral citation
- 1955 INSC 79
Text of the judgment
•
- 1196 :
, SUPREME· COURT· REPORTS
.· [1955]
J '( '
1955
Willie {W.1liam)
Sl1m9
.v.
The Stattof
Madhya Pradesh
Imam J.
obeyed Contravention oC.· its . provisions are unnecessary and neither the . prosecution nor the Courts of
trial should . ignore - 'its. provisions in the hope that
they might find shelter under sections 535 and 537 of
the · Code. , Where the · contravention is substantial
and a retrial. becomes necessary, public time is wasted
and the accused ·is · put to unnecessary harassment
. - . . .
and expense.
I agree that the appellant's conviction be altered
from section 302 of the Indian Penal Code to 304 of
the Indian Penal Code and · that · he be sentenced · to
J
five years' - rigorous imprisonment
.
.
'
.
- ',
'
1955
December 20.
A. THANGAL KUNJU MUSALIAR
v.
M. VENKITACHALAM.POTTI AND ANOTHER
(with connected appeal)
[S. R. DAS,
AcnNG
C.J,
VIVIAN BosE,
JAGANNADIIADAS and B. P. S1NHA JJ.]
BHAGWATI,
Constitution of India-Article 14-Travancore Taratioh on
Income (Investigatian Commissian) Act, 1124 (Act XIV. of 1124),
s. 5(1)-Whether ultra vires the·Constitution -Read along with s.
47(1) of Travancore Income-tar Act, 1121 (Act· XXlll of 1121)High Court-Jurisdiction-Article 226 of the Constitution-Writ
Petition against authorised Official-Appointet! under s. 6_ of the Tra·
vancore· Act (XIV of 11'24)-Investigation Commission-Whether
competent under the provisions of the Travancore Act XIV of 1124
to inv~stigate cases_ not referred to it ~y Government.
· The petitioncr...:..:i native 0£ Qllilon ·within the Travancore State
-'-had been assesied' to income-tax for the years 1942 and 1943, the
final orders in his assessment having been passed by· the Chief Rcvc·
nue authority of Travancore in December )946 and November 1946
r~spectively.
Travan~orc ~Taxation
on
lnc'?mc - (Investigation _<;om-
mission) Act, 1124. {Act XIV of 1124) modelled on.the Indian Act
XXX of 1947,.was passed by the Travancore Legislature, to provide
for an investigation .into matters r,elating·to taxation on inc6me. In
July 1949, 'the United State ofTravancore and -Cochin was brwght
into existence as , a result of i.Iltegration · hetweeri · the two States. All
existing la\vS of Travancorc were to contin_ue in force by virtue of
Ordinance I of 1124 which was later enacted as Act VI of 1125. In,
November· 1949 the Government of the United State: of Travanc~re-
(
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1197
1955
Cochin issued orders under s. 5(1) of the Travancore Act XIV of
1124 referring the cases of the petitioner for the years 1942 and A. Thangal Kunju
1943 (called Evasion Cases Nos. 1 & 2 of 1125) for investigation by
Musaliar
the Travancore Income-Tax Investigation Commission. Before the
Yo
Commission could make its report the Constitution of India came M. Vmkila&halam
into force and the United State of Travancore-Cochin became a part Polti and another
of India (Part B State) and the Travancore Act XIV of 1124 was continued in force until altered, amended or repealed by a competent
authority. In April 1950 Parliament passed Act XXXIII of 1950
whereby Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act, (Act
XXX of 1947) was extended to Travancore-Cochin and the law of
Travancore corresponding to Act XXX of 1947 was to continue in
force with certain modifications. In October 1951, a notification
issued by the Indian Investigation Commission appointed Respondent No. 1 as an authorised official under s. 6 of Travancore Act XIV
of 1124 read with Act XXXIII of 1950. Respondent No. 1 sent a
copy of that notification to the petitioner on 21st November, 1951
for his information and further intimated to him that the investigation proposed to be conducted will not be confined to the year> 1942
and 1943 but that it would be necessary for him to investigate the
petitioner's income for the period from 1940 to the last completed
assessment year.
The petitioner filed a writ petition in the Travancore High
Court against Respondent No. 1 and Respondent No. 2 (Indian Income-Tax Investigation Commission) for a writ of prohibition or
any other writ prohibiting the Respondents from holding an enquiry
into the cases registered as Evasion Cases Nos. 1 & 2 of 1125 or from
holding an investigation into the income of the petitioner from the
year 1940 to the last completed assessment year. The Travancore
High Court held that the Respondent No. 2 had all the powers that
the Travancore Commission had under Travancore Act XIV of 1124
and no more and granted the writ prohibiting respondents from conducting an enquiry into years other than 1942 and 1943. Both the
parties appealed to the Supreme Court against the order of the High
Court. A preliminary objection to the jurisdiction of the High Court
to entertain the writ petition was repeated in the Supreme Court by
the Attorney-General.
Held, that the High Court had jurisdiction under Art. 226 of
the Constitution to issue a writ against Respondent No. 1 because
under the provisions of s. 6 of the Travancore Act XIV. of 1124 the
authorised official (Respondent No. 1) had considerable pmv,rs conferred upon him in the conduct of the investigation, and if he did
anything as authorised official which was not authorised by law or
was violative of the fundamental rights of the petitioner as in the
present case he would be amenable to the jurisdiction of the High
Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution.
Held, further that under the provisions of the Travancore Act
XIV of 1124 the Commission had no authority to investigate any
case suo motu. It could only investigate ·cases referred to it by
1198
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
1955
Government. All that was done in the preserit case was that by
two separate orders made under s. 5(1) of the Act the C'-r0vernment
.A. Thagol KURja
referred two cases of the petitioner for the two years 1942 and 1943
M.,..J;ar
to the Commission. There was no other order under s. 5(1) at any
M.Vmkila</ul/am time before 16th February 1950 and none could be made under that
Poui ll1ld llMt/1# sub-section after that date. Therefore neither Respondent No. 2
nor Respondent No. 1 who had been appointed as authorised Official
by Respondent No. 2 had jurisdiction to cover any period beyond
the two specific years 1942 and 1943 and the notice dated 21st
November 1951 issued by Respondent No. 1 to investigate the petitioner's income for the period from 1940 to the last completed
assessment year was clearly illegal and without jurisdiction.
...
Held, also that s. 5(1) of the Travancore Act XIV of 1124
which is ·to be read in juxta-position with s. 47 of the Travancore
Income-Tax Act, 1121 {XXIII of 1121) is not discriminatory and
violative of the fundamental right guaranteed under Art. 14 of the
Constitution.
Section 47( 1) of the Travancore Act XXIII of 1!21 was directed
only against those persons concerning \Vhom definite information
came into the possession of the Income-tax Officer an<l in consequence of which the Income-tax Officer discovered that the income
of those persons had escaped or been under-assessed or assessse<l at
too low a rate or had been the subject of excessive relief. The class
of persons envisaged by s. 47(1) was a definite class about which
there was definite information leading to discovery within 8 years
or 4 years as the case may be of definite item or items of incomcwhich had escaped assessment. The action to be taken under Travancore Act XXIII of 1121 was not confined to escapement from assessn1ent of income inade during the war period (September 1939 to
1946). Action could be taken in respect of income which escaped
assessment even before the war and also more than 8 years after
the end of the war.
On the other hand under s. 5(1) of the Travancore Act XIV of
1124 the class of persons sought to be reached comprised only
these persons about whom there was no definite information and no
·discovery of any definite item or items of income w}:iich escaped
taxation but about whom the Government had only prima facic
reason to believe that they had evaded payment of tax to a substantial amount. Further, action under s. 5(1) read with s. 8(2) of
the Travancore· Act XIV of 1124 was definitely limited to the evasion
-of payment of taxation on income made during the war period and
therefore s. 5(1) of the Travancore Act XIV of 1124 was not
discriminatory in comparison with s. 47(1) of the Travancore Act
XXIII of 1121.
. Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Rao ([1953]
S.C.R. 1144), K. S. Rashid & Son v. The Income-tax Investigation
CommissiOn, etc. ( [1954 l S.C.R. 738), Azmat Ullah v. Custodian, Evacuee Property, U.P., Lucknow (A.I.R. .1955 All. 435), Burhanpur
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1199
1955
Nation,,/ Textile Wol'kers Union, Burhanpur v. Labour Appellate
Tribumil of India at Bombay and others (A.LR. 1955 Nag. 148), A. Thangal Kunju
/oginde1: Singh Waryam Singh v. Director, Rural Rehabilitation,
Musaliar
v.
Pepsu, Patiala and others (A.LR. 1955 Pepsu 91), Chiranjit Lal
Chowdhuri v. The Union of India ([1950] S.C.R. 869), Budhan M. YmkiJa&holam
Chowdhury and others v. The State of Bihar ([1955] 1 S.C.R. 1045), Poffi and (IJl/}f/utr,
Suraj .\fall 1Hohta & Co. v. A. V. Visvanatha Sastri and another
( 119551 1 S.C.R. 448), Sh1·ee Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. Sri A. V. Visva11atha Sastri and Another ( [1955] I S.C.R. 787), Astvini Kumar Ghose's
case (!1953 J S.C.R. 1), Subodh Gopal Bose's case ([1954] S.C.R. 587,
62il), Kathi Raning Ratl'at v. The State of Saurashtl'a (11952] S.C.R.
4.15). Palser Y. Grinling (119481 A.C. 291) and Kedar Nath Bajoria
v. The State of West Bengal (1954] S.C.R. 30), referred to.
C1v1L APPELLATE
Nos. 21 and 22 of 1954.
JuR1so1cnoN :
Civil
Appeals
Appeals under Article 133(1) (c) of the Constitution of India from the judgment and order dated the
18th September 1953 of the Travancore-Cochin High
Court at Ernakulam in 0. P. No. 41 of 1952.
M. K. Nambiar, (N. Palpu, Sri Narain Andley
and Rajinder Narain) for the appellant in C. A. No.
21 of 1954 and respondent in C. A. No. 22 of 1954.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India ( G. N.
Joshi), R. Ganapatlzy Iyer, Porus A. Mehta and R. H.
Dhebar), for the respondents in C. A. No. 21 of 1954
and appellants in C. A. No. 22 of 1954.
1955. December 20. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
BttAGWATI J.-These two appeals with certificates
under article 133 of the Constitution are directed
against a judgment of the High Court of TravancoreCochin in a writ petition filed by one A. Thangal
Kunju Musaliar, hereinafter called the petitioner.
The petitioner is a native of Quilon within the
Travancore State which was originally under the
sovereignty of the Maharaja of Travancore. He is the
Managing Director of Messrs. A. Thangal Kunju
Musaliar & Sons Ltd., Quilon, and had been assessed
to income-tax for the years 1942 and 1943 and the
final orders in his assessment for the said years were
1200
1955
..!. Tlllmgal ir..ju
Musalia!v.
M. VmlUadialam
Potti and anolhir
Bhagwali].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
passed by the Chief Revenue Authority of Travancore on the 6th December 1946 and 30th November
1946 respectively.
On the 7th March 1949, the Travancore Legislature
passed Act XIV of 1124 (M.E.) modelled · on our Act
XXX of 1947, styled the Travancore Taxation on
Income
(Investigation Commission) Act 1124, to
provide for an investigation into matters relating to
taxation on income. Section 1(3) of the Act provided
that it was to come into force on such date as the
Travancore Government may by notification in the
Government Gazette appoint. Under section 3, a
Commission to be called the Income-tax Investigation Commission was to be constituted inter alia to
investigation in accordance with the provisions of the
Act cases referred to . it under section 5 and report
thereon to the Government. The Commission was
to be appointed to act in the first instance up to the
last day of Karkadakom 1125 (16-8-1950) but the
Government was empowered to extend its · appointment to any period up to the last day of l(arkadakom
1126 ( 16-8-1951). Section 5 ( 1) enacted that the Government might, at any time before the last day <Jf
Makaram 1125 (15-2-1950) refer to the Commission
for investigation and report any case or points in a
case in which the Government had prima facie reasons
for belief that a person had to a substantial extent
evaded payment of tax on income together with such
material as might be available in support of such belief. Section 6 prescribed the powers of the Commission and inter alia provided for the appointment by
the Commission of an authorised official to examine
accounts or documents, interrogate persons or obtain
statements from persons.
On the 1st July 1949, the Travancore State and
the Cochin State integrated with each other and there
was brought into existence the United State of
Tra".ancore and Cochin. By virtue of Ordinance I
of 1124 promulgated on the same day, called the
United State of Travancore and Cochin Administration and Application
of Laws Ordinance, 1124
(Ordinance I was enacted later as Act VI of 1125),
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1201
all existing laws of Travancore were to continue in
force till altered, amended or repealed by competent
.authority. The existing law of Travancore was defined to mean any law in force in the State of
Travancore immediately prior to the 1st July 1949.
