THE MEMBER, BOARD OF REVENUE versus ARTHUR PAUL BENTHALL.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 4 October 1955 | [1955] 2 S.C.R. 842 | 1955 INSC 50
Key facts
- Decided
- 4 October 1955
- Bench
- SUDHI RANJAN DAS*, N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR, NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI, T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR, SYED JAFFER IMAM
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 159/1954
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1955] 2 S.C.R. 842
- Neutral citation
- 1955 INSC 50
Text of the judgment
842
1955
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(l955J
THE MEMBER, BOARD OF REVENUE
v.
Odobtr 4.
ARTHUR PAUL BENTHALL.
(S. R.
DAs.
AcTING
C.
J.,
BHACWATI,
AYYAR, JuER IMAM
VENKATARAMA
and
CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR
JJ.J
The Indian Stamp Act (II of 1899), ss. 5 and 6-Expression
"disti11;t matters" in s. 5 and "description" in s. 6-I-Vhethe1 hav~
diffe1·ent connotations-Instrument in question-Whether comprised
·
distinct tnatters.
Held per S. R. DAs, AcTINC C. J., VENKATARAMA AYYAR,
l~:iAM
and CttANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ. (BH1\GWATI J.
r'issenting) the contention that the word "matter" in s. 5 of the
J.\FER
l ndian Stamp Act was intended to convey the sarne n1eaning as the
word "description" in s. 6 is \Vithout force. In its popular sense,
the expression "distinct matters" would connote something different
from distinct "categories''. 'fwo transactions might be of the san1e
description, but all the same, they might be distinct.
When two words of different import are used in a statute in
two consecutive provisions, it cannot be maintained that they are
used in the same sense and therefore the expression '~distinct
matters" in s. 5 and "description" in s. 6 have different connotations.
It is settled law that when two persons 101n in executing a
power of attorney, whether it comprises distinct matters or not will
depend on whether the interests of the executants in the subject
matter of the power are separate or not. Conversely, if one person
holding properties in two different capacities, each unconnected with
the other, executes a power in respect of both of then1, the instrument should logically be held to comprise distinct rnatters.
Held, that the instrument in question, Exhibit A,-the power of
attorney-comprised distinct matters within the meaning of s. 5 of
the Indian Stamp Act in respect of several capacities of the respon*
dent mentioned therein.
Per BttAGWATI J. (dissenting).-The fact that the donor of the
power of attorney exe<_:utes it in different capacities is not sufficient
to constitute the instrument, one comprising distinct inatters and
thus requiring to be stamped with the aggregate amount of the duties
with which separate instruments each comprising or relating to one
of such matters would be chargeable under the Act, within the mean*
ing of s. 5 of the Indian Stamp Act.
The instrument in question, Exhibit A, does not <umpr.~sc distinct matters but comprises one matter only and that matter is the
execution of a general power of attorney by the donor in favour of
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
843
the donees constituting the donees his attorneys to act for him in
all the capacities he enjoys.
It is within the very nature of_ the general power of attorney
that all the distinct acts which the donor is capable of performing
are comprised in one instrument which is executed by him and
therefore whatever acts the donor is capable of performing whether in
his individual capacity or in his representative capacity as trustee
or as executor or administrator are also comprised within the instrument and are not distinct matters to be dealt with as such so as to
attract the operation of s. 5 of the Indian Stamp Act.
Secretary, Board of Revenue, Madras v. Alagappa Chettiar
I.L.R. [1937] Mad. 553, Ansell v. Inland Revenue Commissioners
[1929] 1 K.B. 608, Reversionary Interest Society v. Commissioners of
Inland Revenue [1906] 22 T.L.R. 740, Davis v. Williams [1804]
104 E.R. 358, Bowen v. Ashley [1805] 127 E.R. 467, Goodson v.
Forbes 11815] 128 E.R. 999, Freeman v. Commissioners of Inland
Revenue [1870-71] L.R. 6 Exch. 101, Allen v. Morrison [1828] 108
E.R. 1152, Reference under Stamp Act, s. 46, [ 1886] l.L.R. 9 Mad.
