TIRATH SINGH versus BACHITTAR SINGH AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 15 September 1955 | [1955] 2 S.C.R. 457 | 1955 INSC 38
Key facts
- Decided
- 15 September 1955
- Bench
- SUDHI RANJAN DAS*, T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR
- Bench size
- 2
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 21/1955
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1955] 2 S.C.R. 457
- Neutral citation
- 1955 INSC 38
Text of the judgment
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
457
lant's whole enc!-eavour was to circumvent such an
enquiry and oust the Tribunal's jurisdiction. In that
she has failed, so she will pay the contesting rcspondent' s costs throughout.
The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs all
through.
1955
Sw:lrda Kripalani
v.
Shri S. S. Dulat,
I.C.S., Chairman
4 the Ekction
TribunaJ, Delhi
and others
Bose].
TIRATH SINGH
ti.
1955
BACHITTAR SINGH AND OTHERS
<;tpkmb1r 15
[S. R. DAs, ACTING C. J. and VENKATARAMA
AYYAR
J.]
Election Dispute-Election petition-Contents alleged to be vague
and wanting in particulars-Mainu1inability-Naming of persons
for disqualification-Recommendation for exemption from disqualification-Notice-Jurisdiction of the Tribunal-The Representation of
the People Act (XLIII of 1951), ss. 83, 99(1)(a) proviso.
Where the respondent in an election petition contended that
the allegations in the election petition were vague and wanting in
particulars, but did not call for any particulars which it was open to
him to do and was not found to have been misled or in any way
prejudiced in his defence, it \Vas not open to him to contend that
the petition was liable to be dismissed for non-compliance with the
provisions of s. 83 of the Act.
Clauses (a) and (b) of the proviso to s. 99 of the Representation
of the People Act read together leave no scope for doubt that clause
(a) contemplates notice only to such persons as were not parties to the
election petition and it is, therefore, not obligatory on the Tribunal
under cl. (a) to issue notices on such persons as were parties in order
that it may name them for disqualification under sub-clause (ii) of s.
99(l)(a) of the Act. Clause (b) to the proviso obviously has the
effect of excluding such persons as have already had the opportunity
of cross-examining ·witnesses, calling evidence and of being heard,
which the clause seeks to afford.
The Indian and the English Law on the matter arc substantially
the same.
Ke.rho Ram v. Hazura Singh, [1953] 8 Election Law Reports
320, overruled.
The jurisdiction that sub-clause (ii) of s. 99(1)(a) of the Act
confers on the Tribunal for making recommendation for exemption
11-83 S. C, India/59.
458
1955
...
Tit-at/a SU.gh
Baehittar Singh
and ol/urs
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
from disqualifications mentioned in ss. 141 to 143 is purely advisory.
Where it omits to do so, aggrieved parties have access to the Election
Commission which under s. 144 has the power to act suo motu. No
person, be he a party or a stranger, has a right to be heard by the
Tribunal on the question of such exemption and, therefore, no question of any service of notice under the proviso in this regard can
arise.
Even supposing that the proviso requires notice on a party to
the dection petition, the noti.:e to him of the election petition itself
can be treated as a notice under the proviso.
C1VIL APPELLATE JuRISDICTION : Civil
Appeal
No. 21 of 1955.
Appeal under Article 133(1) (c) of the Constitution
of India against the Judgment and Order dated the
12th January 1954 of the Pepsu High Court in Civil
Misc. No. 182 of 1953.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, Veda
Vyas and /agannath Kaushal, (Natmit Lal, with them),
for the appellant.
The respondents did not appear.
1955. September 15. The Judgment of the
Court was delivered by
VENKATARAMA AYYAR J.-The appellant was a
candidate for election to the Legislative Assembly of
the State of PEPSU from the Dhuri Constituency,
and having secured the largest number / of votes was
declared duly elected. The first respondent who is
one of the electors in the Constituency filed the petition out of which the present appeal arises, for setting
aside the election on the grounds, . inter alia, (1) that
the nomination of one Mali Singh had been wrongly
rejected by the returning officer, and (2) that the appellant was guilty of the corrupt practice of bribery.
The Tribunal held that both these grounds were made
out, and accordingly set aside the election. It further
recorded a finding in terms of section 99(1) (a) of the
Representation of the People Act No. XLIII of 1951
that the appellant was proved to have committed the
corrupt practice of bribery as mentioned in section
123(1) of the Act. The Appellant thereupon filed in
the High Court of Patiala and East Punjab States
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
459
Union an application under Article 227 attacking the
finding of the Tribunal that he was guilty of bribery.
