CHATTANATHA KARAYALAR versus RAMACHANDRA IYER AND ANOTHER.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 19 September 1955 | [1955] 2 S.C.R. 477 | 1955 INSC 40
Key facts
- Decided
- 19 September 1955
- Bench
- VIVIAN BOSE*, T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR, BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 136/1955
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1955] 2 S.C.R. 477
- Neutral citation
- 1955 INSC 40
Text of the judgment
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT RE.l'ORTS
477
91. The question whether a party to an election pet~
1955
tion is entitled to a notice under the proviso in respect
of the very charges w!Hch were the subject-matter of
enquiry in the petition itself, has been considered by
this Court in Civil Appeal No. 21 of 1955, and it has
been held therein that if the party had opportunity
given to him in the hearing of the petition to meet the
very charge in respect of which a finding is to be re-corded under section 99( 1) (a), then he is not entitled
to a further notice in respect of
the same matter,
under the proviso. In the present case, the finding
under section 99(1)(a) relates to the very payments
which were the subject-matter of enquiry in the election petition, and therefore no notice was required to
be given to the appellant under the pro·1iso. This
objection also fails, and the appeal must accordingly
be dismissed.
S. Khat/er S/tn'il
v.
.\funnruwami
Gounder and others
Venkatarama
AY,var J.
The respondent has stated through his counsel Shri
Naunit Lal that he does not propose to contest the
appeal.
There will accordingly be no order as to
costs.
Appeal dismissed.
1955
CHATTANATHA KARAYALAR
RAMACf{A.NDRA
"·
IYER
AND
ANOTHER.
{V1v1AN BnsE, VENKATARAMA AYYAR and B. P. SINHA
I
I
I
I
S1ptemb11 19
JJ.]
Election Dispute-Returned candidate alleged to be disqualified
for being chosen as a member-Hindu fathe1· entering into Government
contt·act, if does so en behalf of the undivided family-Presumption
ef Hindu Law-Finding of benami, if liable to be intei'fered with in
Special appeal-Representation of the People Act (XL!Il of 1951),
SS. 7(d), 9(2}.
There is no presumption in Hindu Law that a business standing in the name of a member of the Hindu joint family is joint
family business, even when that member is the manager or the father.
There is this difference between the position of the father starting new business and a mere manager doing so that while the
debts r.ontracted by the father in such business are binding on the
sons on the theory of a son's pious obligation to pay his father's
debt, those contracted by the latter are not binding on the other
,
478
1955
ChaJtanatha
Karoyalar
"•
Ramachandra
Iyer and another.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS,
[1955}
mcn1bers of the family unless, at least, it can be shown that the
starting of the business was necessary.
Ram Nath v. Chiranii Lal, ([1934] l.L.R. 57 AIL 605), Chhotey
Lal Chaudhury v. Dalip Narain Sing/,., ([1938] l.L.R. 17 Patna 386),
Hayat Alia Shah v. Nern Chand (A.LR. [1945] Lah. 169), referred to.
But this distinctive position of the father docs not by itself
make the new business started by him a joint business of the an-
divided family.
The question of benaru; is a question of fact and \Vhcrc there is.
evidence to support a finding that a person is a bcnamidar for
another, the Supreme Court in a Special appeal will not interfere
with it.
Consequently, in a case where an election was challenged on the
ground that the candidate returned was intcrt:sted in a contqct
entered into by his father, bcnami in the name of another, with the
Government for felling trees and transporting timber, and as such
disqualified to stand ior election under s. 7(d) read with s. 9(2) of
the Representation of the People Act and the Tribunal found on
evidence that the father was the real contracting party but without
consid_cring the evidence on the other point which, if believed,.
might
sustain a finding
that the father
was acting on behalf
of the fa.mily, presumed as a matter of law that the son had -interest
in the contract and declared the election void.
Held, that the Tribunal took an erroneous view of the law and
made a wrong presumption, so its decision must be set aside, and· as
the findings
are not sufficient for
disposal of the matter the case
must be remitted back for rehearing on the evidence on record.
CML APPELLATE Jua1soicnoN: Civil Appeal No.
136 of 1955.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and
Order dated the 15th November 1954 of the Election
Tribunal, Quilon,
Travancore-Cochin, in Election
Petition No. 18 of 1954.
S. Mohan Kumara Mangalam, H. /. Umrigar and
Ra;inder Narain, for the appellant.
T. R. Balakrishnan, for respondent No. 1.
1955. September
19.
Court was delivered by
The
Judgment of the
VENKATARAMA AYYAR J.-This is an appeal by
special leave against the order of the Election Tribunal, Quilon declaring the election of the appellant
to the Legislative Assembly oi the State of. Travancore-
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
479
Cochin from the Shencottah Constituency void on the
ground that he was diSA.ualified to stand for election
under section 7(d) read with section 9(2) of Act No.
