THE BENGAL IMMUNITY COMPANY LIMITED versus THE STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 6 September 1955 | [1955] 2 S.C.R. 603 | 1955 INSC 36
Key facts
- Decided
- 6 September 1955
- Bench
- SUDHI RANJAN DAS*, VIVIAN BOSE, NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI, B. JAGANNADHADAS, T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR, BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA, SYED JAFFER IMAM
- Bench size
- 7
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 159/1953
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1955] 2 S.C.R. 603
- Neutral citation
- 1955 INSC 36
Text of the judgment
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
603
THE BENGAL IMMUNITY COMPANY LIMITED
Septembw 6
'·
THE ST ATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS.
(S.
R. DAs, ACTING C.J., VIVIAN BosE, BHAGWATI,
]AGANNADHADAS, VENKATARAMA AYYAR, B. P. SINHA
and
JAFER IMAM
1955
JJ.]
Constitution of India-Arts. 141, 226, 286(1), (2) and (3)-Art.
286(J)(a) read tvith the Explanation-Construction of-Whether
controlled by Art. 286(2)-Situs of a sale or purchase determined by
general law or created by fiction in the Explanation-Whether relevant fo1· ascertaining inter-State character of such sale or punhaseAppellant company registered in Calcutta-Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947
(Bihar Act XIX of 1947)-S. 13-Whether appellant company liable
to Sales Tax-Where goods deliveted in the State of Bihm· as a direct
result of sale for purposes of consumption there-Art. 226-Petition
thereunder-.\1.aintainability of-Supreme Court whether competent to
modify or review its pri01· decisions-Art. 141-Meaning of-Bihar
Sales Tax Act, 1947, s. 33-Taxing sales or purchases taking place in
the course of inter-State trade-Validity of-Act whether wholly ultra
vires and void.
The appellant company, having its registered office in Calcutta
and its factory and laboratory in the District of 24-Parganas in
\Vest Bengal, carried on the business of manufacturing and selling
sera, vaccines, biological products and medicines. It was registered
as a dealer under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act. Its products
haYing extensive sales throughout India and abroad were despatched
from Calcutta against orders accepted by the appellant company in
Calcutt'1. It had no agent or manager in Bihar nor any office or
laboratory in that State. A notice under s. 13(5) of the Bihar Sales
Tax Act, 1947 was issued by the Bihar Sales Tax authorities calling
upon the appellar:t company to apply for registration and to submit
returns showing its turn over for a period between the 26th of January, 1950 and 30th September 1951. The appellant company denied its
liability on the grounds, inter alia that it was not resident in Bihar,
it carried on no business there and none of its sales took place in
Hihar. It characterized the notice under s. 13(5) as ultra vires and
illegal and called upon the Sales Tax authorities to cancel it forthwith. The Bihar Sales Tax authorities maintained that all sales in
West Bengal or in any other State under which goods had been delivered in the State of Bihar as a direct result of the sale for the purposes of consumption in that State were liable to Bihar Sales Tax.
Ultimately the appellant company presented before the High Court
at Patna a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution claiming the
reliefs mention.:d above. The High Court dismissed the petition
holding that it was not maintainable. On appeal under a certificate
604
1955
The &ngal
lmmlllliJv
Company limited
v.
Tire Stale of Bihar
and others
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955}
under Art. 132(1) of the Constitution:. Held, (per curiam) (i) that the High Court was not right in holding that the petition under Art. 226 was misconce,ived. In so holding the High Court overlooked the fact that the petitioners' contention
was that the Act, in so far as it. purported to tax a non-resident in
respect of inter-State sales or purchases of goods was ultra vires the
Constitution. There are various provisions in the Act laying down
certain conditions, which dealers must comply with or submit to.
They consti_tuted restrictions on the fundamental right guaranteed to
every citizen of India by Art. 19(1) (g) of the Constitution and these
onerous conditions could not be justified as reasonable restrictions
within the meaning of clause (6) of Art. 19 and further the remedy
under the Act cannot be said to be adequate and was indeed useless
if the Act providing for such remedy was itself ultra vires and void :
(ii) that there is nothing in the Constitution which prevent&
the Supreme Court from departing fron1 a previous decision of its
own if the court is satisfied of its error and its baneful effect on the
general interests of the public.
~t..feld, per S. R. DAs, AcTr~c C. J., V1v1AN BosE, BHAGW.ATI
and fAFER IMAM JJ. (JAGANNADHADAS, VENKATARAMA AvYAJ.
and B. P. S1NHA JJ., Jisse,,ting) that the present is· a fit case for
reviewing the previous majority decision of the Supre1ne Court in
The State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd. ([.1953)
S.C.R. 1069), in view of several circumstances relating to the case.
Held, per ·s. R. DAs, AcTING C. J., V1v1AN BosE, BttAGWATI
and }AFER IMAM JJ. (JAGANNADHADAs, VENKATARAMA AYYAR and
B. P. SINHA JJ., dissenting). The operative provisions of the several
parts of Art. 286, namely clause (l){a), clause (l)(b), clause (2) and
clause (3) arc intended to deal with different topics and, one cannot
be projected or read into another anc1 therefore the Explanation in
clause ( 1) (a) cannot be legitimately extended to clause (2) either as
an exception or as a proviso thereto or read as curtailing or limiting
the ambit of clause (2).
The sales or purchases made by the appellant company which
were sought to be taxed by the State of Bihar actually took place in
the course of inter·State trade or commerce. Parliament not having
by law otherwise provided, no State law could, therefore, tax these
sales or purchases, that is to say, Bihar could not tax by reason of
clause (2) although they fell within the Explanation and other States
could not tax. by reason of both clause ( 1) (a) read with the Explanation and clause (2).
What is an inter-State sale or purchase continues to be so irrespective of 'tl1e State where the sale is to be located cithc.r under the .
general law when it is finally determined what the. general law is or
by the fiction crean:d by the Explanation. The situs of a sale or
purchase •is wholly irrelevant as regards its intcr...Statc character.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
605
1955
Until Parliament by law made in exercise of the powers vested
in it by clause (2) of Art. 286 provides otherwise, no State can
The B<l!gal
impose or authorise the imposition of any tax on sales or puri:hases
lmmuniry
of goods when such sales or purchases take place in the course of Company Limiltd
v.
inter-State trade or commerce and the majority decision in The State
of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd. ((1953] S.C.R. 1069) The State of Bihar
and othas
in so far as it decides to the contrary cannot be accepted as well
founded on principle or authority.
In view of the above interpretation upon Art. 286 the charging
section of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 194 7 read with the relevant definitions cannot operate to tax inter·State sales or purchases and as
Parliament has not otherwise provided, the Act, in so far as it purports to tax sales or purchases that take place in the course of interState trade or commerce, is unconstitutional, illegal and void.
The Act imposes tax on subjects divisible in their nature but
does not exclude in express terms · subjects exempted by the Constitution. In such a situation the Act need not be declared wholly
ultra vires and void for it is feasible to separate taxes levied on
authorised subjects from those levied on exempted subjects and to
exciude the latter in the assessment of the tax.
Held (per JAoANNADHADAs, VENKATARAMA AYYAR and B. P.
SINHA JJ.). The scheme of Art. 286(1)(a) is, that it fixes the situs of
the sales with a view to avoid multiple taxation and for that purpose
it· divides them into two categories-inside sales and outside salesand cnaets cha~ a State cannot tax an outside sale. When in the
same context the &planation declares that a sale in the course of
inter-State trade must be deemed to have taken place in the State in
which the goods arc delivered for consumption, its purpose is clearly
to take it out of inter-State trade and stamp it with the character of
an intra-State sale.
Whether regard is had to the object of the enactment or its
language, the Explanation must be held to authorise the imposition
of tax by the delivery Statc.
Article 286(2) applies to sales in the course of inter-State trade.
The salc!s which fall within the Explanation an! intta-Statc sales.
The grolHlds covered by the two provisions uc distinGt and separate.
:Each has operation within its CIWn sphere, and there is no conllict
between them.
Accerdirtg to die vit:w ellpre!SCd· by Bose J. in The Sllltc of
Bombay v. Tht United Motors (India) Ltd. ((1953] S.C.R. 1069) and
by Das J. in S1111e of TravM1cor11-CocAit1 v. Shanmuglla Vilas Cashuv
Nut Factory ([1954] S.C.R. 53) Articll! 286(2) controls the Explartation. This cannot be sttstaintd on the language! of the enactment.
The Explanation; is not fiFJl'l'SS'd to be subjert t~ Art. 286(2). N'bc
decs the- latter cootaia tile words "notwiHi.ssmling anyehing OOBt*Md in the Explanation to Art. 286(I)(a)". These arc simple and
familiar capsoession. used by the legislature wh11n it intends that a
particular provision in the Statute should be subject to or override
606
1955
Tu Bengal
1..mu11it1
Company L1mittd
v.
Tu Stale ef Bihar
and olhns
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 19551
another. Nor is th~re anything in the language of the Explanation
providing that its operation is not to be in. praesenti but contingent
on Parliamentary legislation under Art. 286(2). To construe, therefore, Art. 286(2) as controlling the Explanation, one must import
into the Statute words which are not there and thereby cut down
the operation of the Explanation \vhich on its terms is of equal
authority and potency with Art. 286(2).
The impugned Act in so far as it authorises the imposition of tax.
or. sales falling within the Explanation to Art. 286(J)(a) is neither
ultra vires the powers of the State Legislature nor bad on the ground
that it is extra-territorial in its operation.
Per ]AGANNADHADAS J. The only reasonable: construction of
Art. 286(I)(a) taken with the Explanation is that this provision
while intended to prohibit taxation by States on outside: sales was
also meant to demarcate: the boundary between inside sales and out·
side sales and to assimilate one particular category of outside sales
into the field of inside sales and to make it available for taxation by
the consuming State.
CIVIL
APPELLATE
No. 159 of 1953.
JuRISDICTION :
Civil
Appeal
Appeal under Article 132(1) of the Constitution
of India from the Judgment and Order dated the 4th
December 1952 of the High Court of Judicature at
Patna in Misc. Judicial Case No. 241 of 1952.
N. C. Chatterji (V. S. Sawhney, S. N. Mukerii and
R. R. Biswas, with him) for the appellant company.
The High Court was wrong in holding that there was
no warrant for issuing a writ under article 226 of the
Constitution on the facts of the case. Although no
actual assessment was made by the Sales Tax authorities the issue of notice by them constituted a sufficient threat which the High Court had jurisdiction to
quash by means of a writ under article 226 of the
Constitution: see Himmatlal Harilal Mehta v. The
State of Madhya Pradesh ([1954] S.C.R. 1122), The State
of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd. ([1953]
S.C.R. 1069}, Mohammad Yasin v. The Town Area
Committee, falalabad ([1952) S.C.R. 572), The King v.
Commissioners for the General Purposes of the IncomeTax for Kensington ([19141 3 K.B. 429), Gtnerai Com•
missioners for the purposes of Income Tax for Kensington v. Aramayo ([1916] 1 A.C. 215), Madan Gopal
Kabra v. The Union of India ([1951 l l.T.R. 214), Sales
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(fJ7
Tax Officer, Pilibhit v. Messrs Budh Prakash /ai
Prakash ([1955] 1 S.C.R. 423), Commissioner of Police,
lJombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji (f1952J S.C.R. 135). Article 286(2) which is in Part XII of the Constitution is
meant to implement the supremacy of Parliament
with regard to inter-State trade or commerce. That
Article puts an embargo on the power of the State
Legislature to levy any tax with respect to interState trade or commerce. Only when the embargo is
lifted by appropriate Parliamentary Legislation that
the State Legislature can levy any tax on sales or
purchases in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. Article 286 puts a fetter on the State Legislatures and the Explanation to article 286(1)(a) does
not confer any power on any State Legislature to
levy any tax. The Explanation is meant to explain
only · clause (1) (a) of article 286, that is, what is an
outside sale or purchase. It does not remove fetter
and it does not convert any inter-State sale or
purchase into an intra-State transaction. See the
judgment of Bose J. in The State of Bombay v. The
United Motors (India) Ltd. ([19531 S.C.R. 1069) and
that of Das J. in The State of Travancore-Cochin "·
Shanmugha Vilas Cashew Nttt Factory (f 19541 S.C.R.
53). The construction of the Explanation by the
learned Judges of the High Court is not correct. They
were wrong in assuming that if article 286(2) is construed in a full and unqualified sense, the Explanation to article 286(1)(a) would become nugatory and
of no effect. They also erred in holding that the
Explanation expressly confers legislative power, and
that the Explanation is in the nature of an exception
which excludes a particular class from a larger class.
The High Court erred in holding that the Explanation created a nexus for conferring jurisdiction on the
State Legis1ature. Test of territorial nexus 1s no
longer applicable after the coming into force of the
Constitution. See The State of Bombay v. 'i.'he United
Motors (India) Ltd. ([19531 S.C.R. 1069).
On a proper reading of all the sections of the
Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947 the idea seems to be that
the intention was only to tax the dealers within the
1955
The Bmgal
Immunity
Company Limitetf
v.
The State of Bilrur
and others
608
-
18&5
TM B<q•I
~
Comptmy Limittd
'
\It;
The Sltlle of Biltar
Gnd oJllm
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
State of Bihar, as some of the provisions of the Act
would be incapable of enforcement outside the State.
Consequently the appellant which has no office or
agent within the State could not be taxed. See ss. 1,
2(c), 2(g), 4, 10, 14-A, 17, 26(a) (c) (b) & (k), of the
Act. Bihar Legislature has . no power to authorise
imposition of tax on outside dealers. The legislative
competence of a State Legislature is derived from
Article 246 read with the Lists. Under article 245(2)
Parliament is given power to enact legislation with
respect to extra-territorial operation. State Legislature has no such power. The combined effect of article 246(3) read with item 54 of List II is that the State
Legislature is competent only to make law imposing
tax on sale or purchase of goods for the whole or any
part of that State. Under article 245 of the Constitution power is limited within the boundary of the
State. Taxable event must happen in that State.
See Swifte v. Attorney-General for Ireland ( [ 1912] A.C.
276), Commercial Cable Company v. Attorney-General
for N_ewfoundland ([1912] A. C. 820), and MacLeod
v. Attorney-General for New South Wales ([1891]
A.C. 455). High Court failed to appreciate the
true effect of the judgment in Wallace . Brotherr and
Co., Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-Tar, Bombay
City and Bombay Suburban District ( [ 1948 I 75 I.A.
87). The Australian case cited by the High Court
viz., Q. Gilpin Limited v. Commissioner for Road
Transport and Tramways (New South Wale!) ([1935]
52 C.L.R. 189) has been overruled in Hugher and Vale!
Proprietary, Ltd. v. State of New South Wales ([1954]
3 All. E.R. @).
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India ( B. Se11
and P. K. Bose: with him), for the State of West Bengal
(Intervener). Bihar Sales Tax Act has to be read as
a whole and on a correct reading of the Act it clearly
appears that the Act is intended to apply only to
dealers in Bihar. Bihar cannot tax the sale because
it takes place in the course of inter-State trade or
commerce and the State is barred from taxing such
sales by reason of clause (2) of article 286. The ques.
tion is whether the majority view in the case of State
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
609
.of Bombay v. Unittd Motors (India) Ltd. ([1953] S.C.R.
1069) is correct. Article 245 read with Entry 54 in
List II gives the Legislative power whereas article
286 imposes restrictions on such Legislative power of
.a State. There are four restrictions placed by that
article-the first by clause ( 1) (a), the second by
clause (l)(b), the third by clause (2) and the fourth
by clause (3). Basis of article 286(2) is to ensure
freedom of movement throughout the country which
principle is to be found in article 301. Article 286(2)
gives authority to the Parliament to watch over the
principles underlying article 301 and to see what
restrictions are necessary. In determining the ambit
·of clause (2) it is not permissible to apply the Explanation. If you do so then logically you must also
apply it to clause 1(b). If the majority decision in
Statt of Bombay v. Unittd Motors (India) Ltd. ([1953]
S.C.R. 1069) is right on the interpretation of clause (2)
then that clause becomes absolutely meaningless.
The Supreme Court can overrule its previous
·decision if it is satisfied that the decision was erroneous: London Strut Tramways Company v. London
County Council ([18981 A. C. 375), In rt Transftrrtd ·
Civil Strvants (!rt/and) Comptnsation ([1929] A.C.
142), Tht Tramways cast (No. 1) (18 C.L.R. 54), Smith
v. Al/wright (321 U.S. 649; 88 L. Ed. 987) and Vinayak
v. Mortshwar (I.LR. [1944] Nag. 342).
Even if the ban imposed by clause (2) of article
186 did not apply, Bihar is not competent to tax on
a reading of article 246(3), Entry 54, List II and
article 286(1) (a). The word 'sale' in Entry 54, means
passing of property in the sense of the Sale of Goods
Act, s. 4. Sec Salt! Tax Offictr, PilibAit v. Mtssrs
Budh Prakash Jai Praka.rh ([19551 1 S.C.R. p. 243}.
'On a true construction of the Explanation to article
286(1)(a) Bihar is competent to levy a purchase tu
and not a sales tax in respect of transactions entered
into by dealers residing outside. The Explanation
cannot be read as extra-territorial. It must be read
as consistent with article 245. Although the Federal
1'955
Th• Bea,..t
lmmunil,J
Company Limited
v•
The Slilll of Bih•
and other<
610
1955
Th~ B~ngal
Immunity
Cumpany Limittd
v.
The Stall of Bihar
and othos
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955J
Legislature had extra-territorial power under the
Government of India Act, 1935 the Provincial Legis_lature · did not have such power. The position is the
same under the Constitution : The Governor-General
in Council v. The Raleigh Investment Co., Ltd. ([1944]
F.C.R. 229) and In re S. Mohan Kumaramangalam
(A.LR. 1951 Mad. 583). So far, nexus theory has
been applied to extra-territoriality as between two
independent States. Decision of the Supreme Court
in Poppatlal Shah's case is applicable to component
parts of the same State; Poppatlal Shah v. The State of
Madras ([1953]' S.C.R. 677), The State of Bombay v.
The United hfotors (India) Ltd. ([1953] S.C.R. 1069,
1078) and The Governor-General in Council v. The
Raleigh Investment Co. Ltd. ([1944] F.C.R. 229). It
is doubtful if nexus theory is applicable to this kind
of legislation. -In any event. the nexus theory is not
· applicable under the Constitution of India. If machinery for enforcement of the Ai:t has extra-territorial
operation and is linked up with the charging section
the whole scheme of taxation is bad due to the prov1S1ons of article 245. In any event the machinery
is bad.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India (Rajeswari Prasad and S. P. Varma, with him) for Tata
Iron and Steel Co., Ltd., (Intervener) supported the
appellant.
T. N. Subramanya Aiyar (T. V. R. Tatachari, with
him) for M. A. Kuriakose (Intervener) adopted the
arguments of the Attorney-General and referred to
V. 0. Vakkan v. The Government of the Province of
Madras ([19521 2 M.L.J. 353), Poppatlal Shah v. State
of Madras (A.LR. 1953 Mad. 91), Tobacco Manufacturers (India) Ltd., Monghyr v. The State of Bihar
(A.LR. 1950 Pat. 450),, The State of Bzhar v. Bengal
Chemical and Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. (A.LR. 1954
Pat. 14), Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 10th
Edn., p. 148 and Craies on Statute Law, 5th Edn., p.
174.
Lal Narain Sinha (B.K.P. Sinha and R.C. Prasad,.
with him), for the respondent (State of Bihar).
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
611
Article 246(3) read with Entry 54 of List II is by itself
enough to grant legislative competence to the making
of laws imposing tax on sales of inter-State character
having a . real and sufficient territorial connection
with the taxing State. Delivery of goods within the
State where such delivery. takes place in performance
of the contract of sale is by itself real and sufficient
territorial connection. The position was the same
under section 100 of the Government of India Act,
1935 read with Entry 48 of List II. A legislation on
the basis of a real and sufficient connection is not invalid on the ground of ext.ta-territorial .operation. The
Governor-General in Council v. The Raleigh Investment
Co., Ltd. (1944 F.C.R. 229), Wallace Brothers and Co.
Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Bombay City and
Bombay Suburban District ([1948] 75 I.A. 86), Broken
Hill South Limited (Public Officer) v. The Commissioner
of Taxation (New South Wales) (56 C.L.R. 337), Commissioners of Taxation v. Kirk (1900 A.C. 588) and In
re S. Mohan Kumaramangalam (A.LR. 1951 Mad. 583,
588). So far as conception of sale is concerned it comprises of several elements. The situs of the sale is
where the various ingredients of the sale take place.
Article 286(l)(a) dr)CS not govern the whole of interState trade or commerce. It does not apply to a case
where goods are delivered in the purchasing State for
purposes other than consumption. Article 286(1)(a)
has no application to cases where the Explanation
itself does not apply. If a Bengal dealer sells to a Bihar
purchaser and delivery takes place in Bihar and if
the purpose is consumption then the Explanation
applies and Bihar alone can tax. If the purpose is
not consumption the Explanation does not apply,
the matter is set at large, and States will be entitled
to tax on the nexus theory. The ban imposed by
clause (2) of article 286 does not apply to cases
covered by article 286(l)(a). The class of sales fallipg under the purview of Article 286(1)(a) form a
special class of inter-State sales which on general
principles of interpretation cannot be affected by the
general provisions of clause (2). Article 286(1)(a) and
article 286(2) are exactly on the same topic and they
1955
The Bengal
Immunity
Company Limited
v.
The Stau of Bihar
and others
612
1955
Tht Btotol
1-11.1
Cmtpany Liviited
v.
Tlw Slat1 of Bih1Jr
orul olhtr$
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
are to achieve the same purpose, i.e., elimination of
multiple taxation on a single sale. The device employed in article 286(1) (a) read with the Explanation
is to convert inter-State sale into an intra-State sale
and thereby to localise a sale and to take away the
taxing power of other States. Article 286( 1) (a) and
article 286(2) are complimentary to each other and
they have to be interpreted harmoniously so that each
of them can operate within its own field. Whilst
article 286(2) comprises all classes of inter-State
trade, article 286(1) (a) deals with a special class. If
article 286(2) applies to cases covered by article 286
(!) (a) and the Explanation then it will result in discrimination against local trade in favour of intcrState trade and this will be inconsistent with the pr<>visions of Part XIII of the Constitution. The purpose of article 286 being to eliminate multiple taxation and article 286(1) (a) having achieved that purpose in regard to a class of sales falling within it, it
is no longer necessary for that purpose to apply article 286(2) to the aforesaid class. The Constitution
itself has divided inter-State sales into two categories.
In regard to one class it has itself provided as to which
State will tax the sale and under what conditions. In
regard to the other class the Constitution itself has
imposed a ban in general terms and granted Parliament power in general to relax that ban to such extent
as Parliament thinks fit. The sale though of an interState character has been converted into an intJra-Statc
sale by reason of the legal fiction. If power of taxation is given all ancillary powers are included in that
very power.
V. K.- T. Chari, Advocate-General of Mlldras (K.
Veerasami, with him) for the State of Madras (Intervener). A State is sovereign within the limits of the
subject matter of List II as well as within its geographical area. The te..t of legislative competence both
as regards the subject matter and the geographical
limits is the same whether it is the Parliament or the
State Legislature. As to the subject matter the rul~
that applies is that of "pith and substance" and inO.
dental invasion of the other Lists is permitted. As
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
613
to area, the test is the territorial connection or nexus
as the limiting factor. The connection must be relevant and real and if the connection is real then any
impact on persons, things, acts or events outside the
State is permissible and valid. The word 'extra-territoriality' is used in the sense of legislation with respect
to conduct of citizens when they are outside the country. [Reference was made to Charter Act of 1833, s.
43, Government of India Act, 1915, s. 65 ( 1) (a), Hodge
v. The Queen (9 A. C. 117), The Commissioner of Stamp
Duties (New South Wales) v. Miller and another (48
C.L.R. 618), The Australasian Scale Company Limited
v. The Commissioner of Taxes (Queens Land) (53 C.L.R.
534), Broken Hill South Limited v. The Commissioner
of Taxation (New South Wales) (56 C.L.R. 337)]. Under
the Government of India Act, 1935 the requirement of
levying sales tax was that the goods belonging to the
seller must be located within the Province and that
those goods should have been made the subject matter
of a sale transaction. To establish territk>rial connection for sale. transaction the sine qua non is that the
goods belonging to the seller must be located within
the Province and that the goods should be made the
subject matter of a sale transaction. The Explanation to article 286(1) (a) is a deliberate reversal of the
pre-existing position.
T. L. Shet1de, Adt1ocate-General of Madhya Pradesh
and M. Adhikari (I. N. Shroff, with them) for the
State of Madhya Pradesh (Intervener). Whereas the
legislative power of all States under article 246(3)
read with Entry 54 List II to tax all outside transactions of sale or purchase has been curtailed or
restricted by clause l(a) and also by clause (2) of
article 286 the said legislative power of the deliverv
State is fully saved by the Explanation of clause I (a)
and is not ~ubject to the provisions of clause (2).
Every delivery State is competent to tax extra-territorially within the ambit of the Explanation and is
not fettered by clause (2). Clause (2) puts a ban on
all inter-State transactions except those covered by
the Explanation. The contention that the Explanation does not come into effect until the ban under
1955
Thr B'••al
fmmumJ1
Compan.J Limit•d
v.
Thi StoJt of Bihar
and •Iha•
614
1955
The Bengal
Immunity
Company Limited
v.
The Stale fl.( Bihar
and others.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
clause ( 2) is lifted by Parliament is incorrect and
untenable and moreover such a contention directly
contravenes the provisions of article 394 of the Constitution. The operation of the Explanation excludes
the operation of clause (2) and vice versa. Sales Tax
is in fact and substance only a purchase tax paid on
one and the same transaction. Intention was to put
an end to the evil of multiple taxation.
S. M. Sikri, Advocate-General of Punjab (Jindra
Lal and P. G. Gokhale, with him) for the State of Punjab (Intervener). Article 286(1)(a) like article 286(2)
deals with only sales or purchases which take place
during the course of inter-State trade or commerce, i.e.,
trade or commerce in which more than one State have
interest. The words 'inter-State ·trade or commerce'
have to be given the widest possible meaning. The
Explanation has the effect of divesting a transaction
of its inter-State character. Commonwealth of Australia
v. Bank of New South Wales (1950 A.C. 235) and Bank
of N. S. W. v. The Commonwealth (76 C. L. R. 1).
Assuming that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to.
overrule its own decision there is no reason for doing
so. Sec Denning on The Changing Law, 1935 Edn.,
p. 5.
Nittoor Sreenivasa
Rao,
Advocate-General of
Mysore, (R. Ganapathy Iyer and P. G. Gokhale, with
him) for the State of Mysore, K. S. Hajela, AdvocateGeneral of Rajasthan (P. G. Gokhale, with him) for
the. State 9f Rajasthan, Lachman Das Kaushal, Advocate-Genera/" of Pepsu (P. G. Gokhale, with him) for
the State of Pepsu, K. B. Asthana and C. P. Lal, for
the State of Uttar Pradesh, P. A. Mehta and P. G.
Gokhale, for the State of Orissa and T. R. Balakrishnan
and Sardar Bahadur Saharya, for the State of Travancore-Cochin (Interveners ), supported the respondent.
N. C. Chatterji replied.
1955. September 6. The judgment of S. R. Das,
Acting Chief Justice, Bose and Jafer Imam JJ. wa•
delivered by S. R. Das Acting Chief Justice. Bhagwati,
fagannadhadas, Venkatarama Ayyar and · B. P. Sinha
JJ. delivered separate judgments.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
615
DAs Acre. C.J.-This appeal, filed under a certificate of fitness granted by the High Court of Patna,
is directed against the judgment of that High Court
pronounced on the 4th December 1952 whereby it dismissed the application made by the appellant company under article 226 of the Constitution praying for
an appropriate writ or order quashing "the proceedings issued by the opposite parties for the purpose of
levying and realising a tax which is not lawfully leviable on the petitioners" and for other ancillary reliefs.
The relevant facts appearing from the petition filed
in support of the appellant company's aforesaid application are as follows : The appellant company is
an incorporated company carrying on the business of
manufacturing and selling various sera, vaccines,
biological products and medicines.
Its registered
head office is at Calcutta and its laboratory and factory are at Baranagar in the district of 24-Perganas in
West Bengal. It is registered as a dealer under the
Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act and its registered
number is S. L. 683A.
Its products have extensive
sales throughout the Union of India and abroad. The
goods are despatched from Calcutta by rail, steamer
or air against orders accepted by . the appellant company in Calcutta. The appellant company has neither
any agent or manager in Bihar nor any office, go<lown
or laboratory in that State. On the 24th October
1951 the Assistant Superintendent of
Commercial
Taxes, Bihar wrote a letter to the appellant company
which concluded as follows :"Necessary action may therefore be taken to get
your firm registered under the Bihar Sales Tax Act.
Steps may kindly be taken to deposit Bihar
Sales
Jax dues in any Bihar Treasury at an early
date
under intimation to this Departplent."
On the 18th December, 1951 a notice was issued by
the Superintendent,
Commercial ·Taxes, Central Circle
Bihar, Patna calling upon the appellant company (i)
to apply for registration and (ii) to submit returns
showing its turnover for the period commencing from
the 26th January, 1950 and ending with the 30th
1955
The Bengal
Immuni!J:
Company Limited
v.
The State of Bihar
and others
Das Actg. C. ].
616
1955
Tiu Bmgal
ltrm1Uni!J
Company Limited
v.
T 11' Slal1 of Bihm
end tJthers
DtU Adg. C. J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955}
September, 1951. This notice was issued under section 13(5) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947 (hereinafter called the Act) read with rule 28. It was drawn
up according to Form No. 8 prescribed by the rules
and was headed "Notice of hearing under section
13(5) ". The reason for issuing this notice, as recited
therein, was that on information which had come to
his possession the Superintendent was satisfied that
the appellant company was liable to pay tax but had
nevertheless wilfully failed to apply for registration
under the Act. Thereafter there was some correspondence between the appellant company and the
Bihar Sales Tax authorities to which it is not necessary to refer in detail. Suffice it to say that while
the appellant company denied its liability on the
ground, inter alia, that it was not resident in Bihar,
it carried on no business there, none of its sales took
place in Bihar and that it did not collect any sales
tax from any person of that State, the Bihar Sales
Tax authorities maintained that under section 33,
which was substantially based on article 286 of the
Constitution and was inserted in the Act by the' President's Adaptation Order promulgated on the 4th
April, 1951, all sales in West Bengal or any other
State under which the goods had been delivered in
the State of Bihar as a direct result of the sale for the
purpose of consumption in that State were liable to
Bihar Sales Tax. Eventually on the 29th May, 1952
the Assistant Superintendent of Sales Tax, Bihar
called upon the appellant company to comply with
the notice by the 14th June, 1952 and threatened
that, in default of compliance, he would proceed to
take steps for assessment to the best of his judgment.
The appellant company by its letter dated the 7th
June, 1952 characterised the notice under section 13
(5) as ultra vires and entirely illegal and called upon
the Superintendent to forthwith rescind and cancel
the same. On the 10th June, 1952 the appellant company presented before the High Court at Patna a
petition under article 226 claiming the reliefs hereinbefore mentioned. The respondents did not file any
affidavit in opposition controverting any of the alle-
2 S.C.R.
,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
617
gations of facts made in the petition and it must,
The Bengal
accordingly, be taken that those facts are admitted
Im mun it;:
as correct by the respondents. The High Court disCompany Limited
y.
missed the petition on the 4th December, 1952 but on
The State of Bihar
the next day issued a certificate, under article 132(1)
and others
of the Constitption, that the case involved a subDas Actg. C.J.
stantial question of law as to the interpretation of the
Constitution. Hence the present appeal.
In view of the importance of the issues involved in
this 'appeal the States of Madras, Uttar Pradesh,
Madhya Pradesh, West Bengal, Orissa,
Punjab,
Pepsu, Mysore, Travancore-Cochin
and
Rajastban
applied for and obtained leave to intervene in this
appeal. Si111ilar leave was applied for by and was
granted to Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd., and
one M. K. Kuriakose. The State of West Bengal,
Tata Iron & Steel Company Ltd., and M. K. Kuriakose
have supported the appellant company while the rest
of the intervcners have opposed the appeal.
Before the High Court the question of maintainability of the petition was raised by the respondents as a preliminary objection and it was answered
in their favour by the High Court. In its judgment
the High Court noticed that facts had not been investigated nor had the liability of the appellant company been determined and that in fact no on:1a of
assessment had been made. It pointed out that it was
not a case for the Sales Tax Officer usurping a jurisdiction not vested in him by law or acting in excess of
his jurisdiction or acting ma/a fide. The High Court
took the view that the Act undoubtedlv conferred
jurisdiction on the Sales Tax Officer to. investigate
the question of liability of a dealer to Sales Tax under
the Act and accordingly he was acting well within his
jurisdiction in issuing the impugned notice. lf on
assessment the Sales Tax Officer erroneously holds the
appellant liable t<l any tax, the Act provides for
rectifying that error by appeal or revision under sec- ·
tions 24 and 25 of the Act. According to the High
Court such a decision, however erroneous, will, nevertheless, be a decision within the ambit of pis jurisdiction and the High Court cannot interfere with it by
2-84 S.C. India/59
6i8
1955
The Bengal
Immunity
...
Company Limited
The State of Bihar
and othtrs
D.as Actz. C.]•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
11955]
a writ of prohibition or certiorari to quash. The High
Court accordingly held that the petition was not
maintainable and was liable to be dismissed.
We are unable to agree with the above conclusion .
In reaching that conclusion the High Court appears
to have overlooked the fact that the main contention
of the appellant company, as set forth ·in its petition,
js that the Act; in so far as it purports to tax a nonresident dealer in respect of an inter-State sale or purchase of goods, is ultra vires the Constitution and
wholly illegal. In the impugned Act there are various provisions laying · down conditions which dealers
must comply with or submit to, namely, to give only
a few instances, compulsory registration of dealers
(Section 10), filing of returns (Section 12), attendance
and production of evidence in support of the return
(Section 13), production, inspection and seizure of
books of account or documents and search of premises
(Section 17). Section 26 prescribes penalties for contravention cif the provisions of the Act. These and
other like provisions in the Act undoubtedly constitute restrictions on the fundamental right to carry
on business which is guaranteed to every citizen of
India by article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution. If,
as contended, the Act is ultra vires the Constitution
and consequently void these onerous conditions can
never be justified as reasonable restrictions within the
meaning of clause ( 6) of that article as this Court
held in the case of Mohammad Yasin v. The Town Area
Committee, Jalalabad( 1 ). The same view was also expressed in the State of Bombay v. The United Motors
(India) Ltd.('), and again only recently in HimmatlaJ
Harilal Mehta v. The State of Madhya Pradesh(').
It is urged that the appellant being a company is
not a ~itizen ;ind cannot, therefore, claim any fundamental right under article 19 which is available only
to citize~ and, therefore, the decisions of this C',ourt
referred to above have no application. While it is
noteworthy that the second case mentioned above
(I) [1952} 3 S.C.R. 572.
(2) [1953 4- S.CcR. 1069, 1077.
(3) [1954 s s.c.R. 1122, 1121.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
619
was concerned with the rights of a company, ·it is,
nevertheless, unnecessary, for the purposes of this
appeal, to decide whether a juristic person like a company is a citizen as defined in Part II of the Constitution and as such entitled to the benefits of Artick 19.
Nor is it necessary to consider whether there has
been any infraction of the right to equal protection
of the laws guaranteed by article 14 in that being a
juristic person it cannot claim any of the rights under
article 19 which only citizens can do. It is also true
that article 31 which protects citizens and non-citizens alike cannot be availed of as it deals with
deprivation of property otherwise than by way of
levying or collecting taxes as held by this Court in
Ramjilal v. Income-Tax Officer, Mohindargarh(1) and
that, therefore, the Act does not constitute an infringement of the fundamental right to property
under that article. It is, however, clear from article
265 that no tax can be levied or collected except by
authoritv of law which must mean a good and valid
law. The contention of the appellant company is
that the Act which authorises the assessment, levying
and collection of sales tax on inter-State trade contravenes and constitutes an infringement of article
286 and is, therefore, ultra vires, void and unenforceable. If, therefore, this contention be well founded,
the remedy by way of a writ must, on principle and
authority, be ·available to the party aggrieved.
It has been argued that the application was prem.1ture, for there has, so far, been no investigation or
finding on facts and no assessment under section B
of the Act. The appellant co:npany, contending, as
it does, that the Act is ultra vires and void, ~hou1d
have ignored the notice served on it and should 'not
have rushed into Court at this stage. This line of
argument appears to us to be utterly untenabie. i:n
the first place, it ignores the plain fact that this notice,
calling upon the appellant company to forthwith get
itself registered as a dealer, and to submit a return
and to deposit the tax in a treasury in Bihar, places
(1) [1951] 2 S.C.R. 127.
1955
The Bengal
lmmwiity
Company Limited
v.
The State of Bihar
and others
Das Aclg. C.J.
620
1955
The Bengal
lmmunip
Company Ltmiltd
v.
The State of Bihar
and others
Das ..4.ctg. C.Ji
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
r1955J
upon it considerable hardship,
harassment and
265
liability which, if the Act is void under article
read with article 286 constitute, in presenti, an encroachment on and an infringement of its right which
entitles it to immediately appeal to the appropriate
Court for redress.
In the next place, as was said by
this Court in Commissioner of Police, Bombay v.
Gordhandas Bhanji ('), when an order or notice emanates from the State Government or any of its responsible officers directing a person to do something,
then, although the order or notice may eventually
transpire to be ultra vires and bad in law, it is obviously one which prima facie compels obedience as a
matter of prudence and precaution. It is, therefore,
not reasonable to expect the person served with such
an order or notice to ignore it on the ground that it
is illegal, for he can only do so at his own risk and
peril. This Court has said in the last mentioned case
that a person placed in such a situation has the right
to be told definitely by the proper
legal authority
exactly where he stands and what he may or may
not do.
Another plea advanced by the respondent State 1s
that the appellant company is not entitled to take
proceedings praying for the issue of prerogative writs
under article 226 as it has adequate alternative remedy
under the impugned Act by way of appeal or revision.
The answer to this plea is short and simple. The remedy under the Act cannot be said to be adequate
and is, indeed, nugatory or useless if the Act which
provides for such remedy is itself ultra vires and void
and the principlt :elied upon can, therefore, have no
application where a party comes to Court with an
allegation that his right has been or is being threatened to be infringed by a law which is ultra vires the
powers of the legislature which enacted it and as such
void and prays for appropriate relief under artide
226. As said bv this Court in Himmatlal Harilal
Mehta v. The Stdte of Madhya Pradesh (supra) this plea
of the State stands negatived by the decision of this
Court in The State of Bombay v. The United Motors
(I) [19521 3 s.c.R. 135, 148, 149.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
621
(India) Ltd. (supra). We are, therefore, of the opm1on,
for reasons stated above, that the High Court was not
right in holding that "the petition under article 226
was misconceived or was not maintainable.
It will,
therefore, have to be examined and decided on merits.
Coming, then, to the merits of the petition, the
principal question is whether the tax threatened to
be levied on the sales made by the appellant company
and implemented by delivery in the circumstances and
manner mentioned in its petition is leviable by the
State of Bihar. The legal capacity of the State of
Bihar to tax these sales is questioned on the following
grounds, namely:(A) that the sales
sought to be taxed having
taken place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce and Parliament not having by law provided
otherwise, all States are debarred from imposing
tax
on such sales by reason of article 286(2);
(B) that even if the ban under article 286(2) did
not apply, the State of Bihar is not competent to impose tax on such sales on a correct reading of article
246(3) read with Entry 54 of List II in the Seventh
Schedule and article 286(1);
(C) that the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947 can have
no extra-territorial operation and cannot, therefore,
impose tax on such sales by a non-resident seller;
(D) that on a true construction of the Act itself,
it does not apply to the sales sought to be taxed.
Re (A) : The main controversy in this appeal has
centred round this ground. It raises a question of
construction of article 286 of the Constitution. In the
judgment under appeal the High Court took the view
that ·;ales or purchases in the course of inter-State
trade or commerce referred to in article 286 (2) must
be construed so as to exclude the particular class of
sales or purchases described in the Explanation to
clause (a) of article 286 (1) and that, therefore,
the
provisions of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947, in so far
as they purported to impose tax on such sales, were
not ill conflict with article 286(2) as so construed.
After this decision of the Patna High Court the question came up for consideration before a Constitution
195$
The Bengal
Jmmu•i!J'
Company Limited
v.
Thi State of Bihar
and others
Das Actg. C.J.
622
1955
Tke Bmgal
Immunity
Company Limited
V·
TM State of Bihar
a'fld others
Das Actg. C.J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
11955]
Bench of this Court in The State of Bombay v. The
United Motors (India) Ltd. (supra). The majority
of
that Bench held that article 286(l)(a), read with the
Explanation thereto and construed in the light of
articles 301 and 304, prohibited the taxation of sales
or purchases. involving inter-State elements by
all
States . except the State in which the goods were
actually delivered for the purpose of consumption
therein and that clause (2) of article 286 did not affect
the power of the State in which delivery of the wlO<!s
was so· made to tax the sales or purchases of the kind
mentioned in the Explanation, the effect of which
was to convert such inter-State transactions into
intra-State transactions and to take them out of the
operation of clause (2) of that article. It is quite clear
that if this majority view is to prevail this. ground
uqied by learned counsel for the appellant
company
and strongly supported by the learned
AttorneyGeneral appearing for the interveners, the State of
West Bengal and Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd.,
and by learned counsel for M. K. Kuriakose must fail.
It has, accordingly, been pressed upon us that we are
not hound by the maiority decision in that appeal
from Bombay and that it is still open to us to examine
and ascertain for ourselves the true meaning, import
and scope of the article in question. Learned counsel
for some of the interveners question our authority to
go behind the majority decision.
It is, therefore,
necessary at this stage to determine this preliminary
question before entering upon a detailed discussion
on the question of construction of article 286.
In England, the Court of Appeal has imposed upon
its power of review of earlier precedents a limitation,
subject to certain exceptions.
The limitation
thus
accepted is that it is bound to follow its own derisions · and those of courts of Co--ordinate jurisdiction,
and the "full" Court is in the same position in this
respect as a division Court consisting of three members. The only exceptions to this rule are: (l) the
Court is entitled and bound to decide which of the
two conflicting decisions of its own it will follow: (2)
the Court is hound to refuse to follow a decision of
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
623
its own which, though not expressly overruled, cannot,
in its opinion stand with a decision of the House of
Lords; and (3) the Court is not bound to follow a decision of its own, if it is satisfied that the decision was
given per incuriam, e.g., where a Statute or a rule
having statutory effect which would have affected the
decision was not brought to the attention of the e:lr!ier
Court. [See Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd.(1) which,
on appeal to the House of Lords, was approved by
Viscount Simon in L.R. 1946 A.C. 163 at p. 169]. A
decision of the House of Lords upon a question of law
is. con<0lusive and binds the House in subsequent case.
An erroneous decision of the House of Lords can be
set right only by an Act of Parliament. fSee Street
Tramways v. London County Council (2) ]. This limitation was repeated by Lord Wright in Radcliffe v.
Ribble Motor Services Ltd. (3).
The High Court in Australia, which is the highest
Court in that Commonwealth, has not adopted such
a rigid rule. In the Tramways case (4) the rule was
thus laid down by Griffith, C.J. at p. 58:
"In my opinion, it is impossible to maintain an
abstract proposition that Court is either legally or
technically bound by previous decisions. Indeed, it
may, in a proper case, be its duty to disregard them.
But the rule should be applied with great caution,
and only when the previous decision is manifestly
wrong, as, for instance, if it proceeded upon the mistaken assumption of the continuance of a repealed or
expired Statute, or is contrary to a decision of another
Court which this Court is bound to follow; not, I think,
upon a mere suggestion that some or all of the members of the later Court might arrive at a different conclusion if the matter was res integra. Otherwise there
would be grave danger of want of continuity in the
interpretation of law."
In the same case Barton, J. m the concluding paragraph of his judgment at p. 69 expressed himself
thus:
"In conclusi9p, I would say that l never thought
(I) L.R. 19H K.B. 718 C.A.
(3) 1939 A.C. 215, 245.
(2) 1898 A.C. 375.
(4) [1914) 18 C.L.R. 54.
1955
The Bengal
Immunit,J
Company Limited
v.
The State of Bihar
ar.d others
Das Actg. C.J.
624
1955
T;t Ben~al
lmmuni'.Y
Company Limited
••
T fie Statt of Bihar
and othtrs
V.s A.-tg. C.J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
f1955]
that it was not open to this Court to review its previous decisions upon good cause. The question is not
whether the Court can <lo so, but whether it will, having due regard to the need for continuity and con,istency in the judicial decision. Changes in the number
of appointed Justices can, I take it, never of themselves furnish a reason for review. That the prior
decision was that of little more than half their number
might be urged with greater fairness, but it cannot be
urged against W hyhrow's case which was decichl by
the whole Court then .in existence save the Justice
who as President of the Arbitration Court, . was a
party respondent to the order nisi. But the Court
can always listen to argument as to whether it ouglit
to review a particular decision, and the strongest
reason for an overruling is that a decision is manifestly wrong and its continuance is injurious to the
public interest".
It is interesting to note that in that case all the Judges
agreed that the decision in W hybrou/s case wa. to be
treated as open to review
(Per Griffith, C.J. at p. 58)
although in the end, after reviewing the position
afresh in the light of new arguments advanced before it, the Court came to the same conclusion.
Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. Adelaide Steamship Co.(') may also be referred to as an instance
where the High Court of Australia departed from its
previous decision.
In the United States of America there have been
a considerable number of cases in which the Supreme
Court has explicitly and avowedly overruled its prior
decisions but there have been more insta11ces in which
the doctrines declared in prior cases have been in paf.I:
evaded or modified without explicit repudiation.
(Willoughby-Constitution of the United States, 2nd
E:rln., Vol. I, pp. 74-75). In State of Washington v.
Dawson & Co.( '), Brandies, J. in his dissenting ju,lgment said :
"The doctrine of .<tare deci.<is should not deter us
from overruling that case and those which follow it.
(I) [1920] 28 C.L.R. 129.
(2) 264 U.S. 646; 68 L.Ed. 219.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
625
The decisions are recent ones. They have not been
acquiesced in. They have no.t created a rule of property around which vested interests have clustered.
They affect solely matters of a transitory nature. On
the other hand, they affect seriously the lives of men,
women and children, and the general welfare. Stare
decisis is ordinarily a wise rule of action. But it is
not a universal. inexorable command. The instances
in which the Courts have disregarded its admonition
are many".
In a foot-ncte to this judgment the learned Judge set
out a large number of instances where the earlier
decisions had been overruled. In another dissenting
judgment in David Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas
Company(1) the same learned Judge, after quoting a
passage from the judgment of Mr. Justice· Lurton in
Hertz v. Woodman( 2 ) proceeded to say:
"Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because
in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled right. Compare National
Bank v. Whitney, 103 U.S. 99; 26 L.Ed. 443-444· This
is commonly true even where the error is a matter of
seriom rnncern, provided correction can be had by
legislation. But in cases involving the Federal Constitution, where correction through legislative action
is practically impossible, this Court has often OV('Truled its earlier decisions. The:: Court bows to the
lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning
recognising that the process of trial and error, so
fruitful in the physical science~, is appropriate also
in the )udicial function".
In his separate but concurring judgment in Mark
Grave.< v. People of tl1e State of Nefll York(3) Frankforter, J. observed :
"Judicial exegesis is unavoidable with reference
to an act like our Constitution, drawn in many particular~ with purposed vagueness so as to leave room
for the unfolding future. But the ultimate touchstone
of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not
(I) 285 U.S. 393; 76 L.Ed. 815.
(2) 218 U.S. 205, ·212; 54. L.Ed. 1001, 1005.
(3) 306 r .S. 466; 83 L.Ed. 927.
1955
The Bengal
bnmunity
Company Limited
v,
The Stll.te of Bihar
mu/ others
Das Actg. C.J.
626
1955
The Be111.al
Immunity
Company Limited
...
The StaU ef Bihar
and othtrs
Das Actg. C.J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
l 1955]
what we have said about it".
In this case two previous d·~cisions were expressly
overruled and two more were impliedly overruled.
We now come to the Privy Council which, prior to
the commencement of our Constitution, was the
highest Court of Appeal to hear appeals from the
Indian High Courts. In a case about Compensation to
Civil Servants('), in repelling the contention that the
Board was bound in law, and without examination,
to follow an earlier decision whether they consi<lered
it right or wrong the Marquess of Reading said :
"Their Lordships are unable to hold that this
proposlt:ion stated in such an extreme form is estab..
lished. It may well be said that the Board would
hesitate long before disturbing a solemn decision by
a prewus Board, which raised an identical or even
a similar issue for determination; but for the proposition that the Board is, in all circumstances, bound to
follow a previous decision, as it were, blindfold, they
are unable to discover any adequate authority. In
other words, no inflexible rule, which falls in all
circumstances to be applied, has been laid down".
In the Attorney-General of Ontario v. The Canada
Temperance Federation(') Viscount Simon stated the
practice of the Board in the following terms :
"Their Lordships do not doubt that in tendering
humble advice to His Majesty, they are not absolutely
bound by previous <lecisions of the Board, as is the
House of Lords by its own judgments. In ecclesiastical
appeals, for instance, on more than one occasion the
Board has tendered advice contrary to that given in
a previous case, which further historical research has
shown to have been wrong. But on constitutional
questions it must be seldom indeed that the Board
would depart from a previous decision which it may
be assumed will have been acted upon both by Governments and subjects".
Finally, in Phanindra Chandra Neogy v. The King(')
Lord Simonds said at p. 88 :
(I) L.R. 1929 A.G. 242; A.LR. 1929 P.C. B4, 87.
(2) [1946] 50 c.w.N. 535; A.LR. 1946 P.c. 88.
(3) L.R. 76 I.A. IO; 1939 Dom. L.R. 87 (P.C.).
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
627
"Theiv Lordships then have before them a decision upon facts which in no material respect differ from
those of the present case. Even so, it is, as they re.·
cognise, competent for them humbly to tender advice
to His Majesty inconsistent with a previous decision,
though it can only be in most exceptional circumstances that such a course should be taken ......... .
Recognising the possibility, they have heard full
argument and, having done so, see no reason to doubt
the validity of the reasoning of the correctness of the
conclusion in Gill's case, and they do not think it
necessary to repeat what was said there".
In considering the applicability of the principles laid
down in the decisions hereinbefore mentioned, ic
should be borne in mind that the English decisions
may well have been influenced by considerations which
can rio longer apply to the circumstances prevailing in India. The error, if any, of the Court of
Appeal in England, may be corrected bv the House
of Lords or eventually by Parliament by a simple
majority. The mistakes, if anv, made by the High
Court of Australia, if not corrected bv itself in a
subsequent case, could be set right by the Privy
Council when appeals were taken there or bv the
appropriate legislativ~ authority. An error made by
the House of Lords or the Privy Council can easily
be rectified by Parliament by a simple majority by an
amending statute. But in a country governed by a
federal constitution, such as the United States of
America and the Union of India are, it is bv no means
easy to amend the Constitution if an erroneous interpretation is put upon it by this Court. (See article
368 of our Constitution). An erroneous interpretation
be
of the Constitution
may quite conceivably
perpetuated or may at any rate remain unrectified
for a considerable time to the great detriment to
public well being. The considerations adverted to in
the decisions of the Supreme Court of America quoted
above are, therefore, apposite and apply in full force
in determining whether a previous decision of this
Court should or. should not he disregarded or overruled. There is nothing in our Constitution which
1955
The Bmgal
Immunity
Company Limitei
v.
The State of Bil.ar
and othns
Das Actg. C.J.
628
1955
The Benial
Immunity
Company LimiUd
v.
The State of Bihar
and others
Das .~ctg. C. J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[195SJ
prevents us from departi11g from a previous dcci,ion
if we are convinced of its error and its baneful effect
on the general interests of the public. Article !41
which lays down that the law declared bv this Court
shall be binding on all Courts within the territory of
India quite obviously refers to Courts other rhan this
Court. The corresponding provision of the Government of India Act, 1935 also makes it clear that the
Courts contemplated are the Subordinate Court<.
There are several circumstances relating to the
maiority decision of the Court in The Stale of Bomhav
v. The United Motors (India) Ltd. (supra) to which
reference must be made. That appeal was heard immediately before the hearing of the appeal r.ported
as The State of Travqncore-Cochin v. Shanmugha Vilas
Cashew Nut Factory(') commenced. The two appeal<
were, as ·a matter of fact, heard one after the other
and judgments were reserved in both of them. The
constitution of the Benches was. however, different.
In the first appeal one of the Judges of that Bench
expressly differed from the majority decision and an<>ther learned Judge did not accept the majority d~ci
sion on many points. In the second appeal one Jud~e
of the Bench, who was not a party to the fir>t appeal,
differed from the majoritv decision in the first apl"t':ll.
The result, therefore. was that the majority decision
was definitely differed from by two Judges. Bhagwati
J. has now in the judgment he has written in the present appeal which we have had the advantage of reading reconsidered the matter and on further reAection
he thinks that the maiority decision on the pre<ei)t
issue was erroneous and he now agrees substantially
with the view of article 286(1 )(a) read with the Explanation and article 286(2) which was expressed in
the two minority judgment< referred to above and
which is adopted in the iudgment now being delivered
in the present appeal. If Bhagwati J. had then expre5'ed the views he is now doing, ther> the maioritv
in the Bomhav appeal would haYe been 3 to 2 and if
we add the oninion of the dissenting fudge in the
Travanrore-Cochin appeal 1hen judicial opinion would
(I) (1954] 5 S.C..R. 53.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
629
have been divided 3 to 3. In this juxtaposition it is
difficult to give the majority decision in the Bombay
appeal that amount of sanctity and reverence which is
usually attributed to an unretracted majority decision of this Court.
The majority decision does not merely determine
the rights of the two contending parties to the Bombay appeal. Its effect is far reaching as it affects the
rights of all consuming public. It authorises the imposition and levying of a tax by the State on an
interpretation of a constitutional provision which
appears . to us to be unsupportable. To follow that
interpretation will result in perpetuating what, with
humility we say, is an error and in perpetuating a tax
burden imposed on the people which, according to our
considered opinion, 1s manifestly and wholly unauthorised. It is not an ordinary pronouncement
declaring the rights of two private individuals inter
se. It involves an adjudication on the taxing power
of the States as against the consuming public generally. If the decision is erroneous, as indeed we conceive it to be, we owe it to that public to protect
them against the illegal tax burdens which the States
are seeking to impose on the strength of that erroneous recent decision.
The third circumstances is that there appears to be
some vagueness, if not inconsistency, in the majority
judgment itself. At p. 1084 of the authorised reportthe majority judgment says :
''The expn:ssion 'for the purpose of consumption
in that State' must. in our opinion, be understood as
having reference not merely to the individual impori.er or purchaser but as contemplating distribution
eventually to consumers in general within the State.
