PURSHOTTAM GOVINDJI HALAI versus SHREE B.M ADDITIONAL COLLECTOR OF BOMBAY & OTHERS.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 14 October 1955 | [1955] 2 S.C.R. 887 | 1955 INSC 53
Key facts
- Decided
- 14 October 1955
- Bench
- SUDHI RANJAN DAS*, N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR, VIVIAN BOSE, B. JAGANNADHADAS, SYED JAFFER IMAM
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 270/1955
- Disposal
- Disposed off
- Citation
- [1955] 2 S.C.R. 887
- Neutral citation
- 1955 INSC 53
Text of the judgment
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
2 S.C.R.
887
be convicted of the offence under section 120-B of the
Indian Penal Code when his alleged co-conspirators
accused 2, 3 and 4 were acquitted of that offence.
In our opinion, therefore, the conviction of the
acoised No. 1 of the charge under section 120-B of
the Indian Penal Code was clearly illegal. The appeal
of the accused No. 1 will, therefore, be allowed to the
extent that his conviction under section 120-B of the
Indian Penal Code ::md the sentence of rigorous impri,;onmeut of l 8 months awanletl to him as the result
thereof would be quashed. 'Ve are not concerned here
with th~ conviction of the accused No. 1 of the offences
under section 471 read with section 465 and also his
conv;ction for each of the three offences under section
420 of the Indian Penal Code and the concurrent
sen<ences of rigorous imprisonment for one year in
respect of each of them passed by the lower Courts
upon him in regard to the same. These convictions
and sentences will of course stand.
f S. R.
V•
The Stal' of
Bombay
Bha;wali ].
1955
v.
October i-f.
DAs,
J,1n1t
AcTING
brA:vr
C.J..
and
Vrvr,1"' BosE,
CHANDRM'EKHARA
JAGANNADHAArYAR
JJ.]
Constitution of India, Arts. 13(1 ), 14, 21-l ndian Income T 11x
Act 1922 ,(Act XI of 192:!), s. 46(2)-Whether offends Arts. 13(1), 14
& 21 of the Constitutio11-Bombay Land Revenue Act 1876 (Boml.1y
Act !! of 1876)-IV!ietlier offends Art. 14 of the Co11stitutio11.
The assessee carrying on business in the City of Bombav was
to income-tax for the years 1943-44 to 1947-48 and 1951-52
by the Income-tax Officer C-1 \Vard Bombay. As the assessee did
not pay the income-tax due the Income-tax Officer issued in April 1951
to the Additional Collector of Bombay a recovery certificate under
s. 46(2) nf the Indian Income tax Act, 1922. In February 1954 the
Additional Collector issued a notice of demand an.cl as no payment
was made he attached the good will and tenancy rights of the assessee's premises by a warrant of attachment dated 24th March 1954.
as~csscd
Topandas
PURSHOTTAM GOVINDJI HALAI
Sf-LS.EE R M. DESAI. ADDITIONAL COLLECTOR
OF BOMBAY & OTHERS.
DAS.
1955
888
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19551
1!155
A sale was held in February 1955. The sale proceeds not being
sufficient to satisfy the assessed t.ax the Additional Collector is.c;ued
Pu.rshotlam
a notice under s. 13 of the Bombay City Land Rc\·enne Act, ] 876
Govintlji Halai
v.
requiring the assessee to appear hcforc him and show cause \Vhy he·
Shrtt B.M, Dtjai, should not be apprehended and confined to civil prison in s:lti:,f;1cA1ditior.al Colh'Clor of Bomba;· tion of the said certified dernand. In default of as:;csSee's app':":arance
and showing cause a warrant for his arrest was issued u11der s. 13
nnd othtrs
of the Bombay Act, 11 of 1876 and he was actually arrested on 1st
July 1955. An application t{) the Bombay High Court tinder Art.
226 of the Constitution for a \Vrit in the nature of a writ of habca,•
corpus having proved unsuccessful, an application un<lr.r .i\rt. 32
· \Vas filed in the Supren1e Court for the san1e relief. 1\vn n1ain
points urged on behalf of the assessce were ·
(a) that ~. 46(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act under which the
Income-tax Officer' issued the recoYery certificate to the Additional
Collector of Bombay \Vas void, under Art. 13( l) of the Con';titutiort
in that it offended Art. 21 and Art. 14 of the Constitution;
(b) that s. 13 of the Bombay Land Revenue Act, 1876 (llom·
hay Act II of 1876) under v:hich the warrant of arrest \Va~ is:iued
by the i\<lditional Collector was void under Art. 13( 1) of the (~on·
stitution as the same was repugnant to Art. 14 of the Con<:1it11tion.
1-leld (as regards a) (i) that there \Vas no violation ol fur;da·
n1ental rig-hts under Art. 21 of the Constitution inas1nuch ;.i-; s. 13
of the B~n1bay Act II of 1876 under which warrant of :nrc-.<;t was
issued for the recovery of the de1nand certified under s. 46(2) of the
Indian Income-tax A.ct constituted a procedure estahlished by l.:nv.