358, Reference under Stamp Act, s. 46, f1891] l.L.R. 15 Mad. 386,
Reference under Stamp Act, s. 46, [1892] 2 M.L.J. 178, and Vidya
Varuthi v. Balusami, 48 I.A. 302, referred to.
C1v1L
APPELLATE
No. 159 of 1954.
JuR1smcnoN :
Civil
Appeal
Appeal hy Special Leave from the Judgment and
Order dated the 27th day of June 1952 of the Calcutta
High Court in Matter No. 214 of 1951-A reference
under s. 57 of the Indian Stamp Act.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India (B. Sen
and P. K. Bose, with him) for the appellant.
S. Chaudhury, (S. N. Mukherjee, B. N. Ghosh and
A. K. Basu, with him) for the respondent.
1955. October 4.
VENKATARAMA AYYAR J.-This appeal raises a
question under section 5 of the Indian Stamp Act II
of 1899. The respondent was, at the material time,
the Managing Director of Messrs Bird and Co. Ltd.,
and of Messrs F. \V. Heilgers and Co., Ltd., which
were acting as Managing Agents of several Companies
registered under the Indian Companies Act. He was
also a Director of a number of other Companies, and
had on occasions acted as liquidator of some Com-
1955
The Member,
Board of Revenue
v.
Arthur Paul
Benthall
844
1955
The Member,
Board of Revenue
'·
Arthur Paul
Benthall
Venkatarama
Ayyar ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955 J
parnes, as executor or administrator of estates of deceased persons and as trustees of various estates. On
4-7-1949 he applied to the Collector of Calcutta under
section 31 of the Stamp Act for adjudication of duty
payable on a power of-attorney, marked as Exhibit A
in the proceedings, which he proposed to execute. By
that power, he empowered .Messrs Douglas Chisholm
Fairbairn and John James Brims Sutherland jointly
and severally to act for him in his individual capacity
and also as executor, administratoi:, trustee, managing agent, liquidator and all other capaCit1es. The
Collector referred the matter under section 56(~) of
the Act to the decision of the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, who eventually referred it under
section 57 to the High Court of Calcutta stating his
own opinion that the stamp duty was payable on the
power "for as many respective capacities as the
principal executes the. power". The reference was
heard by a Bench consisting of the Chief Jmtice,
Das, J. and S. R. Das Gupta, J., who differed in their
opinion. The learned Chief Justice with whom Das, J.
agreed, heir! that the different capacities of the
for
executant did not constitute distinct matters
purposes of section 5 of the Act, and that the proper
duty payable on the instrument was Rs. IO under
article 4S(d) of Schedule 1-A of the Stamp Act as
amended by section 13 of Bengal Act III of 1922. S. R.
Das Gupta, J. · was of the opinion that the different
capacities of the executant were distinct matters for
the purposes of section 5, and that the instrument
was chargeable with the aggregate amount of duty
payable if separate instruments were executed in respect of each of those capacities. In the result, the
question was answered in accordance with the opinion
of the majority in favour of the respondent. Against
that decision, the Board of Revenue, West Bengal
has preferred this appeal by special leave, and contends that the instrument in question comprises distinct matters, and must be stamped in accordance
with section 5.
The statutory provisions bearing on the question
are sections 3 to 6 of the Act. Section 3 is the charg-
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
845
ing section, and it enacts that subject to certain
exempt10ns, every instrument mentioned in the Schedule to the Act shall be chargeable with the duty of
the amount indicated therein as the proper duty therefor. Section 4 lays down that when in the case of any
sale, mortgage or settlement several instruments are
employed for completing the transaction, only one of
them called the principal instrument is chargeable
with the duty mentioned in Schedule l, and that the
other instruments are chargeable each with a duty of
one rupee. Section 5 enacts that any instrument
comprising or relating to several distinct matters shall
be chargeable with the aggregate amount of the duties
with which separate instruments, each comprising or
relating to one of such matters, would be chargeable
under the Act. Section 6, so far as is material, runs
as follows:
"Subject to the provisions of the last preceding
section, an instrument so framed as to come within
two or more of the descriptions in Schedule I, shall,
where the duties chargeable thereunder are different,
be chargeable only with the highest of such duties".
