M/S. RAM NARAIN SONS LTD. versus ASST. COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 20 September 1955 | [1955] 2 S.C.R. 483 | 1955 INSC 41
Key facts
- Decided
- 20 September 1955
- Bench
- SUDHI RANJAN DAS*, N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR, NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI, B. JAGANNADHADAS, SYED JAFFER IMAM
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 132/1955
- Disposal
- Set Aside
- Citation
- [1955] 2 S.C.R. 483
- Neutral citation
- 1955 INSC 41
Text of the judgment
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
483
K.rishnaswami was anxious to support his son, the
present appellant, and that many of the witnesses
whom the respondent was obliged to examine;, were
really anxious to help the appellant. (Vide para 12).
We do not, however, desire to express any opinion on
these contentions, as we propose to leave them to the
decision of the Tribunal.
1953
Chattanlllho.
Karo,>alar
,..
R(JtnJJ(;handra
l)'ar and another
Venkatarama
/glr].
We accordingly set aside the order ~f the Tribunal,
and direct that the Election Commission do reconstitute the Tribunal to hear and decide the question
whether Krishnaswami Karayalar entered into the
contract with the Government of Travancore-Cochin
on behalf of the joint family · or for his own personal
benefit, on a consideration of the evidence on record.
It is made clear that no further evidence will be
allowed. The parties will bear their own costs in this
Court.
Appeal allowed.
Case remitted for hearing.
M/S. RAM NARAIN SONS LTD.
"·
ASST. COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX
AND OTHERS
(and other cases)
(S. R. DAS, ACTING c. J., BHAGWATI, JAGANNADHADAS, JAFER IMAM and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ. l
Constitution of India-Article 286(2)-Pro11iso thereto-Whether the proviso is meant to lift the ban only under Article 286(2) an4
no other-And thus does not lift the ban under Article 286{1)(a)
read with the Explanation-Assessment consisting of a single undi11idetl
sum in respect of totality of property-Wrongful inclusion therein of
certain item of property expressly exempted from taxation-Legnl
effect thereof-Central Pro11inces and Berar Act 1947 (XXI of J.947)
-Explanation II to Section 2(g) as originally enacted-before its
amendment by Madhya Pradesh' Act IV of 1951-Whether offended
Article 286(1)(a) read with the Explanation-Whether the Presidents
order issued under the proviso to Article 286(2) protected the same.
per S. R. DAs ACTING CHIEF JusTICE, BHAGWa\TI,
IMAM and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ. (JAGANNADHADAS J.
Held,
JAFER
1955
~20
484
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19551
1955
dissenting). The bans imposed by Article 286 of the Constitution
on the taxing powers of the States are independent and separate and
each one of them has to be got over before a State Legislature can
Sons IJd.
Yo
impose tax on transactions of sale or purchase of g~s. The Expla~
~'J'· CommissiOIJl'I' nation to Article 286(i)(a) determines by the legal fiction created
.t S.US T.,, and therein the situs of the sale in the case of transactions coming with~
o//ws
in that category and once it is deterl'nined by the application of the
Explanation that a transaction is outside the State it follows as a
matter of course that the State, with reference to which the transac~
tion can thus be predicated to be outside it, can never tax the trans-action.
M/s. R4m Nar.O.
The ban under Article 286(i)(a) read with the Explanation is
effective independently of the fact that the transaction may have
taken place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce or with
reference 'lo goods as have been declared by Parliament by law to bet
essential for the life of the community. The ban imposed under
Article 286(2) is an independent and separate one and looks at the
transactions entirely from the point of view of their having taken
place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. Even if such
transactions may also fall within the category of transactions covered
by Article 286( I) (a) and the Explanation thereto or Article 286( 3)
the moment Article 286(2) is attracted by reason of the ·transactions
being in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, the ban under
Article 286(2) operates and such transactions can never be subjected
to tax at the instance of a State Legislature except in so far as
Parliament by law may otherwise provide or such power of taxation
is saved by the President's order conten1plated in the proviso. The
ban under Article 286(2) may be saved by the President's order hue
that does not affect or lift the ban under Article 286(1)(a) read with
the Explanation.
Apart from the aforesaid construction put upon the several
clauses of Article 286 in The Bengal Immunity Co. case the terms of
the proviso to Article 286(2) itself make it abundantly clear that the
proviso is meant only to lift the ban under Article 286(2) and no
other. It is a carJinal rule of interpretation that a proviso carves
out an exception to the main provision to which it is enacted as a
proviso and to no other. This is made further clear by the nonohstante clause which states in express terms that it is enacted only
with reference to "this clause" i.e. Article 286(2).
The proviso cannot be extended to any of the other provisions
-0£ Article 286 and it has, therefore, not the effect of lifting the ban
which is imposed by Article 286( I) (a) and the Explanation thereto.
Therefore, so far as the post.Constitution period is concerned
the ban impose<l by Article 286(l)(a) and the Explanation _thereto
could not be ri.;moved by the President's order which was issued
under the proviso to Article 286(2) in the present case.
Expianation II to Section 2(g) of the. Central l'rovmces and
Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947 offended Article 286(I)(a) read with the
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
485
1955
Explan<1tion to the same and the State of Madhya Pradesh was therefore, not entitled tO\
the transactions of sale in which goods had M/s. Ram NaraiR
actually been delivered as a direct result of such sale for purposes of
Sons Ltd.
v.
consumption outside Madhya Pradesh and the said Explanation was
not protected by the President's order issued under the proviso to .Asst. Commission<'
of Sales Tax anli
Article 286(2).
others
tax
Where an assessment consists of a single undivided sum in res. pect of the totality of the property treated as assessable, the wrongful inclusion in it of certain items of property which by virtue of a
provision of law were expressly exempted from taxation, renders the
assessment invalid in toto.
Bennett & White (Calgary) Ltd. and Municipal District
Sugar City No. 5 (1951 Appeal Cases 786 at.p. 816), referred to.
of
JAGANNADHADAS J. (Dissenting)-The two bans under Articles
286(1) (a) and 286(2) arc overlapping and the fact that they arc imposed from different angles cannot obscure the result, 11iz., that they
bring about the demarcation of the same--or substantially the same
-field of no taxation.
To construe the two bans as independently and cumulatively
operative is to impute to them some kind of picturesque potency and
is to miss the reality, viz.,. that all the bans under Article 286 are
meant to serve the same purpose, 11iz., that of imposing restrictions
and thereby demarcating the fields of no taxation. The bans and the
proviso are parts of the same Article and have to be harmoniously
construed. The unequivocal and positive language of one part, cannot be taken to have been obliterated by the negative language of
the other part so as to result in futility.