Thus all buyers within the State of delivery from
out-of-State sellers, except those buying for re-export
out of the State, would be within the scope of the
Exolanation and liable to be taxed by the State on
their inter-State transactions".
This passage seems to suggest that it is only the
huvcrs fa\lin~ within the Explanation who are liable
to be taxed by what has been called in the discussion
1955
The Bengal
Immunity
Company' LimitLd
v.
The State of /Jiha•
and others
Das Actg. C. J.
630
1955
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
before us as the delivery State. According to this
passag<, r<ad by itself, the out-of-State sellers are not
lmmwtity
considered liable to be taxed on the sales. The whole
Company Limited
trend of the rest of the majority judgment and the
v.
The State of Bihar
actuai decision therein run counter to this conclusion,
and others
for the out-of-State sellers were, by reason of the
Das Aclg. C. J.
Explanation, subjected to the taxing power of the
delivery State. Indeed, Bihar is claiming to tax the
appellant company, an out-of-the-State seller, by
virtue of the majority decision and all other States
intervening and supporting Bibar read the judgment
in that way and none of them accepts the quoted
passage as containing the actual ratio decidendi of the
majority judgment. This confusion, we consider, is
also a cogent reason for re-examining that decision.
Reference is made to the doctrine of finality of
judicial decisions and it is pressed upon us that w<
should not reverse our previous decision except in
cases where a material provision of law has been
overlooked or where the decision has proceeded upon
the mistaken assumption of the continuance of a repealed or expired statute and that we should not
differ from a previous decision merely because a contrary view appears to us to be preferable. It is needless for us to say that we should not lightly dissent
from a previous pronouncement of this Court. Our
power of review, which undoubtedly exists, must be
exercised with due care and caution and onlv for
advancing the public well being in the light of the
surrounding circumstances of each case brought to
our notice but we do not consider it right to confine
our power within rigidly fixed limits as suggested
before us. If on a re-examination of the question we
·come to the conclusion, as indeed we have, that the
previous majority decision was plainly
erroneous
then it will be our duty to say so and not to perpetuate our mistake even when one learned Judge who
was party to the previous decision considers it incorrect on further reflection. We should do so all the
more readily as our decision is on a constitutional
·question and our erroneous decision has imposed
·illegal tax burden on the consuming public and has
The Bengal
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
631
otherwise given rise to public inconvenience or hardship, for it is by no means easy to amend the Coristitution. Sometimes frivolous attempts may be made
to question our previous decisions but if the reasons
on which our decisions are founded are sound they
will by themselves be sufficient safeguard against such
frivoious attempts. Further, the doctrine of stare
aecisis has hardly any application to an isolated and
stray decision of .the Court very recently made and
not followed by a series of decisions based thereon.
The problem before us does not involve overruling a
series of decisions but oniy involves the question as
to whether we should approve or disapprove, follow
or overrule, a very recent previous decision as a
precedent. In any case, the doctrine of stare decisis
is not an inflexible rule of law and cannot be permitted to perpetuate our errors to the detriment to
the general welfare of the public or a considerable
section thereof.
It is pointed out that all the States are realising
sales tax in respect of sales or purchases of goods
where the goods are actually delive.red for consumption within their respective boundaries on the faith
of our previous decision and a reversal of that decision will upset the economy of the States and will
indeed render them liable to refund moneys already
·collected by them as taxes. This circumstance, it is
pressed upon us, should alone deter us from differing
from the previous decision. We are not impressed by
this argument. It has not yet been decided by this
Court that moneys paid under a mutual mistake of
law induced by a wrong judicial interpretation of a
statute or the CQnstitution must necessarily be refundable as money had and received. If, as contende<l, moneys so paid are in law refundable the
States cannot complain any more than a private
individual in similar· circumstances could do. Finally,
if the State economy is upset the appeal must be to
Parliament which under article 286(2) itself has
ample power to make suitable legislation.
The impugned decision is a recent one. The judicial
opinion was divided, if not evenly balanced. One of
1955
The Bengal
lmmUTi.ity
Company Limited
v.
The State of Bihar
and otlters
Das Actg. C. ].
632
1955
The B1ragal
lmmunitv
Compan_;~ Liinited
v.
The State of Bif1ar
and others
Das Actg. C. ].
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
11955]
the four Judges who formed the majority has revised
his opinion as stated above. The decision on the point
noted above seems to be somewhat inconsistent and
is, at any rate, not quite clear. It has encouraged the
imposition of tax burdens on the consuming public on
an interpretation of the Constitution which appears
to us to be plainly erroneous. It has given rise to considerable inconvenience and hardship to business people who have not acqniesccd in it by any means. To
rectify the error by the legislative process is difficult,
for a constitutional amendment reqnires a specified
majority which may not always be available and if it
involves an amendment of the legislative lists it will
require the consent of a requisite number of the States
which, in this instance, cannot reasonably be expected.
In the premises, we think that it is precisely a case
wher7, in the public interests, the meaning, scope and
effect of article 286 should be re-examined afresh in
the light of the fresh arguments now advanced before
us and the experience we have since acquired. In our
judgment the majority deci.sion in The State of Bombay
v. The United Motors (India) Ltd. (supra) is, in the
circumstances alluded to; open to review and we are
entitled to re-examine article 286 in order to ascertain
its true meaning, scope and effect so far as it is necessary for the purposes of this appeal and we proceed
on this basis.
It is a sound rule of construction of a statute firmly
established in England as far back as 1584 when
Heydon's ·case(') was decided that". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . for the sure and true interpretation
of all Statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial,
restrictive or enlarging of the common law) four things
are to be discerned and considered:ht. What was the common law before the making of the Act.,
2nd. What was the mischief and defect for which
the common law did not provide.,
3rd. What remedy the Parliament hath resolved
and appointed to cure the disease of the Commonwealth., and
(I) 3 Co. Rep. 7a; 76 E.R. 637.
r
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
633
4th. The true reason of the remedy ; and then
the office of all the judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance
the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and
evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro
privato commodo, and to add force and life to the cure
and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers
of the Act, pro bono publico".
In In ,re Mayfair Property Company( 1 ) Lindley, M.R.
in 1898 found the rule "as necessary now as it was
when Lord Coke reported Heydon's case". In Eastman
Photographic Material Company v. Comptroller General
of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks(2) Earl of Halsbury re-affirmed the rule as follows :
"My Lords, it appears to me that to construe the
Statute in question, it is not only legitimate but
highly convenient to refer both to the former Act and
to th() ascertained evils to which the former Act had
given rise, and to the later Act which provided the
remedy. These three being compared I cannot doubt
the conclusion".
It appears to us that this rule is equally applicable to
the construction of article 286 of our Constitution.
In order to properly interpret the provisions of that
article it is, therefore, necessary to consider how
the matter stood immediately before the Constitution came into force, what the mischief was for
which the old law did not provide and the remedy
which has been provided by the Constitution to cure
that mischief.
The position with respect to taxation on sales or
purchases of goods that prevailed in the country had
better be stated in the language of Patanjali Sastri,
C. J. who delivered the majority judgment in the State
of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd. (supra).
After expressing the view, based on the authority of
the Wal/ace Brothers' Case(3) that in the case of sales
tax, it · was not necessary that the sale should take
place within the territorial limits of the State in the
sense that all the ingredients of a sale, like the agree-
M L.R. [1898] A.C. 571, 576.
(3) 1948 F.C.R. I.
(!} L.ll. [1898] 2Ch. 28, 35.
.
3-84 S. C. India/59
1955
The Bncgal
Immuniry
Campany Limilt4
v.
The State of Biliat'
and othws
Das Actg. C. J-
634
1955
The Bmga.l
Immunity
Co1t1p«ny LimiUd
v.
Tilt Slat• of Bihar
and others
D•s Actg. C. ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
ment to sell, the passing of title, delivery of the goods,
etc., should have a territorial connection with the
State and that, broadly speaking, local activities . of
buying and selling carried on in the State in relation
to local goods would be a sufficient basis to sustain
the taxing power of the State, providecj of course
that such activities ultimately resulted in a concluded
sale to be taxed, the learned Chief Justice proceeded
to say:"In exercise of the legislative power conferred upon
them in substantially similar terms by the Government of India Act, 1935, the Provincial Le~is
latures enacted Sales Tax laws for their respective
Provinces, acting on the principle of territorial nexus
referred to above; that is to say, they picked out one
or more of the ingredients constituting a sale and
made them the basis of their sales tax legislation.
Assam and Bengal made, among other thing~ the
actual existence of the goods in the Province at the
time of the contract of sale the test of taxabilitv. In
Bihar the production or manufacture of the goods in
the Province was made an additional ground. A net
of the widest range perhaps was laid in the Central
Provinces and Berar where it was sufficient if the
goods were actually "found" in the Province at any
time after the Contract of Sale or Purchase in respect
thereof was made.
Whether the territorial nexus
put forward as the basis of the taxing power in each
case would be sustained as sufficient was a matter of
doubt not ,.having been tested in a Court of law. And
such claims to taxing power led to multiple taxation
of the same transaction by Provinces and cumulation
of the burden falling ultimately on the consummg
public. This situation posed to the Constitution
makers the problem of restricting the taxing ·power
on sales or purchases involving inter-State elements,
and alleviating the tax burden on the consumer. At
the same time they were evidently anxious to maintain the State power of imposing non-discriminatory
taxes on goods imported from other States, while
upholding the economic unity of India by providing
for the freedom of inter-State trade and commerce.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
635
In their attempt to harmonise and achieve these somewhat conflicting objectives, they enacted articles 286,
301 and 304".
Leaving out, for the moment, the question as to whether articles 301 and 304 have any bearing on the
question of construction of article 286, as to which we
entertain a contrary opinion, the above passage quite
adequately depicts the oictml". of chaos and confusion
that was brought about in inter-State trade or commerce by indiscriminate exercise of taxing power by
the different Provincial Legislatures founded on the
theory of territorial
nexus between the respective Provinces and the sales or purchases sought to
be taxed. Tt was to cure this mischief of multiple
taxation and to preserve the free flow of inter-State
trade or commerce in the Union of India regarded
as one economic unit without any provincial barrier
that the Constitution makers adopted article 286 m
the Constitution which runs as follows :"286. (1) No law of a State shall impose, or
authorise the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of goods where such sale or purchase takes
place( a) outside the State; or
(b) in the course of the import of the goods into,
or export of the goods out of, the territory of India.
Explanation.-For the purposes of sub-clause (a),
a sale or purchase shall be deemed to have taken
place in the State in which the goods have actually
been delivered as a direct result of such sale or purchase for the purpose of consumption in that State,
notwithstanding the fact that under the general law
relating to sale of goods the property in the goods has
by reason of such sale or purchase passed in another
State.
(2) Except in so far as Parliament may by law
otherwise provide, no law of a State shall impose, or
authorise the imposition of, a tax on the sale or
purchase of any goods where such sale or purchase
takes place in the course of inter-State trade or
commerce:
Provided that the President may by order direct
1955
Thi Bengal
Immunity
Company Limited
v.
T ht State of BibMr
Mruf ot/ierJ
D•s .dctg. C. J.
636
1955
Tire Bmg•I
/111munil)'
ComjJtmJ Limited
v.
The State of Bihat
tJNl t1lhlrs
Das)Actg. C. J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
that any tax. on the sale or purchase of goods which was
being lawfully levied by the Government of any State
immediatdy before the commencement of this Constitution shall, notwithstanding that the imposition
of such tax is contrary to the provisions of this clause,
continue to be levied until th~ thirty-first day of
March, 1951.
(3) No law made by the Legislature of a State
imposing, or authorising the imposition of, a tax on
the sale or purchase of any such goods as have been
declared by Parliament by law to be essential for the
life of the community shall have effect unless it has
been reserved for the consideration of the President
and has received his assent".
Article 286 is in Part XII of the Constitution which
deals with "Finance, Property, Contracts and Suits".
It is one of the several articles which are grouped
under the heading "Miscellaneous Financial Provisions" in Chapter I of that Part. It is to be noted
that it has not found ·a place in Part XI, Chapter I
whereof deals with "Legislative Rdations" including
"Distribution of Legislative Powers" between Parliament and the Legislatures of States. The marginal
note to article 286 is "Restrictions as to imposition of
tax on the sale or purchase of goods'', which, unlike
the marginal notes in Acts of the British Parliament,
is part of the Constitution as passed by the Constituent Assembly, prima facie, furnishes some clue as
to the meaning and purpose of the article. Apart from
the marginal note, the very language of that article
makes it abundantly clear that its object is to
place restrictions
on
the
legislative power
of
the States with respect to the imposition of taxes
on the sales or purchases of goods. It will be recalled that section 100(3) of the Government of India
Act, 1935 read with Entry 48 of List II of the Seventh
Schedule to that Act gave power to the Provincial
Legislatures to make laws with respect to "Taxes on
sale of goods and on advertisements". Pursuant t::>
the. legislative power thus conferred on them the Fr<'~
vincial Legislatures enacted Sales Tax Acts for thei1
respective Provinces. Althougli in most of those Acts
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
637
"Sale" was first defined as meaning transfer of the
property in the goods, so as to make the passing of
the property within the Province the principal . basis
for the imposition of the tax, yet by means of Explanations to that definition, those Acts gave extended
meanings to that word and thereby enlarged the scope
of their operation. The imposition of ux on the sales
or purchases of goods on the basis of a very slight
territorial connection or nexus resulted in what has
been graphically described by Patanjali Sastri, C.J.
in the passage quoted above from the majority judgment in the Bombay appeal. This imposition of multiple taxes on one and the same transaction of sale or
purchase was certainly calculated to hamper and discourage free flow of trade within India regarded as
one economic unit. This undesirable state of affairs
had to be put right. Therefore, while the Constitution makers by article 246(3) read with Entry 54 in
List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution
conferred power on the Legislatures of Part A and
Part B States to make law with respect to "Taxes op
the sale or purchase of goods other than newspapers"
they at the same time by article 286 clamped on that
legislative power several fetters. Broadly speaking,
the fetters thus placed on the taxing power of the
States are that no law of a State shall impose or
autnorise the imposition of a tax on the sale or purchase of goods where such sale or purchase takes place,
(a) outside the State or (b) in the course of import or
export or ( c) except in so far as Parliament otherwise
provides, in the course of inter-State trade or commerce and lastly ( d) that no law made by the Legi~
lature of a State imposing or authorising the imposition of a tax on the sale or purchase of a,ny such goods
as have been declared by Parliament by law to be
essential for the life of the community shall have
effect unless it has been reserved for the consideration
of the President and has received his assent. It should
be noted that these arc four separate and independent restrictions placed upon the legislative competency of the States to make a law with respect to
matters enumerated in Entry 54 of List II. In order
1955
T!w B,,,,,,l
J,,,mlllli?
Company l1rniU'
v.
The Stall of Bifuzr
&'1111· ol/rll'I
-
DtU kit· C. J.
638
!955
;he Bengal
lmmuniry
Company Limited
v.
The St ate of Bihar
and others
Das Actg. C. J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
to make the ban effective and to leave no loophole
the Constitution makers have considered the different
aspects of sales or purchases of goods and placed
checks on the legislative power of the States at different angles. Thus in clause (l)(a) of article 286 the
question of the situs of a sale or purchase engaged
their attention and they forged a fetter on the basis
of such situs to cure the mischief of multiple taxation
by the States on the basis of the nexus theory. In
clause (l)(b) they comidered sales or purchases from
the point of view of our foreign trade and placed
a ban on the States' taxing power in order to make
our foreign trade free from any interference by the
States by way of a tax impost. In clause (2) they
looked at sales or purchases in their inter-State character and imposed another ban in the interest of the
freedom of internal trade. Finally, in clause (3) the
Constitution makers' attention was rivetted on the
character and quality of the goods themselves and
they placed a fourth restriction on the States' power
of imposing tax on sales or purchases of goocls declared to be essential for the life of the community.
These several bans may overlap in some caseo but in
their respective scope and operation they are sep;irate
and independent. They deal with different phase, of
a sale or purchase but, nevertheless, they are distinct
and one has nothing to do with and is not dependent
on the other or others. The States' legislative rower
with respect to a sale or purchase may be hit bv one
or more of these bans. Thus, take the case of a sale of
goods declared by Parliament as essential by a selkr in
West Bengal to a nurchaser in Bihar in which goods
are actually delivered as a direct result of such sale
for consumption in the State of Bihar. A law made
by West Bengal without the assent of the Prcsi:knt
taxing this sale will he unconstitutional because ( l)
it wiJI offend article 286(1) (a) as the sale has taken
place outside tlic territory by .virtue of the Explar1'1tion to clause (1) (a), (2) it will also offend article
286(2) as the sale has taken place in the course of
inter-State trade or commerce and (3) such law will
also be contrary to article 286(3) as the goods are
0
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
639
essential commodities and the President's assent to
the law was not obtained as required by clause (3) of
article 286. This appears to us to be the general
scheme of that article.
We come now to the particular bans. Although the
Legislatures of the States were empowered by article
246(3) read with Entry 54 of List II to make a law with
respect to taxes on sales or purchases of goods, the
different State Legislatures, as already mentioned,
considered themselves free to make a law imposing
tax on sales or purchases of goods provided they had
some territorial nexus with such sales or purchases,
e.g., that one or other of the ingredients or events
which go to make up a sale or purchase was found to
exist or had happened within their respective territories. ·whether they were right or wrong in so acting is a question which has not been finally decided
by the Courts but the fact is that they did so. This
resulted in multiple taxation which manifestly prejudiced the interests of the ultimate consumers and
also hampered the free fl.ow of inter-State trade or
commerce. So the Constitution makers had to cure
that mischief. The first thing that they did was to
ta!(e away the Statts' taxing power with respect to
sales or purchases which took place outside theii
respective territorie;. This they did by clause ( 1) (a).
If the matter had been left there, the solution would
have been imperfect, for then the question as to which
sale or purchase takes place outside a State would
yet have remained open. So the Constitution makers
had to explain what an outside sale was and tliis they
did by the Explanation set forth in clause ( 1). The
language employed in framing the Explanation, however, has given scope fpr argument to counsel and
presented considerable difficulties to the Court m
ascertaining its purpose and intendment. If the
Explanation simply said "For the purposes of subclause (a), a sale or purchase shall be deemed to have
taken place outside a State when the goods have
actually been delivered for the purpose of consumption in another State, notwithstanding the fact, etc.,
etc.", then none of the difficulties would have arisen
1955
The Beft~al
Immunity
Company Limited
v.
The State of Bihar
and others
Das Actz. c. J.
640
1955
Th1Bmgal
Immunity
Company Limited
v.
Tiu State of Bihsr
1112d others
Dos Aag. C. J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
at all. But why, it is asked did the Constitution
makers seek to explain what was an outside sale or
purchase by saying that a sale or purchase was to be
deemed to take place inside the particular State
mentioned in tht Explanation? Was the purpose of
the Explanation only to explain what was an outside
sale or purchase or was it also its purpose to allot or
assign a particular class of sales or purchases of the
kind mentioned therein to a particular State so as to
put the question of situs of the sales or purchases of
that description beyond the pale of controversy ?
These are. questions which arise and are raised because of the somewhat involved language of the
Explanation. Four different views as to the true
meaning and effect of the Explanation have been
suggested for our consideration and arguments have
been advanced for and against the correctness of each
of them. In the view we have taken, it is not necessary for us to express any final opinion in the matter.
We propose accordingly to note the possible views
and record very briefly the criticisms relating to each
of those views and the suggested answers to such
criticisms.
One view which has been called the strict view is
this. In clause (1) (a) the Constitution makers have
placed a ban on the taxing power of the States with
respect to sales or purchases which take place outside
the State. If the matter had been left ther~ the ban
would have been imperfect, for the argument would
have still remained as to where a particular sale or
purchase took place. Does a sale or purchase take place
at the place where the contract of sale is made, or
where the property in the goods passes or where the
goods are delivered? These questions are answered bv
the Explanation. That Explanation is "for the purposes of sub-clause (a)" i.e., for the purpose of explaining which sale or purchase is to be regarded as
having taken place outside a State. By saying that
a particular sale or purchase is to be deemed to take
place in a particular State the Explanation only indicates that such sale or purchase has taken place outside all other States. The Explanation is neither an
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
641
Exception nor a Proviso but only explains what is an
outside sale referred to in sub-clause (a). This it
does by creating a fiction. That fiction is only for the
purposes of sub-clause (a) and cannot be extended to
any other purpose. It should be limited to its avowed
purpose. To say that this Explanation confers legislative power on what for the sake of brevity has been
called the delivery State is to use it for a collateral
purpose which is not permissible. Further, it is utterly illogical and untenable to say that article 286
which was introduced in the Constitution to place
restrictions on the legislative powers of the State, by
a side wind, as it were, gave enlarged legislative
powers to the State of delivery by an explanation
sandwiched between two restrictions. This construction runs counter to the entire scheme of the article
and the explanation and one may see no justification
for imputing such indirect and oblique purpose to this
article. Had the Constitution makers so desired they
could have done so in a more direct and straight-forward way. To hold that the Explanation has, besides
its declared purpose, another hidden purpose of conferring or enlarging legislative power is to build up a
fanciful argument merely on the unfelicitous and involved language used _in the Explanation although it
is distinctly not the purpose of the Explanation and
althoµgh it does not purport substantively and propno
vigore, to confer any legislative power on any State.
Its only purpose is to explain what an outside sale is,
so that, by one stroke, as it were, it takes away the
taxing power, in respect of sales or purchases of the
kind referred to in the Explanation, of all States
other than the State where such sales or purchases are,
by the Explanation, to be deemed to have taken place.
This view of the Explanation was taken in the dissenting judgment in the case of the State of Tr.wancore-Cochin v. Shanmugha Vilas Cashew Nut Factory
(supra). The view that the Explanation is only for
the purposes of sub-clause (a) of clause (1) and cannot be carried over to clause (2) was also taken in the
dissenting judgment in the State of Bombay v. The
United Motors (India) Ltd. (supra) at p. 1103.
1955
The BengaJ
Immunity
Company Limited
v.
The State of Bihar
a~d others
Das Actg. c. ].
642
1955
Tht Ben1al .
Immunity
C:?mpany Limited
v.
TM State of Bihar
and otMrs
Das Aclg. C. ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
The criticislI} that has been levelled against thi1
strict view of the Explanation is that it will not entirely eliminate the claims of the States to tax sales
or purchases on the basis of the nexus theory. Suppose, it is said, Parliament lifts the ban .placed on
inter-State trade or commerce by clause (2), all
States will, in that situation, claim the right to tax
sales or purchases if any one of the ingredients or
events making up the sale is to be found to exist or
to have happened in that State. It has been suggested
in reply to this criticism that this apprehension is not
at all well-founded. When Parliament will lift the
ban imposed by clause (2), the Explanation will continue to operate, so that inter-State sales or purchases
falling within it will still be deemd to have taken
place in the delivery State and, therefore, outside all
other States none of which latter States will, by reason of the ban imposed by clause (I) (a), be entitled
to tax such sale. The ban under clause (2) being
lifted the delivery State will become free to tax
such sales or purchases in exercise of the taxing
power conferred on it by article 246(3) read with
Entry 54 in List II. Then, it is asked, what will
happen to those sales or purchases which do not fall
within the Explanation? After Parliament hfts tbe
ban under clause (2) which State will tax sales or
purchases in which goods are actually delivered in a
particular State. not for consumption in that State
but, say, for re-export to another State for consumption ? One of the suggested answers was that those
sales or purchases were not like! y - to be numerous, for
ordinarily a dealer would not actually get the goods
imported into a State only for re-exporting the same
to another State for consumption in the last mentioned State but would find it more convenient and
economical to arrange for the delivery of the goods
straight to the last mentioned State. A further suggestion was that it might well be that when Parliament would by law lift the ban of clause (2) it would,
by the same law, provide which .of the States would
tax such inter-State sales or purchases which were
not covered by the Explanation and on what basis.
2 S.C.R.
..
..
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
643
This suggested answer, in its turn, raises a question
as to the scope and ambit of the legislative power
conferred on Parliament by clause (2). The .opening words ·of clause (2), namely, . "Except in so far as
Parliament may by law otherwise provide" clearly
indicate that the lifting of the ban may be total or
partial, that is to say, Parliameilt may lift the ban
wholly and unconditionally or it may lift it to such
extent as it may think fit to do and on such terms as
it pleases. It is to be remembered that under Entry
42 of List I Parliament alone may make law with respect to inter-State trade or commerce. It is, therefore, conceded that in exercise of its legislative powers
under that entry read with article 286(2) Parliament
may make a law permitting the States to tax interState sales or purcj1ases of certain commodities only.
It is also not questioned that Parliament may, by
way of regulating inter-State trade or commerce, fix a
ceiling rate of tax on sales or purchases of goods
which the law made hy the States under Entry 54 of
List II, may not exceed. Can Parliament also override the Explan:ition? If not, cannot Parliament at
least provide which of the States may tax inter-State
sales or purchases of goods which do not fall within
the Explanation ? These are some of the questions
which may arise as and when Parliament will choose
to make a law· in exercise of the powers conferred on
it and it will then be time enough to discus> and
decide those questions. It is not for the C0urts to
advise Parliament in advance as to the scope of . its
legislative competency under clause (2) and, therefore,
we only note those questions and leave them here.
The second view as to the meaning and effect of
the Explanation is that it once for all fixes rhe situs
of a sale or purchase so that one knows when such a
sale or purchase is outside a State and when it is inside a State. To put it differently, States are told
when a sale or purchase is )inside a particular State
and, therdore, the States are also told when a sale or
purchase is outside a State. In short the Explanation not c;mly explains what is an outside sale or purchase but al59 actually fixes the situs of a sale or
1955
The Bengal
Immunity
Ctmftany Limited
v.
T/it State of Bihar
•nd others
Das Actg. C. J.
644
1955
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19551
purchase in a particular State. This view of the
Explanation was taken in the majority decision in
Immunity
the State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd.
Company Limited
v.
(supra). The majol:ity decision quite clearly concedes
1'11.e Stall of Bi/uzr
that
the Explanation does not, by itself, confer any
and others
legislative power on any State, not even the delivery
JJas Actg. C. J.
State, with respect to sales or purchases of the kind
mentioned therein but as it fixes the situs of such
sales or purchases in the delivery State that State is
left free to tax them in exercise of its legislative powers
under article 246(3) read with Entry 54 of List II. The
criticism offered against this view is, first of all, that
it uses the Explanation for a purpose which is beyond
that of sulrclause (a). This view turns the fiction
created expressly for sub.clause (a) into a reality fixing the location of such sales and purchases for all
purposes. In the next place this · view ignores the
existence of clause (2) which imposes a different ban
on the legislative power of all States including the delivery State also, so that as long as Parliament does
not lift the ban no State, not even the delivery State,
may tax sales or purchases which take place in the
course of inter-State trade or commerce, even though
they may fall within the Explanation. The further
objection is that this view also does not completely
eliminate the confusion arising from the nexus theory.
Suppose Parliament lifts the ban under clause (2),
which State will tax sales or purchases which do not
come within the Explanation? The· same answer was
suggested as was done in reply to similar objections
to the first view. That, as we have said, will call for
decision if and when Parliament exercises its legislative powers under clause (2).
·
The third view, which was adQmbrated and discussed in the separate judgment of Bhagwati, J. in the
case of The State of Bombay v. The United Motors
(India) Ltd. (supra) is that the Explanacion concerns
itself with notionally fixing the situs of sales or purchases in the delivery State only but in no way affects
the taxing power of the State in which, under the
general law relating to the sale of goods, the property
in the goods has passed. The result of this view is
The Bmgfl/
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
645
said to be that the State in which the sales or purchases are to be deemed to have taken place may tax
them but the State in which, under the general law
relating to the sale of goods, the property in the
goods has passed may also tax them if and when.
Parliament lifts the ban of clause (2). This view, it
is said, is open to all the criticisms to which the second
view is subject and in addition to that a further objection • has been suggested against this view, namely,
that it will perpetuate double, if not multiple, taxation on one and the same transaction of sale or
purchase at least after Parliament lifts the ban.
A fourth view has also been suggested before us as
a possible view although it was not put forward on the
previous occasion. It is founded on the non-obstante
clause in the Explanation. It is said that clause ( 1) (a)
and the Explanation concern themselves with only two
States, namely the title State, i.e.. the State in which,
~n<ler the general law, title to the goods passes to the
purchaser and the delivery State, i.e., the State in
which goods are actually delivered as a direct result of
the sale or purchase for consumption in that State.
The purpose of the Explanation is said to be to demarcate the taxing power of only these two States by
taking out the sales or purchases of the kind mentioned therein from the sphere of the taxing power of the
title State and subjecting them to the taxing power
of the delivery State. In the ju,xtaposition of those
two States clause (l)(a) read with the Explanation
provides that the title State cannot tax because such
sales or purchases are, by the fiction, made to take
place outside its territory and that the delivery State
can tax because the sales or purchases in question are,
by the fiction, made to take place inside its territory.
In short, the result of clause (l)(a) read with the
Explanation, according to this view, is that the State
which cannot tax such sales or purchases · on the
ground that thev have taken place outside its territory is only that State in which the property in the
goods has passed. The criticism is immediately put
forward that if clause (l)(a) and the Explanation are
limited in their opeation only to the two States men-
1955
Tire B"'gal
tI111munity
Company Limited
v.
T/14 Stau of Bi/iM
and olh4rs
Das Aclg. C. ].
646
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
~9.>S
[1955 J
tioned above then the other States which also claimed
to tax on the strength of the nexus theory, e.g., the
Immunit,Y
State where the contract was made, or the State where
Company Limitti
the goods were produced or manufactured or were
v'
Thi Stat1 of Bihu found, will be outside the ban and the mischief of
and others
multiple taxation which the Constitution makers
.Das ;fclg. C. J.
were out to curb will continue to be rampant and unabated. This view is also subjected to some of the
other criticisms mentioned in connection with the
other views of the Explanation.
As we have already stated, we do not desire, on this
occasion, to express any opinion on the validity
claimed for or the infirmities imputed to any of these
several views, for, in our opinion, it is not necessary
to do so for disposing of this appeal. Whichever view
is taken of the explanation it should be limited to the
purpose the Constitution makers had in view when
il1ey incorporated it in clause (1). It is quite obvious
that it created a legal fiction. Legal fictions are
created only for some definite purpose. Here the
avowed purpose of the Explanation is to explain what
an outside sale referred to in sub-clause (a) is. The
judicial decisions referred to in the dissenting judgment in The State of Travancore-Cochin v. Shannwgha
Vilas Cashew Nut Factory (supra) at pp. 81 and 82 and
the case of East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Fin.cbury
Borough Council(') clearly indicate that a legal fiction
is to be limited to the purpose for which it was created
and should not be extended beyond that legitimate
field. It should further be remembered that the cle>minant, if not the sole, purpose of article 286 is to
place restrictions on the legislative powers of the
States, subject to certain conditions in some cases
and with that end in view article 286 imposes several
bans on the taxing power of the States in relation to
sales or purchases viewed from different angles and
according to their different aspects. In some cases
the ban is absolute as, for example, with regard to
outside sales covered by clause (!)(a) read with the
Explanation, or with regard to imports and exports
.covered by .clause ( 1)(b) and in som.e cases it is conT 11' Btng•l
(!) L. R. 195~ A.C. 109. 132.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
647
ditional, e.g., in the cases of inter-State sales or purchases under clause (2) which is, in terms, made subject to the proviso thereto and also to the power of
Parliament to lift the ban. Again, in some cases the
bans may overlap but nevertheless, they are distinct
and independent of each othec The operative provisions of the several parts of article 286, namely, clause
(l)(a), clause (l)(b), clause (2) and clause (3) are
manifestly intended to deal with different topics and,
therefore, one cannot be projected or read into another.
On a careful and anxious consideration of the matter
in the light of the fresh arguments advanced and discussions held on the present occasion we are definitely
of the opinion that the Explanation in clause ( l) (a)
cannot be legitimately extended to clause (2) either
as an exception or as a proviso thereto or read as
curtailing or limiting the ambit of clause (2). Indeed,
in The State of Bombay v. The United Motors (fodia)
Ltd. (supra) at pp. 1083-1084 and again at p. 1086 the
majority judgment also accepted the position that the
Explanation was not an exception or proviso either
to clause (l)(a) or to clause (2). If, therefore, the
Explanation cannot be read into clause (2) because of
the express language of the Explanation and also because of the difference in the subject-matter of the
operative provisions of the two clauses, then it must
follow that, except in so far as Parliament may by
law provide otherwise, no State law can impose or
authorise the imposition of any tax on sales or purchases when such sales or purchases take place in the
course of inter-State trade or commerce and irrespective of whether such sales or purchases do or do not
fall within the Explanation. It is not necessary, for the
purposes of this appeal, to enter upon a discussion as
to what is exactly meant by inter-State trade or
commerce or by the phrase "in the course of", for it
is common ground that the sales or purchases made
by the appellant company which are sought to be
taxed by the State of Bihar actually took place in the
course of inrer-State trade or commerce. Parliament
not having by law otherwise provided, no State law
<;an, therefore, tax these sales or purchases, that is
1955
The Benial
·Jm.,unity
Com;a11y Limited
v.
T lie State of Bihar
. •nd •thers
Das .Mz. c. J.
648
1955
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
to say, Bihar cannot tax by reason of clause (2)
although they fall within the Explanation and other
States cannot tax by reason of both clause ( 1) (a) read
with the Explanation and clause (2). This conclusion
The Siat1 of Bihar
lead
us now to consider the arguments by which the
and oth1rs
respondent State and the intervening States which
Dos A.ctg. C. J.
support the respondent State seek to get over this
position.
In the forefront is placed the argument that found
favour with the majority of the Bench which decided
the case of The State of Bombay v. The United Motors
(India) Ltd.· (supra). That argument is to be found
in the majority judgment at pp. 1085-1086. Shortly
put, the majority opinion was that the operation of
clause (2) stood excluded as a result of the legal fiction
enacted in the Explanation. In their view the effect
of the Explanation in regard to inter-State dealings
was to invest what, in truth, was an inter-State
transaction with an int'ra-State character in relation
to the State of delivery and clause (2) could, therefore, have no application. They recognised that the
legal fiction was to operate "for the purposes of subclause (a) of clause ( 1)" and that that meant merely
that the Explanation was designed to explain the
meaning of the expression "outside the State" in
clause (1) (a). They, nevertheless, came to the conclusion that when once it was determined with the aid of
the fictional test that a particular sale or purchase
had taken place within the taxing State, it followed
as a corollary, that the transaction lost its inter-State
character and fell outside the purview of clause (2),
not because the fiction created by the Explanation
was used for the purpose of clause (2), but because
such sale or purchase became, in the eye of the law,
a purely local transaction. In his own inimitable
language the learned Chief Justice, who wrote and
delivered the majority judgment, concluded the discussion on this point by saying that the statutory
fiction completely masked the inter-State character of
the sale or purchase which, as a collateral result of
such masking, fell outside the scope of clause (2). In
spite of the great respect we always entertain for the
The Beng1d
Immunity
Comp11ny Limited
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
649
op1ruons of the then learned Chief Justice and the
other learned Judges who constituted the majority we
are unable to accept the aforesaid arguments or the
conclusions as correct for the reasons we now proceed
to state.
The situs of an intangible concept like a sale can
only be fixed notionally by the application of artificial
tules i11vented either by Judges as part of the judgemade law of the land.. or by some legislative authority. Bur a< far as we know, no fixed rule of universal
application has
yet been definitely
and
finally
evolved for determining this for all purposes. There
are many conflicting theories: One, which is more
popular and frequently put forward and is referred
to :irid m:iy, indeed, be urged to have been adopted
bv the Constitution in the non-obstante clause of the
F:xplanation, favours the place where the property
in the goods passes, another which is said to be the
American view and which was adopted in G. Govindaraju/11 Naidu & Co. v. The State of Madras( 1 ) fixes upon
the place where the contract is concluded, a third
which prevails in the continental countries of Europe
prefers the place where the goods sold are actually deliYered, a tourth ooims to the place where the essential
ingredients which go to make up a sale are most densely grouped. In this situation if the Explanation were
not there and the ban under clause (2) were to be
raised unconditionally it would become necessary for
the Courts to reach a conclusion and choose between
these conflicting views. Article 286( 1)(a), it should
be noted, does not say that an inside sale mav be
taxed. It only says that no outside sale shall be ta~ed.
Now if a State claims that the sale is inside because
part of its ingredients lies within its boundaries, by
the same logic it is also an outside sale because the
remaining parts are outside its territories and if it is an
outside sale it cannot be taxed whether or not it can
be deemed to be mside for some particular purpose.
The prohibition of article 286(1)(a) is against taxing
an outside sale and if the sale is outside even partially
it may well be argued that no State legislature can
(I) A.LR. 1953 Mad. 116.
4-84 S. C. India/59.
1955·
Th• Ben.~a/
Immunity
Compa11y L1'mitld
v.
The State of Bihar
and others
Das Actg. C. J-
-650
1955
The Bengal
linmunity
Company Limittd
,-
T h6 Stall of Bihar
and ot/;e's
Das Act:. C.J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
f19551
override the Constitution by deeming it to be an ir._s;de
sale. Therefore, if the last of the aforesaid theories
were to be adopted, then either no State would be able
to tax, or all having the requisite nexus would be able
to do so. But this, in our opinion, is the very mischief
which the Constitution makers wished to avoid and
that, as we understand the ·majority iudgmcnt in the
Bombay case, was their view also. So that view can
be placed on one side. On any one of the other views
the situs would have to be fixed artificially in one place
ancl then one would have to apply the logic of the
majority decision and hold that as soon as the situs
is determined to be in one place by judicial fiction,
i.e., a fiction enunciated by judicial decision, the interState character of the transaction must cease. The
majority hold that this is the result when the situs is
placed in only one State, namely, the delivery State,
because of the fiction which the Explanation creates.
The same result would have to follow logically if
the situs were to be established by judicial fiction
instead of by a constitutional one. The reasoning of
the majority, pushed to its logical conclusion, will
inevitably lead us to hold that all inter-State transactions must eventually be converted into intra-State
transactions and, therefore, become amenable to the
taxing power of the State within whose territories
they are, by the constitutional or judicial fiction,
to be deemed . to take place. In this view there
will remain no inter-State transaction on which clause
(2) may possibly operate. The argument which leads
to this astounding conclusion has only to be stated
to be rejected. The truth is that what is an interState sale or purchase continues to be so irrespective
of the State where the sale is to be located either
under the general law when it is finally determined
what the general law is or by the fiction created by
the Explanation. The situs of a sale or purchase is
wholly irrelevant as regards its inter-State character.
We find no cogent reason in support of the argument
that a fiction created for certain definitely expressed
purposes, namely, the purposes of clause (1) (a) can
legitimately be used for the entirely foreign and
'
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
651
collateral purpose of destroying the inter-State character of the transaction and converting it into an intraState sale or purchase Such metamorphosis appears
to us to be beyond the purpose and purview of ciause
(l)(a) and the Explanation thereto. When we apply
a fiction all we do is to assume that the situation
created by the fiction is true. Therefore, the same
consequences must flow from the fiction as would
have flown had the facts supposed to be true been the
actual facts from the start. Now, even when the situs
of a sale or purchase is in fact inside a State, with no
essential ingredient taking place outside, nevertheless,
if it takes place in the course of inter-State trade or
commerce, it will be hit by clause (2). If the sales or
purchases are in the course of inter-State trade or
commerce the stream of inter-State trade or commerce
will catch up in its vortex all such sales or purchases
which take place in its course wherever the situs of
the sales or purchases may be. All that the Explanation does is to shift the situs from point A in the
stream to point X also in the stream. It does not lift
the sales or purchases out of the stream in those
cases where they form part of the stream. The shifting of the situs of a sale or purchase from its actual
situs under the general law to a fictional situs under
the Explanation takes the sale or purchase out of the
taxing power of all States other than the State where
the situs is fictionally fixed. That is all that clause
(1) (a) and the Explanation do. Whether the delivery
State will be entitled to tax such a sale or purchase
will depend on the other provisions of the Constitution. The assignment of a fictional situs to a sale or
purchase has no bearing or effect on the other aspects
of the sale or purchase, e.g., its inter-State character
or its export or import character which are entirely
different topics. This fixing of a situs for a sale
or purchase in any particular State either under the
general law or under the fiction does not conclude the
matter. It has yet to be ascertained whether that
sale or purchase which by virtue of the Explanation
has taken place in the delivery State was made in the
course of inter-State trade or commerce. For this
1955
The Bengal
Immunity
Company Limited
v.
The State of Bihar
and others
Das Actg. C.J.
-,
6).
1955
The Bengal
Immunity
Company Limited
v.
Tht State of Bihar
and others
Das .4.ct.!!. C.J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
purpose the Explanation can have no relevancy or
Jpplication at all.
Another
argument
adumbrated
m the majority
judgment in The State of Bombay v. The United Motors
(India) Ltd. (supra) at p. 1081 and at pp. 1086-1087
and elaborated before us is that just as the freedom
of trade referrod to in article 301 has been made to
give way to the States' power of 1mposmg nondiscriminatory taxes by article . 304 so must article
286(2) be regarded as subject to the States' taxing
power, for the protection of article 286(2) could not
have been intended to be larger. This argument was
refuted by the dissenting judgment in that Bombay
case (supra) at pp. 1102-1103 and p. 1127 and also by
the dissenting judgment in The State of TravancoreCochin v. Shanmugha Vilas Cashew Nut Factory (supra)
at p. 89. Nothing that we have heard on the present
occasion induces us to depart from the views expressed on this subject in those dissenting judgments.
It is next urged that the Explanation in effect operates as an exception or a proviso to clause (2). This
view runs directly counter to the express language of
the Explanation itself. So the argument is formulated in a slightly different way. It is said that clause
(2) contains the enunciation of the general rule
and the Explanation embodies a particular or special
rule. According to a cardinal rule of construction
the particular or special rule must control or cut
down the general rule. This view was adopted by
the High Court in the judgment under appeal and also
found favour with one of the Judges in the Bombay
case (supra). It appears to us that this argument
overlooks the basic fact that clause (I) (a) to which
is appended the Explanation and clause (2) deal with
Jilferent topics altogether. The Explanation is concemed with explaining what is an outside sale or purchase by fixing a fictional situs. It cannot be read as
a provision independent of clause (!)(a). It does not,
by itself and in terms, confer any legislative power
on anv State. It is true that the Explanation may
apply to fix the situs of many inter-State transactions but that is only for ascertaining. for the
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
653
purposes of clause (l)(a), whether it has taken place in
side or outside a particular State. The inter-State
aspect of the sales or purchases is not within the
purview of clause (l)(a) which looks at sales or purchases from the point of view of their location only.
Clause (2), on the other hand, takes note of the interState character of sales or purchases which is an
entirely different topic. The two provisions do not
relate to the same subject and, therefore, it is not
possible to hold that one is the enunciation of a
general rule and the other the enunciation of a particular or special rule on one and the same subject.
The principle of construction relied upon cannot,
in
our opinion, be called in aid in construing clause (2)
and the Explanation of clause (l)(a). If the Explanation cuts down clause (2), it must also, on a parity
of reasoning, cut down clause (3) which, as will hereinafter be explained more fully, could not possibly
have been intended by the Crmstitution makers.
lt
must also cut down clause ( 1) (b) dealing with import
an<l export; but to hold that would run counter to the
decision in State of Travancore-Cochin and others v. The
Bombay Co. Ltd.( 1 ). In our opinion to use the Explanation to cut down the operation of clause (2) or clause
(3) will be to us.~ it for a purpose other than its legitimate' and avowed purpose.
The same argument is put in a slightly different way
and in a more attractive form. It is said that we must
construe article' 286. as a whole and give meaning to
every part of it. Sales or purchases which fall within
the Explanation to clause (1) (a) clearly partake of the
character of inter-State transactions.
Therefore,
if
we construe clause (2) of article 286 literally and
strictly then the whole of clause (1) (a) and the Explanation will be redundant and useless and will have
no immediate operation and will remain a dead letter,
at any rate, until Parliament, in exercise of its powers
under clause (2), lifts the ban. We must, it is urged,
make an attempt to avoid such a result and adopt
such a construction as will not only · give effect to
each part of the article but also make each . part
(I) [195°) 3 S.C.R. 1112.
1955
The Bengal
Immunity
Company Limi1t~
"·
The Stale of Billa•
and others
Das Act.~. C.].
654
1955
The &ngal
. Immunity
Company Limited
v.
The State of Bihar
ant[ others
Das Actg. C.J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1955)
applicable in presenti. That, it is pointed out, can
well be done if clause (2) is interpreted in a restricted
manner. The argument runs-give full and immediate. effect to the Explanation and then leave clause
(2) to govern or operate on cases which do not fall
within
the Explanation.
In effect this argument
means that we must treat all transactions of sales or
purchases falling within the Explanation as outside
clause (2). Shorn of its thin veneer of disguise this
argument is nothing more than the argument that
the Explanation, in effect, operates as an exception
to clause (2) and
all the
cnttmms
applicable
to
to that construction will apply mutatis mutandis
the argument in the present form. Apart from
that
there are obvious fallacies which render the argument
utterly unacceptable.
We now proceed to deal with
these fallacies seriatim.
(i) In the first place, the mere circumstance
that
a provision in the Constitution will, on a proper cof!struction, take effect on the happening of a future
event can, by itself, be no ground for not giving effect
to the plain language of that provision. Take the
very next provision in article 286 itself, namely, clause
It has no present application and its usefulness
(3).
will ensue only when Parliament by law declares certain goods to be essential for the life of the community. The fact that the Explanation, in so far as it
relates to inter-State sales, may nor have an immediate operation until Parliament lifts the ban under
clause (2) need not unnecessarily oppress us or lead
us to adopt a forced construction only to give the
whole of it an immediate and present operation.
(ii) In the second place, it is not correct to say
that the Explanation, construed as suggested above,
can have no immediate operation at all. It certainly
has immediate operation to render sales and purchases
which fall within the explanal:!on to be outside sales
and purchases so as immediately to take away the
taxing power of all States other than the delivery
State with respect to them. Further cases ma,y arise
in which purchases or sales which are outside clause
(2)_ may, nevertheless, fall within and be immediately
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
655
governtd by the Explanation.
We do not wish to ex-·
press any opm1on on . )'ypothetical cases but
the
following illustration will show that on a given view
of the law . the Explanation would be called into play
d~spite tbe' fact that clause (2) . was not attraded.
Take, for instance, a case where both the seller and
the buyer reside and carrv on business in Gurgaon in
the State of Punjab. Let us say that the seller has a
godown in the State of Delhi where his goods are
stored and that the buyer has also a retail shop at
Connaught Circus also in the State of Delhi. The
' buyer and the seller enter into a contract at Gurgaon
for the sale of certain goods and a term of the contract is that the goods contracted to be sold will be
actually delivered from the seller's godown to the
buyer's retail shop, both in the State of Delhi, for
consumption in the State of Delhi. Pursuant to this
contract made in Gurgaon in the State of Punjab, the
buyer pavs the full price of the goods at Gurgaon and
the seller hands over to the buyer - also at Gurgaon a
delivery order addressed to the seller's godown-keeper
in Delhi to deliver the goods to the buyer's retail
shop.
As a direct result of this sale the seller's
gcxlown-keeper, on the presentation of this delivery
order, actually deliver_s the goods to the buyer's retail
shop at Connaught ~ircus for consumption in
the
State of Delhi. On one view of the law, the situs of
such a sale would be Gurgaon. We need not decide
that it is, because that type of case is not before us
and there may be other views to consider, but it is
certainly a possible view. It is also possible to hold
that this is not inter-State trade or commerce, because there is no movement of goods across a State
boundary. Again, we need not decide that because
that also may be controversial. But given these two
postulates the transaction would fall squarely within
the Explanation and yet it would not come within
clause (2), for there is no movement of the goods
acrrn the border of any State and both the seller and
the buyer are in the same place. Surely, the Explanation will, in presenti, govern such cases irrespective
of whether Parliament has lifted the ban under clause
1955
The Bengal
Immunity
Company Limited
,..
Thi Stat; of Bih"'
and othtr.r
Das Artg. C.J.
656
1955
The Benpal
immunity
Company Limikd
v.
TM State of Bihcr
and othLrs
Dm ..4.cl.(· C.J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19551
(2). It these postulates are accepted then by virtue
of clause ( 1) (a) read with the Explanation the State
of Delhi alone will be entitled to impose a tax on such
a sale or purchase and the State of Punjab will be precluded from doing so bv reason of the fictional sitt<S
assigned to such a sale or purchose by the Explanation, although the contract was made, price was paid
and symbolical or constructive delivery of the goods
by the handing over of the delivery order took place
in Gurgaon in the State of Punjab.
(iii) It is not correct to say that ciause (l)(a) read
with the Explanation is wholly useless .. It may
well
be argued that there was scope for the operation of
clause (!)(a) and the Explanation as and when the
President exercised the powers vested in him by the
Proviso to clause (2). It will be noticed that under
that proviso the President's order was to take effect
"notwithstanding that the imposition of such tax is
contrary to the provisions of this clause". This non
obstante clause does not, in terms, supersede clause (1)
at all and, therefore, prima facie,
the President's
order was subject to the prohibition of clause (I) (a)
read with the Explanation.
It is, however, pointed
out that the proviso says that any tax which was being lawfully levied by the States immediately before
the commencement of the Constitution will
continue
to be levied .until the date therein specified. It is said
that before the Constitution sales tax was levied bv
the different States on the basis of the nexus theory
irrespective of the situs of the sales or purchases and.
therefore, this very proviso clearly indicates that the
intention of the Constitution makers was that all
taxes imposed on the basis of the nexus theorv must
continue irrespective of the provisions of the Explanation which fictionally fixes the situs of the sales or
purchases in the delivery State. The argument is not
without some force but cannot prevail.
It is true
that the different States used to levy sales tax on the
basis of slight nexus but the legality ,of them had not,
at the date of the Constitution, been tested in a Court
of law. Therefore, the proviso authorised the President by order to continue only such of them as were
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
657
being "lawfully" levied and consequently there is no
reason to think. that the President's order was intended to continue all sales taxes previously ":}e.yie<l irrespective of their legality. In the next place, there is nothing to be surprised at if the President's qrder was made
to operate subject to the prohibition of ~lause (1) (a)
read with the Explanation. Finally, to · accede to this
argument must mean that we must read into the proviso s0mething which is not there. To give effect to
this argument we shall have to alter the non obstante
clause towards the end of the proviso and substitute
the Words "of the foregoing clauses" for the words "of
this clause". However, we need not rest our decision on
this point. It will certainly operate as soon as Parliament, in exercise of the power vested in it by clause (2),
lifts the ban imposed on the States. Upon the lifting of
the ban by Parliament those inter-State sales or purchases which fall within the Explanation will, by
virtue of it, he deemed to take place within the delivery State and such sales or purchases being, as a re-suit of such fiction, outside all other States none of
them will be entitled to tax such sales or purchases.
Whether the delivery State will be entitled to make a
law imposing tax on such sales or purchases in exercise of the legislative powers vested in it by article 24o
(3) read with Entry 54 in Lisr II or whether Parliament,
while lifting the ban, may also by the same law authorise the delivery State to do so or what is the extent of
the authority vested in Parliament by the opening
words of clause (2) are questions which will arise for
consideration only after the ban under clause (2) is
lifted and we need not in advance express any opinion
on a foture problem.
(iv) If we accept the argument that we are to give
full effect to clause (I) (a) and the Explanation and
let it operate immediately on all transactions which
come within their terms and leave clause (2) to govern
only those cases which are outside clause (l)(a)
read with the Explanation then, on a parity of reawning, we shall have to give effect to clause (l)(a)
and the Explanation and leave clause ( 1) (b) and
also
clause (3) to govern only those cases which do not
1955
The Bengal
Immunity
Company Limited
v.
The State of Biho1
and others
Das Act.~. C. J.
658
1955
'.i-M Btnga/
lnununity
Co111pan_v Limited
v.
T!it Slate of Bihar
and olhtrs
Das Actg. C. J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955}
fall within c.lause ( 1)(a) read with the Explanation. To illustrate this point, take clause (3).
Suppose under clause (3) Parliament by law declare'
certain goods, say wheat, to. be essential for the lite
of the community. Suppose there is a sale of such
essential goods by a seller in the State of Delhi to a
buyer in Gurgaon in the State of Punjab in which as
a direct result of such sale the goods are delivered in
Gurgaon in Punjab for consumption in that State. According to the argument we have to give full efkct
first to clause ( 1)(a) and the Explanati::>n and accordingly we must hold that the transaction is wholly
covered by the Explanation and, therefore, Punjab
will be entitled to tax it and clause (3) must be left
to govern only cases other than those which fall
within the Explanation. If the argument were sound
it must follow that the State of Punjab will be perfectly justified in saying that for the purpose of
making a law imposing a tax on such sales or purchases
its law need not be reserved for the assent of the
President at all. It may well say that the restrictive
requirements of reserving the bill for the President" s
assent and of obtaining such assent before the law
n:iay take effect apply only to a law which imposes
tax on sales or. purchases which are outside the Explanation. In other words, the State of Punjab, in
our illustratioo, will be entitled to ,:ay that clause (3)
governs only those cases of sales or purchases of
essential goods which do not come within the description mentioned in the Explanation, namely, for
instance, only those sales or purchases in which essential goods are delivered in a State not for consumption in that State but for re-export to another
State. This will rob clause (3) of practically the best
part of its content and, therefore, of its usefulnes•
and defeat• the very purpose the. Constitution makers
obviously had of safeguarding sales or purchases of
essential commodities by imposing the restriction requiring the reservation of the bill for the President's
assent and the obtaining of such assent. When a
famine is raging in say Punjab, and . sales and purchases are made of wheat which is declared as essential
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
659
to the life of the community and as a direct result of
such sale wheat is delivered in the Punjab for consumption there the State of Punjab may, according
to the reasoning underlying the argument, put up the
price of these essential goods by imposing a sales tax
by making a law to that effect and ignoring the safeguards prescribed by clause (3). An argument which
leads us to a result so utterly absurd and untenable
in reason cannot for a moment be countenanced.
No less than five reasons have been suggested in
support of the argument that a restricted construction should be placed on clause (2) of article 286.
It will be convenient to deal with them at this
stage one by one.
(a) In the first place, it is urged that clause (2)
should be construed in a restricted way because the
class of sales falling within article 286(l)(a) forms a
special class of inter-State sales and they cannot be
affected by the general provisions of article 286( 2).
This argument totally overlooks the real scheme of
article 21:16. It fails to note that bv this article the
Constitution makers were imposing 'restrictions on the
taxing power of the States with respect to sales or purchases in their diff.:rent aspects viewed from entirely
different angles which we h<,ve heretofore already
explained. The subject-matters of the different parts
of article 286 are, therefore, different and distinct and
the principle of interpretation, namely, the special
provision cutting down the general provision cannot
be properly invoked.