Both s. 13 of Bombay Act II of 1876 and s. 46 of the ln:!ian fn ..
come-tax Act under which action had been taken against th~ assessee were not void and therefore no question of violation of fuildJ1ncntal rights under Art. 21 could arise at all;
(ii) the contention that s. 46(2) of the Indian Inc01nc-~.1:-: Act
provides for tv.•o <liffe~ent and alternative 1nethods of recoYcry of the
dues and clothes the Collector 'vith the unfettered and unguiJcd
power to apply either of the two nlethods inas1nuch a:; it enables
the Col1ector at his will to discri1ninate between t\VO defaulters "'·ho
:ire similarly situated and thus viob.tes the equal protection d:1use
of the Constitution V.'as \Vithout force because sub-section (2) of s.
46 does not prescribe t\Vo different procedures. The proviso enartcd
therein does not indicate a ditferent and alternative n1ode of recoYerv of the certified amount of tax but only confers aJtlit~onal
po\ve~s on the Collector for the better and more effective application
of the only 1node of recoYery authorised ·by the body of sub-~ection
(2) of s. 46 and therefore, there was no question of possibility of discrirninarion at. all;
(iii) the further contention th~t s. 46(2) of the Indian JncoineAct viOl:i.tes the equal protection clause of the Constitution and
has thus become void under Art. 14 of the Constitution as s. 46(2)
rrquired the Collector, on receipt of the requisite certificate front
1:1-.:
•
ZS.C.R.
889
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1955
the. Inc9rne-tax Officer, to recover the amount specified in the certificate as if it were an arrear of the land revenue and there are diffPursizotta·n
uent laws adopted by different States for the recovery of land reGovindji Halai
venues and thus 1here is discrimination on the ground that defaulters
v.
:ere treated differently in different States is also without force be- Shree B. M. Desai,
Additional ( .'r1l4
<ause discrimination complained of is a permissible classification and
leclor of Bo1 •b 1y
does not offend the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. i 4 as the
and oth11r.r
grouping of the income-tax defaulters in separate categories or
dasses State-wise is a territoria 1 classi li.ca ti on which is based on an
intelligible differentia and there is a reasonable nexus or co-relation
between the basis of classification and the object sought to be achieved
by the Income-tax Act. The fact that the income-tax demand is a
Union public demand makes no difference in the legal position.
Held, (as regards b) that the contention that s. 13 of the Bombay Act II of 1876 became unconstitutional under Art. 13( 1) of the
Constitution in that the procedure prescribed by s. 13 of the Bombay
Act II of 1876 in respect of a defaulter residing in the City of
Bombay was harsher and more drastic than the procedure laid down
in s. 157 of the Bombay Act V of 1879 in respect of a defaulter residing outside the City of Bombay was without force because s. 13
of the Bombay Act II of 1876 was amended on 8th October 1954
and a new law laid down a law similar to the law laid down by s.
157 of the Bombay Act V of 1879 and thus the vice of unconstitutionality 'if any' was removed.
State of Punjab v. Ajaib Singh & Another ([1953] S.C.R. 254),
Shaik Ali Ahmed v. Collector of Bombay (1.L.R. 1950 Born. 150),
Chiranjit Lal Chowdhury v. The Union of India ( [ 1950] S.C.R. 869)
lludhan Chaudhry and other; v. The Swe of Bih1ir ( \ 19551 1 S.C.R.
1045), Middleton v. Texas Powe,. and Light Company (249 U.S. 152),
Bowman v. Lewis (101 U.S. 22; 25 L.Ed. 689), The State of Rajasthan v. Rao Manoha1· Singhji ([ 19541 S.C.R. 996), Bhikaji Narayan Dhakras v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, Nagpur and Another
( [ l 955J 2 S.C.R. 589) and Erimmal Ebrahim l-lajee v. The Collector
of Malabar ( [ 1954 J 26 l.T.R. 509), referred to.
ORIGINAL
1955.
JURISDICTION :
Petitior.
No.
270
of
Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for
a Writ in the nature o~ Habeas Corpus.
Hemendra Shah, /. B. Dadachanji and
Narain, for the petitioner.
Rajinder
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, C. K.
Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, ( B. Sen and
R. H. Dlzebar, with them) for the respondent No. 1.
19-84 S. C. India/59
890
1955
Purshottam
Govi1uiji Halai
v.
Shrte B. M. Desai,
Additional Collector of Bombay
and others
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
1955. October 14.
DAs AcTG. C.J.-This rule was issued on a petition filed under article 32 of the Constitution by one
Purshottam Govind ji Halai, a citizen of India, calling upon the respondents to show cause why a writ
in the nature of a writ of habeas corpus should not be
issued by this Court directing the Superintendent,
House of Correction, Byculla, being the second respondent herein, to produce before this Court one Govindji
Deoji Halai, the father of the petitioner, who is also a
citizen of India, for the purpose of being released
forthwith.
The facts which are not in dispute may be shortly
stated as follows. The said Govindji Deoji Halai
(hereinafter referred to as the "assessee") is the sole
proprietor of a business carried on under the name and
style of Indestro Sales and Service Co. at No. 50-52,
Lahar Chaw! Street in the City of Bombay. Two
private limited companies, namely, Indestro India
Ltd., and Indestro Eastern Ltd., also carry on business and have their respective offices in the same premises. The assessee is said to have some connection
with the two companies the nature of which, however,
is not quite clear on the record before us. In respect
of his own business of Indestro Sales and Service Co.,
the assessee was assessed to income-tax for the years
1943-44 to 1947-1948 and !951-1952 by the Third Income-tax Officer, C-1 Ward, Bombay, at and for Rs.
