BRAJNANDAN SINHA versus JYOTI NARAIN
Supreme Court of India | Decided 8 November 1955 | [1955] 2 S.C.R. 955 | 1955 INSC 63
Key facts
- Decided
- 8 November 1955
- Bench
- NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI*, BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA, SYED JAFFER IMAM
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 25/1954
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1955] 2 S.C.R. 955
- Neutral citation
- 1955 INSC 63
Text of the judgment
2 S.C.R.
955
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
BRAJNANDAN SINHA
1955
v.
NoD1mb1r 8.
JYOTI NARAIN.
[BHAGWATI, B. P. SINHA and JAFER IMAM
JJ.]
Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850 (XXXVII of 1850)-A
Commissioner appointed thereunder-Whethef a court within the
meaning of Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 (XXXII of 1952).
Held, that a Commissioner appointed under the Public Servants
(Inquiries) Act, 1850 (XXXVII of 1850) is not a court within the
meaning of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 (XXXII of 1952).
Shell Co. of Australia v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation
([1931] A.C.275),Huddart,Parker&Co. v. Moordead([1909] 8C.L.
330) Rex v. Electricity Commissioners ( [ 1924 J 1 K.B. 171 ), Bharat
Bank Limited v. Employees of Bharat Bank Ltd. ([1950] S.C.R. 459),
Maqbool Hussain v. The State of Bombay ([1953] S.C.R. 730), Cooper
v. Wilson ([1937] 2 K.B. 309), S.A. Venkataraman v. The Union of
India and Another ( [ 1954 l S.C.R. 1150), Royal Aquarium and Summer and Winter Garden Society Ltd. v. Parkinson ([1892] 1 Q.B.
431), Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby ([1873] L.R. 8 Q.B. 255), Kapur Singh
v. fagat Narain (A.LR. 1951 Punjab 49) and M. V. Raiwade v. Dr.
S. M. Hassan, (A.LR. 1954 Nag. 71), referred to.
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
Appeal No. 25 of 1954.
JURISDICTION :
Criminal
Appeal under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution from the judgment and order dated the 12th
January 1954 of the Patna High Court in Criminal
Miscellaneous Case No. 10 of 1953.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India and
Mahabir Prasad, Advocate-General of Bihar (Balbhadra
Prasad Sinha and P. G. Gokhale, with them) for the
appellant.
Purshottam Trikamdas,
for the respondent.
(R.
Patnaik,
with
him)
1955. November 8. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
BttAGWATI J.-This appeal with certificate under
article 134( 1) ( c) of the Constitution arises out of an
application under section 2 of the Contempt of Courts
6-85 S. C. India/59
956
1955
Brqjnandon Sillho
v.
Jyoti Narain
BhagwatiJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
{1955)
Act (XXXII of 1952) and section 8 of the Public
Servants (Inquiries) Act (XXXVII of 1850) read
with article 227 of the Constitution filed by the respondent against the appellant in the High Court of
Judicature at Patna and raises an importl\Ilt question
as to whether the Commissioner appointed under Act
XXXVII of 1850 is a Court.
The respondent is a Member of the Bihar Civil Service (Executive Branch). The State Government received reports to the effect that the respondent had
been guilty of serious misconduct and corrupt practices in the discharge of his official duties while employed as Sub-Divisional Officer at Aurangabad and
they accordingly decided that an inquiry into the
truth of the various charges against him should be
made under the provisions of the Public Servants
(Inquiries) Act, 1850 (Act XXXVII of 1850, hereinafter referred to as the Act) and Mr. Anjani Kumar
Saran who was the then Additional District and Sessions Judge, Gaya, and was thereafter the District and
Sessions Judge of that place was appointed Commissioner under the Act for making the inquiry. Gaya
was fixed as the venue of the inquiry and the State
Government also ordered that, during the pendency
of the inquiry, the respondent will remain under suspension. The Government made the appointment
aforesaid after obtaining the concurrence of the High
Court on its administrative side which was obtained
on the condition that an extra-temporary post of
Additional District and Sessions Judge was created
by the Government for the period Mr. Saran was
occupied with the inquiry. The appointment was
made on the 2nd June 1952 and it was expected that
Mr. Saran would be able to complete the inquiry
during a period of three months. The respondent,
however, adopted dilatory tactics. He made various
representations to the Government, one on the 6th
June 1952 demanding that a Judge of the High Court
be appointed as Commissioner under the Act to make
the inquiry against him and that inquiry be made at
Patna and not at Gaya, another on the 10th July
1952 protesting agaimt the appointment of Mr. Saran
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
957
as Commissioner to hold the inquiry against him and
demanding that a confirmed District and Sessions
Judge be appointed as Commissioner in his place, and
a third on the 17th November 1952 in which he
requested the Government to appoint three Commissioners instead of one for holding the inquiry against
him and also to pay the entire cost of his defence at
the same rates at which the Special Public Prosecutor
engaged by the Government was being paid and also
to reimburse other incidental expenses to be incurred
by him. All these representations were turned down
by the Government. Being thus thwarted in his
attempts to put off the inquiry on some pretext or the
other, the respondent tried to evade the same and
failed and neglected to reply to the queries made from
him by the Commissioner. The Commissioner also
could not communicate to him the orders passed by
him from time to time because the respondent did
not stay at the he.:idquarters and did not leave his
proper address for communication either at Gaya or
at Motihari. On the 24th November 1952 the Commissioner passed an order calling upon the parties to
attend the hearing of the proceedings before him on
the 8th December 1952 and forwarded a copy of this
order to the appellanr for communication to the respondent. The District Magistrates of Champaran
and Gaya who were requested to serve a true copy of
the order upon the respondent could not do so as he
was available neither at Motihari nor at Gaya and it
was with great difficulty that he could be traced at
Patna and the order served upon him. On the 18th
1952, the Commissioner passed another
December
order recording that he was feeling great difficulty in
contacting the respondent and in communicating his
orders to him. He observed that this was a highly
undesirable state of affairs and that it was necessary
that his orders should be communicated to the respondent as early as possible. A copy of this order
was forwarded by the Commissioner to the appellant
along with his letter dated the 20th December 1952
for information and doing the needful. The appellant thereafter wrote the letter complained against to
1955
Br~Sinha
v.