(b) The second reason urged is that if article
286(2) applies to the class of sales or purchases falling
within article 286(l)(a) then it will result in discrimination against local trade and in favour of interState trade and this will be inconsistent with the provisions of Part XII I of the Constitution. It is said
that when a Bihar dealer sells certain goods to a Bihar
purchaser the former is obliged to pay sales tax which
he passes on to the 'Bihar purchaser but when the
Bihar purchaser directly imports into Bihar similar
goods from say a West Bengal dealer for consump-
1955
The Bm.~al
lmmunily
Compariy Limited
v.
The-Stale ef Bihar
"nd others
Das Actg. C. J.
660
1955
The Bengal
lmnnmipi
Company Limited
·v,
Thi Stt:ttt of Bihar
and others
Das Act,g. C. J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
tion in Bihar that transaction will not be liable to
Bihar Sales Tax as it will be an inter-State transaction. This, it is said, will prejudice the Bihar seller
for all Bihar purchasers will then be driven to purchasing goods from out-of-State sellers and local producers will suffer a set back. The argument is that as
a literal construction of clause (2) will result in such
discrimination against local trade, the cardinal rule of
interpretation, namely, reading the written provision
literally ancl giving to the words their ordinary
natural meaning should give way to a restricted construction. This argument overlooks several basic
things. lf there is any real hardship of the kind
refened to, there is Parliament which is expressly invested with the power of lifting the ban under clause
(2) either wholly or to the extent it thinks fit to do.
Why should the Court be called upon to discard the
cardinal rule of interpretation for mitigating a hardship, which after all may be entirely fanciful, when
the Constillltion itself has expressly provided for another authority more competent to c:.valuate the correct position to do the needful? This argument also
fails to take into account the benefit which the consuming public derives from the free flow of goods from
one State to another resulting in lower prices. Further,
the argument overlooks the fact that the se>-called
hardship, if any, is brought about, not really by reason
of the liberal construction of clause (2) but by reason
of the State of Bihar imposing a sales tax on an
intra-State transaction. The State of Bihar is not
obliged to levy a sales tax on sales or purchases of
goods in respect of which there is competition between
out-of-State
producers,
manufacturers
and
dealers and the Bihar producers, manufacturers and
dealers and, indeed, if it intends to encourage its local
manufac!llrers or producers it should not do so. It
will not do for the State of Bihar to say that it must
levy a sales tax on intra-State sales or purchases
which it is not obliged to do and at the same time
that it must protect the Bihar dealers or producers
and enable them to compete With outside dealets or
producers and, therefore, ask us to construe the
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
661
Constitution in an unnatural way so as to enable it
to have the best of both worlds. It is immediately retorted that the welfare State must have
sufficient revenue to run itself, that if it is to forego
sales tax its economy will be totally upset. This
harrowing picture of economic collapse of the States
has been pressed upon this Court on this as on the
previous occasion and it evidently oppressed the
minds of the Judges who were parties to the majority
decision. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the
matter a little more closely. Ordinarily, inter-State
trade or commerce is done between a dealer in one
State and a dealer in another State. The dealer in the
consuming State in his turn sells the goods in retail to
actual consumers. There can be no objection to insisting upon all inside dealers getting themselves registered
and submitting returns showing goods imported and
sold by them and bringing their annual turnovers
to tax which they will pass on to the actual consumers.
Call it a purchase tax vis-a-vis the earlier transaction
under which the goods were delivered in Bihar for
consumption in that State or call it a sales tax
vis-a-vis the subsequent local sales by the Bihar
dealer to actual consumers in Bihar, the State will
get the full revenue on these local sales or purchases
from the local · sellers. There can be no doubt that sales
or purchases of this kind to or from one dealer to
another dealer actually form the bulk of inter-State
trade or commerce. To take them out of clause (2) will
be to make the protection of inter-State trade or
commerce wholly illusory and to rob clause (2) of the
best part of its content and utility. Ordinarily individual local consumers buy goods in the local market
and do not generally bring goods for their personal
consumption from outside dealers. It is only in exceptional cases that a local consumer will be energetic
enough to bring goods from outside the State for his
consumption and their number will be small. It is only
those stray individual consumers who are energetic
enough to get goods direct from a dealer in another
State and may be willing to pay freight, etc.. and
undertake the risk of loss or damage who may ev<!de
1955
The Bengal
Immuni!Y
Company L1miltd
v.
Tho State of Bihat
and others
Das Actg. C. ].
662
1955
The Btnial
Immuni!J
Compan_'I' Limited
v.
Th.t State of Bihar
and others
Das Ac
ti. C. J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
the tax. The difficulty in tracing such stray actual
local consumers cannot be any cogent reason for
adopting the unnatural construction sought to be put
upon clause (2) of article 286. If big Bihar purchasers, e.g., Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd., who are very
heavy consumers of coal, prefer to get their supply
of coal from Ranigunge coal fields in West Bengal for
consumption in their large factories at Tatanagar in
Bihar to getting their supplies from the Jharia coal
fields in Bihar and thereby evade sales tax to the
detriment of the revenues of the State of Bihar, then
again there is Parliament to mitigate such hardship by
malting suitable laws in exercise of its power under
article 286(2). Such supposed hardship is, in our view,
no ground for putting a forced and unnatural interpretation upon article 286.
( c) The third reason in support of a restricted
construction of article 286(2) is thus formulated : The
purpo~ of article 286 being to eliminate multiple
taxation and article 286( 1)(a) having already achieved
that purpose with regard to the class falling within
the Explanation, it was no longer necessary for that
purpose to apply article 286(2) to that class. This
reasoning appears to us to be untenable. It overlooks
the patent fact that the different parts of the article
look upon sales and purchases from different perspectives and place different bans on the taxing power of
the States at different angles. The circumstance that
the bans may in given cases overlap is no justification
for concluding that the subject-matter of th~ different
provisions is the sanie. This line of reasoning assumes
that the only purpose of article 286 is to eliminate
multiple taxation. The purposes of the different parts
of the article have to be ascertained from the language
of the article itself read in the light of the contemporary history of the legislative activities of the
different States with respect to taxes on sales or purchases of goods' and the chaos and confusion that
arose and the havoc that ensued as a result of those
activities. There was multiple taxation which imposed
a heavy burden on the consumers and which was also
calculated to impede and hinder the free flow of inttt•
>
>
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
663
State trade or commerce. The Constitution makers,
therefore, imposed several bans on the taxing power
of the States with respect to sales or purchases,
namely, first on the basis of their situs, secondly and
thirdly on the basis of the character of the transactions,, e.g., foreign trade or inter-State trade and
fourthly on the basis of the nature or quality of the
goods sold or purchased, i.e., whether they have been
declared to be essential to the life of the community.
As regards inter-State trade or commerce the clear
intention of the Constitution makers was to place an
absolute ban for the time being, subject to the proviso, and to give some time to Parliament to study
the situation and to evaluate the result of the ban
and to lift the ban to such extent as it thought fit in
the interest of the general public and that of interStatc trade or commerce. If the matter is approached
in this way it becomes abundantly clear that this part
of the argument we arc now considering proceeds on
a wrong assumption of the purpose of the Constitution.
(d) A restricted construction of article 286(2) is
said to he necessary and called for because the Constitution itself has divided inter-State sales or purchases into two categories and in regard to one class
it has itself provided both as to which State will tax
them and under what condition and in regard to the
other class the Constitution has imposed a ban in
general terms and granted power to Parliament in
general terms to relax such ban as Parliament thinks
fit. This is clearly begging the question and does not
require any elaborate refutation.
( e) Another string to the bow is that because of the
legal fiction created by the Explanation the interState sales or purchases were converted into intraState transactions. This, it will he recalled, was the
reasoning adopted in the majority decision in 'I' he State
Qf Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd. (supra).
We are unable to accept this argument for the reasons
given above which need not be repeated here.
It is said that the picture of harassment and inconvenience to the traders referred to in the dissenting
1955
The Bmga/
lmm1111i!J
Company L1mittd
v.
The Slate of Bihflr
a•d othlr.<
Das Actg. C. J.
664
1955
The Bengal
lmmtmit)'
Company Limit~d
v.
Th! State of Bihar
and others
l),l r Actg. C. 7.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955\
judgments is more imaginary than real. It is pointed
out that it is only big traders who will have sales of
.their goods in all the · States in the Union of India.
Those big traders maintain a large staff of clerks and
a.:countants and there can be no difficulty if they are
ubliged to file returns in each State where they sell
their goods. This argument overlooks the practical
effects of the different sales tax laws enacted by different States. All big traders will have to get themselves
registered in each State, study the Sales Tax Acts of
each State, conform to the requirements of all State
laws which are by no means uniforms and, finally,
may be simultaneously called upon to produce their-books of account in support of their rd:lJrns before
the officers of each State. Anybody who has any
practical experience of the working of the sales tax
laws of the different States knows how iong books are
detained by the officers of each State during assessment proceedings. There are different stages of these
proceedings, original, appellate and revisional
and
there will be as many proceedings under each heading
as there are States where the goods are sold. The
harassment to traders is quite obvious and needs no
exaggeration. On the other hand if any risk to the
economy of the States ensues from the construction of
anicle 286 which commends itself to us, the appeal
must be to Parliament which can by law made under
the opening words of clause (2) mitigate that risk.
For all the foregoing reasons we are definitely of
opinion that, until Parliament by law made in exercise of the powers vested in it by clause (2) provides
otherwise, no State can impose or authorise the imposition of any tax on sales or purchases of goods
when such sales or purchases take place m
the
course of inter-State trade or commerce and the majority decision ir: Tlie State of Bombay v. The United
Motors (India) Ltd. (supra) in so far as it decides to
the contrary cannot be accepted as well founded on
principle or auth<>rity.
In the view we have taken on ~uestion (A) it is not
nece;sary for us, on this occasion, to discuss the
other questions (B), '(C) or (D}. All that remains to
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
665
be seen is whether as a result of our finding on question (A) the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947 is ultra vires
and void in its entirety or it is only bad in so far as
it seeks to impose a sales tax on out-of-State sellers
in respect of inter-State sales or purchases: This will
depend on whether the objectionable parts of the Act
are severable from the rest of its provisions. It will
be necessary here to refer to a few provisions of the
Act.
The long title of the Act is "An Act to provide for
the levy of a tax on sales of goods in Bihar". The
preamble recites that "It is necessary to make an
addition to the revenues of Bihar and for that purpose to impose a tax on the sale of goods in Bihar".
The Act extends to the whole of the State of Bihar.
"Dealer" was originally defined in section 2(c) as
meaning:
"any person who sells or supplies any goods in
Bihar whether for commission, · remuneration
or
otherwise and includes any firm or a Hindu joint
family and anv society, club or association which
sells or supplies goods to its members".
By the Bihar Finance Act, 1950 the words "in Bihar"
were omitted from this definition. Clause (g) of the
same section defines sale. That definition has undergone various changes from time to time. The period
we are concerned with in this appeal is from 26th
January 1950 to the 30th September 1951. Between
1st October 1948 and 31st March 1951 which covers
the earlier part of the relevant period the clause stood
as follows :"Sale" means, with all its grammatical variations
and cognate expressions, any transfer of property in
goods for cash or deferred payment or other valuable
consideration, including a transfer of property in
goods involved in the execution of contract but does
not include a mortgage, hypothecation, charge or
pledge:
Provided that a transfer of goods on hire-purchase or other instalment system of payment shall,
notwithst:inding the fact that the seller retains a title
5-84 S. C. lndia/59
1955
Till &tiff"
Co~
v.
Thi Stall of Biltar
and othm
Das A•tg. C. J.
666
1955
Th• Bengal
lmmunif.1
Company Limited
v.
Tk1 Stau of Bi/1at
and others
Dai Actg. C. J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
to any goods as security for payment of the price, be
deemed to be a sale :
Provided further that notwithstanding anything
to the contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930
(III of 193'b), the sale of any goods(i) which are actually in Bihar at the time
when, in respect thereof, the contract of sale as defined in section 4 of that Act is made, or
(ii) which are produced or manufactured in
Bihar by the producer or manufacturer thereof,
shall, wherever the delivery or contract of sale is
made, be deemed for the purposes of this Act to have
taken place in Bihar :
Provided further that the sale of goods in respect
0£ a forward contract, whether goods under such contract are actually delivered or not, shall be deemed
to have taken place on the date originally agreed upon
for delivery".
This definition was amended and between the !st
April 1951 and the 31st March 1952 which covers the
latter part of the relevant period it read as follows:" 'sale' means, with all its grammatical variations
and cognate expressions, any transfer of property in
goods for 'cash or deferred payment or other valuable
consideration, including a transfer of property in
goods involved in the execution of contract but does
not include a mortgage, hypothecation, charge or
pledge:
Provided that a transfer of goods on hire purcha<e or other instalment system of payment shall,
notwithstanding the fact that the seller retains a title
to any goods as security for payment of the price, be
deemed to be a sale :
Provided further that the sale of goods in respect of a forward contract, whether goods under such
contract are actually delivered or not, shall be deemed
to have taken place on the date originally agreed
upon for delivery.
Explanation.-The sale of any goods actually
delivered in Bihar as a direct result of such sale for
the purpuse of consumption in Bihar shall be deemed
for the purpose of this Act to have taken place in
•
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
667
Bihar, notwithstanding the fact that under the general law relating to sale of goods, the property in the
goods has, by reason of such sale, passed in another
State".
It will be noted that the Explanation which is substantially a reproduction of the Explanation to article 286(1)(a) was introduced for the first time by this
amendment.
"Turn over" is defined in section 2(i). The charging section is .section 4 which provides, amongst other
things, that subject to the provisions of sections 5, 6,
7 and 8 and with effect from the commencement of the
Act every dealer whose gross turn over during the
year immediately preceding the date of such commencement on sales which have taken place both in
and outside Bihar exceeds Rs. 10,000 shall be liable
to pay tax under this Act on sales which have taken
place in Bihar and from the date of such commencement. It will be noticed that although the long title
and the preamble refer to the sale of goods in Bihar
the words "in Bihar" were deleted from the definition
of the word "sat::" in section 2(g). There are various
provisions for working out the scheme of the Act to
which no detailed reference need be made. It may, however, be pointed out that a new section was inserted
by the Adaptation of Laws (Third Amendment) Order,
1951 which substantially reproduced the provisions
of article 286(1) and (2). Although, therefore, the
charging section read with the definition of "dealer"
and "sale" may be wide enough to cover inter-State
sales, the new section 33 makes all those provisions
subject to its provisions which are nothing but a reproduction of th<; corresponding provisions of article
286. In view of the interpretation we have put upon
article 286 it must follow that the charging section of
the Act r.ead with the relevant definitions cannot
operate to tax inter-State sales or purchases and it
must be held that as Parliament has not otherwise
provided, the Act, in so far as it purports to tax sales
or purchases that take place in the course of interState trade or commerce, is unconstitutional, illegal
and void. This being the position the question arises
1955
T Ill Bmgal
Immunity
Compa'!Y Limilld
v.
T Ill Stall of Bihar
and ot/llrs
Das Actg. C.J.
668
1955
Thi Bmgal
lmmuttil
Compaf!1
.cY..ma
v.
Thi SlaU
.r Bi/uJr
and others
Dos Aclg. C.J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
whether the Act is bad in toto or is bad only in so far
as it offends the provisions of article 286 as construed
above. It appears to us that the Act imposes tax on
subjects divisible in their nature but does not exclude
in express terms subjects exempted by the Constitution. In such a situation the Act need not be declared
wholly ultra vires and void, for it is feasible to separate taxes levied on authorised subjects from those
levied on exempted subjects and to exclude the latter
in the assessment of the tax. In these circumstances
it is difficult to say that the scheme of taxing interState sales forms such an integral part of the entire
scheme of taxation on sales or purchases of goods as
to be inextricably interwoven with it. There is no
reason to presume that had the Bihar Legislature
known that the provisions of the Act might be held
bad in so far as they imposed or authorised the imposition of a tax on inter-State trade or commerce
even though Parliament had not by law provided
otherwise it would, nevertheless, not have passed the
rest of the Act.
The result, therefore, is that this appeal must be
allowed and we issue an order directing that, until
Parliament by law provides otherwise, the State of
Bihar do forbear and abstain from imposing sales tax
on out-of-State dealers in respect of sales or purchases
that have taken place in the course of inter-State
trade or commerce even though the goods have been
delivered as a direct result of such sales or purchases
for consumption in Bihar. The State must pay the
costs of the appellant in this Court and in the Court
below. The interveners must bear and pay their own
costs.
BHAGWATI J.-I agree with the reasoning and
the ·conclusions reached in the judgment just delivered by my Brother S. R. Das. In so far however as
I was a party to the judgment in The State of Bombay
and Another· v. The United Motors (India) Ltd. and
Others(') it is but proper that I should record my
reasons for doing so.
(I) [t95Sl s.c.R. 1069.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
669
The Appellant is a company incorporated under the
Indian Companies Act having its registered office at
No. 153, Dharamtala Street, Calcutta and laboratory
and factory at Baranagar in the District of 24
Parganas in West Bengal and carrying on business
of manufacturing and selling various sera, vaccines,
biological products and medicines, etc., in Calcutta.
The Appellant has extensive sales of its products
throughout the whole of the Union of India and the
goods are despatthed by the Appellant from Calcutta
by rail, steamer or air against orders accepted at
Calcutta and all sales take place within the State of
West Bengal. The Appellant has no offices, agents,
· managers, godowns or laboratories in the State of
Bihar. It is not a resident of Bihar nor has a place
of business in Bihar and does not enter into any
transaction of sale within the State of Bihar.
On the 24th October 1951 the Assistant Superintendent of Commercial Taxes, headquarters Patna, wrote
to the Appellant to get itself registered under .the
Bihar Sales Tax Act and to take necessary steps to deposit the Bihar Sales Tax dues in any Bihar treasury
at an early date, contending that all sales in West
Bengal in which the goods had been delivered in the
State of Bihar as a direct result of the sale for the
purpose of consumption in Bihar were leviable to
Bihar Sales Tax with effect from the 26th January
1950. The Appellant denied the right of the State of
Bihar to tax the sales effected in West Bengal and by
his letter dated the 18th December 1951 the Superintendent of Commercial Taxes, Central Circle, Bihar
sent a notice under section 13(5) of the Bihar Sales
Tax Act to the Appellant calling upon it to apply for
registration and to submit the return, showing its
turn-over for the period from the 26th January 1950
to the 30th September 1951.
Correspondence thereafter ensued in which both
the parties made futile attempts to convince each
other of the legality of the stand taken by it. The
Appellant asserted that it was not liable to assessment under the Bihar Sales Tax Act and denied the
authority of the State of Bihar to levy sales tax upon
1955
Thi Bengal
Immunity
Comµny Limittd
v.
Thi Stau qf BU!•
and olhn1
Bhagwati].
670
1955
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
the Appellant. The Assistant Superintendent of Commercial Taxes, Central Circle, Bihar, ultimately by
Immuni;
his
letter dated the 28th May 1952 rejected the conCompany LimiUd
tention of the Appellant and asked it to comply with
v.
The State of Bihar the notice under section 13(5) of the Bihar Sales Tax
and oth1rs
Act failing which he threatened to proceed to take
BhagwatiJ.
steps for assessment to the best of his judgment. The
Appellant thereupon by its letter dated the 7th June
1952 called upon the Superintendent of Commercial
Taxes, Central Circle, Bihar to forthwith rescind and
cancel the notice issued under section 13(5) of the
Bihar Sales Tax Act as the said notice was ultra vires
of the Constitution and also the Bihar Sales Tax Act
and was entirely illegal and inoperative.
As the aforesaid demand was not complied with
the Appellant filed in the High Court of Judicature
at Patna a petition under article 226 of the Constitution asking for appropriate reliefs by way of issue of a
writ of mandamus, certiorari and prohibition and any
other appropriate writs or orders quashing the proceedings issued for the purpose of levying and realising a tax which was not lawfully leviable on the
Appellant and asking the Appellant to file a return
and register itself as a dealer. The State of Bihar, Respondent 1, The Superintendent of Commercial Taxes,
Central Circle, Patna, Respondent 2 and Assistant
Superintendent of Commercial Taxes, Central Circle,
Bihar, Respondent 3 were the opposite parties to the
petition. They did not file any affidavit in reply.
The facts alleged by the Appellant were not denied
but arguments on questions of law arising out of the
petition were addressed by the Government Pleader
appearing for them before the High Court. The High
Court held:
(1) That the Respondent 3 was acting within his
jurisdiction in issuing the notice under section 13(5)
and holding that the applicant was liable to pay the
tax, that if he made an assessment under section 13
(5) the Act provided a right of appeal whereby any
error of law might be corrected by the Appellate
authorities prescribed under the Act, that sections 24
and 25 of the Act furnished a complete and effecThe Bengal
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
671
tive machinery for appeal and revision against assessments made under the Act and that there was therefore no warrant for issuing a writ under article 226 of
the Constitution;
(2) That the phrase "sale or purchase in the
course of int<:,r-State trade or commerce" in article
286(2) must be construed so as to exclude the particular class of sales or purchases described in the explanation to article 286(1) and that therefore the amended
clauses ( c) and (g) of section 2 and section 33 of the
Bihar Sales Tax Act were not in conflict with article
286(2);
(3) That the Bihar Sales Tax Act was in pith
and substance not a law with respect to sale of goods
but a law imposing tax on the sale of goods and the
legislation fell entirely within Item 54 of List II of the
Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, viz., taxes on
the sale or purchase of goods other than newspapers
and that the Act could not therefore be said to be
invalid under article .254;
(4) That the Bihar Sales Tax Act had
been
enacted for the purpose of imposing tax on the sale of
goods and not for regulating inter-State or intra-State
trade and commerce and that therefore the Act did
not contravene in any way article 304; and
(5) That the Act was also not invalid on the
ground that it was t::xtra-territorial in operation, that
the jurisdiction to tax existed not only in reg-ard to
persons or property but also as regards the business
done within the State, that it was not necessary for
the purposes of jurisdiction that the entire transaction of sale should have taken place within the territories, that on the other hand the fact that the goods
were delivered in Bihar for consumption constituted
sufficient nexus or territorial connection which conferred jurisdiction upon the Bihar legislature to impose
the tax and that the explanation to article 286{1)(a)
expressly corJerred upon the State power to tax sales
or purchases of gooCls which were actually delivered
for consumption inside the State.
The High Court therefore dismbed the petition with
costs.
1955
The Bengal
Immuni?
Compa1rv Limittti
v.
Thi State q; Bihu
and ethers
BhagwatiJ.
672
1955
Tiii Bengal
Immunil)
Company Limited
;,,
Ti.. Stale of Bi\IW
and ot/tfrs
Bhagwati].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
The Appellant applied for leave to appeal to this
Court and the High Court granted the requisite
certificate under article 132( 1) of the Constitution.
At the hearing of the appeal before us the State of
West Bengal, Tata Iron & Steel Company, Calcutta,
the State of Madras, the State of Myso~e, the State of
Uttar Pradesh, the State ot Orissa, the State of Pepsu,
the State of Rajasthan, the State of Madhya Pradesh,
the State of Travancore-Cochin, the State of East
Punjab and one M. K. Kuriakose applied for and were
granted leave to intervene and counsel for the lnterveners appeared before us and urged their respective
points of view.
The first question as regards the maintainability
of a petition for writ under article 226 on the facts
disclosed in the petition can be disposed of very
shortly in the words of Mahajan, C. J. in Himmatlal
Harilal Mehta v. Tht: State of Madhya Pradesh &
Others( 1 ) where he repelled a similar contention urged
by the Advocate-General of the State of Madhya
Pradesh:"The learned Advocate-General of the State ..... .
. . . . . . however contended that on the principle enunciated by the Privy Council in Raleigh ln~~stment Co.
v. Tht: Governor-General-in-Council( ), jurisdiction to
question assessment otherwise than by use of the
machinery expressly provided by the Act, was inconsistent with the statutory obligation to pay, arising
by virtue of the assessment and that the liability to
pay the sales tax under the Act is a special liability
created by the Act itself which at the same time gives
a special and particular remedy which ought to be
resorted to, and therefore the remedy by a writ ought
not to be allowed to be used for evading the provisions
of the Act, especially a fiscal Act ............. : ........... .
. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. . In our opinion the contentions raised by the learned Advocate-General arc
not well founded. It is plain that the State evinced
an intention that it could certainly proceed to apply
the penal provisions of the Act against the appellant
if it failed to make the return or to meet tl1e demand
(1) [1954] S.C.R. 1122, 1126.
(2) 74 I.A. 50.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
673
and in order to escape from such serious consequences
threatened without authority of law, and infringing
fundamental rights, relief by way of a writ of mandamus was clearly the appropriate relief. In Mohd.
Yasin v. The Town Area Committee( 1 ), it was held by
this Court that a licence fee on a business not only
takes away the property of the licensee but also
operates as a restriction on his fundamental right to
carry on his business and therefore if the imposition
of a licence fee is without authority of law it can be
challenged by way of an application under article
32, a fortiori also under article 226. These observations have apposite application to the circumstances
of the present case. Explanation II to section 2(g)
of the Act having been declared ultra vires, any imposition of sales tax on the appellant in Madhya
Pradesh is without the authority of law, and that
being so a threat by the State by using the coercive
machinery of the impugned Act to realize it from the
appellant is a sufficient infringement of his fundamental right under article 19( 1)(g) and it was clearly
entitled to relief under article 226 of the Constitution.
The contention that because remedy under the impugned Act was available to the appellant it was
disentitled to relief under article 226 stands negatived
by the decision of this Court in The State of Bombay
v. The United Motors (India) Ltd.( ), above referred
to. There it was held , · ~t the principle that a court
will not issue a prerogative writ when an adequate
alternative remedy was available could not apply
where a party came to the court with an allegation
that his fundamental right had been infringed and
sought relief under article 226. Moreover, the remedy
provided by the Act is of an onerous and burdensomr
character. Before the appellant can avail of it he has
to deposit the whole amount of the tax. Such a
provision can hardly be described as w adequate
alternative remedy".
This sufficiently disposes of that contention and I am
of the opinion that the High Court was in error when
-- it held that there was no warrant for issuing a writ
(I) [1952} S.C.R. 572.
(2) tJ'l53] S.C.R. !069.
1955
The Bengal
Immuniry
Compa'!Y Limiud
v.
The State of Bihar
and others
Bhagwati].
674
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
1955
under article 226 of the Constitution on the facts
disclosed
in the appellant's petition,
The Bengal
lmmunif:Y
On the merits Shri N. C. Chatterjee appearing for
Compa1iy Limited
the appellant urged :Thi State of Bilzar
( 1) That article 286 put a fetter on State Legisand others
lature and the explanation did not confer any
BhagwatiJ.
power on any State Legislature tv levy any taxes but
was meant to explain only clause l(a), i.e., what was
an outside sale or .purchase and that it did not remove
any restrictions or fetters and did not convert any
inter-State sale or purchase into an intra-State or
•
local or domestic tran'Saction;
(2) That article 286(2) in Part XII was meant to
implement the supremacy of Parliament with regard
to inter-State trade or commerce and it put an
embargo on the power of State Legislature to levy
any tax on sale or purchase with respect to interState trade or commerce and that it was only when
the embargo was lifted by appropriate Parliamentary
legislation that State Legislature could levy any tax
on sales or purchases in the course of inter-State trade
or commerce; and
(3) That legislative competence of a State Legislature was derived from article 246 read with the lists of
the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, that under
article 245(2) only Parliament ·was given the power t(}
enact legislation with extra-territorial operation and
the State Legislatures had no such power, and that the
combined effect of article 246 (3) and article 245 read'
with Item 54 of List II was that the State Legislature
wa~ only competent to make laws imposing tax on
sale or purchase of gOods for the whole or part of that
State.
·
The determination of these questions involves a:
construction of the provisions of article 286( 1) and
(2) of the Constitution and their trUe scope and effect_
These provi~ions read as follows :"Article 286. (1) No law of a State shall impose,.
or . authorise the imposition of, a tax on thr> sale or
purchase of goods where such sale or purchase takes.
place(a) outside the State; or
...
l
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
675
(b) in the course of the import of the goods into,
or export of the goods out of, the territory of India.
Explanation.-For the purposes of sub-clause (a), a
sale or purchase shall be <leemed to have taken place
in the State in which the goods have actually been
<lelivered as a direct result of such sale or purchase
for the purpose of consumption in that State, notwithstanding the fact that under the general law relating
to sale of goods the property in the goods has by reason of such sale or purchase passed in another State.
(2) Except in so far as Parliament may by law
otherwise provide, no law of a State shall impose, or
authorise the imposition of, a tax on the sale or pur-chase of any goods where such sale or purchase takes
pbce in the course of inter-State trade or commerce :
Provided that the President may by order direct
that any tax on the sale or purchase of goods which
w:is being lawfully le.vied by the Government of any
State immediately before the commencement of this
Constitution shall, notwithstanding that the imposition of such tax is contrary to the provisions of this
clause, continue to be levied until the thirty-first day
of March, 1951".
They are enacted in Part XII of the Constitution
which relates to finance, property, contracts and suits
and fall under the caption of 'Miscellaneous Financial
Provisions'. Their main purpose is to lay down the
restnct10ns on State Legislatures to enact laws
imposing or authorising the imposition of tax on the
sale or purchase of goods. Article 286(1) lays down
such restrictions where such sale or purchase takes
place-( a) outside the State, or (b) in the course of
the import of the goods into, or export of the goods
out of, the territory of India. Article 286(2) lays
down such restrictions where such sale or purchase
takes place in the course of inter-State trade . or commerce. Article 286(1) is hedged in with the explanation and article 286(2) is hedged in with the exception "in · so far as Parliament may by law otherwise
provide" and the proviso under which the President
might direct that any tax which was being lawfully
1955
The Bengal
Immunity
Company Limiteif
v.
The State ef Bihar
and olhtrs
Bhagwati J.
676
1955
The Bengal
Immunity
Company Limited
v.
The Stat< •f Billar
and other1
Bhagwati].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
levied by the Government of any State immediately
before the commencement of the Constitution mav,
notwithstanding the provisions of article 286(2), continue to be levied until the .31st March 1951. Except
for these special dispensations the restrictions laid
down by article 286(1) and (2) prevail and the true
scope and extent of these restrictions would have to
be culled out of the terms m which these provisions
are couched.
These provisions came to be considered by this
Court in two cases, ( 1) The State of Bombay and
Another v. The United Motors (India) Ltd. and
others(') and (2) State of Trat/ancore-Cochin and Others
v. Shanmugha Vilas Cashew Nut Factory and Others( 1 ).
The first of these cases was concerned with the constitutionality of the Bombay Sales Tax Act XXIV of
1952. The High Court of Bombay had declared the
Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1952 ultra vires the State
Legislature and had issued a writ in the nature of
mandamus against the State of Bombay and the
Collector of Sales Tax, Bombay, directing them to
forbear and desist from enforcing the provisions of the
said Act against the respondents. The main ground
of attack in the High Court had been that the Act
purported to tax sales and purchases of goOds regardless of restrictions imposed on the State legislative
power by article 286 of the Constitution and in that
connection the provisions of article 286(1) and (2)
came to be considered by this Court. The majority
judgment of this Court delivered by Patanjali Sastri,
C.J. with which Mukhcrica, J. and Ghulam Hasan, J.
concurred held that article 286(l)(a) of the (',onstitution read with the explanation thereto and construed in the light of article 301 ap.d 304 prohibits
the taxation of sales or purchases involving interStatc elements by all States except the State in which
the gOOds arc delivered for the purpose of consumption therein. The latter State is left free to tax such
sales or purchases. and it derives this power not .by
virtue of article 286(1) but under artic~ 246(3) read
with Entry 54 of List II. The majority judgment
(I) [1953] S;C.R. 1069. ' ,
(2) gQU] s.c.R. 51.
2 S.C.R.
SUI'REME COURT REPORTS
677
differed from the view which was taken by me
that the Explanation does not deprive the State in
which the property in the goods passed of this taxing
power and that consequently both the State in which
the property in the goods passes and the State in
which the goods are delivered for consumption have
the power to tax and characterised it as not correct.
The majority judgment also held that clause (2) of article 286 does not affect the power of the State in which
the delivery of goods is made to tax inter-State sales
or purchases of the kind mentioned in the Explanation
to clause ( 1). The effect of the Explanation is ·that
such transactions are saved from the ban imposed by
article 286(2). Bose, J. and myself agreed that article 286(2) could not be construed in the light of article 304(1) as the two articles dealt with different
matters. Bose, J. however held that the basic idea
underlying article 286 is to prohibit taxation in the
case of inter-State trade and commerce until the ban
under dause (2) of the said article is lifted by Parliament and always in the case of imports and exports.
When the ban is lifted, the Explanation to clause (I)
of article 286 comes into play to determine the situs
of the sale. This Explanation does not govern clause
(2) of article 286 and as it can only apply to transactic 1s which in truth and in fact take place in the
course of inter-State trade and commerce, there is no
need to call it in aid until the ban is removed. The
ma.jority judgment as well as Bose, J. recognised that
the provisions of article 286(1) and (2) had been
enacted in order to prevent multiple taxation which
used to be levied by the States before the commencement of the Constirution having resort to the nex4s
theory. They however did not discard that theory
altogether and were of the opinion that it was sufficient to invest the State Legislature with jurisdiction
to impose a tax on sale or purchase of goods, if any
of the essential ingredients of sale had taken place
within its territory. They did not accept the transfer of ownership in the goods or 'the passing of property therein as the sole criterion determining the
situs of the sale and thus investing the State within
1955
TM Bengal
Immunity
Company Limited
v.
Tiu State ef Bihar
and others
Bhagwati].
678
1955
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19551
whose territories the sale had thus taken place as the
only State entitled to impose the tax on sale or purchase of goods. I howe'l'.er held that under the general law relating to sale of goods a sale must- be re'The State of Bihar
garded
as having taken place in the State in which
and otherJ ·
the property in the goods sold has passed to the purBhagwati].
chaser, and that the State is entitled to tax the sale or
purchase as having taken place inside the State. The
Explanation to article 286(1) does not take away the
right which the State in which the property in the
goods passed has to tax the sale or purchase but only
deems such purchase or sale, by a legal fiction, to
have taken place in the State in which the delivery
of the goods has been made for consumption therein
so as to enable the latter State also, to tax the sale or
purchase in question. The Explanation only lifts the
ban imposed by clause ( 1) (a) on taxation of sales or
purchases which take place outside the State, to the
extent of the transactions mentioned in the Explanation to enable the delivery State also to tax them. l
also held that the general provision enacted in article 286(2) against the imposition of tax on the sale or
purchase of goods in the course of inter-State trade
or commerce should give way to the special provision
which is enacted in the Explanation to article 286( 1)
(a) enabling the delivery State to tax such sale or
purchase in the limited class ·of cases covered by the
Explanation, the transactions covered by the Explanation being thus lifted out of the category of transactions in the course of inter-State trade or commerce
and assimilated to transactions of sale or purchase
which take place inside the State and thus invested
with the character of an intra-State sale or purchase
so far as the delivery State is concerned. There was
thus a divergence between the learned Judges as regards the true scope and effect of the Explanation to
article 286(1) (a) read with article 286(2) and even
though the same conclusion was reached by the
majority Judges and myself we reached the same on
different grounds. The interpretation put on article
286(1) (a) read with the Explanation thereto therefore was that the delivery State is left free to tax such
The Bengal
Immuniry
Company Limited
...
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
679
sales or purchases as fall within the terms of the Explanation and article 286(2) does not affect the power
of such a State to tax inter-State trade or commerce
of the kind mentioned in the Explanation. The Explanation saves such transactions from the ban imposed by article 286(2).
It may be noted that though there was a consensus
of opinion that article 286(1) was designed to avoid
the multiple taxation of a sale or purchase by
various States having resort to the nexus theory there
was divergence of opinion as regards the real purpose
of the Explanation as also the construction of the
non-obstante clause and the true concept of consumption as embodied therein. According to the majority
view the Explanation explained what is an outside sale by defining what is an inside sale. Bose, J.
was of the opinion that the purpose of the Explanation is to explain what is not outside the State and
therefore what is inside. l was of the view that what
is otherwise a sale or purchase which takes place
outside the State is deemed to have taken place inside the delivery State and the only purpose of the
Explanation is to introduce a. legal fiction whereby
the delivery State is also entitled to tax the transaction of sale or purchase along with the State in which
the transfer of ownership has taken place or the property in the goods has passed. The non-obstante
clause also was differently interpreted. I took the
the view that the non-obstante clause is incorporated
in the Explanation to state what according to the
Constitution makers ls the basic idea of fixing the
situs or the location of the sale or purchase in the
place where the transfer of ownership takes place or
the property in the goods passes and to indicate that
notwithstanding that fact a sale or purch::.se which
falls within the category mentioned in the Explanation is nevertheless to be deemed to have taken place
inside the delivery . State. The majority judgment
stated that the non-obstante clause is inserted in the
Explanation simply with a view to make it clear beyond all possible doubt that it is immaterial where
the property in the goods passes as it might otherwise
1955
The Bengal
.lmmunilJI
Company Limited
g;
The State :f Bihar
and others
Bhagwati].
680
!955
Ti.. Bengal
ImmuniJy
Company I imited
v.
The State of Bihar
and others
Bhagwati].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
be regarded as indicative of the place of sale. Bose, J.
stated that the object of the Explanation is to fix
the location of a sale or purchase by means of a fiction,
but he disagreed with the view expressed by me that
the non-obstante clause enunciates the general 1<1w on
this poi_nt. He stated that there was no general law
which fixed the situs of a sale, not even the Sale of
Goods <\ct, that what the general law does is to determine the place where the property passes in the
absence of a special agreement, but the place where
the property passes is not necessarily the place where
the sale takes place, nor has that ever been regarded
as the determining factor. As regards the concept of
consumption the majority were of the view that it
should be understood as having reference not merely
to the individual importer or purchaser but as contemplating distribution eventually to consumers in
general within the State. Bose, J. construed that
word to mean the usual use made of an article for the
purposes of trade and commerce. I adopted the
Dictionary meaning of the term and held that the
Explanation covers only those cases where as a direct
result of the sale or purchase goods are delivered for
consumption in the delivery State by the consumer
and it is only that limited class of transactions which
are covered by the Explanation and which are liable
to tax by the delivery State. I did not accept the
contention that . the words "for the purpose of consumption" must · be accepted in a comprehensive sense
as having reference to immediate as well as ultimate
consumption within the State" and excluding only
resales out of the State.
In regard to article 286(2) all the judges were
agreed that transactions of sale or purchase in the
course of inter-State trade or commerce are within the
restriction and no State can tax such transactions,
except in the two excepted cases, viz., (1) except in
so far as Parliament may by law otherwise provide
and (2) provided that the President may by order
direct that any tax on sale or purchase of goods which
was being levied by the Government of any State immediately before the commencement of the Constitu-
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
681
tion shall continue to be levied until the 31st March
1951. The Explanation to article 286(1)(a) though it
is specifically stated to be for the purposes of sub.
clause (a) was construed by me as an exception or
proviso to article 286(2), thus enabling the delivery
State to tax the transactions of sale or purchase
taking place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. The majority Judges differed from this view
and held that the Explanation converts the interState transaction into aJil intra-State one and
therefore there is no scope at all for the operation of article
286(2) in cases covered by the Explanation. Bose, J.
was of the view that the article 286(2) bans the delivery State also from taxing such transactions, because
if the transactions were in the course of inter-State
trade or commerce the Explanation merely shifts
the
point from A to B but this shifting is of no consequence at all, because both the points are caught in
the vortex of inter-State trade and commerce. It is
only when the Parliament otherwise provides or
the
President gives the directions within the meaning of
the proviso that this ban is lifted and the Explanation is there to settle a matter of considerable controversy regarding the situs of a sale.
The argument
that on this construction being put on the Explanation to article 286(1) and on article 286(2) the Explanation would become nugatory though accepted by
me was rejected by Bose, J. by pointing out that once
th~ Parliament by law otherwise provided or
the
President by order gave the direction within the meaning of the proviso the Explanation would come into
operation and would determine the situs of the sale
thus· enabling the appropriate State to impose a tax
on such transaction of sale or purchase.
The second case concerned itself with the construction of article 286(1) (b) in connection with the Sales
Tax levied by the State of Travancore-Cochin upon
certain dealers in cashew nuts within its territory
under the provisions of the Travancore-Cochin General
Sales Tax Act, 1124 M.E. (Act No. XVIII of 1124
M.E.) and the question for the consideration of the
Court was whether certain sales and purchases could
·-
6-R4'S. C. India'59
1955
,.....,,
Thi a.,111
Com,..yu.t#lrl
.J.:U.
V•
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682
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955J
1955
be said to be in the course of the impor"t of the goods
"TJ..B'"gaJ
ImrnuniJ
Com/Jdl'Y Lfmiled
into or the export of the goods out of the territorv of
India. The High Court had put a very wide construction on the words of ;irticle 2il6(1) (h) and held :.Int
the clause is not restricted to the point of time at
which goods are imported into or exported from India
and the series of transactions which
necess~rily
precede export or succeed import of goods will come
within the purview of this clause. There was a divergence of opinion between Pataniali Sastri, C.J.,
~.fok
herjea, J., Bose, J, and Ghulam Hasan, J, on the one
side and S. R Das, J. on the other so far as the construction of the words "in the course of" was concerned. But apart from this construction of
article
286(l)(b) S. R. Das, J. who was not a party to the
earlier decision hereinbefore referred to put on
record
his views on the construction of article 286(1) (a), the
Explanation thereto and article 286(2) expressing his
disagreement with the interpretation which the majority judgement in that case had put up on the
same. He agreed that the Provincial Legislatures purporting to act under Entry 48 in List II of the Se\1enth
Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935, had
enacted the Sales Tax Acts imposing tax on sales or
purchases of goods on the basis of one or more of the
ingredients of sale having wme connection with
the
Province and that this practice had resulted in the
imposition of multiple taxes on a single transaction
of sale or purchase thereby raising the price of rhe
commodity concerned to the serious detriment to the
consumer, that this evil had to be curbed and that is
what has been done by clause (I) (a) of article 286.
He however was "of the opinion that in imposing the
ban that no law "of a State shall impose or authorise
the imposition of a tax on the sale or purchase where
such sale or purchase takes place outside the State,
the Constitution proceeds on the footing that a sale
or purchase has a location or situs. He further held
that the 11rm-obstante clause in the Explanation also
clearly implies that the framers of the Constitution
adopted the view that a sale or purchase has a situs
and further that it ordinarily takes place at the place
"y.
TM SlaJ1 of Biluu
and
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2. S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
683
where the property in the goods passes. In effect,
to
therefore, the Constitution, by this Explanation
clause ( 1) (a), acknowledges that under the general
law the sale or purchase of the kind therein mentioned
may not really take place in the delivery State, but
nevertheless requires it to be treated as if it did. That
is to say, the Explanation creates a legal fiction. So
far he agreed with me, but he differed from me in
holding that the only effect of this assignment of a
fictional location to a particular kind of sale or purchase in a particular State' is to attract the ban of
clause (1) (a) and to take away the taxing power of
.all other States in relation to such a sale or purchase
even though the other ingredients which go towards
the making up of a sale or purcha~e are to be found
within these States or even if under the general law
the property in the ~ods passes in any of those States.
The purpose of the Explanation ends there and cannot be stretched or extended beyond that purpose.
He therefore held that the effect of clause (l)(a) read
in the light of the Explanation is not to permit both
States, viz.. the State where the property passes
under the general law as well as the State in which,
by force of the Explanation, the sale or purchase is
.deemed to take place. to tax such sale or purchase,
because in that event it will stultify the very purpose
of that clause and it will fail to prevent the imposition of multiple taxes which it is obviously designed
to prevent. In his opinion clause ( 1)(a) in terms
only takes away the taxing power of all States with
respect to as sale or purchase which, by reason of the
fiction introduced by the Explanation, is to be deemed
to take place outside their respective territories and
the purpose of the Explanation is only to explain the
scope of clause ( 1) (a). The Explanation is neither an
exception nor a proviso. It is not its purpose nor
does it purport, substantively and proprio vigore, to
confer any power on any State, not even on the delivery State, to impose any tax. Whether the delivery
State can tax the sale or purchase of the kind mentioned in the Explanation · will depend on other provisions of the Constitution. Neither clause (1) (a) nor
1955
Thi Bengal
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Com/Jal!Y Limited
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TktStaliof Bihar
and ot1"'s
Bhagwati ].
684
195~
1,,.,,...,,,
TM<rJ
C.mpanJ Limited
v.
T 1w
!i"".:/,/;ih"'
Bhagwoli J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
the Explanation has any bearing on that question.
So far as the purpose and design of clause (2) are
concerned he was of the opinion that clause (2) places
yet another ban on the taxing power of the State
under Entry 54 read with article 246(3), in addition
to the ban imposed by clause (l)(a). A sale or purchase contemplated by the Explanation to clause ( l)
(a) undoubtedly partakes of the nature of a sale or
purchase made in the course of inter-State trade and,
therefore, no State, whether it is the State in which
the property in the goods passes under the general
law or the State where the goods are delivered as mentioned in the Explanation, can impose a tax on such
sale or purchase, unless and until Parliament
lifts
this ban. He differed from the view taken by me that
the Explanation to article 286(l)(a) must be regarded
not only as having authorised the delivery State to
impose the tax on the sale or purchase covered by the
Explanation, but having also exempted it from
the
ban imposed by clause (2). He also differed from the
majority view that what was an inter-State transaction within the ban of article 286(2) is converted into
an intra-State or -local or domestic transaction by
virtue of the Explanation to article 286(1)(a). He saw
no warrant for the argument that the fiction embodied
in the Explanation for this definitely expressed
purpose, can be legitimately used for the entirely foreign
purpose of destroying the inter-State character of the
ttansaction and converting it into an intra-State sale
or purchase for all purposes. Such metamorphosis is
completely beyond the purpose and purview of clause
(!)(a) and the Explanation thereto.
After expressing himself as above, he made the
following observations which are very apposite to the
appeal before us :"To accede to this argument will mean that the
Sales Tax Officer of the delivery State will have
jurisdiction to call upon dealers outside that State to
submit returns of their turn over in respect of goods
delivered by them to dealers in that State under
transactions of sale made by them with dealers within that State. Thus a dealer in, say, Pepsu who
2. S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
685
delivers gOods to a dealer ir., say, Travancore-Cochin
will become subject to the jurisdiction of the ·1ast
mentioned State and will have to file returns of their
turn over and support the same by producing their
books of account there. I cannot imagine that our
Constitution makers intended to produce this anomalous result. On the contrary, it appears to me that
they enacted clauses (l)(a) and (2) for the very purpose of preventing this anomaly. I repeat that it is
not permissible, on principle or on authority, to extend
the fiction of the Explanatioh beyond its imme<liate
and avowed purpose which I have explained above.
In my judgment, until Parliament otherwise provides, all sales or purchases which take place in the
course of inter-State trade or commerce are.. by
clause (2) of article 286, made immune from taxation
by the law of any State, irrespective of the place
where the sales or purchases ma1 take place, . either
under the general law or by virtue of the fiction intro<luced by the Explanation to clause (l)(a). If a
particular inter-State sale or purchase takes place
outside. a State, either under the general law or by
virtue of the fiction created by the Explanation, it is
exempted from taxation by the law of that State both
under clause (l)(a) and clause (2). If such inter-State
sale or purchase takes place within a particular State,
either under the general law or by reason of the
Explanation, it is still exempt from taxation even by
the law of that State under clause (2), just as a sale
or purchase which takes place within a State, either
under the general law or by reason of the Explanation, cannot be taxed by the. law of that State, if
such sale or purchase takes place in the course of
import or export within .the meaning of clause
(l)(b)"..
It may be observed that the contentions urged before
us by the Appellant are in conformity with the above
observations of S.R. Das, J.
Normally speaking the construction put by the
majority judgment on the article 286(1), the Explanation thereto and article 286(i) of the Constitution in
the Bombay Sales Tax appeal would be the law bind-
1955
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686
1955
The Bengal
lmmrmi~
c.,"ompatt.1, Limited
~.
Thi Stale of BihtJr
lld otlidt
Bhagwali J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 19551
ing on all parties and in the judgment just referrc<l to
in the Travancore-Cochin Sales Tax Appeal S. R. Das,
r. rightly expressed that decision to be binding on
him so long as it stands. The Appellant has however
sought to urge before us that that decision was erroneous and has attempted to persuade us to reconsider
the same and put a construction on article 286(1)(a),
the Explanation thereto and article 286(2) which is
different from that. adopted by the Majority Judges
in the Bombay Sales Tax Appeal.
The question therefore arises whether we arc entitled to reconsider that decision.
The House of Lords in England has always considered itself bound by its previous decisions. These
<lecisions, as distinguished from the opinions which
arc delivered bv the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council as ad ~ice to the Crown, arc pronounced in
the form of judgments and are binding on the House
a' precedents. The question whether the House had
the power to reconsider the previous decisions of its
own and if it thought the decisions wrong to overrule
or depart from them in subsequent cases was considi:red in Street Tramways v. London County Council(')
Earl of Halsbury, L.C. who delivered the judgment of
the House observed at page 379 :"A decision of this House once given upon a
point of law is conclusive upon this House afterwards,
and that it is impossible to raise that question again
as if it was res integra and could be reargued, and so
the House be asked to reverse its own decision. That
is a principle which has been, I believe, without any
real decision to the contrary, established now for
some centuries, and I am therefore of opinion that in
this case it is not competent for ·us to rehear and for
a,unsel to reargue a question which has been recently
decided".
The reason of the rule was thus stated at page 380 :"Of course I do not deny that cases of individual
hardship may arise, and there may be a current of
opinion in the profession that such and such a judgment was erroneous; but what is that occasional
(I} (1898] App<al Cases 375.
2 S.C.R.
,-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
687
interference with what is perhaps abstract justice as
compared with the inconvenience-the disastrous inconvenience-of having each question subject to being reargued and the dealings of mankind rendered
doubtful by reason of different decisions, so that in
truth and in fact there would be no real final Court of
Appeal?' My Lords, "interest rei publicae" that there
should be "finis litittm" at some time, and there could
be no "finis litium" if it were possible to suggest in
each case that it might be reargued, because it is "not
an ordinary case," whatever they may mean".
and the conclusion was thus recorded at page 381 :"Under these circumstances it appears to me
that your Lordships would do well to act upon that
which has been universally assumed in the profession,
so far as I know, to be the principie, namely, that a
decision of this House upon a question of law is conclusive, and that nothing but an Act of Parliament
can set right that which is alleged to be wrong 111 a
judgment of this House".
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council on the
other hand has held that it is free to. differ from its
own dt:cisions or from. those of tht: House of Lords.
The power of the Privy Council to rt:consider its own
decisions was discussed in In re Compensation to Civil
Servants( 1 ). In that case :\11 earlier decision of the
Board in Wigg v. Attorney-General o.f the Irish Free
State(2) was attempted to be reviewed and after discussing the case-law on the point the Board came to
the conclusion that the Privv Council is not bound in
law and without examination to follow the decision
in a prior appeal whether they considered it to be
right or wrong although the Privy Council would
hesitate long before disturbing a solemn decision bv a
previous .Board, which raised an identical or even a
similar issue for &termination. While laying down
this principle the Board discussed the earlier cases
and in particular the case of Ridsdale v. Clifton( 8 )
which was followed in Tooth v. Power(4) and Read v.
Bishop of Lincoln( 5 ) and the proposition was thus laid
(1) A.l.R. 1929 P.C. 84.
(3) [ 1877] 2 P.D. 276.
(2) A.I.R. 1928 P.C.'!39.
(4) [1891] A.C. 284.
(5) [89 ] A.C. 644.
1955
The Btngal
Immunity°!!
Company Limited
.,,.
The State of Bihtir
and othws.
Bhagwati ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
-
1955
down in the last mentioned case :"In the present case their Lordships cannot but
adopt
the view expreS&Cd in Ridsdale v. Clifton(') as
eom,...,~
to the effect of previous decisions. Whilst fully senTM Sia qf SW. sible of the weight to be attached to such decisions,
their · Lordships are at the same time bound to examine
BM,...ii ].
the reasons upon which the decisions rest, and 'to give
effect fo their own view of the law".
The same principle was reiterated by the Privy Council in Attorney-General of Ontario and Others v. Canada
Temperance Federation and Others( 2 ). The Board was
there concemea with the consideration of a constitutional question. An earlier decision of the Board in
Russell v. Reg( 8 ) had upheld the validity of the impugned statute. That decision had stood unreversed
for 63 years and had moreover received express approval of the Board in subsequent cases between 1883
and 1937. It was contended that the case had been
wrongly decided and ought to be overruled and their
Lords.hips repelled that contention :-··
"Their Lordships do not doubt that in tendering
humble advice to His Majesty they are not absolutely
bound by previous decisions of the Board. as is the
House of Lords by its own judgments. Jn ecclesiastical appeals, for instance, on more than one occasion,
the Board has tendered a\lvice contrary to that given
in a previous case, which further historical research
has shown to have been wrong. But on constitutional
questions it must be seldom indeed that the Board
would depart from a previous decision which it
may be assumed will have been acted upon both by
governments and subjects. In the present case the
decision now sought to be overruled has stood for over
sixty years: the Act has been put into operation for
varying periods in many places in the Dominion;
under its ,provisions business must have been closed,
lines and imprisonments for breaches of the Act have
been imposed and suffered. Time and again the occasion has arisen when the Board could have overruled.
the decision had it thought it wrong. Accordingly, in
T!w&ngol
1,,...,.;1
-"'
(I) (1877] 2 P.D. 276.
(2) A.I.R.1946 P.C.
·
(3l [1882] 7 A.c. 8:9.
I
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
689
the opinion of their Lordships, the decision must be
regarded as firmly embedded in the constitutional law
of Canada and it is impossible now to depart from
it"
It is therefore settled law so far as England is concerned that their Lordships of the Privy Council do
not consider themselves bound in law and without
examination to follow their decision in a prior appeal
whether they consider it to be right or wrong but
feel themselves bound to examine the reasons upon
which the decisions rest and to give effect 'to their
own view of the law. We here are the highest Court
of the land and would derive considerable assistance
from th.e µractice of the Privy Council set out above.
The High Court of Australia is· the highest Court of
Appeal in the Commonwealth and concerns itself
inter a/ia with deciding constitutional questions. The
question whether it is bound by its previous decisions
came up for consideration in the Tramways Case
(No. J) (1) and the High Court held that it was not
bound by its previous decision but would only review
a previous decision when that decision was manifestly
wrong. Griffith, C.J. in this connection made the
following observations at page 58 :"In my opinion it is impossible to maintain as an
abstract proposition that the Court is either legally
or technically bound by previous llecisions. Indeed,
it mav in a proper case be its duty to disregard them.