40,178-4-0. The assessee not having paid up the assessed amount of tax the Income-tax Officer on ·the 10th
April 1951 issued to the Additional Collector of Bombay, the first respondent herein, a recovery certificate
under section 46(2) of the Income-tax Act. It may
here be mentioned that the Indestro Eastern, Ltd.,
was also as~essed to income-tax at and for Rs. 1,92,000
and a recovery certificate was also issued by the Income-tax Officer to the Additional Collector of
Bombay.
On the !st February, 1954 the Additional Collector
issued a notice of demand on the assessee for payment of the assessed amount of tax. No payment
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
891
having been made, the Additional Collector attached
the goodwill and tenancy rights in the said premises
by a warrant of attachment issued on the 24th March
1954. The sale proclamation was issued on the 15th
January 1955. The sale was held on the 25th Febru·
ary 1955 fetching a price of Rs. 33,000 and it wa6
confirmed on the 30th March 1955. The sale proceeds
not being sufficient to satisfy the assessed tax the
Additional Collector on the 7th June 1955 issued a
notice under section 13 of the Bombay City Land
Revenue Act, 1876, requiring the assessee to appear
before him in person on the 16th June 1955 and show
cause why he, the assessee, should not be apprehended
and confined to civil jail in satisfaction of the said
certified demand. The assessee did not appear in person on the appointed day but on the next day, the
17th June 1955, an Advocate acting on behalf of the
assessee wrote a letter to the Additional Collector
purporting to show cause why the assessee should not
be arrested and sent to the civil jail. The contentions
put forward on behalf of the assessee not being considered satisfacto.-y the Additional Collector on the
30th June 1955 issued a warrant for the arrest of the
assessee under section 13 of the Bombay City Land
Revenue Act, 1876. The assessee was actually arrested
on the 1st July 1955.
On the 8th July 1955 an application was made by
the present petitioner to the Bombay High Court
under article 226 complaining of the arrest of his
father, the assessee, and praying for a writ in the
nature of a writ of habeas corpus for the production
and release of the assessee. A rule was issued by the
High Court but eventually on the 24th August 1955
the High Court (Chagla, C.J. and Desai, J.) discharged
the rule. No application was made to the High Court
for leave to appeal to this Court from the decision of
that High Court but on the 2nd September 1955 the
present petition was filed in this Court under article
32 of the Constitution for the relief hereinbefore menfr>ne<l. On the 7th September 1955 a rule was issued
by this Court on that petition subject to the question
of its maintainability in view of the dismissal by the
20-84 S.C. India/59
·
1955
Parshouam
Gouindji Halai
v.
Skree B.M. Desai,
Additional Cot.
lector ef Bombay
and others
Das Actg. c.. J.
892
1955
Purslwttam
Govin.dji Halai
v.
Shree B.M. Desai,
Additional Collector of Bombay
and others
Das Aclg. c. ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
High Court of the petition under article 226 from
which no leave to appeal to this Court had been
sought or obtained. The rule has now come up before us for hearing. In the view we have taken about
the merits of the petition ·it is not necessary for us to
consider the question of its maintainability after the
dismissal of the petition under article 226 or to make
any pronouncement, on this occasion, on the scope
and ambit of article 32 of the Constitution in that
situation.
The principal contentions urged by the learned
Advocate appearing for the petitioner are as follows, namely,(a) that section 46(2) of the Indian Income-tax
Act under which the Income-tax Officer issued the
recovery certificate to the Additional Colle.:tor of
Bombay is void under article 13(1) of the Constitution in that the same offends article 22(1) and (2),
anicle 21 and article 14 of the Constitution;
(b) that section 13 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876 under which the warrant of arrest was
issued by the Additional Collector is void under article 13(1) of the Constitution as the same· is repugnant
to article 14 of the Constitution.
We proceed to deal with the objections seriatim.
Re. (a) : Section 46 (2) of the Indian Income-tax Act
which is impugned before us runs as follows :-
"46. (1) ......................... .
(2) The Income-tax Officer may forward to the
Collector a certificate under his signature specifying
the amount of arrears due from an assessee, and the
Collector, on receipt of such certificate, shall proceed
to recover from such assessee the amount specified
therein as if it were an arrear of land revenue :
Provided that without prejudice to any other
powers of the Collector in this behalf, he shall for -the
purpose of recovering the said. amount have the
powers which under the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 (Act V of 1908), a Civil Court has for the purpose of the recovery of · an amount due under a decree.
"
The first objection to. the above sub-section is that it
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
893
contravenes the fundamental ·rights guaranteed by
clauses (1) and (2) of article 22. In view of the decision of this Court in the State of Punjab v. Ajaib
Singh & Another( 1 ) this objection has not been pressed
before us and we need say no more about it.
The second objection to section 46(2) of the Indian
Income-tax Act is that it is violative of article 21.
