RAJA BAHADUR KAMAKSHYA NARAIN SINGH AND OTHERS versus THE COLLECTOR AND DEPUTY COMMIS SIONER OF HAZARIBAGH AND OTHERS.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 28 October 1955 | [1955] 2 S.C.R. 988 | 1955 INSC 59
Key facts
- Decided
- 28 October 1955
- Bench
- SUDHI RANJAN DAS*, N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR, VIVIAN BOSE, B. JAGANNADHADAS, SYED JAFFER IMAM
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 217/1955
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1955] 2 S.C.R. 988
- Neutral citation
- 1955 INSC 59
Text of the judgment
988
1955
Octobtr 28
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
RAJA BAHADUR KAMAKSHYA NARAIN
SINGH AND OTHERS
v.
THE COLLECTOR AND DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF HAZARIBAGH AND OTHERS.
[S. R.
DAs,
ACTING
DAS, JAFER IMAM
C.J.,
VIVIAN
BosE, JAGANNADHA-
and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]
Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 (Bihor Act XXX of 1950), ss.
3(1), 4(a), 4(h), 5, 7-Buildings standing on the land comprised in
the estate-Transfer after the first day of January, 1946-Estate
notified as having become vested in the State-Notice to the transferee
under s. 4(h)-Notification purporting to vest in the State the transferred properties-Validity-S. 4(h ), whether ultra vires.
On the 29th of December, 1947, petitioner No. I executed a
lease to C (a company) of certain properties consisting of land•
and buildings comprised in the estate belonging to him. Subsequently, in 1949 he executed a deed of settlement whereby he transferred the properties
to
three trustees,
namely,
himself and peti-
tioners 2 and 3. Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 (Bihar Act XXX
of 1950) came into force on the 25th of September, 1950, and on
the 3rd of November, 1951, the State of Bihar issued a notification under s. 3( I) of the Act declaring that the estate of petitioner
No. I had passed to and become vested in the State. A notice under
s. 4(h) of the Act was issued by the Collector to C and on the 4th
of March, 1954, the State GoYCrrunent issued a notification under
s. 3(1) purporting to vest in the State the properties in question. It
was contended for the petitioners that the buildings standing on the
land comprised in the notified estate did not vest in the State, on
the ground (I) that the estate of the petitioner No. I did not vest in
the State under s. 3 of the Act but by virtue of the provisions of s.
4, (2) that the definition of "estate" in the Act speaks of land only
and not of any building on it, (3) that on the date of vesting, the
buildings were not used as office or cutchery for the collection of rent
of the notified estate within the meaning of>. 4(a), and (4) thats.
4(h) is ultra vires the Constitution as it iiuposes an unreasonable
restriction on the fundamental right of the petitioners to realise
rent from the company.
Held, that (1) ,vhether the estate of petitioner No. 1 vested in
the State by reason of the publication of the notification under
s. 3 or by virtue of the provisions of s. 4 was of little consequence
as in either case a vesting took place ;
(2) although in the definition of "estate" the word land is uoed
and there is no mention of the word building, the provisions of ss:
.._, 5 and 7 sho'v the intention of the legislature to include some-
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
989
thing more than merely the land of a notified estate as vesting in
the State. Under s. 4(a), buildings of a certain description and
other things vest in the State absolutely on the publication of a notification under s. 3. Under ss. 5 and 7, the buildings mentioned
therein are deemed to be settled by the· State with the intermediary
and this could only be on the supposition that the buildings vested
in the State, the intermediary being a settlee under the State ;
(3) ss. 4(a) and 4(h) must be read together. Under. s. 4(h), the
use to which the building was put previous to its transfer after the
first day of January, 1946, and not thereafter was what the Collector
was concerned with and not to what use it had been put after its
transfer after the. first day of January, 1946. If a transfer was made
after the first day of January, 1946 of a building comprised in the
notified estate which was used immediately previous to the date of
transfer primarily as office or cutchery for the collection of rent of
such estate the transfer would be liable to be annulled under s. 4(h)
and the building would vest absolutely in the State on the publication of the notification and the provisions of s. 4(a) must be read
accordingly ; and
( 4) the Collector's powers under s. 4(h), wide as they are, are
not quite so absolute or arbitrary as suggested. S. 4(h) is a part of
a validly enacted law of acquisition of estates and is an integral
part of the machinery by which acquisition of an estate takes place.
The Act or s. 4(h) of it imposing any unreasonable restriction on the
fundamental right of the petitioners, therefore, does not arise. The
Act including s. 4(h) of it, is protected by Art. 31-A of the Constitu·
tion.
ORIGINAL
JURISDICTION ;
Petition No· 217 of
1955.
Under article 32 of the Constitution of India for
the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
N. C. Chatterjee, (Vir Sen Sawhney and Ganpat
Rai, with him), for the petitioners.
Lal Narain Sinha, (Bajrang Sahai and S. P.
Verma, with him), for respondent No. 2.