On the 26th July 1949, a notification was
published in the Travancore-Cochin Government
Gazette whereby, in exercise of the powers conferred
by section 1(3) of the Travancore Taxation on Income
Investigation Commission) Act XIV of 1124 as continued in force by the United State of Travancore and
Cochine Administration & Application of Laws (Ordinance, 1124 (I of 1124), the Government appointed
the 7th Karkadakom 1124 (22-7-1949) to be the date
-0n which the said Act was to have come into force·
On the 26th November 1949 the Government of the
United State of Travancore and Cochin issued orders
under section 5(1) of the Travancore Act XIV of 1124
referring the cases of the petitioner for the years 1942
.and 1943 for investigation by the Travancore Income-tax Investigation Commission. These orders
had specific reference to the years 1942 and 1943 and
the investigation to be made by the Commission was
with reference to the alleged evasion of tax by t1'e
petitioner for those respective years. The cases were
registered as Evasion Cases 1 and 2 of 1125.
On the 10th December 1949 the petitioner received
from the Secretary of the ComJ:»ission a notice in
regard to the said cases. The relevant portion of the
said notice stated:
"Whereas the Income-tax Investigation Com·
mission having been informed that a substantial portion of your income for 1942 and 1943 has escaped
-assessment, has ordered investigation into the matter,
you are hereby required to produce the following on
-or before 21-12-1949 before the Commission.
1. The account books (day books and ledgers)
:for the years 1942 and 1943•
. 2.
3.
4.
....
1955
A. T lllmgal Kunju
MUS!lliar
v.
M. Ylllkilackalam
Potti and fJtUJt/zlr
BhagwatiJ.
1202
1955
5.
A. Thangal K1Jnj"
Musaliar
6.
"·
M. Venkitachalam
Potti and anoth"
Bhagwati].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
Pursuant to this notice the petitioner produced the
relevant books and the Commission duly completed
its investigation under the terms of the Travancore
Act XIV of 1124:
Before the Commission could, however, make itsc
report, the Constitution of India came into force on
the 26th January 1950 and the United
State of
Travancore and Cochin became a part of the territory
of India, forming a Part 'B' State. Under article
372(1) of the Constitution, the Travancore Taxation
on Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1124
(Travancore Act XIV of 1124) was continued in force
"until altered, amended or repealed by a competent
authority".
An Indian States Finance Enquiry Committee had
been appointed in 1948-49 and it had made its recommendations regarding the agreements to be entered
into between the President of the Union and the
Rajpramukhs in regard to financial arrangements. In
accordance with the recommendations of the Com-mittee, an agreement was entered into on the 25th
February 1950 between the President of the Union
and the Rajpramukh of Travancore-Cochin in regard'
to these matters and on the 31st March 1950 the
Finance Act, .1950 (Act XXV of 1950) came "into force·
and the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (XI of 1922)
was extended to Travancore-Cochin.
On the 18th April 1950, the Opium and Revenue·
Laws (Extention of Application) Act, 1950, being Act
XXXIII of 1950, was passed by Parliament extending to Travancore-Cochin Taxation on
Income
(Investigation Commission) Act, 1947 (XXX of
1947) and section 3 of that Act provided that the
law of Travancore corresponding to the Taxation on
Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947 (XXX
of 1947) shall continue to remain in force with the
following modifications, viz.,
(a) that all cases referred to or pending before
the State Commission (by whatever name called) in
respect of matters relating to taxation on income
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1203
1955
other than agricultural income shall stand transferred
to the Central Commission for disposal; and
A. Thanga IKUllp
Musaliar
(b) that the State law shall, so far as may be,
v.
apply to determine the procedure that may be fol- M. VenkitachdamPotti and another>
lowed and powers that may be exercised by the
Bha,f<Wali J;
Central Commission in the disposal of cases transferred under clause (a).
The Travancot='c Commission had been appointed
in the first
instance to act up to the last day of
Karkadakom 1125 (16-8-1950). Neither the Travancore Commission nor the Indian Commission to which
the pending cases before the Travancore Commission
were transferred as aforesaid made any report on
these casrs of the petitioner before the expiry of this
period nor was any extension of the term of appoint-ment of the Travancore Commission made up to the
la~t day of Karkadakom 1126 (16-8-1951) as originally
contemplated. On the 25th· August 1951, therefore,,
the Opium and Revenue Laws (Extension of Application) Amendment Act, 1951, being Act XLIV of
1951, was passed amending Act XXXIII of 1950
whereby it was provided that in the place of clause (b)
of section 3 of Act XXXIII of 1950, the following
clause shall be substituted and shall be deemed always
to have been substituted, viz., "in the disposal of
cases
transferred · to the Central
Commission the
Commission shall have and exercise the s:tme powers
as it has and exercise in the investigation 9£ cases
referred to it under the Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission)
Act, 1947 (XXX of 1947) and
shall be entitled to act for same term as under subsectic•n (3) of section 4 of that Act" and it was furher
provided that any decision given by the Chief Revenue
Authority of Travancore or of Travancore-Cochin
shall be deemed a decision of the Income-tax Auth<>
rity for the purposes of sub-section (2) of section 8
of the Travancore Act XIV off 1124.
On the 18th October 1951, a notification was
issued
by the Indian Income-tax Investigation
Commission appointing M. Venkitachalam Potty, Income-tax Officer on Special Duty, Trivandrum, as an
1204
1955
A. Thangal Kunju
Musaliar
v.
M. Venkitachalam
Potti orid another
BhagwaJi].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
rt9551
authorised official under ,section 6 of the Travancore Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission)
Act, 1124 read with Act XXXIII of 1950. The authorised official, hereinafter - referred to as respondent l,
forwarded to the petitioner on the 21st November
1951 for his information a copy of that notification
investing him with the powers of an authorised official
and intimated that the investigation proposed to be
conducted will no be confined to the years 1942 and
1943, the two years originally covered by Evasion
Cases Nos. l and 2 of 1125 but that it would be necessary for him to investigate the petitioner's income
for the period from 1940 to the last completed asse»ment year notwithstanding the fact that the erstwhile
State Commission had not specifically intimated to
him that they proposed to cover the full period.
;rhe petitioner, by his registered letter dated the
23rd February 1952 pointed out to respondent 1 the
illegality of the steps proposed to be taken by
him to 'which, however, the la_tter replied - by his letter
dated the 13th March 1952 stati1ig that he proposed
to consider income for the full investigation period,
viz., from 1940 -to the last completed assessment year.
The petitioner thereupon filed on the 6th May 1952
a writ petition in the High Court of TravancoreCochin, being 0. P. 41 of 1952 against respondent 1
as also the Indian Income-tax Investigation Commission, hereinafter called respondent 2, for a writ of
prohibition or any other appropriate writ or direction
prohibiting the respondents from holding any enquiry
into the cases registered as Evasion Cases Nos. 1 and
2 of 1125 on the file of Income-tax Investigation
Commission of Travancore or from holding any investigation into the income of the petitioner from
1940 to the last completed assessment year or for any
other period.
Respondent 1 filed a counter-affidavit in which it
was inter alia submitted:
"that the Commission by these proceedings is not
trying to clutch at non-existent jurisdiction. They
are fully prepared to shape their proceedings in accordance with the direction of this Hon'ble Court".
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1205
This affidavit was stated to have been filed as the
answer of both the counter-petitioners, viz., respondents 1 and 2 and respondent 1 stated that he had
been fully authorised to do so.
The writ petition was heard by a Bench of three
Judges of the High Court consisting of K. T. Koshi
C. J. and P. K. Subramonia Iyer and M. S. Menon,
JJ. The learned Judges held that respondent 2 had
all thl". powers that the Travancore Commission had
undi;r the Travancore Act XIV of 1124 and no more
and accordingly issued a writ prohibiting respondent
l from conducting an investigation into years other
than 1942 and 1943 observing that any attempt to
enlarge the scope of the enquiry was without legislative warrant.
The petitioner appealed in so far as the order of
the High Court was against him permitting the enquiry for the years 1942 and 1943, his appeal being
Civil Appeal No. 21 of 1954. Respondents 1 and 2
appealed against the order of the High Court in so
far as it prohibited respondent 1 from conducting investigation for the years which were not covered by
the Evasion Cases Nos. 1 and 2 of 1125, their appeal
being Civil Appeal No. 22 of 1954.
Both these appeals came for hearing and final disposal before us on the 20th September 1955. After
the argument had proceeded for some time Shri
Nambiyar, for the petitioner, asked for leave to urge
additional grounds, viz., (a) that section 5 ( 1) of Travancore Act XIV of 1124 was ultra vires under articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution, and (b) that in
particular the said section 5 ( 1) infringed article 14 of
the Constitution inasmuch as it was not based on any
rational classification whatsoever, and the word
"substantial" therein could not possibly be deemed
to be any form of classification. On our giving him
such leave the 'learned Attorney-General, appearing
for respondents 1 and 2 asked for time to put in an
affidavit showing the background against which Travancore Act XIV of 1124 had been passed by the
was accordTravancore Legislature. An affidavit
ingly filed before us by Gauri Shanker, Secretary of
1955
A. Thangol Kunju
Musolior
v.
M. VenkittUholam
Potti and another
Bhogwati].
1206
1955
A. Thangal Kunju
Musaliar
v.
M. Venkitachalam
Potti and another
Bh.agwali].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
p955i
(espondent 2 setting out facts and events as and by·
way of answer to these new contentions of the peti-.
ti oner.
A preliminary objection to the jurisdiction of the
High Court to entertain the writ pet1t10n may be
dealt with first. This objection was not taken in the·
counter-affidavit filed by the respondents, they having expressed their readiness to shape their proceed-ings in accordance with the directions of the Court.
The "learned Advocate-General of Travancore-Cochin
however, urged before the High Court that the Court
was not competent to entertain the petition in view
of the that that respondent 2 was not amenable to
its jurisdiction and the argument was that as respondent 2 functioned outside the State of TravancoreCochin and respondent 1 was a mere subordinate of
respondent 2, it was beyond the competence of the
High Court to grant the prayer embodied in the petition. The High Court overruled the objection observing, that respondent 1 was resident within the State
of Travancore-Cochin, his office was situated
at
Trivandrum, all his communications to the petition.er had emanated from within the State and the
act1v1t1es complained about were acuv1t1es confined
to the State. It was of the opinion that the prayer
in the petition was, in essence, a prayer to paralyse
the hands of respondent 1 and thus prevent the mischief and that, by his residence and the location of
his office within the State, respondent 1 was clearly·
amenable to the jurisdiction of the Court under article 226 of the Constitution.
It was further of opinion
that the writ against respondent 1, if issued, was
sufficient for stopping the mischief complained about
and therefore it was unnecessary for it to decide whether or not a writ could be issued so far as respondent
2 was concerned. It, therefore, issued the necessary
writ of prohlbition against respondent 1.
The learned Attorney-General pressed this preliminary objection at the outset while arguing Civir Appeal
No. 22 of 1954.. He pointed out that respondent 2 had
its office in New Delhi and was permanently located'
there and the mere fact of its having appointed: res-
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1207
1955
pondent 1 to function and carry on the investigation
within the State of Travancore under its direction did A. Tlzangal Ku,Yu
Uusaliar
not make it amenable to the jurisdiction of the High
v.
Court. He, therefore, contended that the High Court M. Vtnkitachalam
had no jurisdicion to entertain the writ petition
Potti and another
Jgainst respondent 2. He further contended that the
Bhagwali].
High Court could not .do indirectly what it was
not
able to do directly an<l that it could not issue any
writ of ·prohibition against respondent 1 either even
though he had his office at Trivandrum and had a
permanent location within the jurisdiction of the
High Court inasmuch as he was merely an arm of respondent 2 and any writ issued against him would have
the indirect effect of prohj_biting respondent 2 from
exercising its legitimate functions within the ambit
of its powers under the Travancore Act XIV of 1124
read with A.ct XXX of 1950 and Act XLIV of 1951.
Reliance was placed by him on the decision of this
Court in Election Commission, India v. Saka T'enkat.1
Rao(1 ). The respondent in that case had applied to the High Court of Madras under article 226
for a writ restraining the Election Commission, a
statutory authority constituted by the Presi<lent and
having its office permanently located at New Delhi
from enquiring into his alleged disqualification for
membership of the Assembly, and a single Judge of
the High Court had issued a writ of prohibition restraining the Election Commission from doing so. The
Election Commission filed an ;ippeal to this Court arid
agitated the question of the jurisdiction of the High
Court under article 226 to issue the writ agai.11st it.