The result of cons~ruing the proviso and by parity of reasoning
the saving clause, as merely removing the ban of a particular na-.
turc leaving another overlapping ban to operate, would be to render
both the saving clause in, and the proviso to, Article 286(2) virtually
nugatory.
A non-obstante clause does not normally add to or substract from
the main provision of which it is a part. It is often enough inserted
by way of extra caution. But it does not have the effect of limiting
the operation of the main provision. The suggestion that the Presidential action lifts the ban only as regards the inter-State sales
would be to read the phrase "notwithstanding that" as meaning "in
so far". There is no warrant for any such reading.
CIVIL
APPELLATE
JuR1so1cTION :
Civil Appeals
Nos. 132, 133 and 137 of 1955 and Petition No. 567
of 1954.
Appeals under Article 132(1) of the Constitution
of India from the Judgment and Order dated the 18th
October 1954 of the Nagpur High Court in Misc. Pcti·
486
1955
M/s. Ram Narain
Sons Ltd.
v•
•4Jrt. 0Jtnmissioner
11l Salts Tax and
.,,,,,,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955}
tions Nos. 265, 348 and 275 of 1953 respectively and
Petition under Article 32 of the Comritutic:n for the
enforcement of fundamental rights.
M. C. Setalvad, Aitorney-General of India (R. M.
Hajarnavis and G. C. Mathur, with him) for the- appel-
lant in C. A. No. 132 of 1955.
N. C. Chatterji, (R. M. Hajarnavis and G. C.
Mathur, with him) for Intervener No. 1 in (;. A. No. 132
of 1955.
R. M. Hajarnavis and G. C. Mathur, for
vener No. 2 in C. A. No. 132 of 1955.
Inter-
R. M. Hajarnavis and G. C. Mathur, for the appellant in C. A. No. 133 of 1955
R. M. Hajarnavis and G. C. Mathur, for the appellant in C. A. No. 137 of 1955.
M. Adhikari, Deputy Advocate-General of Madhya
Pradesh and I. N. Shroff, for respondents in all
.appeals.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India and C. K.
Daphtary, Solicitor-General 6f India (A. P. Sen, /. B.
Dadachanji and Rajinder Narain, with them) for the
petitioner in Petition No. 567 of 1954.
T. L. Shevde, Advocate-General of Madhya Pradesh
(M. Adhikari, Deputy Advocate-General of Madhya
Pradesh and I. N. Shroff, with him) for respondents.
/. B. Dadachanji, R. M. Hajarnavis and
.Narain, for the Intervener.
Rajinder
1955. Septembe:- 20. The judgment of S. R.
Das, Acting Chief Justice, Bhagwati, Jafer Imam and
Chandrasekhara Aiyar JJ. was delivered by Bhagwati
J. Jagannadhadas J. delivered a separate judgment·
Civil Appeals Nos. 132, 133 and 137 of 1955
BHAGWATI J.-These 3 appeals with certificate under
article 132(1) of the Constitution involve the interpetition of the proviso to articl~ 286(2) and raise a
common question as to whether that proviso also saves
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
487
1955
the transactions 0£ sale or purchase covered by the
Explanation to article 286(1) (a) from the ban imposed
M/s. Ram Narain
Sons Lid.
therein.
v.
The Appellants in Civil Appeal No. 132 of 1955 are Asst. Commissiont'f'
Taxan.1
Messrs Ramnarain Sons Ltd., a firm registered as a of Salts
others
"dealer" under the Central Provinces and Berar Sales
Bhagwati J.
Tax Act, 1947, and carrying on business at Amravati
and at other places in Madhya Pradesh. After the
Cotton Control Order, 1949, came into force on the
12th September, 1949, the Appellants entered into
Agreements with several mills situated outside Madhya
Pradesh by which they undertook to purchase kapas
in the various markets in Madhya Pradesh as their
agents on their account and on their behalf. The
kapas after purchase was to be ginned and pressed
into bales and sent to the mills. All the expenses involved in the process were to be borne by the mills
which were also to be credited with the sale proceeds
of the cotton seeds and the Appellants were only entitled to commission on a percentage basis. The Appellants worked as such agents for the period 1st
October, 1949 to 30th September, 1950. By his order
dated the 30th June, 1953 the Assistant Commissioner
of Sales Tax, Amravati, Respondent No. I, included
the transactions valued at Rs. 72,86,454-5-10 with the
said mills in the Appellants' turnover and ordered
the Appellants to pay Rs. 1,13,850-13-6 as sales tax
on the said transactions. The Appellants filed an
appeal to the Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya
Pradesh, Respondent No. 2, on the 30th July, 1953.
The appeal was, however, entertained by the Deputy
C',ommissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh, Respondent No. 3, who ordered the Appellants to pay
Rs. 25,000/- by the 31st August, 1953. The Appellants thereupon filed a petition under Article 226, being Misc. Petition No. 265 of 1953, in the High Court
of Judicature at Nagpur, asking inter alia for the
quashing of the order of 30th June, 1953, passed by
Respondent No. 1 and for consequential reliefs. The
Respondents filed a return denying the contentions
of the Appellants and praying for the dismissal of the
petition with costs.
488
1955
M/s. Ram Narain
Sons Ltd.
v.
Asst. Commissiontr
rJj Salts Tax an:!
others
Rhagwali J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955}
The Appellants in Civil Appeal No. 133 of 1955 arc
the Eastern Cotton Company, a firm registered as a
"dealer" under the Central Provinces and Berar
Sales Tax Act, 1947 and carrying on business at
Amravati and at other places in Madhya Pradesh.
They also, during the period 1st October, 1949 to
30th September, 1950, worKed as agents of certain
mills situated outside Madhya . Pradesh, procured
kapas for them in Madhya Pradesh and sent it to the
mills for consumption outside the State. By his order
dated the 9th September, 1953, the Respondent No. 1
included the transactions valued at Rs. 33,47,405-5-0
with the said mills in the Appellants' turn-over and
ordered the Appellants to pay Rs. 52,303-4-0 as tax on
the said transactions. These Appellants also field a
petition under article 226, being Misc. · Petition No.
348 of 1953, fo the High Court of Judicature at
Nagpur for quashing the order dated the 9th September, 1953, passed by Respondent No. 1 and for consequential reliefs. The Respondents filed a return
denying their contentions.