Article 11 gliarantees that no person shall be deprived
of his personal liberty except in accordance with procedure established by law. In this case the assessee
has been arrested and is being detained in jail in execution of a warrant of arrest issued under section 13
of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876 for the
recovery of the demand certified under section 46(2)
of the Indian Income-tax Act. As long as those sections stand no complaint can be made of infringement of article 21, for those two sections constitute a
procedure established by law. It is only if those sections are void that the question of violation of the
fundamental right under article 21 can arise at all.
We have, therefore, to pass on to the third objection
to section 46(2) founded on article 14 of the Constitution which alone has been strenuously insisted on
before us by learned counsel for the petitioner.
Article 14 is invoked in two ways. It is pointed
out that the first part of section 46(2) provides that
the Collector, on receipt of a certificate from the
Income-tax Officer, shall proceed to recover from the
defaulting assessee the amount specified therein as if
it were an arrear of land revenue. It is next said
that the proviso to the sub-section invests the CollectOi with all the powers a Civil Court has under the
Code of Civil Procedure for the purpose of the recovery of the amount due under a decree. It is submitted that section 46(2) provides for two different
and alternative methods of recovery of the dues and
clothes the Collector with the power to apply either
of the two methods, that is to say, he may issue a
warrant of arrest under section 13 of the Bombay
City Land Revenue Act, 1876 against one defaulter
and keep him in detention for a period which may
ll)[i953] S.C.R. 254.
1955
Purshottam
Govindji H alai
v.
Shree B.M. Desai,
Additional Collector of Bombay
and othns
Das Actg. C. J.
894
1955
Purshottam
GoVindji Halai
v.
Skree B.M. Desai,
Additional Collector of Bombay
and others
Das Actg. C. ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955}
work out to be much longer than six months and he
may proceed against another defaulter under the Code
of Civil Procedure and arrest and detain him for the
maximum period of six months. The powers that
are thus conferred on the Collector by section 46(2)
are unfettered and unguided and enable the Collector,
at his will, to discriminate between two defaulters
who are similarly situated and thereQy violate the
behests of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. This argument appears to us to be founded
on a misapprehension about the true meaning of section 46(2). On a proper reading, that sub-section
does not prescribe two alternative modes of procedure
at all. All that the sub-section directs the Collector
to do is to proceed to recover the cettified amount as
if it were an arrear of land revenue, that is to say,
he is to adopt the procedure prescribed by the appropriate law of his State for the recovery of land
revenue and that in thus proceeding he is, under the
proviso, to have all the powers a Ci vii Court has under
the Code. The sub-sectioh does not prescribe two
separate procedures. The statement to the contrary
in the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Shaik
Ali Ahmed v. Collector of Bombay(' ) does not appear
to us to be correct. In our opinion the proviso does
not indicate a different and alternative mode of recovery of the certified amount of tax but only confers additional powers on the Collector for the better
and more effective application of the only mode of
recovery authorised by the body of sub-section (2) of
section 46. Viewed in this light, there is no question
of the possibility of any discrimination at all. This
part of the argument cannot, therefore, be accepted.
The other way in which the protection of article 14
is invoked is founded on a comparison of the provisions of the different laws adopted by the different
States for the recovery of land revenue. Section 46(2)
of the Indian Income-tax Act requires the Collector,
on receipt of the requisite certificate from the lncometax Officer, to proceed to recover from the assessee
the amount specified in the certificate :is if it were an
(1) I.L.R. [1950] Born. 150, 155.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
895
arrear of land revenue. This means that the Collector
must take such proceedings as he would have done if
he were engaged in recovering land revenue. Thus a
Collector in the City of Bombay in recovering the
certified amount of income-tax must proceed under
section 13 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act,
1876 (Bombay Act II of 1876) and arrest and detain
him for the period therein mentioned which, prior to
the 8th October 1954, might have worked out to a
period much longer than six months. On the other
hand, the defaulting assessee in all other parts of the
State of Bombay has to be proceeded against under
section 157 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879
(Bombay Act V of 1879) under which he cannot be
detained for more than the period limited by the
Code of Civil Procedure for the detention of a judgment-debtor in execution of a decree for an equal
amount of money. So, even in one State there were
two procedures to which defaulting assessees could
be subjected according as they were in or outside the
City of Bombay. A Collector in the State of Madras
in recovering the certified amount of income-tax has
to proceed under section 48 of the Madras Revenue
Recovery Act, 1864 (Madras Act II of 1864). When
the Collector finds that the certified amount cannot be
liquidated by the sale of the property of the defaulting assessee and the Collector has reason to believe
that the defaulter is wilfully withholding payment or
has been guilty of fraudulent conduct in order to
evade payment, the Collector may, under section 48
of that Act, cause the arrest and imprisonment of the
defaulter, not being a female. But that section goes
on to say that no person shall be imprisoned for a
longer period than two years or for a longer period
than six months if the arrear does not exceed Rs. 500
or for a longer period than three months if the arrear
does not exceed Rs. 50. A Collector in Wes~. Bengal
proceeding to recover the certified amount udder the
Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913 (Bengal
Act III of 1913) cannot, under section 31 of that Act,
direct the detention of the defaulting assessee in
prison for more than six months if the amount is more
1955
Purshottam
Govindji Halai
V•
Shree B.M. ~ai,
Additional Coluctor of Bombay
and othlrs
Das Actg. C. ].