Jyoti Narain
BhogwatiJ.
958
1955
Brl!fattmdM Sinka
v.
Jyoli NOl'din
Bhagwati ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955}
the Commissioner on the 26th December 1952 being
D.O. No. II/3C-306/52A-11614 which ran as under:"Dear Mr. Saran,
I am desired to refer to your memo. No. 8266
dated the 26th November 1952 and to say
that Government are anxious not to allow
Mr. Jyoti Narayan to adopt dilatory tactics
and delay the progress of the inquiry against
him. I am to request you to be vigilant
against such tac.tics adopted by Mr. Narayan.
Yours sincere!y,
(Sd.) B. N. Sinha".
The Commissioner acknowledged receipt of this letter
by his D.O. letter No. 244, dated the 5th January 1953
stating that he would not allow the respondent to
adopt any dilatory tactics and delay the progress of
the inquiry against him.
On the 2nd February 1953, the respondent filed a
petition before the Commissioni;r stating inter alia
that he had not been able to engage any lawyer or
counsel for want of necessary papers and copies and
prayed for an adjournment of the inquiry. He also
prayed for starting a contempt of Court proceeding against the appellant but the Commissioner rejected both his prayers. The order which was passed
by the Commissioner . on these applications may as
well be set out in extenso inasmuch as it has a bearing on the question whether the appellant was guilty
of contempt of Court for having addressed ·the letter
complained against to him :"3-2-53. Another point raised in the first petition of the accused was that· Mr. B. N. Sinha, Deputy
Secretary to Government in addressing his D.O. letter
No. 11614, dated the 26th of December, 1952, was
guilty of contempt because he had interfered in my
judicial discretion. I do not find anything in this
letter from which it can be inferred that the author
of the letter intended to influence me in the exercise
of my judicial function. This letter was sent to me
in reply to my memo. No. 8266 dated 26-11-1952
whereby I had forwarded a copy of my order dated
24-11-1952 for communication to Mr. Narayan. Mr;
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
959
B.N. Sinha wrote in his letter dated the 26th of December 1952 that Government are anxious not to allow
Mr. Jyoti Narayan to adopt dilatory tactics and to
delay the progress of the inquiry. Now it is to be
noted that Mr. Narayan in paragraph 11 of his petition has himself charged the State Government for
delaying the inquiry and thereby causing harassment to him. Therefore, it is obvious that both
parties, that is, the State and the accused are
anxious that the inquiry should be expedited so
what Mr. B. N. Sinha meant by writing the D.O. was
that the inquiry should be expedited. This cannot
by any stretch of imagination be construed to mean
that the aforesaid officer in any way tried to influence me in the discharge of my judicial functions.
For these reasons I rejected the two prayers contained in the first petition of Mr. J. Narayan".
The respondent thereafter started proceedings in
contempt against the appellant in the High Court of
Judicature at Patna. A Rule was issued by the High
Court against the appellant which was heard and
finally disp0sed of on the 12th June 1954. The High
Court was:;of the opinion that the Commissioner appointed miaer Act XXXVII of 1850 was a Court, that
the Courf was subordinate to the High Court, that
the lettet complained against amounted to a contempt ~£.Court and that the appellant was guilty of
such contempt. It accordingly sentenced the appellant to · pay a fine of Rs. 250 and in default to undergo
simple imprisonment for a period of one month. The
appellant obtained a certificate under Article 134( 1)
( c) of the Constitution from the High Court. The
certificate was, however, limited to the question as
to whether the Commissioner appointed under the
Act is a Court.
At the hearing before us, the appellant filed a petition for urging additional grounds which included
inter alia the ground that the High Court erred in
holding that the Commissioner appointed under the
Act is a Court subordinate to the High Court within
the meaning of the Contempt of Courts Act for the
mere reason that its orders are open to be reviewed
1955
Brajrumdan Sinha
v.
