INDIRA SOHANLAL versus USTODIAN OF EVACUEE PROPERTY, DELHI & OTHERS.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 28 October 1955 | [1955] 2 S.C.R. 1117 | 1955 INSC 58
Key facts
- Decided
- 28 October 1955
- Bench
- SUDHI RANJAN DAS*, N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR, VIVIAN BOSE, B. JAGANNADHADAS, SYED JAFFER IMAM
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 195/1954
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1955] 2 S.C.R. 1117
- Neutral citation
- 1955 INSC 58
Text of the judgment
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1117
also not only reasonable but called for in the circumstances, which occasioned the Evacuee Property laws.
In this case the petitioner is deprived of his bargain
and incurs consequential loss, not by virtue of any
unconstitutional law but by reason of the quasijudicial order of the Custodian declining to confirm
the transaction. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that any fundamental right of
his has been violated must, therefore, be reiected.
1955
Sadhll Ram
v.
The CustodianGentral of Evacuee
Property
JagannadhadaJ ].
Learned counsel next urges that the action of the
Custodian in basing his decision on some circular of
the Custodian-General is illegal and that it is not relevant material under section 5-A. It is enough to
say that even if this contention be correct, this does
not raise any question of violation of fundamental
rights. If this is the sole ground, this application is
misconceived.
·
This petition accordingly fails and is dismissed but
in the circuqistances without costs.
INDIRA SOHANLAL
1955
ti.
Octob<r 28.
CUSTODIAN OF EVACUEE PROPERTY,
DELHI & OTHERS.
[S. R. DAs, AcTING C. J., VIVIAN BosE, JAGANNADHADAS, JAFER IMAM and CttANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]
Evacuee
Pt'Dperty-Custodian-General-Revisional
powersAdministration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 (XXXI of 1950), ss.
27, 58(3)-Transaction before the passing of the Act-Application for
confirmation-East Punjab Evacttees' (Administration of Property)
Act, 1947 (East Punjab Act XIV of 1947), ss. 5-A, 5-B-Order of
confirmation .afte1· passing of Act XXXI of 1950-Revision-Validity-General Clauses Act (X of 1897), s. 6-Applicability.
The appellant, a displaced person from Lahore, was the owner
o( a house there and on the 10th of October, 1947, she arranged to
have it exchanged with certain lands in a village in the State of
Delhi, belonging to M, an evacuee. On the 23rd of February, 1948,
she made an application to the Additional Custodian of Evacuee
Property (Rural), Delhi, for confirmation of the transaction of ex-
1118
1955
Indirtl Sohonlal
v.
Cust.Jian of
&acuu Property,
Delhi and othtrs
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
change under s. 5-A of the East Punjab Evacuees' {Administration
of Property) Act, 1947, as amended in 1948 and applied to the State
of Delhi. Under s. 5-B of the Act an order if passed by the Custodian or Additional Custodian would not be subject to appeal or revision, and would become final and conclusive. But the application
\.Vas not disposed of until the 20th of March, 1952, and on that date
· the Additional Custodian passed an order confirming the exchange.
In the 1neanwhile~ there were changes in the la\v relating to evacuee
property by \Vhich the East Punjab Act as applied to the State of
Delhi v1as repealed and re-enacted, and ultimately Central Act XXXI
of 1950 was passed which, among other things, conferred by s. 27
revisional powers on the Custodian-General. The Custodian-General
issued a notice under s. 7.7 to the appellant and, after hearing her,
set aside the order of confirmation and directed the matter to be reconsidered by the Custodian, It was contended for the appellant
that the order of confirmation by the Additional Custodian was not
open to revision, on the ground that on the filing of the application
in 1948 the appellant got a vested right to have it determined under
s. 5-A, with the attribute of finality and conclusiveness under s. 5-B
attaching to such determination, and that the subsequent repe3l and
re-enactment of these provisions cannot affect such a right, in view
of s. 6 of the General Clauses Act, and s. 58(3) of Act XXXI of
1950.
Held, (i) that s. 6 of~ General Clauses Act (X. oj 1897) was
not applicable to the case, as s. 58(\) ~\ Act XXXI 'of 1950 was a
self-contained provision indicative "f the intention to e:icclude the
operatic n of s. 6 ;
(ii) that the right to a determination with the attribute of finality, assuming that such a right exists, is not a vested right and it
does not accrue until the determination is in fact made, ~1 hen alone
it becon1es an existing right.
Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. Irving ([1905] A.C. 369)
and Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Income-tar Commissioner ( [ 1927] J.L.R. 9 Lah. 284 ; 54 I.A. 421 ), distinguished;
(iii) that the words "the repeal shall not affect the previous
operation of the repealed law" in s. 58(3) of Act XXXI of 1950 cannot be construed 3.s meaning "the repeal shall not affect the future
operation of the previous law" ; and
(iv) that the scheme underlying s. 58(3) is that every matter to
which the new Act applies has to be treated as arising, and to ~
dealt with, under the new la\v except in so far as certain consequences have already ensured or acts have been completed prior to
the new Act, to \Vhich it is the old law that wi!J ~pply.
In view of s. 58, the application of the appellant for confirmation pending ·on t~e date when Act XXXI of 1950 came into
force, had to be dealt with and disposed of under this Act and the
order of confirmation passed in 1952 was subject to the revisional
power of the Custodian-General under s. 27 of the said ·Act.
2S.C.R.
1119
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Quaere.-Whether a right of. appeal in respect of a pending action can be treated as a substantive right vesting in the litigant on
the commencement of the action.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal :No.
195 of 1954.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated the 20th May, 1953 of the CustodianGeneral of Evacuee Property, New Delhi in Revision
No. 387-R/Judl/53.
Achhru Ram, (Ganpat Rai, with him) for the appellant.