While discussing this question, Patanjali Sastri C. J.,
who delivered the judgment of the Court, observed
as under:"Rut wide as were the powers thus conferred, a
two-fold limitation was placed upon their exercise.
In the first place, the power is to exercised "throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises ·
jurisdiction'', that is to say, the writs issued by the
Court cannot run beyond the territories subject to its
jurisdiction. Secondly, the person or authority to
(I) [1953] SCR 1!44.
1208
1955
A. Thangal Ku,Yu
Musaliar
v.
M. Venkitachalam
Patti and another
BhagwaliJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955}
whom the High Court is empowered to issue such
.writs must be "within those territories" , which clearly implies that they must be amenable to its jurisdiction either by residence or location within those territories".
The learned Chief Justice then traced the origin
and development of the power to issue prerogative
writs as a special remedy in England and observed at
page 1151:"These writs were thus specifically directed to
the persons or authorities against whom redress was
sought and were made returnable in the Court issuing
them and, in case of disobedience, were enforceable
by attachment for contempt. These characteristics
of the special form of remedy rendered it necessary
for its effective use that the persons or authorities to
whom the Court was asked to issue these writs should
be within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction".
The mere functioning, of the tribunal or authority
permanently located and nurmally carrying on its activities elsewhere, within the territorial limits was not
considered sufficient to invest the High Court with
jurisdiction under article 226 nor was the accrual of...,.
the cause of action within the territories considered
sufficient for the purpose. The residence or location
within the territories of the person or authority was
considered a condition of the High Court being empowered to issue such writs with the result that the
Election Commission having its office permanently
located at New Delhi was held not amenable to the
jurisdiction of the High Court for the issue of a writ
under article 226.
This decision in Saka Venkata Rao's case was
followed by this Court in K. S. Rashid & Son v. The
Income-tax Investigation Commission, etc.('). In that
case, the assessees who were within the State of U.P.
and whose original assessments were made by the
ipcome-tax authorities of that State · had filed writ
petitions in the Punjab High Court for the issue of
writs under article 226 to the Income-tax Investigation Commission located in Delhi and investigating
(1) [1954] SCR 738 ..
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
120')
1955
their cases under section 5 of the Taxation on Income
(Investigation Commission) Act, 1947. The Punjab A. Thangal KUJ!iu
Musaliar
High Court had sustained the objection urged on
v.
bi;half of the respondents to the effect that the M. V1nkitae/ullam
assessees having belonged to the State of U.P. their Potti artd a11otlwi
assessment was to be made by the Income-tax ComBhagwatiJ.
missioner of that State and the mere fact that the
location of . the Investigation Commission was in Delhi
would not confer jurisdiction on the Punjab High
Court to issue writs under article 226 and had dismissed the petitions. This Court, on appeal, distinguished the decision in Parlakimidi's case which was
sought to be relied upon by the respondents before it
and followed the position in law as it had been
enunciated in Saka Venkata Rao's case supra,
and held that the Punjab High Court had jurisdiction
to issue a writ under article 226 to the Investigation
Commission which was located in Delhi in spite of
the fact that the assessees were within the State of
U.P. and their original assessments were made by the
income-tax authorities of that State.
The principle of these decisions would, it was urged
by the learned Attorney-General, eliminate respondent 2 and the High Court of Travancore-Cochin
would have no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition against it.
It was, however, urged on behalf of the petitioner
that, in the affidavit filed by the respondents, both
the respondents had submitted that they were fully
prepared to shape their proceedings in accordance
with the directions of the Court. This, it was submitted, was a voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the High Court investing the High Court with
jurisdiction to issue the appropriate writ against
respondent 2. We need not, however, express any
opinion on this point because no writ was in fact
issued by the High Court against respondent 2 nor
was any appeal filed by the petitioner against that
part of the decision of the High Court.
The real question, however, is whether a writ could
issue against respondent 1 who is, it was submitted,
a mere arm of respondent 2 and a writ against whom.
1210
1955
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1955]
would be equivalent to a writ issued by the High
Court against respondent 2 which it had no jurisdic.. A. Thanxal Kunju
Mu.salitJT
tion.
to do.
v.
An authorised official derives his appointment from
M. Vtnkitacludam
Potti anJ anothtr
the O>rnmission under section 6 of the Travancore
Act XIV of 1124. Section 6(4) of the Act provides
-Bhagwa#J.
that if in the course of any investigatior> conducted
by the Commission it appears to the Commission to
he necessary to examine any accounts or tlocuments
of ta interrogate any person or to obtain any statement from any person the Commission may authorise
any income-tax authority not below the rank of an
income-tax officer (called the "authorised official")
in that behalf subject to such directions as may be
issued by the Commission from time to time and the
authorised official shall examine the accounts or documents, interrogate the personi and obtain the statements from the persons. The authorised official is
invested, under section 6, sub-section (5), subject to
the direction of the Commission, with the same
powers . as the Commission under sub-sections (1), (2)
and (3) which empower the Commission to require
any person or banking or other company to prepare
and furnish written statements of accounts and affairs
giving information on such points or matters as in
the opinion of the Commission may directly or indirectly be useful or relevant to any case referred to
it; to administer' oaths and exercise all powers of a
·Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure for the
purpose of taking evidence on oath, enforcing attend·aJlce of witnesses and of persons whose cases are
being investigated, compelling the production of documents and issuing commissions for the examination
of witnesses and to impound and retain in its custody
for such period as it thinks fit any documents produced before it. The authorised official is, under
section 6, sub-section (10), to have full and free access
to all documents, books and other papers which in his
opinion are relevant to the proceedings in any case or
cases under the Act and if specially authorised in this
behalf by the Commission to any buildings and places
where he may have reason to believe that such books,
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1211
documents or papers may be found and also to have
power to place identification marks on such books,
documents or papers and to make extracts or copies
therefrom or if he considers it necessary to take possession of or seize such books, documents or papers.
Under section 6, sub-section ( 11), the authorised official is deemed to be a public servant wihin the meaning of section 16 of the Travancore Penal Code · (I of
1074).
It is clear from the above provisions that the authorised official has considerable powers conferred upon
him in the conduct of the investigation and even
though he could be called a mere arm of the Commission or an authorised agent of the Commission, he
has important functions to discharge and is not
merely a mouth-piece of the Commission or a conduit-pipe transmitting the orders or the directions of
the Commission. He is no doubt under the general
control and supervision of the Commission but he
performs the various functions assigned to him on
his own initiative and in the exercise of his discretion.
If, therefore, he does anything in the discharge of his
functions as authorised official which is not authorised by law or is violative of the fundamental rights
of the petitioner, he would be amenable to the iunstktion of the High Court under article 226.
Even though this is the prima facie position, it was
urged that he is acting under the directions of the
Commission as its authorised agent and as such no
writ can issue against him, because the principal who
directs the activities and not the agent would be
liable for the same. This contention is unsound.
There can be no agency in the matter of the commission of a wrong. The wrong doer would certainly be
liable to be dealt . with as the party directly responsible
for his wrongful action. The relationship between
principal and agent would only be relevant for the
purpose of determining whether the principal also is
vicariously liable for the wrong perpetrated by his
agent. On the analogy of criminal liability, the
22-85 S. C. India/59
1955
A, T hangal K1111ju
Musaliar
v.
M. Tienkilachalam
Potti and another
-·
Bhagwali ].
1212
1955
A. Thangal KU1jju
Musa liar
••
M. Vtnkitachalam
Petti and anotktr
Bhagwati].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
offender could certainly not be heard to say that he
was comm1ttmg the offence under the behest or directions of his principal. On the analogy of a civil wrong,
the tortfeasor fould certainly not protect himself
against liability on the ground of having committed
the tort under the directions of his principal. The
agent could in no event exculpate himself from liability for the wrongful act done by him and if he is
thus amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court
the fligh Court could certainly issue an appropriate
writ against him under article 226. The jurisdiction
under article 226 is exercised by the High Court in
order to protect and safeguard the rights of the
citizens and wherever the High Court finds that any
person within its territories is guilty of iloing an act
which is not authorised by' law or is violative of the
fundamental rights of the citizen, it exercises that
jurisdiction in order to vindicate his rights :rnd
redress his grievances and the only conditions of its
exercise of that jurisdiction are those laid down in the
passage from Patanjali Sastri, C. J.'s judgment cited
above. The argument that by issuing a writ against
the agent under those circumstances the High Court
would be putting him in a position whereby he
would be compelled to disobey the directions of his
principal is also of no avail for the simple reason that
an agent is bound to obey all lawful directions of his
principal anc? not directions which the High Court
holds to be unlawful or not justified in law. The agent
could certainly be prohibited from obeying the unlawful directions of his principal and even if the
principal cannot be reached by reason of his being
outside the territories, the arm of the law could certainly reach the agent who is guilty of having committed the wrong and the High Court could certainly
issue a writ against him under aricle 226.
It was further contended that by issuing such a
writ agaimt the authorised official the High Court
would be indirectly prohibiting the Commission from
conducting the investigation within the territories
even though it could not directly prohibit the Com-
.2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1213
mission from doing so. If the Commission was doing
something within the territories through its auth~
rised official which was not justified in law, it would
not lie in the mouth of the Commission to urge that
the High Court. could not issue a writ of prohibition
against its agent, the authorised official, who had his
residence or permanent location within the territories
merely because it would be indirectly prohibited
from perpetrating a wrong within the territories.
The principal could, in no event urge that his agent
should be allowed to function for him wihin the
territories in a manner which was not warranted by
law or had no justification in law. It is expected
that once this Court has declared the law the Investigation Commission would comply with it and not
place its agent in the wrong by directing him to act
contrary to the law so declared.
Our attention was drawn by the learned AttorneyGeneral in this connection to three recent decisions
of the High Courts of Allahaba<l, Nagpur and Pepsu
which, according to him, supported his contention,
viz., Azmat Ullah v. Custodian, Evacuee Prope;-t)'.
U.P., Lttcknow (1), Burlianpur National Textile Worker.c
Union, Burhanpur v. Labour Appellate Tribunal of
India at Bomba.v and others (2) and f oginder Singh
Waryam Singh v. Director, Rural Rehabilitation, Pepm,
Patia/a and others ('1). These decisions, however, are
clearly not in point for, in each of them, the order
passed by the authority within the territories and
accordingly wihin the jurisdiction of the High Court
concerne<l had merged in the order of the superior
authority which was located outside the territories
and was, therefore, beyond the jurisdiction of that
High Court. In that situation, a writ against the
inferior authority within the territories could be of
no avail to the petitioner concerned and could give
him no relief for the order of the superior authority
outside the territories would remain outstanding and
operative against him. As, therefore, no writ could
be issued against that outside authority and as the
(I) A.I.R. 1955 All 435.
(2) ,\.l.R. 19551\'a~. 1-18.
(3) A.LR. 1955 Pt•psu !JI.
1955
A. Thangal Kunju
Musaliar
v.
M. Venkitachalam
Potti and another
BhagwaJi].
1214
1955
.d. Thangol Kunju
Mwaliar
v.
M. Venkitachalam
Potli anJ another
Bhagwati ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1955]
orders against the authority within the territories
would, in view of the orders of the superior authority,
have been infructuous, the High Court concerned had,
of ·necessity, to dismiss the petition.. Such, however,
was not the position in the present petition before
the High Court of Travancore-Cochine. There was
here no question of merger of any judicial order of
respondent 1 into the judicial order of respondent 2.
In this case respondent 1 was actually claiming to
exercise powers conferred upon him by certain sections of the Travancore Act XIV of 1124 which it
was S]Jbmitted, were contrary to law or discriminatory and consequently ultra vires the Constitution.
The fact that respondent 1 was .the agent of respondent 2, which being beyond its jurisdiction could not
i;!e reached by the High Court, could not make his
acts any the less objectionable or discriminatory and
ultra vires. It is sufficient to say that if his action
was contrary to law or if the provisions of law under
which he was claiming to act became, after the commencement of the Constitution, void under article
13(1) as being repugnant to article 14 and the doer
of the illegal act was within the reach of the High
Court, the High Court had jurisdiction under article
226 to issue a writ against respondent 1 and thereby
prevent further
infringement of the
petitioner's
fundamental rights. The preliminary objection urged
by the learneq Attorney-General against the jurisdiction of the High Court, therefore, fails.
The next question canvassed in Civil Appeal No.