Jyoti Narain
Bhagwali].
%0
1955
Brqjnant!an Sinha
v.
Jyoti Narain
Bhagwati].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
judicially in exercise of the power vested in the High
Court under article 227 of the Constitution and also
the ground that the High Court erred in holding that
the letter complained against tended to interfere
with or obstruct the course of justice and constituted
contempt of Court.
The learned Attorney-General for the appellant
contended in the first instance that the Commissioner
appointed under the Act is not a Court. He next
contended that even if he is a Court, he is not a Court
subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of
the Contempt of Courts Act. He lastly contended
that the letter complained against did not tend to
interfere with or obstruct the course of justice and
did not constitute contempt of Court.
Prior to the enactment of the Contempt of Courts
Act, 1952, there was in existence in India the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926 (XII of 1926). The various
States also had their corresponding enactments. The
Contempt of Courts Act, 1926 (XII of 1926) and the
corresponding enactments in the States of Hyderabad,
Madhya Bharat, Mysore, Pepsu, Rajasthan and
Travancore-Cochin and the Saurashtra Ordinance II
of 1948 were repealed by the Contempt of Courts Act,
1952 and a uniform Act to define and limit the powers
of certain Courts in punishing contempts of Courts
was enacted which extended to the whole of India
except the State of Jammu and Kashmir. In section
2 of the Act, "High Court" was defined as meaning
the High Court for a Part A State or a Part B State
and including the Court of the Judicial Commissioner
in a Part C State. Section 3 of the Act enacted :"3. ( 1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section
(2) every High Coun shall have and exercise the same
jurisdiction, powers and authority,· in accordance
with the same procedure and practice, in respect of
contempts of Courts subordinate to it as it has and
exercises in respect of contempts of itself.
(2) No High Court shall take cognisance of a contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of a
Court subordinate to it where such contempt is an
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
961
offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code (Act
XLV of 1860)".
The word "Court" was not defined in the Act and
the expression "Courts subordinate to the High
Courts" would prima facie mean the Courts of law
subordinate to the High Courts in the hierarchy of
Courts established for the purpose of administration
of justice throughout the Union.
It would be relevant, however, to notice the definitions of "Court" available elsewhere.
Coke on Littleton and Stroud defined the word
"Court" as the place where justice is judicially administered.
According to Stephen, "In every Court, there must
be at least three .constituent parts-the actor, reus
and judex ; actor or plaintiff, who complains of
an injury done ; the reus, or defendant, who is called
upon to make satisfaction for it ; and the judex, or
judicial power, which is to examine the truth of the
fact, 8n<l to determine the law arising upon that fact,
and if any injury appears to have been done, to ascertain, and by its officers to apply, the remedy".
Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act (I of 1872)
defines "Courts" as including all Judges and Magistrates, and all persons, except arbitrators, legally
authorised to take evidence. This definition, however,
has been held to be not exhaustive but framed only
for the purpose of Indian Evidence Act and is not to
be extended where such an extension is not warranted.
Sections 19 and 20 of the Indian Penal Code (Act
XL V of 1860) define the. words "Court" and the
"Court of Justice" as under :"Section 19. The word 'Judge' denotes not only
every person who is officially designated as a Judge,
but also every person-who is empowered by law to
give, in any legal proceeding, civil or criminal, a
definitive judgment, or a judgment which, if not
appealed against would be definitive, or a judgment
which, if confirmed by some other authority would
be definitive, or
who is one of a body of persons, which body of
persons is empowered by law to give such a judgment.
1955
B nan dan Sinha
v.
Jyoti Narain
Bhagwali
962
1955
Brajnandan Sinha
v.
Jyoti Narain
BhagwaJi].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
Section 20. The words "Court of .Justice" denote
a Judge who is empowered by law to act judicially
alone, or a body of Judges which is empowered by
law to act judicially as a body, when such Judge or
body of Judges is acting judicially''.
The pronouncement of a definitive judgment is
thus considered the essential sine qua non of a Court
and unless and until a binding and authoritative
judgment can be pronounced by a person or body of
persons it cannot be predicated that he or they constitute a Court.
The Privy Council in the case of Shell Co. of Australia v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation ( 1 ) thus defined "Judicial Power" at page 295 :"Is this right ? What is "judicial power" ? Their
Lordships are of opinion that one of the best definitions is that given by Griffith, C. J. in Huddart, Parker & Co. v. Moorehead (') where he says: "I am of
opinion that the words 'judicial power' as used in
section 71 of the Constitution mean the power which
every sovereign authority must of necessity have to
decide controversies between its subjects, or between
itself and its subjects, whether the rights relate to
life, liberty or property. The exer.cise of this power
does not begin until some tribunal which has power
to give a binding and authoritative decision (whether
subject to appeal or not) is called upon to take action".