The order of the Tribunal in so far as it set aside his
election was not challenged. By ~der dated 12-1-1954
the High Court upheld the findings of the Tribunal,
and dismissed the application, and by order dated
7-6-1954 granted a certificate for appeal to this Court
under Article 133(1)(c).
That is how the appeal
.comes before us.
On behalf of the appellant, the learned AttorneyGeneral raised two contentions : ( 1) The finding that
the appellant was guilty of bribery was reached in
disregard of the mandatory provisions of section 83,
and that it was besides open to other legal objections;
and (2) the finding recorded under section 99 of the
Act was bad, because no notice was given to the
appellant, and no enquiry held as required by the proviso to section 99. This point was not taken in the
application under Article 227, and was sought to be
raised at the time of the argument in the High Court ;
but the leo.rned Judges declined to entertain it.
( 1) On the first question, the complaint of the
appellant is that in the election petit;:.~n the allegations relating to bribery were ·:ague and wanting in
particulars, and that the petition should accordingly
have been dismissed under sections 83 and 85 of the
Act; that the charge that was sought to be proved at
the hearing was at variance with the charge as alleged
in the petition, and that the Tribun:\l had erred in
giving a finding of bribery on the basis not of the
allegations in the petition but of the evidence addur'!d
at the trial. The allegations in the petition relating
to this charge are as follows:
"The sweepers of Small Town Committee, Dhuri
were each granted good work allowance at Rs. 5 p.m.
for three months only during Election days, simply
because they happened to be voters in the said Constituency, vide letter No. ST/1(4)/52/20702 dated 7th
December, 1951. All this was done to induce these
sweepers to vote for the respondent No. 1. The allowance was against the Rules".
1955
Tirath Singh
v.
Baehitlar Singh
and ollurs
Vmkatarama
AyJar J.
460
1955
Tirath Singh
v.
Bacbiuar Singh
and olhen
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
The reply of the appellant to this charge was as
follows:
"The sweepers of Small . Town Committee represented to me in writing that their pays should be increased, and they also quoted the pays that the employees of other Small Town Committees and Municipal Committees were getting. The representation
was forwarded to the Secretariat. The Secretariat
examined it on merits, passed legal orders. Such concessions were also shown to other employees of the
various Small Tmvn Committees and Municipal Committees in Pepsu
before and after this case. This
was an official act done in the routine and not to
induce the sweepers to vote for respondent No. 1".
On these averments, the following issue was framed:
"5. Whether the sweepers of Small Town Committee, Dhuri, were granted good work allowance at
Rs. 5 p.m. for three months only during the election
days in order to induce them to vote for the Respondent No. 1 ?"
At the trial, the petitioner examined the Darogha
of the Small Town Committee (P. W. 28), and five
sweepers, P. W s. 12, 13, 14, 39 and 40, and their evidence was that sometime in November 1951 the appellant came to Dhuri, enquired about the number of
sweepers in the service of the Committee, and offered
to raise their pay if they would vote for him, that the
sweepers thereupon held a meeting and considered
the suggestion of the appellant, and then decided to
vote for him, if the pay was increased. It must be
stated that the appellant was then Minister for
Health, and was in charge of Local Administration.
On 28-11-1951 he passed an order on a memorial sent
by the sweepers that their pay would be increased by
Rs. 5 per mensem. Objection to the order was· taken
by the Department, and thereupon, the appellant
passed the modified order dated 7-12-1951 granting
good work allowance for a period of three months
from December 1951 to February 1952. The Tribunal
accepted the evidence on the side of the petitioner
that the appellant offered to increase the salary of
the sweepers in 1951, and held that the order dated
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
461
7-12-1951, granting good work allowance for the election period was the outcome of the bargain come to
in November 1951, and that the charge of bribery
had been established.
It is contended for the appellant that in the petition there was no mention of the bargain on which
the finding of bribery by the Tribunal was based, that
the charge in the petition related only to the order
dated 7-12-1951, and that accordingly it was not open
to the petitioner to travel beyond the petition and
adduce evidence in proof of a bargain which had not
been pleaded.
This is to put too technical and
narrow a construction on the averments. The charge
in the petition was not merely that the appellant had
passed the order dated 7-12-1951 but that he had
passed it with a view to induce the sweepers to . vote
for him.