The point for decision in this appeal is as to the
meaning to be given to the words "distinct matters"
in section 5. The contention of the respondent which
found favour wich the majority of the learnrcl Judges
in the court below is that the word "matters" in
section 5 is synonymous with the word "description"
occurring in section 6; and that they both refer to the
several categories of instruments which are set out in
the Schedule. The argument in support of this contention is this : Section 5 lays down that the duty
payable ·when the instrument comprises or relates t~
distinct matters is the aggregate of what would be
payable on separate instruments relating to ea(h of
these matters. An instrument would be chargeable
under section 3 only if it fell within one of the categories mentioned in the Schedule. Therefore, what
is contemplated by section 5 is a combination in one
document of different categories of instruments such
as sale ancl mortgage, sale and lease or mortgage and
lease and the like. But when the category is one
1955
The Member,
Board of Revenue
v.
Arthur Paul
Benthall
V enkataraina
AyyarJ.
846
1955
Tht Mtmbu,
Board of Rei·enue
v.
Arthur Paul
Benthall
Venkatarama
4_1yar ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19551
and the same, then section 5 has no application,
and as, in the present case, the instrument in question
is a power-of-attorney, it would fall under article 48(a)
in whatever capacity it was executed, and there being only one category, there are no distinct matters
within section 5.
. We are unable to accept the contention that the
word "matter" in section 5 was intended to convey
the same meaning as the word "description" in section · 6. In its popular sense, the expression "distinct
matters" would connote something different from
distinct "categories". Two transactions might be of
the same description, but all the same, they might be
distinct. If A sells Black-acre to X and mortgages
White-acre to Y, the transactions fall under different
categories, and they are also distinct matters. But if
A mortgages Black-acre to X and mortgages Whiteacre to Y, the two transactions fall under the same
category, but they would certainly be distinct matters.
If the intention of the legislature was that the expression 'distinct matters' in section 5 should be understood not in its popular sense but narrowly as meaning different categories in the Schedule, nothing would
have been easier than to say so. When two words of
different import are used in a statute in two consecutive provisions, it would be difficult to maintain
that they are used in the same sense, and the conclusion must follow that the expression "distinct matters" in section'· 5 and "descriptions" in section 6 have
different connotations.
It is urged against this conclusion that if the word
"matters" in section 5 is construed as meaning anything other than "categories" or in the phraseology
of section 6, "descriptions" mentioned in the Schedule,
then there could be no conflict between the two sections, and the clause in section 6 that it is "subject
to the provision of the last preceding section" would
be meaningless and useless. We see no force in this
· contention. Though the topics covered by sections 5
and 6 are different, it is not difficult to conceive of
instruments which might raise questions falling to be
determined under both the sections. Thus, if a part-
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
847
nership carried on by members of a family is wound
up and the deed of dissolution effects also a partition
of the family properties as in Secretary, Board of
Revenue v. Alagappa Chettiar (1 ), the instrument can
be viewed both as a deed of dissolution and a deed
of partition, and under section 6, the duty payable
will be the higher duty as on an instrument of
partition. But supposing by that very ~eed one of
the members creates a charge or mortgage over the
properties allotted to his share in favour of another
member for moneys borrowed by him for his cwn
purposes, that would be
a distinct matter which
would attract section 5. Now, but for the savmg
clause, a contention might be advanced that sections 5 and 6 are mutually exclusive, and as the instrument falls within section 6. the only duty payable
thereon is as on an instrument of partition and no
more. The purpose of the clause in section 6 is to
repel any such contention.