Their Lordships further enumerated at page 297 certain negative propositions in relation to this subject :"l. A tribunal is not necessarily a Court in this
strict sense because it gives a final decision ;
2. Nor because it hears witnesses on oath ;
3. Nor l>-ecause two or more contending parties
appear before 1. .between whom it has to decide ;
4. Nor bec'1\Jse it gives decisions which affect
the rights of subjects ;
5. Nor because there 1s an appeal to a Court ;
6. Nor because it is a body to which a matter
is referred by another body.
See Rex v. Electricity Commissioners( )"
(I) [1931] A.C. 275.
(2) [1909] B C.L.R. 330, 357.
(3) [1924] I K.B. 171.
'
•'
•
2S.C.R .
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
963
and observed at page 298 :
"An admiqistrative tribunal may act judicially,
but still remairt an administrative tribunal as distinguished from a Court, strictly so-called.
Mere
externals do not make a direction to an administrative officer by an ad hoc tribunal an exercise by a
Co.urt of Judicial power".
The same principle was reiterated by this Court in
Bharat Bank Limited v. Employees of Bharat Bank
Ltd. (1) and Maqbool Hussain v. The "State of Bombay( 2 )
where the test of a judicial tribunal as laid down in
a passage from Cooper v. Wilson ( 3 ) was adopted by
this Court :"A true judicial decision presupposes an ex1stmg
dispute between two or more parties, and then involves four requjsites :-(1) The presentation
(not
necessarily orally) of their case by the parties to the
dispute ; (2) if the dispute between them is a question
of fact, the ascertainment of the fact by means of
evidence adduced by the parties to the dispute and
often with the assistance of argument by or on behalf of the parties on the evidence ; (3) if the dispute
between them is a question of law, the submission of
legal arguments by the parties ; and ( 4) a decision
which disposes of the whole matter by a finding upon
the facts in disput..: and an application of the law of
the land to the facts so found, including where required a ruling upon any disputed question of law".
Maqbool Hussain's case, above referred to, was
followed by this Court in S. A. Venkataraman v. The
Union of India and Another\ ) where a Constitution
Bench of this Court also laid down that both finality
and authoritativeness were . the essential tests of a
judicial pronouncement.
It is clear, therefore, that in order to constitute a
Court in th~ strict sense of the term, an essential condition is that the Court should have, apart from having some of the trappings of a judicial tribunal,
power to give a decision or a definitive judgment
which has finality and authoritativeness which are
(I) [1950] S.C.R.459.
(3) [1937] 2 K.B. 309. 340.
(2) [1953] S.C.R. 730.
(4) [1954] S.C.R. 1150.
1955
Brqjnatidtm Sinha
v.
]Jou Narain
Bhagwati].
964
1955
Brajnandan Sinlla
v.
Jyoti Narain
BhagwaliJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
the essential tests of a judicial pronouncement.
It was, however, urged by Shri Purshottam Tircamdas for the respondent that the word "Court" should
not be limited to a Court of Justice or a Court of
law but should be construed in a wide sense, including within the connotation, other Courts which,
though not Courts of Justice, were nevertheless Courts
according to law and he relied upon a decision of the
Court of Appeal in England in Royal Aquariun and
. Stemmer and Winter Garden Society Ltd. v. Parkinson ( )
and the observations of Fry, L.J. at page 446 therein :
"I do not desire to attempt any definition of a
"court". It is obvious that, according to our law, a
court may perform various functions. Parliament is
a court. Its duties as a whole are deliberative and
. legislative : the duties of a part of it only are judicial.
It is nevertheless a court. There 1 are many other
courts which, though not Courts of Justice, are nevertheless courts according to our law. There are, for
instance, courts of investigation, like the coroner's
court. In my judgment, therefore, the existence of
the immunity claimed docs not depend upon the question whether the subject-matter of consideration is a
Court of Justice, but whether it is a Court in law.
Wherever you find a Court in law, to that the law
attaches certain privileges, among which is the immunity in question".
The question involved in that case was whether the
defendant was entitled to absolute immunity from
action for anything done by him while performing
his duty as a member of the County Council in
dealing with the applications for licences for music
and dancing. It was coptended on behalf of the
defendant that he was exercising a judicial function
when he spoke the words complained of and therefore was entitled to absolute immunity in respect
of anything he said. The argument that "wherever
you find a Court in law, to that the law attaches
certain privileges among which is the immunity in
question" was used on behalf of the defendant and
Fry, L. J. dealt with th: same as under at page 447 :(1) [1892] l Q.B.431.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
%5
"It was said that the existence of this immunity
1s based on considerations of public policy, and that,
as a matter of public policy, wherever a body has to
decide questions, and in so doing has to act judicially,
it must be held that there is a judicial proceeding to
which this immunity ought to attach. It seems .to
me that the sense in which the word "judicial" is used
in that argument is this : it is used as meaning that
the proceedings are such as ought to be conducted
with the fairness and impartiality. which characterize
proceedings in Courts of Justice, and are proper to
the functions of a judge, not that the members of the
supposed body are members of a Court. Consider to
what lengths the doctrine would extend, if this immunity were applied to every body which is bound to
decide judicially in the sense of deciding fairly and
impartially. It would apply to assessment committees,
boards of guardians, to the Inns of Court, when considering the conduct of one of their members, to the
General Medical Council when considering questions
affecting the position of a medical man, and to all
arbitrators.
