BED RAJ versus THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 28 September 1955 | [1955] 2 S.C.R. 583 | 1955 INSC 48
Key facts
- Decided
- 28 September 1955
- Bench
- VIVIAN BOSE*, B. JAGANNADHADAS, BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 88/1954
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1955] 2 S.C.R. 583
- Neutral citation
- 1955 INSC 48
Text of the judgment
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
583
BED RAJ
1955
v.
Septemb1r 118
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH.
[VIVIAN
BosE,
JAGANNADHADAS
and B. P. SINHA JJ.]
Sentence, Enhancement of-By the High Court-Principles
applicable thereto.
A question of sentence is a matter of discretion and it is well
settled that when discretion has been properly exercised along accepted judicial lines, an appellate court should not interfere to the
detriment of an accused person except for very strong reasons which
must be disclosed on the face of the judgment.
In a matter of enhancement there should not be interference
when the sentence passed imposes substantial punishment. Interference is only called for when it is manifestly inadequate.
In the circumstances and bearing all the considerations of the
present case in mind it was impossible to hold that the Sessions
Judge did not impose a substantial sentence.
The Supreme Court set aside the sentence imposed by the High
Court and restored that of the Sessions Judge as no adequate reason
had been assigned by the High Court for considering the sentence
passed by the Sessions Judge as manifestly inadequate.
Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab ([1954] S.C.R. 145) and Nar
Singh v. State pf Uttar Pradesh ([1955] 1 S.C.R. 238), referred to.
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION :
Criminal
Appeal No. 88 of 1954.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and
Order dated the 7th January, 19~4 of · the Allahabad
High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 377 of 1953 connected with Crimizial Revision No. 461 of 1953 arising
out of the Judgment and Order dated the 17th November, 1952 of the Court of Additional Sessions Judge
at Meerut in Session Trial No. 113 of 1952.
B. B. Tawakley, (K. P. Gupta, with him), for the
appellant.
K. B. Asthana and C. P. Lal, for the respondent.
1955. September 28. The Judgment of the
Court was delivered by
BosE J.-The
tence.
only
question here is about sen-
584
1955
Bid Raj
v.
Tiu State of Ullar
Pradesh
Bose J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
The appellant Bed Raj and another, Sri Chand
were jointly charged with the murder of one Pheru.
The Sessions Judge convicted Bed Raj under section
304, Indian Penal Code, and sentenced him to three
years' rigorous imprisonment. He 'acquitted Sri
Chand.
Bed Raj appealed to the High Court and that
Court, on admitting the appeal for hearing, issued
notice to the appellant to show cause why the sentence should not be enhanced. The· appeal and the
rev1S1on were heard together. The appeal was dismissed and the High Court enhanced the sentence to
ten years.
Now, though no limitation has been placed on the
High Court's power to enhance it is nevertheless a
judicial act and, like all judicial acts involving an
exercise of discretion, must be exercised along well
known ju_dicial lines. The only question before us is
wheth"r those lines have been observed in the present
case.
The facts that have been found by the Sessions
Judge and accepted by the High Court are to be found
in the opening paragraph of the lear.ned Sessions
Judge's judgment. They are as follows :
"Roop Chand, the son of Bed Raj accused, was
removing the dung of the bullocks of Pheru deceased
from an open space near his cattle shed. Pheru protested to the boy and turned down the basket in
which the boy had put the dung. The two accused
who are brothers then came to the scene from their
own cattle shed which was near by and there was an
exchange of abuses between them and Pheru. The
accused Sri Chand then caught hold of Pheru by the
waist and Bed Raj accused took out a knife and
stabbed him in 3 or 4 places. The knife was then left
sticking in the neck of the deceased and the accused
ran away".
The assault occurred about 8 o'clock on the morning of the 23rd February 1952. Pheru was removed
to the hospital and the Medical Officer Dr. Fa.teh
Singh examined him and found that he was suffering
from shock. He found three injuries on his person :
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
585
all "simple". He· gave the following description of
them:
" ( 1) Incised and punctured wound f'Xf'X('
neck, right side lower part.
(2) Incised wound 1 X "l" X ! " right deltoid regior.
frontal and lower part above downward.
(3) Incised wound f'X 1/s" <¥' Epigastric region".
He said"Whcn Pheru was admitted in the hospital he
was under shock but his condition was _not dangerous
.... When Pheru came he could speak. He was not unconscious. As he was under shock no report was made
for recording his dying declaration .... I cannot give
the definite cause of death. I cannot tell if such an
injury can cause death. There was no haemorrhage
from Pheru's neck after his arrival in my hospital".
