BHIKAJI NARAIN DHAKRAS AND OTHERS versus THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND ANOTHER.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 29 September 1955 | [1955] 2 S.C.R. 589 | 1955 INSC 49
Key facts
- Decided
- 29 September 1955
- Bench
- SUDHI RANJAN DAS*, N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR, NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI, T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR, SYED JAFFER IMAM
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 189/1955
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1955] 2 S.C.R. 589
- Neutral citation
- 1955 INSC 49
Text of the judgment
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
589
impossible to hold in the circumstances described that
the Sessions Judge did not impose a substantial senteilce, and no adequate reasoP has been assigned by
the learned High Court Judges for considering the
sentence manifestly inadequate. In the circumstances,
bearing all the considerations of this case in mind, we
are of opinion that the appeal (which is limited to the
question of sentence) should be allowed and that the
sentence , imposed by the High Court should be set
aside and that of the Sessions Court restored. Ordered
accordingly.
1955
Bed iw
v.
T/14 SI/JU of Ullar
Praduh
Bose J.
·---r-
BHIKAJI
NARAIN
DHAKRAS
AND
OTHERS
v.
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
AND ANOTHER.
[S. R. DAS, ACTING c. J., BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA
AYYA11, }AFER IMAM and CHANDRASEKHARA
AIYAR JJ.]
Fundamental Rights, Infringement of-I.Aw void for inconsistency
-'Void', Meaning of-Removal of inconsistency by amendment of the'
Constitution, if revivifies the law-Constitution of India as amended
by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 and the Constitution
(Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, Arts. 13, 19(6), 31(2)-C.P. & Berar
Motor Vehic!es (Amendment) Act, 1947 (Act Ill of 1948).
The petitioners who carried on their business as stage carriage
operators of Ma<ihya Pradesh for a considerable number of years
challenged the constitutional validity of the C.P. & Berar Motor
Vehides (Amendment) Act, 1947 (Act III of 19!l8) which amended
the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Central Act IV of 1939) and conferred
extensive powers on the Provincial Government including the power
to create a monopoly of the motor transport business in its favour
to the exclusion of all motor transport operators. In· exercise of the
powers conferred by new s. 43(1)(iv) a notification was issued on
the 4th of February, 1955, qeclaring the intention of the Government to take up certain ro.ites. The case of the petitioners was that
the passing of the Constitution and the grant of fundamental rights
rendered the ltct void under Art. 13 ( 1) being inconsistent with the
provisions of Arts. 19(1) (g) and 31(2), and reliance was placed on
the decision of the Supreme CQurt in Shagir Ahmad v. The State of
T.J .P. & others. On behalf of the .respondents it was contended that
although as a result of the said decision the iu>pugned Act w:iS
1955
September 29
590
1955
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955,
rendered void, the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, and
the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, had the effect of
Bhikaji Narain
Dhakras and othtrs removing the inconsistency and the Amending Act (III of 1948) be-
v.
The Stale of
Madhya Pradesh
andanotlur
came operative again. It was, however, contended on behalf of the
petitioners that the impugned Act being void under Art. 13(1) was
dead and could not be revivified by any subsequent amendment of
the Constitution. It must be re-enacted.
Held that Shagir Ahmad's case had no application and the con·
tentions put forward by the respondents were well founded and must
be accepted.
That it is well-settled that the word 'void' in Art. 13 means void
to the eXtent of the inconsistency with a fundamental right and the
language of the article makes it clear that the entire operation of an
inconsistent Act is not .wiped out. It applies to past transactions
and the rights and ·liabilities accruing therefrom and continues even
after the commencement of the
Constitution to ~pply to noncitizens.
Keshavan Madhava Menon v. The State of Bombay [1951] S.C.R.
288, relied on.