The Appellants in Civil Appeal No. 137 of 1955 arc
the firm, Ramdas Khimji Brothers, Bombay, registered
as a "dealer" under the Central Provinces and Berar
Sales Tax Act, 1947, and carrying on busine·ss as
cotton dealers in Madhya Pradesh. During the period
1st October, 1950 to 30th September, 1951, the Appellants sold cotton worth Rs. 6,01,949-1-9 to various
persons out side Madhya Pradesh. The cotton was
delivered to the buyers
for consumption
outside
Madhya Pradesh as a direct result of such sales.
By
his order dated the 29th December, 1952, the Sales
Tax Officer, Amravati, in the assessment, of the
Appellants for the same period, included the said
transactions in the Appellants' turn-over and assessed
sales tax thereon. The Appellants filed an appeal
to Respondent No. l but the same was dismissed by an
order dated the 10th July, 1953. The Appellants filed on
22nd August, 1953, a revision before the Commissioner
of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh. The Appellants also
filed a petition under Article 226, being Misc. Petition
No. 274 of 1953, in the High Court of Judicature at
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
489
Nagpur, asking for a writ of certiorari quashing the
order of Respondent No. 1 passed by him in Sales
Tax Appeal No. 13-A dated the 10th July, 1953, and
for consequential reliefs.
The Respondents filed a
return denying the contentions of the Appellants and
asking that the petition be dismissed with costs.
These petitions came up for hearing and final disposal before the High Court of Judicature at Nagpur
along with Misc. Petitions No. 288 of 1953 and No.
132 of 1954. A considered judgment was delivered in
Miscellaneous Petition No. 132 of 1954 and the reasoning contained therein governed the decision in the
connected Petitions Nos. 265, 274 and 348 of 1953.
The High Court held that the Explanation II to section 2(g) of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales
Tax Act, 1947, as amended by the Central Provinces
and Berar Act XVI of 1949 having been declared invalid from its inception by the High Court in Messrs
Shriram Gulabdas v. Board of Revenue
(I.L.R. 1953
Nagpur 332) and by this Court in 1954 S.C.R. 1122,
the original Explanation remained in force until the
1st April, 1951, when it was amended by the Madhya
Pradesh Act IV of 1951. Explanation II originally
enacted was in the terms following:"Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in
the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930, the sale of any
goods which are actually in the Central Provinces and
Berar at the time when the contract of sale as defined
in that Act in respect thereof is made, shall wherever
the said contract of sale is made, be deemed for the
purpose of this Act to have taken place in the Central
Provinces and Berar".
The Appellants contended that this Explanation
offended article 286(1)(a) read with the Explanation
to the same and the State. of Madhya Pradesh was,
therefore, not entitled to tax the transactions of sale
in which goods had actually been delivered as a direct
result of such sale for the purpose of consumption
outside Madhya Pradesh. The Respondents, on the
other hand, contended that the said Explanation was
protected until the 31st March, l951, by the Sales Tax
Continuation Order No. 7 of 1950 issued by the
13-83 S. C. India/59.
1955
M/•. R21nNami11
Sonr lJti.
v.
Asst. Commis.;iontr
of Saks Tax anti
othlrs
Bhagwati ].
,
490
1955
M/1. Ram NaraU.
Sons Lid.
v.
~ sst. CommP"Sionn-
of Saks T """""
olhns
Bliagwali].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
President on the 26th January, 1950, under the
proviso to article 286(2).
The High Court was of the opinion that the original
Explanation was validly enacted as the assent of the
Governor-General to the enactment was given on the
23rd May, 1947, and that under that Explanation the
ta.x prior to the commencement of the Constitution was
lawfully levied on the sales of goods wherever the contracts of sale took place if the goods were actually in
the State at the time of contracts of sale were made.
This power could be exercised by the State even if the
sales took place during the course of inter-State trade
or commerce and the goods were delivered as a direct
result of the sales for the purpose of consumption outside the State. This was because the situs of the goods
constituted a sufficient nexus between the transactions and the taxing State which was the foundation
for taxation prior to the commencement of the Constitution. This positio~ continued until the com.mencement of the Constitution and on the 26th
January, 1950, the President issued the Sales Tax
Continuation Order No. 7 of 1950 in exercise of the
powers conferred· by the proviso to article 286(2).
The sales in question had taken place in the course of
inter-State trade or commerce and accordingly they
were covered by article 286(2) and would, therefore,
·be liable to tax even after the commencement of the
·Constitution Ly virtue of the President's order. Reliance was further placed on the majority judgment of
this Court in The State of Bdmbay v. The United Motors
(India) Ltd. (1953 S.C.R. 1069) where it was held that
the transaction vis-a.vis the delivery State lost its
inter-State character if it fell within the Explanation
to article 286(1) (a) and was accordingly made liable
to taxation by the delivery State. So far, however,
as the exporting State was concerned, it retained its
character of an inter-State transaction and would
not, therefore, be liable to taxation by that State,
vide article 286(2).
The President's order, however,
removed
this ban and the exporting State was
entitled to tax the transaction by virtue of the power
derived by it from the same. On a construction of
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
491
the relevant provisions of article 286(1) and article
286(2) the High Court was of the opinion that it
would be making the proviso to article 286(2)
nugatory if it was held that article 286(1) overrides
it and takes away the taxing power of all States in
inter-State trade or commerce except the delivery
State. The High Court accordingly dismissed the petitions with costs.
The learned Attorney-General appearing for the
Appellants before us contended that so far as the
post-Constitution period is concerned, the position is
governed by our judgment in The Bengal Immunity
Co. Ltd. v. The State of Bihar delivered on the 6th
September, 1955. He urged that the bans in1posed
on the powers of the State Legislatures to levy taxes
on the sale or purchase of goods in the several clauses
of article 286 are independent and separate and that
the transactions of sale or purchase referred to in the
various clauses must be looked. at from different viewpoints. Even if a transaction might fall within the
category of inter-State sale or purchase and the President's order under the proviso to article 286(2) might
enable the State to levy any tax on such sale or pUTchase which was being lawfully levied by the State
immediately before the commencement of the Constitution, such transaction had also to surmount the
ban imposed under article 286(1) (a) and the Explanation thereto so that, if, as a direct result of such sale,
the goods were actually delivered for the purpose of
consumption in another State, the exporting State
(to use the phraseology of the Nagpur High Court) or
the title-State (to use the phraseology adopted in
some of the judgments in The Bengal Immunity Co.'s
Appeal) would not be entitled to levy a ta.~ on sud~
sale the transaction being fictionally outside the State
by reason of the Explanation and therefore coming
within the ban of article 286(1) (a).