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, (Porus
A. Mehta and R. H. Dhebar, with him) for respondents Nos. 1 & 2.
1955. October 28.
was delivered by
The
Judgment
of
the
Court
JAGANNADHADAS J.-This is an appeal by special
leave against the order of the Custodian-General 0£
Evacuee Property dated the 20th May, 1953, revi~
ing an order of the Additional Custodian of East
Punjab, Delhi, elated the 20th March, 1952. The two
questions raised before us on the facts and circumstances, to be stated, are (1) whether the CustodianGeneral had the revisional power which he purported
to exercise, and (2) was the order of the CustodianGeneral · on its merits such as to call for interference
by this Court.
The appellant before us, one Mrs. Indira Sohanlal, is
a displaced person from Lahore. She was the owner
of a house at Lahore known as 5, Danepur Road.
Malik Sir Firoz Khan Noon of West Pakistan owned
766 'bighas of agricultural land in a village called
Punjab Khore within the State of Delhi. An oral
exchange is said to have taken place between these
two, of the said properties, on the 10th October, 1947.
In pursuance of that exchange Malik Sir Firoz Khan
Noon is said to have taken possession of the Danepur
Road House. The appellant is also said to have been
put in possession of the said agricultural lands in
Punjab Khore presumably by way of attornment
1955
Indira Sohanlal
v.
Gus to di an of
Evacuee Property,
Delhi and others
1120
1955
Indira Sohanlal
v.
Custodian of
Evacute Property,
Delhi and others
JagannadhadaJ J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
of tenants who were in actual cultivating possession
of the lands. Under section 5-A of the East Punjab
Evacuees'
(Administration of Property) Act, 1947
(East Punjab Act XIV of 1947), as amended in
1948 and applied to the State of Delhi, such a
transaction required confirmation by the Custodian.
In compliance with this section the appellant made
an application on the 23rd February, 1948, to the
Additional Custodian of Evacuee Property (Rural),
Delhi, for confirmation of the above transaction of
exchange and of the consequent transfer to her of the
property in agricultural land. In view of certain
rules which came into force later and which prescribed that the application was to be in a set form
furnishing certain particulars, the appellant filed an
amended application dated the 14th August, 1948,
furnishing the required particulars. This application·
was not disposed of by the Additional Custodian, for
reasons not clear on the record, until the 20th March,
1952. On that date he passed an order confirming
the exchange. Meanwhile, however, a proposal was
put up to the Additional Custodian by his Revenue
Assistant to allot agricultural lands of the village
Punjab Khore, including those covered by this exchange, to a number of refugee cultivators. The proposal was approved by the Additional Custodian on
the 12th June, 1949. In pursuance thereof a detailed
allotment was made to twenty six individual allot~ees
on the 27th October, · 1949. There is a report of the
Rehabilitation Patwari dated the 27th February 1950,
on the record showing that the allottees entered into
possession of the land and cultivated their respective
lands and settled down in the· village. After the order
confirming the exchange was passed by the Additional
Custodian on the 20th March, 1952, the appellant filed
an application on the 5th May, 1952, asking to be
placed in possession, and for a warrant of delivery of
possession to be issued against the various allottees
and tenants of the land. The Naib. Tehsildar recommended that possession may be given to the appellant"
and that the Patwari may be informed accordingly to
take the necessary action in the matter. But it does
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1121
not appear from the record whether this was done or
whether possession was in fact delivered. At this
st:ige, a notice under section 27 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 (Central Act
XXXI of 1950), appears to have been issued to the
appellant by th:'. Custodian-General to show cause
why the order of the Additional Custodian dated the
20th March, 1952, confirming . the exchange and the
further orders dated the 20th and 28th July, 1952,
sar.ct!oning
mutation and other consequential and
incidental orders made in connection therewith be not
set aside. This notice appears to have been issued
asking the appellant to show cause on the 4th May,
1953. The case was adjourned to the 12th May, 1953,
at the request of counsel for the appellant and thereafter a more detailed notice dated the 14th May, 1953,
was issued setting out the various grounds on which
the previous orders were sought to be set aside. The
learned Custodian-General passed . the order now under
appeal on the 20th May, 1953, setting aside the order
of confirmation. He directed the' Custodian to decide
the case after giving notice to all those who might
be affected by the
confirmation of
this transaction. As the earlier part of his order shows, the
reference to the persons affected was to those who
were allotted the lands in question by virtue of the
order of the ·Additional Custodian of the year 1949
above referred to.
To appreciate the first question that has been raised
as to the validity of the exercise of revisional powers
by the Custodian-General on the above facts, it is
necessary to set out the course of the relevant legislative measures from time to time.
To meet the unprecedented situation of sudden
migration of vast section of population on a large
scale from West Punjab to East Punjab and vice
versa, leaving most of the properties which they had,
moveable and immoveable, agricultural and nonagricultural, the concerned Governments had to take
wide legislative powers to deal with the situation,
to set up the
necessary administrative machinery,
and to evolve and give effect to their policies
1955
Indira Sohanlal
v.
Custodian of
Evacuee Property,
Delhi and others
Jagannadhadas J.
1122
1955
Indira Sohanlal
v.