That clearly raised the question as to the
circumstances under which the order came to be
passed, whether it was in the course of official routine
as the appellant pleaded, or under circumstances
which were calculated to influence the voters. Issue
5 put the matter beyond doubt, when it pointedly
raised the question whether the grant was "for three
months only during the election days in order to
induce them (the sweepers) to vote for the respondent No. l". Under the circumstances, the compiaint
that the evidence and the finding as to the bargain
went beyond the pleadings and should be ignored
appears to be without any substance. It may be
that the allegations in the petition are not as full as
they might have been; but if the appellant was really
embarrassed by the vagueness of the charge, it was
open to him to have called for particulars; but he did
not do so. At the trial, the petitioner first adduced
evidence, and his witnesses spoke to the bargain in
November, 1951. It is stated on behalf of the appellant that he objected to the reception of the evidence
on the question of bargain, as it was not pleaded.
But this is denied by the petitioner in his affidavit
filed in the High Court dated 3-12-1953. Even apart
from this, the witnesses on behalf of the petitioner
gave evidence on this point on the 8th and 11th
1955
T irath Singh
v.
Bachittar Singh
and others
Venkatarama
AJ!)'arJ.
462
1955
Tirath Singh
v.
Baehittar Singh
alfd others
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955)
November, 15th and 16th December, 1952, and on the
2nd February, 1953. Then the appellant entered on
his defence. On 26-2.1951 he examined R.W. 4, a
member of the Small Town Committee, to rebut the
evidence on the side of the petitioner, and himself
went into the box and deposed to the circumstances.
under which the order came to be passed. Having
regard to the above facts, there is and can be no complaint that the appellant was misled, or was prejudiced by the alleged defect in the pleadings. The
contention that is urged for him Is that the petition
should have been dismissed under section 83 for wan:
of particulars. This was rightly rejected by the High
Court as without force, and we are in agreement with
it.
'
It is next contended that there is no evidence or
finding that the sweepers were entitled to vote in the
Constituency, or that the appellant was a candidate
as defined in section 79(2) at the time when the bargain was made. But the allegation in the petition is
clear that the order dated 7-12-1951 was made with
a view "to induce the sweepers to vote for the appellant". The reply of the appellant to this was that
the order was made in the course of official routine
and "not to induce the sweepers to . vote" for him.
Far from there being any specific denial that the
sweepers were electors, the r{!ply of the appellant proceeds on the basis that they were entitled to vote.
This objection was not raised before the Tribunal,
and, as pointed out by the High Court, P. W. 12 does
say in his evidence that he is a voter. This contention must accordingly be overruled. Nor is there
any substance in the contention that there is no proof
that the appellant was a candidate at the time of the
bargain. This again is an objection which was not
taken before the Tribunal, and on the evidence of the
witnesses examined on the side of, the petitioner which
was accepted by the Tribunal, the appellant would be
a prospective candidate as aefined in section 79(b) of
the Act.
The finding that the appellant is guilty of
bribery is therefore not open to attack.
(2) It is next contended that the order of the
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
463
Tribunal in .so far as it recorded a finding that' the appellant had committeed the corrupt practice specified
in section 123(1) is bad, as no notice was given to him
as required by the proviso to section 99 and no opportunity to show cause against it.
Section 99 runs
as follows:
"99. (1) At the time of making an order under
section 98 the Tribunal shall also make an order( a) whether any charge is made in the petition
of any corrupt or illegal practice having been committed at the election, recording(i) a finding whether any corrupt
or illegal .
practice has or has not been proved to have been
committed by, or with the connivance of, any candidate or his agent at the election, and the nature of
that corrupt or illegal practice; and
(ii) the ilames of all persons, if any who have
been proved at the trial to have been guilty of any
corrupt or illegal practice and the nature of that
practice, together with any such recommendations as
the Tribunal may think proper to make for the exemption of any persons from any disqualifications
which they may
have incurred in this connection
under sections 141 to 143.
Provided that no person shall be named in the
order under sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) unless( a) he has been given notice to appear before the
Tribunal and to show cause why he should not be so
named; and
(b) if he appears in pursuance of the notice, he
has been given an opportunity of cross-examining any
witness who has already been examined by the Tribunal and has given evidence against him, of calling
evidence in his defence and of being heard ...... "
The point for detision is whether it was obligatory on
the part of the Tribunal to issue notice under the
above proviso to parties to the election petition before
recording a finding under section 99(1)(a). The contention of the ~ppellant is that under section 99(1)(a)
the Tribunal has to record the names of all persons
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1955
Tirath Singh
v.