Is it necessary, on grounds of public
polit.:y, that the doctrine of immunity should be
carried as far · as this ? I say not. I say that there
is ample protection afforded in such cases by the
ordinary law of privilege. I find no necessity or propriety in carrying the doctrine so far as this argument
requires" .
. Lord Esher, M. R. expressed himself as follows while
dealing with this argument at page 442 :"It is true that, in respect of statements made
in the course of proceedings before a Court of Justice,
whether by judge, or couQsel, or witnesses, there is an
absolute immunity from liability to an action. The
ground of that rule is public policy. It is applicable
to all kinds of Courts of Justice ; but the doctrine has
been carried further ; and it seems that this immunity
applies wherever there is an authorized inquiry which,
though not before a Court of Justice, is before a
tribunal which has similar attributes. In the case of
Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby( 1 ) the doctrine was extended
(I) L.R. 8 Q.B. 255; L.R. 7 H.L. 744.
1955
Brajnanda11 Sinha
v.
Jyoti Narain
BhagwatiJ.
%6
1955
Br'!jnant!an Sinha
v.
]7oli Narain
Bh•gwali J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
to a military court of inquiry. It was so extended on
the ground that the case was one of an authorized
inquiry before a tribunal acting judicially, . that is to
say, in a manner as nearly as possible similar to that
in which a Court of Justice acts in respect of an inquiry before it. This doctrine has never been extended
further than to Courts of Justice and tribunals acting
in a manner similar to that in which such Courts act.
Then can it be said that a meeting of the county
council, when engaged in considering applications for
licences for music and dancing, is such a tribunal ? It
is difficult to say who are to be considered as judges
acting judicially in such a case".
The case of Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby(') was a case
where immunity was claimed by a witness who had
given evidence before a military. Court of inquiry.
The case went to the House of Lords and the Lord
Chancellor, in his speech at page 754, in 7 H.L. 744
observed:"Now, my Lords, adopting the expressions of
the learned Judges with regard to what I take to be
the settled law as to the protection of witnesses in
judicial proceedings, I certainly am of opinion that
upon all principles, and certainly. upon all considerations of convenience and of public policy, the same
protection which is extended to a witness in a judicial proceeding who has been examined on oath
ought to be extended, and must be extended, to a
military man who is called before a Court 0f Inquiry
of this kind for the purpose of testifying there upon
a matter of military discipline connected with the
army".
Both these cases, the one before the Court of Appeal
and the other before the House of Lords, were concerned with the extension of the principle of immunity of members of a tribunal or witnesses in judicial proceedings and the Courts logically extended
the principle of immunity beyond the Courts of
Justice to tribunals or bodies of persons functioning
in a manner and according to procedure which was
assimilated to a judicial inquiry. The extension of the
(I) L.R. 8 Q.B. 255; L.R. 7 H.L. 744.
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
%7
immunity to such tribunals or bodies would not, however, constitute them Courts of Justice or Courts of
law.
The position is thus summarised in the following
passage in Halsbury's Laws of England, Hailsham
Edition, Volume 8, page 526 :"Many bodies are not courts, although they have
to decide questions, and in so doing have to act judicially, in the sense that the proceedings must be conducted with fairness and impartiality, such as assessment committees, guardians committees, the Court of
referees constituted under the Unemployment Insurance Acts to decide claims made on the insurance
funds, the benchers ·of the Inns of Court when considering the conduct of one of their members, the
General Medical Council, when considering questions
affecting the position of a medical man".
We must, therefore, fall back upon the tests laid
down above for determining what is a Court strictly
so-called within the connotation of the term as used
in the Contempt of Courts Act. It would be appropriate at this stage to note the relevant provisions of
the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act (XXXVII of
1850) which would fall to be considered for determining whether the Commissioner appointed under the
Act is a Court or not.
The Act was passed for regulating inquiries into the
behaviour of public servants and the preamble
runs :"Whereas it is expedient to amend the law for
regulating inquiries into the behaviour of public servants not removable from their appointments without the sanction of Government, and to make the
same uniform throughout India ; It is enacted as follows:-"
Section 2 requires the articles of charges to be drawn
out and a formal and public inquiry to be ordered
whenever the Government shall be of opinion that
there are good grounds for making a formal and
public inquiry into the truth of any imputation of
misbehaviour by any such person. The inquiry may
be committed under section 3 either to the Court,
1955
BrajntwlQfl SiMa
v.
Jyoti N orain
Bhagwati].
968
1955
..