The true effect of Art. 13( 1) is to render an Act, inconsistent
with a fundamental right, ifioperative to the extent of the inconsistency. It is overshadowed by the fundamental right and remains
dormant but is not dead. With the amendment made in cl. ( 6) of
Art. 19 by the first Amendment Act the provisions of the impugned
Act were no longer inconsistent therewith and the result was that
the impugned Act began to operate once again from the date of such
amendment with this difference that, unlike amended clause (2) of
Art. 19 which was expressly made retrospective, no rights and obligations could be founded on the provisions of the impugned Act
from the date of the Commencement of the Constitution till the
date of the amendment. The notification declaring the intention of
the State to take over the bus routes to the exclusion of all other
motor transport operators was, therefore, perfectly valid..
Shagir Ahmad v. The State of U.P. & Others, [1955] 1 S.C.R.
707 and Behrom Khurshed Pesikaka v. The State of Bomb~y. [1955]
1 S.C.R. 613, distinguished and held inapplicable.
American authorities held inapplicable.
Nor can the impugned Act, e>n a parity of reasoning be held to
infringe any longer the fundamcn~al rights of the petitioners under
Art. 31(2) in view of the amenament effected therein by the Constitution (Fo11rth Amendment) Act of 1955 which came into force
on the 27th April, 1955, these petitions having been filed thereafter,
and the petitioners could not be allowed to challenge the validity of
the impugned Act on that ground.
Scmble. It is not clear at all that the impugned Act was in
conflict with s. 299 of the Government of India Act, 1935, before the
advent of the Constitution,
.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ORIGINAL
193 of 1955.
JURISDICTION : Petitions
Nos.
591
189
to
Petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of
India for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
G. S. Pathak, (Rameshwar Nath and Rajinder
Narain, with him) for the petitioners in Petition
No. 189 of 1955.
Rameshwar Nath and Rajinder Narain, for petitioners in Petition No. 190 of 1955.
Sri Narain Andley and Rajinder Narain, for petitioners in Petitions Nos. 191 to 193 of 1955.
T. L. Shevde, Advocate-General of Madhya Pradesh
(I. N. Shr_off, with him), for respondents in all petitions.
1955. September 29. The Judgment of the
Court was delivered by
DAS Acre. C. J.-This judgment will dispose of all
the five petitions (Nos. 189 to 193 cl. 1955) which have
been heard together and which raise the same question as to the constitutional validity of the C.P. &
Berar Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1947 (Act
III of 1948).
The facts are short and simple. Each of the petitioners has been carrying on business as stage carriage operator for a considerable number of years under
permits granted under section 58 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Central Act IV of 1939) as amended
by the C.P. & Berar Motor Vehicles (Amendment)
Act, 1947 (Act III of 1948).
Prior to the amendmen,t section 58 of the Motoc
Vehicles Act, 1939 was in the following terms:"58(1). A permit other than a temporary permit
issued under section 62 shall be effective without
renewal for such period, not less than three· years and
not more than five years, as the Regional Transport
Authority may in its discretion specify in the permit.
Provided that in the case of a permit issued
or renewed within two years of the commencement of
this Act, the permit shall be effective . without renewal
1955
Bhikaji Narain
Dhakras and othtrs
v.
The State of
Madh,a Pratksh
andanotlur
592
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
!955
for such period of less than three years as the Provin-
BlliktJji Jftrraln
D/uJkras and ot/urs
v;
T Ji. Stai. qf
Madhya Pradesh
andnnothtr
cial Government may prescribe.
(2) A permit may be renewed on an application
made and disposed of as if it were an application for
a permit:
Provided that, other conditions Leing equal, an
application for renewal shall be given preference over
new applications for permits".
It will be noticed that under the section as it originally stood the permit granted thereunder was for a
period· of not less than 3 years and not more than 5
years and a permit-holder applying for renewal of the
permit had, other things being equal, preference over
new applicants for permit over the same route and
would ordinarily get such renewal.