22 of 1954 was that respondent 2 was entitled to
investigate the alleged evasion of tax by the petitioner not only for the years 1942 and 1943 but also
the other years from 1940 to the last completed assessment year. The decision of this question turns
on a construction of the terms of .the references made
by the Government of the United State of Travancore
and Cochin under section 5(1) of the Travancore Act
XIV of 1124. A report dated the 17th November 1949
had been made by the Board of Revenue in regard to
the income-tax assessment of the petitioner for the
years 1119 and 1120 (M.E.) and two orders were passed
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1215
on the 26th November 1949 by the Government on
the strength of that report. The first of these orders
related to taxation on the petitioner's income for 1119
and the second related to the taxation on his income
for 1120. The return of income for the year ending
the 31st December 1942 was the subject-matter of the
first order and after setting out the materials in the
order the Government stated that they had prima
facie reasons for believing that the petitioner had to
a substantial extent evaded payment of tax on his
income for 1119 and they considered that this was a
fit case for reference to the Income-tax Investigation
Commission under section 5(1) of the Act. The second
order' referred to the petitioner's return of income for
the year ending the 31st December 1943 and after
setting out the materials, wound up similarily by stating that the Government had prim a facie reasons for
believing that the petitioner had to a substantial extent evaded payment of tax on his income for 1120
and they considered that this was a fit case for reference to the Income-tax Investigation Commission
under section 5(1) of the Act.
A cursory perusal of the Travancore Act XIV of
1124 will show th<it the Commission had n~ authority
to investigate any case suo motu. It could only
investigate cases referred to it by the Government.
Thus under section 5(1), Government might refer to
it for investigation
and report any case or points in
a case in which the Government had prim a facie reasons for believing that a person had to a substantial
extent evaded payment of taxation on income. Such
reference, however, could be made at any time before
the 16th February 1950 but not later. Again, under
sub-section ( 4) of the same section, if in the course of
investigation into any case or points in a case referred · to it under sub-section (1) the Commission had
reason to believe that some other person had evaded
payment of taxation on income or some other points
required investigation, it might make a report to the
Government and the Government would forthwith
refer to the Commission for investigation the case of
such nther person or such additional points as might
1955
A. Thangal KWfiu
Musqliar
v.
M. Venkilachalam
Potti and. another
Bhagwati].
1216
1955
A. Thangal Kunju.
Musaliar
v.
M. Vmkitachalam
P1tti and onolhtr
Bhagwati].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1955J
be indicated in that report. All that was done in the
present case was that by .two separate orders made
under section 5 (I) of the Act the Government referred
two cases of the petitioner for the two vears 1942
and 194.3 to the Commission and they were "tegistered
as Evasion Cases Nos. 1 and 2 of 1125. There was no
other order under section 5 ( 1) at any time before the
16th February 1950 and none could be made under
that sub-section after that date. It was not suggested
that there was any report by the Commission or any
reference of any case or additional points in a case
under section 5 (4). It was, therefore, contended for
the petitioner that the Commission had no jurisdiction to enquire into any alleged evasion in any • year
prior or subsequent to the years 1942 and 1943 . The
learned Attorney-General, on the other Jland, contended that the Government could, under section 5 ( 1)
of the Act, only refer the case of the petitioner who was reasonably suspected to have evaded the tax and,
therefore, the whole case of the petitioner for all the
years referred to in section 8(2) of the Act was the
subject-matter cif the investigation which had been
entrusted to the Commission.
We are• unable to accept this contention. Under
section 5 ( 1) the Government could refer any case or
points in a case. There is nothing in that sub-section which requi.res that a "case" referred thereunder
must cover ,;he entire p~rio<l mentioned in section 8(2).
Indeed, the Government might have reason to believe
that an assessee evaded the tax only in, say, two years
and not in others and in such a case the Government
could only refer the case for investigation of evasion
during those two years only but cn:uld not refer
any case for other years as to which they had no reasonable belief. Therefore, in such a situati:m' the
reference must be limited to the particular yeats· in
which the evasion was believed to have taken place.
It makes no
difference whether one calls the matter
referred a "case" or "points in a case". It follows,
therefore, that, in order to ascertain whether, in a
given case the reference covers the entire period or
only a shorter period, one has only to look at the order
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1217
of reference. The operative parts of the two orders
of reference dated the 26th November 1949 in the
present case clearly record the fact that the Government had prima facie reasons for believing that the
petitioner had to a substantial extent evaded payment of taxation on his income for 1119 and 1120
(M.E.) and that they considered that "this was a fit
case for reference to the Income-tax · Investigation
Commission under section 5(1) of Act XIV of 1124".
What was a fit case for reference was described as
·1bis" which clearly referred back to the evasion
Gt payment on taxation on income for the two
specific years in
the two orders. It is, therefore,
1
clear that neither re~pondent 2 nor respondent
who was appointed an authorised official by respondent 2 had jurisdiction to cover any period beyond those specific years
1942 and 1943 and the
notice which was issued by respondent 1 on the 21st
November 1951 was, therefore, not warranted by law.
Respondent 1 had no warrant or authority whatever
for issuing the said notice and we are of the opinion
that
the High Court was right in the conclusion to
which it came that the action of respondent 1 was
clearly
illegal, wi~hout jurisdiction and unsupported
by law. The writ of prohibition issued against respondent 1 was, therefore, in
order and Civil Appeal
No. 22 of 1954 must stand dismissed with costs.
As regards Civil Appeal No. 21 of 1954, the petitioner contended that respondent 2 J1ad no power or
authority to conduct an investigation in regard to
the alleged evasion of tax by the petitioner for the
years 1942 and 1943 also. Shri Nambiyar urged that :
(1) The Travancore Act XIV of 1124 was not a
law in force prior to the integration and was not an
"existing law" continued in force by Ordinance I of
1124;
(2) The notification dated the 26th July 1949
which purported to bring the Travancore Act XIV
of 1124 into force from the 22nd July 1949 was ineffective and invalid;
(3) Even if the Travancore Act XIV of 1124 was
1955
A. Thangal Kunju
Musaliar
. :v.
M. Venkitachalarn
Potti and another
Bhagwati].
1218
1955
A. Thangal KPju
Musaliar
••
M. Venkitachalam
Potti and another
BhagwatiJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
in force, it could not
apply to or override the assessment orders conduded by the Chief Revenue Authority, Travancore;
(4) The Rajpramukh's agreement read with
article 245 of the Constitution precluded any investigation except in accordance with the Travancore Act
XIV of 1124 and Act XXXIII of 1950 amended by
Act XLIV of 1951 was invalid to the extent that it
authorised investigation otherwise than in accordance
with the Travancore Law;
(5) Assuming 'all the foregoing points were held
against the petitioner, section 5(1) of the Travancore
Act XIV of 1124 was in any event unconstitutional
and void as being inconsistent with article 14 of the
Constitution.
Re. (J) : The Travancore Act XIV of 1124 was
passed by the Travancore Legislature on the 7th
March 1949. It was, however, under section 1(3) to
come into force on such date as the Travancore Government might by notification in the Government
Gazette appoint. No such notification was issued by
the Travancore Government up to the 1st July 1949
when the Travancore State and the Cochin State integrated into the United State of Travancore and
Cochin. On the 1st July 1949, the United State of
Travancore and Cochin promulgated -Ordinance I of
1124 thereby all existing laws of Travancore were
continued in force till altered, amended or repealed
by competent authority and the "existing law of
Travancore" was therein defined to mean any law in
force in the State of Travancore immediately prior
to the ht July 1949. It was only on the 26th July
1949 that a notification was issued under section 1(3)
by the United State of Travancore and Cochin bringing Act XIV of 1124 into force retrospectively from
22nd July, 1949.
The contention put forward on behalf of the petitioner was that as· no notification under section 1(3)
of Act XIV of 1124 had been issued up to the 1st July
1949, that Act had not been brought into force and
was not in force on that date and, therefore, was nor
then an "existing law" which alone was given conti-
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1219
nuity by Ordinance I of 1124 which was promulgated
on that very day. The contention further was that
in the circumstances the Act was not continued by
Ordinance I of 1124 but had lapsed and, therefore,
the subsequent notification issued on the 26th July
1949 was wholly ineffective and consequently the
reference of the cases of the petitioner to the Commission for investigation under section 5(1), the
appointment of respondent 1 as the authorised official
and the notices issued by him were unauthorised and
wholly devoid of any authority of law. The question
for our consideration is whether Act XIV of 1124 or
any part of it was, on the 1st July 1949, an existing
\aw.
The general rule of English law, as to the date of
the commencement of a statute, since 1797, has been
and is that when no other date is fixed by it for its
coming into operation it is in force from the date
when it receives the royal assent (33 Geo. 3, c. 13).
The same rule has been adopted in section 5 of our
General Clauses Act, 1897. We have not been referred
to any Travancore Law which provides otherwise. If,
therefore, the same principle prevailed ·in that State,
Travancore Act XIV of 1124 would have come into
force on the 7th March 1949 when it was passed by
the Travancore Legislature. What prevented that
result? The answer obviously points to section 1( 3)
which authorises the Government to bring the Act
into force on a later date by issuing a .notification.
How could section 1(3) operate to postpone ·the commencement of the Act unless that section itself was
in force? One must, therefore, concede that section
1(3) came into operation immediately the Act was
passed, for otherwise it could not postpone. the coming
into operation of the Act. To put the same argument in another W;\y, if the entire . Act including section 1(3) was not in operation at the date of its
passing, how could the Government issue any notification under that very section? There must be some
law authorising the Government to bring the Act into
force. Where is that law to be found unless it were
in section 1(3) ? In answer, Shri Nambiyar referred
1955
A. Thangal Kwfiu
Musalw
v.
M. Venkita&halam
Potti and anothef
BhagwatiJ.
1220
1955
A. Thangal Kunju
Musaliar
v.
M. V1nkitachalam
Polti and onothe r
Bhagwali].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955}
us to the principle embodied in section .37 of the
~nglish Interpretation Act which corresponds to sect10n 22 of our General Clauses Act. That section does
not help the petitioner at all. All that it does is to
authorise the making of rules or bye-laws and the
issuing of orders between the passing and the commencement of the enactment but the last sentence of
the section clearly says that "rules, bye-laws or orders
so made or issued shall not take effect till the commencement of the Act or Regulation". Suppose Shri
Nambiyar is right in saying that the Government
could issue a notification under section 1(3) by virtue
of the principle embodied in section 22 of the General
Clauses Act, it will not take his argument an inch
forward, for that notification by reason of the last
sentence of section 22 quoted above, will not take
effect till the commencement of the Act. It will bring
about a stalemate. It is, therefore, clear that a
notification bringing an Act into force is not contemplated by section 22 of the General Clauses Act.
Seeing, ·therefore, that it is section 1(3) which operates
to prevent the commencement of the Act until a
notification is issued thereunder by the Government
and that it is section 1(3) which operates to authorise
the Government to issue a notification thereunder, it
must be conceded that that section 1(3) came into
force immediately on the passing o{ the Act. There
is, therefore, no getting away from the fact that the
Act was a11 "existing law" from the date of its passing ·
right up. to. the 1st July 1949 and was, consequently,
continued by Ordinance I of 1124. This being the
position, the validity of the notification issued on the
26th July 1949 under section 1(3), the reference of
the case of the petitioner, the appointment of respondent 1 as the authorised official and all proceedings
under the Travancore Act XIV of 1124 cannot be
questioned. ~n the ground that the Act lapsed and
was not continued by Ordinance I of 1124.
Re. (2) : It is urged that the notification issued
on the 26th July 1949 was bad in that it purported
to bring the Act into operation as from the 22nd
July 1949. The reason relied upon is that the Govern-
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1221
1955
ment:'could not,•;,in .the] absence: of ·express. provision,
authorising it: in · that behalf, · fix · the commencement A. Thangal Kunju
Afusaliar
of the.• Act·· retrospectively. :-,.The: reason for which the
y.