But the rule should be applied with great caution,
and only when the previous decision is manifestly
wrong ...... Otherwise there would he grave danger of
a want of continuity in the interpretation of the
law'·.
Barton, f. observed at page 69 :"In conclusion, I would say that I have never
thought that it was not open to this Court to review
its previous decisions upon good cause. The question
is not whether the Court can do so, but whether it
will, having due regard to the need for continuity and
consistency in judicial decisions. Changes in the
number of appointed Justices can, I take it, never of
(I) 18 C.L.R. 54.
1955
Tu Bengal
Immunity
Comflilny Limilld
V•
Thi StaU of Bihar
-4 oth111
Bhagwati J.
690
1955
T/,. Bmgal
Immunil7
Company Limikd
v;
T/,. Stole of B;har
ad otkMr
_
Bhagwati ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955J
themselves furnish a reason for review. That the
prior decision was that of little more than half their
number might be urged with greater fairness, but it
cannot be urged against an earlier case. . . . . . . . . . But
the Court can always listen to argument as to
whether it ought to review a particular decision, and
the strongest reason for an overruling is that a decision is manifestly wrong, and its maintenance is
injurious to the public interest".
Powers, J. at page 86 referred to an earlier decision
given by him in the case of The Australian Agricultural Co. v. Federated Engine-Drivers and Firemen's
Association of AtlStralasia(') :"I am at all times prepared to consider the review
of any decision of this Court, by a Full Bench called
to consider that question, and to reverse any decision
if it is shown to be clearly wrong, subject to the well
known considerations to be applied to the particular
case in question at the time, according to the well
known judicial policy of British, Australian and
American Courts, and I think of all Courts of Appeal
in English-speaking communities"-except the House
of Lords... . . . . . . . "I decline even to consider a questioa
of reversing a decision of this Court casually, or even
seriously, raised by counsel, not clearly urgent, and
not raised before as full a bench as is available. If
we do not show some respect to oui· own Court's decisions, no counsel will feel safe in advising the public,
and it will create uncertainty and confusion" ........... .
. . . . . . "Under those circumstances I think it would
have to be shown that the decision was clearly wrong,
and, as it has been followed by this Court in other
cases, that it would be in the interests of the public
to reverse it".
This_ question came for consideration again by the
High Court of Australia in The Amalgamated Society
of Enginurs v. The Adelaide Steamship Company Limited and Others (2) and the majority judgment stated
at p. 142:"It is therefore, in the circumstances, the manifest duty of this Court to turn its earnest attention
(1) 17 C.L.R. 261, "9c.
(2) <8 C.L.R. 129.
'
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
691
to the provmons of the Constitution itself. That
instrument is the political compact of the whole of
the people of Australia, enacted into binding _law by
the Imperial Parliament, and it is the chief and special
duty of this Court faithfully to expound and give
effect to it according to its own terms, finding the intention from the words of the compact, and upholding
it throughout precisely as framed. In doing this, . we
follow, not merely previous instances in this Court
and other Courts in Australia, but also the precedent
of the Privy Council in Read v. Bishop of Lincoln(1),
where the Lord Chancellor, speaking for the Judicial
Committee in relation to reviewing its own prior decision, said: "Whilst fully sensible of the weight to be
attached to such decisions, their Lordships are at the
same time bound to examine the reasons upon which
the decisions rest, and to give effect to their own
view of the law". The ground upon which the Privy
Council came to that conclusion we refer to, but need
not repeat, adding, however that as the Commonwealth and State Parliaments and Executives arc
themselves bound by the declarations of this Court as
to their powers inter se, our responsibility is so much
the greater to give the true eftect to the relevant constitutional provisions. In doing this, to use the language
of Lord Macnaughten in Vacher & Som Ltd. v. London
Society of Compositors( 2 ), "a judicial tribunal has
nothing to do with the policy of any Act which it
may be called upon to interpret. That may be a
matter for private judgment. The duty of the Court,
and !ts only d}Ity, is to expound the language of the
Act m accordance with the settled rules of construction"."
Higgins, J. at page 160 added:"But the decision is now directly impugned by
the claimant ; and it is our duty to reconsider the
subject, and to obey the Constitution and the Act
rather than any decision of this Court, if the decision
be shown to have been mistaken".
The High Court of Australia has therefore considered
itself free to review its own decisions just as much
(l) [1892JA.C. 644.
(2) [1913] A.C. 107, 118.
1955
lmmuttity
Company Limilld
v.
The Sla11 of Bi/Jlw
ONfllfwl
Bhagwati· ].
692
1955
Tht Bengal
Immunity
Company Limiletl
Vo
T/1' Stale of Bi/ia'
and oth#s
Bhagwati ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
as the Judicial Committee ,pf the Privy Council, examine the reasons upon which the decisions rest and
to give effect to its own views of the law, in other
words to reconsider the subject and to obey the Constitution and the Act rather than any decision of
the Court if the decision be shown to have been
mistaken.
Our Constitution has drawn freely inter ali11 upon
the Constitution of the United States and it would be
helpful to consider what is the position in the United
States in regard to the re-consideration of its previous
decisions by the Supreme Court. There have been
numerous decisions of. the Supreme Court in which
the Court has departed from the doctrine of stare
decisis and has either refused to allow or overruled
its previous decisions.
In Hertz v. Woodman(') Mr. Justice Lurton observed:"The rule of stare decisis, though one tending to
consistency and uniformity of decisions, is not inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or departed from
is a question entirely within the discretion of the
court, which again is called upon to consider a qu~s
tion once decided".
Mr. Justice Brandies while delivering his dissenting
opinion in Waslzington v. Dawson & Co.( 2) rims expressed himself with regard to the proprietv upon the
part of the Supreme Court of departing from its
earlier doctrines if it has coipe to consider those
doctrine as erroneous :"The doctrine of stare decisis should not deter us
from overruling that case and those which follow it.
The decisions are recent ones. They have not been
acquiesced in. They have not created a rule of property around which vested interests have clustered.
They affect solely matters of a transitory nature. On
the other hand, they affect seriously the live; of men,
women, and children, and the general welfare. Star~
decisis is ordinarily a wise rule of action. But it is
not a universal, inexorable command. The instances
(1) 218
u.s. 205.
(2) 264 U.S. 219·
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
693
in which the court has disregarded its admonition arc
many".
The same learned Judge in a dissenting opinion in
David Bttrnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Company (1) reitera1..!d the same position in the manner following:-"Stare decisis is not, like the rule of res iudicata,
a universal, inexorable command".
After quoting the passage from the judgment of Mr.
Justice Lurton in Hertz v. Woodman (1 ) above cited
the learned Judge proceeded:"Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because
in mosr matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled
right. ............. This is commonly true even where
the error is a matter of serious concern, provided correction can be had by legislation. But in cases involving the Federal Constitution, where correction
through legislative action is practically impossible,
this Court has often overruled its earlier decisions.
Tht: (',ourt bows to the lessons of experience and the
force of better reasoning, recognizing that the process
of trial and error, so fruitful in the physical sciences,
is appropriate also in the judicial function ........... .
Recently, it overruled several leading cases, when it
concluded that the States should not have been permitted to exercise powers of taxation which it had
theretofore repeatedly sanctioned. In cases involving
the Federal Constitution the position of this Court is
unlike that of the highest court of England, where
the policy of stare decisis was formulated and is
strictly applied to all classes of cases. Parliament is
free to correct any judicial error; and the remedy may
be promptly invoked".
It will be instructive at this juncture to note the
following passages to be found in foot-note 3 at p.
825 in the report of this case (') :- ·
"Compare Taney, Ch. J. in Passenger Cases, 7
How. 283, 470; 12 L. Ed., 702, 780: After such opinions judicially delivered, I had supposed that question to be sc;.ttled, so far as any question upon the
construction of the Constitution ought to be regarded
(I) 285 U.S. 393.
(2) 218 U.S. 205.
(3) 76 L. Ed. 815.
1955
Tht&11gal
lmmunily
ComjJally Limild
v.
The Sta11 of Bihar
. i o11r1rt
Bhagwali J.
694
1955
Tiu Blng,U
Im~
Com~: Limited
v.
TM Stat, of Bih"'
-
arJt! 9Jbns
B/uJgwati ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955J
as closed by the decision of this Court. I <lo not,
however object to the revision of it, and am quit<;
willing that it be regarded her~aher as the law of this
court,. that its opinion upon the co'.l,trnction of the
Constitution is always open to discussion when it is
supposed to have been founded in error, and that its
judicial authority should hereafter depend' altogether
on the force of the reasoning by which it is supported".
Compare Field;J. in Barden v. Northern P.R. Co. ( 1 ) :
'"It is more important that the court should be
right upon later and more elaborate consideration of
the cases than consistent with previous declarations.
Those doctrines only will eventually stand which
bear the strictest examination and the test of experience".
In Mark Graves v. People of the State of New Yorlc(')
Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated:"But the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality
is the Constitution itself and not what we have said
about it".
The same principle was reiterated in Smith v. Al/wright (3) :_::
"In reaching this conclusion we are not unmindful of the desirability of continuity of decision in
constitutional questions. However, when convinced
of former error, this Court has never felt constrained
to follow precedent. In constitutional questions,
where correction depends upon amendment and not
upon legislative action this· Court throughout its
history has freely exercised its power to re-examine
the basis of its constitutional decisions. This has
long been accepted practice, and this practice has
continued to this day".
and in United States of America v.
South-Eastern
Underwriters Association (') iil the dissenting judgment
of Stone, C.J. at p. 579:"This Court has never committed itself to any
rule or policy that it will not "bow to the lessons of
experience and the force of better reasoning" by
overruling a mistaken precedent ............ This 1s
(I 154 U. s. "BB, 3 ').
(2) 306 U. S. 466, 4Si
l
(3 321 U.S. 649.
'-
(4) 312 U.S. 533.
2 S.C.R.
espec~ally
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
695
the case when the meaning of the Consl:ltuaon is at issue and a mistaken construction is
one which cannot be corrected by legislative action.
To give blind adherence to :i rule or policy that no
decision of this Court is to be overruled would be
itself to overrule many decisions of the Court which
do not accept that view. But the rule of stare decisis
embodies a wise policy because it is often more important that a rule of law be settled than that it be
settled right. This is especially so where as here, Congr<'."$s is not without regubtory power ........ The question then is not whether an earlier decision should
ever be overruled, but whether a particular decision
ought to be. And before overruling a precedent in
any case it is the duty of the Court to make certain
that more harm will not be done in rejecting than in
retaining a rule of even dubious validity".
The position has been thus summarised by Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States--·.V oL
I-Second Edition-at p. 74 :-"There are indeed good reasons why the doctrine
of stare decisis should not be so rigidly applied to the
constitutional as to other laws. In cases of purely
private import, the chief desideratum is that the law
remain certain, a!lll, therefore, where a rule has been
judicially declared and private rights created there··
under, the courts will not, except in the clearest cases
of error, depart from the doctrine of stare decisis.
When, however, public interests are inv:>lved, and
especially when the question is one of constitutional
construction, the matter is otherwise. An error in the
construction of a statute may easily be corrected by
a legislative act, but a Constitution and particularly
the Federal Constitution, may be changed only with
great difficulty. Hence an error in its interpretation
may for all practical purposes be corrected onlv bv
the court's repudiating or modifying its f~rme~
decision".
These then are the principles which should guide
us in determining whether we should reconsider the
earlier decisions of this Court. We are here not merely
concerned with legislative enactments which it would
1955
Tire Bengal
Immunity
Company Limiteil
.v.
Tire State ef Bihar
fllld others
Bhogwati J.
696
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19S5)
1955
be within the competence of either the Union ~
lature or the State Legislatures to enact if our earlier
Jmm:muy
decisions were erroneous. We are concerned with the
O.mpany Limited
construction of the prov1S1ons of the Constitution
Tht State of Bihar which it will be almost impossible to amend. The
al•lh1rs
Howie of Lords considered itself bound by its pRBhaKUJQli ].
vious decisions, because it felt that the Act of Parliament could set right an erroneous decision of th"
House by enacting appropriate legislation. But the
High Court of Australia as well as the Supreme Court
of the United States felt themselves free to reconsider
their earlier decisions because of the practical impossibility of correcting the erroneous decisions
through legislative action. They considered it their
bounden duty to construe the constitutional provisions and- be guided by the provisions of the Constitution itself and not bv what had been their earlier
decisions on the questions of its construction. The
only safeguard which they put on the exercise of such
powers of reconsideration was that the earlier decision should be manifestly wrong or erroneous. We
here also are concerned with the construction of the
prov1S1ons of the Constitution which cannot he
amended so easilv and if we come to the conclusion
that the earlier · decision was manifestly wrong or
erroneous and that public interest demanded that the
same should be reconsidered · we should not have the
slightest hesitation in doing so. We therefore approach the consideration of the earlier decision of
this Court in the Bombay Sales. Tax Appeal bearing
in mind the principles above enunciated.
It will be necessary at the outset to take stock of
the situation as it obtained before the enactment of
article 286 of the Constitution. The Government of
India Act, 1935 contained provisions in regard to the
distribution of legislative powers between the Dominion and the Provincial Legislatures in sections 99
and 100. The Dominion Legislature was competent
to make laws including laws having extra-territorial
operation for the whole or any part of the Dominion
and the Provincial Legislatures were competent to
make laws for the Province or for any part thereof,
The Bmf.al
...
r
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
697
The legislative heads in respect of which the laws
could be made by the respective Legislatures were
enumerated in the lists of the Seventh Schedule to the
Act and the demarcation between the powers of the
Dominion Legislature and the Provincial Legislatures
in that behalf was to be found in section 100. Entry
48 in List II of the said Schedule gave the power to
the Provincial Legislatures in respect of "taxes on the
sale of goods and on advertisements". Even though
the entry mentioned taxes on sale of goods · that head
was construed to mean in reality a power to tax the
transaction and the power to tax the transaction
carried with it the power to tax either party thereto.
The expression "taxes on sale" was therefore construed to include also a tax on purchases of goods, as
the transaction resulted in change of ownership from
one person to another and was from its very nature a
bilateral transaction with a seller on the one hand and
the purchaser . on the other. (Vide V. M. S. Md. & Co.
v. State of Madras( 1 ) ). The same distribution of
legislative powers obtained when the Constitution
came to he enacted and article 245 provided that
Parliament may make laws for the whole or any part
of the territory of India, and the Legislature of a
State may make laws for the whole or any part of the
State. Exclusive power to make laws with respect to
the legislative heads enumerated in the Union List
(List I) and the State List (List II) of the Seventh
Schedule to the Constitution was given to Parliament
and the State Legislatures respectively by article 246.
Entry 54 of the State List gave the exclusive power to
the State Legislatures with respect to taxes on the sale
or purchase of goods other than newspapers. What
was implicit in the phraseology of Entry 48 of List II
of the ~ev~nth Schedule to the Government of Indja
Act was thus made explicit by the phraseology adopted in Entry 54 of the State List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.
Prima facie laws enacted by State Legislatures
would have operation within the territories of the
States. Primarily legislation of a country is territorial
(I) A.LR. 1953 Ma<lra, 105.
-84 S. C. i.ndia/59
1955
The Btngal
lmmuniry
Company Limited
v.
T/16 Stal< of Bihar
and others
Bhagwati J.
698
1955
TM Bengal
lmmuniry
Company Limited
v.
Thi State of Bihm
and o'thm
Bhagwati J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
and the general rule is "extra territorium jus dicenti
impune non paretur". The laws of a nation apply to
all. its subjects and to all things and acts within its
territories. (See Maxwell on the Interpr~tation of
Statutes-10th Edn. page 144). Craies' on Statute
Law-5th Edn. at p. 174 contains the following citation from the speech of Lord Cranworth in Jefferys v.
Boosey( 1 ) : "Prima facie the Legislature of this country must
be taken to make laws for its QWn subjects exclusively".
The same principle has been applied also to sales tax
and it is stated in American Jurisprudence-Vol. 47,
p. 202 Para. 5 under the caption "Territorial Jurisdic·
tion" that :·"The general rule that a State may not ta.:i persons, property or interests which are not wichin its
territorial jurisdiction is applicable to sales taxes".
It would therefore appear that when the State
Legislatures enacted laws in respect of taxes on sales
or purchases of goods they would only have operation
within the territories of the States and the sales or
purchases of goods even though they are not specified
in the relative entry to be "within the territories"
of the States would prima facie ,be such as take place
within the respective territories of the States.
This po.wer to tax the sales or purchases of goods
would again have to be construed with reference to
the connotation of the term "sale" as it was understood in the legislative practice of the country at the
time when the ·power was conferred. As was observed
by Their Lordships of the Privy Council in Croft v.
Dunphy(') :"When a power is conferred to legislate on a
particular topic it is important, in determil)ing the
scope of the power, to have regard to what is ordi·
narily treated as embraced within that topic in legislative practice and particularly in the legislative
practice of the State which has conferred the power".
The expression "Sale of goods" in Entry 48 in List
(1) [1854] 4 H.L.C. 815, 955.
(2) [1933] A.G. 156, 165.
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
699
II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India
Act, 1935 came to be construed by this Court in Sales
Tax Officer v. Budh Prakash Jai Prakash(1) in relation
to an attempt by the State of Uttar Pradesh to tax
forward contracts of sale and this Court held :"There having existed at the time of the enactment of the Government of India Act, 1935, a welldefined and well-established distinction between a sale
and an agreement to sell it would be proper to interpret the expression 'sale of goods' in Entry 48 in the
sense in which it was used in: legislation both in
England and India and to hold that it authorises the
imposition of a tax only when there is a completed
sale involving transfer of title".
The expression "sale of goods" was construed in the
light of the definition thereof to be found in section
4 of the Indian Sale of Goods Act (Act III of 1930)
as also the corresponding provision of the English
Sale of Goods Act and the relevant passage from
Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 15, Para 13 quoted
therein. Section 4 of the Indian Sale of Goods Act
runs as follows :" ( 1) A contract of sale of goods is a contract
whereby the seller transfers or agrees to transfer the
property in goods to the buyer for a price. There mav
be a contract 9f sale between one part-owner and
another.
(3) Where under a contract of sale the property
in the goods is transferred from the seller to the buyer,
the contract is called a sale, but where the transfer of
the property in the goods is to take place at a future
time or subject to some condition thereafter to be fulfilled, the contract is called an agreement to sell.
(4) An agreement to sell becomes a sale when the
time elapses, or the conditions are fulfilled subject to
which the property in the goods is to be transferred".
The corresponding provision in section 1 of the
English Sale of Goods Act is as follows :" ( 1) A contract of sale of goods is a contract
(I) f1955] I S.C.R. 243.
1955
Th6BmfJl
Immunity
Company Limiutl
v.
Thi Stal4 of Bilutr
01ttl otll#rs
Bhogwiiti J.
700
1955
Ti.. Bengal
Immunity
Company LimiUd
v.
TM Statt ef Bihar
and othPs
Bhagwati ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
whereby the seller transfers or agrees to transfer the
property in goods to the buyer for a money consideration, called the price. There may be a contract of
sale between one part-owner and another.
(3) Where under a contract of sale the property
in the goods is transferred from the seller to the
buyer the contract is called a sale; but where the
transfer of the property in the goods is to take place
at a future time or subject to some condition thereafter to be fulfilled the contract is called an agreement to. sell.
( 4) An agreement to sell becomes a sale when the
time elapses or the conditions are fulfilled subject to
which the property in the goods is to be transferred".
This being the legislative practice in India as well
as in England at the time when the power to tax
sales or purchases of goods was conferred on the
State Legislatures the scope of that power would have
been ordinarily determined by the definition of. the
sale of goods to be found in these· respective Sales of
Goods Acts and the State Legislatures would have
had the power to tax sales or purchases of goods in
which the property in the goods passed within
the respective territories of the State,s. This was not
a power to tax a seller or a purchaser in personam.
It was a power to tax the sale or purchase of goods
which took place within the territories of the State
and was to be exercised in those cases where the property in the goods which were the subject matter of
the sale or purchase passed within the territories of the
State.
This position however was not acceptable to the
various States which wanted to enlarge the scope of
their power to tax sales or purchases of goods. There
was therefore an attempt made to analyse the concept
of sale into its various ingredients and to fasten upon
any one of the ingredients as conferring upon them the
power to tax the sale or purchase of goods by having
resort to the theory of territorial connection or nexus.
As was observed by Bose, J. in The State of Bombay and
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
701
Another v. The United Motors (India) Ltd. & Others(')
at p. 1101 :"The difficulty is apparent when one begins to
split a sale into its component parts and analyse
them. When this is done, a sale is found to consist
of a number of ingredients which can be said to be
essential in the sense that if any one of them is missing there is no sale. The following are some of them :
( 1) the existence of goods which form the subjectmatter of the sale, (2) the bargain or contract which,
when executed, will result in the passing of the property in the goods for a price, (3) the payment, or
promise of payment, of a price, ( 4) the passing of the
title".
Having analysed the concept of the sale thus into its
essential
ingredients the only essential condition
which was considered necessary to be satisfied was
the completion of the transaction of sale wheresoever
it, may take place and the taxable event was taken to
be any one of these essential ingredients provided it
took place · within the territories of the State. Reliance was placed for this purpose on the decision of
the Federal Court in In re The Central Provinces and
Berar Sales of Motor Spirit and Lubricants Taxation
Act, 1938 ( C. P. & Berar Act No. XIV of 1938) ( 2 )
where Their Lordships observed that :"Tax on sale of goods must necessarily be a tax
imposed at the time of the sale of goods and must exclude other forms of transfer like mortgages, leases,
etc."
Similar observations were also to be found in the
Province of Madras v. Boddu Paidanna & Sons(3) where
it was ·stated that a tax on the sale of goods is a- tax
levied on the occasion of the sale of goods and the
liability to tax arises on the occasion of the sale. The
sale was therefore ta~en to be the concrete event which
gave rise to the power of the State to tax the sale of
goods but was taken as not necessarily taking place
within the territories of the taxing State, the only
thing considered essential for the purpose being the
(I) [1953] s.c.R. 1069.
(2) (1939] F.C.R. 18, 86.
(3) [1942) F.C.R. 90, 101.
1955
The Ben~al
JmmlJllUy
Company LimiUtl
~
The Stau of Bi/tar
and olh#I
Bhagwati J.
702
1955
Tl1' B'"$al
Im"""!'!>'
Company Limited
Y•
Th< Sia/< of Bihm
and others
Bhagwati J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
territorial connection or nexus between the taxing
State and one or more of the necessary ingredients of
sale analysed as above. The territorial connection
or nexus theory was sought to be supported by reference to certain decisions of the High Court of
Australia, e.g., The Wanganui Rangitikey Electric
Power Board v. The Australian Mutual frovident
Society(') where Dixon, J. observed :
"So long as the statute selected some fact or
circumstance which provided some relation or connection with New South Wales, and adopted this as the
ground of its interference, the validity of an enactment reducing interest would not be open to
challenge".
and the dissenting judgment of Rich, J. in Broken Hill
South Ltd. v. Commissioner of Taxation (N.S.W.)( 2)
which stated that :"I do not deny that once any connection with
New South Wales appears the legislature of that State
may make that connection the occasion or subject of
the imposition of a liability. But the connection with
New South Wales must lie a real one and the liability
sought to be imposed must be pertinent to that conn~ction".
These observations of the learned Judges of the High
Court of Australia were referred to with approval by
our Federal Court in Governor-General-in-Council v.
Raleigh Investment Co. Ltd.(•). It was an income-tax
case and the dispute related to the claim of the Indian
Government to levy income-tax and super tax on the
dividends paid to the assessee company (which was a
joint stock company incorporated under the English
Companies Act having its registered offices in the Isle
of Man and its main offices in England) by nine sterling companies, the bulk of whose shares were held by
the assesse~ company. These sterling companies were
registered under the English Companies Act and were
controlled in London where the Boards of Directors
sat, the s~are registers were situate and dividends
were declared. They however carried on the business
(1) [1934] 50 C.L.R. 581, 60Q.
\2) [l937] 56 C.L.R. 331, 361.
(S) A.l.R. 1944 F.C. 51 s.c. 1944 F.C.R. 229.
<
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS.
703
of manufacturing and selling tobacco and cigarettes
in India and the business in India where all profits
were made was managed by the local boards which
were constituted by the Boards in London. The financial policies of these companies were controlled by the
London Boards and in all important matters of busi·
ness the London Boards were consulted and all the
general meetings of the Companies were held in
England. The dividends of these Companies were aho
declared by them in England and paid by them in
England to the assessee company in England. It was
however held that the source of the dividends paid to
the assessee company by the sterling companies was
British Indian and when the attempt was to tax income and not the corpus and the question to be considered was the 'source' of that income it was legiti-·
mate to take into account the place where the business
from which the income was derived was in fact carried
on and not to treat the situs of the shares in the eves
of the law as concluding the matter. The Court ~as
therefore of the opinion that the source of the dividends paid to the assessee company by the sterling
companies was British Indian and that in making
them liable to income-tax on that basis the Indian
Legislature was not giving its law any extra-territorial
operation. Spens, C.J. who delivered the judgment
of the Court further quoted with approval the following passage from the judgment of Evatt, J. in Trustees. Executors & Agency Co. Ltd. v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation( 1 ) at p. 236 :"The Constitution requires that it must be possible to predicate of every valid law that it is for the
peace, order and good government of the Dominion
with respect to a granted subject, e.g., customs, taxation, external affairs. In such cases, the presence of
non-territorial elements in the challenged law has to
be considered upon a slightly different footing and
those affirming its validity have to show not only
that the Dominion has some real concern or interest
in the matter, thi~g or circumstance dealt with by the
legislation, but that the concern or interest is of such
(I) [1933] 49 C.L.R. 220.
1955
The Bengal
Im1nrmily
Company Limited
v.
The State 1( Biha1
and olhtrs
704
1955
T!it Bengal
lmmrmity
CtJmpany Limiled
v.
Till Stau of BiM<
and others
Blwgwati ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
a nature that the challenged law is truly one with
respect to an enumerated subject-matter".
Two more decisions of the Federal Court reiterating
the same principle may be noted in this context :
Wallace Bros. & Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of lncometar, Bombay . City(') and A.H. Wadia v. Commissioner
of Income-tar, Bombay( 2 ). In the former case the
Court held that where the Imperial Parliament has
conferred a power to legislate on a particular topic it
i~ permissible and important in determining the scope
and meaning of the power to have regard to what is
ordinarily treated as embraced within that topic in
the legislative practice of the United Kingdom. The
general conception as to the scope of the legislative
practice in the United Kiogdorn with regard to income-tax is that given a sufficient territorial connection between the person sought to be charged and the
country seeking to tax him, - income-tax may properly
extend to that person in respect of his foreign income.
That general conception, both on a consideration of
the British legislation and as a matter of construction
of the Government of India Act, 1935, finds a place
in the phrase "taxes on income" as used in that Act
and the principle of sufficient territorial connection
is implicit in the power conferred by the Act of 1935.
The derivation from British India of the major portion of its income for a year gives to a company as
respects that year a territorial connection sufficient
to justify the company being treated as at home in
British India for all purposes relating to taxation on
its income for that year from whatever source it may
be derived, and if it is so at home in British India it
is a person properly subject to the jurisdiction of the
Central Indian legislature. In the latter case the
Court held that a law imposing a tax cannot be impugned on the ground that it is extra-territonal if
there is a connection between the person who is subjected to the tax and the country which imposes that
tax. The connection must however be a real one and
the liability sought to be imposed . must be pertinent
to that connection; but, if these conditions are satis(1) [19~8] F.C.R. I.
(2) (1948] F.C.R. 121.
F
2 S.C.R.
.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
705
fied it is of no. importance on the question of validity
that the liability imposed is, or may be, dispropor·
tionate to the territorial connection. Kania, C.J. also
observed at p. 141 :"As mentioned above, the aspect of it affecting
persons who are beyond the jurisdiction of the municipal courts cannot be considered sufficient for the
Court to hold it ultra vires. The municipal courts are
bound to enforce the law. Whether after obtaining
the opinion or decree the same is enforceable against
the other side or not, is not a matter for the Court's
consideration. The Court has only to see that the
legislation is within the ambit of the powers of the
Legislature".
Having resort therefore to the territorial connection or the nexus cheory enunciated in the cases abm·c
noted and . analysing the concept of sale into its
necessary ingredients as above the various State
Legislatures enacted laws in respect of taxes on sales
or purchases of goods spreading their net as wide as
they could having regard to the situation obtaining
in their respective territories. A transaction of sale
or purchase of goods thus came to be taxed by more
States than one even though really there was only
one transaction of sale or purchase of goods as between the seller and the purchaser. The consumer was
the last person who ever counted in the scramble for
taxes on sales or purchases of goods and even the free
flow of inter-State trade and commerce was affected.
The state of affairs was thus graphically described by
Patanjali Sastri, C.J. in his judgment in Bombay
Sales Tax Appeal(1) at p. 1079 :"In exercise of the legislative power conferred
upon them in substantially similar terms by the Government. of India Act 1935, the Provisional Legislatures enacted sales-tax laws for their respective Provinces, acting on the principle of territorial nexus
referred to above; that is to say, they picked out one
or more of the ingredients constituting a sale and
made them the basis of their sales-tax legislation.
Assam and Bengal made among other things the actual
(J) fl953J s.c.R. 1069
1955
Thi Benga.
Immunity
Company Limited
v.
The Stau of Bihal
and otherl
Bhogwati J.
706
1955
The Ben{fal
Immunity
Company Limited
v.
T ht State ?f Bihar
and others
Bhagwali ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955)
existence of the goods in the Province at the time of
the contract of sale the test of taxability. In Bihar
the production or manufacture of the goods in the
Province was made an additional ground. A net of
Prothe widest range perhaps was laid in Central
vinces and Berar where it was sufficient if the goods
were actually 'found' in the Province at any time after
the contract of sale or purchase in respect thereof
was made. Whether the territorial nexus put forward
as the basis of the taxing power in each case would
be sustained as sufficient was a matter of doubt not
having been tested in a court of law. And such claims
to taxing power led to multiple taxation of the same
transaction by different Provinces and cumulation of
the burden falling ultimately on the consuming public.
This situation posed to the Constitution makers the
problem of restricting the taxing power on sales or
purchases involving inter-State elements, and alleviating the tax burden on the consumer".
Apart from the States resorting to the territorial
connection or nexus theory in the manner aforesaid
the courts also appeared to lend their support to the
theory and the High Court of Madras in particu Jar in
two decisions, Poppatlal Shah v. State of Madras(')
and C. G. Naidu & Co. v. State of Madras( 2 ), gave its
imprimatur to this theorv. In the former case the
expression "sale · of goods" was understood m its
popular sense as distinct from its legal sense and it
was held that the sales tax could be levied if the transaction substantially took place within the State notwithstanding that the property did not pass within
the State. In the latter case it was held that the
power of the State to impose taxes was not conditioned
on the subject-matter being whollv within its jurisdiction and the exercise of the power was valid if
there was sufficient territorial connection with reference to the subject-matter.
After discussing the
American case law on the subject the Court came to
the· conclusion that in respect of inter-State sales the
State in which the contract was concluded wa,; the
(1) A.I.R. 1953 Madras 91.
'(2} A.I.R. 1953 Madras 117.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
707
only State which had the power to impose a tax. This
Court also in the majority judgment in the Bombay
Sales Tax Appeal(1) while summarising the position
as it obtained before the enactment of the Constitution incidentally ei<:pressed its opinion in this behalf
at p, 1078 as under :"As pointed out by the Privy Council in the
Wallace Brothers case( ) in dealing with the competency of the Indian Legislature to impose tax on the
income arising abroad to a non-resident foreign company, the constitutional validity of the relevant
statutory pro';isions did not turn on the possession
by thi:: legislature of extra-territorial powers but on
the existence of a sufficient territorial connection
between the taxing State and what it seeks to tax. In
the case of sales-tax it is not necessary that the sale
or purchase should take place within the territorial
limits of the State in the sense that all the ingredients
of a sale like the agreement to sell, the passing of
title, delivery of the goods, etc.. should have a territorial
connection with the State.
Broadly speaking
local activities cf buying or selling carried on in the
State in relation to local goods would be a sufficient
basis to sustain the taxing power of the State, provided of course. such activities ultimatelv resulted in
a concluded sale or purchase to be taxed".·
In
another case decided
immediatelv
thereafter
Poppatlal Shah v. The State of Madras(3) this Court
understood this expression of opinion in the majority
judgment as laying down the principle of territorial
connection or nexus :--·
"It :idmits of no dispute that a Provincial Legislature could not pass a taxation statute which would
be binding on anv other part of India outside the
limits of the Province. but it would be quite ccmpetent to .enact a legislation imposing taxes on transactions concluded outside the Province, provided that
there was sufficient and a real territorial nexus between such transactions and the taxing Province. This
principle, which is based upon the decision of the
Judicial Committee i!1 Wallace Brothers & Companv v.
(I) [1'153] S.C.R. 1069.
(2) [1948] F.C.R. I.
(3) [1953] S.C.R. 677.
1955
The Bengal
•Immunity
Comp1J11y Limilltl
v.
The State of Bih•
and others
BhagwaJi J.
708
1955
The&IJgal
Immunity
Company Limited
v.
The Slate of Bihar
and other,'
Bha.11,WQti j.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay( 1 ) has been held
by this court to be applicable to sale tax legislation,
in its recent decision in the· Bombay Sales Ta:r: Art
case(2) and its propriety is beyond question. As :i
matter of fact, the legislative practice in regard to
sale tax· laws adopted by the Provincial Legislatures
prior to the coming into force of the Constitution has
been to authorise imposition of taxes on sales and
purchases which were related in some manner with
the taxing Province by reason of some of the ingredients of the transaction having taken place within the
Province or by reason of the production or location of
goods within it at the time when the transaction took
place'°.
It may be observed that in the Bombay Sales Tax
Appeal the question of the territorial connection or
nexus was not directly in dispute and in Poppatlal's
case(') referred to above it was taken as decided by
this C->urt in the Bombay Sales Tax Appeal that the
theory of territorial connection or nexus was applicable to sales tax legislation. It is a moot point whether this theory of territorial connection or nexus
which has been mainly applied .in income-tax cases is
also appkable to sales ta:-r legislation, the 'pheres of
an income-tax legislation and sales tax legislation being quite distinct. 'Vhereas in the case of income-tax
legislation the tax is levied either on a person who is
within the territory by exercising jurisdiction over
him in personam or upon income which has accrued
or arisen to him or· is deemed to have accrued or arisen
to him or has been derived by him from sourcrs within the territory and it is therefore germane to enquirt
whether any part of such income has accrued or
arisen or has been derived from a source within the
territory, in the case of sales-tax legislation it is the
sale or purchase of goods which is the subject-matter
of taxation and it cannot be predicated that the sale
or purchase takes place at one or more places where
the necessary ingredients of sale happen to be located.
The theory of territorial connection or nexus was not
put to the test at any time prior to the enactment of
(I) [1948] F.C.R. J,
(2) [1953] S.C.R. IO!i9.
(3) [1953] S.C.R. 6i7
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
709
the Constitution and it is not necessary also for us to
give a definite pronouncement on the subject. Suffice
it to say that there was this evil which was rampant
in the pre-Constitution period by reason of the various
States fastening upon one or more ingredients of the
sale and arrogating to themselves the power to tax
sales or purchases of goods by reason of the territorial connection or nexus which they claimed to have
with one or more of the ingredients of the sale provided however that a sale or purchase ultimately did
take place either within their territories or anywhen:
else. It was this evil amongst others which was
sought to be remedied by the Constitution-makers
when they came to enact article 286 of the Constitution.
The Constitution-makers enacted several provisions in Part XIII relating to trade, commerce and
intercourse within the territory of India with an eye
towards India. as an economic unit and enacted in
ahicle 301 that trade, commerce and intercourse
throughout the territory of India shall be free and by
article 302 they empowered the Parliament to impose
such restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce
and intercourse between one State and another or
within any part of the territory of India as may be
required in the public interest. Broad based on this
conception of freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India and also with
a view inter alia to relieve the consumer of the burden
of multiple taxation which he was subjected to by the
various State Legislatures by having resort to the
territorial connection or nexus theory as afort>said the
Constitution-makers in article 286 enacted restrictions
on the power of the State Legislatures in regard to the
imposition of tax on the sale or purchase of goods and
these restrictions were fourfold :(I) State Legislatures were restrained from imposing a tax on the sale or purchase of goods where such
sale or purchase took place outside the State;
(2) The State Legislatures were restrained from
imposing a tax on the sale or purchase of goods where
such sale or purchase took place in the course of thr
1955
Tk Bengal
Immunity
Company Limited
v.
The State of Bihar
and others
Bhagwati ].
710
1955
TheBmpl
lmmuniry
Company LimiUd
v.
The Stau of Bihar
and others
Bhagwati J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
import of the goods into or export of the goods out of
the territory of India;
( 3) The State Legislatures were restrained from
imposing a tax on the sale or purchase of any goods
where such sale or purchase took place in the course
of inter-State trade or commerce except in so far as
the Parliament might by law otherwise provide;
and ( 4) The State Legislatures were restrained
from imposing a tax on the sale or purchase of any
such goods as had been declared by Parliament by law
as essential for the life of the community unless such
law had been reserved for the consideration of the
President and had received his assent.
These were the four restrictions which were put upon
the powers of the State Legislatures to impose a tax
on the sales or purchases of goods and were imposed
with different objectives in view.
The first restriction was devised to achieve the
objective of relieving the consumer of the burden of
multiple taxation and put it out of the power of a
State to tax the sale or purchase of goods where such
sale or purchase took place outside the State. The
Sale of Goods Act contained several provisions which
determined when a sale or purchase took place or in
other words when the property in the goods sold
passed from the seller to the purchaser. But it was
silent in regard to the place where the sale or purchase took place. There was no rule of law enacted
therem which determined the situs or location of such
sale or purchase and resort was therefore had to the
general law of the land for the purpose. The territorial connection or nexus rheory had an eye over
the various ingredients of a sale or purchase and if
anyone or more , of these ingredients fixed the situs or
the location of 'the sale it would mean that a sale had
more situses or locations than one. This state of
affairs could not be allowed to continue any further
having reg"d to the interests of the consumer and it
was therefore thought necessary, when the State
Legislatures were restrained from imposing a tax on
sale or purchase of goods where such sale or purchase
took place outside the State, also to determine when
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
711
such sale or purchase could be said to take place outside the State. It was for this purpose that the Explanation to article 286(1)(a) was enacted and it was
enacted for the express purpose therein mentioned,
viz., "for the purposes of sub-clause (a)". The Explanation was thus enacted for the express purpose
of determining what sales or purchases could be said
to have taken place outside the State and the basic
idea which was adopted therein was that under the
general law relating to Sale of Goods property in the
goods would by reason of such sale or purchase pass
in a particular State which would therefore be the
situs or location of such sale or purchase. But notwithstanding that fact the sale or purchase was
deemed to have taken place in the. State in which the
goods have actually been delivered as a direct result
of such sale or purchase for the purposes of consumption in that State. The anti-thesis appears to have
been between the State in which the property in the
goods has by reason of such sale or purchase passed
and the State in which the goods have actually been
delivered as a direct result of such sale or purchase
for the purpose of consumption in that State and in
the competition between these two States the Explanation provided that the sale or purchase in those
circumstances shall be deemed to have taken place
in the State in which the goo<ls have actually been
delivered as a direct result of such sale or purchase
for the purpose of consumption therein. This Explanation was interpreted in various ways, one view
being that it defined an outside sale and went no further :m(\ that the situs of the sale was determined for
the limited purpose of telling the State what it could
not tax by telling it that in the cases covered by the
EXj'hnatinn in spite of the property in the goods
having passed within its territories it was an outside
sale qua that State. The other view was that besides
fixing the situs of sale in this manner it also defined
what was a sale or purchase which shall be deemed
to inve taken place in the delivery State and thus
fulfilled a double function of investing only the delivery State with the power to tax such sale or pur-
1955
The Bengal
Immunity
Company limited
v.
The State of Biha'
and oth.,s
Bhagwati ,7.
712
1955
Tht Btn..t:al
Immunity
Company Limited
v.
The State of Bihar
and olhtr.t
Bhagwati ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
cha;e to the exclusion of all other· States qua whom
the sale or purchase was deemed to be an outside sale.
The third view was that the Explanation was concerned with fixing the situs of sale in respe.:t of the
delivery State only and did not affect the power of
the State in which the property in the goods had
passed to tax such sale or purchase which it enjoyed
by reason of the fact that the property in the goods had
passed within its territories. A fourth possible view
was that the only State which could not tax such sale
or purchase on the ground that the sale was outside
the State was the State in which the property in the
guu,ls had passed leaving open to the other States to
tax such sales or purchases by having resort to the
power which they possesml under article· 246(3) and
Entry 54 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. Whatever be the correct view to take of
this Explanation one fact remained that article 286
(l)(a) and the Explanation thereto were enacted with
the one and only motive to relieve the consumer of
the burden of multiple taxation to which he wos subjected by having .resort to the territorial connection
or nexus theory and to replace the nexus theory by
what may be described as the situs theory fixing the
situs or the location of the sale or purchase a1~d putting
a restriction on the taxing power of the States qua
which it could be predicated that such sale or purchase took place outside the State, thus leaviqg only
actually
one State in which the goods have been
delivere<l as a direct result of such sale or purchase
for the purpose of consumption therein free to tax
the sale or purchase having resort to the powers
vested in the State Legislature by article 246( 3)
and Entr)' 54 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to
the Constitution.
If therefore the situs or location of the sale was laid
down as the criterion of the taxing power of the
State the non-obstante clause contained in the Explanation gave the clue as to what was in mind of the
Constitution-makers when they
substituted the situs
theory in place of the nexus theory which theretofore
prevailed. They took cognisance of the general law
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
713
1955
relating to the sale of goods under which the property
in the goods passed by reason of such sale or pur- .
Thi B1ngal
lmmunii,
chase. The conception of the transfer of ownership Compon;•
Lirnitd
of the goods by the seller to the purchase was thus
v.
of Bill•
accepted by them as determining the situs or loca- Thi Stott
and otliln
tion of the sale or purchase and this conception had
Bhtlgwoti ].
its roots in the relevant provisions
of the Sale of
Goods Acts both in India and in England and in spite
of the fact that those provisions did not in terms say
where the sale took place or the transfer of ownership came about or the property in the goods passed
by reason of such sale or purchase, the general law
relating to sale of goods was taken in the . Explanation to fix the situs or location of such sale or pur<:hase within the territories of a particular State and
that event could only take place in one State and not
in more .States than one. There could be onlv one
situs or location of the sale or purchase and if that
were so the State in whose territories such sale or
purchase took place or in which the property in the
goods passed by reason of such sale or purchase was
the State which could claim the power to tax such
sale or purchase by reason of its having taken place
within its territory. It would therefore appear that
the Constitution-makers had in enacting the Expla.nation the one and only motive of negativing the territorial connection or nexus theory and replacing it by
the situs theory and fixing the situs or location of the
sale or purchase withiri the State in which the property in the goods passed by reason of such sale or
purchase. While doing so they also created a legal
fiction whereby in the competition between what may
be called the title State and the delivery State the
delivery State was given the power to impose a tax
on sale or purchase of goods where the goods had
actually been delivered as a direct result of such sale
or purchase for the purpose of consumption in that
State. If the object to be achieved was the relief of
the consumer from the burden of multiple taxation
that object could only be achieved by subjecting him
to taxation at the instance of one State only and not
by more States than one and to that C'XtCtt the view
-·
~4 S. C. Jndia/59
714
1955
The Bengal
Immunity
C.mpany Limil•d
y.
T111:s1ate of Bih.ar
and otkws
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
that both the title State and the delivery State woul<l
be entitled to impose the tax on the sale or purchase
falling within the Explanation was clearly erroneous,
the only State which would be in a position to tax
the sale or purchase in question being the State in
which the goods had been actually delivered as a
direct result of such sale or purchase for the purpose
of consumption ~herein.
The second restriction on the taxing power of the
State Legislatures was devised to safeguard the import and ex!JOrt trade of the country and embraced
transactions of sale or purchase of goods where such
sales or purchases took place in the course of the import of the goods into or export of the goods out of
the territory of India, vide article 286(1) (b ). It is
significant to observe that the Explanation to article
286(1) (a) was definitely put for the purposes of subclause (a) and it hdd therefore no application to the
cases which were covered by article 286(l)(b). This
concept was quite di>tinct from the concept which
was dealt with in arcicle 286(l)(a). The sales or purchases were looked at from different view-points and
the particular aspect whtch was dealt with in article
286(l)(b) was the import-export aspect of the transactions of sales or purchases. That aspect was separately dealt with even though for the sake of economy
of words the provisions in regard thereto were incorporated in article 286(1). They had nothing in
common with the provision contained in article 286
(l)(a).
The third restriction was divised to protect interState trade or commerce and covered transactions of
sale or purchase of any goods where such sale or purchase took place in the course of inter-State trade or
commerce except in so far as Parliament might by
law otherwise provide. This was still another viewpoint and this restriction was put with a view to
safeguard the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India. The imposition of this restriction meant that the States would be
deprived of a large part of their income which they
used to derive from tairing sales or purchases falling
•
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
715
within this category before the commencement of the
Constitution. A proviso was therefore enacted that
the President may by order direct that any tax on
the sale or purchase of goods which was being lawfully levied by the Government of any State immediately before the commencement of the Constitution
shall, notwithstanding that the imposition of such
tax is contrary to the provisions of article 286(2),
continue' to be levied until the thirty-first day of
March. 1951. This proviso enabled the State Governments to levy the taxes which they used to levy before the commencement of the Constitution up to the
31st March 1951 within which period they were expected to adjust their economies and replenish their
treasuries by having resort to their legitimate powers
of taxation. By the 31st March 1951 the States could
also make representations to the Centre and induce
the Parliament to otherwise provide by appropriate
legislation within the meaning of article 286(2) and
authori~e them to impose taxes on the sale or purchase of any goods where rnch sales or purchases took
place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce.
But until that ban was lifo::Ll by appropriate legislation by the Parliament the ban imposed under article
286(2) was absolute and no transaction of sale or purchase of goods where ~11ch sale or purchase took
place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce
could eve.r be made the subject-matter of taxatio'1 at
the instance of a State Legislature. The Explanation
to artide 286(1)(a) being expressly for the purpose of
sub-clause (a). i.e.. for the purpose of determining
what transaction of sale or purchase was outside the
State or inside the State as above stated could not be
read into article 286(2) nor could it be read as an exception or proviso to article 286(2). Reading it as
such exception or proviso would be contrary to the
express terms of the Explanation and would also
stultify the purpose of the enactment of article 286
(2) thus taking a large slice out of the transactions
falling within that category. The rule as to the
exclusion of the general provision by a special provision would also not apply for the simple reason that
1955
The Birtt.J.
Immunity
Company Limitd
VI
Thi State of BiM,
and oth"
-
Bhag>JJati J.
716
1955
Thi Bengal
Immuni~
Company Limited
v.
The StaU of Bih"'
an4 olhen
Blaogwati].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
f1955 j
the object of article 286(l)(a) and the Explanation thereto is quite distinct from the object of article
286(2) and the objects being quite different these
provisions do not cover the same subject-matter and
therefore there would be no occasion for the application of that rule of construction. To this extent the
view taken by me in the Bombay Sales Tax Appeal(')
that the Explanation to article 286( 1)(a) was an
exception or proviso to article 286(2) was clearly
erroneous.
The last restriction on the taxing powers of the
State Legislatures was devised to maintain the supply
of essential commodities and related to the imposition
of a tax on the sale or purchase of any goods as have
been declared by Parliament by law to be essential
for the life of the community unless such law has
been reserved for the consideration of the President
and has received his assent. This restriction also
though of another nature was a restriction put on the
power of the State Legislatures to tax such transactions of sale or purchase and was absolute in terms
having nothing whatever to do with the restrictions
put in the earlier clauses of article 286. These transactions comprised a distinct category by themselves
and were not affected bv the restrictions put in the
earlier clauses of the article. Tt may be noted that
the transactions covered by article 286(l)(a), article
286(2) and article 286(3) though looked at from different view-points may overlap. A transaction which
is covered by article 286( 1)(a) may also be covered
by article 286(2) and both these sets of transactions
may be covered by article 286(3). Such overlapping
would not necessarily mean that the provisions of
one particular clause have to be read as fastening
upon the transactions falling within the category
comprised therein and treating them as lifted out of
the ban sought to be imposed by the other clauses of
the article. Each ban has got to be effective and imposed on the transactions falling within its ambit and
even though the transaction may be saved out of the
ban imposed in one particular clause it may just as
(I) [1953] S. C.R. 1069.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
717
well fall within the ban imposed in another clause
and thus be excluded from the taxing power of the
State Legislatures. It cannot therefore be urged that
the Explanation to article 286( 1) (a) lifts the transaction out of the ban imposed by article 286(2) or by
article 286(3) and leaves such transaction of sale or
purchase as is covered by the Explanation free to be
taxed by the delivery State in spite of the same heing
of an inter-State character or being in regard to goods
declared by Parliament by law to be essential for the
life of the community.
The whole scheme of article 286 is that four different restrictions are put on the taxing power of the
State Legislatures in regard to the sales or purchases
of goods and each one of these restrictions has got to
be considered separately by itself and it is only those
transactions of sale or purchase which do not fall
within any of those categories that can be taxed by
the State Legislatures by having resort to their powers
under article 246(3) and Entry 54 of List II of the
Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.
The learned Government Advocate for Bihar however urged five distinct reasons why article 286(2)
cannot apply to the transactions of sale or purchase
covered by article 286(1)(a) and the Explanation
thereto and they were :( 1) The class of sales falling under article 286( 1) (a)
form a special class of inter-State sales which on general principles ought not to be af!ected by the general
provisions of article 286(2);
(2) If article 286(2) applies to the class of sales
covered by article 286(1)(a) and the Explanation
thereto it would result in discrimination against local
trade in favour of inter-State trade and it will be inconsistent with the provisions of Part XIII of the
Constitution;
(3) The purpose of article 286 being to eliminate
multiple taxation and article 286(1)(a) having already
achieved that purpose with regard to the class of sales
falling within it it was no longer necessary for that
purpose to apply article 286(2) to that class of sales;
1955
Tiii Bengal
lmmuni!J>
Compo'!)! L1mittd
'Vo
Tl# State of Bi!zar
and olhw1
Bhagwati].
718
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1955
[1955)
( 4) The Constitution itself has divided inter-State
sales into two categories and in relation to one class
Immuni'l
it has itself provided which State will tax and under
C1mpany Limited
what conditions and in relation to the other class the
v.
TM Stale of Bihar Constitution itself has imposed a ban in general terms
and othtrs
and granted Parliament power in general terms
IJha:•aJi ].
again to relax that ban as and when Parliament
thinks lit;
and (5) By a legal fiction, the inter-State sale is
converted into an intra-State sale.
We shall deal with these reasons seriatim.
As to reason ( 1) : it was submitted that the transaction~ of sale covered by article 286(1) (a)
and the
Explanation thereto and the transactions of sale
covered by article 286(2) were of the same category
and both these provisions dealt with the same topic.
That being so, article 286(2) contained a general pr<>vision whereas article 286(1)(a) and the Explanation
thereto contained a special provision having reference
to the transactions of sale or purchase falling within
that category, with the result that the rule of harm<>nious construction applied and the special provision
was to be read as an exception to the general provision. This argument found favour with the High
Court below as well as myself in the Bombay Sales
Tax Appeal('). This rule of harmonious construction
no doubt would apply if the topics covered by both
these provisions were the same, and the subjectmatters dealt with in both these provisions were identical. There is this difference however between the two
provisions, viz., that the transactions covered by both
do not fall within the same category and a transaction of sale which is looked at from the point of view
of its being an outside or an inside sale may just
as well be a sale in the course of inter-State trade
or commerce. In article 286(1)(a) the transaction is
looked at from the point of view of its situs or location and in article 286(2) it is looked at from the
ppint of view of its being in the course of inter-State
trade or commerce and the two approaches arc quite
distinct one from the other. That being so it cannot
Thi Be•gal
(I) [1953] S. C. R. 1069.
2 S.C.R.
.1
I
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
719
be said that the topics which are dealt with by both
these provisions are the same or that the subjectmatters thereof are identical. The ban which is impmed by article 286(1)(.a) and the rule of harmonious
construction and the exception of the special provisions from the general one as indicated above would
have no application in the matter of the construction
of both these provisions.
As to reason (2) : there is no question of discrimination against local trade in favour of inter-State
trade if article 286(2) applied to the class of sales
covered by article 286( 1) (a) and the Explanation thereto. The local trade would certainly be liable to the
levy of intra-State sales tax· which could be avoided
if a transaction takes place in the course of interState trade or commerce. For the working of the
Union as an economic unit and for the free flow of
trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India it is necessary that no fetter should be
placed on the course of inter-State trade or commerce.
The consumers within a State who would rewrt to
transactions of purchase across the border with a
view to avoid the payment of the intra-State sales tax
would be comparatively few and could in conceivable
cases be caught within the net by imposing a tax on
goods of a non-discriminatory nature within the
meaning of article 304(a). This reason is therefore no
deter:rent to our holdin~ that the ban under article
286(2) is absolute and unaffected by article 286(l)(a)
and the Explanation thereto.
As to reason (3) : it postulates that the only purpose
of the enactment of article 286(1)(a) and the Explanation thereto is to eliminate multiple taxation. If that
was the only purpose of the article it might conceivably be argued that once that purpose is achieved in
regard to the particular set of transactions which are
c:overed by article 286(l)(a) and the Explanation
thereto there is no further need of putting any ban
unller article 286(2). As has been already observed
l>efore, the purposes of the enactment of article 286
were manifold and they were achieved by enacting
the four distinct provisions in the manne · indicated
1955
Th1Bmfll
lmmun•I/
Crm/llJtly Limilld
VJ
Thi Stu- of Rihtrr
and othn-;
BhagwatiJ.
720
1955
TM Bengal
Immunity
Company Limited
..
The Statt of Bihar
tmd others
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
above and the restrictions which were put on the
powers of the State Legislatures to tax transactions
of sale or purchase were mutually exclusive even
though the transactions might so far as their naturr.
and character be concerned overlap in certain events.
Even though therefore a transaction fell within the
ban of article 286(1) (a) it could nonetheless be subjected to the ban which was imposed by article 286(2)
and it could be taxed only if it survived th.is scrutiny
also, which could be done if the Parliament by law
otherwise provided as set out in article 286(2).
As to reason ( 4) : it assumes that the Constitution
itself has divided transactions of sale or purchase in
the course of inter-State trade and commerce into
two distinct categories, one falling within article
286(l)(a) and the Explanation thereto and the other
falling within article 286(2). There is no warrant for
holding that transactions in the course of inter-State
trade or commerce are divided into such distinct
categories for the purpose of the imposition of the ban.