It was, however, urged on behalf of the State of
Madhya Pradesh that the President's order not only
saved the· transactions from the ban of article 286(2)
but also from the ban of article 286 (1) (a), because the
transactions covered by the Explanation to article
1955
M/s. Ram Narain
Sons Ltd.
v.
Asst. Commilsiolltl'
of Sales T 41< and
others
Bhagwati].
492
1955
M/s. Ram Narain
Sons LJd.
v.
.4.rst. C<mJmissiontr
of Sales Ta. and
othtrs
Bhagwati].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
286 ( 1)(a) were of the same category as transactions
coveted by article 286(2) and were all in the course
of inter-State trade or commerce. It was further
urged that if the transactions covered by the Explanation to article 286(1) (a) were not saved from the
ban by the President's order, the whole intention of
the Constitution-makers in maintaining the status
quo qua the taxes on sales or purchases of goods
which were being lawfully levied
by the State immediately before the commencement of the Constitution would be frustrated, because the transactions
covered by the Explanation to article 286( 1)(a) being
necessarily in the course .of inter-State trade or commerce the President's order would be rendered nugatory and the exporting State or the title State would
be restrained from levying tax on such transactions
in spite of the ban having been lifted by the president's order.
We are unable to ac<;.ept this contention. As held
by the majority Judges in The Bengal Immunity Co.'s
Appeal, the bans imposed by article 286 on the taxing powers of the States are independent and separate and each one of them has to be got over before a
State Legislature. can impose tax on transactions of
sale or purchase of goods. These bans have been
imposed from different view-points, and, even though
the transactions of sale or purchase may in conceivable cases overlap so far as these different viewpoints are ~oncerned, each of those bans is opentive
and has to be enforced. So far as article 286( 1) (a) is
concerned, the Explanation . determines by the legal
fiction created therein the situs of the sale in the case
of transactions coming within that category and when
a transaction is thus determined to be inside a particl1lar State it necessarily becomes a transaction outside all other States. The only relevant enquiry for
the purposts of article 286(1)(a), therefore, is whether
a transaction is outside the State and once it is determined by the application of the Explanation that it
is outside the State it follows as a matter of course
that the St~te with reference to which the transaction can thus be predicated to be outside it can never
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
493
tax the transaction. This ban is effective independently
of the fact that the transaction may also have taken
place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce
or with reference to goods as have been declared by
Parliament by law to be essential for the life of the
community. The ban imposed under article 286 (2)
is an independent and separate
one and looks at the
transactions. entirely from the point of view of their
having taken place in the course of inter-State trade
or commerce. Even if such transactions may also fall
within the category of transactions covered by article 286(1) (a) and the Explanation thereto or article
286(3), the moment article 286(2) is attracted by
reason of the transactions being in the course of interState trade or commerce, tpe ban under article 286
(2) operates and such transactions can never be subjected to tax at the instance of a State Legislatur.::
except in so far as Parliament by law may otherwise
provide or such power of taxation is saved by the
President's order contemplated in the proviso.
The
ban under article 286(2) may be saved by the President's order but that does not affect or lift the ban
undQ" article 286 ( 1) (a) read with the Explanation.
Apart from the construction thus put upon the
several clauses of article 286 by the majority of the
Judges in The Bengal
Immunity Co.'s Appeal as
above, the terms of the proviso itself make it abundantly clear that the proviso is meant only to lift the
ban under article 286(2) and no other. It is a cardinal
rule of interpretation that a proviso to a particular
provision of a statute only embraces the field which
is covered by the main provision.
It carves out an
exception to the main provision to which it has been
enacted as a proviso and to no other. Even if the
non-obi-tante.
clause:
"Notwithstanding that
the
impos1t1on of such tax is contrary to the provisions
of this clause": had not been enacted in the proviso,
the proviso could only have been construed as operating upon the field enacted in article 286(2) and could
not be extended to any of the other provisions of
clause,
however,
article 286. The non-obstante
makes it abundantly and further clear and states in
1955
M/1. Ram Narain
Sons Ltd.
v.
Asst. Commissionn
of Saks T OJt an4
.,,,,,,,
Bhagwali].
494
1955
[1955J
explicit terms that it is ·enacted only with reference
to "this clause", i.e., article 286(2). The President's
Sons IJd.
order
may direct tha~ any tax _on the sale or purchase
v.
bst. Commissionn of goods which was being lawfully levied by the Govef Sale1 T .. and
ernment of any State immediately before the comOt/rns
mencement of the Constitution was to continue to be
Bhapati J.
levied until 31st March, 1951, but the effect of that
order was to raise the ban in so far as it was imposed
by the provisions of "this clause". The President's
order, therefore, only lifted the ban in so far as the
transactions took place in the course of inter-State
trade or commerce and could not be projected into
the sphere of any other clause of article 286. It had,
therefore, not the effect of lifting the ban which was
imposed by article 286(1) (a) and the Explanation
thereto, even though the transactions covered by the
Explanation to article 286(1) (a) by and large fell
within the category of transactions which took place
in the rourse of inter-State trade or commerce. The
ban imposed by article 286(1)(a) was independent and
separate and could. not be lifted by the President's
order which had operation only in regard to the intcrState- character of the transactions. The moment it
was determined that the transactions were outside
the State by virtue of the Explanation to article
286(1) (a) the ban imposed by article 286(1)(a)
attached to the same and could not be lifted by the
President's order which operated only on the interState character of the transactions and saved only
those inter-State transactions which did not come
within the Explanation.
If the contention urged on behalf of the State of
Madhya Pradesh is accepted it would mean that we
should re-write or amend the proviso to article 286(2)
in order to effectuate the supposed intention of the
Constitution-makers. The supposed intention of the
Constitution-makers was alleged to be to preserve to
the States all the taxes on sale or purchase of goods
which were being la".l'fully levied by them immediately_ before the commencement of the Constitution
by having resort to the territorial connection or
nexus theory. We have no evidence before us of this
M/s. Rom Narain
-
/
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
495
supposed intention of the Constitution-makers. Whatever their intention was can only be gathered from
the language which they have used and where the
language is plain there is no scope whatever for
speculation in that behalf. When the Constitutionmakers themselves used the words "Notwithstanding
that the imposition of such a tax is contrary to the
provisions of this clause" it would not be legitimate
for us to go behind the plain words and try to read
into the proviso something which would involve either
a deletion of the non-obstante clause or a re-writing
thereof as suggested. Whatever be the effect of our
judgment on the treasuries of the exporting or titleStates we cannot assist them by reading something
into the proviso which is not warranted by any canon
of construction. The proviso has reference only to
article 286(2) and cannot be projected into any other
clause of article 286.