XLIII of 1951. .
Under section 7(d), a person is disqualified for being chosen as a member of the Legislative Assembly
of a State, if he is interested in any contract for the
supply of goods or for the execution of any works for
the Government of that State.
Section 9(2) declares
that if any such contract has been entered into by or
on behalf of a Hindu undivided family, every member
thereof shall be subject to the disqualification mentioned in section 7(d); but that if the contract has
been entered into by a member of an undivided family
carrying on a separate business in the course of such
business, other members of the family h2ving no share
or interest in that business shall not be disqualified
under section 7 ( d).
The contract in the present case was for felling
trees in a Government forest and transporting them
for delivery at the places specified therein.
There is
now
no dispute that this contract is one that falls
within section 7 ( d) of the Act. The point in controversy is simply whether the contract with the Government was entered into on behalf of the joint
family, of which the appellant is a member. The
ap;reement stands in the name of one Kuppuswami
Karayalar, and the allegations in the petition are that
he is a mere name-lender for one - Krishnaswami
Karayalar, who is the manager of a joint family consisting of himself and his sons, the appellant being
one of them, and that he entered into the contract in
question on behalf of and for the benefit of the joint
family. The case of the appellant, on the other hand,
is that Kuppuswami whose name appears in the contract was the person solely entitled to the benefits
thereof, that he was not a name-lender 'for Krishnaswami Karayalar, and that further neither he nor the
joint family had any interest in the contract. Certain
other pleas were also put forward by him, but they
are not now material.
1955
Chaltanatlia
Earayalar
v.
RamJJ<handra
ljer and anothl'
Venkalarama
A»ar ].
480
1955
C/rJJU-tq
Eulf10/•
v.
R~ltatlra
l.Jtr ""'1 nPl/itr
Ymk•,.,•m•
..i_,_,., ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
The following issues were framed on the above contentions:
"(2) Is the said 1omt family the owner of the
right and benefits of the contract for the felling and
removal of timber from Coupe No. 4, Nedumangad
Taluq, entered into with the Forest Department,
Has the joint family any
Travancore-Cochin State?
interest in the said contract ?
(3) Is Mr. Kuppuswami Karayalar whose name
appears as the contractor only a name-lender for the
joint Hindu family of which the respondent is a
member?"
'
On issue 3, the Tribunal found that Krishnaswami
Karayalar was the real contracting party, and that
Kuppuswami was a benamidar for him, and on issue
2, that the contract was entered into on behalf of the
iomt family, of which the appellant was a member.
On these findings, it held that the appellant was disqualified under section 7(d) read with section 9(2),
and declared his election void. The appellant questions the correctness of this order firstly on the ground
that the finding that Kuppuswarni is a benamidar for
Krishnaswami Karayalar is not warranted by the
evidence, and secondly on the ground that the finding
that Krishnaswami entered into the ·contract on behalf of the joint family is based on a mistake of law,
and is unsustainable.
On the first question, Mr . Kumaramangalam for the
appellant ad~its that there .is evidence in support of
the conclusion that Kuppuswami
was a benamidar
for Krishnaswami, but contends that it is meagre and
worthless. The question whether a person is a benamidar or not, is purely one of fact, and a finding
thereon cannot be interfered with in special appeal,
if there is evidence on which it could be based. We
must, therefore, accept the finding of the Tribunal
that it was Krishnaswami, the father of the appellant,
who was the real contracting party to the agreement
with the Government.
The next question is whether Krishnaswami entered
into the contract in h.is own personal capacity or
as manager of the joint family.
The Tnbunal found
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
481
as a fact that the business started by Krishnaswami
~arayalar was a new venture, and instead of _proceedmg next to consider on the evidence whether in
·entering into the contract he acted for himself or for
the joint family, it entered into a discussion whether
under the Hindu law there was a presumption that a
business started by a coparcener was joint family
business.
After observing that there was no such
presumption "in the case of an ordinary manager", it
held that "the law is different when the manager
happens to be also the father". It then referred to
-certain decisions in which it had been held that the
sons were liable for the debts incurred by the father
for a new business started by him, and held "on the
.ibove authorities that the joint family of ~he respondent is the owner or the right and benefit of the preiCnt contract".
The appellant contends that tJie statement of law
by the Tribunal that there is a presumption that a
new business started by the father is joint family
business is erroneous, and that its finding that the
joint family of which the appellant was a member had
an interest in the contract of Krishnaswami could
not be supported, as it was based solely on. the view
which it took of the law. This criticism is, in our
?Pinion, well founded. Under the Hindu law, there
1s no presumption that a business standing in the
name of any member is a joint family one even when
that member is the manager of the family, and it
makes no difference in this respect that the manager
is the father of the coparceners.