The transaction of sale or purchase would be one but
it is subject to the imposition of distinct bans having
regard to the view-point from which it is being looked
at. If it is looked at from the view-point of its being
an outside or an inside sale it may be caught within
the ban of article 286(1) (a). If it is looked at from
the view-point of its being a transaction in the course
of inter-State trade or commerce it may be caught
within the ban imposed by article 286(2). These bans
are mutually exclusive and may have to be applied to
the same transaction of sale or purchase, one ban not
necessarily excluding the other.
As to reason (5) : the argument totally ignores the
purpose and efficacy of a legal fiction. A legal fiction
pre-supposes the correctness of the State of facts on
which it is based and all the consequences which flow
from that state of facts have got to be worked out to
their logical extent. But due regard must be bad in
this behalf to the purpose for which the legal fiction
has been created. If the purpose of this legal hcnon
contained in the Explanation to article 286(l)(a) is
solely for the purpose of sub-clause (a) as expressly
}
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
721
stated it would not be legitimate to travel beyond the
scope of that purpose and read into the provision any
other purpose howsoever attractive it may be. The
legal fiction which was created here was only for the
purpose of determining whether a particular sale was
an outsid<; sale or one which could be deemed to have
taken place inside the State and that was the only
scope of the provision. It would be an illegitimate
extension of the purpose of the legal fiction to say
that it was also created for the purpose of converting
the inter-State character of the transaction into an
intra-State one. This type of conversion could not
have been in the contemplation of the Constitution
makers and is contrary to the express purpose· for
which the legal fiction was created as set out in the
Explanation to article 286(1)(a).
All these reasons therefore taken individually or
collectively are not sufficient to negative the position
that the transactions c9vered by article 286(1)(a) and
the Explanation thereto are not excluded from the
operation of article 286(2) and that the ban under
article 286(2) also applies to the same.
It was also urged that this construction put upon
article 286(1) (a) and the Explanation thereto and
article 286(2) would render the Explanation nugatory
and that the Constitution makers at the very commencement of the Constitution would not have given
the power by one hand and taken it away by
the other and that therefore the Explanation to artide 286 ( 1) (a) should be read as an exception or a proviso to article 286(2). This argument no doubt
found favour with me in the Bombay Sales Tax
Appeal( 1 ) and also with the High Court below. If
due regard however is had to the purpose of the enactment of article 286 as a whole and also to the various
considerations which have been set out herein above
it is clear that this argument is untenable. The
transactions of sale and purchase covered bv the
Explanation to article 286(1)(a) are not necessarily
co-extensive or conterminous with the transactions
of sale or purchase covered by article 286(2). There
are transactions which would be covered bv the
(I) [1953] .<;. C R. !069.
1955· .
The Bmgal
Immunity
Company Limiutl
"'·
The State of Bilulr
and ot,,.,s
B/llJgwali J.
722
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
Explanation to article 286(1) (a) without their being
transactions of sale or purchase in the col\fse of inter1 h• Jlmgal
lmmunit;
State trade or commerce and which therefore would
Company L1mittd
without anything more be covered by the Expla••
nation and would be the subject-matter of taxation
The Stat' of Bihar
a'1d olh,,s
by the delivery State by the appropriate exercise of
its power of taxation. There is also a further
BlrazwatiJ.
fact to be noted and it is that even though the transactions covered by both these provisions .may be
conceivably co-extensive or conterminous with each
other, the Explanation to article 286 ( 1) (a) would
come into operation the moment the ban of article
286(2) was lifted by an otherwise provision enacted
by Parliament and it was certainly lifted up to the
31st March 1951 by the President directing the continuance of the operation of the sales tax laws which
previously existed in the various States. It coul<l not
therefore be stated that the construction put upon
article 286( I) (a) and the Explanation thereto and
article 286(2) as above would render the Explanation
nugatory. If the States thought that the operation
of the ban under article 286(2) prevented them trom
taxing transactions of sale or purchase which take
place in the course of inter-State trade and commerce
and which are also covered by the Explanation to
article 286(1)(a) it was open to them to adopt proper
measures for lifting the ban under article 286(2) and
making themselves free to tax the transactions of
sale or purchase covered by the Explanation. Parliament would in that event consider the proposals made
by the respective States in their proper perspective
having regard to the provisions of the Constitution
in regard to the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India, the convenience or inconvenience of the public and the needs
of the respective States and lift the ban in the manner
and to the extent it thought fit.
The majority judgment in the Bombay Sales Tax
Appeal has been construed by the various States as
giving them an authority to impose a tax on the transactiom of sale or purchase covered hv the Explanation to article 286(1)(a) and authorising them to
1955
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
723
impose such tax on the seller even though he may be
residing outside their territories. The non-resident
businessmen therefore who entered into Uansactions of sales of goods where as a direct result of
iUch sales the goods are actually delivered for the purpose of consumption in a particular State have been
iC>ught to be subjected to the levy of sales tax at the
instance of these States with great inconvenience and
harassment to themselves, and the warrant for their
action in this behalf is stated by these States to be the
majority judgment of this Court. The various States
however in the scramble ior taxes have been oblivious
to the fact that a transaction of sale or purchase
is not a unilateral transaction but a bilateral one and
when it is looked at from the point of view of a sale
or purchase it is one transaction which has two facets.
From the point of view of a seller it is a sale transaction and from the point of view of a purchaser it is a
purchase transaction. When therefore the transaction is one on which a tax on sale or purchase can be
levied it does not necessarily mean that onlv a sales
tax can be levied and not a purchase tax. The inside
dealer may therefore be taxed on his purchases or if
he sells in retail to actual consumers in the State he
may be taxed on the sales. lf the inside dealer is
himself the consumer then there will be no difficulty
in assessing him for his books will show how much he
has imported from other States and how much he has
consumed. In any case, the convenience or . inconvenience of collecting a sales tax or a purchase tax
\s not a relevant consideration when one is considering the validity or otherwise of such a tax, as was
observed by Kania, C. J. in the case of A.H. Wadia v.
Commissioner of Income-tax, Bomuay(1) at p. 141. In
the very judgment of the majority in !he Bombay
Sab Ta:v Appea!C) there is a passage at p. 1084
which indicates that all buyers within the delivery
State except those buying for re.-export out of the
State would be within the scope of the Explanation
and liable to be taxed by the State on such transactions, anti it would be an unwarranted assumption on
(ll [1948] F. C. R.121.
(2) [1953] S. C.R.1069.
1955
The Rental
lmmuniry
Company Limited
v.
Thi State of Bih11r
and oth4r•
BhagwatiJ.
124
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1955
[l.955]
the part of anyone who read that judgment to say
that the delivery State was entitled to levy a tax on
lmmuni?
the sale or purchase of goods falling within the ExCampany L1miud
planation to article 286(l)(a) on the seller alone. The
v.
Tlw State of Bilw seller would be outside the territories of the taxing
ond others
State and would primarily not be liable to the jurisBltat,wati].
diction of the Sales Tax Act enacted by the taxing
State. It would be by· adopting the theory of the
territorial connection or nexus as it was being done
prior to the enactment of the Constitution that the
taxing Sate WQuld seek to reach the non-resident
businessmen outside its territories and if regard be
had to the fact that the taxation is either in personam or in relation to the transaction of sale or
purchase which takes place within its territory there
is no warrant at all for taxing the outside businessmen on the transactions of sale or purchase covered
bv the Explanation to article 286(1)(a). All the prc:>visions contained in the Bihar Sales Tax Act with regard to t~ registration of the outside dealer, the
maintenance of the, books of account, submission of
returns bv him to the Sales Tax authorities of the
State of Bihar, the production and inspection of books
of account before the Sales Tax authorities, the search
of the premises of the outside dealer by them and the
imposition of penalties on him by reason of his noncompliance with the various provisions contained in
the Act amongst others are unwarranted and illegitimate exercise of the powers incidental to the power of
taxing sales or purchases conferred upon the State of
Bihar by article 246(3) and the Entry 54 iri List II of
the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and do nut
affect non-resident businessmen who ate outside the
territories of the State of Bihar.
The majority judgment in the Bombay Sales Tax
Appeal(') did not say that the delivery State was entitled to tax the sellers in the transactions of sale or
purchase covered by the Explanation to article 286 (1)
(a). The question whether the seller or the purchaser
would be subject to the levy of a tax on the transaction of sale or purchase at the instance of the delivery
'Tiu Bengal
(1) [1953] S. C. R. 1069.
: S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
7'25
1955
State was not before the Court and the observations
contained in the majority judgment were made with
The &ni«I
lmmun"?
reference to a pure question of the interpretation of
Companf Lsmiktl
article 286(1) (a) and the Explanation thereto. As a
v.
matter of fact the passage above-quoted from the The State ef Biltttr
and ot/rlr1
judgment(1) at p. 1084 would go to show that they
Bftai1raali J
contemplated the purchasers being amenable to tax
at the instance of the delivery State in the case of
transactions covered by the Explanation to article
286(1)(a). Even though it is not strictly relevant to
consider the consequences of a particular position in
law when construing a statutory provision it is nonetbdess necessary to visualise those consequences when
one tries to probe into the mi11d of the legislators and
see whether they could have ever contemplated such
consequences. If the construction sought to be put
upon the Explanation to article 286(1)(a) and the
majority judgment in relation thereto by the State
Legislatures were accepted, all outside dealers wheresoever they may be located or residing or carrying on
their liusiness all over tl1e Union would be amenable
to the levy of sales tax at the instance of the delivery
State and one dealer in a particular State who had a
very large business ancl was entering into transactions
of sale with consumers in outside States all over the
Union would be amenable to the jurisdiction of several States in the matter of his transactions of sale of
his goods. There are as many as 21 Sales Tax Acts to be
found in the Manual of Sales Tax Acts and if a dealer
in one State was going to be held amenable to the
levy of sales tax at the instance of all the other States
it would mean that he would have to ascertain from
the purchaser in each of the transactions of sale which
he enters into the State to which the purchaser belongs, whether the purchaser is purchasing the goods
for the purpose of consumption within that State. to
get himself registered as a dealer in that State; to
maintain his books of account with a view to produce
them and · subject them to inspection by the Sales
Tax authorities in that State, to submit returns of
the sales tax recovered by him from the . purchasers
(I) [195!] S. C.R. 1069.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1955
[1955]
in that State before the Sales Tax authorities of that
State and make himself liable for the non-observance
of the various requirements of the Sales Tax Act
enacted by that State. The task of fulfiliing the reThi State of Bihal
quirements
qua one State would be formidable· enough.
ond othlrs
But when one visualises that the dealer who enters
into such transactions of sale with the various cusromers may be subjected to this process at the instance
of each and every State within whose territory the
purchaser may happen to be importing the goods as
a direct result of such sale for actual consumption
within the territories of that State, one can easilv
u,nderstand what untold harassment and inconvenfence the dealer would have to suffer from. It will be
easy to understand that if those were the circumstances attendant upon his business the dealer may
as well close down his business rather than submit to
all this harassment at the hands of the various States.
The free flow of trade, commerce and intercourse
throughout the territory of India will be thoroughly
choked up and we are quite sure that neither the
Constitution makers nor the majority judgment in
the Bombay Sales Tax Appeal would ever have contemplated these consequences. It is legitimate therefore to hold that no such thing could ever have bt:·:n
contemplated by them and nothing would have l'een
farthest from their minds than such a position. The
seller in such cases would certainly not be ameuable
to the levy of a sales tax at the instance of the deiivery State and no law passed by the delivery State
in regard to a levy of sales tax would have any operation against
the non-resident businessman who
enters into a transaction of sale where as a direct
result pf such sale the goods are actually delivered for
consumption within the taxing State.
If however the majority judgment be construed to
have said that the seller could be subjected to the levy
of a sales tax at the instance of the delivery State in
the case of transactions covered by the Explanation
to article 286(1)(a) I am of the opinion that it was
clearly erroneous and public interests demand that
the same should be reversed.
The Bengal
Immunity
Company Llmilld
...
728
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955}
1955
by all the Courts which function on the pattern
of the British Judicial system. This rule, in its very
Immunity
strict form, is observed by the English Courts. (Vide
Ca-y Liiniltd
Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co., Ltd.(') and Williams
v
Tllc Si4Jeef Bihar v. Glasbrook Brothers Ltd.('). The House of Lords has
lllld.ot/tm
ruled, after careful consideration, in its judgment in
j.,""""'°"11J ].
the case in London Street Tramways Co., Ltd. v. London County Council(') that the House is bound to
follow its own previous decisions and will not allow
any question settled thereby to be reopened and
argued again, nor can the House be asked to reverse
its own prior decision. Such reversal, if needed, is
one that has to be brought about by parliamentary
legislation. The Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council has, however, not adopted this extremely
rigorous view but has felt itself free, in appropriate
cases, to reconsider its prior decisions. (Vide In Re.
Transferred Civil Servants (Ireland) Compensation(') ).
The same is the case with the Supreme Court of the
United States of America. (See Willoughby on the
Constitution of the United States, Vol. I, page 74).
Our Constitution which has made detailed provision
about various matters relating to the Supreme
Court including a matter relating to its practice, such
as, whether there can be a dissenting judgment· (sec
article 145(5). has not, in terms, made any provision
in this behalf. Article 141, no doubt, provides that
"the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all Courts within the territory of India". It
has been urged before us that the phrase "all Courts"
is comprehensive enough to include the Supreme
Cpurt. It is pointed out, that since every decision
declares the law, a later decision declaring the law in
a contrary sense, would in effect, be the exercise of
legislative function which must be taken to have been
impliedly prohibited. While these arguments arc
not without force, it is reasonably clear, in the context of article 141, that the phrase "all Courts" must
refer to Courts other than the Suprem~ Court. In the
absence, therefore, of any clear provision m the
Th6 Bmgal
(I) [1944] K. B. 718.
{3) [1898] A.C. 375.
12) [1947] 2 All E. R. SM.
(4) [1929] A. C. 242. '
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
729
Constitution and in view of the fact that this Court
has historically succeeded to the pre-existing Federal
Court and the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council, we cannot· deny to this Court, the competence to reconsider its prior decisions.
But, it does not follow that such power can be
exercised without restriction or limitation or that a
prior decision can be reversed on the ground that, on
later consideration, the Court disagrees with the prior
decision and thinks it erroneous. The necessity for
certainty and continuity in the declaration of law
by the highest courts in the cpuntry is recognised on
all hands. That necessity is all the greater, and not
the less, by reason of the Constitution itself having
formally provided that the decisions of this Court are
declaratory of the law. The rule as to the binding
character of a judicial precedent is based on a juristic
principle of universal application. The reason for its
adoJ,>tion is "the disastrous inconvenience of subjecting each question decided by a previous judgment to
reargument, thereby rendering the dealings of mankind
doubtful by different decisions; so that in truth and in
fact there would be no real final court of appeal" (See
London Street Tramways Co., Ltd. v. The London County
Counojl(1) at page 380). It is, therefore, necessary to
consider within what limits the competency of this
Court to reconsider its prior decisions may well be
exercised. For this purpose the actual practice of other
comparable Courts as affording guidance ·requires
close examination.
The practice of the Supreme Court of America is
indicated in the following passage from Willoughby
on the Constitution of the United States of America,
Vol. I, page 74:
"In cases of purely private import, the chief
desideratum is that the law remain certain, and,
therefore, where a rufe has been judicially declared
and private rights created thereunder, the courts will
not, except in the clearest cases of error, depart from
the doctrine of stare decisis. When, however, public
interest~ are involved, and especially .when the que~
(1) [1898] A.C. 375.
s. C. India/59
9-$4
1955
TM Bengal
Immunity
Company Limild
v.
TM Slat. of Bilur
and olhers
Jagannadhadas J.
730
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
tion is one of constitutional construction, the matter
is
otherwise. An error in the construction of a statute
Tiu Btngal
Immunity
may easily be corrected by a legislative act, but a
Company Limited
Constitution and particularly the Federal Constitu·
v.
The State of Bihm'
tion, may be changed only with great difficulty.
and ot/:ers
Hence an error in its interpretation may for all practical purposes be corrected only by the Court's IC·
.7agannac/ftadas ]•
pudiating or modifying its former decision".
It would appear, therefore, that the power of reconsideration of a prior decision is somewhat freely
exercised by the Supreme Court of America in Consti
tutional cases. The reason for such free exerc1Se, or
to the same extent, does not exist under our Consti·
tution. To appreciat~ this, it is necessary to compare
the provisions in the two Constitutions for amend·
ment of the Constitution. The machinery for amendment of the Constitution of the United States is prc.>vided in Article V thereof and is as follows :
"The Congress, whenever two thirds of both
houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to this Constitution, or, on the application of
two thirds of the several States. shall call a convet!·
tion for proposing amendments, which, in either ca~,
shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of
this Constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of
three fourths of the several States, or by conventions
in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode
of ratification may he proposed by the Congress".
Under article 368 of our Constitution, the normal
procedure provided for amendment. except in 1;,spect
of specified matters to be presently enumerated, is as
follows:
"An amendment of this Constitution may he initiated bv the introduction of a Bill for the purpose in
either House of Parliament, and when the Bill is
passed in each House by a majority of the total membership of that House and by a majority of not less
than two-thirds of the members of that House present
· and voting, it shall he presented to the President for
his assent and upon such assent being given to the
Bill, the Constitution shall stand amended in accordance with the terms of the Bill".
1955
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
731
In respect, however, of a limited number of matters
specified in the Constitution, an additional step is
required, namely, that "before the Bill making provision for such amendment is presented to the President for assent, the amendment shall also require to
be ratified by the Legislatures of not less than onehalf of the States specified in Parts A and B of the
First Schedule by resolutions to that effect passed by
those Legislatures". Now the special matters where
amendment is conditional on this additional requirement relate to the election of President (articles 54
and 55), extent of the executive power of the Union
(article 73), extent of the executive power of a State
(article 162), provisions relating to the Union Judiciary (Supreme Court) (Chapter IV of Part V), and
to the High Courts of the various States, in Parts A
and B (Chapter V of Part VI) and in Part C (article
241), and the relations between the Union and the
States (Chapter I of Part XI), as also the distribution of the legish}tive powers and the various lists in
the Seventh Schedule, the representation of the States
in Parliament, and the provision in the Constitution
relating to the machinery for amendment of the Constitution. Thus, it will be seen, excepting in respect
of a few basic matters-of which it may be noticed
article 286 is not one-the normal machinery for the
procedure of amendment is the same as that for the
passing of any statute by Parliament except that a
specified majority in each of the Houses is essential,
the securing of which would be difficult or easy
according to the strength of the Government at the
time in each of the Houses. The requirement of special
majority as a condition for the passing of legislation
in respect of certain specified items of business is not
altogether an unknown feature. However that may
be, it is quite clear that while the amendment of the
Constitution does not depend upon the ordinary
majority rule under which Parliament conducts its
business, the machinery therefor is by invoking the
very same Parliament and not anything so difficult,
cumbroµs and dilatory as that envisaged in article V
of the American Constitution. Even as regards the
195.5
The Bengtl.l
Immunit
company ~d
v.
n .. Stau of mna,
and othln
Jo~].
732
1955
The Bengal
lmmunit,Y
Compa~y Limited
v.
The Stau of BIM'
and others
Jagannadhadtu ],
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1955]
few specified matters for which an additional requirement of ratification by State Legislatures is provided
for, our machinery for amendment is clearly much
easier and less cumbersome, It does not appear to
me, therefore, right to rely upon the American practice
as a safe guide to determine our practice on the question as to the binding character of a judicial precedent. Neither, are we bound to adopt the very rigid
rule which the House of Lords has formulated for its
own practice. The problem of interpreting a written
Constitution does not generally arise before it.
The only other comparable courts whose practice
has been brought to our notice, through citation of
cases, are the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
and the High Court of Australia. As th is is the first
case in this Court wherein this question arises, it is
desirable to consider that practice carefully for our
guidance, though it is not necessary to lay down any
absolutely rigid or inelastic formula. It is worthwhile
at this stage to notice what, according to the Constitution of Australia, is the machinery for the alteration of their Constitution. This is to be gathered from
section 128 of the Commonwealth Act of 1900 which
-broadly speaking-shows that what is required
there is an absolute majority in each of the Houses
and the approval of each State to be obtained by a
referendum to the electors of each State. This is
definitely much more ditlicult, cumbersome and dilatory than what. obtains in our Constitution. Therefore, there can be no reason for our adopting a less
rigid standard than that adopted by the High Court
of Commonwealth of Australia, nor is there any reason for our adopting a standard less rigid thah that
of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. who
while feeling themselves free not to follow the very
strict rule of the House of Lords, were under no constitutional limitations in this behalf.
The practice of the Judicial Committee as to the
limits within which they generally exercise the freedom to reconsider their prior decisions can be gathered
from the cases in In Re. Transferred Civil Servants
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
733
(Ireland) Compensation( 1 ) ; Attorney-General for Ontario
v. Canada Temperance Federation( 2 ); and Phanindra
Chandra Neogy v. The King(3). The matter was discussed elaborately and various prior decisions of the
Privy Council were considered and the conclusion was
summed up as follows in In Re. Transferred Civil Ser11ants (Ireland) Compensation( 1 ) :
"There is no inherent incompetency in ordering
rehearing of a case already decided by the Board,
even when a question of a right of property is involved
but such an indulgence will be granted in very exceptional circumstances only. It is of the nature of an extraordinarium remedium".
After the above formulation of their practice, the
Privy Council in this case permitted itself to reconsider the previous decision in Wigg's caseC), on two
grounds. ( 1) The case came up before them on a
reference under section 4 of the Judicial Committee
Act of 1933, and that reference would have been futile
if it did not necessarily involve such reconsideration.
(2) The reference itself was granted on account of an
alleged material mistake of fact, into which the previous Board of the Judicial Committee had fallen. On
such reconsideration the previous decision was affirmed. In Attorney-General for Ontario v. Canada Temperance Federation ( 2 ) the Judicial Committee expressed itself as follows at page 206 :
"The appellants' first contention is that Russell's
c11Je( •) was wrongly decided and ought to be overruled.
Their Lordships do not doubt that in tendering
humble advice to Hi.s Majesty they are not absolutely
bound by previous decisions of the Board, as is the
House of Lords by its own. judgments. In ecclesiastical appeals, for instance, on more than one occasion,
the Board has tendered advice contrary to that given
in a previous case, which further historical research
has shown to have been wrong. But on constitutional
questions it must be seldom indeed that the Board would
depart from a previous decision which it may be
(I) [19291 A.C. 242.
(5) 76 I.A. JO.
(5) 7 A. C. 829.
(2) [!946] A.C. !93.
(4) [1927] A.C. 674.
1955
The Beng"l
Immullity
Company Limikd
Yo
The State of Bihar
and othlrs
]agannadhadas .1·
734
1955
TM Bmgal
lmmunif;Y
Company Limited
v.·
The Stale of Bihar
and others
Jagannadhadas J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
assumed will have been acted on both bv Governments
·
and subjects".
In this case the Privy Council was invited to reconsider the correctness of the law laid down by them in
Russell v. The Queen ( ) but they declined to do so on
two grounds, viz., ( 1) on constitutional questions the
Board seldom departs from its previous decisions,
and (2) the prior decision stood unchallenged for over
60 years.
.
In Phanindra Chandra Ncogy v. The King( 2) the Privy
Council stated that it is only "in the most exceptional
cases" that they would tender advice to His Majesty
inconsistent with a previous decision and reaffirmed
the decision in Gill's case(').
Three cases of the High Court of Australia out of
those brought to our notice are instructive. In the
Tramways case( ') the position was expressed in the
following terms. Griffith, C.J. observed as follows :
"In my opinion it is impossible to maintain a» an
abstract proposition that the Court is either legally
or technically bound by previous decisions. Indeed,
it may, in a proper case, be its duty to disregard them.
But the rule should be applied with great caution,
and only when the previous decision is manifestly
wrong, as, for instance, if it proceeded upon the
mistaken assumption of the continuance of a repealed
or expired statute, or is contrary to a decision of another Court ·which this Court is bound to follow; not, I
think upon a mere suggestion that some or all of the
members of the later Court might arrive at a different conclusion if the matter were res integra. Other·
wise there would be grave danger of want of conti"
nuity in the interpretation of the law''.
Justice Barton observed as follows :
"I have never thought that it was not open to
this Court to review its previous decisions upon good
cause. The question is not whether the Court can do
so, but whether it will, having due regard to the need
for continuity and consistency in judicial decisions.
Changes in the number of appointed Justices can, I
(I) 7 A.C. 829.
(3) 761.A.41.
(2) 76 I.A. IO.
(4) 18 C.L.R. 54.
•
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
735
1955
take it, never of themselves furnish a reason for review .......... But the Court can always listen to arguThe Bengal
lmmunit;
ment as to whether it ought to review a particular Company
Limiter/
decision, and the strongest reason for an overruling is
v.
that a decision is manifestly wrong, and its maintenance Tl11;State of Bihar
and others
is injurious to the public interest".
Having so laid down the rule of practice for their Jagannar/hadas J.
Court, the learned Judges, on account of the special
circum~tances in
that case, unanimously agreed to
reconsider the prior decision and on such reconsideration affirmed it. In so reaffirming the prior decision,
one of the learned Judges, Justice Powers, stated his
grounds to the following effect.
"In Whybrow's case( 1 ), the Court consisted of all
the Justices of this Court who could sit on the application. The case was very fully argued. Both parties
and two of the States were represented by counsel.
The judgments were considered judgments delivered
more than two weeks after the preliminary objection
was taken ......... Under the circumstances I have no
hesitation in following the judgment".
The same learned Judge at another portion of his
judgment stated as follows :
"If we do not •,how some respect to our own
Court's decisions, no counsel will feel safe in advising
the public, and it will create uncertainty and confusion''.
The principles so laid down have been reiterated in. a
recent case of the High Court of Australia in perpetual
Executors and Trustees Association of Australia Ltd.
v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation(2) in the following terms:
"The Court is not bound by its previous decisions so as absolutely to preclude reconsideration of
a principle approved and :ipplied in a prior case, but,
as was stated in Cain v. Malone(3), the exceptions to
the rule are exceptions which should be allowed only- with great caution and in clear cases".
Then the above quotation from the judgment of
Justice Barton in the Tramways Case( 4 ) was repeated
(I) 11 C.L.R. I.
(3) 66 C.L.R. JO.
(2) 77 C.L.R. 493.
(4) 18 C.L.R. 54.
736
1955
Tu B'"t•I
Imm1111ill
C.mpan7 Limikd
v.
TM Siok of Bihar
and """'
J•t•tlNl<ihadas J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
and the principle indicated therein was reaffirmed. In
this case the Court was asked to overrule their prior
decision in Trustees Ex~cutors and Agency Co. Ltd. v.
Federal Commissioner of Taxation( 1 ). The learned
Judges declined to reconsider it with the following
observations :
"The decisions of a superior Court have a double
aspect. They determine the controversy between the
parties, and in deciding the case they may include a
statement of principle which it is the duty of that
Court and of all subordinate courts to apply in cases
to which that principle is relevant. Continuity and
coherence in the law demand that, particularly in this
Court, which is the highest court of appeal in Australia, the principle of stare decisis should be applied,
save in very exceptional cases".
The criterion, viz., that of manifest error plus injury
to public interest by maintenance of previous decision
laid down in the above cases as being the ground on
which a reconsideration can be granted was reiterated
by Justice Williams in his judgment in AttorneyGeneral for N.S. W. v. Perpetual Trustee Co. Ltd.(•).
In this case the High Court was asked to reconsider
the correctness of the majority decision in a prior
case, viz., that in Commonwealth v. Quince(•). On reconsideration the Judges by a majority affirmed the
prior decision. One of the learned Judges, Justice
Dixon, considered the matter on its merits elaborately
and came to the conclusion that if the matter were
to be considered afresh he should prefer a view contrary to that which had been expressed in the prior
decision but concurred with the majority view with
the following observations :
"There appears to me to be no ground for reconsidering the d~ision in Quince case( 8 ) unless it be a
sufficient ground simply that the opposite conclusion
is to be preferred. It is evident that the decision was
reached only after a very full examination of the question. It cannot be said that any compelling consideration or important authority was overlooked or that the
decision conflicts with well established principle or fails
(1) 69 C.L.R. 270.
(2) 85 C.L.R. 237.
(3) 68 C.L.R. 227.
'
'
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
737
to go with a definite stream of authority. It is a
re.cent and well considered decision upon what is evidently a highly disputable question.
. • . - • ••••••• e e
I• ••••••
Thi Bengal
lmrmm~
Company Limilld
V;
e. •. • • e • • e • • e
I do not think that we should reconsider the
correctness of that decision. The proper course judicially is to follow and apply that decision".
This is a strong case of the year 1951-52 indicating
the most recent practice of that Court, and the above
passage aptly summarises almost the very considerations applicable to the present case.
A consideration of these cases shows that while the
highest courts other than the House of Lords have
reserved to themselves theoretically the competency
to reconsider the correctness of a prior decision, they
have also carefully confined the actual exercise of that
~wer within very narrow limits. In a number of
cases in which they did permit themselves to reconsider, they have ultimately declined to overrule the
prior decision notwithstanding that another view
might well have been taken. The only instances
brought to our notice where, on a reconsideration, a
previous decision was not followed, are two. One is
the Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. The Adelaide
Steamship Co. Ltd.(1). That was a case where the
question which arose was a very important one as to
the power of State Legislature to encroach on the
field of the Commonwealth Legislature by virtue of a
rule of construction laid down in an earlier case, viz.,
Railway Servants' case( 2 ). The learned Judges were
of the_ opinion that that was a question of far reaching public importance and that the prior decision being
man~'festly wrong and opposed to the rules of construction laid down by the Privy Council in a number of cases,
should be reconsidered and overruled. It would be
seen that in this case the Court acted upon the limitations which they have laid down in the course of
their decisions, that reconsideration and overruling
of a prior decision is to be confined to cases where the
prior decision is manifestly wrong and its maintenance
(I) 28 C.L.R. l29.
1955
(2) 4 C.L.R. 488.
Thi State of Bihar
.1111 othlll
]ag•naihadas J
738
1955
The Bengal
Immunity
Company Limited
v.
of Bif.ar
and others
/' !11J State
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
is productive of great public mischief. The second
is the case in Gideon Nkambule v. The King('), where
the Privy Council declined to follow its prior de~ision
in T umahole's case (2). In this case, the Privy Council, while it reaffirmed the proposition that a prior
decision upon a given set of facts ought not to be reopened without the greatest hesitation, explained why
they, in fact, differed from the previous one in the
following passage :
"From a perusal of the judgment in Tumahole's
case( 2 ), it is apparent that the history of the adop·
tion and promulgation of the various statutes and
proclamations dealing with the effect of the evidence
of accomplices in South Africa was only partially
put before the Board, and much material which has
now been ascertained was not presented to their Lordships on tint occasion. The present case, therefore,
is one in which fresh facts have been adduced which
were not under consideration when T11mahole's case
was decided, and accordingly it is one in which, in
their Lordships' view, they are justified in reconsidering the foundations on which that case was determined".
This was a case where the question arose as to the
applicability of the English rule of law relating to accomplice evidence as laid down in Rex v. Baskerville("),
viz., that a particular portion of the rule which lays
down that the evidence of one accomplice cannot be
corroborated by that of another. What was under
consideration of the Privy Council was whether a
prior decision of the Judicial Committee, construing
a particular section of the relevant statute applicable
in that case in consonance with the above rule, was
correct. It will be noticed that the overruling of the
prior decision in this case was based on the fact that
important and relevant material was not placed before the Judicial Committee in the earlier case. These
cases emphasise under what exceptional circumstances
a prior decision of the highest and final court in a
country is treated as not binding on itself.
(I) [1950] A.C. 379.
(2) [1949] A.C. 253.
(3) [19161 2 K.B. 658.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
739
Now what are the grounds in the present case to
justify a reconsideration of the prior decision. At
this stage, I cannot help noticing that the argument
before us-'3.S it appears to me-has taken a somewhat unusual course. I should have thought that
when the decision in a case so recent as that in the
United Motors case( 1 ) given after full consideration, is
sought to be challenged, the first question to have been
considered was whether or not there were circumstances to justify a reconsideration. It is only after
the Court came at least to a prim a facie conclusion on
that preliminary matter that a reargument on the
merits of that decision should have been permitted.
What has happened, however, is that the correctness
of the prior decision was straightaway canvassed before us and the question as to the competency or the
desirability of such reconsideration occupied a later
and subordinate part in the arguments. I must confess to the feeling that this all important question
has accordingly suffered for want of due consideration thereof at the stage of arguments before us.
Now, let us see what are the facts relating to the prior
decision. The decision was given on the 30th March,
1953. · The case itself was heard for 12 working days,
i.e., from the 9th February, to the 25th February, 1953.
The Union of India and as many as eight States were
permitted to intervene and their arguments were also
heard. A perusal of the judgments then given shows
that every possible aspect had been fully presented
and considered. The decision was that of a majority
as against that of one dissenting Judge. One of the
learned Judges in the majority, though concurring on
the main point, was prepared . to go further on one
point than what the majority held (though, as appears
now, he is prepared to go back on his concurrence).
It is true that in a later decision in State of T ravancore-C ochin v. Shanmugha Vilas Cashew Nut Factory(2),
another Judge of this Court expressed a view in disagreement with the view of the majority in this case.
But that was a decision given on the 8th May, 1953,
more than a month after the judgment in the prior
(I) [1953) S. C. R. 1069.
94
(2) [1954] S. C.R. 53.
1955
The Bengal
Immuni'l'
Company Limited
The Sta;,~-q/ Bihar
and otheTs
Jagannadhadas ].
740
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
1955
case had been delivered and had become binding. The
question that directly arose for consideration in the
later case was not the one that had come in for consideration
in the earlier case. However this may be,
''•
Tht Slal1 of Bilw it may also be noticed that in a later decision of this
and othlrs
Court in Himmatlal Harilal Mehta v. The State of
Jagannadhad., J.
Madhya Pradesh ( 1 ) the law as laid down in the earlier
decision in the United Motors case( 2 ), was reiterated
and it was stated that the correctness of the view
could no longer be questioned. (See page 1126). In
view of the above facts, it appears to me prima facie,
that there was no reason for reconsideration except
the fact that a different view had been taken by two
of the learned Judges of this Court and except the
chance of a differently constituted majority emerging
on rehearing.
This, however, is sought to be justified on various
grounds. It is said that the prior decision does not
merely determine the rights of the two contending
partjes to that case but has far reaching effects on
the rights of the consuming public and that it involves the. adjudication of the taxing power of the
States as against the consuming public in general.
It is, therefore, said that, if that decision is erroneous, it is our duty not to perpetuate the error. It
appears to me, with respect, that this is begging the
question. There is no absolute standard by which the
erroneous character of a previous decision can be ascertained. What a previous decision has determined,
must be presumed to be right unless it can be pronounced to be perverse or manifestly wrong. It is,
therefore, a strong thing to characterise a previous
decision as erroneous where, even on reconsideration,
no w1animity is reached and the previous view is
supported by a substantial minority. Nor, can the
mere fact of one of the prior learned Judges having
gone back on his views be any criterion to determine
which out of his two views is erroneous. As regards
the suggestion of tax burden on the consuming public,
it is relevant to notice that the burden, if any, which
arises under the prior decision can only be by legis. Thi B,.gal
lmmunit,1
Company. Limited
(1) [1954] s. a. R. 1122.
(2) [1953] s. a. R. 1009,
,
2 S.C.R.
'
SUPREJl.!E!CQURT. REPORTS
'141
lative action of the very State in .which the'consum•
1sss
ing public are residents. · The removal of the burden;
.The &ngal
if called for, is a matter which, under the :constituImmunity
tion, can be brought about by democratic process 'C<nn}any Limiteil
which is available to the consuming public, through . "v.
its representatives in the State Legislature; It appears The st?t• 0! Bihizli
to me that that is not a matter for. our considera•
and others
t.ion:: I may be permitted to add that in the course Jagann-;;:adasJ;.
of the arguments there has been.no serious grievance
made about the alleged burden . on .the consuming
public. But there has been a good deal of emphasis
on the harassment to the business· community, i.e., to
the out-of-State dealers, from whom the tax is pri"
marilycollected and passed on, under the law,- to the
consumer. We are not, however, concerned with any
question arising from_ such alleged· hardship. · The
hardship such as it is, is one that: may have to be ob".
viated by the adoption of a common· and agreed machi~
nery by all the States for the ·assessment (as· distinguished from levy) and collection of the tax from out•
of-State dealers, or if necessary, by the passing of the
requisite legislation enabling this to b·e dorie. But that
hardship, if any, can afford no reason for reversing the
prior decision which, as will ·be shown later, has
construed article 286 ·consistently ·with the· entire
scheme of the Constitution.. That decision enables
the consuming State. to derive· an elastic source· of
revenue from its own residents to make it ·available
for the expanding needs of the State in the discharge
of the responsibilities allotted to it under the Cons ti•
tution. It is not for this Court now to choose between the alleged hardship of the business community
and the interests.of the consuming State and treat
the former as a ground for reconsideration. :
It is next suggested that there is some vagueness,
if not inconsistency, in the prior majority judgment
which justifies reconsideration .. It is said, with reference to a particular passage quoted from· the· judg~
ment, that it is only buyers falling within the Explanation who were contemplated as liable and nof the
out-of-State dealers, but that the whole trend of the
rest of the judgment and the actual.. decision i:un$ .
742
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
!955
[19551
counter to this. With very great respect, it I<
hardly fair to read the decision as being in any way
vague or inconsistent with itself by extracting one
single
passage. The passage relied on is at page 1084
v.
The State of Bit.M and appears, in the context where the question was
and olhtrs
being considered, as to whether the phrase "acn1al
Jagannadha<IU J.
delivery for consumption" has reference to "delivery
to the actual consumer-purchaser" or delivery also to
"a purchaser fo_r eventual distribution to the consu.
mers in the State". The view indicated in the extracted passage was that delivery to a purclzaser for
eventual distribution to the consumer in the State
was also "actual delivery for consumption" and hence
the designation of purchaser as liable to tax in that
passage. That the extracted passage was not meant
to indicate that only such purchaser was taxable and
not the seller is quite clear from the various passages
in the immed_iately succeeding paragraph at pages
1084 and 1085 where "taxation of sales or purchases
involving inter-State elements bi the State in which
the goods are delivered for consumption in the sense
explained above" is repeatedly referred to. All that
can, If · at all, be said is that the decision has not,
in terms, indicated the choice hetween the seller or
the purchaser as regards taxability but has indicated
either of them,as taxable.
It has next been said that the impugned decision
is a recent one and that "judicial opinion was divided,
if not evenly balanced". It is no doubt tru~ that the
prior decision is only two years old. But that is not
by itself a ground for reconsideration. On the other
hand, I should have thought that the very fact of its
being recent should militate against reconsideration.
The real test to my mind, as indicated by Justice
Dixon in Attorney-General for N.S.W. v. Perpetual
Trustee Co. Ltd.(•) is whether it was a fully considered judgment and whether any fresh material has
been brought to the notice of the Court. In considering the question whether a decision is open to reconsideration on account of its being recent, it is of
importance ro observe that our decisions become
The Bengal
lmmnnity
Company Limiltd
(I) 85 C. L .. R. 237.
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
743
declarations of law under article 141 and must be
treated norm'!llY as final from the very moment they
are pronounced. The finality of the decisions of this
Court, which is the court of last resmr, will be greatly
weakened and much mischief done if we treat our
own judgments, even though recent, as open to reconsideration.
It has next been suggested that rectification of the
error, if any, in the view taken by the previous decision, is difficult and that this could be brought about
only by the amendment of the legislative lists necessitating the consent of the requisite number of States.
With respect, I am unable to appreciate this. The
points of difference in the two opposing views ultimately boil down to this. (1) Does the Explanation
to article 286(1) (a) taken with the relevant legislative
entry enable the consuming State to tax fictional
inside sale? (2) If so, does article 286(2) override
this taxing power? If the right construction of article
286(2) is not what has been accepted by the majority
in the prior decision, what all was · required to correct
that error would be to amend article 286(2) so as to
make it clear that it overrides article 286(1) (a) taken
with. the Explanation bv the insertion therein of
some appropriate phrase like "notwithstanding Explanation to article 286(1) (a)". The responsibility for
any such amendment, if called for, should be left to
the Parliament who, as recent experience has shown.
is quite capable of bringing about constitutional
amendments when it felt the clear necessity for it.
The proper course for this Court, therefore, is to
adopt the attitude of Justice Dixon in the case in
Attorney-General for N.S.W. v. The Perpetual Tmstee
Co. Ltd.(1) wherein notwithstanding that he came to
a contrary conclusion, he declined to disturb the prior
decision. The case for not disturbing the prior decision is all the stronger. where, as happens in the
fJresent case, no unanimous opinion could be reached
in favour of overruling the prior decision.
Notwithstanding my opinion that there is no ground
for reconsideration of the prior decision of this Court
(I) 85 C. L. R. 237.
1955
The Bengal
Immunity
Company Limiud
v.
Thi State of Bihll1'
and others
Jagannadhadas J.
744
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1955
[1955!
in the United Motors case('), I propose, out of respect
for my learned brothers, who are prepared to take
the opposite view, to give my reasons why, on a fresh
v.
consideration of the question involved, I am clearly
Thi Stale ef Bi/oar
m agreement with the decision of the majority in
anti othtn
the said case. Having had the benefit of reading the
]agannadhadas ].
judgments of my learned brothers, Justice S. R. Das
and Justice Venkatarama Ayyar, I propose to confine myself mainly to the consideration of the construction of article 286.
There can be no doubt that article 286 taken as a
whole has to be read in the context of the power vested in the States for levying taxes on ~e sales or purchases of goods (other than newspapers) under Entry
54 of List II of the Seventh Schedule taken with artide 246(3). Entry 54 does not, in terms, say that the
sales or purchases of goods contemplated thereby as
taxable are to be sales or purchases "within the State".
In this respect it is in contrast with Entry 26 which
vests in the State the power to legislate in respect of
trade and commerce "within the State". The apparently wide language of Entry 54 is in recognition
of the theory that in substance a tax on sale or purchase of goods is a tax on the goods with reference to
the event of sale or purchase thereof. (See the United
Motors case('). Article 286 appears in Part XII of ,
the Constitution relating to finance, property, contracts and suits and is in Chapter I thereof relating
to finance. This is mainly concerned with the prob.
!cm of allocation of finances between the Centre and
the States in order to enable each to carry on the respective governmental functions allotted to it under
the Constitution. Keeping this context in view as also
the avowed purpose of the article as indicated by
the marginal note, it may be taken that article 286
was intended to indicate clearly the ambit of the taxing power ot the State on sales or purchases of goods
and to limit it to a demarcated field. To determine
the exact scope of this ambit and of the limitations,
it is relevant to consider what was the sales-tax law
b operation just prior to the new Constitution.
Thi Blngol
lmnumil
ComJlal!J J;.;i14
(I) [1953] S. ·c; R. 1069.
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
745
A careful and thorough examination of the Provinciai Sales-tax Acts at the time discloses the following. There were sales tax laws in operation in all the
then nine Provinces, which subsequently became Part
A States under the Constitution, as also in one Native
State of Mysore. The pattern of the sales-tax laws in
everv one of the ten units had the following common
features
(with minor additions and variations).
Under the charging section in each of these Acts, tax
wa~ levied as against a "dealer" whose turnover of
sales (or purchases) exceeded a particular amount. A
"dealer" was defined as a person carrying on the !-msiness of selling or supplying goods in the Province.
"Sale" was defined as meaning transfer of property
in goods in the course of trade for valuable consideration. In addition, each one of these Sales-tax Acts
had an Explanation to the definition of the word
''sale" to the etfect that, notwithstanding anvthing
to the contrarv in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, a
sale or purch~se of goods "which were actually in the
Province'' at the time when the contract of sale or
purchase is made, slzall be deemed to have taken place
in the Province, wherever the contract for sale or
purchase may have been made. This was, broadly
speaking, the common pattern of every one of the
sales-tax laws just prior to the Constitution, subject
to some further additions to the definition of sale by
a few of the States, which will be r,resentk noticed.
This pattern indicates, that apart from the purely
internal sales-in respect of which the power of taxation hv the States was undoubted-the States claimed
the p~wer to tax sales with an outside element in the
following two cases: (1) Where the transfer of ownership in the goods was within the State (assumed to be
so) according to the Indian Sale of Goods Act. (2)
Where the gocds which are the subject-matter of th-=
sale are actuallv in the Province at the time when the
contract of sale' is made, i.e., at the crucial moment of
transfer of ownership. If I may express this in
another way, these Sales-tax Acts purported .to tax
~ales as being within the State1 with reference to (1)
.rit!1s (a:; :i~~nmecl) under the Sale of Goods Act, and
to-84 s. c tnclhp0
1955
Tht Bengal
Imm11ni(1
Compan_y L1miltd
The Stale of Bihar
lltld others
Jaganrwtfhadas J.
746
1955
Th~ 1Je11gal
Immunity
Com~'V Limited
v.
T1"JState of Bihar
and othns
Jag41WJl/hadas J.
Su-PREME COURT REPORTS
[1955J
(2) situs (as probably assumed to be) under the general law. It is possible that this general law was so
assumed with reference to the dictum of Lord
Loreburn in Badische Anz'fin Und Soda Fabrik v. Hickson( 1 ) which suggests that the situs of the goods
at the time of appropriation of the goods to a particular sale is the situs of the sale. Whether the underlying assumptions as regards both these criteria
were right or wrong is not material at this stage.
While this was the general pattern, four of the States
claimed the taxing power with reference to some additional criteria. Madras and Mysore had an additional
Explanation as follows :
"In case the contract was for the sale or purchase
of future goods by description, then, if the goods are
actually produced in the Province at any time, after
the contract of sale or purchase in resp.ect thereof was
made, the sale or purchase shall be deemed to have
taken place in the Province, wherever the contract of
sale or purchase might have been made, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Indian Sale of
Goods Act".
Bihar and United Provinces had the following additional Explanation. (Taken from the U. P. Act).
"Notwithstanding anything in the Indian Sale of
Goods Act, the sale of any goods which are produced
or manufactured in the Province by the producer or
manufacturer thereof, shall, wherever the delivery
or contract of sale is made, be deemed for the purposes
of the Act to have taken place in the Province".
Both these additions refer to future goods. Madras
and Mysore apparently treated such future goods as
having been appropriated to the sale the moment
they. were "actually produced in the Province". The
Bihar and U .P. addition was more or less the same
and is limited to the case of sale by the very manufacturer or prqducer. The above additions are in effect
.the same as category No. 2 of the general pattern as
applied to future goods. The underlying assumption
appears to be that future goods which are contracted
to, be sold get appropriated thereto on their coming
(I) [1906] A. a. +19.·
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
747
into existence and that thus a taxable sale emerges.
Besides the above mentioned variations from the
general pattern, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh had further additions to the definition pf sale relating to
forward contracts which virtually amounted to treating "agreement to sell" itself as being the taxable
event. This, it may be seen, had nothing to do with
the nexus ·theory of taxation of sales and has been
pronounced invalid by this Court in The Sales Tax
Officer, Pilibhit v. Messrs Budh Prakash fai Prakash( 1 ).
From the above broad summary it will be seen that
the Provinces were deriving sales-tax revenues not
only in respect of purely internal sales, but also in
respect of sales with an outside element. But in the
generality of such sales, the tax was leviable at either
or both of the above mentioned two points, i.e., (1)
transfer of ownership within the State, (2) actual
existence of goods within the State at the moment of
such transfer. The ultimate consumer in respect of
such sales would normally be not a person within the
taxing State. Hence having regard to the structure
of the sales-tax and the universally accepted machinery therefor which brings about the passing on, of
the incidence thereof, to the ultimate consumer, this
must have been felt to be inequitable. It appears to
me that in the adjustments called for on the passing
of the Constitution it was this feature of the pre-existing sales-tax law which called for being remedied by
the imposition of a ban on taxation of sales with an
outside element. But that very consideration would
equally indicate the permissibility of taxing an out~
side sale where the ultimate burden of it could be
passed on to the resident of the very taxing State. This
could be done by making the consuming State the
taxing Stat<:. This, in my opinion, was the background
with reference to which article 286 was incorporated
m the Constitution.
The Constitution wanted to put a ban on taxation
of sales with an outside element on account of tbct
inequity of making the residrnts of other States
(I) [1955] I g, C. R~43.
195:i
T/18 Bengal
Immunity
Company Limited
v.
TM State of Bi/uzJ'
and DIM'ls
J~].
748
1955
The B"'l•I
lmmunitl
Company Limited
v.
The Siok of Bihar
and olhtrs
]ogannadhados ],
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955)
contribute towards the resources of the selling State.
But in doing so it could not have intended to confine
the resources of the State under this head to the comparatively small fiejd of pure! y internal sales. Having
regard to the expanding needs of a . social welfare
State and the limited taxing powers allocated to it,
the Constitution could not have meant to limit an
elastic source of taxation payable by its own consumers to the very small field of purely internal sales.
It, therefore, selected and took out one category of
sale with an outside element from the field of
restriction, by adopting the device of a fictional inside sale and left that category taxable so that the
incidence thereof may be the same as that of a purely
internal sale. This, to my mind, is the reason for the
positive approach in the Explanation by a deeming
provision as to an inside sale. It is on account of
this common feature, as to the incidence of taxation.
that the fictional inside sale indicated in the Explanation was assimilated to a purely internal or intraState sale. It appears to me not very reasonable to
assume that the Explanation to article 286(1) (a) was
required in order merely to determine what an outside sale is. If the Constitution intended nothing
more than to ban taxation on outside sales, it might
well have contented itself with declaring such a ban.
I do not think that the Courts would then have found
any serious difficulty in construing "outside sale" to
mean, a sale with a substantial outside element, or in
the alternative, as a sale in which the ownership has
passed outside the State in the assumed sense of the
Sale of Goods Act. ft was quite unnecessary and
indeed out of the way to define: 3n outside sale as the
implied negative of a fictional inside >;:le. Nor can
the purpose of the Explanation be readily ;;~~urned
to be to obviate the supposed chaotic condition arising out of the adoption of the nexus theory in the
Sales-tax Acts. This could have been sufficiently and
effectively provided· for-as in fact it was done-by
the ban imposed under article 286(2). It has been
suggested that the Explanation covers some outside
sales which do not fall within article 286(2) and that
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
749
therefore the Explanation was necessary. But the
possibility of a few ingenously illustrated. cascslike the Gurgaon-Delhi illustration put forward in the
course of •arguments-as falling outside the ambit of
article 286(2) and within the scope of article 286(1)
(a) taken with the Explanation, would not have been
any adequate reason fof the Constitution involving
itself in two such provisions, mostly overlapping in
effect. It appears to me, therefore, that the reasons
for having these two provisions were distinct and
different. Article 286(l)(a) with the Explanation was
meant to prevent taxation whose ultimate incidence
would fall on residents of outside States. Article 286
(2) was meant to prevent the taxing structure of the
States being availed so as unduly to hamper the
freedom of inter-State trade and commerce which, for
the first time, the Constitution declared by article
301. In this context it also became necessary to
provide that the foreign trade of the country should
not be affected at all by the sales-tax structure of the
States, while . at the same time indicating that the
internal trade could be permitted to bear a limited
burden of taxation. It is in reconciliation of these
various ideas that article 286(1) and (2) were drafted.
Judged in this light the following is the only
reasonable construction of article 286 ( 1)(a) taken
with the Explanation. This provision, while intended
to prohibit taxation by States on outside sales was
also meant to demarcate the boundary between inside
sales and outside sales and to assimilate one particular category of outside sales into the field of inside
sales and to make 'it available for taxation by the
consuming State. The underlying aim of this demarcation was to obviate the inequity of one State levying a tax whose ultimate incidence was on the residents of another State but to provide instead an
elastic source of taxation which in its effect was to be
against its own residents. The field of export trade
is completely marked off as not being available for the
operation ot sales-tax by article 286(1) (b). Then the
ban on sales in the course of inter-State trade and
commerce is declared. This ban, which was for a
1955
Tu &Aglll
1,.._,,w,,
Ctnnp;;;Tfmw
y,
Thi Stall of BWtl
Ondolhm
Jaganaadliodas J.
750
1955
Tiu Bengal
lmmunitv
c.mpany LimiUd
v.
Tiu Stale of B;har
and others
Jagannadkadas J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955}
totally different l?~rpose cannot be so construed as to
nullify the positive results intended and brought
about by article 286(1) (a) read with the Explanation.
To such a situation the principle of harmonious construction
would
apply as enunciated by Lord
Herschell in John Carter Colquhoun v. Henry Brooks(')
at page 506 in the following terms :
"It is beyond dispute that we are entitled and
indeed bound when construing the terms of any provision found in a statute to consider any other parts
of the Act which throw light upon the intention of
the legislature and which may serve to shew that the
particular provision ought not to be construed as it
would be if considered alone and apart from the rest
of the Act".
If, as my learned brother, Justice Venkatarama Aiyar,
is inclined to think, a sale cannot be said to have
occurred in the course of inter-State trade and commerce if the sale follows the completion of the interState transportation of goods, as for instance, would
be the case when · a hawking pedlar brings goods
across a State boundary and vends it from door to
door in another State, then clearly the fiction which
brings about the notional inside sale would by itself
be sufficient to take such a sale out of the category
"of the course of inter-State trade and commerce".
Because, in such a situation, while the transportation
of goods across State boundaries remains as a fact,
the sale itself is deemed to be inside the consuming
State, the very purpose of the fiction being to shift
the situs of the sale for the purpose of taxability. It
is, I think, in this sense that in the earlier decision,
the learned then Chief Justice laid down that by
virtue of the Explanation this particular category of
inter-State sale became an intra-State sale, of course,
not for all purposes, but for the limited purposes for
which the Explanation was inserted, viz., the purpose
of demarcating the taxable field from the non-taxable
field. Looked at either on the ground of harmonious
construction or on the ground that the notional inside sale brought about by the Explanation ceased,
(l1 [1889] 14 A. C. 493, 506.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
751
by that very fiction, to be part of the course of interState trade and commerce for taxation purposes, the
only proper construction of article 286(2) would be
that it cannot override article 286(1)(a) taken with
the Explanation. Having indicated the broad lines
on which I have, on independent consideration of the
construction of articles 286(1) and (2), arrived at the
same construction as that adopted in the United Motors
case( 1 ), it is unnecessary for me to deal with all the
various aspects raised before us in the course of the
arguments, except to express my general agreement
with a good deal of the reasoning of my learned
brother, Justice Venkatarama Aiyar, on this part of
the case. It is, however, necessary to refer to a few
matters referred to in the contrary view.