Brq/Mll4oo Siltlra
JyotfNarain
B/UJgwati j.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
Board or other authorities to which the person accused is subordinate or to any other person or persons specially appointed by the Government, Commissioners for the purpose. Sections 4 to 7 contain
provisions in regard to the conduct of the prosecution
and section 8 prescribes the powers of the Commissioners. This section has been particularly relied
upon as constituting the Commissioners a Court, and
runs as under :"Section 8. The comm1ss1oners shall have the
same power of punishing contempts and obstructions
to their proceedings, as is given to Civil and Criminal
Courts by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and
shall have the same powers fot the summons of witnesses, and for compelling the production of documents, and for the discharge of their duty under the
commission, and shall be entitled to the same protection as the Zila and City Judges, except that all
process to cause the attendance of witnesses or other
compulsory process, shall be served through and
executed by the Zila or City Judge in whose jurisdiction the witness or other persons resides, on whom the
process is to be served, and if he resides within Calcutta, Madras or Bombay, then through the Supreme
Court of Judicature thereto. When the commission
has been issued to a court, or other person or persons
having power to issue such process in the exercise of
' their ordinary authority, they may also use all such
power for the purposes of the commission".
Section 9 prescribes a penalty for disobedience to
process issued as aforesaid for the purpose of the
commission and sections 10 to 20 prescribe the procedure to be followed in the conduct of the inquiry. It
may be noted that this procedure is assimilated as
far as possible to the conduct of a prosecution in a
Criminal Court of law and the person accused is given
the fullest opportunity to enter upon his defence and
lead evidence in ord~r to clear himself of the charges
levelled against him. Sections 21 and 22 lay down the
functll)ns of the Commissioners in regard to the report to be mad~ by them to the Government of their
.proceedings under the commission and the powers of
is.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
%9
the Government to pass final orders on such reports.
These sections have an important bearing on the
question before us and they enact :"Section 21.-After the close of the inquiry the
comm1ss1oners shall forthwith report to Government
their proceedings under the commission, and shall
send with the record thereof their opinion upon
each of the articles of charge separately, with such
observations as they think fit on the whole case.
Section 22.-The Government, on consideration
of the report of the commissioners, may order them
to take further evidence, or give further explanation
of their opinions. It may also order additional articles of charge to be framed, in which case the inquiry
into the truth of such additional articles shall be
made in the same manner as is herein directed with
respect to the original charges. When special commissioners have been appointed, the Government may
also, if it thinks fit, refer the report of the commissioners to the Court or other authority to which the
person accused is subordinate, for their opinion on
the case ; and will finally pass such orders thereon as
appear just and consistent with its powers in such
cases".
These provisions were considered by this Court in
the case of S. A. Venkataraman v. The Union of India
and Another( 1 ). The question that arose for consideration there was whether an inquiry made and concluded under the Act amounted to prosecution and
punishment for an offence as contemplated under
article 20(2) of the Constitution. Articles of charge
had been framed against the petitioner in that case
and evidence had been led both by the prosecutor
and by the defence arid witnesses on both sides were
examined on oath and cross-examined and re-examined in the usual manner. The Commissioner had
found, on a consideration of the evidence, that some
of the charges had been ,:J"oved against the petitioner
and had submitted a report to that effect to the Govvernment. The President had accepted the opinion
of the Commissioner and, in view of the findings on
U) [1954] S.C.R. 1150.
1955
Br~andtm Sin/ia
v.
]µti Narain
B/iagwati ].
970
1955
Brtgnll1llhn S'rn!ra
v.
]1.tiNMaio
B,.,,_. ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1955]
the several charges arrived at by the latter, was provisionally of the opinion that the petitioner should
be dismissed. Opportunity was given to the petitioner under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution to
show · cause against the action proposed to be taken
in regard · to him and after considering his representation and after consultation with the Union Public
Service Commission, the President finally decided to
impose the penalty of dismissal upon him and he was
according! y dismissed. After his dismissal, the police
submitted a charge-sheet against him before the
Special Judge. Sessions Court, Delhi, charging him
with offences under sections 161 and 165 of the Indian
Penal Code and section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and upon that summons were issued by
the learned Judge directing the petitioner to appear
before his Court. The petitioner thereupon challenged
the legality of this proceeding in a writ petition contending that the proceedings were without jurisdiction inasmuch as they amounted to a fresh prosecution for offences for which he had been prosecuted
and punished already.
While considering whether under the circumstances
there had ·been a violation of the fundamental right
of the petitioner under Article 20(2) of the Constitution, this Court scrutinised the provisions of the
Act and t)te position of the Commissioner appointed
thereunder. Justice Mukherjea, as he then was, delivered the judgment of the Court and observed at
page 1159 :"As the law stands at present, the only purpose,
for which an enquiry under Act XXXVII of 1850
could be made, is to help the Government to come to
a definite conclusion regarding the misbehaviour of a
public servant and thus enable it to determine provisionally the punishment which should be imposed
upon him, prior to giving him a reasonable opportunity of showing cause, as is required under article