Speaking of the injuries, the doctor said"Injuries 2 and 3 on the person of Pheru which
were incised wounds were not punctured. It was not
possible to inflict them from a sharp pointed weapon".
The appellant was also examined by the doctor
and a slight simple injury, which could have been
caused by a simple blunt weapon, was discovered.
This indicates that there was a scuffle between the
appellant and the deceased in which the appellant
was hit over the nose and, up to a point, bears out
what the appellant says in his defence, namely that
Pheru was beating the appellant's son Rup Chand;
he went there and tried to extricate Rup Chand;
Pheru started beating him (the appellant) and he, the
appellant, received a fist blow on the nose.
The depth of the injury on Pheru's neck was ! of
:m inch. In this connection the doctor says" A knife can penetrate lt or 2 inches in a case of
deliberate stabbing".
Pheru died about 12-45 A. M. on the 24th February
1952, that i~ to say, about 16 or 17 hours after the
assault. The post-mortem was conducted gy another
doctor, Dr. J. K. Dwivedi. Describing the injury on
the neck-the only one we need consider as the other
two were slight-he said that clotted blood was present
all roun1l injury No. 1 and that9-83 S. C";. Indi::i/59
1955
-
Btd Rq/
v.
Tlir. 8~1111 of Ullar
Pradtsh
BoSI J.
5&1
1955
Bed Raj
Th• Stat;· 01 Utt.,
p,a,foh
Bose J..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955)
"the right side dome of pleura is punctured under
injury No. 1 and clo1ted blood present all round it.
Upper lobe of right lung (appex) is punctured for
, i"X.!-''Xf'.
Clotted blood present over the lung surface ~II round the punctured area. A branch of the
externa l jugu lar vein was divid ed in right side neck
under injury No. 1. . . . Death was due to shock and
haemorrhage as a result of injury to neck".
In cross-examination he said"It 'was possible and impossible also that the
bleeding could be stopped. Such injury as injury
No. 1 are more likely to cause death".
After reviewing the evidence
the learned Sessions
Judge held"It is evident that the whole scene took just a
few moments. Both of the accused must have been
in a moment of heat and before either of them could
think of doing any act, the whole thing was over ...... .
That the injuries with the knife were likely to cause
death is clear but they were caused at a time when
the parties were in a heat and there was a sudden
fight and no room for premeditation".
Because of this, and seeing that ther was no reason
to infer pre-concert, he acquitted · the other accused,
and by reason of those circumstances he considered
that three years would be sufficient punishment and
sentenced the appellant accordingly. This was on
17-11-1952.
The appellant filed an appeal to the High Court on
13-12-1952 and that Court thereupon issued notice to
him to show cause why the sentence should not be
enhanced. The High Court directed enhancement on
7-1-1954.
On the same day the State Government ordered the
release of the appellant on probation, under section 2
of the U. P. Prisoner's Release on Probation Act,
1938, for the full term of the sentence imposed by the
Sessions Court. We are not concerned with the State
Government's order except in so far as _it indicates
the view that that Government took of the antecedents and conduct in prison of the appellant, matters
that arc also relevant for consideration by a Court
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
587
when determining a question of sentence: a prisoner
can only be released on probation under that Act if
the State Government is satisfied.
"from his antecedents and his conduct m the
prison that he is likely to abstain from crime and
lead a peaceable life, if he is released from prison".
These facts were not known to the High Court when
it made its order of enhancement, but it is a matter
relevant for our consideration now that the appeal is
before us.
Now the High Court accept the findings of the Sessions Judge about the circumstances in which the
offence took place. They agree that the attack was
not premeditated and that there was a sudden quarrel
and that the blows were inflicted in the heat of
passion. They also say that there was counter-abuse
and they notice the abrasion on the appellant's nose.
Despite this they hold that
"it is possible that this injury was received by
the appellant in the attempt of the deceased to resist
the attack made by the appellant. There was therefore no fight".
This is a very half-hearted finding and ignores the
fact that the benefit of all doubts must be given to
the accused. If it was only "possible" that the injury was due to Pheru's attempt to ward off an attack
by the appellant, then it r_nust be equally "possible"
that it was received in the course of a scuffie. The
appellant very definitely says in his examination that
there was a fight and the abrasion on his nose, which
the doctor says was caused by a blunt weapon,
bears out his version that Pheru struck him with his
fist. The circumstances also indicate that there must
have been a scuffie. Why else should it be necessary
for the second accused to come and hold him down by
the waist?