The contrary opinion adopted by my learned brothers is based almost entirely on the view that artick
286 is inspired by the anxiety of the Constitution
to prevent the mischief of multiple taxation, which
arose from the operation of the pre-existing sales-ta:i.
laws. It is said that this result was achieved bv
covering all loopholes from various angles, articl~s
286(1)(a), 286(1)(b), 21l6(2) and 286(3) being said to
be the four plugging points. With respect, I i;Jn only
think that this is the outcome of an overdrawn picture
as to the chaos said to have been created bv the
earlier pre-Constitution sales-tax laws. As a·lready
pointed out, the common feature of all the previous
ten Sales-Tax Acts, was to bring about limited multiple
taxation in respect of outside sales at two points, viz.,
(1) transfer of ownership within the taxing State, and
(2) the actual presence of goods in the taxing State at
the point of time when the transfer of ownership
takes place in another State. It must be mentioned
that none of the Sales-Tax Acts took the mere presence
of goods in the S_tate as enabling it to levy the tax.
What was taken as enabling taxation was the existence of goods within the State at the crucial point of
time, viz., the point at which the ownership became
transferred wherever it may be. Once this is appreciated, it is difficult to agree with the assumption that
(!) [1953] S. c. R. 1069.
1
1955
The Bengal
Immunity
Company Limited
v.
The State of BihflJ'
and others
Jagannadhaaas].
~52
1955
TM Btngal
lmmunit'V
Campan_-v Llmited
v.
The'iStale of Bihat
and othtn
]agannad;tulas ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
r19551
under the pre-existmg law, the taxauon might get
multiplied in the course of the transit of goods under
sale through a number of States, if the . goods happened to remain in the successive States for some
time. In none except one of the States would the
goods be in actual existence at the single crucial point
of time of transfer of ownership. Hence, 1 am clear in
my mind tftat the previous legislation would not have
normally involved taxation of the same sale with an
outside element, at more than two points. (Whether
even this would not get limited by the fact that a
"dealer" is defined in all the then Acts as "within
the Province" would he a matter for consideration).
Four of the .then provincial units had, as already
stated, an additional criterion for taxation. But, so
far as Madras and Mysore were concerned that criterion which relates to futnre r,oods cannot be cumulative with criterion two. So far as U.P. and Bihar are
concerned which authorised the manufacturing State
as such to levy the tax, it appears to me that if it is
borne in mind that this is limited to the sale b1' the
very manufacturer, this was also not likely to operate
as a cumulative point. Even otherwise these additional
criteria might, if at all, have given rise to taxation at
a third point, when the sale transaction had to be put
through vja these particular States. But even so
there is no justification for the impression of chaotic
conditions resulting therefrom which has been assumed. There is no evidence before us that prior to
the Constitution there was in fact multiple taxation
of sales in operation, at any rate at more than the m•o
points as explained by me above. Hence in the light
of the detailed scrutiny of the provisions in the various Sales-Tax Acts which were in torce prior to the
Constitution, I cannot help feeling that the mischief
of multiple taxation which might if at all have existed in a limited measure as pointed out above, has
been overstated. No doubt, the future prevention
of such multiple taxation by invoking the nexus
theorv recognised by the Privy Council in Wr1!/11ce's
casr(') mav well be one of the results of article 286.
(I) (1q4q7 F
. R. J.
•
·.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
753
But l am unable to think that the main purpose
Wlderlying each and every one of the provisions ol
article 286 was to prevent the continuance of, pre·
e:ustmg chaotic conditions of multiple taxa~on
by virtue of the nexus theory. I cannot help feelmg
that a wholly wrong impression of the pre-existing
state of law in this respect has been created by overlooking that the existence of goods in a particular
State has been taken as a taxing point only if that
existence was at the crucial moment of transfer of
ownership. (A statement showing the definition of
"sale" under each of the Sales-Tax Acts in operation
just prior: to the Constitution is appended-as Appendix I-for reference).
On the construction of article 286, reference has
also been made in the dissenting view to sub-article (3J
of article 286 which runs as follows :
"No law made by the Legislature of a State imposing, or authorising the imposition of, a tax on the
sale or purchase of any such goods as have been
.declared by Parliament by law to be essential for the
life of the community shall have effect unless it has
been reserved for the consideration of the President
and has received his assent".
With great respect, J am unable to see its bearing on
the question at issue. It is a totally different kind
of restriction from what sub-articles (1) .and (2) bri~g
about. While sub-articles (1) and (2) impose certam
bans on taxation what sub-article (3) does is not
to impose a ban at all but to impose a fet~r 1.n:
respect of taxation on sales of e,ss~ntial goods declared as such by th~ l'arlia~mt'nt1 by requiring that
before such a taxation-law can have any effect, it
should be reserved for the consideration of the President and receive his assent. In this respect it is in line
with what would happen if any other Sta~ legislation passed 'by that Legislature is presented to the
Governor for his assent and he reserves the same for
the consideration of the President. The only difference is that while in the latter the reservation for
the President is optional, in the case of such essential goods the reservation is compulsory. Subject to
1955
Till Bengal
Immunity
Company Limittd
v.
The State of Bihat
and others
Jagannaihadas ].
754
1955
The Bmgal
lmmunit/
Company Limited
v.
The State of Bihar
and others
Jagamiadhadas J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
f1955J
this, even essential goods continue to be, m theory
and by Constitution, taxable (by the States themselves) in respect of sales thereof. I am, therefore,
unable to see the bearing of this provision on the
construction of the other two provisions which bring
about a total or contingent ban of taxation in respect
of the sales to which they have reference.
There is one other matter which has been stressed
or implied in the dissei\ting view and it is this. The
assumption is that even a single point tax on a sale
arising in the course of inter-State trade would be a
burden on the freedom of inter-State trade and commerce guaranteed under the Constitution by article
301 which runs as follows :
"Subject to the other provisions of this Part,
trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the
territory of India shall be free".
Now it is not disputed that a tax on a purely internal
sale which occurs as a result of the transportation of
goods from a manufacturing centre within the State
to a purchasing market within the same State is
clearly permissible and not hit by anything· in the
Constitution. If a sale in that kind of trade can bear
the tax and is not a burden on the freedom of trade,
it is difficult to see why a single point tax on the same
kind of sale where a State boundary intervenes between the manufacturing centre and the consuming
centre need ..be treated as a burden, especially where
that tax is ultimately to come out of the residents of
the very State by which such sale is taxable. Freedom of trade and commerce applies as much within a
State, as outside it. It appears to me again, with great
respect, that there is no warrant for treating such a
tax as in any way contrary either to the letter or the
spirit of the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse p~ovided under article 301.
For all the above reasons, I am quite clear in my
mind that the view taken in the prior decision, viz.,
that the consuming State has the present power to tax
a fictional inside sale which falls within the scope
of the Explanation and that th~ said ,power is not
affected by article 286(2) and that article 286(2)
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
755
cannot be construed as overriding article 286(1)(a)
read with the Explanation, is correct and that there
is no reason to depart from that decision.
The real difficulty, if any, that arises from this
view is as regards what has been called the extraterritorial operation of the tax which such a view may
involve. In the conclusion reached by my learned
brothern who are prepared to uphold the dissenting
view taken in the prior decision that question does
not arise for consideration and has been left untouched.. I do not, therefore, feel called upon to go
into it or to commit myself to any particular view on
this . somewhat difficult question. I am doubtful
whether, as between the component States of a Union
of the kind, which India is under the Constitution,
there can be any question of extra-territoriality in the
sense of the doctrine that one nation does not act in
aid of the revenue laws of another (and foreign)
nation. It is true that a defined geographical part of
India constitutes the territory of each unit called the
State and that the governance of that unit is committed to that State. But it appears to me that on
that account, the territory of one State is not a foreign
territory in respect of another State, when freedom
of movement and a number of other common fundamental rights are guaranteed. On the other hand, I
think it permissible to suggest that where the various
.States owe their existence to the same Constitution
and are subject to its common operation, any taxing
power vested in an individual State must carry with
it the incidental implication of enforceability, if need
be, in any other State within the Union when the
very nature of that tax, as contemplated by the Constitution involves it. In this context article 261 ( 1)
which enjoins that full faith and credit shall be given
throughout the territory of India to public acts, records and judicial proceedings of the Union and of
every State, may well be relied upon to justify such a
view. I am aware that this has been generally taken
as applicable to judicial and legislative proceedings.
Rut the language of the article is capable of wider
application. I do not, however, wish to go into the
19!>5
The Bengal
lmmuni~
Company Lsmit4d
v.
The State of Bihar
and others
Jagannadhadas J.
756
1955
The Bengal
lmmuni'l
Company Lim~ed
v.
Tiu State of Bili.at
and others
JaganNJdhadas J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1955]
matter further because even if in the course of the
administration of sales-tax, of the kind permissible,
in the view of article 286 which the prior decision has
accepted, there emerges the element of extra-territorial operation of such a tax, that by itself can be
no reason for negativing the construction of articles
286( 1) and (2) above indicated. In this context it is
necessary to bear in mind the following clear dictum
of the Privy Council in British Columbia Electrical Railway Co., Ltd. v. The King(') :
"A legislature which passes a law having extraterritorial operation 'may find that what' it has enacted
cannot be direct! y enforced, but the Act is not invalid on that account, and the courts ot Its country
must enforce the law with the machinery available to
them".
The question, therefore, of extra-territoriality is not
germane for construction of article 286.
At the present stage we are not concerned with the
enforcement of the levy of the assessed tax but with
the assessment of the tax. All that we are concerned
with is the validity of the steps so far taken by tbe
assessment authorities and particularly of the notice
dated the 29th May, 1952, which intimates that on
non-compliance before the 14th June, 1952, proceedings for assessment on the basis of "best judgment"
will be made. That step, to my mind, is perfectly
valid as appears from the following. In Whitney v.
Commissioners of Inland Revenue('), the House of Lords
by a majority held that where a tax was leviable on
a non-resident, a requisition served upon him by post
to file a return and to produce accounts was valid so
as to entitle the taxing authority to make ;,.n assessment on the basis of best judgment on non-compliance
with the requisition. The following passage from
Lord Wrenbury's speech at page 56 is instructive:
"There is a S!!Cond question in the case-namely,
whether the appellant has been duly brought within
the machinery for assessment provided by the Act.
This turns upon section 7. There was sent to the
appellant by post addressed to him in the United
(I)
A.C. 37.
2 S.C.R
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
757
States a notice under section 7, sub-section 2, requiring him to make a return. It is contended that there
was no right to post him such a notice so addressed.
The case, it is contended, is similar to the case of
service of a writ out of the jurisdiction. I do not agree.
It is similar rather to the service of a notice of dishonour of a bill or of a notice to quit or of a notice
requiring payment of calls upon shares as a preliminary to' forfeiture in default of payment. It is not a
step in judicial proceeding but a step which will
create inter partes a state of things in which judicial
proceedings can subsequently be taken in default of
compliance".
It may be that some or all of the provisions in the
Bihar Act which contemplate enforcemerit out of
State or create penalties for non-compliance out of
State may require closer examination when the validity
thereof is directly challenged. It may also be that
the harassment consequent on such outside operation
may require to be remedied either by agreed co-ordination between the States or by appropriate legislation, if need be. These, however, are not relevant
considerations for us on the question we have now to
deal with.
I am accordingly clear in my opinion that this
appeal should be dismissed with costs.
APPENDIX-I.
STATEMENT SHOWING THE DEFINITION OF
"SALE" UNDER EACH OF THE SALES-TAX
ACTS IN OPERATION JUST PRIOR TO THE
COMMENCEMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION.
(Vide Page 753).
MADRAS SALES-TAX ACT, 1939.
"Sale" (with all its grammatical variations and
cognate expressions) means every transfer of the property in goods by one person to another in the course
of trade or business for cash or for deferred payment
or other valuable consideration, (and includes also· a
transfer of property in goods involved in the execu-
1955
Th. Bengal
Immunity
Company Limiletl
v.
Th• Stale ef Bihar
and others
Jagannadhadas ].
758
195.i:.
·Tht Bengal
Immunity
Company Limited
v.
The Stale of Bihar
and others
]agannadhadas ].
[1955]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
tion of a works contract, but does not include a mortgage, hypothecation, charge or pledge;)
(Explanation 1 : A transfer of· goods on the hirepurchase or other instalment system of payment shall,
notwithstanding the fact that the seller retains the
title in the goods as security for payment of the price,
be deemed to be a sale.)
Explanation 2 : Notwithstanding anything to tlit:
contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act. J930, the
sale or purchase of any goods shall be deemed, for
the purposes of this Act, to have taken place in this
Province, wherever the contract of sale or purchase
might have been made( a) if the goods were actually in this Province at
the time when the contract of sale or purchase in respect thereof was made, or
(b) in case the contract was for the sale or purchase of future goods by description, then, if the goods
are actually produced in this Province at any time
after the contract of sale or purchase in respect thereof was made.
BENGAL FINANCE (SALES-TAX) ACT, 1941.
"Sale" means any transfer of property in goods for
cash or deferred payment or other valuable consideration ............... .
•
•
•
•
Explanation 2 : Notwithstanding anything to the
contrary in the Indian .Sale of Goods Act, 1930, the
sale of any goods which are actually in West Bengal
at the time when the contract of sale (as defined in
that Act) in respect thereof is made, shall, wherever
the said contract of sale is made, be deemed for the
purposes of this Act to have taken place in West
Bengal.
..
BOMBAY SALES-TAX ACT, 1946.
"Sale" means any transfer of property in goods
for cash or deferred payment or other valuable considention.............. .
•
•
•
•
759
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
2 S.C.R.
Explanation 2 : Notwithstanding anything to
the
contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930. the
sale of any goods which are actually in the Province
of Bombay at the time when the contract for sale
(as defined in that Act) is made in respect thereof,
shall, wherever the said contract of sale is made, be
deemed for the purposes of this Act to have taken
place in the Province of Bombay.
ASSAM SALES-TAX ACT, 1947.
"Sale" means any transfer of property in goods by
any person for cash or deferred payment or other
valuable consideration ............... .
Explanation : Notwithstanding anything to the
contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930, the
sale of any goods which are actually in the Province
at the time when the contract of sale (as defined in
that Act) in respect thereof is made, shall, irrespective
of the place where the said contract is made, be deemed
for the purposes of this Act to have taken place in the
Province.
BIHAR SALES-TAX ACT, 1947.
"Sale" means • • • any transfer of property in
goods for cash or deferred payment or other valuable
consideration................ .
•
•
•
•
Provided further that notwithstanding anything
to the contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act,
1930, the sale of any goods(i) which are actually in Bihar at the time when,
in respect thereof, the contract of sale as defined in
section 4 of that Act is made, or
(ii) which are produced or manufactured in Bihar
by the producer or manufacturer thereof,
shall, wherever the delivery of contract of sale is
made, be deemed for the purposes of this Act to haW!
taken place in Bihar;
Provided further that the sale of goods in respect
of a forward contract, whether goods under such con-
1955
The Be•gal
lmmrmi'!
Company L1mittd
v.
TM State of Bih"'
and olh,,s
Jagannadhuas J.
7(1J
1955
TM Bengai
Immunity
ompany Limited
[1955]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
tract are actually delivered or not, shall be deemed to
have taken place on the date originally agreed upon
for delivery.
v.
ht StaU of Bihar
and others
CENTRAL PROVINCES AND BERAR
SALES-TAX ACT, 1947.
agnnnadhadas J.
"Sale" ............ means any transfer of property in
goods for cash or deferred payment or other valuable
consideration ........... .
•
•
•
•
•
Explanation 2 : Notwithstanding anything to the
contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930, the
sale of any goods which are actually in the Central
Provinces and Berar at the time when the contract of
sale as defined in that Act in respect thereof is made,
shall wherever the said contract of sale is made, be
deemed for the purpose of this Act to have taken
place in the Central Provinces and Berar.
ORISSA SALES-Tj\.X ACT, 1947.
"Sale" means .......... any transfer of property in
goods for cash or deferred payment or other valuable
consideration ..............•
•
•
•
•
•
Provided further that notwithstanding anything to
the contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930,
the sale of any goods which are actually in Orissa at
the time when, in respect thereof, the contract of sale
as defined in section 4 of that Act is made, shall,
wherever the said contract of sale is made be deemed
for the purpose of this Act to have taken place in
Orissa.
MYSORE SALES-TAX ACT, 1948.
"Sale" means ............ every transfer of the property in goods by one person to another in the course
of trade or business for cash or deferred payment or
other valuable consideration ........... .
•
•
•
•
•
2 S.C.R.
761
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Explanation 2 : Notwithstanding anything to the
contrary in the S:i Ir l}f Goods Act, 1932, the sale or
pmchase of any goods shall be deemed, for the purposes of ' this Act, to have taken place in Mysore,
wherever the contract of sale might have been made;
(a) if the goods were actually in Mysore at the time
when the contract of sale or purchase in respect ther.:of was made, or
(b) in case the contract was for the sale or purchase of future goods hv description, then, if the
goods !lre actually produced in Mysore at any time
after the contract of sale or purchase in respect thereof was made.
EAST PUNJAB GENERAL SALES-TAX ACT, 1948.
"Sale" means any transfer of property in goods for
cash or deferred payment or other valuable consideration ........... .
•
•
Explanation 2 : Notwithstanding anything to the
contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930, the
sal~ of any goods whic!i are actually in East Punjab
at the time when the contract of sale (as defined in
that Act) in . respect thereof is made, shall, wherever
·the said contract of sale is made, be deemed for the
purposes of this Act to have taken place in East
Punja!,.
UNITED PROVINCES SALES-TAX ACT, 1948.
"Sale" means ............ any transfer of property in
goods for cash or deferred payment or other valuable
consideration .......... .
••
•
Explanation II : Notwithstanding anything m the
Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930, or any other law for
the time being in force, the sale of any goods(i) which are actually in the United Provinces at
the time when in respect thereof, the contract of sale
as defined in section 4 of that Act is made, or
(ii) ...,:J.iich are produced or manufactured in the
United Provinces by the producer or manufacturer
11-9~ S.C. Ind1a/.5".
1955
Tiii Bengal
lmmuni'l
Company Limiltd
v.
The Slate of Bihar
and othns
762
1955
Bengal
lmnwnity
Company L;miud
v.
The StaU of Bihat
and ot/rns
T.i1t
JagannadMJas J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
thereof, shall, wherever the delivery. or contract of
sale is made, be deemed for the purposes of this Act
to have taken place in the United Provinces.
Explanation Ill : Where goods under a forward
contract are not actually delivered, the sale in respect of such contract shall be deemed to have been
completed on the <lat~ originally agreed upon for
delivery.
Note : The omitted portions .in the definitions other
than those in the Madras Act are to the same
effect as those shown within brackets in the
Madras definition.
VENKATARAMA AvYAR J.-The appellant is a Company registered under the Indian Companies Act
carrying on business in the manufacture and sale of
sera, biological products and medicines. Its registered
office is at No. 153, Dharamtalla Street, Calcutta, and
its laboratory and factory are situated at Baranagar,
24 Parganas, West Bengal. The first respondent is
the State of Bihar, and respondents 2 rrnd 3 are respectiveiy the Secretary ::111<l the
..i\.ssist'.lnt Secret2!"y
of Commercial Taxes. On the 18th December 1951,
the second respondent issued a notice under section
13(5) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947 (Act XIX of
1947) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) calling upon
the appellant to register itself as a dealer under the
Act and to submit a return for assessment of sales
tax. To this the appellant sent a reply on the 8th
january 1952 disputing its liability on various
grounds, and after further correspondence between
the parties which it is needless to set out, the third
respondent sent a notice on the 29th May 1952 that
if the appellant failed to comply with the notice dated
the 18th December 1951 by the 14th June 1952, steps
would be taken to assess tax on the basis of best
judgment. The appellant replied by filing the application out of which the present appeai arises, under
artide 226 of the Constitution for a writ of prohibition restraining the respondents from proceeding with
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
763
the assessment. It was alleged in the petition that
as the appellant had no .place of business wit}\in the
State of Bihar, the provisions of the Act under which
it was sought to be taxed were ultra vires as extraterritorial in operation, and that further those provisions were repugnant to article 286(2) of the Constitution and were therefore void. The State of Bihar,
which will hereafter be referred to as the respondent.
resisted the application on the ground firstly, that it
was not maintainable for the reason that the appellant had, under the provisions of the Act, a right of
appeal against the assessment to the appropriate
authorities, and secondly, that as the sales proposed
to be taxed must be deemed to have taken place by
reason of the Explanation to article 286(1)(a) within
Bihar, the provisions of the Act imposing tax on a
non-resident seller were neither ultra vires- nor unconstitutional. The learned Judges of the High Court
upheld both these contentions and dismissed the
application, and this appeal has been preferred against
their judgment on a certificate granted under article
132(1) of the Constitution. In view of the importance
of the issues involved, leave of the Court was sought
PY and granted to ten States, one commercial firm
and one individual dealer. Nine out of the ten States,
namely Orissa, PEPSU, Punjab, Madhya Pradesh,
Madras, Mysore, Rajasthan, Travancore-Cochin and
Uttar Pradesh, have intervened and supported the
respondents. One State, West Bengal, represented
by the learned Attorney-General supported the appellant, and so did the Tata Iron and Steel Co., Ltd., and
one M. K. Kuriakose.
On the arguments addressed before us, the following points arise for determination :
1. Whether the application for a writ of prohibition is maintainable?
2. Whether the Explanation to article 286(1)(a)
confers authority on the State Legislatures to impose
tax on sales falling within its purview?
3. Whether the sales covered by the Explanation to article 286(1) (a) are subject to the prohibition
contained in article 286(2) ?
1955
The Btn&ol
l1111nut1ih
Company il,,;;ud
v.
TM Slau of Bilutr
and others
764
1955
The Bengal
/mnumilv
enpm, dmiled
v.
TM Stau qf Bilim
and "'""'
v-....
4.l!l"' 1•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1955]
4. Whether the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947 is
invalid on the ground that it is extra-territorial i11
its operation, and ultra vires the power of the State
Legislature?
5. Whether the assessment proposed to be made
on the appellant is not authorised by the Explanation to article 286(1) (a)?
1. On the question of the maintainability of the
application for a writ of prohibition, it was observed
by the learned Judges that under section 13.(5) of the
impugned Act, the Commissioner was competent to
decide whether the appellant was a person liable to
pay tax under the Act, that even if he came to an
erroneous conclusion on the merits, that did not affect
his jurisdiction over the subject-matter, that the Act
itself provided in sections . 24 and 25 a complete and
effective machinery by way of appeal and revision for
correction of such errors, and that accordingly a writ
of prohibition was not the proper remedy. If the
learned Judges intended to lay down that a writ of
prohibition should not issue because another remedy
was open under the Act, that cannot be supported.
The existence of another remedy is .a very material
circumstance . to be taken into account when the
Court is calied upon to issue a writ of certiorari, but
wholly different considerations arise when the writ
asked for is prohibition. Writ of prohibition is issued
whenever a, subordinate Court or Tribunal usurps
jurisdiction which does not belong to it, and when
that has been shown, the issue of the writ, though not
of course, is· of right and not discretionary. The point
to be determined, therefore, is whether in taking
proc~edings under section 13(5) of the Act, respondents 2 and 3 acted without jurisdiction or in excess
of it. The contention of the appellant is that
the Bihar Legislature had no competence to tax the
sales in question, because they were effected in Bengal,
and the appellant was not carrying on business
within the State of Bihar. If this contention is we!lfounded, "then section 13(5) of the Act would be ~oid
and inoperative in its application as against the ap-·
pellant, and the proceedings taken thereunder would
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
765
in consequence be without jurisdiction. We are not
here concerned with a statute whose vires is not in
question, and which confers jufisdiction on anv authority to take proceedings if certain facts exist and the
enquiry directed by the authority is as to whether
those facts exist. The determination in such a case is
incidental to the effective exercise by the authority of
its undisputed jurisdiction and if, as a result of that enquiry, it came to an erroneous conclusion, there is 1no
error of jurisdiction, and it might well he contended in
that case that the remedy of the party aggrieved was
to resort to the machinery provided in ·the statute
itself by way of appeal or revision, and that a writ of
prohibition would be misconceived. But here, the
contention of the appellant is that the statute itself
is void in so far as it authorises the imposition of a
tax on dealers who are not residents within the State
<>r do not carry on business there, and that, in consequence, the proceedings taken under section 13(5)
of the Act should be restrained on the ground of
·want of jurisdiction. It is no answer to this contention that the appellant should seek redress through
the channels provided in the Act therefor. Indeed,
the contention that the Act is ultra vires is not one
which the Tribunals constituted under the Act, whether original, appellate, or revisional, could entertain, their duty being merely to administer the Act.
It was argued by Mr. N. C. Chatterjee that if the
tax was illegal, as contended by the appellant, then
the proceedings taken for imposing the same would
amount to unconstitutional interference with the
fundamental right of the appellant to carry on business guaranteed under article 19(1)(g), and that the
-courts were bound to interfere under article 226. He
relied on the decisions of this court in Mahommad
Yasin v. The Town Area Committee, /alalabad(1), The
State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) L~d.( 2 ),
and Himmatlal Harilal Mehta v. The State of Madhya
Pradesh( 8 ). That is undoubtedly the position in law,
but as the appellant is a Company registered under
(1) [1952] S.C.R. 578.
.
(2) [1953] s.c.R. 1069.
(3) [1954] S.C.R. 1122.
1955
Tht &llgal
lmmunitl
Company LimitMJ
v.
T/14 State of Bihar
and others
7(;6
19$5
TIN .Bmpl
lmmtmily
eo..pan, Llmi1'tl
v.
TIN Stale of Bihar
anti ollN'1
Ylllkatarama
AY.1"' J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
the Indian Companies Act and the question whether
a juristic person is a citizen for the purpose ot article
19(1) (g) is still an open ·one, I would prefer not to
rest my decision on this ground. It is sufncient for
the purpose of this appeal to hold that a writ of pr<>hibition should issue, if the appellant establishes that
the proceedings taken against it under section 13(5)
of the Act are without jurisdiction. The contentions urged in support of that position must now be
examined.
2. It is firstly argued that the Explanation to article 286(1)(a) on which the validity ot the impugned
Act depends confers no authority on the State Legislature to impose a tax on sales falling within its purview. To appreciate the contentions advanced on
either side, it must be mentioned that the Act as
passed in 1947 contemplated the in.position ot a tax
on residents within the State. They might be natural
persons, or they might be juristic persons carrying
on business within the State. The business might be
carried on in person or through agents. But if the
persons who carried on the business of buying and
selling did not reside within the State or carry on
business there, then the Act did not authorise the
imposition of tax on them. That was the effect of the
definition of "dealer'' as mea.ning "any person who
carries on the business of selling or buying goods in
Bihar". Thi:n came the Constitution, and the Explanation to article 286(1) (a) enacted that sales shall be
deemed to have taken place in that State in which
die goods are delivered for consumption; notwithstanding that title to them passed in another State.
The construction which the respondent puts on the
Explanation is that it confers on the States proprio
vigore, a power to tax sales when the conditions mentioned. therein are satisfied. Agreeably to this view,
the Bihar Finance Act, 1950 (Act XVII of 1950) substituted for the words "who carries on business of
selling or buying goods in Bihar" the words "who sells
or supplies any goods". The point to be noted is that
the words "in Bihar" which occurred in the previous
definition were omitted. In 1951 by the Adaptation
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
761
of Laws Order, a new section, section 33, was added
and that is as follows :
"33. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in
this Act,(a) a tax on the sale or purchase of goods shall
not be imposed under this Act(i) where such sale or purchase takes place outside the State of Bihar; or
(ii) where rnch sale or purchase takes place in
the course of import of the gooJs into, or export of
the goods out of, the territory of India;
( b) a tax on the sale or purchase of any good'
shall not, after the 31st day of March 1951, be imposed
where such sale or purchase takes place in the course
of inter-State trade or commerce except in so far as
Parliament may by law otherwise provide.
(2) The Explanation to clause (1) of article 286
of the Constitution shall apply for the interpretation
of sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of sub-section (1)".
The contention of the respondent is that the appelb nt has become ~iable to be taxed under these provisions. The appellant replies that article 286(1)(:i) is
restrictive in its scope, that it merely takes away a
power to tax which the State might otherwise possess,
but that it does not positively confer on a State a
power to tax where it did not previously exist, and
that on its true construction, it would operate to
divest Bengal of its power to tax but not to vest it in
Bihar. To decide which of these two contentions is
the correct one, it is necessary to examine what the
law was prior to the enactment of article 286(1) (a)
and the Explanation, what the defect was which was
disclosed in the working of that law, and how it was
proposed to remedy it.
Under the Government of India Act, 1935, the
power to enact a law imposing tax on sale of goods
was conferred on the Provincial Legisla»1re by Entry
48 in List II. Under sections 99( 1) and 100(3) that
law must be for .the Province, and as interpreted in
Wallace Bros. v. /. T. Commissioner, Bombay( 1 ), that
meant that there should be sufficient territorial
(I) (1948] !i'.C.R. I.
.1955
TluJJmgoJ
Jmmunil.J
Company Limikd
v.
Th-. State of Bihar
and olhtrS
768
1955
Tht Btrsgal
Immunity
Compan_v LimiUd
••
1"h1 StaJt of Bihm
and othnt
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ri95sJ
connection between the person proposed to be taxed
and the State seeking to tax with reference to the
subject matter of the taxation. Dealing with this
aspect of the matter, Pataniali Sastri, C.J. obsened
in The State of Bombay v. The United Mota,.,. (111<t1al
Ltd.(') as follows :
·'The expression 'for such :;rare or any part
thereof' cannot, in our view, be takeu to import mto
Entry 54 the restriction that the sale or purchase
referred to must take place within .the territory of that
State. All that it means is that the laws which a
State is empowered to make must be for the purposes
of that State. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . In the case of salestax it is not necessary that the sale or purchase
should take place , within the territonal limits of the
State in the sense that all the ingredients of a sale
like the agreement to sell, the passing of title, delivery of the goods, etc. should have a territorial .:onnection with the State. Broadly speaking, locai activities of buying and selling carried un m the State in
relation to local goods would be a sufficient basis to
sustain the taxing· power of the State, provided of
course, such activities ultimately resulted in a concluded sale or purchase to be taxed".
This statement of the law was again adopted l:.y this
Court in Poppatlal Shah v. The State ot Madras(•).
Vide the observations of Mukherjea, J. (as he then
was) at pages 682 and 683. In this view, a law of the
State imposing a tax on sales must, to be valid, fulfil
two conditions. Firstly, there must be a completed
sale involving the transfer of title in the goods to the
purchaser. It is only then that the power to tax
arises. That was held by this Court m The Sales Tax
Officer, Pilibhit v. Messrs Budh Prakash Jai Prakash(•).
Secondly, there must be sufficient territorial nexus
between the transaction and the State which seeks to
tax it. This condition undoubtedly introduced an
element of uncertainty and vagueness in the law with
the result that the power to tax which was linked up
with it, had indefiniteness which could lerid itself to
(i) (1953] s.c.R. 1069.
(2) [1953) S.C.R. 677.
(3) [1~55) 1 •.C.R. 243.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
769
.abuse. How c:xoansive was the area open to the State
Legislature to impose a tax on the basis of the nexus
theory is forcibly brought out by Bose, J. in the following observations in The State of Bombay v. The
United Motors (India) Ltd.( 1 ) at page 1101 :
"The difficulty is apparent when one begins to
~olit a sale
into its component parts and analvse
them. When this is done, a sale is found to consist
-of a number of ingredients which can be said to be
essential in the sense that if any one of them is missing there is no sale. The following are some ol: them :
( 1) the existence of gtX>ds which · form the subjectmatter of the sale, (2) the bargain or contract which,
when executed, will result in the passing of the property in the goods for a price, (3) the payment, or
promise of payment, of a price, ( 4) the passing of the
title. When all take place in one State, there is no
difficultv. The situs of the sale is the place in which
all the ingredients are brought into being. But when
ore or more ingredients take place in different States,
what criterion is one to employ? It is impossible to
-say that any of these ingredients is more essential
than any other because the result is always the same
the moment you take one away. There is then no
sale".
Many were the problems which this state of the law
created both for the State and for the consumers.
Whether the fact on which a State law seeks to tax is
sufficient nexus must, except in some obvious cases,
be open to debate, and until a court pronounces on
it, there must be a cloud of uncertaintv hanging over
the validity of the enactment. More than that, when
the several elements which go to make up a sale are
distributed over different States it might happen that
the same transaction might be subjected to tax by
more States than one and the burden thereof must
ultimatdy fall on the consumers. It was this, the
possibilitv of multiple taxation that was the most
serious defect in the law as it stood prior to the Constitution, and it was to remedy this that a new provi·sion. trticle 286(1 )(a) with its Explanation was
(I) [1953] S.C.R. 1069.
1955
The Bengal
Immunity
Company Limited
v.
The Slate of Bih11r
and others
Venkalarama
Ayyar J.
770
1955
The Btngal
lmmunil'
Compan, LimiUd
v.
The State of Bihar
and others
Ven.tatarama
A.uarJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955)
enacted. It is as follows :
"'7.86. ( 1) No law of a State shall impose, or
authorise the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purehase of goods where such sale or purchase takes
place(a) outside the State.
Explanation.-For the purposes of sub-clause (a),
a sale or purchase shall be deemed to have taken
place in the State in which the goods have actually
been delivered as a direct result of_ such sale or purchase for the purpose of consumption in that State,
notwithstanding the fact that under the general law
relating to sale of goods the property in the goods
bas by reason of such sale or purchase passed in
another State".
It will be convenient hereafter to refer to the State
in which title to the goods passes as the selling State,
and the State in which goods are delivered for consumption as the delivery State.
Now, we may examine how this provision is
designed to put an end to multiple taxation. The
scheme of the enactment is to fix, what had not been
done under . the Government of India Act, 1935, the
situs of the sale, and for that purpose, to classify it
into two categories, sale inside the State and sale
outside the State. On what principle the situs was
fixed will presently be considered. But when once that
is done, the problem is solved. If a sale is inside a
State, the power of that State to tax it under Entry
54 remains unaffected. But if the sale is outside a
State, article 286(1)(a) prohibits that State from taxing it This process must have the effect of eliminating multiple taxation, because a sale must be either
inside or outside a State, and if it is inside one State
it must be outside all other States. In this respect,
article 286(1)(a) effected a fundamental alteration in
the law under Entry .48 in List II and section 100(3)
of the Government of India Act; 1935, as construed
by the courts. Whereas under these provisions a
State could tax irrespective of where a sale took place,
provided there was sufficient territorial nexus, under
article 286(1)(a) that power can be exercised only
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
771
when it takes place inside the State, mere nexi being
insufficient to support such a power. The theory of
nexus as a source of jurisdiction to tax was thus
abandoned, and the power to tax was annexed to the
situs of the sale to be exercised by the State wherein
it is fixed and as a given sale can take place only in
one State and in no other, it must follow that the
power of taxing that sale is capable of exercise only
by one State and not others.
The foundation on which this scheme rests is the
location of a sale in a particular State. But how is this
to be done? When all the essential elements of a sale
take place within one State, · the question presents no
difficultv. But what, if they are distributed over
several States? It is to deal with this situation that
the Explanation has been enacted. Its purpose is to
fix the situs of a sale when it is of an inter-State
character, and it does that by providing that it shall
be deemed to have taken place in that State in which
the goods are delivered for consumption. What the
significance of the words "for consumption" is, will
be considered in due course. But· that apart, it is
delivery of the goods that has been adopted by the
Constitution as the determining factor in fixing the
situs of the sale, not the agreement to sell, nor the
passing of title to the goods, nor other ingredients of
sale, and there is good reason for this. Where
an agreement to sell is concluded by correspondence
as generally it must be when the transaction is of an
inter-State character, difficult questions m1gnt crop
up as to where the agreement was concluded. Likewise, the conception as to passing of property in the
goods is largely juristic and not seldom obscured by
legal subtleties and refinements, and it is conceivable
that there might be conflict among the States as ta
in which of them the title has passed. But deliverv
is a matter of fact,' about which. there ought to be no
dispute, and it is consistent with the purpose of
article 286(l)(a) that the Explanation should have
chosen delivery as the determining element in the
transaction of sale. Now, the question to be decided
is whether in the light of the above discussion, the
:955
Tht Bengal
lmmunily
Company Limiled
v.
The State of Bihar
and others
Ven(catarama
· AyyarJ.
772
1955
The Bengal
Immunity
·company Limited
v.
The State of Bihar
and others
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
contention of the appellant that the Explanation opcr:>tes only to deprive the selling State of its power to
tax the sale, and that it confers no authority on the
delivery State to impose a tax can be accepted.
An obvious objection to this view might at once be
stated. If the Explanation has no application to any
but the selling State, it must follow that all the other
States including the delivery State will have power to
impose a tax under Entry 54 uncontrolled by the
Explanation, and that will bring into play the nexus
theory with its attendant evii of multiple taxation.
On this contention, therefore, article 286 ( 1) (a) must
be held to have failed to achieve what it set about to
do. A construction which leads to such a conclusion
cannot be accepted unless there are cogent reasons
therefor. Wl:iat are those reasons? It is urged that
article 286(1)(a) does not, in terms, purport to confer
a power on the State to impose a tax on sale, that, on
the other hand, it assumes the pre-existence of such
a power in the State, and then proceeds to restrict it,
that the substantive provisions which confer power to
tax are Entry 54 in List II and article 246(3), that
when a State has no power to tax under those provisions, then article 286(1) (a) could have no application
as there could he no question of restricting what does
not exist, and that it could not, therefore, operate to
confer 'on it such a power. In support of this position,
reliance is placed on the form of article 286(J)(a)
that no law of a State shall impose a tax on outside
sale. This prescription, it is argued, is merely negative and destructive and not positive and creative in
its content.
But this contention does not give sufficient effect to
the Explanation which is in substance and form positive, and it also fails to take adequately into consideration the purpose of the enactment. The object
of artide 286(1) (a)-and there is no dispute about it
-is to avoid multiple taxation and that as already
stated, was sought to be achieved by fixing the situs
of sale in one State in accordance with the Explanation. The scheme of the enactment must, by its
very nature, have both a positive. and a negative
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
773
aspect. In so far as it lays down which of the several
States could .tax-and it <loes that in the Explanation
-it is positive in its aspect, and in so far as it prohibits the other Scates from imposing tax-and it does
this in the body of article 286(l)(a)-it is negative
in its aspect. The body of article 286(l)(a) and the
Explanation together form parts of a single enactment charged with a single purpose and to refer to it
either as negative or positive in character can only be
a partial and not an accurate statement of the true
position. It is no doubt true that article 286(1)(a)
assumes that there is in the State a power to tax
al.iunde. "111d then proceeds to restrict it. But it is
not inconsistent with .this to construe the Explanation
as positive m character. The problem of multiple
taxation, which it is the object of the enactment to
avoid, is possible only when the sale is of an interState character, and when the Explanation enacts
that in such .cases the sale shall be deemed to have
t<1krn place in the delivery State, that is at once a
recognition and a declaratio!1 by the Constitution that
delivery is sufficient nex.us on which the State can tax
the sale under Entry 54. The object of this declaration was to remove the question from the arena of
controversy and settle it once and for all. It is thus
a positive enactment and not the less so, because .it
is decl:iratorv in character and it is also restrictive in
that it takes away by necessary implication the power
of taxation on the basis of other nexi which other
States would have had under Entry 54. No purpose
would be served by entering into a subtle disputation
as to whether the Explanation conferred a new and
substantive power, or whether it affirmed an existing
power. In either case, the power of the delivery State
to tax could not be challenged.
Looking at the form of the Explanation, it is
emphaticalfy positive in that it declares that the sale
shall be deemed to have taken place in the delivery
State, and that is all the more significant in view of
the fact that the body of article 286(1)(a) to which it
is appended is negative in form. The change over
from the negative of the body of article 286(l)(a) to
1955
The Bengal
Immunity
Company Limited
v.
The State of Bihat
and others
Venkatarama
Ayyar J.
774
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
1955
the positive of the Explanation is highly significant,
and the appellant has been unable to suggest any
lmm11nity
reason for this, except inadvertence and slovenliness
Company Limiltd
on
the part of the draftsman .
••
T Ju Slalt of Biliar
The marginal note to article 286 was also referred
and olhers
to as showing that ·the ExP.lanation was merely resVo!nkalarama
trictive in character. In T hakurain Ba/raj Kunwar
A»"'].
v. Rae fagat Pal Singh(') Lord Macnaghten observed :
"It is well settled that marginal notes to the sections of an Act of Parliament cannot be referred to
for the purpose of construing the Act. The contrary
opinion originated in a mistake, and it has been
exploded long ago. There seems to be no reason for
giving the marginal notes in an Indian statute any
greater authority than the marginal _ notes in an
English Ace of Parliament...
The reason on which this ru!e rests was thus 'tated
by Baggallay, L. J. in Attorney-Genera! v. G. E.
Ry.(2):
"I never knew an amendment set ·down or discussed upon marginal notes to a clause. The House
oi Commons has nothing to do with a marginal' note".
Vide also the observations of Lord Hanworth, M.R.,
in Nixon v. Attorney-General('). This reasoning applies with equal force to marginal notes in Indian
'Statutes. In my opinion, the marginal note to artide 286(l)(a) cannot be referred to for construing the
Explanation. It is clearly inadmissible for cutting
down the plain meaning of the words of the Constitution. Vide Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay v.
Ahmedbhai Umarbhai and Co.(').
,
Two other views as to the scope of the Explanation
which were discussed by the learned Attorney-General
in the course of his argument must now be noticed.
One is that the Explanation does not deprive the
selling State of its power to tax under Entry 54 but
confers additional power of taxation on the delivery
State. And the other is that the Explanation merely
settles the competing claims of the selling and of the
delivery State, and leaves untouched the power of the
Tiu &ngal
(I) 31 I.A. 13~, 142, 143.
(3) [1930] I Ch. 566, 593.
(2) [1879] 11 Ch. D. 449, 461.
(4) [1950] S.C.R. 335, 353.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
775
other States to tax on the basis of the nexus theory.
Neither of these views has been pressed by any of the
parties before us, and both of them are open to the
objection that they would result in multiple taxation,
which it was the purpose of the Explanation to avoid,
and must in consequence be rejected. In the result,
whether regard is had to the object of the enactment
or its language, the Explanation must be held to
authorise the imposition of tax by the delivery State.
3. It is next contended by the appellant that the
sales covered by the Explanation to article 286(1)(a)
are within the prohibition contained in article 286(2)
and that in consequence the charge sought to be imposed on such sales by the impugned Act is illegal and
void. That raises the question as to what the scope
of the Explanation to article 286(1)(a) is, and whether it is controlled by article 286(2). The Explanation declaring as it does that the situs of a sale for
purposes of taxation is the delivery and not the selling State can apply, by its very terms, only to sales
of an inter-State character, and that is the basis on
which the argument of both the parties to the appeal
has proceeded. Article 286(2) prohibits the impositio:1. of tax on sales in the course of inter-State trade.
Thus, the field on which the Explanation operates
falis within the area covered by article 286(2), and
there is apparently a conflict between them. Now
the question is how the power of a State to tax on
the basis of the Explanation is affected by the impact
of article 286(2), and on that, three views have been
put forward :
(a) The Explanation fixes ~he situs of the sale b
the delivery Smte. It becomes thereby a sale inside ·
that State and outside all other States. It accordingly
ceases to be a sale in the course of inter-State trade
and becomes an intra-State sale and is, therefore
outside the purview of article 286(2); and the power
of the delivery State to tax under the Explanation
remains unaffected. That was the view taken by the
majority of the learned Judges in The State of Bombay
v. The United Motors (India) Ltd.(1 ), and accordin1r
(I) [1953] S.C.R. 1069.
1955
The Bengal
Immunity
Company Limited
v.
The Stale of BihDI
and others
,
Venkatarama
AyyarJ.
776
1955
The Bengal
-4mmunUy ·
Company' Limited
v.
TM Stau of Bihar
and others
Vtnkatarama
AY,1at ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
f1955J
to it, there is no conflict between the Explanation
and article 286(2).
(b) The sales to which the Explanation applies are
in the course of inter-State trade, and fall within the
coverage of article 286(2), and there is thus a conflict
between the two provisions, but the Explanation
deals with a special topic, and therefore preva.ils
against article 286(2) on the principle of generalia
speczalibus non derogant, and the power to tax thereunder is unaffected. That was the view taken by
Bhagwati, J. in The State of Bombay v. The United
Motors (India) Lid.(').
( c) The sales to which the Explanation applies are
in the course of inter,State trade, and are hit by article 286(2) and unless Parliament lifts the ban as pr<>vided therein, no ta can be levied on them. According to this view, the twn orovisions are irreconcilably
in conflict, and article 286(2) must prevail as against
the Explanation unless its operation i~ superseded by
Parliamentary legislation. This was the view taken
by Bose, J. in The State of Bombay v. The United
Motors (India) Ltd.('), and by Das, J. in State of
Travancore-Cochin v. Shanmugha Vilas Cashew Nut
Factory(•). The points for determination are thus
whether there is .conflict between the Explanation to
article 286(l)(a) and article 7.86(?.), and if so, which
of them is to prevail. To decide this, it is necessary
to examine first what the position was under the Government of India Act, 1935, and next how it has been
affected by the provisions of the Constitution.
Under the Government of India Act, 1935, the Pr<>vinces had under Entry 48. in List II the exclusive
power to make laws in respect of taxes on sale of
goods, and under Entry 27, in respect of trade and
commerce within its territory. There was no entry
relating to trade and commerce among the Provinces
though several topics relating to inter-State trade and
commerce were specifically enumerated in List I. Nor
was there any provision for regulating inter-State commerce though under section 297 some restrictions were
placed on the powers of the Provincial Legislature 'Witll
(I) [1953] S.C.R. 1069.
(~ [1954J $.C.R.. 53.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
777
reference thereto. The conception of a commerce clause,
as we now have it, was unknown to the Government of
India Act, 1935. It came in for the first time as part
of the Constitution. To understand its true scope, it
would be legitimate and indeed necessary tQ examine
its bearings and incidents in other systems of law.
The American Constitution is the oldest written
Federal Constitution in the world, and the problems
it had to deal with were what many Federal Governments have had since to face. The commerce clause
is one of its notable provisions, and it was before the
framers of the British North America Act, 1867 and
cf the Commonwealth Act of Australia, 1900. Our
Constitution also has largely been influenced by it,
and it would be useful to examine it to see what light
it throws on the present controversy.
In America the authority of the Congress to enact
laws on the matters delegated to it under the Constitution is supreme. In respect qf all other matters,
the States po5$ess plenary powers of legislation subject to the inhibitions contained in the Constitution.
It is in exercise of these powers that the States enact
laws regulating sales and imposing tax on them.
Under section 8 of article 1 of the Constitution, the
power "to regulate commerce among the States" is
vested in the Congress. Thus, while intra-State commerce is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
State, inter-State commerce is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Congress.
A question
which came up frequently for decision before the
Courts was wkether the States had the power to enact
laws with reference to goods which Ind come into a
State 'in the course of inter-State trade, and it was
settlecl on the highest authority that if the sale was
for the purposes of consumption within the State it
became domestic in its character, and fell within the power of the State to regulate and to tax, but
that if it was for, purposes other than consumption
such as re-sale, then that was in the course of interState commerce, and Congress alone had the iuriscliction to legislate m respect of it. In Pennsylvania
12-84 S. C. lndia/59
1955
Thl&ngal
Immunity
Company LimiUd
Yo
Th• Slau of Biltar
and oli.trs
Venkalarama
Ayyar J.
778
1955
Th< Bengal
lmmiini!J
Company Limittd
v.
The State of Bihar
and ot11.ers
V en/catarama
Ayyar j.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1955 I
Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission(') the question
was as to the validity of a statute of New York regu·
lating the rates which could be charged for sale of
natural gas for consumption within the State. The
gas was transported into the State by pipe lines from
outside, and it was accordingly held that the regulation was in respect of inter-State trade and commerce,
and was therefore "subject to applicable Constitutional limitations" but that the State law was valid
because "the thing which the State Commission has
undataken to regulate, while part of inter-State
transmission, is lo>al in its nature, and pe;L1ins to the
furnishing of natural gas to local consumers within
the city of Jamestown, in the State of New York".
In Missouri e.t: rel. Barrett v.. Kansas Natural Gas
Co.(2), the facts were similar except that the sales
were not for consumption within the State bu( for resale. It was held that those sales continued to retain
the character of inter-State trade, and fell within the
commerce clause. Vide also Public Utilities Commission v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co.( 3 ). The principle
underlying these ·decisions· would appear to be that
goods which are transported in inter-State trade must
neces5arily come to the end of their journey when
they are consumed, and that, therefore, sales for consumption take them out of the course of inter-State
trade. But if the goods are sold for re-sale, they are
still moving in inter-State journey and therefore the
commerce clause applies.
ln Ed8 the Congress
enacted a legislation with reference to sales in the
course of inter-State trade for purposes of resale.
Examining the. question whether the States had thereafter the power to enact a law regulating sales which
take place in the course of inter-State trade but for
local consumption, the Supreme Court held in Panhandle Eastern Pipe line Co. v. Public Service Commis_rion of India(') that they had, and observed :
"Prior to that time (1938) this Court in a series
of . decisions had dealt with various situations arising
from State efforts to regulate the sale of imported
(1) 252 U.S.23; 6·1 L, Ed. 434.
(3) 273 U.S; 83; 71 L. Rd. 549.
(2) 265 U.S. 298; 68 L. Ed. 1027.
(4) 332 U.S. 507; 92 L. Ed. 128.
2 S.C.R.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
779
1935
natural gas. The story has been adequately told antl
we do not stop to review it again or attempt reconThe Bericul
lmmui1ity
ciliation of all the decisions or their groundings. Suffice Company
LimihJ
it· to say that by 1938 the Court had delineated
v.
Slate of JJihar
broadly between the area of permissible state control The and
otlt.rs
and that in which the states could not intrude. The
Yenkatarama
former inclu<led inter~tatc direct sales to local con~Y"' J.
sumers, the latter, service interstate to local distributing companies, for resale".
It further held that the Congress legislation was itself
a recognition of. the distinction established by. the decisions "between sales for resale and direct sale for consumpti•)n". This decision was followed quite recently
in Panli1mdle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Michigan Public
Service Commission (1 ). Four propositions might accordingly be taken as well-settled in American law :
(i) The States have plenary and exclusive power of .
legislation in respect of intra-State sales.
(ii) Regulation of inter-State commerce is a topic
within rhe exclusive jurisdiction of the Congress.
(iii) Sales which take place in the course of interState tr:idc are local in character and within the jurisdiction of the State, if they are for consumption
within the State.
(iv) Where such sales ::ire for other purposes than
consum;ition such as resale, they retain their character as s:ilcs in the course of inter-State trade and
are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Congress.
The provisions of the Indian Constitution bearing
on this subject may now be referred to :(a) The States have exclusive jurisdiction under
Entry 54 to impose sales tax and under Entry 26 to
regulate trade and commerce within the State. Legislative .powers in respect of these matters were conferred on the Provinces by the Govemment of India
Act, 1935, and these powers have been continued in
the States by the COnstitution.
(b) Article 301 enacts that trade and commerce
within the territory of India shall be free, and under
Entry 42 in List I, the power to legislate on interState trade and commerce is vested exclusively in the
(I) 34-1 U.S. 319; 95 L. Ed. 99S.
780
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1955
[ 19551
Union. There was nothing corresponding to these
provisions in the Government of India Act, 193;.
Immunity
(c) Under the Explanation to article 286(l)(a), a
Cotnpa1!v limiJed
sale is deemed to take place within the State 111 which
v.
The Stale of BiluJr
the goo<ls are delivered for consumption. This again
·
and ot,,as
is a new provision introduced in the Constitution.
Venkatarama
( d) No law of a State can impose a tax on a sale
AJ!1'l' ].
which takes place in the course of inter-State tradeThat is article 286(2) which is also a new provision.
Reading side by side the law on the subject both
in America and under the Indian Constitution, it is
difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Explanation
to article 286(l)(a) and article 286(2) have been inspired by the American law on the subject, and that
their spheres of operation correspond respectively to
the jurisdiction of the State and of the Cougress in
America as delineatea m Mwot1ri ex rel. Barrett v.
Kansas Natural Gas Co.('), and Panhandle Eastern
Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Commission of India(').
I shall now pass on to consider which of'· the three
views which have been placed before us as to· the
effect of article 286(2) on the Explanation to article
286( l )(a) deserves to be accepted. The fir>t view is
that the sales falling within the Explanation are
intra-State in character, an<I are therefore outside the
area covered by article 286(2). This derives consid··
erable support from the language of the enactment
The scheme of article 286( l) (a) is, as already stated,
that it fixes the situs of the sales with a view to avoid
multiple taxation, and for that purpose it divides
them into two categories-inside sales and outside
sales-and enacts that a State cannot tax an out<i•.le
sale. When in the same context the Explanation <k·
dares that a sale in the course of inter-State trade·-·
that this is its scope is common ground-mrnt
be deemed to have taken place in the State in which
the goo<ls are delivered for consumption, its purpose
is clearly to take it out of inter-State trade and stamo
it with the character of an intra-State sale. Under
Entry 26 in List II, it is the State that has juriS<iicThe /hnp
(1) 265 U.S. •911; 68 L. Ed. 1027.
(2) 332 U.S. 507; 92 L. F.cl. 128.
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
781
tion in respect of trade and commerce within the State,
1955
dlld reading that with the language of the Explana-
Tlt1 Fen.~al
tion that the sales covered by it are deemed to take
place in the State, the inference is irresistible that the
intention of the Constitution-makers was to bring
those sales within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
State for purposes of taxation undc:r Entry 54. The
result is that with reference to sales for local consumption made in the course of intcr··State trade, the
iaw under the Constitution is exactly what it is in
America and indeed, the similarity is too striking to
be merely accidental. The position may thus he
summed up : Article 286(2) applies to sales in the
.course of inter-State trade. The sales which fall
within the Explanation are intra-State sales. The
grounds covered by the two provisions are distinct and
separate. Each has operation within its own sphere,
and there is no conflict between them.
The appellant resists this conclusion on several
grounds, and they will now be considered. It was
argued firstly that the conclusion that the Explanation and article 21:16(2) relate to two different subjects and that they operate on different fields could
be reached only by importing the Explanation into
article 286(2), and that could not be done because it
is in terms stated to be ·"for the purposes of subclause (a)" and also because such a course could not
be supported on any recognised rule of interpretation.
Now. \\·i1at is the significance of the words "for the
purposes of sub-clause (a)" occurring in the Explanation? In rhe context, its purpose is only to exclude
its application to article 286( 1)(b). Artic 1e 2R6(1)
deals w•th two matters, sales outside the State and
sales in the course of export and import. The former
is dealt with in sub-clause (a) and the latter in
sub-clau~c: (b). Jf the Legislature intended that the
Exnlanation should aoply to the former and not to the
fatter. the most natural and obvious mode of expressing rhat intention would be to enact, as it has, that it
is "for the purposes of sub-clause (a)''. This prol)lem
wm11f\ 1i1lt have ari~en if, the two matters h:id heen
<leal1· wnli in two different clauses as logically they
Immunig
Compan.J limil•d
v.