311(2) of the Constitution. An enquiry under this
Act is not at all compulsory and it is quite open to
the Government to adopt any other method if it so
chooses. It is a matter of convemence merely and
2 S.C.R.
,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
971
nothing else. It is against this background that we
will have to examine the material provisions of the
Public Servants (Inquiries) Act of 1850 and see whether from the nature and result of the enquiry which
the Act contemplates it is at all possible to say that
the proceedings taken or concluded under the Act
amount to prosecution and punishment for a criminal
offence." ;
and at page 1160 :"A Commissioner appointed under this Act has
no duty to investigate any offence which is punishable under the Indian Penal Code or the Prevention
of Corruption Act and he has absolutely no jurisdiction to do so. The subject-matter of investigation
by him is the truth or otherwise of the imputation
of misbehaviour made against a public servant and it
is only as instances of misbehaviour that the several
articles of charge are investigated, upon which disci·plinary action might be taken by the Government if
it so chooses. The mere fact that the word "prosecution" has been used, would nol make the proceeding before the Commissioner one for prosecution of an
offence. As the Commissioner has to form his opinion
upon l~gal evidence, he has been given the power to
summon witnesses, administer oath to them and also
to .compel production of relevant documents. These
may be some of the trappings of a judicial tribunal,
but they cannot make the proceeding anything more
than a mere fact finding enquiry. This is conclusively established by the provisions of sections 21 and 22
of the Act. At the close of the enquiry, the Commissioner has to submit a report to the Government
regarding his finding on each one of the charges made.
This is a mere expression of opinion and it lacks both
finality and authoritativeness which are the essential
tests of a judicial pronouncement. The opinion is not
even binding on the Government. Under section 22
of the Act, the Government can, after receipt of the
report, call upon the Commissioner to take further
evidence or give further explanation of his opinion.
When Special Commissioners are appointed, their report could be referred to the court or other authority
7-85 S.C· India/59
1955
Brajnandan Sinha
v.
Jyoti JVarain
Bhagwati J.
972
1955
Brajnandan Sinha
v.
.Jyoti Narain
B!iagwati ·J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
to which the officer concerned is subordinate for further advice and after taking the opinion of the different authorities and persons, the Government has to
decide finally what action it should take".
The Court. was no doubt concerned in that case with
finding whether the inquiry before the Commissioner
was tantamount to a prosecution of the petitioner.
While .considering the same, however, the position of
the Commissioner was discussed and the conclusion
to which the Court came was that he was a mere fact
finding authority, that the report made by the Commissioner to the Government was merely his expression of opinion and it lacked both finality and authoritativeness which are the essential tests of a judicial
pronouncement. This conclusion is sufficient to establish that the Commissioner appointed under the
Act was not a Court and his report or findings were
not a definitive judgment or a judicial pronouncement
inasmuch as they were not binding and authoritative
and lacked finality. We are also of the same opinion.
Apart from. the above considerations which weighed
with the Court in that case. we have also the provisions of section 8 of the Act itself which go to show
that the Commissioners are given certain powers of
the Civil and Military Courts in regard to punishing
contempts and obstruction to their proceedings, summoning of witnesses, compelling the production of
documents and for service of their process as also the
same protection as Zila and City Judges. The very
fact that this provision had got to be enacted shows
that the position of the Commissioners was not assil)'lilated to that of Judges and that they did not constitute Courts of Justice or Courts of law but were
mere fact finding tribunals deriving whatever powers
they could exercise under the very terms of the Act
which created them. The power of punishing contempts and obstruction -to their proceedings as is
given to Civil and Criminal Courts by the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1898 was also similar in its
nature and the very nature and extent of the power
indicated that they were not Courts in the ordinary
sense of the term, No such provision would have been
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
973
necessary to be enacted if in fact they were constituted Courts of Justice or Courts of law and it_ is no
argument to say that these provisions were enacted
even though they were not strictly necessary merel~·
for the sake of abundant caution or clarification of
the position. We are of the opinion that the Commissioner appointed under the Act, having regard to
the circumstances above set out, does not constitute
a Court within the meaning of the term as used in
the Contempt of Courts Act.
Our attention was, however, drawn by Shri Purshottam Tricamdas · to a decision of a Division Bench
of the Punjab High Court in Kapur Singh v. fagat
Narain( ). That was a case directly in point and on
all fours with the case before us. The learned Chief
Justice of the Punjab High Court had been appointed
a Commissioner under the Act in the matter of an
inquiry against Sardar Kapur Singh, I.C.S., and Lala
Jagat Narain, the editor, printer and publisher of an
Urdu Daily newspaper published at Jullundur called
The Hindu Samachar, was called upon to show cause
why he should not be punished under section 3 of
Contempt of Courts Act with regard to a leading
article which appeared in his name in the issue of the
paper dated the 12th March 1951. A preliminary
objection was taken on his behalf that the Court had
no jurisdiction to take proceedings against him for
contempt and the argument was that the Court of the
Commissioner appointed to hold an inquiry under the
Act was not a Court and in any event was not a Court
subordinate to the High Court. Mr. Justice Falshaw
who delivered the judgment of the Court observed at
page 50 in connection with this argument : "The
Public Servants (Inquiries) Act itself seems clearly
to indicate that a Commissioner or Commissioners
appointed under the Act constitute a Court as they
are given all the powers of a Court regarding the
summoning of witnesses and other matters, and the
only ground on which the learned coun~el for the
respondent could base his argument that the Com:missioner does not constitute a Court was that he can
(I) A.I.R. 1951 Punjab 49
1955
Brajnandan Sinha
v.