Custodian of
Evacuee Property,
Delhi and others
Jagannadhadas J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
in regard thereto from time to time. The earliest
of these legislature measures so far as we are
concerned, was the East Punjab Evacuees (Administration of Property) Act, 1947 (East Punjab Act XIV
of 1947), which came into force on the 12th December, 1947. This Act was amended by the East Punjab Evacuees' (Administration of Property) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1948 (East Punjab Ordinance No. II
of 1948) and later by East Punjab Evacuees' (Admi(Amendment)
Act, 1948,
nistration of Property)
(East Punjab Act XXVI of 1943), which inserted two
new sections, 5-A and 5-B, prescribing the requirement of confirmation of transactions relating to evacuee property and providing a right of appeal or revision
therefrom. These sections were specifically
made applicable to transactions on or after the 15th
August, 1947. The above Punjab Legislative measures
were extended to the State of Delhi by Central GoYernment notifications under the Delhi Laws Act,
dated the 29th December, 1947, the 28th January,
1948, and the 22nd April, 1948, respectively. In so
far as these measuces applied to Chief Commissioners'
Provinces they were repealed by the Administration
of Evacuee
Property (Chief Commissioners' Provinces) Ordinance, 1949, (Central Ordinance No. XII of
1949) which came into force so far as Delhi is concerned on the 13th June, 1949. This Ordinance, in
its turn, was repealed and a fresh Central Ordinance
came into force in its place, applicable to all the ProYinces of India except Assam and West Bengal.
That was Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949, (Central Ordinance No. XXVII of 1949),
which came into force on the 18th October, 1949.
This Central Ordinance in its turn was repealed and
replaced by the Administration of Evacuee Property
Act, 1950 (Central Act XXX.I of 1950) which came
into force on the 17th April, 1950.
It is necessary to notice at this stage that until
the Central Ordinance XXVII of 1949 was passed,
the Evacuee Property law was regulated by the respective Provincial Acts and were under the respective
Provincial
administrations. Central Ordinance
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1123
No. XXVII of 1949 provided for a centralised law
and ce1tralised administration which was. continued
by Central Act No. XXXI of 1950. One of the main
steps taken for such centralised administration was
to create the office of Custodian-General with powers
of appeal and revision as against the orders of Provincial Custodians. Section 5 of the Central Ordinance No. XXVII of 1949 authorised the Central
Government to appoint a Custodian-General of Evacuee Property in India for the purpose of discharging
the duties imposed on him by or under the Ordinance, while the appointment of Provincial Custodians, Additional, Deputy or Assistant Custodians,
wa> still left to the various Provincial Governments.
These provisions were continued by sections 5 and 6
of Central Act XXXI of 1950. As regards the transactions by evacuees
relating to evacuee property,
the first legislative interference in East Punjab and
Delhi appears to have been by virtue of East Punjab
Evacuees' (Administration of Property) (Amendment)
Ordinance, 1948 (East Punjab Ordinance No. II of
1948) and the East Punjab Evacuees' (Administration
of Property) (Amendment) Act, 1948 (East Punjab
Act XXVI of 1948) which inserted two new sections
5-A and 5-B into the East Punjab Act XIV of 1947.
The said sections were as follows :
"5-A.(l) No sale, mortgage, pledge, lease, exchange or other traasfer of any interest or right in
or over any property made by an evacuee or by any
person in anticipation of his becoming an evacuee,
or by the agent, assign or attorney of the evacuee
or such person, on or after the fifteenth day of
August, 1947, shall be effective so as to confer any
rights or remedies on the par!ies to such transfer or
on any person daiming under them unless it is confirmed by the Custodian.
(2) An application for confirming such transfer
may be made by any person claiming thereunder or
by any person lawfully authorised by him.
(3) The Custodian shall reject any application
made after the thirty first day of March, 1948 or after
1955
Indira Sohanlal
v.
Custodian of
Evacuee Property,
Delhi and others
Jagannadhadas J.
1124
1955
Indira Sohanlal
v.
Custodian of
Eva.cue6 ProlJtrty,
Delhi and others
Jagannadhadas J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
I 1955]
the expiration of two months from the date the transaction was entered into, whichever is later.
( 4) The Custodian shall hold a summary enquiry
into an application, which is not rejected under subsection (3) and may decline to confirm the transaction if it appears to the Custodian that( a) the transaction was not a bona fide one for
valuable consideration ; or
(b) the transaction is in the opinion of the
Custodian prejudicial to the prescribed objects ; or
( c) for any other reason, to be given hy the
Custodian in writing, the transaction ought not to be
confirmed.
(5) If the Custodian confirms the transaction,
he may confirm it unconditionally or subject to such
conditions and terms as he may consider proper.
(6) The Custodian, if the order is not pronounced
in the presence of the applicant, shall forthwith give
notice in writing to the applicant of any order passed
by him under sub-sections (3), (4) or (5).
5-B. If the original order under section 5-A is
passed by an Assistant or Deputy
Custodian of
Evacuee Property, any person aggrieved by such
order may appeal within sixty days from the date of
the order to the Custodian of Evacuee Property who
may dispose of the appeal himself or make it over for
disposal to the Additional Custodian of Evacuee Property ; and subject only to the decision on such
appeal, if any, the order passed by the Assistant or
Deputy Custodian of Evacuee Property, or any original or appellate order passed by the Custodian or
Additional Custodian of Evacuee Property shall be
final and conclusive".
It will be seen that these two sections enjoined that
transfers by an evacuee or intending evacuee relating
to his property from and after the 15th August, 1947,
required confirmation and provided for appeal or
revision from the orders passed on applications therefor and subject thereto, such orders were made final
and conclusive. The requirement as to confirmation
has been substantially continued in more or less the
same form by sections 25, 38 and 40 respectively of
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1125
1955
the successive legislative measures with certain modiIndira Sohanla<'
fications which are not material for this case. But
v.
so far as the appealability or revisability of an order
Cu.rtodian of
passed on an application for confirmation is con- Evacuee Property,
Delhi and others
cerned, there have been changes from time to time.
It will be seen from section 5-B of the East Punjab Jagannadhadas J,
Act, XIV of 1947, as quoted above, that any original order passed by the Custodian or Additional
Custodian is not subject to appeal or revision and it
is specifically declared to be final and conclusive.