Tiu State nf Bihar
aod olil4rs
V1nkalaram•
~'"' J.
782
The ·Be,,gal
ltwnunity
Cflm~· LirniJtd
••
'I h11 State of Bihar
rmd ot,ins
I 'tr;katarama
.~'l'}Ot ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955 /
might have been. If that had been done, the article
simplifying it, would run as follows :
"286. (1) No law of a State shall impose a tax
on a sale, where it takes place outside that State.
Explanation : A sale shall be deemed
to have
taken place within that State where the goods are
delivered for consumption as a direct result of the
sale
•
.
•
•
286. (4) No law of a State s.hall impose a tax
on a sale in the course of export or import."
Article 286 ( 1) as drafted above, relegating sub-clause
(b) to a separate clause and omitting the words "for
the purposes of sub-clause (a)" in the Explanation
would convey precisely the import of article 286(1)
(a) as it now stands with sub-clause (b) and with the
words "for the purposes of sub-clause (a)". That would
clearly show that the force of the words "for the purposes of sub-clause (a)" becomes spent when ar:icle
286(l)(b) is excluded frotn the operation of the Explanation.
But then, it is contended that whatever the form in
which the Explanation may be couched, it could not
be extended beyond article 286(1)(a) and projected
into article 286(2), and that unless that was done, it
was not possible to hold that the sales falling within
the Explanation are taken out of the purview of
article 286(2). In my opinion, rhis argument proceeds
on a misconception of the real reasoning on which
the conclusion that the Explanation and article 286
(2) relate to two different subjects is based. In view
of the insistence with which this contention was
pressed by the appellant, it seems desirable to examine the position in some deta.il. To start with, the
two relevant provisions to IJC considered are article
286(1)(a) with the Explanation and article 286(2).
Omitting what is not material, they would run as
follows:
"286. (1) No law of a State shall impose a ta~
on a sale, where it takes place outside that State.
Explanation: A sale in the course of inter-State
'
-
\
',-.
2 S.C.R.
- . '...
~-~
. ,_ ..--. ,., ...
~
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
' ---
783 '
trade is inside that State in which goods are actually_7955
delivered for consumption.
- ·
_
.,.
The Bengal
· (2 ) No law of a State shall impose tax on a sale
Im-,,,zmity in the course of inter-State trade".
company Limited
The argument of the appellant that article- 286(2) is
v.
comprehensive and includes all sales in the course of The State of mhar
inter-State trade and that therefore the sales covered _ and others
by the Explanation fall -within its_ purview, ta. kes Venkatarama
"
into account only ar.ticle 286(2) and the Explanation, ' Anar J.
and it would have been unassailable if the question
had to be decided on a construction only of these tw'o
provisions. But that, however, is not the position.
An explanation appended to a section or clause get,s __
incorporated into it, and becomes an integral part of
it, and has no independent existence apart from it._
There is, in the eye of law, only one enactnient,- of
which both the section and the Explanation are two_
inseparable parts. "They move in a body if they move_
at all". When, therefore, the question is whether sales falling within the Explanation are comprised
within article 286(2), what has to be construed is that
article in relation to, not merely the Explanation taken·
in isolation but to article 286(l)(a) read·with the Explanation. If the matter is thus considered, the resultant position might thus be stated;- Article 286(I)(a) confers on States power to tax sales inside their territory. Article 286(2) prohibits them from taxing sales
in the course of inter-State trade. Explan-ation to
article 286(1)(a) enacts that sales in the course of
inter-State trade in which goods are delivered for consumption in a State shall be deemed to have taken·
place inside that State. The combined effect of all
these provisions is that States can tax sales in the
course of inter-State trade if they _fall within the
Explanation. _This conclusion is .reached, it will be
seen, not by reading the Explanation into article 286
(2) as a sort of exception but giving to all the provi- _
sions the status of independent enactments and
determining what, on a construction of the language,
their respective spheres of operation are.
In this view, the argument that if the Explanation
could be read into article 286(2) it might as well be
784
1955
rt.e &nraJ
Immunity
Campany Lir1dled
v.
T111 SltJte of Bifia,
and olh#r;
Vmhtara•nu
A")'ar ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19551
read into article 286(l)(b) and article 286(3) does not
cail for consideration. As the question is one of
determining on a reading of the entire article the
precise operation of the several parts thereof, there
can be no objection to examining the scope of article
286(1) including the Explanation in relation to article
286(l)(b) and article 286(3). Article 286(l)(a) relates
to sale inside a State, and article 286 ( 1) (b) to sales
in the course of export from or import into the country,
and there could not be any interaction between them,
and that is made abundantly clear by the words "for
the purposes of sub-clause (a)" in the Explanation.
Likewise, reading article 286(l)(a) including the Explanation along with article 286(3), the result is that the
power to tax which the State otherwise possesses has
to be exercised subject to the conditions mentioned
in the latter, when there is a Parliamentary declaration thereunder. The impact of article 286(3) is, it
should be noted, not confined lo the Explanatiun but
extends to the whole of article 286(l)(a). It operates
not only on the inter-State sales falling within the
Explanation but also on sales which are indisputably
intra-State, and it controls both of them on the principle of generalia specialibtts 12012 derogant.
It is next contended that the sales to which the
Explanation applies, takes place as a fact in the
course of inter-State trade, and that the Explanation
could not be construed as altering that fact, and that
its true scope was merely to shift the sitlls of the sale
from the selling to the delivery State. Conceiving interState trade as a stream flowing from point A in the
selling State to a point B in the delivery State, it was
argued that what the Explanation did was to shift the
situs of the sale from point A to point B, that the
stream was still there despite the shifting and that
the sale therefore did not cease to be in the course of
inter-State tra,le. \Vith respect, the fallacy in this
argument lies in thinking that after the shifting of
the sittts from point A to B, the sale could be regarded as one in the course of inter-State trade. A sale
could be said to be in the course of inter-State trade
oniy if two conditions concur: (!) A sale of goods,
•
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
785
and (2) a transport of those goods from one State to
another under the contract of sale. Unless both these
conditions are satisfied, there can be no sale in the
course of inter-State trade. Thus, if X, a merchant
in State A goes to State B, purchases goods there and
transports them into A, there is undoubtedly a movement of goods in inter-State commerce. But that is
not under :iny contract of sale. X might be entitled
under article 301 to certain rights in the matter of
transportation. But article 286(2) has no application,
as there is no sale in the course of inter-State trade
or commerce. In the same illustration, if X after
transporting the goods into State A sells them, then
also there is no sale in the course of inter-State trade.
It is true that there is a sale, and there is also a
movement of goods from one State ·to another. But
that movement has not · been under the sale, there
having been no sale at the time of transportation. In
Rottschaefer on Constitutional Law (1939 Edition)
sale in the course of inter-State commerce is thus defined :
"The activities of buying and selling constitute
inter-State commerce if the contracts thert:for contemplate or necesrarily involve the movement of goods in inJer-State Commerce".
The law is thus stated by Gavit in "Commerce Clause"
(1932 Edn.) :"The dividing line between an inter-state sale and
intra-state sale is rather fine, although clear. If the
goods are shipped into a State without a previous sale,
any sale within the State is intra-State commerce ..... .
ihus if the sale succeeds the transportation in point
-of time, however close, the state may license it".
In William T. WaJ!ner v. City of Covington( 1 ), it was
held that local sales of goods brought into the State
from outside for the very purpose of the sale were not
parts of inter-State commerce. The following observations at page 197 might be quoted :
"Of course the transportation of plaintiffs' goods
across the state line is of itself inter-state commerce ;
(I) 252 U. S. 95; 64 L. Ed. 157.
195'.i
Tlr• &ngaJ
Immunity
Company Limit•J
v.
T ht State of Bi\ar
Olld otNrs
786
1955
Th4 Bengal
Immunity
Company Limited
v.
Thi State of Bihar
and otMrs
V11tkatarama
A»ar ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
but it is not this that is taxed by the city of Covington, nor is such commerce a part of the business that
is taxed, or anything more than a preparation for it.
So far as the itinerant vending is concerned the goods
might just as well have been manufactured within the
State of Kentucky; to the extent that plaintiffs dispose of their goods in that kind of sales, they make
them the subject of local commerce; and this being
so, they can claim no immunity from local regulation,
whether, the goods remain in original packages or
not".
In the light of the above principles, what is the legal
character of the sales effected by the appellant and
sought to be taxed by the respondent? There is firstly
the fact that the goods were actually delivered in
Bihar, and secondly, there is the fiction enacted by
the Explanation that the sale had taken place not in
Bengal but in Bihar. If both sale and delivery ace in
Bihar, it is difficult to see how the sale can be said to·
be in the course of inter-State trade. The argument
of the appellant that there was, in fact, a movement
of goods from Bengal to Bihar and that stood unaffected by the fictional . shifting of the sittts of the
sale from Bengal to Bihar, overlooks that by this
very shifting, the character and complexion of the
sale become altered, because as the sale follows the
transport of goods, it cannot, according to the principles already stated, be said to be in the course of inter-State trade. It may be urged as against this conclusion that as the Explanation to article 286(1) (a) merely
shifts the situs of the sales, and leaves unaffected
the agreements to sell which must in the present case
be held to have been made at Calcutta when the anpellant executed the orders received from the Bihar
purchasers, the transport of goods from Bengal to
Bihar was under the above contracts to sell, and that
therefore the sales were in the course of inter-State·
trade. Such a contention would be untenable, because·
the expression "contract of. sale" in this context has
the same meaning as the words "contract of buying
and selling" in the definition of inter-State commerce:
given by Rottschaefer in the passage already quoted.
~
I
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
787
and they both refer to the bargain resulting in the
sale irrespective of whether it is in the stage of an
agreement to sell, or whether it is a sale in which title
10 the goods has passed to the purchaser. That is also
the definition of 'contract of sale' in section 5 (l) of
the Indian Sale of Goods Act. As there can be only
one final and concluded bargain in respect of any
particular sale, and as that is fixed by the Explanation at Bihar, it follows that there could not be any
bargain with reference thereto in Calcutta, and the
movement of goods from Bengal to Bihar was not
under any contract of sale. The position in law is
exactly the same as if the goods had been sent by the
seller from Bengal to Bihar on his own account and
tl1en sold there and delivered to the purchaser, in
which case it would be indistinguishable from William
T. Wagner v. City of Covington(1), and the sale would
clearly be intra-State. This conclusion does not negative the factum of inter-State movement of goods,
and does not prevent any rights being put forward on
that footing under article 301. It only negatives the
notion of a sale in the course of inter-State trade, and
thus takes it out of the purview of article 286(2).
It was argued that the Explanation merely enacted
a legal fiction, and that it being a well-established
rule of construction that legal fictions should be
limited to the purpose for which they are enacted, it
would be contrary to this rule to hold that the Explanation not merely shifted the situs of the sale but also
obliterated the course of inter-State commerce. But
the conclusion that the sales covered by the Explanation cease to be in the course of inter-State trade is
not the result of any extension of the fiction because,
as already stated, the factum of inter-State transportation is not ignored. That is the legal consequence
of the fictional shifting of the situs. It will be useful
in this connection to q uote what Lord Asquith observed in dealing with a similar contention in East
End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council(2).
"If you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of
0
(I) 251 U. S. 95; 64 L. Ed. 157.
(2) [i952] A. C. 109, 13l.
1955
The B'"gal
Immunity
Company Limited
v.
T /,e State ef Bihar
and ot/iers
Venkatara"'a
A;yar ].
788
1955
The Bengal
Immunity
Company Limited
v.
The State of Bihar
and others
Venkatarama
.4yyar ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955 I
affairs as real, you must surely, unless prohibited from
doing so, also imagine as real the consequences and
inci<lents which, if the putative state of aftairs had in
fact existed, must inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it. One of these in this case is emancipa·
tion from the 1939 level of rents. The statute says
that you must imagine a certain state ur atlatrs; ll
does not say that having dune ,u, yuu must came m
permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to
the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs".
It is next contende<l that the view that sales in which
goods are delivered for consumption within the State
are not within article 286(2) would render that pro·
vision practically useless, because sales for purposes
other than consumption such as for resale must be
very few and negligible. Why should a seller ior
consumption, it is asked, get his goods from an in·
termediary and not directly from the manufacture?
But then, the Constitution has itselt recognise<! in
clear and unmistakable terms a distinction between
sales in which goods arc delivered for consumption
and sales in which they are delivered for purposes
other than consumption such as re-sale, and what
purpose this distinction serves, the appellant has been
unable to explain. Besides, what are the materials
on which we can hrmh it asicle on the ground that it
is not one of substance? One of the developments of
modern big business is the agency system under which
middlemen enter into contracts with manufacturers,
stipulate for monopoly of the distribution rights
within a specified area, guarantee a certain volume of
business, and are granted liberal commission on the
sales. In such cases, retail sellers can get the goods
only from the distributors, and even when there is no
grant of monoooly, it is nothing unusual in business
that large- distributors are able to get the goods from
the manufacturers on rates more favourable than
retail sellers can obtain and that consequently, it is
more economic~] for the latter to buy them from the
distributors than from the manufacturers. And it is
not without significance that the distinction between
the two classes of sales has been rccognistd in com-
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
789
merciallv ::icivanced America for now nearly a century
:md recogni~ed for this very purpose; and how can
such a distinction be characterised as unsubstantial?
It was finally contended by the learned AttorneyGeneral that 1t article 286 ( 2) were to be construed as
not comprehending sales falling within the Explanation, then then· wnnld lv'. nr>thing on which it could
oper:i.te. The argument was thus presented : Article
286 ( 1)(a) bars the selling State, in the present case
Bengal, from taxing the sale because by reason of the
Explanation, it becomes an outside sale, and if article 286(L) is to be construed 1s 11ut barring the delivery St:ite, in the instant case Bihar, from taking the
sale, then there is nn ~ale to which it can apply, and
it will serve no purpose. The error in this argument
lies in taking the illustration as exhausting the entire
range of inter-State trade. But that is not correct.
Inter-State commerce consists in a flow of goods not
merelv from one State to another but in its continuous flow through several States, and article 286(2) is
designed to protect such a flow without being bur<len<'d by State taxes. Thus, if A in Bengal sells to B in
Bihar, and if in his turn B sells the same goods to C
in U. P. for local consumption, there will be inrerState commerce under article 286(2) and in the course
thereof. there will be two sales. Taking first the sale
frnm Benval to Bihar, "RengJI can tax it under article
286(1) (a) becJuse the Explanation thereto is not applicable as the delivery to Bihar is not for locJI con:mmption. But :uticle 286(2) would interpo<e a har.
Bihar cannot tax the safe under article 286(J)(a),
became that is an outside sale. the Explanation heing
inapplicable. Coming next to the sale bv Bihar to
U.P .. Bihar will be entitled to tax it under the body
of article 286(1) (a) as the ~-ale took place inside its
limits. But it cannot Jo so as under the Explanation,
it becomes an outside sale. But U. P. will be entitled
to tax the sale under the Explanation as it wa~ for
mnsumption within that State. Thus, the effect of
the combined operation of both article 286(2) and
::irticlt" 281l(l)(a) rf"ad witli the Explanation is that
the on Iv State which can tax the sale is .the one m
1955
The Bengal
lmmunitv
Company Limited
..
The State of Bihnr
and ol.iers
Venkataramn
Ayyar ].
790
1955
The Bengal
lmmU11ity
Company Limited
v.
The State of Bihar
and ot.1trs
Venkataram.a
AJ.>ar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
which the goods are sold for local consumption.
These are the objections advanced by 1the appellant
against the view that the sales covered by the Explanation are outside article 286(2), and they are not of
sufficient weight to overthrow it.
The consideration of this question will, however,
be incomplete without an examination of the other
two views that have been put forward as to the true
meaning and scope of article 286(2). The second
view-and that was taken by Bhagwati, J. in The
State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd.(1)
-is that the sales covered by the Explanation are in
the course of inter-State trade and they are, therefore, within the purview of article 286(2), but that as
the latter is a general provision covering all sales in
the course of inter-State trade, and the former deals
only with a special class thereof, the maxim generalia
specialibus non derogant applies, and the Explanation
prevails as against article 286(2). It will be noticed
that this agrees with the fust view in its conchision
but it differs from it on the reasoning by which it
reaches it. According to the first view, sales in the
course of inter-State trade contemplated by article
286(2) include only those under which goods are delivered for purposes other than local consumption;
whereas according to the second, they include all sales
including those in which goods are delivered for consumption within the State and those in which they
are delivered for other purposes. According to this
view, therefore, there is conflict between the Explanation and article 286(2), and the solution for it is to
be sought in the application of the rule of constniction that general provisions do not derogate from the
special. As between these two views, the first view
is, for the reasons already given, to be preferred. But
if the contention that article 286(2) applies both to
sales in which goods are delivered for local consumption and those in which they are delivered for other
purposes is correct, then. it is difiicult to see how the
appellant can escape the conclusion reached by
Bhagwati, J. in The State of Bombay v. The. Uniied
{1){1953] S.G.R. 1069.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
791
.Motors (India) Ltd.(1). The appellant is plainly m
th1: horns of a dilemma. Sales in which gooJs are
deii vered for local consumption fall either outside
anicle 286 ( 2) . or inside it. If they fall outside article
2<~6\2), then the appellant can claim no immunity
frorn taxation under that provision. In case they fall
m·,Juc article 286(2), then the Explanation must
picvall as against it on the principle generalia specwftf4ts non derogant, and the sales will be liable to be
taxed. To get out of this difficulty, the appellant
contended that article 286(2) and the Explanation
related to two different matters, and therefore the
maxim in question had no application. The argument
was that article 286 imposed a number of restrictions
on the power of the State to tax sale of goods from
different angles, e.g., when they were outside the
State, article 286(1) (a); in the course of export or
import, article 286(1)(b); in the course of inter-State
trade, article 286(2); and in relation to commodities
decl:ued essential by Parliamentary legislation under
article 286(3); that the Explanation was enacted from
the standpoint whether the sales were outside or inside and article 286(2) from the standpoint whether
they were in the course of inter-State trade or intraState trade, and that the purpose and the policy of
the two provi~ions being different, their subject-matter
mmt he held to be different and that therefore the
maxim was inapplicable.
I see no force in this contention. It is a cardinal
rule of construction that when there are in a Statute
two provisions which are in conflict with each other
such that both of them cannot ~tand, they should, if
possible, be so interpreted that effect can be given to
both, and that a construction which renders either of
them inopera,tive and useless should not be adopted
except in the last resort. Th~ is what is known as
the rule of harmonious construction. One application
of this rule is that when there is a law generally dealing with a subject and another dealing particularly
with one of the topics comprised therein, the general
law is to be construed as yielding to the special in
(I) [l953J ~.C.R. 1069.
'1955
The Bengul
Immunity
Compa:p Limittd
v.
The State of Bi!w
and others
Venkatarmnri
A_Y.Yar J.
792
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1955)
respect of the matters comprised therein. Now, the
reason of the rule requires that it should apply when~
1
~';::,~~f;
ever there is overlapping of the fields occupied by two
Company Limited conflicting enactments, and when that is shown; it
v.
would not be logical to exclude its application on the
The State of Bihar ground that the enactments have been made with a
an.I others
different purpose. It is the identity of the subjectVenkatarama
matter of the conflicting provisions, not the identity
Ayyar J.
of their purpose or angle of vision that is essential
for the application of the maxim. No authority was
cited for limiting it in the manner contended for by the
appellant. Now, it is the appellant's own contention
that t_he sales covered by the Explanation are within
the purview of article 286(1)(a), and are· therefore
exempt from taxation thereunder, and that such
taxation would be permissible only when the hold of
article 286(2) over the Explanation is removed by
Parliamentary legislation under that sub-clause. That
is to say, the subject-matter of the Explanation is ·
within the coverage of article 286(2), and that the
two provisions are directly in conflict. It is difficult to
see how consistently with this stand the appellant
could· resist the application of the maxim aforesaid.
It is true that Bhagwati, J. who took that view in
The State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India)
Ltd.(') !las now retreated from that position. But
with respect, there is irrefragable logic in his reasoning in that decision, and that com~ends itself to me.
· Then, there is the third view thatthesalestowhich
the Explanation applies are' in the course of interState trade, and therefore fall within the purview of
article 286(2), and that in consequence, the power of
the delivery State to tax those sales is incapable of
exercise, as it is within the prohibition contained in
that article, and that when the Parliament enacts a
· · Jaw in terms of article 286(2) lifting the ban thereunder, then and not until then could the Explanation
have any operation. That was the view expressed by
Bose, J. in The State of Bombay v. The United :Motors
(India). Ltd.(') and by Das, J. in State of Trai-ancoreCochin v. Shanmugha Vilas Cashew Nut Factory(').
1955
· 11> (1963) s.c.11. 1069.
m r195!) s.0.11. 63,
A..
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
793
Briefly, according to this view article 286(2) controls
the
Explanation. Can this be sustained on the
language of the enactment? The Explanation is not
expressed to be subject to article 286(2). Nor does
the latter contain the words "notwithstanding . anything contained in the Exptanation to article 286(1)
(a)". These are simple and familiar expressions used
by the legislature when it intends that a particular
provision in the Statute should be subject to or override another. Nor is there anything in the language
of the Explanation providing that its operation is
not to be in praesenti but contingent on Parliamentary legislation under article 286(2). To construe,
therefore, article 286(2) as controlling the Explanation, we must import into the Statute words which
are not there and thereby cut down the operation of
the Explanation which on its terms is of equal authority and potency with article 286(2).
There being nothing express in the language of the
enactment to lead to the conclusion that the Explanation is controlled by article 286(2), it has to be
seen whether that conclusion can be drawn on a construction of the relevant provisions of the Statute.
The appellant argues that it can be, and relies firstly
on the saving clause in article 286(2), and secondly,
on the proviso ·thereto as supporting it. The argument based on the saving clause may thus be stated :
The contention that article 286(2) controls the Explanation would have resulted in rendering the latter
wholly nugatory, if the words "except in so far as
Parliament may by law otherwise provide" had not
been there. But that result is avoided by the saving
clause under which the Explanation can come into
operation when there is Parliamentary legislation
lifting the ban under article 286(2). This construction, it is argued, gives effect to the plain language
of the article and also to both the provisions. But
when examined, it will be seen that far from giving
effect to both the Explanation and article 286(2),
this construction results in destroying one or the
other of them. The harmonious construction which
the law favours is one which gives operation to both
13-64 S. C. lndia/59
1955
The Bengal
lmmuniry
Company Limited
v.
Thi State of Bihar
and others
VenkaJarama
Ayyar J.
794
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
the provisions at the same time but in their respective
spheres. But according to the appellant,
The Bengal
if article 286(2) is in force then the Explanation canImmunity
Company Limited
not operate, and if the Explanation is to operate, it
v.
can only be if the Parliament puts an end to article
The State of Bihar
and others
286(2) by legislation th~eunder. This construction,
far from reconciling the two provisions and giving
Venkatarama
Ayyar J.
operation to both of them, renders them uncompromisingly hostile, and makes their co-existence and cooperation impossible.
It is also open to question whether the saving
clause could be referred to for the purposes of determining the respective spheres· of operation of the Explanation and the body of article 286(2). The scope
of a saving clause or an exception is that it operates
within the area covered by the main provision on
which it is engrafted. It cannot add to it though,
when in force, it can detract from it. It would, therefore, be inadmissible for enlarging what woul<l
otherwise be the sphere in which article 286(2) would
operate. If the view that article 286(2) controls the
Explanation cannot be maintained on a construction
of the body of article 286(2) and the Explanation, it
cannot properly be adopted on the strength of the
saving clause annexed thereto.
There was considerable discussion before us as to
the nature and scope of the law that could be enacted
under article 286(2). It must be confessed that the
matter is not free from doubts and difficulties. But
about one thing, there can be no dispute. The law
to be enacted by Parliament cannot run counter to
any of the provisions of the Constitution. Thus, it
cannot itself impose a tax on sales, that being within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the States under Entry
54 in List II. Nor can it confer a power to tax a sale
in the course of inter-State commerce on any State
of its own choice in contravention of the Explanation
to article 286(1) (a). Its operation can only be negative. It can lift the ban imposed by article 286(2). It
. was suggested for the appellant that it can do that
as regards particular commodities or with reference
to particular States, and that further in so limiting
1955
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
795
the operation it could enact suitable provisions
for an equitable adjustment of the interests of all the
States. But laws limited in their operation to specified commodities and States must in their very nature,
be temporary legislation to be withdrawn and reenacted from time to time suitable to the everchanging conditions of inter-State trade and commerce. If that was the sort of legislation that the
Constitution-makers had in mind, one would have expected that the authority contemplated by article 307
would have been empowered to deal not merely with
the matters mentioned in articles 301 to 304 but also
article 286(2), and it is also not a little surprising that
no legislation should have been enacted on those lines
during all these years. In any event, it must be a
profitless task to speculate on the scope and effect of
a hypothetical legislation under article 286(2), and it
would be unsafe to base any conclusion as to the true
scope of the' Explanation on the existence of a power
in the Parliament to enact a law under article 286(2).
The contention based on the proviso to article
286(2) must now be considered. It was argued that
while the proviso is to have operation notwithstanding anything contained in article 286(2) it does not
similarly override article 286(1)(a) and that therefore
when the President issued an order under that proviso, the Explanation would have operation, and that
therefore it was not useless. To this contention, there
are two answers: (1) An order issued by the President
under the proviso can operate only to continue existing taxes. It cannot go further, and authorise the
imposition of a tax even when the conditions mentioned in the Explanation are satisfied, if, in fact, it
had not been previously collected. Therefore, the
Explanation can have no practical effect on the operation of the proviso. If, in fact, a delivery State had
been levying a . tax before the commencement of the
Constitution, that would continue to be valid under
the proviso, not by the operation of the Explanation
but by reason of the fact that it had been levied
before. Thus, the Explanation as such has no operation. (2) It should also be mentioned that prior to
1955
The Bengal
Immunity
Company Limited
v.
TM-State of Bihar
and others
Venkalarama
Ayyar ].
796
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
the Constitution no State was actually levying a tax
on
the basis of delivery and therefore the ExplanaThe Bengal
Immunity
tion could have no practical effect even when the
Company Limited
President made the order. The Constitution-makers
v.
The State of Bihar
presumably had before them the sales tax legislation
and others
of all the States, and it is a legitimate inference that
Venkaturama
they could not have thought of the Explanation as
AYJ'OT J.
deriving any force or operation by reason of an order
of the President under the proviso.
Mr. Taifad Subramanya Iyer, counsel for M. K.
Kuriakose, one of the intervene.rs, arguing in support
of the contention of the appellant that article 286(2)
is the controlling provision, suggested a third category
of cases wherein the Explanation could operate apart
from a law under the saving clause in article 286(2)
or the order of the President under the proviso thereto. His argument was this : Suppose that both the
seller and the purchaser are in State 'A' and the goods
are located in State 'B'. The instrument of sale is
executed in State A, and pursuant thereto, the purchaser gets actual delivery of the goods in State B·
Article 286(2) has no application to the sale as there
is no inter-State movement of goods thereunder. But
for the Explanation, State A would have been entitled
to tax the sale as it was inside that State. But the
Explanation bars it, and confers on State B the right
to tax it. This, it is contended, gives operation to
the Explanation consistently with the view that it is
controlled by article 286(2). The assumption underlying this argument is that the property in the goods
passed in State A when the instrument of sale was
executed, though the goods were then located in
State B. But this is not correct. It is one thing to
say that title to the goods passes at the time when
the instrument of sale was executed and quite a different thing to state that it passes at the place where
it is executed. Considering the matter with particular
reference to the power of a State to impose tax, sale
is a practical conception havil)g relatioµ to the right
to enjoy and dispose of the goods, and it is a wellsettled feature of all sales.-tax legislation that the
power to tax the sale is annexed to the place where
1955
2 S.C.R.
797
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
the goods are located at the time of the contract.
Under the general law also, the position is that title
to the goods passes in the State in which the goods
are situated at the time of the de. In Badische
Anilin Und Soda Fabrik v. Hickson( 1 ), there was a
contract of sale signed by both the parties in England
with reference to goods situated in Switzerland. The
action was laid in England for breach of patent, and
the point for decision was whether it was maintainable tliere. It wou}d have been maintainable there
if the sale was in England but not if it was in Switzerland. It was held by the House of Lords that the
sale was ,not in England, and that the action did not
lie. The position in law was thus stated by Lord
Loreburn, L. C. at page 421 :
"As I understood him, Mr. Cripps argued that
the defendant had 'vended' these goods in England
within · the terms of the patent. He admitted that
merely to make a contract of sale would not be 'vendi!'lg' or, to use a word in sense equivalent and in use
more familiar, selling. But he maintained that if the
contract to sell was made in England, and, in pursuance of it goods were, by the consent of buyer and
seller, appropriated to meet the contract, then the
transaction became a sale completed in England, and
that it did not signify whether the goods were at the
time of such appropriation in England or abroad.
I cannot accept that view. A contract to sell
unascertained goods is not a complete sale, but a promise to sell. There must be added to it some act
which completes the sale, such as delivery or the
appropriation of specific goods to the contract . by the
assent, express or implied, of both buyer and seller.
Such appropriation will convert the executory agreement into a complete sale.
•
In my opm1on, if you must decide in what country
an appropriation of goods by consent takes place, it
takes place not where the consent is given, but where the
goods are at the time situate".
(1){1906]A.C. 419•.
1955
The Bengal
lmmuniry
Company Limited
v.
The State of Bihar
and others
Venkatarama
Ayyar J.
798
1955
Tht Bengal
Immuhit)
Compahy Limited
V•
Tht State of Bihar
and others
Venkatarama
AyyaT J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
In view of these observations, it cannot be contended
that the title to th~ goods passed in State A and that
State B gets the right to tax by reason of the Explanation. State B gets the power to tax the sale not
under the Explanation but under the general law.
This contention, it should be noted, has reference to
cases which ex hypothesi are outside article 286(2),
and has on! y an indirect bearing on the question
whether article 286(2) controls the Explanation.
It is necessary now to refer to the arguments
addressed by both parties based on what were stated
to be the broad principles underlying the Constitution
and on - considerations of hardship or inconvenience
arising from one vie~ or the other. It was argued
for the appellant that the intention of the Constitution-makers as disclosed in article 301 was to encourage the free flow of trade and commerce within the
Union unimpeded and unobstructed by State legislation, that article 286(2) was enacted in furtherance of
that policy, as taxation by the States might become
so heavy as to become burdensome to inter-State commerce; that the normal situation envisaged by that
article was, therefore, that no tax should be levied on
sales in the course of inter-State trade, power being
reserved in Parliament to intervene in appropriate
cases and that consistently with this policy, article
286(2) should 'be construed as the controlling provision and the Explanation as an emergency reserve.
The reply of the respondent was that the intention of
the Constitution as expressed in article 286(1)(a) was
to avoid multiple taxation of sales in the course of
inter-State trade, and not to free them from any taxation, that the Constitution did contemplate the levy
of one tax on every sale, and that the construction of
the appellant, if accepted, .must place local sales in a
greatly disadvantageous situation as against sales in
the coui:_se of inter-State trade, and that must result
in driving out local trade and business across the
borders of the Statx.
The appellant is undoubtedly right in his contention that the Constitution intended trade ahd · commerce within the Union to be free. But the question
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
is whether that requires that there . should be no tax
at all at any stage even when the goods have come to
the end of their journey as a result of sale. That
clearly is not the law in America where inter-State
commerce is highly developed and jealously protected.
That the Constitution did contemplate one tax on a
sale in the course of inter-State trade when it is for
local consumption is clear from the Explanation. To
argue that freedom from taxation under article 286(2)
is the normal condition, and that taxation under the
Explanation is an exception is to beg the very question that we have got to decide. No other provisions
of the Constitution have beeri cited as expressive of
that intention. On the other hand, such indication
as there is, tends in the opposite direction. Article
304(a) which is an exception to article 301 authorises
the imposition of a tax on imported goods when similar
goods locally manufactured are subject to a State tax
provided that such imposition is not discriminatory.
It is true, as contended by the learned AttorneyGeneral, that under article 304(a) the ta.x is levied on
the goods whereas under article 286(2) it is laid on the
transaction of buying and selling. But on a question
of policy, what difference would it make whether the
tax is imposed on the transaction of sale or on the
import of goods, as in either case it must fall on the
consumers? That clearly is the reasoning of the majority of the learned Judges in The State of Bombay v.
The United Motors (India) Ltd.(1), and there has been
no satisfactory answer to it by the appellant.
On the other hand, article 304(a) lends considerable support to the contention of the respondent that
it could not have been the intention of the Constitution to place local sales in a worse position than sales
in the course of inter-State commerce, which must be
the result of holding that sales in the course of interState trade are immune from taxation under article
286(2), while intra-State sales are liable to be taxed
under Entry 54. What reason or justice can there be for
making a local purchaser of goods pay a higher price
therefor than what a purchaser of the same goods
(I) [ 1953] S.C.R. I069, I 088.
1955
Tlie Bengal
Immunity
Company Limited
v.
The State of Bihar
and others
Venkataraina
Ayyar J.
800
1955
The Bengal
lmmunily
Company Limited
v.
T1" Slate of Bihar
and others
Venkatarama
Ayyar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
across the State line would have to pay? The only
answer that was suggested was that the State might
refrain from taxing even intra-State sales of those
commodities which are the subject-matter of interState trade. Seeing that inter-State trade is happily
an expanding factor ,in national life, and that it tends
to comprehend an increasing variety of goods, there
will be left, if the suggestion of the appellant is to be
followed, very few commodities which the State could
tax, and Entry 54 might as well be effeced from out
of the Constitution. There is, besides, the apprehension expressed by the respondent-and it cannot be
brushed aside as fanciful-that if the contention put
forward by the appellant is accepted, then it must inevitably result in local trade shifting on to adjacent
States. If the scheme of the Constitution is, as I conceive it to be, to put both intra-State sales and sales
in the course of inter-State trade on the same footing
-and that is manifest on the language of article 301
-it must follow that as the former are liable to be
taxed under Entry 54, the latter should also be s1m1larly liable to be taxed, and that is precisely what
the Explanation provides for.
It was next argued for the appellant that the view
that under the Explanation delivery States would
be entitled to tax all sales in the course of inter-State
trade if goods are delivered for consumption there,
would render sellers liable to be taxed in all the States
in which their goods are sold, and that would subject
them to a perplexing multitude of assessment proceedings in several States and that that must cause great
inconvenience and hardship in business circles. Our
attention was also .invited to the provisions of the
impugned Act relating to assessment and collection
of tax, and it was contended that they must result
in considerable harassment of the assessees. As
against this, the respondent contended that the sellers
had really no grievance in the matter as the tax
would be ultimately pa.id by the consumers, and that,
on the other hand, if the contention of the appellant
were to be accepted, the States would have to lose
a substantial portion of the revenue derived from
'
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
801
1955
sales tax and that must seriously affect their economy.
It must be conceded that in the view that the
Thi Bengal
Immunity
Explanation authorises the imposition of tax on all
Company Limited
sales in the course of inter-State trade falling within
v.
its purview, non-resident sellers will be liable to be The Stale of Bihar
and others
taxed in every State in which the goods ai;-e sold for
consumption, and that they must in consequence be
Venkatarama
Ayyar J.
exposed to multiple assessment proceedings in different
jurisdictions and that that must cause inconvenience.
But then, that is necessarily inherent in the Explanation whether it operates when the ban under article 286(2) is lifted by Parliamentary legislation as contended for by the appellant, or even without such law,
as the respondent maintains. That does not, therefore, appear to be very material in construing the
scope of the Explanation. The right which residents
of one State have to trade freely in other States is one
conferred by article 301 and is a creature of the Constitution,. and when the same Constitution provides
for taxation of sales in the course of inter-State trade
by the Explanation to article 286(1)(a), and the inconvenience complained of results from that proYision
and is incidental to its enforcement, it does not sound
logical that the sellers should, while electing to take
the benefit under article 301, disclaim their obligations
under the Explanatiollr
The point of substance against the appellant is that
the sellers are not the persons really affected, as the
incidence of taxation will ultimately fall on the consumers. The Explanation applies to goods delivered
for consumption within the State, and the tax imposed on the sale of such goods is really a tax laid on
the purchasers for consumption.
It might happen
that such purchasers are numerous and scattered all
over the State, and that must be so when the goods
sold are, as in the present case, medicines. The power
to tax in such a case can be effectively exercised only .
through the seller. No administrative machinery can
succeed in reaching the consumers when th~ir name
is legion, and as the seller is merely to pass on the
tax to the consumer, he is, in fact, constituted collector of the tax on behalf of the State. This is the
802
1955
The Bengal
Immunity
Campany Limil<d
v.
The Stale •f Bih!W
and others
Venkatarama
Ayyar ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
practice largely adopted in America in the collection
of Use Tax, and its validity has been repeatedly
affirmed. A recent decision on the question is that
in General Trading Co. v. State Tax Commi1sion of the
State of Iowa('). There, the State of Iowa imposed a
Use Tax on a foreign Company in respect of goods
distributed by it for consumption within the State.
In upholding the tax, Frankfurter, J. observed:
"To make the distributor the tax collector for the
State is a familiar and sanctioned device. M onamotor
Oil Co. v. fohnson( 2 ), Felt & T. Mfg. Co. v.
Gallagher(")".
It was. argued by the appellant that in the above
case, the foreign Company was "a retailer maintaining· a place of business" within the State. But as the
tax in question was not a sale-tax but a use tax payable by the purchaser, ·it would be wholly irrelevant
whether the distributor had a place of business within the State, and that indeed is what is stated in the
judgment itself.
Even looking at the matter from the practical standpoint, it is easy to exaggerate the inconvenience which
the Explanation might cause. If sellers have trade
and commerce all over the . States, theirs must undoubtedly be a big business. That means that they
would have, for the purpose of the business, adequate
clerical
establishment-accountants,
correspondence
clerks and so forth.
Regular account books would
be maintained showing the dispatch of goods to dealers
and purchasers in other States. And thus, all the
materials on which retnrns have to be made would be
already there. The additional burden will consist in
this that in posting the entries in the ledger accounts, .
separate folios will have to be opened for the several
States. This is no doubt additional work thrown on
the sellers, but viewed in its true perspective, it is
too unsubstantial to deny the States a substantive
power to tax.
It is said that there would be considerable harassment of the sellers under the provisions of the impugned Act. But why should there
(1) 332 U.S. 335; 88 L. Ed. 1309•.
(2) 292 U.S. 86; 78 L. Ed. 1141, 1147, 1148.
(3) 306 U.S. 62; 82 L.Ed.488.
•
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
003
be? It must be presumed that sales-tax officers will
do nothing unfair or oppressive, and the c,orrespondence between the parties preceding the proceedings
shows a just and sympathetic attitude on the part of
the respondent. True, some of the provisions of the
Act are of a stringent character.
But they have
terrors only for those who would evade and avoid
tax, and persons like the appellant doing big business
of an all-India character and maintaining regular and
correct accounts have nothing to fear from them.
Now, let us look at the other side of the picture.
Prior to the Constitution, the States had the power
to tax even sales in the course of inter-State trade
and commerce, and it is stated that a substantial portion of their revenue was derived from this source.
The Constitution enacted article 286(1)(a) with a view
to avoid multiple taxation of sales in the course of
inter-State trade, and it is the contention of the respondent that the Explanation on its true interpretation provides for a single taxation of those sales, at
the stage of consumption. If the contention of the
appellant as to the scope of the Explanation and of
article 286(2) is accepted, this tax could not be levied
after the 31st March 1951, and the States would have
lost a substantial source of revenue.
\Vhat is the
substitute that the Constitution has provided therefor?
None. In the result, there must be, as argued by the
respondent, a financial crisis in the affairs of the
States.
The position, therefore, is that we have to
choose between depriving the States of their power to
impose a tax on which their very existence depends,
and exposing the sellers having business outside their
State to the inconvenience of multiple assessment
proceedings. In that situation, can there be any doubt
as to what . our decision should be? Surely, the claim
of the State should have precedence over that of
individuals. It is very significant that all the States
which have intervened have, with one exception,
strongly supported the stand of the respondents. That
e;i:ception is the State of West Bengal. The learned
Attorney-General appearing for this State did not
contend for any right in it to· tax the sales. His argu-
1955
The Bengdl
lmmrinit)
Company Limited
v.
The State of Bihar
and others
Venkatarama
Ayjar ].
804
1955
The Bengal
Immunity
Company Limited
v.
Tht St~tt (If Bihar
and others
Venkatarama
Ayyar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
ment · was that neither West Bengal nor Bihar was
entitled to tax by reason of artide 286(2). The intervention of West Bengal is, therefore, not for protecting its rights but for the vindication of the law, as it
conceives it to be.
It was suggested for the appellant that the · solutiop
to the problem lay in the Centre taking ·over the
subject of tax on sales in the course of inter-State
trade, provision being made for distribution of the
receipts among the States under . article 269 after
making the necessary amendments to the Constitution.
Our duty is to construe the provisions as they stand
and not to discuss questions of policy which it is for
the Legislature to decide; and if I examine the
suggestion of the appellant, it is only for the purpose
of finding out what light it throws on the present
controversy, and how far it will be an improvement on
the present position under the Constitution. Under
Entry 48 in List II of the Government of India Act,
1935, the States had the power to impose tax on sale
of goods and advertisements. When dealing with this
topic,
the Constitution-makers took over advertisement of newspapers to the Union List, the residue
being left to the States. Thus, the decision to entrust
the power to tax sales to the States was deliberate,
and there is good reason for it. Sales might take place
either in the course of inter-State trade or the intraState. There can be no question of the Centre taking
over taxation of intra-State sales. To confer a power
on the Centre to tax sales in the course of inter-State
trade alone would be to dichotomise the power to
impose sales tax and distribute it between the States
and the Centre. For such a course, there does not
appear to be any precedent, anywhere, and the practical inconvenience attendant thereon is obvious.
·Moreover, let us assume that the Centre takes over
the taxation of sales in the course of inter-State trade.
What difference will it make in the present position?
So far as sellers are concerned, they will have to submit
one consolidated statement of all the sales outside
their State instead· of splitting them according to the
States in which the sales are effected, and there will
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
805
he a single assessment proceeding instead of as many
as the States where the sales take place. That would
no doubt avoid much of inconvenience. But, so far
as the burden of taxation on the sellers is concerned,
the position would be exactly what it is now. And
on what principle is the Centre to distribute the tax
realisations among the States? It can only be on the
basis of receipts from the several States. And there
is justice in each State claiming what is realised
from the consumers resident within its territory.
That is precisely the scope of the consumption tax
under the Explanation. Thus, the suggestion of the
appellant, if acted upon, will not relieve it from the
liability to be taxed; it will only reduce the assessment proceedings from many to one. In other words,
the relief will be with reference not to substantive
rights. but to a matter of procedure. But the contention of the appellant that article 286(2) controls the
Explanation is directed not against the procedure in
the assessment of tax, but against the very liability
to be assessed to it, the argumentum ab inconvenienti
being availed of as a ground for denying it. The
suggestion, therefore, that the taxation of sales in the
course of inter-State trade should be left to the Centre
lacks substance. Even with reference to the inconvenience that might result from the multiplicity of
::is~essment proceedings, it is one which is capable of
being removed without disturbing the existing scheme
of the Constitution, by Parliament enacting a law
constituting an authority under article 307 and conferring on it power to receive from the sellers one consolidated statement of all their sales outside their
State and determining the precise extent thereof effected in the several States and making that determination
final for purposes of assessment by the States. That
would, on the one hand, secure to the States the
finance legitimately due to them under the Explanation, and at the same time, save the sellers from the
harassment of multiplicity of proceedings. Such a law
cannot be impugned as trespassing on the exclusive
domain of the States to impose sales tax under Entry
54, as the authority to impose the tax would continue
1955
Tl« Bengal
Immuniry
Company Limited
v.
The State of Bih ar
and others
Venkatarama
Ayyar ].
806
1955
The Bengal
Immunity
Company Limited
v.
The State of Bihar
and others
Venkatarama
Ayyar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
to be the States. It is the law of the several States
that will determine the conditions under which, and
the rate at which, the tax will be chargeable. It is
the machinery set up by the States that will make the
assessment and collect the taxes, and these realisatiojls will find their way into the coffers of the States.
The effect of the Act would be only to enact a rule of
evidence, on which the ;tssessing authorities have to
act. Such a law would not conflict with any of the
provisions of the Constitution. It is scarcely necessary to add that this suggestion is only by way of
answer to the one put forward by the appellant, and
even if there · are Constitutional difficulties in the way
of acting on it, that would not affect the decision of
this appeal, which must turn on the provisions of the
Constitution as they stand.
Having carefully considered the arguments addressed by the learned counsel appearing for the parties to the appeal and for the interveners, I am clearly
of opinion that the sales falling within the Explanation are, by reason of the fiction enacted therein, intraState sales, that accordingly they fall outside the
ambit of article 286(2) and are unaffected by the
prohibition contained · therein. In coming to this conclusion, I have considered the question afresh and on
its own merits as if it were res integra. But, in fact,
it is concluded by the decision of this Court in The
State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd.(')
to which reference has been made in the course of the
discussion. It is conceded that if this decision is to
govern, then this point would have to be found against
the appellant. But it is contended that it is erroneous
and should not be followed. That raises the question whether this Court has the power to reconsider
a previous judgment given by it on the identical issue.
As the point arises for decision for the first time before this Court, and as our pronouncement thereon
must be of the highest importance, we have heard
arguments as to what the practice is in the highest
judicial tribunals of other countries with reference to
this matter.
(I) f1QS3J s.~a. 1Qli9.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
807
In Street Tramways v. London County Council(1),
it was held by the House of Lords that its decision on
a question of law was conclusive and binding on the
House in subsequent cases and that if it was erroneous, it could be set right only by an Act of Parliament. The practice before the Privy Council however
has been different. In Ridsdale v. Clifton( 2 ), Lord
Cairns dealing with this question observed as follows :
"In the case of decisions of final Courts of appeal
on questions of law affecting civil rights, especially
rights of property, there are strong reasons for holding the decisions, as a general rule, to be final as to
third parties. The law as to rights of property in this
country is to a great extent based upon and formed
by such decisions. When once arrived at, these decisions become elements in the composition of the law,
and the dealings of mankind are based upon a reliance
on such decisions.
Even as to such decisions it would perhaps be
difficult to say that they were, as to third parties,
under all circumstances and in all cases absolutely
final, but they certainly ought not to be reopened without the very greatest hesitation".
The case before the Board was one involving questions
of ecclesiastical law, and it was held that in such
cases their Lordships were free to examine for themselves the reason on which the prior decision rested
and to decide on their own view of the matter. The
authorities bearing on this question were reviewed by
the Privy Council at some length in Re : Transferred
Civil Servants (Ireland) Compensation( 3 ), and the
result was thus summed up :
"There is no inherent incompetency in ordering
a rehearing of a case already decided by the Board,
even when a question of a right of property is involved, but such an indulgence will be granted in very
exceptional circumstances only. It is of the nature
of an extraordinarium remedium".
This opinion was reiterated in Attorney-General of
Ontario v. Cattada Temperance Federa1ion( •) wherein
Viscount Simon said :
(1) [1898] A.C. 375.
(3) [1929] A.C. 242.
(2) [1877] 2 P.D. 276.
(4) A.I.R. J946"P.C. 88.
1955
The Bengal
Immunity
Compa'!)I Limited
v.
The State of Bihar
and others
Venkatarama
Ayyar ].
808
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
"Their Lordships do not doubt that m tendering
humble
advice to His Majesty they are not absolutely
The Bengal
lmmuniry
bound by previous decisions of the Board, as is the
Company Limited
House of Lords by its own judgments. In ecclesiv.
Tht State of Bihar
astical appeals, for instance, on more than one occaand others
sion. the Board has tendered advice contrary to that
Venk~crama
given in a previous case, which further historical
Ayyar J.
research has shown to have been wrong. But on constitutional questions it must be seldom indeed that
the Board would depart from a previous decision
which it may be assumed will have acted upon both
by Government and subjects".
Thus, the practice of the Privy Council has been to
recognise a power to reconsider its previous decisions, but it is exercised only in exceptional circumstances. In Jame.< v. Commonwealth(') the High Court
of Australia has ruled that it has the power to examine the correctness of its previous decisions. The
practice of the Supreme Court of America is that it
has considered itself free to reconsider its previous
decisions especially when they relate to questions of
constitutional law. (Vide Willoughby on Constitutional Law, Vol. I, pages 74 and 75 and the cases
cited there). The reason given for this view is that
while errors of law not bearing on constitutional provisions could be corrected by ordinary process of
legislatior., an error on a question of constitutional
law could he set right only by resort to the dilatory
and cumbersome machinery of amendng the Constitution. (Vide Smith v. Al/right(') ). This reasoning
will also be applicable to decisions involving interpretation of our Constitution .. It was argued for the
respondents that article 141 gives the decisions of
this Court the status of law, and that, therefore, if
they are to be changed that could be only by process
of legislation. Article 141 only enacts that the decisions of this Court are binding on all courts, and that
does not stand in the way of this Court itself, reversing or modifying a previous decision, as when that is
done, such decision would thereafter become itself the
law under that article. There is, therefore, good
1955
(1) 18 C.L.R. 54.
(2) 321 U.S. 659:·88I.. Ed. 987.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
809
reason for holding that this Court has the power to
reconsider, m appropriate cases, a previous decision
given by it.
The question then arises as to the principles on
which and the limits within which this power should
be exercised. It is of course not possible to enumerate
them exhaustively, nor is it even desirable that they
shoulJ be crystallised into rigid and inflexible rules.
But oqe principle stands out prominently above the
rest, and that is that in general, there should be finalitv in the decisions of the highest courts in the land,
an·d that is for the benefit :.mJ protection of the public. In this connection, it is necessary to bear in mind
that next to legislative enactments, it is decisions of
Courts that form the most important source of law.
It is on the faith of decisions that rights are acquired
and obligations incurred. and States and subjects
alike shape their course of action. It must greatly
impa·ir the value of the decisions of this Court, if the
notion c:ime to be entertai1,,:d that there was nothing
certain or final about them, which must be the conseq uencc if the points decided therein came to be reconsidered on the merits every time they were raised.
It should be noted that though the Privy Council has
repeatedly declared that it has the power to reconsider its decisions, in fact, no instance has been
quoted in which it cfid actually reverse its previous
decision except in ecclesiastical cases. If that is
the correct pos1t10n, then the power to reconsider
1s
one which should be exercised very sparingly
and only in exceptional circumstances,
such as
when a material provision of law had been overlooked, or where a fundamental asmmption on
which the decision is based turns out to be mistaken.
In the present case, it 1s not suggested
that in deciding the question of law as they did in
Tlze State of Bombff\1 v. The United Motors (India)
Ltd.(1) the learned Judges ignored any material provisions of law, or were under any misapprehension as
to a matter fundamental to the decision. The arguments for the appellant before us, were in fact only a
(I) (1953] S.C.R. 1069.
14-8-1 S. C.Ir.dia/59
1955
"I he Bengal
Immunity
Compan_v Limited
v.
The State onBihat'
and others
Vm/r:atarama
Ayyar ].
SIO
1955
The Bengal
Immunity
Company Limited
v.
The State of Bihnr
and oth~s
Venkatarama
Ayyar ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ri9ss J
repet1t1on of the very contentions which were urg<d
before the learned Judges and negatived by them.
The question ·then resolves itself to this. Can we
differ from a previous decision of his Court, because
a view contrary to the one taken therein appears to
be preferable? I would unhesitatingly answer it in
the negative, not. because the view previously taken
must necessarilv be infallible but because it is important in public. interest that the law declared should
be certain· and final rather than that it should be
declared in one sense or the other. That, I conceive,
is the reason behind article 14 L There are questions
of law on which it is not possible to avoid difference
of opinion, and the present case is itself a signal
example of it. The object of article 141 is that the
decisions of this Court on these questions should settle
the controversy, and that they should be followed as
law by all the Courts, and if they are allowed to be
reopened because a different view appears to be the
better one, then the very purpose with which articl~
141 has been enacted will be defeated, and the prospect will have been opened of litiirants sub1ecting our
decisions to . a continuous process of attack before
successive Benches in the hope that with changes in
the personnel of the Court \vhich time must inevitably bring, a different view might find acceptance. l
can imagine nothing more damaging to the prestige
of this Court or to the value of its pronouncements.
In fames v. Commonu•ealth(' ), it was observed that a
question settled by a previous decision should not be
allowed to be reopened "upon a mere suggestion that
some or all of the Members of the later Court might
arrive at a different conclusion if the matter was re.<
integra. Otherwise, there would he grave danger of
want of continuity in the interpretation of the law"
(per Griffiths, C.J. at page 58). It is for this reason
that article 141 invests decisions of this Court with
special authority, but the weight of that authority
can only be what we ourselves give to it.
It was suggested as a ground for reconsidering the
correctness of the decision in The State of Bombay v.
(I) 18 C.L.~. 54.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
811
The United Motors (India) Ltd.(') that it had caused
great hardship to the business world. I h:::ve already
held that there is not much of substance in this complaint. On the other llJnd, acting on the view that
the Explanati0i1 confers on the delivery States power
to tax the sales, several States amended their Sales
Tax Acts in 1951 by inserting appropriate prov1s10ns
and it is represented before us that for some y"ars,
taxes have been collected by the States on the basis
of these provisions. If we are now to hold th:tt the
view taken in T lze State of Bombay v. The U 11ited Motors
(India) Ltd.(') is erroneous, the consequences will be
to render the amended pro,·isions inoperative and the
collections of taxes made thereunder illegal. The
States will then be not merely powerless to tax sales
falling within the Explat13tion in future, but will have
actually to refund whatever they might have collected
in the past. I can see no end to the chaos, confusion
am\ trouble that must ensue on such a decision'-a
situation that can be retrieved only by Parliament
removing article 286(2) out of the scene with retrospective operation, and all this, to benefit not the consumers who are the persons really affected but the
sellers who are only statutory middlemen for collection, some of whom are stated to have collected sales
tax from purchasers outside their States. I consider
it wholly inexpedient that our power of reconsideration should be exercised for that end. This, of course,
is apart from my conclusion that on a correct interpretation of the Explanation and artick 286(2). the
respondents have the power to tax. In the result,
this point must be held against the appellant.
4. I shall now consider the question urged by the
appellant that the Bihar Sales Tax Act is invalid on
the ground that it is extra-territorial in operation
and ultra vires the powers of the State Legislature.
The Comtitutional provisions bearing on this question are articles 245(1) and 246(3) which are as follows:
"245. ( 1) Subject to the provisions of
this Constitution, Parliament may make laws for the whole
or any part of the territory of India, and the Legis(ll [1953] S.C.R. 1069.
1955
The Btr,gal
lmmuniry
Cmnpan_1• Limited
v.