When villagers or any man for that
matter, come to blows after hot words and an interchange of abuse, there is nearly always resis'tance to
the initial attack. Very rarely does a man "turn the
other check". It must also be remembered that the
incident started with the use of force by Pheru. It
was he who took hold of the basket of oow dung and
20-83 S. C. Indiaj59
1955
Bed Raj
v.
The State of Uttar
Pradesh
Bose J.
588
,1955
Btd Rqj
v.
Till Stale of Ullar
Pradesh
Bosa J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19551
overturned it. That occasioned the quarrel, and the
finding is that there was abuse and counter-abuse. It
was then that the second accused rushed in and
caught Pheru by the waist. That accused was acquitted because there was nothing to suggest that that
was done. in aid of the appellant's intention to assault
Pheru and he was absolved .of all intention to assault
on. his own account; and the finding is that even the
appellant had no such intention till the last moment.
If that was the case, then why should the second
accused rush in and hold Pheru by the waist? If he
had no intention to assault on his own account and
none to assist the appellant in his assault, the only
other reasonable conclusion is that he tried to stop a
fight. It would be fair in the circumstances to reach
that conclusion, for the accused is as much entitled
to the benefit of any doubt when a co-accused is
acquitted as in any other case. In any case, it was
incumbent on the High Court to reach a more definite
finding than the one given before deciding to enhance
the sentence.
The only reason that the learned Judges give is that
Pheru was unarmed and as the attack was made with
a knife it cannot be said that the appellant did not
act in a cruel or unusual manner. Nevertheless, they
uphold the finding that the offence falls under section
304, Indian Penal -Code, and not under section 302.
A question of a sentence is a matter of discretion
and it is well settled that when discretion has been
properly exercised along accepted judicial lines, an
appellate court should not interfere to the detriment
of an accused person except for very strong reason..
which must be disclosed on the face of the judgment;
see for example the observations in Dalip Singh v.
Stilte of Puniah(') and Nar Singh v. State of Uttar
Pradesh(°). In a matter of enhancement there should
not be interference when the sentence passed imposes
substantial punishment. Interference i~ only called
for when it is manifestly inadequate Jn our opinion,
these principles have Jlot been observed. It is
(II {UJ5f] 8. C.R. 145, 156.
(2) {Jiiii~] I S. C. lt. 2311, :Ml.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
589
impossible to hold in the circumstances described that
the Sessions Judge did not impose a substantial senteilce, and no adequate reasoP has been assigned by
the learned High Court Judges for considering the
sentence manifestly inadequate. In the circumstances,
bearing all the considerations of this case in mind, we
are of opinion that the appeal (which is limited to the
question of sentence) should be allowed and that the
sentence , imposed by the High Court should be set
aside and that of the Sessions Court restored. Ordered
accordingly.
1955
Bed iw
v.
T/14 SI/JU of Ullar
Praduh
Bose J.
·---r-
BHIKAJI
NARAIN
DHAKRAS
AND
OTHERS
v.
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
AND ANOTHER.
[S. R. DAS, ACTING c. J., BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA
AYYA11, }AFER IMAM and CHANDRASEKHARA
AIYAR JJ.]
Fundamental Rights, Infringement of-I.Aw void for inconsistency
-'Void', Meaning of-Removal of inconsistency by amendment of the'
Constitution, if revivifies the law-Constitution of India as amended
by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 and the Constitution
(Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, Arts. 13, 19(6), 31(2)-C.P. & Berar
Motor Vehic!es (Amendment) Act, 1947 (Act Ill of 1948).
The petitioners who carried on their business as stage carriage
operators of Ma<ihya Pradesh for a considerable number of years
challenged the constitutional validity of the C.P. & Berar Motor
Vehides (Amendment) Act, 1947 (Act III of 19!l8) which amended
the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Central Act IV of 1939) and conferred
extensive powers on the Provincial Government including the power
to create a monopoly of the motor transport business in its favour
to the exclusion of all motor transport operators. In· exercise of the
powers conferred by new s. 43(1)(iv) a notification was issued on
the 4th of February, 1955, qeclaring the intention of the Government to take up certain ro.ites. The case of the petitioners was that
the passing of the Constitution and the grant of fundamental rights
rendered the ltct void under Art. 13 ( 1) being inconsistent with the
provisions of Arts. 19(1) (g) and 31(2), and reliance was placed on
the decision of the Supreme CQurt in Shagir Ahmad v. The State of
T.J .P. & others. On behalf of the .respondents it was contended that
although as a result of the said decision the iu>pugned Act w:iS
1955
September 29
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