896
1955
PW'shottam
Gvvindji Halai
v.
Shr~e B.M. Desai,
Additional Collector of Bomba;
and others
Das Actg. C.J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955)
than Rs. 50 or in other cases for more than six weeks.
The defaulter in the Punjab cannot, under section 69
of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (Punjab Act
XXVII of 1887), be kept in civil jail for more than
one month. Section 148 of the U. P. Land Revenue
Act, 1901 (U.P. Act III of 1901) limits the period of
detention D 15 days and also exempts many persons,
e.g. Talukdars and women, from any imprisonment.
The Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, 1886
(Reg. I of 1886) does. not insist on imprisonment
at all. A cursory perusal ot the provisions of the
different Acts referred to above will at once show that
in the matter of recoverv of arrears of land revenue the
different States have piescribed different machinery,
some obviously harsher than others. The argument
is that income-tax being a subject with respect to
which the Union alone may make law and the recovery
of it being the Union responsibility, the machinery
for the recovery of income-tax should be framed on
a uniform all-India basis, for to the Union all defaulters who may not pay up the Union demand are
similarly situated; but the Indian Income-taX Act by
section 46(2) authorises the Collectors in different
States to adopt machinery which differs from State
to State, so that defaulters are treated differently in
different States. The contention is that section 46(2)
which sanctions such discrimination is clearly violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution
and has, therefore, become void under article 13( 1).
The learned Attorney-General appearing for the
respond<;pts seeks to meet the aforesaid argument in
two ways. In the first place, he urges that the impugned sub-section does not by itself make any discrimination. All that it says is that the certified
ataount of income-tax is to be recovered as if it were
an arrear of land revenue and there its operation ends.
In recovering the certified demand the Collector has
to have recourse to the machinery av:!ilable to him
for enforcing a demand for arrears of land revenue
hut the provisions of the State laws which prescribe
that machinery are not incorporated in section 46(2).
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
891
If the State laws are discriminato:-y that vice cannot
be imputed to section 46(2).
There is good deal to be said on either side. The
State laws prescribe the procedure for the recovery of
arrears of land revenue only and they are not, in
terms and by themselves, concerned at all with the
recovery of income-tax demand. That machinery
is made . available for the purpose of recovery of income-tax by virtue only of section 46(2) of the Indian
Income-tax Act. In the matter of recovery of income-tax the Collectors adopt the procedure laid down
by the State laws, not because the State laws enjoin
them to do so but because section 46(2) directs them
to do so. In other words, it is section 46(2) which
tells the Collectors of Madras to follow the procedure
under section 48 of the Madras Revenue Recovery
Act, 1864 as if those provisions are set out in the
Indian Income-tax Act in extenso and it tells the
Collectors of all other States to adopt the procedure
prescribed by their own State laws as if the provisions prescribing that procedure were set out in that
section. In such a situation it is a plausible argument
to say that all the provisions of all the State laws
are, mutatis mutandis, to be read into section 46(2)
and that, therefore, if there be any vice of discrimination in the State laws that vice cannot but be
regarded as having crept into section 46(2). On the
other hand, to hold that all the provisions of all the
State laws for recovery of arrtars of land revenue
have been referentially. incorporated in section 46(2)
of the Indian Income-tax Act will lead us into difficulties. Will the subsequent amendments of the
State laws be also incorporated in section 46(2)?
Section 46(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act havingincorporated the State laws as they then stood, how
can any State Legislature which has no power to make
any law "'.ith respect to income-tax alter or amend
section 46(2)? Are the State laws as incorporated in
section 46(2) at the time it was enacted to be treated
as crystallised and to be applied by the Collectors,
although the State laws for the recovery of arrears
of J,.nJ revenue may be materially altered by sub-
1955
Purshottam
Govindji Halai
y.;..·
Skree B. M. Desai,
Additional Colkctor ef Born/Jay
and others
Dtl.fActg.C.J.
898
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1955
[1955J
sequent amendment? These are some of the questions which will have to be answered before we can
Punhottam
'Govindji Halai
come to a decision on this point. In the view we
take of the second part of the learned Attorney:'Shrtt B. M. Dtsai,
Additional Col~
General's argument to which we shall presently refer
Jectur of Bombay
it is not necessary for us to express any opinion on
and others
this part of his argument.
IJa1 Actg.C.J.
The learned Attorney-General then argues that assmning that section 46(2) by incorporating the cliff. ereni State laws which are not uniform has become
discriminatory such discrimination' is permissible and
does not offend the fundamental right guaranteed bv
artic!e 14. This argument appears to . us to be well
founded.
The meaning, scope and effect of the article in
question have been explained by this Court in a serie~
of decisions beginning with that in Chiranjit Lal Chowdhury v. Tlze Union of India(') and ending with that in
Budhan Chowdhury and others v •. The State of Bihar(').
The following passage in the unanimous judgment of
the Full Court in the last mentioned case at p. 1049
briefly summarises the true intendment of the constitutional provision :" .......................... It is now well-established
that while article 14 forbids class legislation, it does
not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes
of legislation. In order, however, to pass the test of
permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (i) that the classification must. be
founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together
from others left out of the group and (ii) that that
differentia must have a rational relation to the ol:>ject sought to be achieved by the statute in question.