Very far reaching amendments were introduced by
the C. P. & Berar Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act,
1947 into the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 .in its application to Central Provinces and Berar. By section 3 of
the amending Act, item (ii) of sub-section ( 1) of section 43 of the Central Act was replaced by the following items :
.
"(ii) fix maximum, minimum or specified fares
or freights for stage carriages and public carriers to
be applicable throughout the province or within any
area or any route within the province, or
· (iii) notwithstanding anything contained in section 58 or section 60 cancel any permit granted under
the Act in respect of a transport vehicle or class of
such permits either generally or in any area specified
in the notification :
Provided that no such notification shall be issued
before the expiry of a period of three months from
the date of a notification declaring its intention to
do so:
Provided further that when any such permit has
been cancelled, the permit-holder shall be entitled to
such compen5ation as may be provided in the rules;
or
(iv) declare that it will engage in the business of
road transport service either generally or in any area
specified in the notification".
Das .dctg. C. J.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
593
I95 5
The following sub-section (3) was added after subsection (2) of section 58 of the Central Act l;>y section Bhikaji Narain Dhak8 of the amending Act, namely:ras and othns
v
"(3) Notwithstanding
anything
contained
in
Tll4Ststeof
sub-section (I), the Provincial Government may order Madhya
Pradesh
a Regional Transport Authority or the Provincial
and anot!rn
Transport Authority to limit the period for which
Das Act1:. C. J.
any permit or class of permits is issued to any period
less than the minimum specified in the Act".
Section 9 of the amending Act added after section
58 a new section reading as follows :"58-A. Notwithstanding
anything
hereinbefore
contained the Provincial Government may by order
direct any Regional Transport Authority or the provincial Transport Authority to grant a stage carriage
permit to the Provincial Government or any undertaking in which the Provincial Government is financially interested or a permit-holder whose permit has
been cancelled under section 43 or any local authori ty specified in the order".
The result of these amendments was that power was
given to the Government ( i) to fix fares or freights
throughout the Province or for any area or for any
route, (ii) to cancel any permit after the expiry of
three months from the date of notification declaring
its intention to do so and on payment of such compensation as might be provided by the Rules, (iii) to
declare i.:s intention to engage in the business of road
transport generally or in any area specified in the
notification, (iv) to limit the period of the license to
a period less than the minimum specified in the Act,
and (v) to direct the specified Transport Authority to
grant a permit, inter alia, to the Government or any
undertaking in which Government was financially interested. It may be mentioned here that in the State
of Madhya Pradesh there are two motor transport
companies known as C. P. Transport Services Ltd.,
and Provincial Transport Co. Ltd., in which, at the
date of these writ petitions, the State of Madhya
Pradesh and the Union of India held about 85 per
cent. of the share capital. Indeed, since the filing
of these petitions the entire undertakings of these
594
1955
Bhikaji Narain
Dhah-as and others
v.
TM State of
Madhya Pradesh
and another
Das Actg. C. ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
companies have been purchased by the. State of
Madhya J;>radesh and the latter are now running the
services on some routes for which permits had been
granted to them.
A cursory perusal of the new provisions introduced
by the amending Act will show that very extensive
powers were conferred on the Provincial Government
and the latter were ~uthorised, in exercise of these
powers, not only to regulate or control the fares or
freights but also to take up the entire motor transport business in the province and run it in competition with and even to the exclusion of all motor transport operators. It was in exercise of the powers
under the newly added sub-section (3) or section 58
that the period of the permit was limited to four
months at a time. It was in exercise of powers conferred on it by the new section 43(1) (iv) that the
Notification hereinafter mentioned declaring the intention of the Government to take up certain routes
was issued. Tt is obvious that these extensive powers
were given to the Provincial Government to carry
out and implement the policy of nationalisation of
the road transport business adopted by the Government. At the date of the passing of the amending
Act (III of 1948) there was no such thing as fundamental rights of the citizens and it was well within
the legislative. competency of the Provincial Legislature to enact that law. It has been conceded that
the amending Act was, at the date of its passing, a
perfectly valid piece of legislation.