Central Ordinance No. XII of 1949 by section 30(1)
(b) thereof provided for an appeal to the High
Court against an original order of a Custodian or
Additional Custodian or authorised Deputy Custodian
but there was no provision for revision of such an
order. Under the Central Ordinance No. XXVII of
1949 the position was substantially different. Secti<:>n /
24 thereof, inter alia, provided that any
person
aggrieved by an order made under section 38 (which
corresponds to the previous section 5-A of the East
Punjab Act XIV of 1947) may prefer an appeal in
such manner and within such time as may be prescribed, to the Custodian-General where the original
order has been passed by the Custodian, Additional
Custodian or an Authorised Deputy Custodian. Section 27 thereof provided for revisional powers of the
Custodian-General but it was specifically confined to
appellate orders and there was no power given thereunder for revision by the Custodian-General of an
original order passed by the Custodian. But under
Central Act XXXI of 1950 which repealed and replaced this Ordinance the position became different.
The provision for appeal under section 24 thereof was
virtually the same as before, in so far as it is relevant
here. But as regards revision, however, section 27
of the Act provided for the revisional powers of the
Custodian-General in the following terms :
"27. ( 1) The Custodian-General may at any
time, either on his own motion or on application
made to him in this behalf, call for the record of any
proceeding in which any district judge or ~ustodian
has passed an order for the purpose of satisfying him-
1126
1955
Indira Sohanlal
v.
Custodian of
EvtUuu Property,
Delhi and others
Jagannadhadas J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
self as to the legality or propriety of any such order
and may pass such order in relation thereto as he
thinks fit :
Provided that the Custodian-General shall not
pass an order under this sub-section prejudicial to any
person without giving him a reasonable opportunity
of being heard.
"
The question relating to the validity of the revisional
powers exercised by the Custodian-General in the
present case arises with reference to the provisions
above mentioned.
It is· not disputed that Malik Sir Firoz Khan Noon
was an evacuee. Nor is it disputed that this property
in Punjab Khore which was the subject-matter of
the exchange was evacuee property.
Though the
exchange in question was alleged to have taken place
on the 10th October, 1947, at a time when there was
no restriction against any evacuee dealing with the
property he left behind, it is indisputable that section 5-A of the East Punjab Act XIV of 1947 which
has been specifically made retrospective from the 15th
August, 1947, operates in respect of the present transaction
also.
It, therefore, requires confirmation
under the said section and under the corresponding
sections in the subsequent legislative measures in
this behalf. It was in compliance with this requirement that the appellant made an application for confirmation on the 23rd February, 1948, and that a
subsequent amended application was filed on the 14th
August, 1948. It is these applications that were disposed of on the 20th March, 1952, by the Additional
Custodian, Delhi, by an order confirming the exchange, which has since been revised by the Custodian-General on the 20th May, 1953.
The main contention of the learned counsel for the
appellant is that the powers which are vested in the
Custodian-General to revise the original orders of the
Custodian or Additional Custodian under section 27
of the Central Act XXXI of 1950 are not applicable
to an order passed by the Custodian or Additional
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1127
Custodian on an application made long prior to the
time when the office of the Custodian-General was
set up and he was clothed with powers of revision.
It is urged that on the date when the application for
confirmation was first made on the 23rd February,
1948, an order passed under section 5-A by the
Custodian or Additional Custodian is final and conclusive under section 5-B. It is strongly urged that
the subsequent repeal and re-enactment of these provisions cannot affect the right vested in the appellant
to obtain a final and conclusive order from the Custodian or Additional Custodian on her application for
confirmation. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act
and the Privy Council case in the Coionial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. lrving(1) were relied on in support of
this contention. To determine
the validity of this
contention, it is necessary to trace the course of the
various relevant statutory provisions from time to
time which repealed the prior corresponding legislative measures and to determine the effec~ thereof.
The East Punjab Act XI\1 of 1947 was 'replaced by
the Central Ordinance No. XII of 1949 relating to
Chief Commissioners' Provinces. Section 40 thereof
which repealed the prior Act was as follows :"40. (1) The East Punjab Evacuees' (Administration of Property) Act, 1947 (East Punjab Act XIV
of 1947), as in force in Ajmer-Merwara and Delhi, is
hereby repealed.
(2) Notwithstanding such repeal, anything <lone
or any action taken in the exercise of any power conferred by the Act aforesaid shall, in relation to the
Provinces of Ajmer-Merwara and Delhi, be deemed to
have been done or taken in the exercise of the powers
conferred by this Ordinance, and any penalty incurred or proceeding commenced under the said Act
shall be deemed to be a penalty incurred, or proceeding commenced under this Ordinance as if this Ordinance were in force on the day when such thing was
done, action taken, penalty incurred or proceeding
commenced".
When this Ordinance was in turn repealed by
(!) [1905] A.O. 369.
1955
Indira Sohanlal
v.
Custodian of
Eu'ac::ee Property,
Delhi and others
Jagannadhadas ].
1128
1955
Indira Sohanlal
v.
Custodian of
Evacuee Proper!;P,
Delhi and others
Jagannadhadas ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
Central Ordinance No. XXVII of 1949, the repealing
section 55 was as follows :
"55. (1) The Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949 (XII of 1949), as in force in·
the Chief Commissioners' Provinces ............ is hereby repealed.
(2) ......................... .
(3) Notwithstanding the repeal by this Ordinance
of the Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance,
1949, or of any corresponding law, anything done or
any action taken in ·the exercise of any power conferred by that Ordinance or law shall be deemed to
have been done or taken in the exercise of the powers
conferred by this Ordinonce, and any penalty incurred or proceeding commenced under that Ordinance or law shall be deemed to be a penalty incurred or proceeding commenced under this Ordinance as if this Ordinance were in force on the day
on which such thing was done, action taken, penalty
incurred or proceeding com"menced".