Court:c· disfavours . retroactive , operation : of laws. is . that M~ Venkitachalam
it: 'may ·:prejudicially. affect vested:. rights.. No. such Potti and another
reason. is• involvetl ·in this case,• Section;-.1(3) - autho:}Jhagwati J.
rises the · Government · to . bring the .. Act :1 into force on
such.< date as it may, . by: ,notification,''. appoint.... In
exercise oL. the : power conferred by ·this section the
Government surely had the power to issue ·the' ,notifi~
cation :bringing the. Act· into force on any. date subsequent· 'to the passing of the _Act.. ·There can· there~
fore, · be . no , objection . to the notification fixing . the
commencement of.: the Act- •. on ..o the 22nd - July_.1949
which was: a date subsequent ,·to the. passing of the
Act.; So.the .Act; has; not· been· given.: retrospective
operation, . that is· to· say, · it has, not . been inade,, to commence from , a.-date .. prior._ to ,. .the . date of its
passing. · , It is true,; that the· date ; of commencement as
fixed. by the notification ··is , anterior, to .: the date , of the
notification :.:but i,-that· 1circumstance does,. not attract
the principle .disfavou~ing the retroactive operation
of,a statute,,., Here,,thers is no question. of affecting
vested. rights.:, The ciper~tion. , of , the notification it, _self. is. not..retrospective, .. It' :only brings the Act _into
operation ,on and. friiin an earlier ·. oate. In' any case
it' was . 'in terms ' autho~ised ' to issue : the - notification
bringing the - Act irito , fo~ce on . any date. subseq,;ent
.to the passing . of the ,Act ', and.; th:it . is all . that the
Go,;ernmcnt did. . Ill ' this view. of . ' the ' matter, the
further 1argument advanced:_by .. the l~ned 'Attorney~
General,. an,d; whicl( fou~d . fav~ur with : the:, ,Cburi
below, , namely( that the not1ficat1on was at ·any. rate
good to bring the, Act· into operation :is· on and from
the date of. its' issue 'need not be'corisidered. There
is no substance ;in this contention. also. '. :
· .. ·
. Re. (J) ;:J~ 1was, urged that, ~ven if die ,Tr~v;n~o~e
Act . XIV of 1124 ,was, in: force -on the 1st , July·· 1949
and was ·validly brought into. operation . from ; the
22nd July 1949, the terms of section 8(2) of the . Act
could not , apply: · to.· or override the·• assessment , orders
which
of the petitioner,
.for
the · years 1942 · and ..1943
.
.
.
1222
1955
A. Thangal Kurrju
Musaliar
v.
M. Venkitachalam
Potti and another
· Bhagwati J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
were concluded by the Chief Revenue Authority of
Travancore. Section 8(2) of the Act ,provided that,
after considering the report of the Commission, the
Government shall, by an order in writing direct that
such proceedings as they think fit under the various
Income-tax Acts of Travancore therein mentioned or
any other law shall be taken against the person to
whose case the report relates in respect of the income
of any period commencing after the last day of
Karkadakom 1115 (16-8-1939) and upon such a direction being given such proceedings may be taken and
completed under the appropriate law notwithstanding
any decision to a different effect given in the case by
any income-tax authority or Income-tax Appellate
Tribunal. It was contended that the Chief Revenue
Authority was not included in the description of
"any income-tax authority" and, therefore, e.ven if
the report of respondent 2 was adverse to the petitioner. the assessment orders which were concluded
by the Chief Revenue Authority could not be affected
by the provisions of section 8(2) and could not be reopened.
This argument is based on a misconception of the
true position of the Chief Revenue Authority. The
Chief Revenue Authority was an income-tax authority mentioned in the hierarchy under the Travancore
Act VIII of 1096. 'Vhen the Travancore Act XXIII
of 1121 came to be passed, the income-tax authorities
enumerated therein included the Board of Revenue
at the apex, substituting the Board of Revenue for
the Chief Revenue Authority which occupied a similar position in the old Act. By section 10 of the
Travancore Act XIV of 1124, the Travancore Act
VIII of 1096 was deemed to be in force for the purpose of the Act and to the extent necessary, with the
result that in construing the provisions of section
8(2) of the Act, the words "any income-tax authority" would include the Chief Revenue Authority
which was an income-tax authority under the Travancore Act V!II of 1096. It may also be noted that
section 4 of the Travancore Act XVII of 1122 continued all proceedings and petitions pending before the
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1223
Chief Revenue Authority and provided that the same
may be disposed of by the said authority or by such
authority as may be appointed by the Government
for the purpose · as if the said Travancore Act VIII
of 1096 had not been repealed. It, therefore, follows
that the Chief Revenue Authority was included within the expression "any income-tax authority" in section 8(2) of the Act and the assessment orders of the
petitioner for the years 1942 and 1943 which were
concluded by the Chief Revenue Authority could be
affected or overridden by any order which might be
passed by the Government under section 8(2) of the
Act. This contention of the petitioner also, therefore, does not avail him.
Re. (4) : The Indian States Finance Enquiry
Committee 1948-49 made two interim reports. It recommended in the first interim report that subject to
certain limitations indicated therein which were designed to secure legal "continuity" of pending proceedings and "finality and validity" of completed
proceedings under the pre-existing State legislation,
the whole body of State legislation relating to "federal" subjects should be repealed and the corresponding body of Central legislation extended proprio vigore
to the States with effect from the prescribed date or
as and when the administration of particular "federal" subjects was assumed by the Centre. All matters
and proceedings pending under or arising out of preexisting States Acts should be disposed of under
those Acts by, so far as may be, the "corresponding
authorites" under the corresponding Indian Acts.
The income, profits and gains accruing and arising in
States of all periods which were 'previous years' of
the States' assessment
years '1949-50 or earlier
should be assessed wholly and · in accordance with
the States' laws and at the States' rates respectively, appropriate to the assessment years con~
cerned.
Except in Travancore, there was no Income-tax Investigation Commission in any State.
Should the Travancore Commission still be functioning at the time of the federal financial integration;
all cases pending before it should be taken over by
195!>
A. Thangal Kunju
Musaliar
.
v.
M. Vmkita&halam
foUi (Z1ld another
Bhagwati].
1224
1955
.A. Thangal K~nJu
Musaliar
v.
M. VtnAitochalam
.Potti and anothn
BhagwatiJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
the Indian Commission. The disposal of those cases
should, however, (as in the case of pending assessments) be in accordance with the pre-existing Travancore Law.. It recommended in the Second Interim
Report that the Travancore Commission should be
wound up and the. cases referred to it should be transferred to the corresponding Commission in India.
These recommendations of the Committee in so far
as they applied to Travancore-Cochin were accepted
by and incorporated into the agreement entered into
between the President of India and the Rajpramukh
of Travancore-Cochin on the 25th February 1950 subject to certain modifications which are not relevant for
the purpose of the present enquiry. The result of the
agreement was the enactment of Act XXXIII of 1950
which extended to Travancore-Cochin the Act XXX
of 1947 and section 3 of that Act provided that the
law of Travancore corresponding to Act XXX of 1947
shall continue to remain in force with the modification that all cases referred to or pending before the
Travancore Commission shall stand transferred to the
Central Commission for disposal and .that the State
law shall determine the procedure to. be followed and
the powers to be exercised by the Central Commission
in the disposal of those cases. Evasion Cases Nos.
1 and 2 of 1125 which were pending before the Travancore Commission thus became transferred to respondent 2 and were to be disposed of in accordance
with the procedure laid down and the powers conferred on the Travancore Commission by the Travancore Act XIV of 1124. Two questions, however, arose
in the matter of this investigation by respondent 2,
viz., (1) whether the life of ·the Travancore Commission, not having been extended beyond 16-8-1950,
respondent 2 had the power and authority to continue
the investigation of the cases of the petitioner after
16'8~1950, and (2) whether any orders passed by the
Government on the report made by respondent 2
would have the . effect of overriding the assessment
orders concluded by the Chief Revenue Authotity,
Travancore, in cases of the petitioner for the years
1942 and 1943.
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1225
In regard to the first question, it was urged by Shri
Nambiyar that the life of the Travancore Commission having come to an end on the 16th August 1950,
respondent 2 also, which was its successor and to
which the pending cases of the petitioner were transferred, &ould not function beyond 16-8-1950. Parliament, however, passed, on the 26th August 1951, Act
XLIV of 1951 amending Act XXXIII of 1950 whereby it provided with retrospective effect that, in the
disposal of cases transferred to respondent 2, it shall
have and exercise the same powers as it has and exercises in the investigation of cases transferred to it
under Act XXX of 1947 and shall be entitled to act
for the same term as under sub-section (3) of section 4
of that Act thus extending the life of respondent 2
beyond 16-8-1950. This, it was submitted, Parliament was not competent to do by reason of the terms
of the agreement dated the 25th February, 1950, the
effect of the enactment of Act XLIV of J951 being to
amend the law of the Travancore State ,which was to
govern the investigation of pending ca~t·s by respondent 2. The agreement was one whlch was contemplated under article 295 of the 'Constitution and,
being provided by the Constitution itself, was a bar
to the legislative competence of the Central Legislature under article 245. The Central Legislature, it
was submitted, was, therefore, not competent to pa5s
Act XLIV of 1951 extending the life of respondent 2
beyond 16-8-1950 and respondent 2 was, therefore, not
entitled to carry on any further investigation in the
Evasion Cases Nos. 1 and 2 of 1125.
Considerable argument was addressed to us on the
effect of the agreement on the legislative competence
of the Central Legislature under article 245. We do
not, however, consider it necessary to decide this
question as, in our opinion, the life of respondent 2
was not a part of the law of Travancore State which
was to govern the procedure followed or the powers
exercised by it in the investigation of the cases of the
petitioner. Respondent 2 to which the pending cases
of the petitioner were transferred, was a body with a
longer lease of life and the fact that the Travancorc
1955
A. Thangal Kunju
Mwaliar
Yo
M. Venkitathalam
Potti and anothn
Bhagwali].
1726
1955
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(19551
Commission had a shorter lease could 110t have the
effect of curtailing the life of respondent 2. The life
of respondent 2 depended upon the law which estaby,
lished it and it was extended from time to time by
M. V enkffaeh4lam
Potti and anothn'
subsequent legislation up to December, 1955, and that
accident which gave to respondent 2 a longer •lease .of
Bhagwali].
life did not contravene any provision of the Travancore law which determined the procedure to be
followed and the powers to be exercised by the
Travancore Commission. The transfer to respondent
2 of the cases pending before the T ravancore Commission, of necessity involved that those cases would
be dealt with by respondent 2 which had a longer
lease of life and respondent 2 ·could conduct the
investigation of these cases and complete the same
within the span of life which had been allotted to it
by the relevant provisions of the Indian Law, the
only limitations imposed upon the conduct of such
investigation being that the procedure to be followed
as also the powers to be exercisec! by it would be
those obtaining in the Travancore Law. Act XLIV
of 1951 merely accepted this position and there was
nothing in that Act which ran counter to the agreement.
As regards the second question also, the Chief
Revenue Authority, as observed before, was an income-tax authority within the meaning of the term
as used in section 8(2) of the Travancore Act XIV of
1124 read with section 10 of that Act which continued
in force the provisions of the Travancore Act VIII of
1096 so far as it was necessary for the purpose of the
Act. There also Act XLIV of 1951 did not make any
changes in the existing Travoncore Law which was
to govern the investigation of the pending cases . by
respondent. 2. This contention of the petitioner,
therefore; is equally untenable.
Re. (5) : This contention urged by Shri Nambiyar
questions the t1ires of section 5(1) of the Travancore
Act XIV of 1124. This section provides:
"Section 5(1): Our Gov.ernment may at any time
before the last day of Makaram 1125 refer to the
Commission for investigation and report any case or
A. Tluzngal KUf!iu
Musaliat
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1227
points in a case in which our Government have prima
facie reasons for believing that a person has to a substantial extent evaded payment of taxation on income,
together with such material as may be available in
support of such belief, and may at any time before
the last day of Meenam 1125 apply to the Commission
for the withdrawal of any case or points in a case
thus referred, and if the Commission approves of the
withdrawal, no further proceedings shall thereafter
be taken by or before the Commission in respect of
the case or points so withdrawn".
It corresponds to section 5(1) of the Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947 (XXX of
194_7) which reads as under :
"Section 5 (J) : The Central Government may at
any time before the last day of September 1948 refer
to the Commission for investigation and report any
case or points in a case in which the Central Government has pfima .facie reasons for believing that a person has to a substantial extent evaded payment of
taxation on income, together with such material as
may be available in support of such belief, and may
at any time before the first day of September 1948
apply to the Commi.;sion for the withdrawal of any
case or points in a case thus referred, and if the Commission approves of the withdrawal, no further proceedings shall thereafter be taken by or before the
Commission in respect of the case or points so withdrawn."
We may also at this stage refer to the provisions of
section 47 of the Travancore Act XXIII of 1121 which
relates to income escaping assessment:
"Section 47 (1) : If in consequence of definite information which has come into his possession the Income-tax Otficer discovers that income, profits or
gains chargeable to income-tax have escaped assessment in any year, or have been under-assessed, or
have been assessed at too low a rate, or have been the
subject of excessive relief under this Act the Incometax Officer may, in any case in which he has reason to
believe that the assessee has concealed the particulars of his income or deliberately furnished inaccu23-'-85 S. C. India/59
1955
A. Thangal Kunju
Musaliar
,.