The untenability of the contentions of the Respondents will be clear from the following illustration:Suppose the goods are in the State of Madhya
Pradesh at the time the contracts of sale of those
goods are made in, say, the State of Bombay. Suppose further that the property in the goods has by
reason of such sales passed in the State of Bombay
but the goods as a direct result of such sales have
been delivered for consumption in the State of Madras. According to the Respondents, the President's
order made under the proviso to article 286(2) saves
the transactioqs from the ban of article 286(1)(a) read
with the Explanation. Then the State of Madras will
be able to tax by virtue of article 286(1) (a) read with
the Explanation or on the nexus theory by reason of
the goods being delivered there for consumption; the
State of Bombay will be able to tax because the title
to the goods passed there; and the State of Madhya
Pradesh will also be able to tax under the Explanation . II to section 2(g) of the Act because the goods
were in the State of Madhya Pradesh at the time
when the contracts of sale were made in the State of
Bombay. Nobody will say that the Constitution.
makers intended to perpetuate multiple taxation of
_,
1955
M/s. Ram Naraia
Sons .lid.
....
..bst. Commissionu
of Salts T OJI and
others
BhagwatiJ.
496
1955
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
this kind and yet that will be the result if we were to
accede to the arguments advanced by the Respon-Son1 l.Jt!.
dents.
v.
The result, therefore, is that so far as the Post-ConAsst. Commissionlr
of Sak• T .. and
stitution
period is concerned the ban which is imposed
otlins
by article 286(1)(a) and the Explanation thereto canBhagwati].
not be removed by the President's order which was
issued under the proviso to article 286(2) and the High
Court was in error when it construed the proviso to
article 286(2) as projecting into the field of article
286(1) (a) and lifting the ban imposed therein.
On . the above reasoning, Civil Appeal No. 137 of
1955 filed by the firm of Ramdas Khimji Brothers,
Bombay, which relates only to the post-Constitution
period will be allowed and the order of assessment
dated the 29th December, 1952, will be set aside. The
Respondents will pay the costs of the Appellants here
as well .as in the Court below.
As regards Civil Appeals Nos. 132 of 1955 and 133
of 1955, however, the assessments therein relate not
only to the post-Constitution period but also the preConstitution period to which different considerations
would apply. The validity of the assessment in regard to the same would have to be canvassed having
regard to the various contentions of law and fact
which could be urged against the same by the Appellants. There are two Ol!tstanding questions which
have be~n mooted before us by the learned AttorneyGeneral in regard to this period, viz., (1) a question
of fact, as to whether the Appellants were agents of
the various miils in regard to the transactions which
were the subject-matter of the assessment, and (2) a
question of law, whether the law under which the tax
was levied, viz., Explanation II to section 2(g) of the
Act was validly enacted.
Both these contentions,
though they are also relevant to the Post-Constitution period were not specifically pressed before us
because the argument based on the proviso to article
286(2) was considered sufficient to set aside the assessment for that period. They would, however, appropriately arise and be urged by the appellants when
the liability to assessment for the pre-Constitution
Mf•· Ram NMain
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
period is to be determined and if we were to determine that liability we would have tc deal with the
same. The necessity for doing so is, however, obviated by reason of the fact that the assessment is
one composite whole relating to the pre-Constitution
as well as the post-Constitution periods and is invalid
in toto. There is authority for the proposition that
when an assessment consists of a single undivided
sum in respect of the totality of the property treated
as assessable, the wrongful inclusion in it of certain
items of property which by virtue of a provision of
law were expressly c:xempted from taxation renders
the assessment invalid in toto. The Privy Council
have observed in Bennett & White (Calgary) Ld. And
Municipal District of Sugar City No. 5 (1951 Appeal
Cases, 786 at page 816) :"When an assessment is not for an entire sum,
but for separate sums, dissected and earmarked each
of them to a separate assessable item, a court can
sever the: items and cut out one or more along with
the sum attributed to it, while affirming the residue.
But where the assessment consists of a single· undivided sum in respect of the totality of property
treated as assessable, and when one component (not
dismissible as "de minimis") is on any view not assessable and wrongly included, it would seem clear that
such a procedure is barred, and the assessment is
bad wholly. That matter is covered by authority.
In Montreal Light, Heat & Power Consolidated v. City
of Westmount ((1926) S.C.R. (Can.) 515 the court
(see especially per Anglin, C. J.) in these conditions
held that an assessment which was bad in part was
infected throughout, and treated it as invalid. Herc
their Lordships are of opinion, by parity of reasoning,
that the assessment was invalid in toto".
It was, therefore, urged that on the facts of this case
the assessment was invalid in toto and that it should
be set aside. The learned Deputy Advocate-General
of Madhya Pradesh did not seriously contest this
position and the result, therefore, is that the order of
assessment dated , the 30th June, 1953, in Civil Appeal
No. 132 of 1955 and the order of assessment dated the
1955
M/s. Ram Narain
Suns LJd.
v.
Asst. Commission#
of Salts Tax and
others
Rhagwati].
498
1955
M/1, Ram Narain
Son' Ltd.
••
.AsJt. Commissioner
of Saler Ta. and
otlurs
Bhagwatij.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
9th September, 1953, in Civil Appeal No. 133 of 1955
are liable to be set aside. The appeals will therefore
be allowed the orders of assessment will be set aside
and the matters will go back to the Assessment Officer for re-assessment of the Appellants in accordance
with law. The Appellants will be at liberty to urge
before the Assessment Officer the contentions of law
and fact available to them in the fresh assessment proceedings including those adverted to above. The
Respondents will pay the costs of these Appellants
here as well as in the Court below.
Petition No. 567 of 1954·
BHAGWATI J.-This petition under article 32 of the
Constitution . also involves the interpretation of the
proviso to article 286(2) and raises the same question
as to the meaning, scope and operation of the proviso
as was raised in the Civil Appeals Nos. 132, 133 and
137 of 1955 just disposed of.
The facts giving rise to this Petition may be shortly stated. The petitioners are a partnership firm
carrying on business of manufacturing bidis at Jabal·
pur and registered as a "dealer" under the Central
Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947. The petitioners had their branches at Lucknow, Kanpur,
Faizabad, Agra, Bombay and Bhopal. They had also
their selling agents at various places in Uttar Pradesh
and elsewhere outside the State of Madhya Pradesh.