It is no doubt true
that with reference to a trade newly started there is
this difference between the position of a father and a
manager, that while the debts contracted therefor by
the former would be binding on the sons on the theory
of pious obligation, those incurred by a manager
would not be binding on the members, unless at least
there was necessity for the starting of the trade, as to
which see Ram Nath v. Chiranji Lal(t ), Chotey Lal v.
Dt1lip Narain(') and Ha}'at Ali v. Nem Chand( 8 ). But
(') [1934] I.L.R. 57 All. 605.
(1) [1938] I.L.R. 17 Patna 386.
(')A.LR. 1945 Lah. 169.
1955
Chauanalha
Karayalar
v.
Ramochantlra
Jy" and another
Venkafarama
.1'Jar J.
482
1955
Ckallll1Ullha
Karaya/M
y,
Ramaehandra
Jyar and another
Vmkatorama
~.,,.,
J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
it is one thing to say that the sons are liable for the
debts contracted by the father in the trade newly
started by him, and quite another thing to treat the
trade itself as a joint family concern.
We arc therefore unable to accept the finding of the Tribunal that
the contract of Krishnaswami Karayalar should, as a
matter of law, be held to be a joint family business' of
himself and his sons.
This conclusion, however, is not sufficient to dis-·
pose of the matter. The case of the respondent that
Krishnaswami entered into the contract with the
Government of Travancore-Cochin on behalf of thejoint family rests not merely on a presumption of law
but on evidence as to facts and circumstances which,
if accepted, would be sufficient to sustain a finding in.
his favour: In the view it took of the law on the
question, the Tribunal did not discuss the evidence
bearing on this point or record a finding thereon. It.
is therefore necessary that there should be a remittal
of the case for a consideration of this question on the
evidence.
The appellant contends that there is· only the evi-·
dence of the respondent in rnpport of the plea that
the contract was entered into by Krishnaswami on
behalf of the joint family, and that this Court could
itself record a finding thereon.
But it is argued
by the respondent that there are in the judgment of
the Tribunal several observations which would support the conclusion that the contract was entered into
on behalf of the joint family. Thus, it is. pointed outthat in para 5 of the judgment the Tribunal observes
that Krishnaswami Karayalar started this new
bu,iness with a view to discharge the family debts.
It further observes in para 6 that the business required an initial investment of about Rs. 25,000 to Rs.
30,000, and that while there is evidence that about Rs.
7,000 had been borrowed by Krishnaswami Karayalar,.
there is no evidence how the balance was made up.
The contention of the respondent is that this must
have proceeded from the joint family funds, and that
this is implicit in the finding of the Tribunal. It is
also mentioned in the judgment of the Tribunal that'
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
483
K.rishnaswami was anxious to support his son, the
present appellant, and that many of the witnesses
whom the respondent was obliged to examine;, were
really anxious to help the appellant. (Vide para 12).
We do not, however, desire to express any opinion on
these contentions, as we propose to leave them to the
decision of the Tribunal.
1953
Chattanlllho.
Karo,>alar
,..
R(JtnJJ(;handra
l)'ar and another
Venkatarama
/glr].
We accordingly set aside the order ~f the Tribunal,
and direct that the Election Commission do reconstitute the Tribunal to hear and decide the question
whether Krishnaswami Karayalar entered into the
contract with the Government of Travancore-Cochin
on behalf of the joint family · or for his own personal
benefit, on a consideration of the evidence on record.
It is made clear that no further evidence will be
allowed. The parties will bear their own costs in this
Court.
Appeal allowed.
Case remitted for hearing.
M/S. RAM NARAIN SONS LTD.
"·
ASST. COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX
AND OTHERS
(and other cases)
(S. R. DAS, ACTING c. J., BHAGWATI, JAGANNADHADAS, JAFER IMAM and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ. l
Constitution of India-Article 286(2)-Pro11iso thereto-Whether the proviso is meant to lift the ban only under Article 286(2) an4
no other-And thus does not lift the ban under Article 286{1)(a)
read with the Explanation-Assessment consisting of a single undi11idetl
sum in respect of totality of property-Wrongful inclusion therein of
certain item of property expressly exempted from taxation-Legnl
effect thereof-Central Pro11inces and Berar Act 1947 (XXI of J.947)
-Explanation II to Section 2(g) as originally enacted-before its
amendment by Madhya Pradesh' Act IV of 1951-Whether offended
Article 286(1)(a) read with the Explanation-Whether the Presidents
order issued under the proviso to Article 286(2) protected the same.
per S. R. DAs ACTING CHIEF JusTICE, BHAGWa\TI,
IMAM and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ. (JAGANNADHADAS J.
Held,
JAFER
1955
~20
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