1955. October 28. The Judgment of the Court
was deJ.ivered by
IMAM J.-The pet1t1oners have .filed this application under article 32 of the Constitution claiming that
the buildings and lands as set out in the Schedule
annexed to the petition and marked "A" . (hereinafter
referred to as the disputed properties) did not vest
in the State of Bihar under the provisions of the
1955
Raja Bahadur
Kamalc.rhya
Narain Singh
and others~
v.
The Collector and
Deputy Commissioner of Hazaribagh and ot/ters
990
1955
Raja Bahat!ur
Kamakshya
Narain Singh
and others
v.
The Collector and
Depu'.'Ji Commissioner 1f Hazaribaglt anc? others
lmam].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred
to as the Act). Petitioner No. 1 in his individual
capacity was at one time the owner of the disputed
properties which lie within Touzi No. 28 of the Collectorate of Hazaribagh. On the 29th of December,
1947 petitioner No. 1 as owner leased out the disputed properties to a Company known as Mineral
Deveiopment Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the
Company). The company took possession of the disputed properties and has been paying rent. On the
7th of April, 1949 petitioner No. 1 in his individual
capacity executed a deed of settlement whereby he
transferred the disputed properties to three trustees,
namely, himself and petitioners 2 and 3. The Company has been paying rent to the trustees since then.
The Act came into force on the 25th of September,
1950. On the 3rd of November, 1951 the State Government issued a notification under section 3(1) of
the Act declaring that the estate of petitioner No. 1
in his individual capacity specified therein had
passed to and become vested in the State. On the
26th of October, 1953 a notice under section 4(h) of
the Act was issued by the Collector to the Company, and on the 4th of March, 1954 the State Government issued a notification under section 3(1) of
the Act purporting to vest in the State the propc:·ties
covered by the above-mentioned deed of settlement
and anothe~ deed of settlement with which we are
not concerned. The Company instituted a title suit
No. 33 of 1951 aga;nst the State of Bihar in the
Court of the Subordinate Judge, Hazaribagh basing
its claim on a mining lease executed by petitioner
No. 1 in his individual capacity the genuineness of
which
was challenged by the State. Petitioner
No. 1 in his individual capacity was made a party to
this suit. The Company also instituted a title suit
No. 9 of 1954 against the State of Bihar to which
petitioner No. 1 in his individual capacity was made
a party challenging the legality of the issue of notice
dated 25-10-1953 under section 4 (h) of the Act. On
the 11th of November, 1954 the State of Bihar
filed title suit No. 53 of 1954 to which the Company,
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
991
petitioner No. 1 in his individual capacity, the three
trustees and others were made part!·cs. By this suit
the State of Bihar challenged the genuineness of
the lease in favour of the Company and the deed of
settlement in favour of the trustees.
The real question for deternfr:iation it, what vested
in the State on the publication of the notifcation
under section 3 and by virtue of the provisions of
section 4(a) of the Act? According to Mr. Chatterjee
the disputed properties did not vest in the State,
whatever else may have. Having regard to the definition of "estate" in the Act, if anything vested in
the State on the publication of a notification it was
the land comprised in the notified estate. Although
the disputed properties stood on the land in the notified estate, they did not vest in the State, because
the definition of "estate" speaks of land only and not
of any building on it. The notification under section
3 was a mere declaration and actual vesting took
place under section 4(a). On the date of vesting the
disputed properties were not used as office or cutchery
for the collection of rent of the notified estate of
petitioner No. 1, who had parted with his right, title
and iHterest therein long before the Act was enacted
and the publication of the notification under section
3. Mr. Sinha on behalf of the State of Bihar, on. the
other hand, contended that on a perusal of the provisions of sections 4, 5 and 7 of the Act, it would appear
that the Act contemplated something more than the
land in an estate vesting in the State and the disputed
properties could and did vest in the State on the publication of the notification under section 3.
In our opinion, it is of little consequence in the
present case whether the notified estate vested in the
State by reason of the public:ition of the notification
under section 3 or by virtue of the provisions of section 4 of the Act, becau~e in either case a vesting
did t:ike place. Although the word land is used in
the definition of "estate'', the provisions of sections
4, 5 and 7 show the necessary intentio)l to include
something more than the land when an estate vests
in the State. Under section 4(a) it is not only the
1955
Raja Bahadur
KamllkslrJa
Narain Singh
and otMrs
....
The Collector and
Depu!Y Ccmmissioner nf Hazarihagh '!!'~ _ot/v.rs
Imam].
992
1955
Raja Bahadur
K amllkshya
}{arain Sinth
and others
v.
T/1' Ccl11etor and
Inpuiy Ccm>nis-
sioner of H~ari
l11igh and others
Imam].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955)
estate but also buildings of a certain description and
other things which vest in the State absolutely on
the publication of a notification under section 3.
Under sections 5 and 7 the buildings mentioned therein also vest in the State, because the buildings in
question are deemed to be settled by the State with
the intermediary in possession. This could only be
on the supposition that these buildings vested in the
.State and the person in possession held the same as
settlee under the State.
In the present case on the date of the publication
of the notification under section 3 the disputed properties were said to be in the possession of the Company as lessee and the petitioner No. 1 had no right,
title or interest therein as he had transferred his
lessor's reversion to trustees by a deed of settlement.