Considerable stress was laid bv Mr. Chaudhury on
the scheme of the Act as embodied in sections 3 to 6
as strongly supporting the view that 'matters' m
section 5 means the same thing ds 'description· m
section 6. He argued that under section 3 the duty
was laid not on all instruments but Qn those which
were of the descriptions mentioned in the Schedule,
that section 4 enacted a special provision with reference to three of the categories mentioned in the
Schedule, sale (conveyance), mortgage and settlement,
that if they were completed in more than one instrument, not all of them were liable for the duty specified in the Schedule, but only one of them called the
principal document, and that section 6 provided that
when the instrument fell under two or more of the
categories in the Schedule, the duty payable was the
highest payable on any one of them, that thus the
categories in the schedule were the pivot on which
the entire scheme revolved, and that in construing
the section in the light of that scheme, the expression
"distinct matter" must in the setting be construed as
distinct categories. To construe "distinct matters" as
(I) l.L.R. [1937) Mad. 553.
The Member,
Board of Revenu!
v.
Arthur Paul
Bmtha/I
J.,.cnkatararwi
Ayyar ].
848
1955
The Member,
Board of Revenue
••
Arthur Paul
Benthall
Venkatarama
A;:yar J.
[1955]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
something different from "distinct categories" would
be, it was argued, to introduce a concept foreign to
the scheme of the enactment .
The error in this argument lies in thinking that the
object and scope of sections 4 to 6 are the same,
which in fact they are not. Section 4 deals with a
single
transactjon
completed
in
seve1al
in~trument,.
and section 6 with a single transaction which might
be viewed ·as falling under more than one category,
whereas section 5 applies only when the instrument
comprises more than
one
transaction, and
it
is
in1-
material for this purpose whether those transactions
are of the same category or of different categories.
The topics dealt with in the three sections heing thus
different, no useful 1mrpose will he server! bv referring
to section 4 or section 6 for determining the scope of
section 5 or for construing its terms. It is not without significance that the legislature has used three
different words m relation to the three sections,
'transaction'
in section
4,
'matter'
in section 5,
:i.nd
'description' in section 6.
In support of his contention that 'distinct matters'
in section 5 meant only different categories, learned
counsel for the respondent relied on certain observations in Ansel] v. Inland Revenue Commissioners(').
There, the instrument under consideration was a deed
of settlement which comprised certain Government
secunt1es as also other investments, and under the
Stamp Act, 1891, it was chargeable with a single duty
ad va!orem on the value of all the properties settled.
Bv section 74, sub-section (1) of the Finance Act,
1910, voluntary dispositions were chargeable with a
higher stamp duty as on a conveyance; but Government securities were exempted from the operation of
the section. The question that arose for decision was
whether a separate duty was payable in respect of
Government stocks under the provisions of the Stamp
Act, 1891 over and above what was paid under section 74, sub-section (I) of the Finance Act, 1910 on
account of other investments. Answering it m the
affirmative, Rowlatt, J. observed :
(1) [19°9] 1 K.B. """·
2 S.C.R.
.•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
849
"If two different classes of property are being
transferred by the same words of assignment in the
same document, and those two different classes of
property in the same document are different from the
point of view of the Stamp Act and taxation, it
seems to me in common sense that they must be distinct matters".
The respondent wants to read these observations as
meaning that where the matters are not dealt with
separately for purposes of stamp duty, then they are
not distinct matters. This, however, does not follow.
The case before the court was one in which the instrument dealt with properties which fell under two
categories, and the decision was that they were· distinct matters. There is nothing either in the decision or the observations quoted above to support the
contention of the respondent that if the instrument
comprises matters falling within the same description,
it is not to be construed as comprising distinct
matters. Reliance was also placed on the observatio•"; in Reversionary Interest Society v. Commissioners
of Inland Revenue(1), in which it was held that a
statutory declaratic 11 for the purpose of carrying
through a transacti0n was liable for a single stamp
duty. There, the declaration was made by husband
and wife, and in view of the purpose for which it had
to be used, it was construed as one declaration. This
is a d·~cision on the facts, and is not of much assistance.