The classification may be founded on different bases;
namely, geographical, or according to objects or occupations or the like. What is necessary is that there
must be a nexus between the basis of classification
and the object of the Act under consideration. It is
:also well-established by the decisions of this Court
...
(1) [1950] S. C.R. 869.
(2) [1955] I S. C.R. 1045.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
899
that article 14 condemns discrimination not only by
a substantive law but also by a law of procedure".
The respective contentions now put forward as to the
validity or otherwise of section 46(2) of the Indian
Income-tax Act have to be judged in the light of the
principles so laid down by the Full Court.
The Indian Income-tax Act imposes a liability on
persons who are amenable to it to pay the tax assessed against them. The assessed amount is a public demand of the Union and has to be recovered, if
not voluntarily paid up. The assessees are scattered
all over the Union and machinery has to be devised
for that purpose. On looking round the Union finds
that there is machinery in every State for recovery of
land revenues which are State demands. Each State
in its wisdom has devised a machinery which it has
considered appropriate and suitable· for the recovery
of its own public demand. As was said by the
Supreme Court of America in Middleton v. Texas
Power and Light Company(1)"There is a strong presumption that a legislature
understands and correctly appreciates the needs of
its own people, that its laws are directed to problems
made manifest by experience and that its discriminations are based upon adequate grounds".
It is conceded that each State is well within its rights
to devise its own machinery for the recovery of its
own public demand and that no person belonging to
one State can complain that the law of his State is
more rigorous than that of the neighbouring State. The
reason is obvious, for the people of one State are not
similarly situated as people of another State. Their
needs, as understood by their own Legislature, are
different from those of the people of other States. If
in the matter of recovery of arrears of land revenue
defaulters of one State cannot complain of denial of
equal protection of the laws on the ground of the
difference in the modes of recovery prevailing in other
States. can it be said to be unreasonable for the Union
to adopt, for the recovery of its public demand from
defaulters of each State, the same mode of recovery
(I) 249 U.S. 15'!, 157.
1955
l'W'sholta.Nt
GJ,111tiji Hal4i
"'
Shtu B. M. Dual,
Additional Colil{lor ef Bom~
a/Id othArs
Das Adg. C. ].
900
1955
Purshottam
Govindji Halai
v.
Skree B. M. Desai,
Additional Collector of Bomba.J
and gthlrs
Das Actg.C.J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955J
of public demand prevailing in that State? Here
the defaulters are classified on a territorial or
geographical basis and this basis of classification has
precisely the same correlation to the object of the
Indian Income-tax Act as it has to the object of the
different Public Demands Recovery Acts. The objects
of the two Acts in this behalf are in pari materia and
the same considerations must apply to both. People
of each State .are familiar with and used to the
coercive processes which each State finds it necessary
to impose on its own people for the recovery of public
demand and there can be no hardship and consequently no objection to their being put to the same
processes for the recovery of the public demand of the
Union. The grouping of the income-tax Lcfaulters
into separate categories or classes Statewise is certainly a territorial classification which is based on an
intelligible differentia and the subjection, for the purposes of the recovery of the certified demand, of, each
of such classes of defaulters to the same coercive pre>cess devised by their own State, on a consideration
of local needs, for the recovery of their own public
demands, cannot be regarded as bereft of a reasonable
nexus or correlation between the basis of classification and the object sought to be achieved by the
Indian Income-tax Act any more than it can be so
regarded with respect to the respective State laws.
The fact that the income-tax demand is a Union public demand appears to us to make no difference ·in the
legal position.
The Indian Income-tax Act classifies people into
various groups for the purpose of imposing the tax and
taxes them differently. e.g, insurance companies which
are taxed differently from an ordinary business concern and in some cases exempts them altogether, e.g.,
agriculturists and persons with income below a certain
level. There can, on the same principle, be no objection to people of a backward area who may be in need
of aid in the shape of tax remission to be exempted
from taxation either wholly or in part. If this js
right when a question of imposition is concerned. it
cannot be wrong when the matter is one of recovery.
The two together illake up the full measure of the
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
901
burden and if it is permissible to vary the burden at
one end it must be equally valid to vary it at the other
for the same or similar reasons.
It is said that the income-tax demand being a Union
demand there should be uniformity in the punishment to be meted out to defaulters and it can be
done easily by suitably amending section 46(2) so as
to provide for the detention of all defaulters for the
same period in all cases in all States. In the first p!ace,
it is a fallacy to regard arrest and detention of a defaulter who fails to pay income-tax as -a punishment
or penalty for an offence. It is a coercive process for
recovery of public demand by putting pressure on the
defaulter. The defaulter can get himself released bv
paying up the dues. In the next place, the Court is
only concerned to interpret the law and, if it is valid,
to apply the faw as it finds it and not to enter upon
a discussion as to what the law should be. The whole
problem before us is whether the apparent discrimination can be supported on the basis of a permissible
classification. The case of Bowman v. Lawis(') is in
point. \Ve do not, however, find it necessary to express any opinion on the extreme contention urged
b~ the learned Attorney-General, on the authority of
that decision. that a mere territorial classification,
bv itself and without anything else, is enough to place
the law beyond the operation of the equal protection
clause. Indeed. in that very case it was recognised
that it '>Vas not impossible that a distinct territorial
establishmel}t and jurisdiction might be intended as
or might have the effect of discrimination against a
particular race or class where such race or class should
happen to be the principal occupants of the disfavoured area. For the purposes of this case it will
suffice to sav that the discrimination complained of
is not unco~stitutional for the simple reaso'n that the
impugned law is based on a territorial classification
having a reasonable nexus or correlation between
that basis of classification and the object sought to
be achieved by the Act. Our decision in The State of
Rajasthan v. Rao Manohar Singh;i(2) which is relied
on by learned counsel for the petitioner is easilv
(I) 101 U.S. 22; 25 L. Ed 989.