Bachittar Sin~h
end others
Ytnkatarama
AJyar J.
[1955]
who are proved to have been guilty . of corrupt or
illegal practice, that that would include both parties
to the petition as well as non-parties, that the proviso requires that notice should be given to all persons
who are to be named under section 99(1) (a), subclause (ii), and that the appellant was accordingly
entitled to fresh notice under the proviso. It is
argued that if the language of the enactment is interpreted in its literal and grammatical sense, there
could be no escape from the conclusion that parties to
the petition are also entitled to notice under rhe proviso. But it is a rule of interpretation well-established
that, "Where the language of a statute, in its ordinary
meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a
manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the
enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity,
hardship or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the
meaning of the words, and even the structure of the
sentence".
(Maxwell's Interpretation
of
Statutes,
10th Edition, page 229).
Reading the proviso along
with clause (b) thereto, and construing it in its set·
ting in the section, we are of opinion that notwithstanding the wideness of the language used, the proviso contemplates notice only to persons who are not
parties to the petition.
The object of giving notice to a person under the
proviso is obviously to give him an opportunity to be
heard before a finding is given under section 99(l)(a)
(i) that he has committed a corrupt or illegal practice.
This clearly appears
from clause (b) of the
proviso, which enacts that the person to whom notice
is to be given should have an opportunity of crossexamining witnesses who had been examined before
and given evidence against him, of calling his own
evidence and of being heard.
This is in accordance
with the rule of natural justice which requires that no
one should be condemned without being given an
opportunity to be heard.
The reason of the rule,
therefore, requir~s that notice should be given to persons who had had no previous opportunity in respect
of the matters mentioned in sub-clause (b) to the pro-
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
465
viso. Such for example would be witnesses and possibly
agents of the parties, as observed in Nyalchand Virchand v. Election Tribuna/( 1 ), though it is i10t necessary to decide that point, but it cannot refer to parties to the petition who have had every opportunity of
taking part in the trial and presenting their case.
Where an election petition is founded on a charge of
corrupt practice on the part of the candidate, that
becomes the subject-matter of enquiry in the petition
itself. If at the trial the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the charge had been proved, then it has
to hold under section 100(2) (b) that the election is
void, and pass an order to that effect under section
98(d). Section 99(1) enacts that the finding of corrupt
practice under section 99(1)(a)(i) or naming a person
under section 99(1) (a)(ii) should be at the time of
making an order under section 98. If the contention
of the appellant is to be accepted, then the result will
be that even though there was a full trial of the
charges set out in the petition, if the Tribunal is disposed to hold them proved it has first to give notice
of the finding which it proposes to give, to the parties,
and hold a fresh trial of the very matters that had
been already tried. That is an extraordinary result,
for which it is difficult to discover any reason or
justification. It was argued by the learned Attorney.
General that the giving to a party to a proceeding a
second opportunity to be heard was not unknown to
law, and he cited the instance of an accused in a
warrant case being given a further opportunity to
recall and cross-examine prosecution witnesses after
charge is framed, and of a civil servant being given
an opportunity under article 311 to show cause against
the action proposed to be taken against him. In a
warrant case, the accused is not bound to cross<:xamine the prosecution witnesses before
charge
is framed, and in the case of civil servants, the
decision that they arc entitled to a second opportunity was based on the peculiar language of sections
240(2) and (3) of the Government of India Act, 1235,
and
Article 311 of the Constitution. They arc
(I) [1953] 8 Electiou Law Reporta 417, 421.
1955
Tiralh Singh
v.
Baehillar Singh
and others
Venkatarama
AY.)'ar ].
466
1955
Tirath Singh
v.
Bachiltar Singh
and othtr1
V1nkatarama
.dy)'ar ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19551
exceptional cases, and do not furnish any safe or
useful guidance in the interpretation of section 99.
The appellant also sought support for his contention that notice should be given under the proviso
even to persons who are parties to the election petition, in the provision in section 99(l)(a)(ii) that the
Tribunal might make such recommendations as it
thinks proper for exemption of any persons from any
disqualifications which may have been incurred under
sections 141 to 143. The argument is that the disqualifications mentioned in section 143 could only be
with reference to candidates, as they relate to default
in filing return of election expenses or in filing false
returns, that before the Tribunal could take action
under this provision it would have to give notice to
the persons affected thereby who must necessarily be
parties to the petition, and that if the proviso applies
when action is to be taken under section 143, there is
no reason why it should not apply when action is to
be taken under the other sections of the Act as well.