In the view, then, that section 5 would apply even
when the instrument comprises matters of the same
description, the point for decision is whether the
instrument proposed to be executed by the respondent is a single power-of-attorney or a combination
of several of them. The contention of Mr. Chaudhury
is ! 1.at when the executant of one instrument confers
on the attorney a general authority to act for him in
whatever matters he could act, then there is, in fact,
only a single delegation, and that therefore the instrument must be construed as a single power-ofattorney liable for a single duty under article 48( d)
I [1906] 22 T.L.R. 110:
i955
The Mcmbtr,
lioard of Rfvenue
v.
Arthur Paul
Bmtha/l
Vimkatarama
A_ryar ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
850
1955
'[hf .\frmbtr,
B1·ard 11( R~1·erwt
"·
Arthur Pau
Bfnll,all
V111katarama
Ay;·ar ].
r195s 1
of the Schedule. The contention of the appellant, on
the other . hanJ, is that though the instrument is
executed by one person, if he fills several capacities and
the authority conferred is general, there woul,\ he
distinct delegations in respect of each of those capacities, and that the instrument should bear the aggregate of stamp duty payable in respect of each of sEeh
capacities: The question is which of these two contentions
Li
correct .
.We are unable to agree with the respondent that
when a person executes a power-of-attorney in respect
of all the matters in which he could act, it should be
held, as a matter of law and without regard to the
contents of the instrument, to comprise a single
matter .. Whether it relates to a single matter or to
distinct matters will, in our opinion. depend on a
number of factors such as who are parties thereto,
whic'l is t 11e ;ubiect-matter ·on which it operates and
so forth. Thus, if A executes one power authorising X
to manage one estate and Y to manage another e<tate,
there would really be two distinct matters, though
there is onlv one instrument executed b•1 one person.
But if both X and Y are constituted atto~neys tG act
jointly and severally in respect of both the estates,
then there is only one delegation and one matter, and
that is specifically provided for in article 48( d ). Conversely, if a number of per:Sons join in executing one
instrument, and there is community of interest between them in the subject-matter comprised therein,
it will be chargeable with a single duty. This was
held .in Davis v. Williams('), Bot1Jet1 v. Ashley('), Goodson v. Forbes(') and others cases. But if the interest•
of the executants are separate, the instrument must
be construed as comprising distinct matters. Vitle
Freeman v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue('). Applying .the, same principle to powers-0f-attornev, it
was held in Allen v. Morrison(' ) that when members
of a mutual insurance. club executed a single power,
it relat.ed to one matter, Lord Tenterdon, C. ). observmg . that "there was certain Iy a community of
(I) [1804] 104 E.R. 358.
( ) [1805] 127 E.R.467, 469.
(3) [1815] 128 E.R. 999, lfl00-1001. (4) [1870-71] L.R. 6 Exch. 101.
\5) [128] 108 ll.R. 115:, 1153.
•
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
851
purpose actuating all the members of this club".
ln Reference under Stamp Act, s. 46( 1 ) , a powcr-ofpersons ~ relaattorncy executed by thirty-six
tion to a fund in which they were jointly mterested
was held to comprise a single matter. A similar decision was given in Reference und•.,· Stamp Act, s. 46(2)
where a power-of-attorney was executed by ten
mirasdars empowering the collection of communal income appurtenant to their mirasi rights. On the other
hand, where several donors having separate interests
execute a single power-of-attorney with reference to
their respective properties as, for example, when A
constitutes X as attorney for management of his
estate Black-acre and B constitutes the same person as
attorney· for the management of his estate White-acre,
then the instrument must be held to comprise distinct
matters. It was so decided in Reference under Stamp
Act, s. 46( s ). Thus, the question whether a power-ofattornev relates to distinct matters is one that will
have t; be decided on a consideration of the terms of
the ·instrument and the nature and the extent of the
authority conferred thereby.