(7) [1954] S. C.R. 996.
1955
Purshottam
Govindji Ha/ai
!,I;
Shree B. ,If. Desai~
Additional Collector of Bombay
and others
Das Actg. C. ].
902
1955
PUl'shottam
Govindji Halai
\),
Shree B. M. Desai,
Additional Collector of Bombay
and othns
Das Mg.C.J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
distinguishable on facts, for, the law impugned in that
case for the first time imposed certain disabilities on
Jagirdars of a certain area of the State and there was
no evidence that those Jagirdars were in any way
different from the · Jagirdars of the other areas of the
State. In the present case the classification has been
made Statewise and it is clear that in the matter of
payment of public. demands of the States the people
of different States are not similarly situated and their
own States have imposed on them such coerciYe pr<>cesses as the circumstances and needs of each State
require. The law impugned before us has .only :idopted, for its own purpose, the same coercive process
which was devised by tbe States for their own purposes which are closely akin or similar to the purpose
of the Union. The same or similar considerations
apply to both cases. There is the same or similar
correlation between the basis of classification and the
object sought to be achieved bv the Indian Incometax Act. To deny this power to the Union on constitutional grounds urged before us will lead us to hold
that no new offence created by law can be made triable according to the procedure laid down in the Code
of Criminal Procedure, for that Code sanctions different modes of trial in different areas, namely, bv a
Section 30 Magistrate in some areas, by the Sessions
Judge with assessors in certain areas and by .the Sessions Judge with jurors in other areas. Adoption of an
existing machinerv devised for a particular purpose
cannot. if there be no vice of unconstitutionalitv in
the machinery, render it unconstitutional if it is made
to subserve a purpose closelv akin or similar to the
purpose for which it had been devised. The first objection formulated by learned counsel for the petitioner
must, therefore, be rejected.
Re. (b).-As already stated under section 46(2), the
Collector, on receipt of the certificate from the Income-tax Officer, has to proceed to recover the certified demand as if it were an arrear of .land revenue.
This means that the Collector of a particular place
has to take steps as indicati;d in the State law relating to the recovcrv of arrears of land revenue. As
already stated, _in the State of Bombay there are two
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
903
statutes regulating the procedure for the recovery of
arrears of land revenue according as the defaulter resides in the City of Bombay or in any other area
within the State of Bombay. Section 13 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876 applies to the City
of Bombay and section 157 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 applies to the rest of the State.
Prior to the 8th October 1954 the portion of section
13 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876 which
is relevant for our present purpose was as follows :- ·
•'lf the sale of the defaulter's property shall not
produce satisfaction of the demand, it shall be lawful
for the Collector to caus<:i him to be apprehended and
confined in the civil jail under the rules in force at the
Presidencv for the confinement of debtors, for which
purpose
certificate of demand under the Collector's
signature sent with the .defaulter shall be the sheriff's
sufficient warrant, equally with the usual legal process in ordinary cases of arrest in execution of judgment for debt :
Provided, however, that such imprisonment shall
cease at any time upon payment of the sum due, and
that it shall in no case exceed one day for each rupee
of the said sum".
Section 157 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879
which provides for the arrest and detention of the
defaulter residing outside the City of Bombay contains the following proviso :"Provided that no defaulter shall be detained in
imprisonment for a longer period than the time limited
by law in the case of the execution of a decree of a
Civil Court for a debt equal in amount to the arrear
of revenue due by such defaulter".
A cursory perusal of the two sections will show at
once that the procedure prescribed by section 13 of
t~ Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876 for the recovery of arreai;s of land revenue was harsher and
more drastic than the procedure laid down in section 157 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879
in that a defaulter residing in the ·City of Bomba.y
could be ·kept in detention for a day for every rupee
·of the arrears which might considerably exceed the
maximum period of six months which is the iperiod
a
1955
Pursh-OUam
Govindji Halai
v.
Shree B. M. Desai,
Additional Collector of Bombay
and others
Das Actg. C. J.
904
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1955
[1955]
limited by the Code of Civil Procedure for the detention of a judgment-debtor in civil jail. The arguGovindji Halai
ment is that on the aJvent of the Constitution secv.
tion 13 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act,
Shret B. M. Desai,
Additional Col1876 became void under article 13 ( 1) in that it denied
lector of Bombay
to the Bombay defaulter equality before the law in
and others
comparison with the defaulter outside the City of
.Das Actg. C. J.