The fallacy m this argument is in thinking that
notice to a person is requisite for making a recommendation under section 9(1) (a) (ii)· Section 99(1)
(a)(ii) deals with two distinct matters-naming persons who are proved to have been guilty of corrupt
and
illegal practices, and recommending whether
there should be any exemption in respect of the disqualifications mentioned in sections 141 to 143, and
the proviso, properly construed, requires notice only
in the former case and not the latter. It will be noticed
that while in cases falling within sections 139 and 140
the disqualification is automatic and immutable, in
cases falling within sections 141 to 143 the Election
Commission has power to grant exemption under section 144 of the Act. It is to guide the Commission
in exercising its powers under section 144, that the
Tribunal is directed in section 99(l)(a)(ii) to make
any recommendations with reference thereto. The
jurisdiction of the Tribunal in respect of this matter
is purely advisory. There is nothing to prevent the
Commission from taking up the question of exemption under section .144 suo motu, even though the
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
f67
Tribunal has made no
recommendation. Indeed,
there . is nothing to prevent the person adversely
affected from applying directly to the Commission for
exemption. While, therefore, there is compelling
reason why a person should have an opportunity of
showing cause before he is named there is none such
when the question is one of recommendation. As
we construe the proviso, it confers no right on any
person, party or stranger, to be heard on the question
whether he should be recommended for exemption
from the disqualifications ·under section 141 to 143.
The provision for exemption in section 99 (l)(a)(ii)
therefore does not lend any support to the contention
of the appellant that notice should be given to parties
to the petition under the proviso before they are
named.
Reliance was also placed by the appellant on thedecision of the Election Tribunal in Kesho Ram v.
Hazura Singh(1), wherein it was held by a majority
that notice under the proviso to section 99 should be
given to the parties to the petition also. For the reasons given above, we do not agree with the decision
of the majority.
Our conclusion is that while the persons to bcnamed under section 99(1) (a)(ii) would include both
parties to the petition as well as non-parties, the proviso thereto applies only to persons who had no opportunity of taking part in the trial, and that, therefore, whether notice should issue under the proviso
will depend on whether the person had an opportunity
to cross-examine witnesses who had given evidence
against him and to adduce his own evidence. This
conclusion is in accord with the law in England.
Under section 140, sub-clause (1) of the Representation of the People Act, 1949, an election Court has to
state in its report the names of all persons who are
found guilty of corrupt and illegal practice but "in
the case of some one who is not a party to the petition nor a candidate on behalf of whom the ·seat or
office is claimed by the petition", the court has to
issue notice to him, give him an opportunity of being
(I) [19,53] 8 Election Law Reports 320.
1955
Tirath Singh·
v.
Baehittar Singf,
and ot/wt
Venkatarama
AyyarJ.
468
1955
Tiralh Singh
v.
IJaehiltarSmgh
ondolhm
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
heard by himself, and calling evidence in his defence.
It was suggested for the appellant that the law as
enacted in section 99 makes a deliberate departure
from that under section 140( l) of the English Act.
The difference in the wording between the two sections is due to the difference in the arrangement of
the topics of the two statutes, and there is no reason
to hold that with reference to the substance of the
matter, there was any intention to depart from the
English law on the subject; nor is there any reason
therefor.
In the present case, the appellant was a party to
the petition, and it was his election that was being
questioned therein.
He had ample opportunity of
being heard, and was, in fact, heard, and therefore
there was no need to issue a notice to him under the
proviso to section 99 before recording a finding under
section 99(1)(a) (ii). Further, even if we agree with
the contention of the appellant that notice under the
proviso should be given to a party to the petition,
seeing that the reliefs which could be claimed in the
election petition under section 84 are those mentioned
in section 98, and that action under section 99(1) (a) is
to be taken at the time when the order under section
98 is pronounced, there is no insuperable difficulty in
treating the notice to the party in the election petition
as notice for purposes of the proviso to section 99( l) (a)
as well. This reasoning will not apply to persons who
are not parties to the petition, and a notice to them
will be necessary under the proviso, before they are
named.
In the result, all the contentions urged in support of
the appeal fail, which must accordingly be rejected.
As the respondent has not appeared to contest the
appeal, there will be no order as to costs.
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