Then came our Constitution on the 26th Janmry
1950. Part III of the Constirution is headed "Fundamental Rights" and consists of articles 12 to 35. By
article 19(1) the Constitution guarantees to all citizens the right to freedom under seven heads. Although
in article 19(1) all these rights are expressed in unqualified language, none of them, however, is absolute,
for each them is cut down or limited by whichever
of the several clause< (2) to (6) of that article is applicable to the particular right. Thus the right to
practise any profession or to carry on any occupation,
trade or business conferred by article 19(1) (g) was
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
595
1955
controlled by clause (6) which, prior to its amendBhikaji Narain
ment to which reference will presently be made, ran
Dhakras and otlw
as follows :v.
" ( 6) Nothing in sub-clause (g) of the said clause
Tiu State of
Pradesh
shall affect the operation of any existing law in so Madhya
and anothtr
far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making
any law imposing, in the interests of the general Das Actg. C. J.
public:, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the
right conferred by the said sub-clause, and, in particular, nothing in the said sub-clau~ shall affect the
operation of any existing law in so far as it presc1lbes
or empowers any authority to prescribe, or prevent
the State from making any law prescribing or empowering any authority to prescribe, the professional
or technical qualifications necessary for practising any
profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or
business".
The fundamental rights conferred by articles 14 to 35
are protected by the provisions of article 13 the relevant portions of which are as follows:"13. (1) All laws in force in the territory of
India immediately before the commencement of this
Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistent with
the provisions of this Part, shall to the extent of
such inconsistency, be void.
(2) The State shall not make any law which takes
away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part
and any law made in contravention of this clause
shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void".
The amending Act ( III of 1948) was, at the commencement of the Constitution, an existing law. The
new provisions introduced by the Act authorised the
Provincial Government to exclude all private motor
transport_ operators from the field of transport business. Prima facie, therefore, it was an infraction of
the provisions of article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution
and would be void under article 13(1), unless this
invasion by the Provincial Legislature of the fundamental right could be justified under the provisions of
clause (6) of article 19 on the ground that it imposed
reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right
under article 19(1) (g) in the interests of the general
596
1955
Bltikqji Narain
Dhalcras and oth1J1s
v.
The State of
MadhJa Pradesh
and another
Dat Aclg. C.Jo
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955}
public. In Shagir Ahmad v. The State of U.P. d:
Others(') it was held by this Court that if the word
"restriction" was taken and read in the sense of limitation and not extinction then clearly the law there
under review which, like the amending Act now before us, sanctioned the imposition of total prohibition
on the right to carry on the business of a motor
transport operator could not be justified under article
19(6). It was further held in that case that if the
word "restriction" in clause (6) of article 19 of the
'Constitution, as in other clauses of that article, were
to be taken in certain circumstances to include prohibition as well, even then, having regard to the nature
of the trade which was perfectly innocuous and to
the number of persons who depended upon business
of this kind for their livelihood, the impugned law
could not be justified as reasonable. In this view of
the matter, there is no escape from the conclusion
that the amending Act, in so far as it was inconsistent
with article 19(1) (g) read with clause (6) of that article, became. under article 13(1), void "to the extent
of such inconsistency" and if there were nothing else
in the case the matter would have been .completely
covered by the decision of this Court in that case.
On the 18th June 1951, however, was passed the
Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951. By stc·
tion 3(1) of that Act for clause (2) of article 19 a new
sub-clause was substituted which was expressly made
retrospective. Clause (6) of article 19 was also
amended. That clause, so amended, now reads as
follows:"(6) Nothing in sub-clause (g) of the said clause
shall affect the operation of any existing law in so
far as it imposes, or prevent the State .from making
any law imposing, in the interests of the general
public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the
right conferred by the said sub-clause, and, in particular, nothing in the said sub-clause shall affect the
operation of anv existing law in so far as it relates to,
or prevent the State from making any law relating
to,(!) [1955] I S. C.R. 707.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
597
(i) the professional or technical qualifications
necessary for practising any profession or carrying on
any occupation, trade or business, or
(ii) the carrying on by the State, or by a corporation owned or controlled by the State, of any trade,
business, industry or service, whether to the exclusion,
complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise".