Thev also entered into transactions direct with mercha~ts in U ttar Pradesh. The transactions in question which were the subject-matter of assessment at
the instance of the Sales Tax authorities were for the
period of assessment 21st October, 1949 to 9th November, 1950, and ~pread over two periods, viz., (1) the
period between 21st October, 1949, to 25th January,
1950, which may be called the pre-Constitution period,
and (2) the period subsequent to the inauguration of
the Constitution on the 26th January, 1950, up to the
9th November, 1950, which may be called the postConstitution period. The petitioned gross turn-over
was determined to be Rs. 49,40,140-6-9 and the
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
amount of Sales Tax assessed on the transactions was
Rs. 1,51,291-13-0 as per . the order of the Deputy
Commissioner, Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh, Respondent No. 3, dated the 14th July, 1954, in Sales Tax
Appeal No. 6/A-1.6.54. The petitioners preferred a
second appeal to the Respondent No. 2 against the
said order. The Respondent No. 2, however, refused
to admit or register the appeal unless the amount of
tax assessed was paid up. The petitioners paid about
Rs. 91,000/- towards the amount of tax assessed but
finding it difficult to pay the balance filed this Petition against the State of Madhya Pradesh, Respondent No. 1, the Commissioner of Sales Tai, Madhya
Pradesh, Respondent No. 2, and the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh, Respondent No. 3, for a wm of certiorari quashing the said
order dated the 14th July, 1954, made by Respondent No. 3 and for consequential reliefs. The Respondents filed a return denying the contentions of the
petitioners and maintaining that the Sales Tax was
lawfully assessed by them against the petitioners.
The position as regards the petitioners' turn-over
for the period OE assessment was as stated below :-
Nature of tht Parties.
(a) Direct to seliing agents
on orders. .......... .....
(b) Direct to merchants on
orders.
(c) Direct to destinations
other than branches or
depots but accounted
for against branches
and depots.
(d) Direct to Stations or
destinations having
branches or depots
owned by the proprietors of this registered
firm-Kanpur, Bombay, Luck:iow and
Faizabad. .........
Sales Prices of goods
Rs.
6,15,236- 3- o
3,99,450- 2- o
6,20,996- 14- o
31,06,739-13- o
1955
M/1. Ram Narain
SonsUd.
v.
Alst. Commission#
of Saks T aJt and
otlurs
Bhagwati].
500
1955
M/s. Ram Narain
Son1 Lltf.
v.
Assl. Commissionnof Saks Tax and
others
Bhagwati].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
The Sales Tax authorities treated all these transactions as transactions of sale coming within the deli·
nition contained in Explanation II to section 2(g) of
the Act and assessed the petitioners to sales tax in
respect of the same, negativing the contentions of
the petitioners that they were in any event sales
effected by them outside the State of Madhya Pradesh and that the State of Madhya Pradesh was
therefore, not entitled to impose a tax on those transactions by virtue of the provisions of article 286(1)
(a) and the Explanation thereto.
The learned Attorney-General who ·appeared for
the petitioners contended that
the bidis manufactured by the petitioners were all actually delivered as
a direct result of the transactions of sale for the purpose of consumption in the State of Uttar Pradesh
and that after the inauguration of the Constitution
on the 26th January, 1950, it was only the State of
Uttar Pradesh which was the delivery State that
alone had the right to impose the tax on these transactions
notwithstanding the fact that under
the
general law relating to the sale of goods the property
in the goods might have passed in the State of Madhya
Pradesh. He, therefore, urged that these transactions
were sales outside the State of Madhya Pradesh and
that the State of Madhya· Pradesh was not entitled to
impose a tax on such sales.
The learned Advocate-General of Madhya Pradesh
on the other hand contended that these were purely
intra-State transa~tions entered into by the petitioJlers within the State of Madhya Pradesh and that the
Explanation to article 286(1)(a) did not come into
play at all because the goods were not actually delivered as a direct result of such sales for the purpose
of consumption in the State of Uttar Pradesh. He,
therefore, maintained that even for the post-Constitution period there was no ban on the State of
Madhya Pradesh imposing the sales tax on what were
purely "inside sales".
It is necessary in view of these rival contentions to
ascertain the true nature of the transactions in question. In paragraph 15 of the Petition, the petitioners
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
501
had averred that the bidis manufactured by the firm
were all delivered in the State of Uttar Pradesh for
consumption in that State and that after the 26th
January, 1950, the delivery State, viz., the State of
Uttar Pradesh, had alone the right to impose tax on
the sales of the commodity. They had further submitted that the State of Madhya Pradesh where the
bidis were manufactured :.nd from where they were
sent could not any more exercise its right to levy a
tax on such transactions of sale taking place elsewhere
by reason of the inhibition contained in article 286.
In the return filed by the Respondents, they did not
deny the allegation made by the ,Petitioners in their
Petition that the bidis manufactured by the firm were
all delivered in the State of Uttar Pradesh for consumption in that State. In substance, they contended
that in spite of the State of Uttar Pradesh being the
delivery State within the meaning of the Explanation
to article 286(1)(a), the liability of these transactions
to sales tax at the instance of the State of Madhya
Pradesh was saved by the President's order
made
under the proviso to article 286(2) and that the imposition of such tax at the instance of the State· of
Madhya Pradesh was lawful and did not contravene
the provisions of article 286(1) (a) read with the Explanation thereto.
Both the order which was made by the Assistant
Commissioner of Sales Tax, Jabalpur, in the original
assessment case No. 16 of 1950-51, dated the 7th
August, 1953, and the order which was made in Sales
Tax Appeal No. 6/ A-1.6.54 by the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh, Respondent
No. 3, dated the 14th July, 1954, proceeded on the
basis that even though the transactions in question
were transactions of sale where the goods had actually
been delivered as a direct result of such sales for the
purpose of consumption in the State of Uttar Pradesh
the President's order made under the proviso to
article 286(2) saved the transactions also from the ban
of article 286(1) (a) and the Explanation thereto and
that the State of Madhya Pradesh was, therefore,
entitled to impose a tax on the same. It \\'.as never
1955
M/s. Ram Narain
Sons Ltd.
v.
Asst. Commisswnw
of Sales Tax and
others
Bhagwati ].
502
1955
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
contended before either of them that the sales were
purely "inside sales" and that the Explanation to
San1 LJd.
article 286(l)(a) did not come into play at all under
v.