The State <f Bihar
and others
Venkalarama
.l!rr•r ].
812
1955
The Bengal
Immunity
Company Limited
v.
The State of Bihar
and others
Venkatarama
Ayyar ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
I 19551
lature of a State may make laws for the whole or any
part of the State.
246. (3) Subject to clauses (1) and (2), the
Legislature of any State specified in Part A or Part
B of the First Schedule has exclusive power to make
laws for such State or any part thereof with respect
to any of the matters enumerated in List II in the
Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as
the "State List")".
The contention of the appellant is that the words
"for the whole or any part of the State" in article
245(1) and "for such State or any part thereof with
respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II"
in article 246(3), impose a territorial limitation on the
jurisdiction of the State Legislature; that under these
provisions it can enact laws only for persons and properties within the State and that the provisions of . the
Act to the extent that they impose tax on sellers who
are outside the State are ultra vires. It was also contended that the impugned provisions were extra-territorial in their operation, and were beyond the competence of the State Legislature. The questions thus
raised are of great importance involving the determination of the nature and extent of the power which a
State has to make laws in respect of the matters
enumerated in List II.
It is necessary, to begin with, to define the precise
meaning of the words "extra-territorial operation".
A sovereign State has plenary jurisdiction to enact
laws for its own •erritory. Such laws may be in respect of persons within the territory whether citizens
or not, of property, immovable or movable, situated
within the State; or of acts and events which occur
within its borders. In Maxwell on Interpretation of
Statutes (10th Edn. p. 144) the law is thus stated :
"Primarily, the legislation of a country is territorial. The general rule is, that extra territorium jus
dicenti impune non paretur. The laws of a nation apply
to all its subjects and to all things and acts within its
territories".
In "Conflict of Laws-Restatement of the Law" by
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
813
the American Law Institute, the position is thus
summed up:
"47. A State has jurisdiction over a person :
(a) if he is within the territory of the State,
( b) if he is domiciled in the State although not
present there,
( c) if he has consented or subjected himself to
the exercise of jurisdiction over him either before or
after the exercise of jurisdiction.
48. An immovable thing is subject to the jurisdiction of the State within which it is.
49. A chattel is subject to the jurisdiction of. the
State within which it is.
56. A State has jurisdiction over all acts done or
events occurring within the territory of the State, and
over all failures to act in cases where there is a legal
duty to act within the State".
The legislation in respect of the above matters is
intra-territorial, notwithstanding that it might operate on persons residing outside the State. Thus, a
law of a State taking over the management of lands
of absentee-landlords must operate on owners who are
residing abroad. But in strictness, this is not extraterritorial legislation but legislation in respect of lands
within the State. Likewise, a law with reference to
acts or events which occur within the State is not
extra-territorial, though it might have to be enforced
against a person who is residing outside the State.
Such a law is one in respect of an act or event within
the State. These laws, though intra-territorial, are
often loosely described as extra-territorial in operation.
In this context the words "extra-territorial
operation" connote laws in respect of properties or
acts or events within a State but having impact or
operation on persons outside the State.
There is another sense in which these words are
used. When a State enacts a law with reference to
an act or event which takes place outside its territory, it is described as extra-territorial,_ and such
legislation is recognised as valid by rules of International Law where it is directed against its own
nationals and persons in its service. Thus, in "Con-
1955
Tht Btn~al
lmmunil)'
Company LimiUd
v.
Tht Stau of Bili•
and olhn"s
Ven,l;atarama
Ayyar ].
814
1955
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955J
llict of Laws-Restatement of Law" it is observed
that "a nation has jurisdiction over its nationals aJ..
Immunfty
though not present within the territorial limits of the
Company Limited
v.
nation". (Page 78). In Corpus Juris Secundum, extra17~ Stale Of Bihar
territoriality is defined as "the act by which a State
t1t1d othtr's
extends its jurisdiction beyond its own boundaries
Pmkatarama
into
the territory of another State'', and it is added
A>J"' J.
that "the almost self-evident proposition should perhaps also be noted in this connection that a sov"
ereignty has power to make laws regulating the conduct of its subjects, while beyond the limits of its
territorial jurisdiction". (Volume 15, pages 868-869)
"Extra-territorial Legislation", says Wheare, "simply
means legislation
which attaches significance for
courts within the jurisdiction to facts and events occurring outside the jurisdiction". (Statute of Westminster and Dominion Status by Wheare, 4th Edition, page 167). A typical illustration of this class
of legislation is furnished by section 4, Indian Penal
Code, which enacts that "the provisions of this. Code
apply also to any offence committed by( 1) any citizen of India in any place without ancl
beyond India;
· (2) any person on any ship or aircraft registered
in India wherever it may be.
Explanation : In this section the wore! 'offence'
includes every act committed outside (India) which,
if committed in (India) would be punishable under
this Code.
Illustration : A (who is a citizen of India) commits a murder in Uganda. He can be tried and convicted of murder in any place in (India) in which ·he
may be found".
In this connection, extra-territorial legislation means
a law of a State with reference to its own cmzens in
respect of acts or events which take place outside the
State. In discussing questions relating to extra-territorial operation, it is desirable that the two connotations of the words should be kept distinct and separate. As the impugned Act purports to tax sales
within its territory, its operation against persons who
are residing outside but in respect of sales within the
The &ngai
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
815
State is extra-territorial in the first sense, and it is
the validity of the provisions. of the Act in this sense
that this appeal is concerned with.
Now, the question is, can a State Legislature make
laws with extra-territorial operation in the sense
stated above? The appellant contends that it cannot,
and calls in aid observations and decisions of the
Privy Council with reference to the powers of a subordinate or colonial legislature to enact iaws with
extra-territorial operation. In Macleod v. AttorneyGeneral for New South Wales(1), the· point for decision
was whetht>r an Act of New South Wales conferred,
· on its true construction, jurisdiction on the Courts
within the Colony to try an offence of bigamy committed presumably by its national in America. In
construin!!' it as intended to apply to crimes committed within the state. Lord Halsbury, L.C. observed
tbat the jurisdiction of the colonies to enact laws was
confined within · their own territories'', and that "it
would have been beyond the jurisdiction of the
Colony" to enact a law in respect of a crime committed outside their territory.
These observations
rder to extra-territorial operation in the second sense
stated ah9ve, and have no application when the law
of the State is in respect of an act or event taking
place within its territories. In Commercial Cable
Company v. Attorney-Genern! of Newfoundland( 2 ), the
question was with reference to a law of Newfoundland imposing a tax on telephone companies in respect of cables landed or established in the Colony. In
disrn~sing the scope of these provisions, Lord Macn:tghtcn observed at page 826 :
"While, of course, it was competent to impose
taxation on cables within its territorial jurisdiction,
it was not competent for the Government to lay a
tax on cables outside its territorial jurisdiction".
These observations again have no bearing on the
point now under consideration whether a law enacted
in respect of an act or event occurring within the State
is incompetent, if it seeks to operate on a person concerned in the act but residing outside the State. In
(I) (!89l]A.C.455
('.:) [19 1 2] A.C. R20.
1955
The Bntgal
Immunity
Company pmilld
V;
Tire Stale of Bihm
and others
Venkatarama
Ayyar J.
816
1955
T hz Bengal
Immunity
Campany Limited
v.
Tire Slate of .Biliar
and Others
Vm/catarama
AY.J'OT J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
N adan v. The King('), the question was as to the
validity of section 1025 of the Criminal Code of the
Dominion of Canada which enacted that "no appeal
shall lie in criminal case to any authority in the
United Kingdom by way of appeal or petition to His
Majesty in Council". It was held by Viscount Cave,
L.C., that that section was repugnant to the Privy
Council Acts of 1833 and 1844, and was therefore void
under the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, and that
accordingly the appeal to I he Privy Council was competent. He also observed that however widely the powers
of the Dominion Parliament be construed, they were
confined to action to be taken in the Dominion, and
could not extend to annulling the prerogative right of
the King in Council to grant special leave to appeal. As
the law in question was in respect of crimes committed
within the State, these observations are capable of the
construction which the appellant seems to put on them
that such a law would be incompetent to the extent
that it is to have operation outside the State. But it
must be mentioned that the vires of the action to
be taken under the Act within the State itself was
affirmed in unqualified terms, and that is what we are
concerned with in this appeal. The question, however,
must now be taken to be settled by the decision in
Croft v. Sylvester Dunphy( 2 ). There, the question
related to the validity of sections 151 and 207 of the
Customs Act of Canada under which the officers of the
State were authorised to search ships within 12 miles
of the coast, and seize dutiable goods found in them,
the provisions being obviously intended to aid in the
effective collection of customs. There was no dispute
that the legislation was within the competence of the
Dominion Legislature,, customs being one of the
topics enumerated in section 91 of the British North
America Act, 1867, but the attack was on the validitv
of sections 151 and 207 on the ground that their op~
ration was extra-territorial. Thus, the question raised
is the very question which now arises for determination. In holding that the kgislation , was valid, Lord
Macmillan obsei:ved as follows :
(!) [1926] A.C. 482.
(2) [1933] A.C. 156.
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
817
"Once it is found that a particular topic of legislation is among those upon which the Dominion
P::.rliament may competently legislate as being for
the peace, order and good Government of Canada or
as bdng one of the specific subjects enumerated in section 9.1, British North America Act, their Lordships
see no reason to restrict the permitted scope of such
legislatiun by any other consideration than is applicable to lhe legislation of a fully Sovereigi1 State".
The law as settled by this decision may thus be stated:
Whether a subordinate Legislature has power to enact
laws with extra-territorial operation will depend on
the terms of the Constitution Act which creates it and
subject to any limitations contained therein, it has
1n . respect of the topics assigned to it powers of legislation as plenary as the Sovereign Legislature which
constitutes it.
It was argued by Mr. N. C. Chatterjee that subsequent to the decision in Croft v. Dunphy(1) the Privy
Council had again to consider in British Coal Corporation v. The King(2) the validity of a Canadian law
which had extra-territorial operation, and therein the
:grounds of the decision in Nadan v. The King(3) were
stated at page 516 with apparent approval, and that
though the legislation was held to be valid, it was
because of the Statute of Westminster, 1931, and that
in the absence of a similar statute for India, the Legislature of this country had only the limited powers
recognised in Nadan v. The King(3), and that extrallut there is
territorial legislation was incompetent.
nothing in the observations in British Coal Corporation v. The King(2) relied on by the appellant, to support the contention that the view expressed in
Nadan's case( 3 ) was adopted in preference to that
taken in Croft v. Dunphy( 1 ) ; in fact there was no
decision at all on this point. Nor does the fact that
the Statute of Westminster has conferred an express
power on the Colonial Legislature to enact laws with
extra-territorial operation affect the weight to be
:attached to the conclusions come to in Croft v. Dtm(1) [1933) A.C. 156.
(2) [!935] A.C. 500, 516.
(S) [1926] A.C. 482.
1955
The Bengal
Immunity
Company Limited
v.
The State of Bihar
and others
Vtnkatarama
4J>yar J.
818
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
1955
phy('), because they were reached, not with reference
to
the Statute of Westminister about the applicability
T l1e Ben,l!,al
lmmuni!J
of
which retrospectively to the case before the Boatd
Com/xmy Ltmi'trrl
there
was controversy, but on general principles, and
v.
Tht Stalt of Bihnr
what
is
more to the present case, it was the law as
and nlh".1
declared in Croft v. Dunphy(') that was before the
i 'enkatara111a
framers of the Constitution when they enacted 5c, ·
1h!:i1ar J.
tions 99 and 100 of the Government of India AC!,
1935.
Turning now to the Constitutiorul provi,ions under
the Indian law, this topic is dealt with in sections
99(1) and 100(3) of the Government of India Act. To
understand the precise scope of these provisions, it is
necessary to examine the position under the previous
C',onstitution Acts. Section 43 of the Charter Act,
1833 (3 and 4 Will. IV, Chap. 85) conferred power ou
the Governor-General in Council "to make laws and
regulations for all persons .............. and for all Courts
and for all places and things whatsoever within and
throughout the wlzole and every part of the said territory".
In the Government of India Act, 1915 (5 and 6 .Geo.
V, Ch. 61) the corresponding provisions was section
65(1) (a) which enacted that the Indian Legislatures
have the "power to make laws for all persons, for all
Courts and for all places and things within the British
India". Under these provisions, it cannot be doubted
that the Indian Legislatures would have had no jurisdiction to enact laws operating on persons who were
not within the Stat~,. a< that would be plainly opposed
to the limitation that they should be "for persons
within the territory'.'. Both section 43 of the Charter
Act, 1833 and section 65(1)(a) of the Government of
India Act, 1915 are based on the theory which was
then widely held that a subordinate Legislature had
no competence to enact laws with extra-territorial
operation. Then came the Government of India Act,
1935. Sections 99(1) and 100(3) which are relevant
provisions are as follows :
"99. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act,
the Federal Legislature may make laws for the ·whole
or any part of British India or for any Federated
(I) [1933] A.C. 156.
i'
..
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
gjt)
State, an<l a Provincial Legislature may make l'aws
for the Province or for any part thereof.
100. ( 3) Subject to the two prece<ling sub-sections,
the Provincial Legislature has, an<l the Federal Legislature has not, power to make laws for a Province or
any part thereof with respect to any of the matters
enumerated in List II in the said Sche<lule (hereinafter called the "Provincial Legislative List")".
The language of these sections marks, it will be noticed, a wide departure from that of section 43 of the
Charter Act an<l section 65 (1) (a) of the Government
of India Act, 1915. The limitation that the legislation should be for persons or things within the territory has been removed. Instead, it is enacted that
it could be ;'for the whole or ·part of British India in
the case of Federal Legislature" and "for the Province or part thereof in the case of Provincial Legislature", and under section 100(3), the power is to
make laws for a Province or a part thereof with respect to the matters enumerated in List II. Under
sections 99(1) and 100, the legislative power of the
Centre or the Province is determined by two conditions. It must be for the territory specified, and it
must be in respect of the topics enumerated in the
rtspective lists. If these conditions are satisfied, then
the law is valid notwithstanding that it may have
impact or operation outside the State. The scope of
the legislative power conferred by sections 99( 1) and
100 is precisely the same as that conferred on the
Legislatµres of Canada under sections 91 and 92 of
tht; British North America Act. That was also a
power conferred on the Dominion Parliament or the
Provincial Legislature to make laws for the Dominion
or the Province in respect of the matters mentioned
in sections 91 and 92 respectively. It is on the construction of these ,provisions that Lord Macmillan
held in Croft v. Dunphy(1) that the Dominion Legislature was competent to enact laws in respect of those
matters even if. thc;y had extra-territorial operation.
The framers of the Government of . India Act, 1935
changed the language of section 65 ( 1) (a) of the Gov( I) [!933] A.C.. '5o.
1955
Tlie Bengal
Immunity
Companv Limited
v.
The State of Bi/ia•
and others
Vtnkatarama
A;,var J.
820
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
{1955]
1955
ernment of India Act, 1915, and substituted wunls
similar to those in sections .91 and 92 of the British
North America Act, 1867. It is a reasonable deducC-Ompany Limited
tion to make that they intended to give effect to the
v.
T ht State of Bihar
law as declared in Croft v. Dunphy('). A law which
and others
satisfies the two conditions prescribed m sections 99
Vmkatarama
(1) and 100, therefore, must be held to L,e intra vtres,
AJYar ].
even though it might have extra-territorial operation. ·
The precise extent of the powers conierred by sections 99( 1) and 100 has also been the subject of considerable judicial consideration. In Governor-General
in. Council v. Releigh. Investment Co. Ltd.("), the question was as to the liability of a Company which was
incorporated under. .the English Companies Act having its ~ain office in England and no place of business in India to be assessed . to income-t<l'x under the
provmons of . the Indian Income-tax Act. The Company held the bulk of shares in nine Companies which
were also registered in·· England and controlled from
there, and carried on business . in British Jndia and
earned profits. Dividends in respect of these profits
were declared. in London and paid to the assessec in
London. The Explanation to section 4(i) (c) of the
Indian Income-tax Act enacts that a dividend paid
outside British India shall be deemed to be income
accruing i!' or arising in British India to the extent to
which it has been paid out .·of profits subjected to _tax
in British India. The income-tax authorities claimed
that the dividends received by the assessee-Company
were liable to be taxed under this provision. The
Company resisted the daim inter alia on the ground
that as it was not resident in British India. and did
not carry on business there, the Indian Legislature
had no competence to impose ·a tax on it, and that
the provisions of the Act 'were ultiu vires as e:traterritorial in .their operation. This contention succeeded before the High Court of Calcutta,. the Chief
Justice observing that the
impugned provision
amounted to the "Legislature of British India without specific or apparent authority stretching out its
legislative arm and physical hand beyond British
The Btngnl
Immunity
(I) [1933] A.C. 156.
(2) [1944] F.C.R. 229,
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
821
India into other countries in an attempt to tax persons
and property there not subject to its laws"; and
Mitter, J. characterising it as a "piece of extra-territorial legislation not by a superior or Dominion
Legislature but by a subordinate Legislature". On
appeal, this decision was reversed by the Federal
Court. Spens, C. J. who delivered the judgment of
the Court held firstlv that as the source of the income
which was subjected. to tax was Indian, it was competent for the Indian Legislature to impose a tax
thereon, and no question of extra-territorial operation
arose. That is to say, Entry 54 in List I gave power
to the Indian Legislature to tax income which arises
from British India, even though the person to be
taxed was not residrnt within the British India. He also
held that even if an element of extra-territoriality
wa~ i~volved, the legislation was not bad on thit
account, because section 99( 1) and section 100 of the
Government of India Act, 1935 were · intended to
embody the law as declared in Croft v. Dunphy(1)
and to confer on the Indian Legislature plenary
powers of legislation in respect of matters mentioned
in the lists, departing in this respect from the position
under section 65 ( 1)(a) of the Government of India
Act, 1915.
In Wallace Brothers & Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of
Income-tax, Bombay("), the appellant was a Company
registered in England and controlled from there. It
held a 14/32 share in a firm called Messrs Wallace &
Co., which was carrying on business in Bombay. The
appellant was sought to be taxed not merely on its
income as partner of the Bombay firm about >vhich
there was no dispute but also on the i!'.come of over
seven lakhs of rupees which had arisen and had
acuued to it abroad. The appellant resisted the
claim on the ground that the provisions of the Indian
Act were ultra vires as their operation was extra-territorial; inasmuch as they sought to tax income of a
non-resident received abroad. The Federal Court
rejected this contention. It held that if the person
proposed to be taxed had sufficient business connec(1) [1933] A. C. 156.
(2) [1945] F.C.R. 65.
1955
The Be11gal
Immunity
Company Limited
v.
The State of Bihar
and others
Vt11kalarama
A.~l'llT J.
822
1955
The Bengal
Immunity
Compan_)' Limited
v.
The State of Bihat
and others
Venkatarama
AJ:Yar .J..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
tion with British India, that would confer a jurisdiction on the Indian Legislature to tax him, and that
what heads of income in his hands should be taxed was
a matter of policy which was within the province o!'
the Legislature to decide. It also held that the pro·
visions of the Act were "not in their operation extraterritorial in the strict legal sense'". There was an
appeal against this judgment to Privy Council, i.e.,
Wallace Bros. v. /. T. Commissioner, Bombay(').
Affirming the judgment of the Federal Court, Lord
Uthwatt observed that the fact that the appellant
"was a member of the partnership carrying on business in British India" was irrelevant in .consi(lering
whether the legislation was intra vires; that it w:ts to
be assumed that there was "no connection between
the Companies and British India except the derivation from British India of the larger part of their
income", and that the validity of the legislation
should be determined on that basis. He .then observed:
"There is no rule of law that the territorial li.mits
of subordinate legislature define the possible scope of
its legislative enactments or mark the field open to its
vision. The ambit of the powers possessed by a subordinate legislature depends upon the proper construction of the statute conferring those powers. No doubt
the enabling statute has to be read against the back·
ground cha· only a defined territory has been committed to the charge of the legislature. Concern by
a subordinate Legislature with affairs or persons outside its own territory may therefore suggest a query
whether the Legislature is in truth minding its. own
business. It does not compel the conclusion that it
is not. The enabling statute has to be fairly construed".
He then referred to section 99(1) and section 100 of
the Government of India Act unde.r which the Indian
Legislature had power to enact laws for the whole or
part of British India with respect to tax on incomes,
and concluded :
"The resulting general conception as to the scope
(I) [1948] F.C.R. I.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
823
of income-tax is that given a sufficient territorial connection between the· person sought to be charged and
I he country seeking to tax him income-tax may properly extend to that person in respect of his foreign
incomf' ............ The principle-sufficient territorial connection-not the rule giving effect to that principle
-residence-is implicit in the power conferred by the
Government of India Act, 1935. The result is that
the validity of the legislation in question depends on
the sufficiency for the purpose for which it is used of
the territorial connection set _forth in the impugned
portion of the statutory test''.
It is the contention of the respondent that the present
question is concluded by this decision. In A. H. W adia
v. I. T. Commissioner, Bombay(1), the question related
to the liability of the Gwalior Durbar to be assessed
to income-tax in respect of interest received at
Gwalior. There was a Company called the Providenc.e
Investment Co. Ltd. carrying on business in Bombay.
The shares of the Company were all held by the
Durbar or by its nominees. It was financed by the
Durbar, the transaction taking the form of loan
adv:rncrd at Gwalior. On these facts, the Income-tax
Officer assessed the Agent of the Durbar to tax on
the interest received at Gwalior. The validity of this
assessment was disputed on the ground that the
statutory provisions under which it was made were
extra-territorial in their operation and therefore ultra
vires. It w:i.s held by all the learned Judges following the decisions in Governor-General in Council v
Releigh Investment Co, Ltd.(2) and W a/lace Bros. v. I.
T. Commissioner, Bombay(8) that the assessee would
be liable to ta'lC if there was sufficient business con.
ni:ction between him and British India, and that, m
that event, the provisions would not be bad on the
ground of extra-territorial operation. There was,
however, a difference of opinion among the learned
Judges as to whether, on the facts, sufficient territorial connection had been established, · the majority
holding that it had been, while two learned Judges
(1) [1949] ~'.C.R. 18.
.
(3J [1948] F.C.R. J.
~2) [1944] F.C.R. 229.
1955
The Bengal
Immunity
Company Limited
v.
T fie State of Bihar
and others
Venkatarama
Ayyar J.
824
1955
The Bengal
Immunity
Company Limited
v.
T ht State of Bihar
and othns
Venkalarama
Ayym- ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
thought otherwise. That, however, is not material
to the pre5ent discussion.
These authorities establish that under section 99(1)
and section 100 of the Government. of India Act, ;i
law enacted by the Indian Legislature in respect of
the matters enumerated in the appropriate lists would
be valid provided it is for the territory entrusted to
their charge; that whether it was so or not would
depend on whether there was sufficient territorial connection between the person who is sought to be
charged or proceeded against under the law and the.
country which enacts the law; and that .when such
.connection exists, the law is not strictly speaking.
extra-territorial, and it is not ultra vires on the ground
that the person is not residing within the State which
enacts the law.
Then, we come to the Constitution. Articles 245 ( 1)
and 246 which deal with this subject reproduce sections 99(1) and 100 with only alterations of a formal
character. They confer on the Parliament and the
State Legislatures power to enact laws in · respect of
the ~opics mentioned in ·the respective lists to be
exercised for the territory over which they have
j1irisdiction. It is a well-settled rule of construction
that when a statute is repealed and re-enacted and
words in the repealed statute are reproduced in the
new statute,. they should be interpreted in the sense
which had been judicially put on them under the repealed Act, because the Legislature is presumed to be
acquainted with the construction which the Courts
have put upon the words, and when they repeat .the
same words, they must be taken to have accepted the
interpretation put on them by the Court as correctly
reflecting the legislative mind. On a construction of
articles 245(1) and 246, therefore, it will be difficult
to come to any other conclusion than that a sales tax
legislation of a State which is otherwise valid is not
ultra vires on the ground that the person proposed to
be taxed is not resident within the territorial limits
of the State.
Three other contentions urged in opposition to this
conclusion must now be considered :
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
825
I. It is only the Central or Federal Legislature that
has the power to enact laws with extra-territorial operation, and that the Legislatures of the States forming
units of a Federal Union do not possess such power.
2. Under article 245(2) there is a prohibition
against States enacting laws with extra-territorial
operation.
3. Some of the provisions of the Act forrning the
rnachinerv sections for the assessment and collection
of taxes , are, in any event, unauthorised and the
· whole Act is void on the ground that the valid provisions thereof cannot be separated from the invalid
ones.
On the first question, it is argued by the learned
Attorney-General that the decision in Croft v. Dunphy(1) had reference to a law enacted by the Legislature of Dominion of Canada and not any of the
Provinces, and that the decisions in Governor-General
in Council v. Raleigh Investment Co.( 2 ), Wallace Brothen f:T Co. v. The Commissioner of Income-tax, BombayC) and A. H. Wadia v. Income-tax Commissioner,
Bombay( 4 ) related to the Indian Income-tax Act
which was enacteci by the Central Legislature, and
·that to apply the doctrine laid down in those cases
to laws passed by the States would be to extend it~
operation beyond recognised limits, and that there
was no warrant for it in the Constitution. On principle, it is difficult to see why a law enacted by the
State in respect of the matters assigned exclusively to
its jurisdiction should stand on a different footing
from a law passed by Parliament on a matter within
its jurisdiction. Both
the Legislatures derive their
authority from the same source, whether it be the
Government of India Act, 1935, or the Constitution
of India. Under these Statutes, the State is not subordinate to the Centre, its authority ' being supreme
in respect of the matters entrusted to it. Under the
Government of India Act, 1935, when the British
Government decided to change what was a unitary
into a Federal Government, the process adopted for
(I) [1933] A. C. 156.
(3) [1948] F.C.R. I.
15-84 S.C. India/59.
0
( ) [1944] F.C.R. 2~9.
(4) [1949] F.C.R. 18.
1955
The Bengal
immunity
Company Limited
v.
The State of Bihar
and others
Venkatarama
Ayyar ].
826
1955
The Bengal
Immunity
Company Limited
v.
The Stott of Bihar
and others
Venkatarama
A;yar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
that purpose was that the Parliament resumed all the
powers that had been granted under the previous
Constitution Act and redistributed them between the
Centre and the Province. The terms on which the
redistribution was made were identical both for the
Centre and the Province, their authority under sections 99(1) and 100 being to enact laws in respect of
the matters mentioned in the appropriate lists and
for their respective territory. The extent of this
authority must, therefore, be the same both in the
case of the Centre and the State, each being sovereign
within its own sphere. The principle laid down in
Croft v. Dunphy(') that a subordinate Legislature
has plenary powers in respect of the topics assigned to
it will apply as much to the State with reference to
the matters enumerated in List II as to the Centre
with reference to the topics mentioned in List I and
III. In Hodge v. The Queen(') which is one of the
cases on which the decision in Croft v. Dtmplzy('} was
based, the law under challenge was that of the Province of Ontario in Canada in respect of a topic
enumerated in seetion 92 of the British North America
Act of 1867. The question whether States as distinct
from the Commonwealth have competence to enart
laws with extra-territorial operation has also been
·considered in some of the decisions of the Australian
High Court. In Broken Hill South Limited v. The
Commissioner of Taxation(•), Evatt, J. in discussing
this question observed as follows at page 378 :
"Some of the cases also ill1JStrate the fact, occasionally overlooked, that, constitutionally speaking,
the status of the States of Australia is equal to, or
co-ordinate with, that of the Commonwealth itself.
Sovereignty is not attributable to one authority more
than to the others; it is divided between them in
accordance with the demarcation of functions set out
in the Commonwealth Constitution. Within the
limits so pr~scribed, the legislative authority of the
States is of precisely equivalent quality and potency
to that of the Commonwealth, the authority of which
(2) [1883] 9 A,C, 117,
(1) [1933] A.C. 156.
(3) 56 C.L.R. 337.
2 S.C.R.
.....'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
827
is, in sections 51 and 52 of the Commonwealth Constitution, limited by reference to subject-matter. In
short, the Commonwealth Parliament may legislate
for 'the peace, order and good government of the
Commonwealth with respect to' a large number of
subject-matters. Similarly, the State of New South
Wales may legislate for 'the peace, welfare and good
government' of New South Wales. In relation to such
a subject-matter as that of taxation, and subject, of
course, to any overriding provision of the Commonwealth Constitution, it is quite impossible to deny to
the States in relation to their geographical area constitutional powers precisely analogous to those possessed by the Commonwealth Parliament in relation
to its geographical area. The legislation of the States
cannot be deemed ultra vires merely because of territorial reasons, unless analogous legislation of the
Commonwealth Parliament would similarly be deemed unconstitutional and void".
These observations are very apposite to the present
controversy. The conclusion is inescapable that the
powers of the Union and the State under sections
99(1) and 100 of the Government of India Act, as
also under articles 245 ( 1) and 246 in respect of the
matters mentioned in their respective lists have the
same content anrl quality, and that if legislation with
extra-territorial operation is within the competence
of the Union, it is equally within the competence of
the State.
Coming now to the second contention, the argument of the appellant is that in enacting that "no
law of Parliament shall be deemed to be invalid on
the ground that it would have extra-territorial operation", article 245(2) prohibits by implication the
enactment of such laws by the States. This contention is unsound. The words "extra-territorial operation" are used, as already ,stated, in two different
senses as connoting firstly, laws in respect of acts or
events which take place inside the State but have
operation outside, and secondly, laws with reference
to the nationals of a State in respect of their acts
outside; that in its former sense, the laws are strictly
1955
The Bengal
Immunity
Company Limited
v.
The Stalt of BihlW
and others
Venkatarama
Ayyar J.
828
1955
The Bengal
Immunity
Company Limited
v.
The State of Bihar
and others
Venkatarama
Ayyar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955}
speaking
intra-territorial
though
loosely
termed
'extra-territorial', and that under article 245(1) it is
within the competence of the Parliament and of the
State Legislatures to enact laws with extra-territorial
operation in that sense. The words "laws with extraterritorial operation" in article 245(2) must be understood in their second and strict sense as having reference to the laws of a State for their nationals in
respect of acts done outside the State. Otherwise,
the provision would be redundant as regards legislation by Parliament and inconsistent as regards laws
enacted by States. This conclusion is placed beyond
doubt when regard is had to the history of legislation
on this topic. Section 43 of the Charter Act, 1833
while restricting the scope of legislative authority to
persons and things within the State thus denying the
power to enact laws with extra-territorial operations
in the first sense, conferred a power to make laws
"for all servants of the Company within the Dominion of Princes and States in alliance with the said
Company". This was a power to enact extra-!erritorial legislation in the second sense for servants of
the Company. Section 65(1) of the Government of
India Act, 1915 followed the same pattern, and while
limiting under sub-clause (a) the power of Indian
Legislatures to enact laws for persons and things
within British India conferred jurisdiction to enact
laws with extra-territorial operation in the second
sense by sub-clauses (b), (c), (d) and (e) which are as
follows :
"65. (1) The (Indian Legislature) has power
to make laws(b) for all subjects of His Majesty and servants
of the Crown within other parts of India; and
( c) for all native Indian subjects of His
Majesty, without and beyond as well as within British
India; and
( d) for
the government of officers, soldiers,
(airmen) and followers in His Majesty's Indian forces,
wherever they are serving, in so far as they are not
subject to the Army Act (or the Air Force Act); and
( e) for all persons employed or serving in or
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
829
belonging to the Royal Indian Marine Service".
This topic was again dealt with in section 99(2) of
the Government of India Act, 1935, which runs as
follows:
"99. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of
the powers co:1ierred, by the preceding sub-section,
no Federal law shall, on the ground that it would
have extra-territorial operation, be deemed to be iIJ
valid , in so far a~ it applies( a) to
British subjects and servants of the
Crown in any part of India; or
(b) to British subjects who are domiciled m
any part of India wherever they may be; or
( c) to, or to persons on, ships or aircraft registered in British India or anv Federated States where.
ever they may be; or
( d) in the case of a law with respect to a
matter accepted in the Instrument of Accession of a
Federated State as a matter with respect to which
the Federal Legislature may make laws for that State,
to subjects of that State wherever they may l:ie; or
( e) in the case of law for the regulation or discipline of any naval, military, or air force raised in
British India, to members of, and persons attached
to, employed with or following, that force, wherever
they may be".
·
In Governor-General in Council v. Raleigh Investment
Co.( 1 ) , the question was raised whether these provisions were restrictive of the power of the Indian Legislature to enact laws with extra-territorial operation in
respect of matters other than those enumerated in section 99(2). Spens, C.J. held that as the impugned provisions were within the ambit of legislative power under
sections 99(1) and 100 of the Government of India
Act, 1935, they were ·not extra-territorial m operation and that even if they were, the words "without
prejudice to the g~nerality of the powers conferred
by the preceding sub-section" occurring in section
99(2) posited the existence of a power aliunde, and
that the enumeration of the specified topics in that
sub-clause was by way of abundant caution. On the
(l) [1944] F.C.R. 229.
1955
The Bengal
Immunity
Company Limited
·"·
The State of Bihar
and others
Venkatarama
Ayyar ].
830
1955
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955)
14th August, 1947, acting under section 9 of the
Indian Independence Act the Governor-General issued
Immunity
an Adaptation Order, and therein, for the words "for
Company Limited
the whole or any part of British India or for any
Tht State of Bihar
Federated State" were substituted the words "includand others
ing laws having extra-territorial operation for the
VenkalaTama
whole or any part of the Dominion"; and sub-section
Ayyar J.
(2) was omitted. When the Constitution was enacted,
the words "including laws having extra-territorial
operation for the whole or any part of the Dominion"
were omitted, and in their place, article 245(2) was
enacted. Thus, article 245(2) is a successor to section
65(1), sub-clauses (b), (c), (d) and (e) of the Government of India Act, 1915 and section 99(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935, and its scope is extraterritorial legislation in the second sense. As we are
concerned in this appeal with extra-territorial operation in its first sense, article 245(2) has no application,
and the attack on the impugned Act on the ground
that it is barred by article 245(2) must fail.
The third contention has reference to the machinery sections of the Act relating to the assessment
and collection of taxes. The argument was that even
if the Bihar Legislature had the competence to enact
under Entry 54 a taxation law against non-residents,
it had no power to enforce it outside its own territorial limits, and some of the provisions were bad on
this ground, such as section 17 which authorised
search of premises and seizure of accounts, and section 26 which made it an offence to obstruct such
search or seizure. But we are not called upon in these
proceedings to pronounce on the validity of these prc>visions. The respondent issued notice under sectivn
13(5) of the Act calling upon the appellant to .send
his returns and proposing in'. case of default to make
assessment on the basis of best judgment. It was at
this stage that the appellant rushed to the Court, and
moved for a writ of prohibition to restrain the proceedings on the ground of want of jurisdiction. That
is the one and the only question that now falls to be
determined. Even if some of' the machinery sections
are bad-it is a question to be decided when it arises
The Bengal
...
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
831
whether they can be justified on the ground that they
are ancillary or incidental to the substantive provisions, as to which see Attorney-General for lanada v.
Cain(1) and Croft v. DunphyC)-that would not
affect the power of the State to impose a tax, and it
will therefore be foreign to the scope of this appeal
to enter into a discussion of their validity.
It was urged_ by the learned Attorney-General that
if the machinery sections were bad on the ground that
.they were extra-territorial in their operation, and if
the power to tax was so mixed up with them as to be
inseparable from them, then, when they fall it must
also fall. A power to tax is a matter of substantive
law, whereas the machinery sections providing for the
execution of that power such as, assessment, and
collection of tax, pertain to the domain of adjectival
law, and the two are distinct and separable. It is
elementary law that the power to tax does not depend
on the abilitv to realise it. In British Columbia Electric Railway ·co. Ltd. v. The King(s) Viscount Simon
observed:
"A legislature which passes a law having extraterri~orial operation may find that what it has enacted
cannot be directly enforced, but the Act is not invalid on that account, and the courts of its coumry
must enforce the law with the machinery available to
them".
Without expressing any opinion, therefore, on the
validity of the machinery sections, I must hold that
the impugned Act in so far as it authorises the imposition of tax on sales falling within the Explanation
to article 286(1 )(a) is neither ultra vires the powers of
the State Legislature nor bad on the ground rhal it is
c:xtra-territorial in its operation.
5. Then there remains the contention of the appellant that even assuming that the States could, under
the Explanation, enact a law imposing a tax on a
non-resident and that such law would not be hit by
article 286(2), the impugned Act must even then be
held to be bad for the reason that it was not auth\ \) (19061 A.G. SE
(2) [1933] A.C. 156.
(3) [1946] A.C. 527.
1955
The Bengal
Immunity
Company Limited
v.
The State of Bihar
and others
Vrnkatarama
Ayyar J.
832
)955
The Bengal
lmmuniry
Corrlj>any Limited
v.
Tiu Slate of Bikar
and others
Venkatarama
Ayy<U' J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
orised by the terms of the Explanation. Two grounds
were urged in support of this contention : ( l) that
under the Explanation truly construed, a seller could
be taxed only if he is within the State, and (2) that
the goods were actually delivered not in Bihar but in
Bengal and· that therefore the Explanation did not
apply. The argument in support of the first ground
was that as the Explanation enacts that the sak or
purchase-not mere! y the sale-must be deemed to
have taken place in the delivery State, it must be construed in the light of the presumption that the laws of
a State are intended to operate on persons or things
within its territory, and so construed, it should be
held to authorise the levy of a tax on the seller only
if he was within the State or on the purchaser who
must be within the territory. The assumption on
which this argument rests is that States have jurisdiction only over persons and property within their
territory; but this, as already shown, is not correct.
A State has jurisdiction to .enact laws in respect of
acts and events which occur within its territory; and
if a sale takes place within the State as under the
Explanation it does by a legal fiction, then its jurisdiction to enact a law imposing a tax thereon is complete, and no question of its overstepping its territorial limits arises. It should also be noted that the
scope of the presumption that the laws of a State are
not intended to operate outside its territory is, as
stated by Maxwell, that "Parliament does not design
its Statutes to operate on its subjects beyond the
territorial limits of the United Kingdom" (Maxwell's
Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edn., page 145). That
has reference to extra-territorial operation in the
second sense. There is no presumption that the laws
of a State made with reference to acts and events
occurring within its borders are not intended to have
operation outside its territory.
Moreover, a tax on sale of goods is, as observed in
The Province of Madras v. Messrs Boddu Paidanna &
Sons(') "a tax levied on the occasion of the sale of
goods" and the liability to tax arises "on the occasion
(1) A.I.R. 1942 F.C. 33.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
833
of a sale". In The State of Bombay v. The United
Motors (India) Ltd.(1) it was stated that the sales tax
was a tax imposed "on the occasion of the sale as a
£axable event". It is thus, in essense, a tax levied on
the act of buying and selling. Sale is the result of a
contract, and is bilateral in character. There can be
seller only in relation to a purchaser and vice versa.
It therefore follows that the power to impose a tax
on sale imports a power to tax either the seller or the
purchaser.
In V. M. Syed Mohammad & Co. v. The State of
Andhra(2), the question was raised for decision whether Entry 48 in the Provincial List of the Government of India Act 1935 "tax on sale of goods" included
a power to impose a tax on the purchaser. It was
held that it did, and it was observed that when Entry
54 ' in List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution substituted for the words "tax on sales" occurring in Entry 48 the words "tax on sale or purchase",
it did not thereby enlarge the powers previously conferred by Entry 48 but "merely expressed in clearer
language what was implicit in that corresponding
entry". When article 286(1)(a.) and the Explanation
refer to a sale or purchase, they merely conform to
the terms of Entry 54, and these words cannot therefore be construed as splitting up the power to tax sales
into two parts, one available against the purchaser at
all times, as in the very nature of it he must be within the State, and the other against a seller if he is
within jurisdiction. The power is one and indivisible
to be exercised when the conditions mentioned in the
Explanation are satisfied against either a seller or
buyer as the Legislah1re might determine.
The language of the Explanation, it should be
marked, does not impose any limitation or condition
on the exercise of this power. It is general and unqualified, and will comprehend all cases in which
goods are delivered for consumption in the taxing
State irrespective of whether the seller is within the
State or not. To hold that the tax could be imposed
on a seller only if he is within the State would be to
{l) [1953] S.C.R. 1069.
(2) [1954] S.C.R. 1117.
1955
Thi Beng«l
lmr11U1lity
<Ampany Limited
v.
Thi Slate of Bih•r
GM oth1rs
Yenkatarama
AY.Jiar ].
834
1955
The Bengal
Immunity
Company Limited
v.
The State flj Bihar
and othrrs
Vtnkatarama
Ayyar ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1955)
add words to the Explanation which ·are not there,
and for this, there is no justification. On the other
hand, there are good reasons why the power should
have been vested in the legislature to determine w hether it will tax the seller or the buyer. The tax imposed under the Explanation really falls on the consumer-purchaser. While it is possible that with reference to certain classes of goods the tax can effectively be imposed on the purchaser, it must happen
that with reference to other kinds of goods as, for
example, medicines in the present appeal, it cannot
be so done, and, as already pointed out, it is a "familiar and sanctioned device" to make the seller the
agent of the State for collection of taxes. In leaving
it to the States to determine whether they will tax
the seller or the buyer, the Explanation has merely
given recognition to a familiar principle of taxation
laws sanctioned by usage anJ upheld by authority_
This objection must accordingly be overruled.
It was then contended that the sales proposed to be
taxed did not take place in Bihar as the goods were
actually delivered as contemplated by the Explanation not there but in Bengal. The argument is that
the words "actual delivery" in the Explanation are
used in contrast to constructive or symbolic delivery as
meaning physical delivery of goods, that under section 39(1) of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 (Act III of
1930) the common carrier is the agent of the purchaser,
and that therefore delivery of the goods to the railway authorities in Bengal was actual delivery thereof
to the purchaser in Bengal. Section 39(1) is as follows:
"Where in pursuance of a contract of sale, the
seller is authorised or required to send the goods to
the buyer, deliYcry of the goods to a carrier, whether
named by the buyer or not, for the purpose of trans-mission to the buyer, or delivery of the goods to a
wharfinger for safe custody is prima facie deemed to
be a delivery of the goods to the buyer".
It is difficult to see what there is in this section to
support the contention that deli very to a common
carrier is actual delivery to the purchaser. The section
1.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
835
does not say so. On the other hand, it proceeds on
the assumption that there was, in fact, no delivery
to the purchaser, actual or otherwise, a t.hing being
deemed to be something only, when as a fact it is not
that, and then enacts on that basis a fiction that deli. very to a common carrier shall be deemed prim a facie
to be delivery to the buyer. What is the purpose. of
this fiction? It is, as will be clear from section 39(2),
to fix on whom the· loss is to fall in case the goods are
lost or damaged in course of transit. But where no
such question arises, the fiction has to be ignored, and
the matter will have to be decided on the factua>l
basis whether the goods were actually delivered.
A reference to section 51 ( 1) of the Sale of Goods
Act is very instructive. It runs as follows :
"Goods are deemed to be in course of transit
from the time when they are delivered to a carrier or
other bailee for the purpose of transmission to the
buyer, until the buyer or his agent in that behalf takes
delivery of them from such carrier or other bailee".
In this clause, the word "delivery" is used to denote
both the delivery of goods by the seller to the common
carrier and the delivery to the purchaser by the
common carrier. They cannot both be acmal deliveries, as goods sold under a sale can actually be delivered only once. If the delivery of the goods to the
common carrier was actual deliYery, then what is the
nature of delivery when the purchaser took possession
of the goods from the common carrier? It is also
physical delivery of the goods, and is therefore actual
delivery on the appellant's own definition.
The fact is that while for some purposes delivery
to t):ie common carrier is treated as delivery to the
purchaser, there is delivery in fact and in its popular
sense, only when the purchaser obtains possession of
the goods and it is this that is connoted by the words
"actual delivery". When section 51(1) refers to delivery to buyer or his agent, it refers to actual delivery,
and delivery to common carrier is regarded as constructive, having regard to section 39(1). The section,
it will be noticed, proceeds on the footing that :r
1955
The Bengal
lmmuniry
Company Limitet!
v.
The State of Biha~
and others
Venkatarama
Ayyar J.
836
1955
The Btntal
lmmuniry
Company Limited
..;_
The State of Bihar
and otht1s
V~nkatarama
Ayyar ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19551
common carrier is not the agent of the buyer with
reference to actual delivery. He is the agent of the
purchaser for transmission of the goods to him.
This position was well-established in the common
law of England, and was thus stated by Parke, B., in
James v. Griffin(') in the following terms:
"The delivery by the vendor of goods sold to a
carrier of any description, either expressly or by
implication named by the vendee, and who is to carry
on his account, is a constructive delivery to the vendee;
but. the vendor has a right if unpaid, and if the vendee
be insolvent, to retake the goods before they are
actually delivered to the vendee, or some one whom he
means to be his agent, to take possession of and keep
the goods for him, and thereby to replace the vendor
in the same situation as if he had not parted with
the actual possession .......... The actual delivery to tlze
vendee or his agent, which puts an end to the transit11s
or state of passage, may be at the vendee' s own warehouse, or at a place which he uses as his own, though
belonging to another, for the deposit of goods: (Scott
v. Prettit( 2): Rowe v. Pickford(') ) ; or at a place where
he means the goods to remain until a fresh destination
is communicated to them by orders from himself;
Dixon v. Baldwen(') ; or it may be by the vendee's
taking possession by himself or agent at some point
short of the original intended place of destination''.
In Ex parte Rosevear C/zina Clay Company. In Re
Cock(') James, L.J. said :
"The authorities show that the vendor has a
right to stop in transitu until the goods have actually
got home into the hands of the purchaser, or of some
one who receives them in the character of his servant
-or agent".
In the same case, the position was stated even more
fully by Brett, L.J., in the following terms :
"As soon as the clay was appropriated by the
vendors to this contract and was placed on board the
ship, the property in it passed to the purchaser and
(1) 2 M. & W. 623; 115 E.R., 906, 910.
(2) [1803] 3 B. & P. 469.
(3) (1817) 8 Taunt, 83.
(4) (1804] 5 East 175.
(5) II Ch. D. 560.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
837
at the same time as between the vendor and the purchaser, there was a delivery of the claim to the latter.
But it was a constructive not actual. delivery".
The same learned Judge again observed in Kendal v.
Marshall (1) as follows :
"Where the goods have been appropriated by the
vendor, and have been delivered by him to a carrier
to be transmitted to the vendee, a constructive possession exists in the vendee".
The law as declared in the above decisions was embodied in section 32(1) of the English Sale of Goods
Act, which has been reproduced in section 51(1) of
the Indian Sale of Goods Act. Vide also Benjamin
on Sales, Eighth Edn., page 889 where the possession
of the carrier on behalf of the buyer is stated to be
"constructive though not yet actual possession". It
must accordingly be held that the expression "actual
delivery'' in the Explanation to article 286(1) (a)
means delivery of the goods to the purchaser or his
agent, and delivery to the common carrier is not
actual delivery, and that, in this case, the goods were
actually delivered not in Bengal when they were
delivered to the common carrier but in Bihar when
they were deliv<;red to the purchaser. This contention of the appellant must also be rejected.
In the result, the appeal should, in my judgment,
be rejected with costs.
SrNHA J.-1 have had the advantage of perusing
the judgments prepared by my brothers, . S. R. Das,
N. H. Bhagwati, B. Jagannadhadas and T. L.
Venkatarama Aiyar. After a careful and anxious consideration of the two viewpoints contained in the
judgments respectively of my brother S. R. Das holding that the previous decision of this court in The
State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd.(2)
should be overruled, and of my brother T. L. Venkatarama Aiyar that it should be followed, I have come
to the conclusion that the latter view is more acceptable.
We are all agreed that the present case is governed
(l) 11 Q.B.D. 356, 3M.
(:!) [1953] S.C.R. 1069.
1955
The Bengal
Immunity
Company Limited
v.
The State of Bihar
and others
Ve•katarama
Ayyar ].
838
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
1955
by the previous decision of this Court just referred to
and that if that case lays down the correct rule of
law, this appeal should be dismissed. We are also
agreed that the language of article 286 of the ConThe State of Bihar
stitution on which the case depends is not felicitous
and others
and free from vagueness, with the result that the
Sinha].
interpretation of that article is not free from doubt
and difficulty. The very fact that in the case referred to, as also in the later decision of this Court reported in State of Travancore-Cochin v. Shanmugha
Vilas Cashetl! Nut Factory( ) involving the construction of article 286, the Court was divided in its opinion
shows that the interpretation of the articles in question is by no means easy. The fact that the Court is
sharply divided in the present case also emphasizes
the difficulty. The question we have to determine at
the outset is whether or not we should follow
the previous decision of this Court in The State of
Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd.('). We are
all agreed that in a proper case it is permissible for
this Court to go back upon its previous decision; but
we are again divided as to whether this is a fit occasion for reviewing its previous decision. For the reasons given by my brothers, Jagannadhadas and Venkatarama Aiyar, I would agree with them in holding
that sufficient grounds have not been made out for
overruling that decision which had been taken after
hearing all the parties interested in the result of the
case. Not only the parties directly concerned with
the case but a number of States by way of interveners as in the present case were also heard. After
giving a very full hearing the Court gave its judgment
which is a very elaborate one,-the report of the case
running into 60 pages in print. It is true that
much can be said for the opposite view as adumbrated in the judgment of my brother S. R. Das; but,
in my opinion, simply because another view may be
taken of the points in controversy is not a sufficient
justification for our reviewing the previous judgment
of this Court. It has not been suggested that any
relevant provisions of the Indian Constitution or any
The Bengal
Immunity
Company Limited
v.
(I) [1954] S.C.R. 53.
(2) [1953) S.C.R. 1069.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
839
'>ther provision of law had been overlooked by this
Court when it pronounced its previous ruling; nor
has it been suggested that this Court on the previous
occasion proceeded on erroneous suppositions. Under
the Constitution and even otherwise this Court is
naturally looked upon by the country as the custodian
of law and the Constitution, and if this Court were
to review its previous decisions simply on the ground
that another view is possible, the litigant public may
be encouraged to think that it is always worthwhile
taking a chance with the highest court in the land.
Definiteness and certainty of the legal position are
essential conditions for the growth of the rule of law.
In my opinion, therefore, this Court should review
its previous decisions only in exceptional circumstances as is the practice of the Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council in the cases referred to by my
brothers
Jagannadhadas
and Venkatarama Aiyar.
If this Court has taken a view of the relevant provisions of the Constitution which does not commend
itself to the acceptance of the Legislature, the latter
can make necessary amendments, as has been done in
the recent past.
Coming to the merits of the case in hand, we are all
agreed that the Explanation to article 286(1)(a) of
the Constitution has created a legal fiction as a result
of which a transaction of sale or a purchase partaking
of an inter-State character has been treated as a
domestic transaction. The fiction has localized sales
or purchases contemplated by the Explanation, by
converting such transactions as would otherwise have
been inter-State sales or purchases into sales or purchases inside one State in a sense in which it is placed
in a class distinct and separate from what is referred
to as sales or purchases "outside the State" in , the
main body of article .286(1) (a) which prohibits imposition of tax by any State. There is a general agreement amongst us, I take it, that the main purpose of
creating the fiction is to prevent multiple taxation
of the same transaction, but, it may be added,
not altogether to stop the taxation of such transac·
tions. We are also agreed that full effect must
1955
The Bengal
lmmuniry
Company Limited
v.
The State of Bihar
and ot/.trs
Sin.'1a J.
840
1955
Tht Btngal
Immunity
Company Limited
v.
The State of Bihar
and othtrs
Sinha].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955 J
be given to the legal fiction on the supposition that
the putative state of affairs is the real one. While
thus agreeing on the general principle bearing on the
question of the. purpose and scope of a legal fiction,
we are again divided on the question of how far the
legal fiction should be carried in its actual application.
For the reasons given by my brother Venkatarama
Aiyar, I agree with him that the fiction created by
the Explanation brings such a sale within the taxing
power of the State within which such a sale is said to
have taken place. Such a result is brought about not
by holding that the Explanation has conferred positively the power on the relevant State to impose sales
tax, but by holding that such an inside sale is beyond
the scope of the prohibition contained in the main
body of article 286(1)(a) which interdicts the imposition of a tax on a sale "outside the State". The Explanation has got to be read as an integral part of
article 286(1) ( :i.) and thus read, it means negatively
that a sale or purcha,se outside a State cannot be
taxed; and by necessary , implication, that a sale or
purchase inside a State may be taxed by that State
as falling outside the mischief of the prohibition
directed against the imposition of a tax on a sale or
purchase of goods outside a State; in other words, as
soon as a sale or purchase of goods is declared to be
outside the pale of the prohibition contained in article
Z86(l)(a), the State's power of imposing a tax contained in article 246 read wil'11 item 54 of List II of
the 7th Schedule comes into operation. I do not find
myself in agreement with the view propounded by
my brother S. R. Das chiefly because that view goes
beyond the purpose of the creation Qf the fiction which
admittedly was to prevent multiple taxation. The
view as propounded by him besides preventing multiple taxation goes to the length of prohibiting any
irnposititm of sales tax by any State. Such, in my
opinion, was not the intention of the Constitution.
Whereas the imposition of multiple sales tax on transactions of sale or purchase may be an obstacle to the
free flow of inland trade and commerce, the impo<..ition of sales tax by a single State in which the sale is
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
841
deemed to have taken place by virtue of the Explanation cannot be predicated as having such an effect.
The view propounded by my learned brother Venkatarama Aipr is thus not inconsistent with the avowed
purpose of the Constitution, as expressed in article
301. wb;ch provides that trade, commerce and intercourse shall be free throughout the territory of India.
In my opinion, the view propounded by my learned
brother S. R. Das about the actual application
of the legal fiction stops short of giving full effect to
that fiction. Allied with this question is the controversy a~ to. whether clause (2) of article 286 is subject
to article 286(1) (a) re:id with the Explanation or
/lice versa. In my opinion, for the reasons given by
my ieamed brother Vcnkatarama Aivar the hetter
view is that clause (2) of article 286 of the Constitutior~ is subject to article 286(1 )(a) read with the
Explanation. On the whole, therefore, I would agree
\\'ith the view d1at the previous decision of this Court
in 1953 S.C.R. 1069 should continue to hold good :md
govern the present controvcrsv also. In that view of
the matter I would dismiss this appeal with costs.
BY THE CouRT.-The appeal is allowed and an order
shall be issued directing that, until Parliament by
law provides otherwise, the State of Bihar do forbear and abstain from imposing Sales Tax on out-ofState dealers in respect of sales or purchases that
have taken place in the course of inter-State trade or
commerce even though the goods have been delivered
as a direct result of such sales or purchases for consumption in Bihar. The State must pay the costs
of the appellant in this Court and in the Court below.
The interveners must bear and pay their own costs.
16-84 S. C. India/59.
1955
The Bengal
lmm1.·nity
Co111panr Limited
v.
The Slate of Bihar
and others
Sinha).
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