It may be mentioned that questions of this character
cannot now arise in England in view of the special
prnvision contained in the Finance Act, 1927 (17 &
18, Geo. 5, Ch. 10), section 56 which runs as follows :
"No instrument chargeable with stamp duty
under the heading 'Letter or Power of Attorney and
Commission, Factory, Mandate, or other instrument
in the nature thereof in the First Schedule to the
Stamp Act, 1891, shall be charged with duty more
than once by reason only that more persons than one
are named in the instrument as donors ar donc:es
(whether jointly or severally or otherwise), of the
powers thereby conferred or that those powers relate
to more than one matter".
~h~re is no provision in the statute law of this country
similar to the above, and it is significant that it
assumes that a power of attorney might consist of
distinct matters by reason of the fact that there arc
(I) [1886] I.LR. 9 !Vad. 358.
(2) [1891] l.L.R. 15 Mad. 386.
(3) [1892] 2 M.L.J. 178.
1955
The ;\/ember,
Board of Revenue·
V.
Arlhur Paul
Bent 1·all
Vtn/.;alarama
.~yar
J.
852
i~l55
The .\!ember,
Board n._f.Re1·em1e
"·
Arthur Paul
Benthall
V rnkatarama
~~yyar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
I 19551
several Jonors or donees mentioned in it, or that. it
relates to more than one matter.
Now, considering Exhibit A in the light of the
above discussion, the point for determination is whet.her it can be said to comprise distinct matters by
reason of the fact that the respondent has executed it
in different; capacities. In this form, the question is
bereft of authority, and falls to be decided on wellrecognised principles applicable to the nuttcr. It is, >s
has been stated above, settled law that when two
persons
10111
ifi
executing a power-of-attorney, whe-
ther it comprises distinct matters or not will depend
on whether the interests of the cxecmants in the
subject-matter of the power are separate or joint.
Conversely, if one person holding properties in two
different capacities, each unconnected with the other,
executes a power in respect of both of them, the
instrument should logically be held to comprise ,\istinct matters. That will he in consonance with the
generally accepted notion of what are <fotinct mattero,,
and that certainly was the view which the responde;it
himself took of the matter when he expressly recited
in the power that he executed it both in his individual
capacity and in his other capacities. But it is contended by Mr. Chaudhury that the fact that the
respondent filled several capacities would not aifect
the character of the instrument as relating to a single
matter, as the delegation thereuncier extended to
whatever the respondent could do, and that it woulcl
be immaterial that he held some properties in his
individual capacity and some others as trustee or
executor, as the legal title to all of them would vest
in him equally in the latter as well as in the former
capacity. We are concerned, he argued, not with the
source from which the title flowed but with the reservoir in which it is now contained.
This is to attach more importance to the form of
the matter than to its substance. When a person is
appointed trustee, the legal title to the estate does,
under the English law, undoubtedly vest in him;
hut then he holds it for the benefit of the cestui que
trtut in whom the equitable estate vests.
Under the
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
2 S.C.R.
853
Indian law, it is well established that there can be
trusts and fiduciary relations in the nature of trust
even without there being a vesting of the legal estate
in the trmtee as in the case of mutts and temples.
Vidc Vidya Varuthi v. Balusami( 1 ). In such cases,
the legal title is vested in the institution, the mahant
or shebait being the manager thereof, and any delegation of authority by him can only be on behalf of
the institution which he represents. When a person
possesses both a personal capacity and a representative capacity, such as trustee, and there is a delegation of power by him in both those capacities, the
position in law is exactly the same as if different persons ;om m executing a power in respect of matters
which are unrelated. T:1ere being no community of
interest between the personal estate belonging to the
executant and the trust estate vested in him, they
must be held to be distinct matters for purposes of
section
The position is the same when a person is
executor or administrator, because in that capacity
he represents the estate of the deceased, whose
persona is deemed to continue in him for purposes of
administration.