The facts as found by
Alll. Cammissionlr the circumstances of the case.
ofSain Talt and
the
Sales
Tax
authorities
also
emphasized
that these
olWI
transactions fell within the definition of sale contained
BhaguiaJi J.
in the Explanation II to section 2(g) of the Act and
that so far as the post-Constitution period was concerned they were saved from the ban of article 286
( 1) (a) and the Explanation thereto by the President's
order made under the proviso to article 286(2). It
was, however, urged by the learned Advocate-General
of Madhya Pradesh that the transactions were pure
"inside sales" entered into by the petitioners in
Madhya Pradesh on orders received by them from
outside the State. These orders were accepted by the ·
petitioners in the State of Madhya Pradesh and goods
were appropriated to the contracts and the property
in the goods passed within the State of Madhya
Pradesh and that, therefore, they were pure intraState sales or "inside sales" which it was within
the competence of the State of Madhya Pradesh
to tax.
This contention of the learned Advocate-General
of Madhya Pradesh is untenable. So far as direct
supplies to. selling agents on orders and direct supplies to merchants on orders covered by items (a) and.
(b) above are concerned, it was found that these supplies were made to the merchants buying the goods
on commission basis or profit on their previous orders,
instructions or indents which were either in printed
forms or in ordinary letters and the sale prices were
realised by sending bills and railway receipts through
some scheduled banks. The very fact that the bills
and the railway receipts were sent through the sche. duled banks went to show that the petitioners reserved the right of ·disposal of goods covered by those
railway receipts and the property in the goods passed
in the State of Uttar Pradesh only after the relative
bills were either accepted or honoured by the purchasers and the railway receipts delivered by the
scheduled banks to them. It is clear, therefore, that
M/1. Ram N"'ain
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
503
in the Stat~
of Uttar Pradesh and were not intra-State sales or
"inside sales" qua the State of Madhya Pradesh. As
regards the direct supplies to destinations other than
branches or depots but accounted for against the
branches or depots being item ( c) above, it was found
that the petitioners despatched the goods and hilled
them to depot npnagers who were responsible for the
collection of the orders and then the railway receipts
and bills were sent there. The managers prepared
other bills adding incidental or other charges and
delivered the railway receipts to the customers to
whom the goods were sent from the State of Madhya
Pradesh. Here also the despatches of the goods were
made from the State of Madhya Pradesh by the petitioners to their depot managers and it was the depot
managers who in their turn prepared and submitted
their own bills and handed over the railway receipts
to the respective customers appropriating the goods
themselves to the contracts of sale which had been
entered into by them with the latter and completing
the sales in the State of Uttar Pradesh. These transactions also were, therefore, sales effected in the
State of Uttar Pradesh and did not fall within the
category of intra-State sales or "inside sales" qua the
State of Madhya Pradesh.
The direct supplies to Stations or destinations having branches or depots owend by the proprietors of
the firm, Kanpur, Bombay, Lucknow and Faizabad
being item (b) above, also were outside sales qua the
State of Madhya Pradesh inasmuch as the branch
managers asked the petitioners to send stocks of goods
to execute t~ orders which they had obtained from
the customers to make their own supplies to them.
As a matter of fact it was found that several consolidated indents were placed by the depot managers
with the petitioners in respect of the previous orders
which had been collected by them and tlie petitioners
supplied the goods to the depots or branches in pursuance of such indents. If this was the true position
qua these supplies, these sales also were completed in
in those cases the sales were completed
1955
M/1. Ram Narain
Sons LU.
v.
Aul. Commitsioner
of Salts Tax and
olhtrs
Blaagwati J.
504
1955
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
the State of Uttar Pradesh by the depots or branches
supplying the goods in their turn to several customers.
M/s. Ram NOTain
Sons IJd.
There
could be no sales as such between the petiv.
Asst. Commissioner
tioners on the one hand and their depots or branches
of Saks Tax and
on the other hand and the State of Madhya Pradesh
others
could certainly not be at all in a position to tax the
BhagwatiJ.
same.
The whole theory, therefore, or "inside sales" falls
to the ground and the only thing which we are left
with is that these transactions were inter-State transactions in which as a direct result of such sales the
goods were actually delivered for the purpose of consumption in the State of Uttar Pradesh. The Explanation to article 286(1) (a) determined the State of
Uttar Pradesh to be the State in which the sales took
place and which alone was entitled to tax these
transactions, the State of Madh}a Pradesh becoming
an "outside" State for the purpose.
Apart from the ban imposed on the State of Madhya
post-Constitution period, therefore, is invalid and
thereto, these trans2ctions were also in the course of
inter-State trade or commerce and were hit by the
ban of article 286(2). The President's order no doubt
lifted that ban but was not competent to lift the ban
under article 286(1)(a) and the Explanation diereto
with the result that in spite of that order the State
of Madhya Pradesh was not in a position to impose a
tax on these transactions during the post-Constitution period.
The assessment of th.:se transactions to tax for the
post-Constitution period, therefore, is invalid and
cannot be sustained. The assessment, moreover, is a
composite one coverin11: the pre-Constitution period as
well. The case, therefore, falls within our judgment in
Civil Appeals Nos. 132, 133 and 137 of 1955 just delivered, and following the reasoning contained therein,
we are of the opinion that the order dated the 14th
July, 1954, made by the Deputy Commissioner, Sales
Tax, Madhya Pradesh, Re&pondent No. 3, in Sales
Tax Appeal No. 6/A.-1.654 should be set aside.
We accordingly allow the Petition, set aside the
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
505
said order dated the 14t.1i July, 1954, and the matter
will go back to the Assessment Officer for re-assessment of the petitioners in accordance with law. The
petitioners will be at liberty tu urge before the Assessment Officer the content;ons of law and fact available
to them in the fresh assessment proceedings. The
Respon<lents will pay the costs of the petition.
JAGANNADHADAS J.-1 regret I feel constrained to
differ from the view taken by my learnt>d brothers as
regards the construction of proviso to article 286(2)
and the effect of the Presidential order issued thereunder.
There is no' dispute that the proviso has to be construed as part of article 286(2). It is meant to empower the President to keep the ban arising thereunder in temporary abeyance so that the States may
continue to levy taxes on sales by virtue of their preConstitution sales-tax laws (if then lawful) for a
limited period. It is urged, however, that the proviso
(meaning thereby also the Presidential order thereunder) is effective to lift only the ban under article
286(2) and that the ban under article 286(l)(a) is
operative nonetheless. Now, it may be correct to say
that these two bans are imposed from different angles
and are ir. that sense independent. But there can be no
doubt that they are substantially overlapping in operation. A transaction which brings about an outside
sale is also an inter-State transaction (barring, if at
all, a few ingeniously conceived and illustrated cases).