Bombay, for he could be detained for a longer period
of time. In the view we have taken, it is not necessary to express any opm1on whether the discrimination brought about by the two sections was supportable on the ground of a reasonable classification based on territorial considerations so as not to
offend the constitutional inhibition. Assuming, then,
but not . deciding, that section 13 of the Bombay
City Land Revenue Act, 1876 became inconsistent
with the fundamental right guaranteed by article 14
and, therefore, became void to the extent of such
inconsistency, it was not, as recently explained· by
this Court in Bhikaji Narayan Dhakras v. The State
of Madhya Pradesh, Nagpur and Another( 1 ), obliterated from the statute book for all times or for all
purposes or for all people. The effect of article 13 ( 1)
is that the law could not stand in the way of the
enjoyment of fundamental rights. The law was not
dead. Further, the law was amended on the 8th
October, 1954 when the proviso to section 13 quoted
above was replaced by the following proviso :"Provided that such imprisonment shall cease at
any time upon payment of the sum due and that it
shall in no case exceed( i) A period of six months when the sum due 1s
more than Rs. 50; and
(ii) A period of six weeks in any other case".
This amendment is nothing less than an enactment
of a new pr11vision. It lays down a new law which is
similar to the law laid down by section 157 of the
Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879. Therefore, the
disparity that prevailed between the original proviso
to section 13 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act,
1876 and the proviso to section 157 of the Bombay
Land Revenue Code, 1879 is now removed. The
Purshotlam
(I) [195512 S. C.R. 589.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
905
disparity between the two provisions as they originally
stood being thus eliminated, the vice of unconstitutionalitv is also removed and section 13 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876, as it now stands,
cannot be assailed as repugnant to article 14 of the
Constitution.
It was faintly suggested that as the assessment
proceedings hag been started . and the certificate had
been issued by the Income-tax Officer to the Additional Collector of Bombay and the Additional Collector issued a notice of demand and actually attached the properties prior to tl1e amendment; the
assessee must be governed by section 13 as it originally stood and not by it as subsequently amended.
We do not think there is any substance in this contention. It is true that the warrant of attachment
of the property was issued on the 24th March 1954
but the sale proclamation was issued and the sale was
actually held after the date of amendment. The
defaulting assessee might have paid up the dues in
which case there would have been no occasion for sale.
It is, therefore, his default that occasioned the sale.
Again, the sale proceeds might have been sufficient to
cover the certified demand, in which case there would
have been no occasion for the issue of warrant for his
arrest. It is only after the sale proceeds were found
to be insufficient to satisfy the assessed amount and
the assessee failed to pay· up the balance that the
question of the arrest of the defaulter arose. By that
time section 13 had been amended and the warrant of
arrest was issued on the 7th June 1955, that is to say,
long after the amendment of the section. In our
opinion, the second ground urged by the learned
coumel must also he negatived.
We may mention that our attention was drawn to
the decision of the Madras High Court in Erimmal
Ebrahim Hajee v. The Collector of Malabar(') but
learned counsel could not rely upon it as an authority
as it was itself under appeal before this Court.
The result, therefore, is that this application must
be dismissed.
ii) [1954] 26 I. T. R. 509.
1955
Purshottam
Govindji Halai
v.
Shre• B. M. Desai,
Additional Collector •f Bo,,..ay
and otkn
Das Actg.C.J.
906
1955
Purshottam
Gf)l)indJi Halai
v.
Skree B. M. Desai,
Additional Col~
lector of Bombay
and others
Chandrasekhara
A!Jar. J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955)
CHANDRASEKHARA
AIYAR J.-I agree rather reluctantly. The reluctance is not because there is anything in the reasoning of the judgment pronounced
just now by my Lord which does not appear to be
sound but because I am not happy about the result.
We have to face and accept wholly different consequences for non-payment of income-tax according
as the assessee belongs to one State or another. The
nature of the tax is one and the same, and it is levied
under a single Central Act, and yet the ultimate
coercive processes for recovery differ in nature and
extent between State and State. We have to attribute to the legislature a rational classification based
on geographical areas, the susceptibilities of people
in those areas, and their reactions to the adoption of
methods of recovery. For arrest and detention, wilful default or fraudulent conduct is required in Madras. In Assam, there can be no imprisonment at all.
The periods of detention vary between Bengal, U.P.
and the Punjab. Taluqdars in U.P. are completely
exempt. Are we to assume that people in Madras are
more amenable and generally ready and willing to pay
as compared with those in Bombay wno are a tenacious lot and must be subjected to a longer process of
detentive coercion? hre the Taluqdars in U.P. exempt
from arrest because of possible political repercussions
if such influential persons are subjected to such treatment? What is the rationale in providing different
periods of detention for Bengal and the Punjab?
We must be in a position to postulate some reasonable basis for the differentiation and we cannot ge~
away - from this necessity by vague references to the
wisdom of the legislature or by indulging in pure
speculation as to what might have been at the back
of its mind. Speaking broadly, for the enforcement of
the levy of a central tax like the Income-tax there
should be uniformity of procedure .and identity of
consequences from non-payment. The machinery for
recovery might be different between the several States
but the defaulting assessees must be put on the same
footing as regards the penalties.
But the law as it now stands can be supported on
the grounds mentioned by my Lord and I do not propose to differ.
GIPN-86-84 S. c. India/59-24-7-63 -1,000.
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