It was finallv contended by Mr. Chaudhurv that if
e\'ery capacity of the donor is to be considered as a
distinct matter, we should have to hold that there
are distinct matters not only with reference to the
capacity of the executant as trustee, executor and so
forth, but in respect of every transaction entered into
by him in his personal capacity. Thus, it is argued,
if he confers on his attorney authority to sell one
property, to mortgage another and to lease a third,
he would have acted in three different capacities as
vendor, mortgagor and lessor, and the instrument
will have to be stamped as relating to three distinct
matters. 'Phis, he contended, would destroy the very
basis of a general power-of-attorney. The fallacv in
this argument is in mixing up the capacity which a person possesses with acts exercisable by virtue of that
capacity. When an executor, for example, sells one
property for discharging the debts of the testator and
s:
(!) [1921] 48 I.A. 302.
1955
The Member,
Board of Revenue
v.
Arthur Paul
Benthall
V<nkatarama
Ay;·ar ].
854
1955
The ,\!ember,
Board of Revenue
v.
ArlhU1' Paul
Benthall
Venkalfirama
Ayyar].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1955]
mortgages another for raising funds for carrying on
his business, he no doubt acts in two different transactions; but in respect of both of them, he functions
only in his capacity as executor. In our opm1on,
there is no substance in this contention.
In the result, we are of the opinion, differing from
the majority of the learned Judges of the court below,
that the instrument, Exhibit A, comprises distinct
matters in respect of the several capacities of the
respondent mentioned therein, and that the view
taken by the revenue authorities and supported by
S. R. Das Gupta, J. is correct. This 3ppeal will accordingly be allowed. The respondent will pay the
costs of the appellant here and in the court below.
BHAGWATI J.-I regret I am unable to agree with
the conclusion reached in the Judgment just delivered.
While agreeing in the main with the construction
put upon sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Act and the connotation of the words "distinct matters" used in section 5, I am of the view that the question still survives whether the instrument in question is a single
power ot attorney. or a combination of several of
them. The argument which has impressed my Brother Judges forming the majority of the Bench is
that though die instrument is executed by one individual, if he fills several capacities and the authority
conferred is general, there would be distinct delegations in respect of each of those capacities and
the instrument should bear the aggregate of stamp
duty payable in respect of each of such capacities.
With the greatest respect I am unable to accede to
that argument. I agree that the question whether a
power of attorney relates to distinct matters is one
that will have to be decided on the consideration of
the terms of the instrument and the nature and the
extent of the authority conferred thereby. The fact,
however, that the donor of the power of attorney
executes it in different capacities is not sufficient in
my opinion to constitute· the instrument, one comprising distinct matters and thus requiring to he
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
855
stamped with the aggregate amount of the duties with
which separate instruments each comprising or
relating to one of such matters would be chargeable
under the Act, within the meaning of section 5. The
transaction is a single transaction whereby the donor
constitutes the donees
jointly and severally his
attorneys for him and in his name and on his behalf
to act for him in his individual capacity and a\;o in
his capacity as managing director, director, managing
agent, agent, secretary or liquidator of any company
in which he is or may at any time thereafter be interested in any such capacity as ·aforesaid and also as
executor, administrator, trustee or in any capacity
whatsoever as occasion shall require. No doubt, different capacities enjoyed by the donor are combined
herein but that does not constitute him different individuals thus bringing this instrument within the
mischief of section 5. The executants of the instrument are not several individuals but is only. one individual, the donor himself, though he enjoys different
capacities. These different capacities have a bearing
on the nature and extent of the powers which he could
exercise as such. In his own individual capacity he
could exercise all the powers as the full owner qua
whatever right, title and interest he enjoys in the property, whether it be an absolute interest or a limited
one; he may be the absolute owner of the property or
may have a life interest therein, he may have a mortgagee's interest or a lessee's interest therein, he may
be a dominant owner of a tenement or may be a mere
licensee; but whatever interest he enjoys in that property will be the subject-matter of the power which
he executes in favour of the donee. He may, apart
from this individual interest which he enjoys therein,
be a trustee of certain property and he may also enjoy
the several interests described above in his capacity
as such .trustee. It may be that in his turn .he- may
be accountable to the beneficiaries for the due administration of the affairs of the trust but that does not
mean that he, as trustee, is not entitled to exercise
all these powers, the trust property having vested in
him, and he being therefore in a position to exercise
1955
ThL Member,
Board .of Revenue
v.