M. Venkita&/zlllam
Patti and another
BhagwaJi].
1228
1955
.
A. Thangal Irlllfiu
Mrualiar
M. Vmkilaehalam
Patti and another
Bhagwati].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
rate particulars thereof, at any time within eight
years, and in any other case at any time within four
years of the end of that year, serve on the person
liable to pay tax on such income, profits or gains, or,
in the case of a company, on the principal officer
thereof, a notice containing all or any of the requirements which may be included in a notice under subsection (2) of section 29, and may proceed to asse•s
or re-assess such income, profits or gains, and the
provisions of this Act shall, so far as may be, apply
accordingly as if the notice were a notice issued under
that sub-section: ................ " ·
The corresponding prov1S1on of the Indian Incometax Act was contained in section 34 which provided
"Section 34(1): If in consequence of definite ·information which has come into his possession the
Income-tax Officer discovers that income, profits or
gains chargeable to income-tax have escaped assessment in any year, or have been under-assessed, or
have been assessed at too low a rate, or have been
the subject of- excessive relief under this Act the Income-tax Officer may, in any case in which· he has
reason to believe that the assessee has concealed the
particulars of his income or deliberately furnished inaccurate particulars thereof, at any time within eight
years, and in any other case at any time within four
years of the end of that year, serve on the person
liable to p:ty tax on such income, profits or gains, or,
in the case of a company, on the principal officer
thereof, a notice containing all or any of the requirements which may be included in a notice under subsection (2) of section 22, and may proceed to assess
or re-assess such income, profits or gains, and the
provisions of this Act shall, so far as may be, apply
accordiiigly as if the notice were a notice issued under
that sub-section: ............ "
Section 34 of the Indian · Income-tax Act was
amended by Act XLVIII of 1948 which received the
assent of the Governor-General on the 8th September
1948. It was further amended by the Indian Income-tax Act, 1954 (XXXIII of 1954) which was
assented to by the President on the 25th September
2 S.C.R
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1229
1955
1954 and introduced sub-sections (1-A) to (1-D)
A. T hangal Krufiu
therein.
Musalilll'
It may, however be noted that no amendment was
v.
made in section 47 of the Travancore Act XXIII of M. Vmkitaehalam
1121 at any subsequent period and the question as to Polli and 4lllJlhlr
whether the provisions of section 5(1) of the TravanBhagwatiJ.
core Act XIV of 1124 became discriminatory and
violative . of the fundamental right guaranteed underarticle 14 of the Constitution will have to be determined with reference to the provisions of that section set out above.
The true nature, scope and effect of article 14 of
the Constitution have been explained by this Court
in a series of cases beginning with Chiranjit Lal
Chowdhuri v· The Union of Indian (1) and ending with
Budhan Chowdhury and others v. The State of Bihar
It is, therefore, not necessary to refer to the earlier
cases and it will suffice to quote the principle as summarised in the decision of the Full Court in the last
mentioned case at page 1049 in the following terms:
"It is now well-established that while article 14
forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable
classification for the purposes of legislation. In order,
however, to pass the test of permissible classification
two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (i) that the
classification must be founded on an intelligible
differentia which distinguishes persons or things that
arc grouped together from others left out of the
group, and (ii) that that differentia · must have a
rational relation to the object sought to be achi~ved
by the statute in question. The classification may
be founded on different bases, namely, geographical,
or according to objects of occupations or the like
What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of cla&sification and the object of the
Act under consideration.
It is also well-established
by the decl'sions of this Court that article 14 condenms discrimination not only by a substantive law
but also by a law of procedure."
The principles underlying article 14 of the Constitution are well-settled.
The only difficulty which
e).
(I) [1955] S. C. R. 869.
(2) [1965] I S. C.R. 104-:i.
1230
1955
A. Thangal Kunju
Musaliar
v.
M. Venkitachalam
Potti and anothtr
Bhagwati].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955}
arises 1s in regard to the application of those principles to the facts of a particular case and the Court
has to consider the terms of the impugned legislation
having regard tO' the background and the surrounding
circumstances so far as it may be necessary to do so
in order to arrive at a conclusion whether it infringes
the fundamental right in question.
Section 5(1) of Act XXX of 1947 (which 1s m pari
materia with section 5(1) of the Travancore Act XIV
of 1124) was impugned in the case of Sura; Mall
Motha & Co. v. A. V. Visvanatha Sastri and another(').
The references for investigation in that case had been
made in pursuance of a report made by the Commission
to the Central Government under the provisions of
section 5( 4) of the Act requesting that the case of the
petitioner along with other cases may be referred to
the Commission for investigation. The contention
urged on behalf of the petitioner was that the provisions of sections 5 (1), 5(4), 6, 7 and 8 of Act XXX of
1947 had become void being discriminatory in character after the coming into force of the Constitution.
The attack made against the provisions of section
5(1) of the Act was two-fold: "(l) That the section
was not based on any valid classification; the word
"substantial" being vague and uncertain and having
no fixed meaning, could furnish no basis for any
classification at all; (2) That the Central Government
was entitled by the provisions of the section to discriminate between one person and another m the
same class and it was authorised to pick and choose
the cases of persons who fell within the group of
It
those who had substantially evaded taxation.
could, if it chose, send the case of .one person to the
Commission and show favouritism to another person
by not sending his case to the Commission though
both of these persons be within the group of those
who had evaded the payment of tax to a substantial
extent".
As regards section 5(4), it was urged that it had no
independent existence and was bound to fall with
section 5 ( l) if his contention regarding its invalidity
(I) [1955] S, C. R. 448.
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COUI,!.t REPORTS.
1231
prevailed. In the alternative, it was urged that as.suming that section 5(1) was valid, even then section
5 ( 4) had to be declared void becaust; it gave arbitrary
power to the Commission to pick and choose and
secondly because the clause was highly discriminatory
in character · inasmuch as an evasion, whether substantial or insubstantial, came within its ambit as
well as within the ambit of section 34( 1) of the Indian
Income-tax Act.
This Court considered it sufficient for the decision
of that case to examine the contentions urged against
the validity of section 5 ( 4) of the Act because the
case of the petitioner was referred to the Commission
under those provisions of the Act and not under section 5(1)
and decided that case on the assumption
that section 5(1) of the Act was based on a valid classification and dealt with a group of persons .who came
within the class of war-profiteers which required
special treatment, that the classification was rational
and that reasonable grounds existed for making a
distinction between those who fell within that class
and others who did not come within it, but without in
any way deciding or even expressing any opinfon on
that question.
This Court compared the provisions of section 5(4)
oE the Act with "those of section 34(1) of the Indian
Income-tax Act and came to the conclusion that section 5 ( 4) dealt with the same class of persons who
fell within the ambit of section 34(1) of the Indian
Income-tax Act arid were dealt with in sub-section (1)
.of that section and whose income could be caught by
a procee<ling under that section. It held that ,there
was nothing uncommon either in properties or in
characteristics between persons who had been •discovered as evaders of income-tax during an investigation conducted under section 5 (1) of the Act and
those who had been discovered by the Income-tax
Officer to have evaded payment of income-tax. Both
those . kinds of persons had common properties and
had common characteristics and therefore required
equal treatment. The Court thus held that both section 34(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act and sub-sec-
i
I\
!955
A. Thangal Kunju
Musalia;
VI
M. Vmkitachalam
Potti and another
1232
1955
A. Thangal Ku•ju
Musali1J1
v.
M. V1nlcitachalam
Potli and another
.Bluiewati ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955J
tion ( 4) of section 5 of the impugned Act dealt with
persons who had similar characteristics and similar
properties, the common characteristics being
that
they were persons who had not truly disclosed their
income and had evaded payment of taxation on income ..
The court then considered whether the procedure
prescribed by Act XXX of 1947 for discovering the
concealed profits of those who had evaded payment
of taxation on their income was substantially different and prejudicial to the assessees than the procedure prescribed in the Indian Income-tax Act.
After comparing the provisions o£ section 8 of Act
XXX of 1947 and those df sections 31, 32 and 33 of
the Indian Income-tax Act, this court came to the
conclusion that there was material and substantial
difference between the two procedures and there was
no doubt that the procedure prescribed by the impugned Act deprived a person who was dealt with
under that Act of those rights · of appeal, second
appeal and revision to challenge questions of fact
decided by the judge of first instance. The procedure
prescribed by the impugned Act in sections 6 and 7
was also compared with the procedure prescribed in
sections 37 and 38 in the Indian Income-tax Act and
this Court held that the procedure prescribed by
the impugned Act was substantially more prejudicial
to the assessee than the procedure prescribed under
the Indian Income-tax Act. It was thus clear that
persons dealt with under Act XXX of 1947 were submitted to a procedure which was more drastic ~nd
prejudicial than the procedure which was available
to those who were dealt with under section . 34 of
the Indian Income-tax Act.
This Court, therefore, was of the opinion that section 5( 4) and the procedure prescribed by the impugned Act in so far as it affected the persons proceeded
against thereunder being a piece of discriminatory
legislation offended against the provisions of article
14 of the Constitution and were thus vOid and unenforceable.
It was after this decision of this Court in S11rai
\
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1233
Mall Mohta's case, supra, that Parliament enacted the
Indian Income-tax Amendment Act, 1954 (XXXIII
of 1954) introducing sub-sections (1-A) to (1-D) in
section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act. Though
Act XXXIII of 1954 received the assent of the President on the 5th September 1954 it was to come into
effect from the 17th July 1954.
Section 34(1-A) purported to meet two criticisms
which had been, in the main, offered against the constitutionality of section 5(1) of the Act in Suraj Mall
Mohta's case. One criticism was that the classification made in section 5(1) of the Act was bad because
the word 'substantial' used therein was a word which
had no fixed meaning and was an unsatisfactory
medium for carrying the idea of some ascertainable
proportion of the whole, and thus the classification
being vague and uncertain, did not save the enactment from the mischief of article 14 of the Constituti,on. That aHeged defect was cured in section 34
( 1-A) inasmuch as the Legislature clearly indicated
there . what it meant when it said that the said object
of Act XXX of 1947 was to catch persons who, to a
substantial extent, had evaded payment of tax, in
other words, what was seemingly indefinite within
the meaning of the word 'substantial' had been made
definite and clear by enacting that no evasion below
a sum of one lakh was within the meaning of that
expression. The other criticism was that section 5(1)
did not necessarily deal with the persons, who, during
the war, had made huge profits and evaded payment
of tax on them. Section 34(1-A) remedied . this defect
also. It clearly stated that it would operate on income made between the 1st September 1939 and 31st
March 1946 tax on which had been evaded.
Section 5(1) was again attacked in the case of Shree
Meenakshi Mills Ltd.• v. Sri A. V. Visvanatha Sastri and
Another(1). This was a petition under article 32 of
the Constitution filed on the 16th July 1954 after the
decision in Suraj Mall Mohta's case, supra, had been
pronounced. Section 5(1) of the Act was attacked
on the very same grounds which were mentioned in
(I) [19j5] IS.CR. 787.
1955
A. Thangal Kunju
Musaliar
v.
M. Venkitaehalam
Patti and another
Bhagwati J
1234
1955
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1955]
the judgment in Sura; Mall M ohta's case, supra, but
had not been dealt with by this Court it being considered sufficient to strike down section 5( 4) of the
v.
Act without expressing any opinion on the vires of
M. Venkitachalam
Patti and atWthtr
section 5(1). Even in this case, section 5(1) was not
struck down as void on a comparison of its proviB/zagwati J.