The effect of each of the bans under article 286 is to
demarcate the fields within which the taxing power
of the States on sales c.tnnot operate. If, as I conceive,
the two bans under articles 286(1) (a) and 286(2), are
overlapping, the fact . that they arc imposed from
different angles cannot obscure the result, viz., that
they bring about the demarcation of the same-or
substantially the same-field of no taxation. It
appears to me that it is in this light that the proviso
and the Presidential order issued thereunder have to
be construed. N'lw, the proviso (with the Presidential
order) declares the field covered by sales in the course
I .f.-83 S. C. lndia/59.
1955
Mis. Ram Narain
Sons Ltd.
v.
AsJt. Cornmissiorur
of Sales TtJJt and
ol/urs
Bhagwati].
506
1955
M/t, Ram Narain
Sons IJd.
v.
Asst. Contmissian1r
of Salts Tiu anJ
others
JagaftnaJJaada1 J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
of inter-State trade and commerce as taxable for a limited period by stating positively and emphatically that
"any tax on the sale or purchase of goods which was
being lawfully levied by the Government of any State,
immediately before the commencement of the Constitution shall continue to be levied until the 31st day
of March, 1951". There is no d')ubt the non-obstanti:
clause which will be dealt with presently, and which
only emphasises the fact tl1at this is a proviso to article 286(2). But there is no mistaking the positive and
mandatory terms of the proviso. The effect of this is
clearly and unequivocally to make the whole field of
inter-State trade and commerce temporarily taxable
in respect of the sales which take place in the course
thereof. If this be so, it appears to me to be implicit
therein that no other ban on such taxation can operate, for the time being, within that very field. To
construe the two bans as independently and cumulatively operative is to impute to them some kind of
picturesque potency and is to miss the reality, viz.,
that all the bans under article 286 are meant to serve
the same purpose, viz., that of imposing restrictions
and thereby demarcating the fields of no taxation.
The bans and the proviso are parts of the same article and have to be harmoniously construed. The unequivocal and positive language of one part, cannot
be taken to have been obliterated by the negative
language of the other part so as to result in futility.
A similar situation as that contemplated by the
proviso would also arise with reference to the savi·ng
clause in article 286(2).
If the proviso is to be construed in tlie way suggested by the learned AttorneyGeneral, it would seem to follow that when and as
the Parliament lifts the ban under article 286(2), the
lifting of that ban would equally become futile by
virtue "of article 286(1)(a). The Parliament has not
in terms been given the power to lift the latter ban.
This, therefore, will lead to the extraordinary result
that though the Constitution has in terms provided
tl1at the ban on taxation of sales in tlie course of
inter-State trade and commerce can be lifted, by the
Parliament generally, and by the President for a
''
I
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
507
limited period, the exercise of both these powers
would become ineffective and still-born by virtue of
article 286(1) (a). It appears to me unreasonable to
impute any such intention as inevitably arising from
the language used. It appears to me, with great respect, that, whether it is by parliamentary legislation
or by the Presidential action that the ban on taxing
sales in the course of inter-State trade and commerce
is lifted, the principle of harmonious construction of
article 286 taken as an integral whole, requires that
the lifting of the ban is to be construed as laying
open for taxation the entire field covered by article
286(2) and to carry with it the implication that no
other overlapping ban will be operative. No doubt, it
has been suggested that so far as lifting of the ban
under article 286(2) by the Parliament is concerned,
the same would be at least partly operative by virtue
of article 286(1) (a) taken with the Explanation under
which the consumption-delivery State may well be
free to tax. This was the view expressed by the
learned dissenting Judge in the case in The State of
Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd.(1). But the
majority in the recent decision in the Bengal
Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar(2) including the
said learned Judge, have left that question open. It
is problematical whether having regard to the inevitable extra-territorial operation of the levy of such a
tax and the consequent harassment to the business
community which looms large, the Explanation will
receive that construction again and not receive the
strict construction preferred in
the dissenting judgment in the case in State of Travancore-Cochin v.
Shanmugha Vilas Cashew Nut Factory( 8 ). The result,
therefore, of construing the proviso and by parity of
reasoning the saving clause, as merely removing the
ban of a particular nature leaving another overlapping ban to operate, would be to render both the saving
clause in, and the proviso to, article 286(2) virtually
nugatory.
(ll [1953) S.C.R. 1069.
(2) Sup,..,me Court Judgment in Civil Appeal No. 159 of 1953.
(3) [1954) S.C.R. 53.
1955
M/1. Ram Narain
Soni Lid.
v.
AW. Commiuion1r
o/Sol11 TIJll and
olhm
JagalUllJdhadas J.
508
1955
M/s. Ram Narain
Sons LJd.
v.
Asst. CommiJsioner
of Sales Tax and
others
Jagannadhadas ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
The argument based on the non-obstante clause in
the proviso, viz. "Notwithstanding that the imposition of such tax is contrary to the provisions of this
clause" remains to be considered.
It is urged that
this clause clearly indicates the intention that the
operation of the proviso is to be confined to the sole
purpose of lifting the ban arising under article 286(2)
With respect, I am unable to agree. The non-obstante
clause undoubtedly affirms the fact that the proviso is operative in respect of article 286(2).
But
it does not purport to limit the efkct of the proviso, which a reasonable construction thereof may
justify. A non-obstante clause does not normally add
to or subtract from the main provision of which it is
a pa.rt. It is often enough inserted by way of extra
caut10n. But it dx> not have the effect of limiting
the operation of the main provision. (See Astvini
India v. Shrinbai A. Irani(') ). The suggestion that
Kumar Ghosh v. Arabinda Bose(') and The Dominion of
the Presidential action lifts the ban only as regards
the inter-State sales would be to read the phrase "notwithstanding that" as meaning "in so far as". I can
see no warrant for any such reading.
In my view, therefore, the pre-Constitution salestax laws, if then lawful, are not hit by article 286( 1)
(a)-at least to the extent that the ban under article
286(1) (a) overlaps with - that under article 286(2). In
this view, the orders of assessment in these cases cannot be set aside and the validity of the relevant preConstitution laws · will have to be considered and the .
further facts gone into.
But it is now not necessary to do so in these cases
in the view taken by my learned brothers and the
order propo>ed by them will govern these cases.
Cl) \1953] S.C.R. 1, 21 and 24.
(2) 1955] I S.C.R. 206 213.
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