Jyoti Narain
B/iagwali J.
974
1955
Brajnandan Sinha
\".
Jyoti Narain
B!iagwaJi ],
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(19551
f~ive no final decision, but merely has to draw up a
teport giving his findin gs on the charge or charges
against the respondent, which is to be forwarded to
the Government. In my opinion, however, this fact
: lone is not sufficient to make the Commissioner or
Commissioners any thing other than a Court and ir
is to be noted that the definition of Court in section
3, Evidence Act, is very wide indeed as it reads :
"'Court' includes all Judges and Magistrates and all
persons, except arbitrators, legally authorised to take
evidence". The learned Judges there relied upon
the definition of Court given in section 3 of the Indian
Evidence Act which, as has already been noted, is
£ramed only for the purposes of the Act and is not
to be extended where such an extension is not ·
warranted.
This definition does not help in the
determination of the question whether the Commi~·
sioners appointed under the Act constitute a Court
and the attentio11 of the learned Judges was not drawn
to the position that finality and authoritativeness
are the essential tests of a judicial pronouncement.
We are of the opinion that the decision reached by
the learned Judges of the Punjab High Court in that
case was wrong and cannot help the respondent.
Our attention was also drawn to another decision
of the Nagpur High Court in M. V. Rajwade v. Dr.
S. M. Hassan( 1 ). The question which came to be considered by the Court in that case was whether a commission appointed under the Commissions of Inquiry
Act, 1952 was a Court within the meaning of section
3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952, and while considering the provisions of that Act, the learned Judges
of the Nagpur High Court incidentally considered the
provisions of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act,
1850. They rightly observed that "the term 'Court'
1-ias not been defined in the Contempt --£ Courts Act,
1952. The Act, however, does contemplate a 'Court
· of Justice' which as defined in section 20, Indian
Penal Code, 1860, denotes 'a judge who is empowen·d
by law to act judicially'. The least that is requirf'.d
of a Court is the capacity to ddiver a "definitive judg( t ) A.I.R. 1954 N"-g. 71.
"
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
<J75
ment'', and ur.less this power vests in a tribunal in
any particular case, the mere fact that the procedure
adopted by it is of a legal character and it has the
power to administer an oath will not impart to it the
status of a Court'', and came to the conclusion that
the commission appointed under the Commissions of
Inquiry Act, 1952 is not a Court within the meaning
of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. The learned
Judges were merely considering the provisions of the
Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 and were not concerned with the construction of the provisions of the
Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850 and whatever
obsen-1tions they made in regard to the provisions or
the latter Act by way of comparing the same with the
provisions of the former which they were there considering would not have the effect of putting cr1 the
provisions of the latter Act a construction which
would be any avail to the respondent before us. The
rati0 which was adopted by the learned Judges was
quite correct but it appears that they digressed into
a consideration of the provisions of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850 in order to emphasize
the character and position of the commission appointed under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952
ev":n though it" was not strictly necessary for the purpose of arriving :it their decision, though it must be
mentioned that while discussing the nature and function of the commission they expressed themselves
correctly as under:"The Commission governed by the Commissions
of Inquiry Act, 1952 is appointed by the State Government "for the information of its own mind'', in
order that it should not act, in exercise of its executive power, "otherwise than in accordance with the
dictates of justice & equity" in ordering a departmental enquiry against its officers. It is, therefore,
a fact finding body meant only to instruct the mind
of the Government without producing any docummt
of a judicial nature".
We are of the opinion that neither of these cases
which have been relied upon l-y ~hri I-·urshottam
Tricamdas is of any help to the respondent or detracts
1955
Brl!feandan Sinha
v.
Jyoti J(araiR
BhagwatiJ.
976
!955
Braj'ft01fdan Sinha
v.
Jyoti Narain
BhagwatiJo
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
from the true position as we have laid down above.
The only conclusion to which we can come on a consideration of all the relevant provisions of the Act
is that the Commissioner appointed under the Act is
not a Court within the meaning of the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1952.
In view of the conclusion reached above, we do not
think it necessary to go into the question whether the
Commissioner appointed under the Act is a Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of the
Contempt of Courts Act. Nor do we think it necessory to express any opinion as to whether the letter
complained against constituted a contempt of Court.
We may, however, note in passing that the circumstances under which the letter came to be addressed
by the appellant to the Commissioner, the terms
thereof and the order which was passed by the Commissioner on the application made by the respondent
to proceed against the appellant in contempt on date
the 2nd February 1953 lend support to the argument
which was advanced on behalf of the appellant that
the letter complained against did not constitute contempt of Court.
The result, therefore, is that the appeal will be
allowed, the order passed against the appellant by
the Court below will be set aside and the original
Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 10 of 1953 filed
by the respondent in the High Court of Judicature at
Patna will stand dismissed. The fine if paid will be
refunded.
Report an error or ask for masking: grievance@lawgrids.org