We may assume, therefore, that on the date of publication of the notification tl1e disputed properties were
not used primarily as office or cutchery for the collection of rent of the notified estate of petitioner No. 1.
It becomes, therefore, necessary to interpret the
word "used" occurring in section 4(a). It is to be
noticed that this clause of section 4 does not expressly
state that a building used primarily as office or cutchery for the collection of rent must be so used at the
date of the publication of the notification. In this
clause the words "used primarily as office or cutchery
for the collection of rent of such estate" must be read
in the light of the provisions of section 4(h) where
similar words are employed. Under section 4(h) the
Collector has the power to make inquiries in respect
of any transfer of any kind of interest in any building used primarily as office or cutchery for the collection of rent of such estate, if the transfer had been
made at any time after the first day of January,
1946. If on due inquiry the Collector is satisfied that
such transfer was made with the object of defeating
the provisions of the Act or causing loss to the State
or obtaining higher compensation, then the Collector
may, after giving notice to the parties concerned
and hearing them and with the previous sanction of
the State Government, annul the transfer and dis-
2 S.C.R.
~sess
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
9')3
the person claiming under it. These prov1s1ons clearly indicate that if any building was used
primarily as office or cutchery for the collection of
rent and such building had been transferred after
the first day of January, 1946, the transfer could be
annulled
if the circumstances mentioned in section 4(h) had been established. That is to say, under
these provisions the use to which the building was
put previous to its transfer after the first day of
January, 1946 and not thereafter was what the
Collector was concerned with and not to what use it
had been put after its transfer after the first day of
January, 1946. To hold otherwise would be to make
the provisions of section 4(h) meaningless. When a
proprietor transfers any such building, it necessarily
follows that the building thereafter was not .used by
him as office or cutcherv for the collection of rent of
his estate. If the transf~r was made before the first
day of January, 1946 the provisions of section 4(h)
would not apply and such a transfer would not be
liable to be annulled and the building so transferred
would not vest in the State on the date of the publication of the notification covering the estate on which
such building stands. If, on the other hand, this
transfer was made after the first day of January,
1946, a building comprised in a notified estate, which
was used immediately previous to the date of the
transfer primarily as office or cutchery for the collection of rent of such estate the transfer would be liable
to be annulled under section 4(h) and it would vest
absolutely in the State on the publication of the
notification and the provisions of section 4(a) must
be read accordingly. It would be unreasonable to
construe the provisions of section 4(a) in the way
suggested by Mr. Chatterjee. The scheme of the Act
has to be borne in mind and the provisions of sections
4(a) and 4(h) have to be read together. The petitioners had not asserted in their petition that the
disputed properties were not used as office or cutchery
for the collection of rent of the notified estate of petitioner No. 1 before the first of January, 1946 or before the lease in favour of the Company. On behalf
1955
Rqja Bahadur
Kamaksh"a
Narain Singh
; and others
v.
The Collector and
Depu{Y Commissioner of Hazaribagh and others
Imam].
994
1955
Raja Bafiadur
Kamaks4Ja
Narain Sing!i
and otitrs
v
The r;,.,fleetor arid
Deputy CJmmissioatr of Hazaribagll and :)t.1.ers
'--
Imam].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
of the State, on affidavit, it has been stated that the
disputed properties were all along used as cutchcry
before the creation of .the lease and that they were
not being used in connection with any mining operation. In our opinion, if as a re.suit of the inquiry
under section 4(h) the transfer of the disputed properties by the petitioner No. 1 is annulled the disputed properties must be regarded as having vested
in the State, because they were used as office or cutchery for the collection of rent previous to the
transfers made by the petitioner 1'1o. 1.
It was next contended that section 4(h) is ultra
vires the Constitution, because it imposed an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right of the
petitio11ers to realize rent trom the Company, as the
transfer in its favour was imperilled by the notice
issued to it under section. 4(h). No appeal or review
was provided in the Act against the order of the
Collector issuing notice or an order of annulment
made by him. The Collector was left with absolute
power to annul a transfer and to dispossess a person
in possession thereunder. Section 4(h), however,
does direct' the Collector to give reason.able notice to
the parties concerned and to hear them. Such annulment or dispossession which he may order, must be
with the previous sanction of the State Governrrient
and he is compelled to do so on terms which may appear to him fair and equitable. The power is, therefore, not quite so absolute or arbitrary as suggested.
Assuming, however, that the Collector has very wide
powers, it ·is to• be remembered that section 4(h) is a
part of the law of acquisition of estates as enacted by
the Act and is an integral part of the machinery by
which acquisition of an estate takes place. The Act is
a valid lavr of acquisition and its v1hole purpose may
be defeated unless there was some such provision as
contain~d in section 4(h). The Act being a law for
acquisition of estate the question of it or section 4(h)
of it imposing any unreasonable restriction on the
fundamental rights of the petitioners does not arise.
In any c\·e11t the Act including sect!on 4(h) is
. protect~d by · ;irticle 31-A of the Constitution.
The petition is accordingly dismissed with cqsts.
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