Ordinance No. XXVII of 1949 was in its turn repealed by Central Act XXXI of 1950. This Act was
amenqed by an Ordinance and later by an Act of the
same year. Section 58 is the repealing provision of
this Act as so amended. The material portion thereof
is as follows :
"58. ( 1) The Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949 (XXVII of 1949) is hereby
repealed.
(2) ............................. .
(3) The repeal by this Act of the Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949 (XXVII of
1949) ................ shall not affect the previous operation thereof, and subject thereto, anything done or
any action taken in the exercise of any power conferred by or under that Ordinance shall be deemed to
have been done or taken in the exercise of the powers
conferred by or under this Act, as if this Act were in
force on the day on which such thing was done or
actio11 \Vas taken".
Thus in the transition of the Evacuee Property law
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1129
relating to Delhi, from the East Punjab Act XIV of
1947 to the present Central Act XXXI of 1950, there
have been three repeals. The first two repealing provisions are in almost identical terms but the third is
somewhat different. The difference is in two respects.
( 1) The provision in the previous repealing sections
that "any penalty incurred or proceeding commenced
under the repealed law shall he deemed to be a penalty
incurred or proceeding commenced under the new law
as if the new law were in force on the day when the
penalty was incurred or proceeding commenced" is
now omitted. (2) The provision that "anything done
or any actiol1 taken in exercise of any power conferred by the previous law shall be deemed to have
been done or taken in exercise of the powers conferred
by the new law as if the riew law were in force on the
day when such thing was done or action taken" is
.continued. But it is specifically provided that this is
subiect to the repeal not affecting the "previous operation of the repealed law" which in the context
clearly means the previous operation of the repealed
law in respect of "anything done or any action
taken". The question thus for consideration is what
is the result brought about by these provisions.
Before proceeding to determine it, it is desirable to
consider whether section 6 of the General Clauses Act
can be relied on. The position as regards section 6
of the General Clauses Act in the case of repeal and
re-enactment has been considered by this Court in
State of Puniab v. Mohar Singh(') and laid down as
follows at page 899 :
"Whenever there is a repeal of an enactment,
the consequences laid down in section 6 of the General Clauses Act will follow unless, as the section itself says, a different intention appears. In the case
of a simple repeal there is scarcely any room for expression of a contrary opinion. But when repeal
is followed by fresh legislation on the same subject
we would undoubtedly have to took to the provisions
of the new Act, but only for the purpose ·of determining whether they indicate a different intention.
(I) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1393, 899.
1955
Indira Sohanlal
v.
Custodian of
Evatue< Properly,
Dtlhi and othm
Jagannadhadas ].
1130
1955
lttdira Sohanlal
v.
Custodian of
Et· acute ProP.,'T{1,
Delhi and others
JagannadharfaJ ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
The line of enquiry would be, not whether the new
Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities
but whether it manifests an intention to destroy
them. We cannot therefore subscribe to the broad
proposition that section 6 of the General Clauses Act
is ruled out when there is repeal of an enactme!]J'
followed by a fresh legislation. Section 6 would be
applicable in such cases also unless the new legislation manifests an intention incompatible with or contrary to the provisions of the section. Such incompatibility would have to be ascertained from a consideration of all the relevant provisions of the new
law ...... ".
In the present case sub-section ( 3) of section 58 of
Central Act XXXI of 1950 . purports to indicate the
effect of that repeal, both in negative and in positive
terms. The negative portion o.f it relating to "the
previous operation" of the pnor Ordinance appears
to have been taken from section 6(b) of the General
Clauses Act, while the positive portion adopts a
"deeming" provision quite contrary to what is contemplated
under that section. Under the General
Clauses Act the position, in respect of matters covered
by it, would have to be determined as if the repealing Act had not been passed, while under section 58
of Central Act XXXI of 1950, the position-so far a•
the pos1t1ve portion is concerned-has to be judged
as if the repealing Act were in force at the earlier
relevant <late. Therefore where, as in this case, the
repealing section which purports to indicat~ the effect
of the repeal on previous matters, provides for the
operation of the previous law in part and in negative
terms, as also for the operation of the new law in the
other part and in positive terms, the said prov1s1on
may well be taken to be self-contained and indicative
of the intention to exclude the application of section
6 of the General Clauses Act. We are, therefore, of
the opinion that the said section cannot be called in
aid in this case.
Now, as to the meaning of section 58(3) of Central
Act XXXI of 1950, it must be admitted that this ;,
not free from difficulty. This kind of provision in a
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1131
repealing Act appears rather unusual. Learned counsel for the appellant urges that the positive portion
of this provision, i.e., "anything done or any action
taken in exercise of any power conferred by or under
the Ordinance shall be deemed to have been done or
taken in the exercise of the powers conferred by or
under this Act as if this Act were in force on the day
on which such thing was done or action was taken"
applies only to purely administrative
matters and
that his case falls within the scope of the first portion,
viz., "the repeal ...... shall not affect the previous
operation of the (repealed) Ordinance". His contention is. that the application for confirmation which
was made by the appellant in 1948 and which remained pending until Act XXXI of 1950 came into force
and superseded the earlier legislation in this behalf,
had to be disposed of in accordance with sections 5-A
and 5-B of the East Punjab Act XIV of 1947, as
amended in 1948 ; that the order of confirmation
passed by the Additional Custodian m such a
pending
application
was
not
open
to appeal
or revision
but became final and conclusive.
It
is urged that on the filing of the application in
1948, the appellant got a vested right to have
it determined under
section 5-A with the attribute of finality and conclusiveness under section 5-B
attaching to such determination. According to the
learned counsel this follows from the "previous operation" of the repealed law and is in consonance with
the principle laid down by the Privy Council in
Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd; v. Irving (1) relates
pears to us that these contentions are unsustainable.
Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. Irving( 1) relates
to the case of a right of appeal against an order
passed . or to be passed in a pending action. Their
LorJ:;hips treated the right of appeal to a superior
tribunal in a pending action as an existing right and
held that the suitor cannot be retrospectively deprived of it except by express words or by necessary
implication. This doctrine was affirmed by the
Privy Council in Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd.
[\] [1905] A.C. 369.
I 7-35 S. C. India/59
1955
Indira Sohanla/
v.
Custodian of
Evacuee Property,
Delhi and others
JagannadhadlJI ],
1132
1955
Indira Sohan/al
v.
Custodian of
Evacutt Property,
Delhi and others
Jagannadhada! J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
v. Income Tax-Commissioner, Delhi(') in its application to the converse case in the following terms :
"Their Lordships can have no doubt that provisions which, if applied retrospectively; would deprive
of their existing finality orders which, when the
statute - came into force, were final, are provisions
which touch existing rights".
General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Income-Tax Commissioner (1),
General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Income-Tax Commissioner('),
the orders of the High Court from which appeals
were sought to be filed to the Privy Council were
dated the 6th January, 1926 and 12th January, 1926.
As the .Indian Income-tax Act stood at the time and
according to the interpretation of section 66 thereof by the Privy Council in Tata Iron & Steel Co. v.
Chief Revenue Authority, Bombay (2) there was no appeal to the Privy Council. The legislature by an amendment of the Income-tax Act, which came into force on
the 1st April, 1926, inserted therein section 66-A and
gave a right of appeal against such orders as provided therein. In this situation the Privy Council repelled
the contention that the litigant could avail himself
of the new provision by pointing out the finality of
the orders sought to be appealed against and referring to it as an existing right. This is obviously so
because finality attached to them, the moment orders
were passed, prior to the new Act. In the present
case, the position is different. The action was still
pending when Central Act XXXI .of 1950 came into
force. No order was passeJ '•which could attract the
attribute of finality and conclusiveness under section
5-B of the East Punjab Act XIV of 1947. Further
the possibility of such finality was definitely affected
by the repealing provision in Central Ordinance No.
XII of 1949 and Central Ordinance No. XXVII of
1949, which specifically provided that a pending action
was to be deemed to be an action commenced under
the new Ordinance as if it were in force at the time
and therefore required to be continued under the new
Ordinances. Each of these Ordinances provided for
[!] [1927] l.L.R. 9 Lahore 284.
[2] [1923] L.R. 50 I.A. 212.
2S.C.R.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1133
appeal against such an 6rder and the second of them
provided for the exercise of revisional power against
an appellate order of the Custodian. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that, even so, the finality and conclusiveness, which would have attached
to an order made under section 5-A, if made before
Ordinance XII of 1949 was promulgated, was affected
only to the extent of its being subject to an appeal
and not to revision. But once the attribute of finality
in respect of such an order is affected by subsequent
legislation, it does not appear to be of consequence
that it was affected first by a provision for appeal
and later by provisions for appeal and revision. It
is difficult to see that such provisions, in those circumstances, are anything more than alterations m
procedure.
· However this may be, it appears to be clear that
while a right of appeal in respect of a pending action
may conceivably be treated as a substantive right
vesting in the litigant on the commencement of the
action-though we do not so decide-no such vested
right to obtain a determination with the attribute of
finality can be predicated in favour of a litigant on the
institution of the action. By the very terms of section 5-B of East Punjab Act XIV of 1947, finality
attaches to it on thf making of the order. Even if
there be, in law, any such right at all as the right to
a determination with the attribute of finality, it can
in no sense be a vested or accrued right. It does not
accrue until the determination is in fact made, when
alone the right to finality becomes an existing right
as in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. lncomeTax Commissioner(1). We are, therefore, of the
·opinion that the principle of Colonial Sugar Refining
Co. Ltd. v. lrving( 2 ) cannot be invoked in support of
a case of the kind we are dealing with.
Nor can· this be brought under the ambit of
the phrase "previous operation of the repealed law".
What in effect, learned counsel for the appellant contends for is not the "previous operation of the repealed law" but the "future operation of the previous
{I) [1927] l.L.R. 9 Lahore 284.
[2] [1905] A.C. 369.
1955
Indira Sohanlal
v.
Custodian of
Evacuee Property,
Delhi and others
Jagannadhadas J.
1134
1955
Indira Sohanlal
v.
Custodian of
Evacuee Property,
Delhi and others
Jagannadhadas J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955J
law". There is no justification for such a construction. Besides, if in respect of the pending application
in the present case, the previous repealed law is to
continue to be applicable by virtue of the first
portion of section 58(3) the question arises as to who
are the authorities tMt. can deal with it. The application can be dealt with by the Custodian and on
appeal by the Custodian-General only as functioning
under the previous law. But as such Custodian or
Custodian-General they have disappeared by virtue of
the repeal. It is only the second portion of section
58(3) which continues them as though the appointments were made under the new Act-a position which
could scarcely be controverted. To the extent of the
future operation, if any, of the repealed law they
can have no function. Indeed, a comparison of the
wording of section 58 of Act XXXI of 1950 with the
wording of section 6 of the General Clauses Act would
show that if the legislature intended either that
pending proceedings were to be continued under the
previous law or that anything in the nature of vested
right of finality of determination or some right akin
thereto was to arise in respect of such pending proceedings, the negative portion of section 58(3) would
not have stopped short with saving only the "previous
operation" of the repealed law. It would have borrowed
from out of some portions· of the remaining sub-sections ( c), ( d )'and ( e) of section 6 of the General Clauses
Act, and provided in express terms for the continuance of the previous law in respect of pending proceedings. Obviously no particular sub-section of section 6 of the General Clauses Act could be borrowed
in toto as that would contradict the positive portion
of section 58(3) of Act XXXI of 1950 and would be
inconsistent with the idea underlying it. We are,
therefore, clearly of the view that the appellant cannot call in aid the principle of the case in Colonial
Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. Irving('), nor can his case
fall within the ambit of the first portion of sub-section (3) of section 58 of Act XXXI of 1950.