It will be noticed that clause (6), as amended, was
not made retrospective as the amended clause (2) had
been made. The contention of the respondents before
us is that although the amending Act, on the authority of our decision in Shagir A4mad's case (supra),
became on and from the 26th January, 1950 void as
against the ciLizens to the extent of its inconsistency
with the provisions of article 19(1) (g), nevertheless,
after the 18th June 1951 when clause (6) was amended by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951
the amending Act ceased to be inconsistent with the
fundamental right guaranteed by article 19( I) (g) read
with the amended clause (6) of that article, because
that clause, as it now stands, permits the creation by
law of St:ite monopoly in respect, inter alia, of motor
transport business and it became operative again even
as against the citizens. The petitioners, on the other
hand, contend that the law having become void for
unconstitutionality was dead and could not be vitalised by a subsequent amendment of the Constitution
removing the constitutional objection, upless it was
re-enacted, and reference is made to Prof· Coolev's
work on Constitutional Limitations, Vol. I, p. 3.84
Note referred to in our judgment in Shagir Ahmad's
case (supra) and to similar other authorities. The
question thus raised by the respondents, however,
was not raised by the learned Advocate-General in
that case, although the notification was published by
the U. P. Government on the 25th March 1953 and
the proposed scheme was published on the 7th April,
1953, i.e., long after the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 had been passed. This question was
not considered by this Court in Shagir Ahmad's case,
for it was there conceded (see p. 720 of the report)
that the validity of the U. P. Act which, in this res-
1955
Bhikaji Narain
Dhakras and otlurs
v.
The Stale of
Madhya Pradesh
and anot/ur
Das Actg. C. J.
598
1955
Bhikoji Norain
Dhakras and others
v.
Ti1' State •f
MadhJa PraJesh
and another
DOI Adg. C. J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1955]
pcct, was similar to the C. P. & Berar Act now under
consideration, was not to be decided by applying the
provisions of the amended clause (6). Nor was this
problem raised before or considered by this Court in
Behram Khurshed Pesikaka v. The State of Bombay(').
We, therefore, conceive it to be open to us to go into
the new question that has now been mooted before us
and to consider what effect the amended clause ( 6)
has on the impugned Act. This involves a question
of construction of article 13 of the Constitution.
The meaning to be given to the word "void" in
article 13 is no longer res integra, for the matter stands
concluded by the majority decision of this Court in
Keshavan Madhava Menon v. The State of Bombay(').
We hJve to apply the ratio decidendi in that case to
the facts of the present case. The impugned Act
was an existing law at the time when the Constitution came into force. That existing law imposed on
the exercise of the right guaranteed to the citizens of
India by article 19(1) (g) restrictions which could not
be justified as reasonable under clause ( 6) as it then
stood and consequently under article 13(1) that existing law becamr void "to the extent of such inconsistency". As explained in Keshavan Madhava Menon's
case (supra) the law became void not in toto or for all
purposes or for all times or for all persons but only
"to the extent of such inconsistency'', that is to
say, to the extent it became inconsistent with the
provisions of• Part III which conferred the fundamental rights on the c1t1zens. It did not become
void independently of the existence of the rights
guaranteed by Part III. In other words, on and after
the commencement of the Constitution the existing
law, as a result of its becoming inconsistent with the
provisions of article 19(1) (g) read with clause (6)
as it then stood, could not be permitted to stand in
the way of the exercise of that fundamental right.