.sions with those of section 34( 1) of the Indian Incometax Act as was done in the case of section 5( 4) in
Sura;. Mall Mohta's case, supra. By the time this
petition came to be heard by this Court, the Parliament had enacted Act XXXIII of 1954 which, as
stated above, introduced section 34(1-A) in section
34 of the Indian Income-tax Act and this Court came
to the conclusion on a comparison of the provisions
of section 5(1) of the Act with section 34(1-A) of the
, Indian Income-tax Act that the new sub-section in. serted in section 34 by Act XXXIII of 1954 was intended to deal with the class of persons who were said
to have been classified for special treatment by section 5(1) of Act XXX of 1947. This Court reiterated
the conclusions to which it had come in Surai Mall
Mohta's case, supra, that the procedure prescrib~d by
the Act for making the investigation under its provisions was of a summary and drastic nature and it
constituted a departure from the ordinary law of pre>cedure and in certain important aspects was detrimental to the persons subjected to it and as such was
discriminatory. It did not again express an opinion
on the validity of section 5( 1) as being based on a
valid classification and being thus saved from the
mischief of article 14 of the Constitution, but on a
comparison of the provisions of section 5 ( 1) of the
Act with those of section 34( 1-A) of the Indian Income tax Act which came into effect from the 17th
July 1954, came to the conclusion that this defence
of the provisions of section 5(1) being saved from
the mischid of article 14 of the Constitution on the
basis of a valid classification was no longer available
in support of it after the introduction of the new sub.
section in section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act
which sub.section dealt. with the saine class of persons dealt with by section 5(1) of the impugned
.d. Thangal Kunju
Musoliar
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
'
1235
Act. The result was that proceedings could no
longer be continued under the procedure prescribed
by the impugned Act and section 5(1) was thus struck
down as unconstitutional and void after the coming
-into operation of section 34(1-A) of the Indian Income-tax Act.
These two cases, viz., Suraj Mall Mohta's case supra,
and Shri Beenakshi Mills' case, supra, did not
directly pronounce upon the vires of section 5(1) of
the Act fo comparison with section 34(1) of the Indian
Income-true Act though the vires were the subjectmatter of a direct challenge therein. The ratio of these
decisions is, however, helpful in the determination
of the question that arises directly before us, viz.,
whether section 5(1) of the Act is discriminatory in
its character and thus violative of the fundamental
right guaranteed under article 14 of the Constitution.
In both these cases, this Court was of the opinion
that the procedure for investigation prescribed by · Act
XXX of 1947 (corresponding with the Travancore
Act XIV of 1124) was of a ·summary and drastic nature
and constituted a departure from the ordinary law of
procedure and in certain aspects was detrimental to
persons subjected to it as compared with the procedure prescribed by the corresponding provisions of
the Indian Income-tax Act (corresponding to the
Travancore Act XXIII of 1121) and was as such discriminatory. The provisions of sections 5(4) and 5(1) of
the Act were compared respectively with the provisions of section 34(1) and section 34(1-A) of the Indian
Income-tax Act and, on a comparison of these provi~ons, this Court came to the conclusion that the
dasses of persons who were said to have been classified
for special treatment by those respective sections of
the Act were intended to be and could be dealt with
under section 34(1) and section 34(1-A) of the Indian
Income-tax Act and there could, therefore, be no
basis of a valid classification for special treatment
under the provisions of Act XXX of 1947 (corresponding with the Travancore Act XIV of 1124).
The procedure prescribed by the Travancore Act
XIV of 1124 being thus discriminatory as compared
1955
A. Thangal Kunju
Musaliar
v
M. V mkilachalam
Pol Ii and another
Bhazwat; J.
1236
1955
A. Thangal Kunju
Musaliar
v.
M. Venkilaehalam
Potti and another
B/ragwati J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955}
with the procedure prescribed in the Travancore Act
XXIII of 1121, the questions that arise for our consideration are, ( 1) whether there is a rational basis of
classification to be found in the enactment of section
5(1) of the Act, and (2) whether the same class of
persons were intended to be and could be dealt with
under the provisions of section 47 of the Travancore
Act XXIII of 1121.
In order to ascertain the scope and purpose of the
impugned section reference must first be made to the
Act . itself. The preamble of a statute has been said
to be a good means of finding out its meaning and as
it were a key to the understanding of it. The preamble
to the Travancore Act XIV of 1124, like that of Act
XXX of 1947, runs thus: "Whereas it is expedient
for 'the purpose of ascertaining whether the actual
incidence of taxation on income is and has been in
recent years in accordance with the ·provisions of law
and the exterit to which the existing law and procedure for the assessment and recovery of such . taxation is adequate to prevent the evasion thereof, to
m<ike provision for an investigation to be made into
such matters. It is hereby enacted as follows". It does
not unfortunately give any assistance in the solution
of the problem before us.
Section 5(1) itself, however, gives some indication
as to the real object of it. The condition on which
the action of the Government under that section is
made dependent is that the Government must have
prima facie reasons for believing that a person has to
a subs.tantial extent evaded payment of taxation on
his income. The powers conferred on the Commission by section 6 and the procedure prescribed for the
Commission by section 7 are dearly very drastic and
harsh. This unmistakably shows that the legislative
authority took the view that these stringent measures
were necessary for unearthing the tax evasions which
had gone unnoticed before when the usual procedure
under the Income-tax law was applied. Then comes
section 8(2) which authorises the Government after
perusal of the report of the Commission to direct
proceedings to be taken against the person to whose
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1237
case the report relates in respect of the income of any
period commencing after the 16th August 1939. This
provision_ clearly evinces that the intention of the
legislative authority is to catch the income evaded
from after the 16th August 1939. Section 5(1) also
provides that the reference thereunder of a case must
be made at any time before the 16th February 1950.
From these sections it will appear that the object of
this law was to uncover the evasion of tax on income
made after the 16th August 1939 and before the 16th
February 1950 about the existence of which evasion
the Government had prim a facie reason to believe.
The question at once arises as to why it was that
the legislative authority took the view that there
were possible cases of tax evasion. It has been said
that although .the statement of the objects and
reasons appended to a bill is not admissible as an aid
to the construction of the Act as passed (see Aswini
Kumar Ghose's case (1), yet it may be referred to only
for the limited purpose of ascertaining the conditions
prevailing at the time which necessitated the making
of the law (see Subodh Gopal Bose's case( 2 ) ). - Similar
observations were made by Fazal Ali, J. with reference
to legislative proceedings being relevant for
the proper understanding of the circumstances under
which an Act was passed and· the reasons which
necessitated it in Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. The
Union of India(-). Indeed, in the case of Kathi R{lning
Rawat v. The State of Saurashtra( 4 ), this Court
permitted the State to file an affidavit stating in
detail the circumstances which prevailed at the time
when the law there under consideration had been
passed and which necessitated the passing of that law.
In the present case also, an affidavit has been filed'
by Gauri Shanker, Secretary of respondent 2, stating
the reasons why it was thought necessary to enact the
impugned Act including section 5(1).
This affidavit
clearly brings out the serious problem that faced the
revenue authorities.
A war of unprecedented magnitude had raged from September 1939 to 1946. The
(I) [1953] S.C.R. I.
(3) [1950] S.C.R. 869, 879.
(2) (1954] S. C.R. 587, ~8.
(4' (1952) S.C.R. 435.
1955
A. Thangal Irun ,.,
Musaliar
v.
M. V enkitacha/arr,
Potti and another
Bhagwati J.
1238
1955
A. ThMgal K .,Yu
Musaliar
"·
M. V1nki1athalom
Polti and anotht:r
Bkagwati J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
war conditions brought in their train a sudden rise in
the demand of all kinds of goods, both consumer and
_industrial, which, naturally pushed up the prices to
abnormal heights affording a great opportunity to the
producers, manufactures and merchants to reap huge
profits. There was good reason to believe that these
abnormal profits were not being brought into regplar
accounts but were being concealed. Faced with this
situation, means had to be devised to enquire into the
tax evasions and to realise the legitimate dues of the
State. If regard be had to this background it is
obvious that section 5(1) had reference to a class of
substantial . evaders of income-tax who required to be
specially treated under the drastic procedure provided by Act XXX of 1947.
It was, however, urged that the words "substa!!tial
extent" were of such vague import that they did not
afford any reasonable basis of classification, Reference was made to Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 3rd
ed., Vol. 4, page 2901, where the word "substantial"
has been described to be:
"A word of no fixed meaning, it is an unsatisfactory medium for carrying the idea of some ascertainable proportion of the whole (Terry's Motors, Ltd. v.
Rinder, [1948] S.A.S.R. 167)".
.
.
The word "sub~tantial" has been used m vanous
legislative enactments and even though it is said to
be a word of no fixed meaning, Viscount Simon m
Palser v. Grinling(' ) observed:
"One of the primar)l meanings of the word is
equivalent to considerable, solid, or big. It is in this
sense that we speak of a substantial fortune; a substantial meal, a substantial man, a substantial argument or ground of defence. Applying the word in
this sense, it must be left to the discretion of the judge
-of fact to decide as best he can according to the circumstances in each case . ... ,,
and it has been described at page 2902 of Stroud's
Judicial Dictionary to be "equivalent to ~onsiderable,
-~olid or big".
Even though the word "substantial" by itself might
(l) [1948) A.C. 291,317.
2 S.C.ll.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1239
not afford a de~nite measure or yard-stick for including particular individuals within the classification,
the background and the circumstances mentioned in
the aforesaid affidavit of Gauri Shanker indicate with
reasonable certainty the class of persons who are
intended to be subjected to this drastic procedure. It
does not require much effort to pick out persons who
would fall within this group or category of substantial evaders of income-tax and even though a definite
amount be not specified in section 5(1) of the Act as
constituting a substantial evasion of income-tax the
Government, to whom the process of selection for the
purposes of reference of the cases for investigation to
the Commission is entrusted, would not have any
difficulty in finding out the persons coming within
this group or category. To use the language of Viscount Simon, the income-tax which has been evaded
would have to be considerable, solid or big, and once
that conclusion was reached by the Government, the
cases of such persons would indeed be referred by
them for investigation by the Commission under section 5(1) of the Act.
It was, however, urged that it would be open to the
Government within the terms of section 5(1) of the
Act itself to discriminate·. between persons and persons who fell within the very group or category; the
Government might refer the case of A to the Commission leaving the case of B to be dealt with by the
ordinary procedure laid down in the Travancore Act
XXIII of 1121. The possibility of such discriminatory treatment of persons falling within the same
group or category, however, cannot necessarily invalidate this piece of legislation. It is to be presumed,
unless the contrary were shown, that the administration of a particular law would be done "not with an
evil eye and unequal hand" and the selection made
by the Government of the cases of persons to be
referred for investigation by the Commission would
not be discriminatory.
This question was considered by this Court in tw<>
cases, viz., Kathi Raning Rawat v. The State of Sau-
1935
A. Thangal Kunju·
Miualillr
v.
M. Venkitachalan:
Potti and anot/rn
Bkagwati ].
1240
1955
.4. Thattgal Ku,Yu
Musaliar
v.
.M. Venkilachalam
Potti and another
Bhagwati ].
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
rashtra(i) and Kedar Nath Bajoria v. The State of West
Bengal(•). Mr. Justice Mukherjea, as he then was,
.dealt with the argument in Kathi Raning Rawat v.
The State of Sauras~tra( 1) as under:-
"It is a doctrine of the American courts which
seems to be well-founded on principle that the equal
protection clause can be invoked not merely where
discrimination appears on the express terms of the
statute itself, but also when it is the result of improper or prejudiced execution of the law. (Vide
Weaver on Constitutional law, p. 404). But a statute
will not necessarily be condemned as discriminatory,
because it does not make the classification itself but,
as an effective way of carrying out its policy, vests
the authority to do it in certain officers or administrative bodies ......... .In my opinion, if the legislative policy is clear and definite and as an effective
method of carrying out that policy a discretion is
vested by the statute upon a body of administrators
or officers to make selective application of the law to
certain classes or groups of persons, the statute itself
cannot be condemned as a piece of discriminatory
legislation. After all "the law does all that is needed
when it does all that it can, indicates a policy .... and
seeks to bring within the lines all similarly situated
so far as its means allow" (Vide Buck v. Bell, 274
U.S. 200, 208). In such cases, the power given to the
executive body would import a duty on. it to clas·sify
the subject-matter of legislation in accordance with
the objective indicated in the statute. The discretion that is conferred on official agencies in such
circumstances is not an unguided discretion, it has to
be exercised in conformity with the policy to
effectuate which the direction is given and it is in
relation to that objective that the propriety of the
classification would have to be tested. If the adm1rustrative body proceeds to classify persons or
things on a basis which has no rational relation to
the objective of the legislature, its action can certainly be annulled as offending against the equal
protection clause. On the other hand if the statute
(1) [1952] S.C.R. 435, 459.
(2) [1954] S.C.R. 30, 41.
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1241
itself does not disdose a definite policy or objective
1955
and it confers authority on another to make selection A. T haagal K"'fiu
MU1alial'
at i~s pleasure, the statute would be held on the fa~e
v.
of it to be discriminatory irrespective of the way m M. Ven/ritadullam
Potti and atUJtlitr
which it is applied ........ "
The same line of demarcation was also emphasized by
Bha&wati J.
Patanjali Sastri , C. J., delivering the judgment of the
Court in Kedar Nath ·Bajoria v. The State of West
Bengal(1).