The next question for consideration is how· the
(!) [1905] A.G. 369.
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1135
second and positive portion of section 58(3) of Act
XXXI of 1950 is to be understood, This portion
says that "anything done· or any action taken in
exercise of any power conferred by or under the
(repealed) Ordinance, shall be deemed to have been
done or taken in the exercise of the powers conferred
by or under this Act as if this Act were in force on
the day on which such thing was done or action was
taken". To appreciate the meaning of this it is desirable to have a general idea of the scheme of the
thererepealed Ordinance, the powers exercisable
under, and the nature of the things that may be
done or action that may be taken, thereunder. The
powers exercisable are to be gathered from vanous
sections and broadly speaking fall under the following categories.
1. To make appointments-sections S and 6.
2. To make enquiries-sections 7, 16, 19 and
38 and to make dedarations or issue notifications as
a result thereof.
·
3. To make various kinds of consequential or
administrative order such as those under sections 9,
10, 11, 12 and 21.
4. To hear and dispose of appeals, reviews or
revisions-sections 24, 25, 26 and 27.
5. Power of the Central Government, to exempt,
to give directions, to take action with regard to
evacuee property, to delegate powers and to make
rules-sections 49, SO, 51, 52 and 53.
In addition there are provisions which bring about
various consequences such as vesting in the Custodian,
valid discharge by payment to the Custodian, attachment, and so forth, sections 7(2), 8, 11, 13, 16(3), 19(3),
20 and 22, etc. The above enumeration is by no means
intended to be exhaustive but is merely to illustrate
the scheme of the various provisions in the Ordinance with reference to which section 58 of the Act
has to be understood. There are also rules framed by
virtue of section 53 of the Ordinance under which
various powers may be exercised, thihgs done, and
action taken.
If section 58(3) of Central Act XXXI of 1950 which
1955
Indira Sohanlal
v.
Custodian of
Evacuee Property,
Delhi and others
Jagannadhadas J,
1136
1955
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
repealed the prior Ordinance is understood with reference to the above scheme, there is no reason to confine the operation of the second portion .of section
58(3) to administrative action as suggested by learned
counsel for the appellant. Broadly speaking, the
second portion of section 58(3) refers to the whole
Jagannadhadas J.
range of, things that may be done, or action that
· may be taken, under the previous Ordinance and the
rules framed thereunder, while the first portion of
section 58(3) relates to the legal consequences resulting under the Ordinance or the rules from certain
facts or from completed acts or things done thereunder. Without attempting to be meticulously accurate, it may be stated in general terms, that the
scheme underlying section 58(3) appears to be. that
every matter to which the new Act applies has to be
treated as arising, and to be dealt with, under the
new law except in- so far as .certain consequences have
already ensued or acts. have been completed prior
thereto, to which it is the old law that will apply. In
this view of section 58, the application of the appellant for confirmation pending on the date when
Central Act XXXI of 1950 came into force had to be
dealt with and disposed of under this Act and the
order of confirmation passed in 1952 would clearly be
subject to the revisional power of the CustodianGeneral under section 27 of the said Act.
It is next contended that the revisional power cannot be exercised when there was an appeal provided
but no appeal was filed, that it was open to the
Assistant Custodian who appeared before the Custodian-General in support of the notice for revision
or to the allottees of the property in whose interest
the revisional order appears to have been passed, to
file an appeal under the Act as persons aggrieved.
Section 27 however is very wide in its terms and it
· cannot be construed as being subject to any such
limitations, Nor can the scope of revisional powers
be confined only to matters of jurisdiction or illegality
as is contended, because under section 27, the Custodian-General can exercise revisional powers "for
the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or
Indira Sohanlal
v.
Custodian of
Evacute Property,
Delhi and others
I
•
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1137
propriety of any order of the Custodian". We are
1955
thus clearly of the opinion that the contention of the
learned counsel for the appellant that the exercise
of revisional powers in this case by the CustodianGeneral is without jurisdiction or is illegal, must
fail.
The next question to be considered is as regards
the merits of the revisional order of the CustodianGeneral which is under appeal before us. Learned
counsel for the appellant attacked it on various
grounds. He urged that the ground on which the
learned
Custodian-General set aside the Additional
Custodian's order, viz., absence of notice to the prior
allottees is wholly untenable. He contended that
the allottees had no kind of interest in the land which
entitled them to contest the application for confirmation, that they were at best only lessees for three years
which was due to expire very shortly after the order
of confirmation was passed by the Additional Custodian. He pointed out that as soon as the application
for confirmation was filed on the 23rd February, 1948,
general notice by beat of drum and affixture in the
locality and by publication in the Indian News
Chronicle was given, that the persons in possession
at the time were only the previous tenants on the
land, who either attorned to the appellant or left the
village, that the allottees came into possession much
later and pending the disposal of the confirmation
proceedings and presumably subject to its result. He
also pointed out that even when the rules in this behalf c.ame into force under Act XXXI of 1950, it was
discretionary with the Custodian to give notice to
persons other than the transferor and transferee, if
he considered them to be interested, and urged that
since the same officer, Shri R. Dayal, made the allotment as also the• confirmation, he must be taken to
have exercised his discretion properly in not giving
any notice to them, in view of the imminent expiry
of the three years term for which they were put in
possession. It is strongly urged that having regard
to the above considerations and to the categorical
findings of the Custodian-General himself that the
Indira Sohan/al
v.