Article 13(1) by reason of its language cannot be read
as having obliterated the entire operation of the inconsistent law or having wiped it out altogether from
(1) [1955] 1 S. C.R. 613.
(2) [1951] S. C.R. 228.
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
599
the statute book. Such law existed for all past transactions and for enforcement of rights and liabilities
accrued before the date of the Constitution, as was
held in Keshavan Madhava Menon's case. The law
continued in force, even after the commencement of
the Constitution, with respect to persons who were
not citizens and could not claim the fundamental
In short, article 13(1) had the effect of nulliright.
fying or rendering the existing law which had become
inconsistent with article 19(1) (g) read with clause (6)
as it then stopd ineffectual, nugatory and devoid of
any legal force or binding effect only with respect to
the exercise of the fundamental right on and after the
date of the commencement of the Constitution. Therefore. between the 26th January 1950 and the 18th
June 1951 the impugned Act could not stand in the
way of the exercise of the fundamental right of a
citizen under article 19 (1) (g). The true .position is that
the impugned law became, a.~ it were, eclipsed, for the
The effect of
time being, by the fudamental right.
the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 was to
remove the shadow and to make the impugned Act
free from all blemish or infirmity. If that were not
so, then it is not intelligible what "existing law"
could have been sought to be saved from
the operation of article 19(1) (g) by the amended clause (6) in
so far as it sanctioned the creation of State monopoly, for ex hypothesi, all existing laws creating such
monopoly had already become void at the date of the
commencement of the Constitution in view of clause
(6) as it then stood. The American authorities refer
only to post-Constitution laws which were inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution. Such
laws never came to life but were still born as it were.
The
American authorities, therefore, cannot fully
apply to pre-Constitution laws which were perfectly
valid before the Constitution. But apart from this
distinction between pre-Constitution and post-Constitution laws on which, however, we need not rest our
decision, it must be held that these American authorities can have no application to our Constitution.
All laws, existing of future, which are inconsistent
1955
Bhikaji Narain
Dhakras and others
v.
The State of
Madhya Pradtsh
and another
Das Actg. C. J.
600
1955
Bb.ikoji Narain
DhaMas and others
v.
The State of
Mad~?a Pradesh
and another
Das Actg. C. ].
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
with the provisions of Part III of our Constitution are,
by the express provision of article 13, rendered void
"to the extent of such inconsistency''..
Such laws
were not dead for all purposes. They existed for the
purposes of pre-Constitution rights and liabilities and
they remailled operative, even after the Constitution,
as against non-citizens. It is only as against the citizens that they remained in a dormant or moribund
condition; In our judgment, after the amendment of
clause (6) of article 19 on the 18th June 1951, the im. pugned Act ceased to be unconstitutional and became
revivified and enforceable agaii1st citizens as well as
against non-atJzens.
It is true that as the amended
clause (6) was not made retrospective the impugned
Act could have no operation as against citizePs between the 26th January 1950 and the 18th June 1951
and no rights and obligations could be founded on the
provisions of the impugned Act during the said period
whereas the amended clause (2) by reason of its being expressly made retrospective had effect even during that period. But after the amendment of clause
(6) the impugned Act immediately became fully operative even as against the citizens.
The notification
declaring the intention of the State to take over the
bus routes to the exclusion of all other motor transport operators was published on the 4th February
1955 when it was perfectly constitutional for the State
to do so. In our judgment the contentions put forward by the respondents as to the effect of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951
are wellfounded and the objections urged against them by the
petitioners are untenable and must be negatived.
The petitioners then contend that assuming that
the impugned Act cannot be questioned on the ground
of infringement of their fundamental right under
article 19(1) (g) read with clause (6) of that article,
there has been another infraction of their fundamental right in that they have been deprived of their
property, namely, the right to ply motor vehicles for
gain whim is an interest in a commercial undertaking
and, therefore, the impugned Act does conflict with
the prq.v~ns of article · 31(2) of the Constitution and
2 S.C.R
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
601
again they rely on our decision in Shagir Ahmad's case.