It, therefore, follows that the mere fact that the
Government is entrusted with the power to select
.cases of persons falling within the group or category
of substantial evaders of income-tax for reference to
the Commission would not render section 5(1) discriminatory and void.
The object sought to be achieved by the impugned
piece of legislation is quite definite and that is to
catch substantial evaders of income-tax out of those
who have made huge profits during the war period.
They form a class by themselves and have to be
specially treated under die procedure laid down in the
Act. Being a class by themselves, the procedure to
which they are subjected during the course of investigation of their cases by the Commission is not at all
-discriminatory because such drastic procedure has
reasonable nexus with the object sought to be
achieved by the Act and therefore such a classification is within the constitutional limitations. The
selection of the cases of persons falling within that
category by the Government cannot be challenged as
discriminatory for the simple reason that it is not
left to the unguided or the uncontrolled discretion of
the· Government. The selection is guided by the very
objective which is set out in the terms of section 5
(1) itself and the attainment of that object controls
the discretion which is vested in the Government and
guides the Government in making the necessary selection of cases of persons to be referred for . investigation by the Commission. It cannot, therefore, be
disputed that there is a valid basis of classification
.to be found in section 5 ( 1) of the Act.
(I) (1954J S.C.R. 30, 41.
1242
A. Tltangal Kunja
M111alw
v.
M. Vln/;ilaehalam
Potli and (JJll)l/ier
BhagwaJi J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955J
The validity of the classification was further attacked on the ground that the limitation of the period
within which the cases of the substantial evaders of
income-tax falling within this group or category may
he referred for investigation by fhe Government to
the Commission, viz., 16th February 1950 imports a
discrimination in so far as those persons whose cases
are referred before that date would be treated under
the procedure laid down in the Travancore Act XIV
of 1124 whereas those whose cases have not been
referred by that date would not be subjected to the
same treatment even though they fell within the
same category. This would bring about a discrimination between the same class of persons some of
whom would be subjected to that special treatment
and others who would escape the same. Section 5(4)
of the Act also would not cure this defect because the
cases contemplated therein are either the cases which
have been already referred for investigation to the
Commission -under section 5(1) of the Act or cases
of other persoris about whose· alleged evasion of income-tax the Commission has gathered information
during the course of their investigations. Even if
these other persons be thus subjected to the special
procedure prescribed in the Act there would remain,
outside the jurisdiction of the Commission; numbers
of persons. whose cases are not covered by sections
5(1) or 5f4) but who nonetheless are comprised withe
in the class of substantial evaders of income-tax.
They would have to be dealt with under the ordinary
law and presumably under section 47 of the Travancore Act XXIII of 1121 if they could be dealt
with thereunder. If they could not be so dealt with,
the only result would be that they would escape the
surveillance of the Government and_ the escapement of income-tax in their cases would be without
any remedy. This, it was urged, was discriminatory
.and was enough to strike down section 5 ( l) of the
Act.
It would be impossible in the normal course to reach
all substantial evaders of income-tax. Those persons
falling within that category in. respect of whom the
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT llEPORTS
12..143
Government had
received the· requisite information
-and in whose cases the Government had prima facie
reasons for believing that they had to ·a substantial
extent evaded payment of taxation on income would
have their cases referred by the Government for
investigation by the Commission; Those persons in
respect of whom no such information was available
to the Government would certainly escape detection
but that is the position with regard to each and every
law which may be passed in order to detect evasion
of payment· of income-tax. Even under the provisions of section 47 of the Travancore Act XX:Ill of
1121 (corresponding to section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act as it stood before the amendment in
1948), those persons in respect of whom the Incometax Officer had gathered definite information and
consequently discovered that income, profits or gains
chargeable to income-tax had escaped assessment in
any year could be dealt with under the relevant provisions of that Act. Those persons in respect. of whom
no such information had been received by the Income-tax Officer could not be reached at all. The fact
that some persons failing within a particular category
may escape detection altogether is not necessarily
destructive of the efficacy of the particular legislation. The only thing required is that, as between
persons who fall. within ·the same category and who
can be dealt with under the same procedure, there
should , be no dis,crimination, ·some being treated in
one way and others being treated in another.
It was also urged that discrimination was inherent
in the terms of section 5(1) itself by reason of its
operation being limited only to those persons whbse
cases were referred to the Com~sion on or before
the 16th February 1950. It thus arbitrarily left out
persons who evaded payment of taxation on income
made during the war period but whose cases were not
discovered or referred to the Commission on or before
that date although they were· otherwise similarly
situated. Reliance was placed in support of this
position on the following passage from the judgment
of Mahajan, C. J. in Shree ·Meenakshi Milli case,
24--'85 S.C. Ibdia/59
1955
.4. Thangtll Ku,P
Mwaliar
,,.
M. Villditaclialflfll
PotJi and anot!r"
1244
1955
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
supra, at pages 795-796:
"Assuming that evasion of tax to a substantial
amount could form a basis of classification at all for
M. ·venkitaeWam
imposing a drastic proc~dure on that class, the inclur olti and anolhn sion of only such of them whose cases had been
rB1iagwa1; J.
re£erred before 1st September, 1948, into a class for
being dealt with by the drastic procedure leaving
other tax evaders to be dealt with under the ordinary
law will be a clear discrimination for the reference of
the case within a particular time has no special or
rational nexus with
the necessity for drastic procedure ........ "
These observations were made to repel the first argument ·of the learned Attorney-General that the class
of substantial evaders who fall within section 5(1)
were only those whose cases had been referred within the date fixed. It was pointed out that if the
class was so circumscribed then that by itself would
make the classification discriminatory by leaving out
those substantial evaders whose cases had not been
referred · by that date. By that passage, however.•
this Court did not hold that in fact section 5 ( 1) was
confined to such a limited class. We are of the opinion that the fixation of the date for references for
investigation by the Government to the Commission,
viz., the 16th February 1950 was not an attribute of
the class of substantial evaders of income-tax which
were inten.ded to be specifically treated under the
dractic procedure prescribed in the Travan~ore Act
XIV of 1124 but was a mere accident and a measure
of administrative convenience. The date of such
references could, without touching the nature and
purpose of the classification, be extended by the
Travancore Legislature by a necessary amendment
of the Travancore Act, XIV of 1124, and if such an
amendment had been grafted on the Act as originally passed, no one belonging to the particular
class or category of substantial evaders of incometax could have complained against the same.
The next question to consider is whether the same
class of persons dealt with under section 5(1) of the
'l'ravancore A~t XIV of 1124 were intended to and
A. Thangal Kunju
Musaliar
...
28.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1245
could be dealt with under the provisions of section
47 of the Travancore Act XXIII of 1121. Because,
if that was the position at any particular period of
time, section 5(1) of the Travancore Act XIV of 1124
would certainly be discriminatory in so far as there
will be two distinct provisions simultaneously existing in the statute book, one of which could be applied
to some persons within the same class or category
and the other could be applied to others also falling
within the same class or category, thus discriminating
between the two groups.
Section 47 of the Travancore Act XXIII of 1121,
as already observed, was in -the same terms as section
34(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act as it stood before
its amendment in 1948. Each of the following condi..;
tions had to be fulfilled before the Income-tax Officer
could take action under this section, viz.:
(i) that definite information had come into the
possession of the Income-tax Officer that income, etc.
had escaped;
(ii) that in consequence of such definite information the Income-tax Officer discovered that income,
etc.
(a) had escaped assessment, or
(b) had been under-assessed, or
( c) had been assessed at too low a rate, or
(d) had been the subject of excessive relief;
(iii) that the Income-tax Officer had reason to
believe that( a) the assessee had concealed the particulars of
his income, or
(b) deliberately
furnished inaccurate
particulars thereof.
It is, therefore, abundantly dear that section 47(1)
of the Travancore Act XXIII of 1121 was directed
only · against those persons con~erning whom definite.
information came into the posse8$ion of the Income.
tax Officer and in consequence of which the Incometax Officer discovered that the income of those
persons had e~capcd or been under-assessed or
assessed at too 10-w a rate or had been the subject of
excessive relief. The class of persons envisaged by
1955
A. Thmigal K!Jtifu
Musaliar
v•
M. Trmkita&halam
Potii and aMihn
B/llJgwatiJ.
1:246
!955
A. Thongal Kunju
MUJQ!iar
V•
M. Vmkitacha/a,,.
Potti and anothlr
SUPREME COURT REPOR~
[t955J
section 47(1) was a definite class about which there
was definite information leading to discovery within
8 years or 4 years as the case may be of definite item
or items of income which had escaped assessment.
The Travancore Act XXIII of 1121 was passed on the
9th July 1946. The action to be ta.ken under it was
not confined to escapement from assessment of income made during the war period (September 1939 to
1946).
Action could be taken in respect of income
which escaped assessment even before the war and
also more than 8 years after the end of the war.
Turning now to section 5(1) it will be noticed that
the . class of persons sought to· be reached comprises
only persons about whom there was no definite
information and no discovery of any definite item or
items of income which escaped taxation but about
whom the Government had only prima facie reason
to believe that they evaded payment of tax to a substantial amount. The · class of persons who might fall
within section 5(1) of the Travancore Act XIV
of 1124 was, therefore, not the same class of persons
who may come under section 47(1) of the. Travancore
Further, action under section
Act XXIII of ll21.
5(1) read with section 8(2) of the Travancore Act
XIV of ll24 is definitely limited to the evasion of
payment of taxation on intome made during the war
period.
It cannot, therefore, be urged that section
5(1) of the Travancore Act XIV of ll24 was discriminatory in comparison with section 47(1) of' the Travancore Act XXIII of ll21, for the persons who came
under section 5(1) were not similarly situated as persons who came under section 47(1). Section 5(1) of
Act XXX of 1947 was struck down in Shru Meenakshi Mills' case, supra, as it comprised the same class
of person& who were brought in in the amended section, 34(1-A) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922
but the same caruwt be said about section 5(1) as
compared to section 47(1).. These two section do
not ovcdap: and: do not coYCr the sairu: class of persons.
'fhe· result, therefore, is that section 5(1) of the
'Jltavamiore Act XIV of 1124 which. has to: be read for
2·s.c.R.
·1247
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
this purpose in juxta-position with section 47 of. the
Travancore Act XXIII of 1121 cannot be held to be
discriminatory and violative of the fondamental right
guaranteed under article 14 of the Constitution. The
proceedings which took place in the course of investigation by the Commission up to the 26th January
1950 were valid and so also were the proceedings
during. the course of investigation which took place
after the inauguration of the Constitutiol). on the 26th
January 1950 under which the petitioner, as a citizen
of our Sovereign Democratic Republic acquired inter
alia .guarantee of the fundamental right under article
14 of the Constitution.
The result, therefore, is that .all the contentions
urged on behalf of the petitioner fail and Civil Appeal No. 21 of 1954 must be ·dismissed with costs.
Civil ·Appeals Nos. 21 and 22 of 1954 wil~ accordingly be diSlllissed with costs. There
be a set off
for costs.
1955
A. Thangal Kunju
Musaliar
V•
M. Vmliit°'halam
Polti and anothlr
Bhagwati].
wm
M. CT. MUTHIAH & 2 OTHERS
1955
ti •.
D1umbu 20.
THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,
MADRAS &, ANOTHER;
[S. R.
DAs~
ACTING
C.J,
V1vr:rn BosE,
JAGANNADHADAS and B. f. SINHA JI.)
BHAcrWAn,
Constitution of India, Art. ]'/--Taxation on Income (Investigation Commisiion) Act, 1947 (Act XXX of 1947), s. 5(1)-'Whetil~
.ultra vires 'lhe· Constitution in vie1v of s. 34 of Indian lncome-Ta1r
Act, 1922 (Act XI of 1922) as amended by the 'Income-Tax and Bu1iness Profits .Tax (Amendment) Act, 1948 (Act XLVlll tif 1948) and
the Indian· Income-Tax (Amendment) Act, 1954 (Act X!XXW uf
1954).
H~ld (Per S..R. DAs, .A,cTING C.J., V1v1AN iBoSE, .BHAcwATI
and B. P. SINHA, JJ . .}AGANNAoHADAS J., dissenting) that s. 5.(1) of the
T<1xation on .. Income (Investigation Commission) Ac~,· .1947 (Act
XXX of 1947) iis ultra vires the Constitution as it ii discriminawry
and violative of the fundamental .right guaranteed by .Art. l4 of
the Constitution by reason of two amenc;lments which were made in
,s. 34 of thf: Indian In~omc-Tax Act, 1922 (Act XI afl922) one ia
.1948 by the .c:nac[ment of the Income-T.u: and Busine$& Profit$ Ta
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