Arthur Paul
Benthall
Bhagwati J.
856
1955
The Member,
Board of Revenue
v.
Arthur Paul
Benthall
Bhagwati J.
SUPREME t.:0URT REPORTS
[1955]
all these powers in relation thereto. The same would
be the position if he were an executor or an administrator of an estate, in possession of the estate of the
deceased as such. The property of the deceased would
vest in him though his powers of dealing with the
same would be circumscribed either by the provisions
of the · testamentary instrument or the limitations imposed upon the same by law. All these circumstances
would certainly impose limitations on his powers of
dealing with the properties but that does not detract
from the position that he is entitled to deal with those
properties and exercise all the powers in relation
thereto though with the limitations imposed upon
them by reason of the capacities which he enjoys. It
follows, therefore, that, though enjoying different
capacities, he is the same individual who functions
though in different capacities and conducts his affairs
in the various capacities which he enjoys but as a
single individual. He is not one individual when he
is acting in his own individual capacity; he is not
another individual when he is acting as a trustee of a
particular estate and he is not a third individual when
he is acting as an executor or administrator of a
deceased person. In whatever capacity he is acting
he is the same individual dealing with various affairs
with which he is concerned though with the limitations imposed upon his powers of dealing with the properties by reason of the properties having vested in
him in different capacities.
I am therefore of the opinion that the instrument
in question does not comprise distinct matters but
comprises one matter only and that matter is the
execution of a general power of attorney by the donor
in favour of the donees constituting the donees his
attorneys to act for him in all the capacities which
he enjoys. The instrument in question cannot be split
up into separate instruments each comprising or relating to a .distinct matter in so for as the different
capacities of the donor are concerned. A general
power , of attorney comprises all acts which can be
done by the donor himself whatever be the capacity
or capacities which he enjoys and cannot be split up
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
857
into individual acts which the donor is capable of performing and which he appoints his attorney to <lo for
him and in his name and on his behalf. It is within
the very nature of the general power of attorney that
all the distinct acts which the donor is capable of performing are comprised in the one instrument which is
executed by him, and if that is the position, it is but
logical that whatever acts the donor is capable of performing whether in his individual capacity or in his
representative capacity as trustee or as executor or
administrator are also comprised within the instrument and are not distinct matters to be dealt with as
such so as to attract the operation of section 5.
I am therefore of the opinion that the conclusion
reached by the majority Judges in the High Court of
Judioture at Calcutta was correct and would accordingly dismiss this Appeal with costs.
1955
The MrmbeT,
Board of Revenue
v.
Arthur Paul
Bwthall
Bhagwati ].
BY THE CouRT.--In accordance with the opinion of
the majority the Appeal is allowed with costs here
and in the Court below.
JUGAL KISHORE RAMESHWARDAS
1955
v.
Octobtr 4.
MRS. GOOLBAI HORMUSJI
[BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA AYYAR and B. P.
SINHA JJ.)
Bombay Securities Contracts Control Act, 1925 (Bombay Act
Vil/ of 1925)-Ss. 3( 4) and 6-Sale and purchase of securities by
appellant on behalf of resffondent-Dispute between the parties whether
appellant was acting within his authority wl1en he purchased the
shares-Relationship between the patties that of principal and agent
and, not that of seller and purchaser-Whether falls within purview of
s. 6-Contract notes sent by brokers to their constituent-Mere intimations by brnkers to constituent-That contract had been entered into
-Arbitration agreement-Essentials thereof-Rules framed by Native
Share and Stock Brokers' Association-Complete code by themselvesRule 167-Whether contract notes void thereunder.
The appellant-a share-broker carrying on business in the City
of Bombay ar.d a member of the Native Share and Stock Brokers'
17-84 S. C. lndia/59
Report an error or ask for masking: grievance@lawgrids.org