Here, too, if there were nothing else in the case this
co.Ptention may have been unanswerable. But unfortunately for the petitioners there is the Constitution
(Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955 which came into force
on the 27th April, 1955. By section 2 of that Act
article 31 of the Constitution was amended and for
clause (2) of that article the following clauses were
substituted:" (2) No property shall be compulsorily acquired
or requisitioned save for a public purpose and save by
authority of a law which provides for compensation
so acquired or requisitioned and
for the property
either fixes the amount of the compensation or specifies the principles on which, and the manner in which,
the compensation is to be determined and given; and
no such law shall be called in question in any court
on the ground that the compensation provided by that
law is not a<lequ;ite.
(2-A) Wl:ere a law does not provide for the
transfer of the ownership or right to possession of any
property to the State or to a corporation owned or
controlled by the State, it shall not be deemed to provide for the compulsory acquisition or requisitioning
of property, notwithstanding that it deprives any
person of his property".
Article 31-A of the Constitution was also amended.
There can be no question that the amended provisions, if they apply, save the impugned law, for it
does not provide for the transfer of the ownership or
right to possession of any property and cannot, therefore, be deemed to provide for the compulsory acquisition or requisitioning of any property. But the petitioners contend, as they did with regard to the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, that these
amendments which came into force on the 27th April
1955 are not retrospective and can have no application to the present case. It is quite true that the impugned Act became inconsistent with article 31 as
soon as the Constitution came into force on the 26th
January 1950 as held by this Co1,1rt in Shagir Ahmad's
case (supra) and continued to be so inconsistent right
1955
B/aikaji Narain
Dhakras and other&·
v.
The Stau of
Madhya PraJnli
and another
Das Actg. C.J.
602
1955
Blai!oji Narain
DluWas and others
v.
Thi Stat• of
Madhya Pr!Uksh
and another
Das Act~. C. ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
up to the 27th April 1955 and, therefore, under article
13(1) became void "to the extent of such inconsistency". Nevertheless, that inconsistency was removed
on and from the 27th April 1955 by the Constitution
(Fourth Amendment)
Act, 1955. The present writ
petitions were filed on the 27th May 1955, exactly a
month after the Constitution (Fourth Amendment)
Act, 1955 came into force, and, on a parity of reasoning hereinbefore mentioned, the petitioners cannot be
permitted to challenge the constitutionality of the
impugned Act on and from the 27th April 1955 and
this objection also cannot prevail.
Learned counsel for the petitioners sought to raise
the question as to the invalidity of the impugned Act
even before the advent of the Constitution. Prior to
the Constitution, when there were no fundamental
rights, section 299 of the Government of India Act,
1935 which corresponds. to article 31 had been construed by the Federal Court in Rao Bahadur Kunwar
Lal Singh v. The Central Provinces and Berar (') and in
other cases referred to in Rajah of Bobbili v. The State
of Madras(•) and it was held by the Federal Court that
the word "acquisition" occurring in section 299 had
the limited meaning .of actual transference of ownership a..'ld not the wide · meaning of deprivation of any
kind .that has been·given by this Court in s,,bodh
Gopal Bose's case (') to _that wo.rd acquisition appearing in article 31 (2) in the light of the other provisions .
of the Constitution. It is, therefore, not clear at all
that the impugned Act was in conflict with section
299 of the Government of India Act, 1935. Besides,
this objection was not taken or even hinted at in the
petitions and cannot be permitted to be raised at this
stage.
The result, therefore, is that these petitions must
be dismissed. In the circumstances of this case we
make no order as to costs.
(1) fl944~ F. C.R. 284.
(2J 1952 1 M. L. J. 174, 193-194.
13) 1954 S. C.R. 587.
Gll':\-56 83 S. C. India/59-16-4-63-1,000.
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