Custodian of
Evacuee Property,
Delhi and others
·JagannadhadaJ ].
1138
pg55
Indira Sokanlal
v.
Custodian of
Evacuee Property,
Dtlhi and others
Jagannadhadas J•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955}
transaction which was confirmed, was perfectly bona
setting aside of the order of confirmation
against which no appeal was filed by any one, and
the consequential disturbance of the vested property
rights of the appellant, was in the nature of perverse
exercise of revisional power. The learned SolicitorGeneral appearing for the respondent contended that
the finding of the Custodian-General about the bona
fides of the transaction was only tentative, that the
allottees, though provisionally placed in possession
for three years had, what has come to be recognised
as, a quasi-permanent interest, that they had a genuine
interest in opposing the confirmation sought, which
related to a large tract of agricultural land, and which
would reduce the pool of agricultural lands available
for rehabilitation of displaced agriculturists and that
confirmation of transactions relating to such land was
opposed to the policy and directives of the Government and that the confirmation should not, in the
circumstances, have been lightly granted by the Addi- ·
tional Custodian without notice to the allottees and
a proper consideration of the policies and directives
in this behalf. In reply thereto learned counsel for
the appellant m ged that the alleged policies or directives are not relevant matters for consideration by
the Custodian in these proceedings which must he
taken to he quasi-judicial, if not judicial, unless such
policies or directives are embodied in rules made by
the Central Government under section 56(2) ( q) and
that no such rules were prescribed by the relevant
dates and that even the Custodian-General himself in
his order under appeal discounted the usefulness of
any reference to notifications and directives for the
purposes of this case. It was also urged that the
matters which could be taken into consideration are
regulated by section 40( 4) of Act XXXI of 1950 and
that clause '( c) thereof must he construed as referring
to matters ejusdem gen eris with clauses (a) and (h ).
But in the view we take of the order under appeal and
the course we propose to adopt, we do not wish to
express any opinion on the merits of the above arguments.
fide, the
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1139
The order under appeal is. one· passed by virtue of
the wide powers of revision vested in the CustodianGeneral under section 27 of the Act':-;. The jurisdiction which has been challenged having been found in
favour of the Custodian-General, this Court would
normally be slow to interfere with the order on hs
merits. But with respect to the learned CustodianGeneral, his order is such that it is difficult to maintain it. The learned Solicitor-General himself has been
obliged to put forward arguments in support of it
which cannot be clearly gathered from the order itself. It is also difficult to gather from it whether the
remand to the Additional Custodian for reconsideration, after notice was a general and open remand
where all que'stions on the merits are to be reconsidered or was only a limited remand and if so what
the limitations are. If it was meant to be an open
general remand, as the concluding portion of his order
seems to indicate, his definite findings on points ( 1)
and (2) which he formulated for himself and the doubt
he has expressed ·in his order about the usefulness of
examining afresh the various notifications and directives to which his attention was drawn by the Assistant
Custodian, would render it difficult for any Custodian
on remand to consider any of those matters. If so,
the remand would appear to serve no substantial purpose. In the circumstance!, and in fairness to the
learned Custodian-General, the only proper course
would be to set aside his order under appeal and to
remit the matter back to him for fresh consideration.
On such fresh consideration he will give full opportunity to both sides for presentation of their respective
points of view. If on the rehearing, he decides to
remand the case to the Custodian, he will clearly
indicate what are the matters to be considered by
him. The learned Custodian-General may also consider the feasibility of his dealing with the matter
finally by himself, calling for a report, if need be,
from the Custodian on specified matters, in order to
obviate any further delay by appeal and revision in
this already protracted matter.
1955
Indira Sohanlal
v.
Custodian of
Evacuee Property,
Delhi and others
Jagannadhadas J.
1140
1955
Indira Solumlal
v.
Custodian of
Evacute Propm,,
Delhi and others
[1955]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
The appeal is allowed and the order of the CustodianGeneral is set aside. The case is remanded to him so
that he may reconsider and dispose of the same in the
light of this judgment. There will be no order as to
costs.
Jagannadhadas J.
1955
WILLIE (WILLIAM) SLANEY
v.
October 31.
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH.
[S. R. DAs, Acrrna C.J., V1vrAN BosE, }AGANNADHA·
DAS, }AFER IMAM and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR
Sessions
Trial-Charge
JJ.]
under s. 304 read evith s. 34 of the
Indian Penal Code against tevo persons-Acquittal of one-Omission
to frame alternative charge against the other-Conviction under s.
302 simpliciter-Validity-Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of
~898), ss. 225, 226, 227, 228, 232, 233, 237, 238, 535, 537-lndian
· Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 34, 149, 302.
The appellant and his brother were put up for trial on charges
under s. 302 read with s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The appellant was specifically charged with murder in prosecution of the common
intention.
There was
evidence to show
that he and not his
brother had struck the fatal blow. The brother was acquitted and
the appellant was convicted under s. 302 and sentenced to transportation for life. The High Court upheld the convietion and sentence and dismissed the appeal. The question was whether the
omission to frame an alternative charge under s. 302 simpliciter was
an illegality that vitiated the trial and invalidated the conviction
and whether there was a conflict of decisions of this Court on the
matter in controversy.
Held per curiam, that the omission to frame an alternative
charge under s. 302 in the facts and circumstances of the case was
not an illegality that vitiated the trial bUt was a curable irregularity
as it had not occasioned any prejudice to the appellant and the conviction was not liable to be set aside.
That s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code by itself does not create
any offence and where, as in the present case, it is possible to ascertain who struck the fatal blow, the fact that· another was also sought
to be made liable does not invalidate a conviction for murder unless
there was prejudice.
That the expression 'illegality' used in Nanak Chand'i case
must be read with reference to the facts of that case where the court·
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