SUCHETA KRIPALANI versus SHRI S.S. DULAT, I.C.S., CHAIRMAN OF THE TRIBUNAL, DELHI AND OTHERS.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 6 September 1955 | [1955] 2 S.C.R. 450 | 1955 INSC 37
Key facts
- Decided
- 6 September 1955
- Bench
- VIVIAN BOSE*, NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI, B. JAGANNADHADAS, BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA, SYED JAFFER IMAM
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 139/1955
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1955] 2 S.C.R. 450
- Neutral citation
- 1955 INSC 37
Text of the judgment
450
1955
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
SUCHETA KRIPALANI
Stpttmbr 6
ti.
SHRI S. S. DULAT, I.C.S., CHAIRMAN OF THE
ELECTION TRIBUNAL, DELHI AND OTHERS.
[VIVIAN
BosE,
BHAGWATI,
SINHA
and
JAGANNADHADAS,
JAFER IMAM
JJ.]
B.
P.
Election Dispute-Election petition by unsuccessful rival-A/legations of r12ajo1· co"upt practices and falsity in the return of election
expenses against the returned candidate-Return of election expenses
found defective and returned candidate disqualified by the Election
Commission-Removal of such disqualification on lodging of fresh return-furisdiction of Election Tribuna/_:_If competent to inquire
into identical allegations of falsity against the second return-Repre·
sentation of the People Act (XL/II of 1951), s. 143-The Representa·
tion of the People (Conduct of Elections and Election Petitions) Rules,
1951, rule 114(4), (5) and (6).
The provisions of the Representation of the People Act and the
Rules framed thereunder assign distinct and different jurisdictions
to the Election Commission and an Election Tribunal so far as a
Re.turn of election expenses is concerned.
Where there are allegations of major corrupt practices and a
Tribunal constituted is in lawful seisin Of the dispute, s. 143 of the
Act gives it the sole jurisdiction and makes it incumbent on it to inquire into the falsity of any particulars mentioned in the return
where such falsity is alleged and brought into issue and is reasonably connected with the major corrupt practices.
What the Election Commission has to do under Rule 114( 4) is
to satisfy itself that the return is in the prescribed form. It is no
part of its function to inquire into the correctness of any particulars
mentioned therein. That question can only arise when some one
raises a dispute and brings the matter into issue.
Consequently, in a case where, as in the present, the Election
Commission removed the disqualification it had imposed on the returned candidate for lodging a defective return of election expenses
on the lodging of a fresh return; Held, that the decision of the Election Commission removing the disqualification attaching to the first
return in no way precluded the Tribunal from inquiring into the
falsity of the particulars in the second return although they were
identical with those challenged in the first return;
that the removal of the disqualification only meant that the
accepted return was the only valid return, being the first to be correct in form, and the Tribunal had only that return before it.
-----------
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
----
451
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
139 of 1955.
. suC11efa- Kri'p~lani
·v.
Appeal under Articles 132and 133 of the ConstituSh~i
S.S.- Duiat~
tion of India against the Judgment and Order dated I.C.S., Chairman
the 23rd December 1953 of the High Court of Judi- Of the Eiection
cature for the State of Prinjab,in Civil \Vrit Applica- Tribunal~ Delhi
tion No. 24 of 1953.L_____ ·;- 0 • "·. .
·
•
•
·and others
'
'
. ~: 1-tl -. . .
.
.
- ;.
N. 0. Chatterjee·, (R. S. N!irula, with him) for the
appellant.
.. .
· . .. ·
·.
a:s. Pathak and Veda Vyds',-(Ganpat :R~i, ~ith
them), for respondent No. 5
·
""
. - ·- ..
~-
· i955. Septe~ber, 6.' The ·Judgment _of the
Court was delivered by • ,. · ··,
BosE J.-·The proceedings that have given rise fo
this appeal arise out of an·eJection petition liefore the
Election Tribunal; Delhi.
'
.·
. ·.. ' ·
The appellant Shrimati Sucheta·Kripalani together
with the contesting respondent Shrimati Manmohirii
Sahgal and others were candidates for· election to the
House of the People from the Parliamentary ,Con. stituency of New Delhi. The polling took place on 14th January, 1952, and when the' votes.were counted
on 18th January, 1952; it was foun·d that the appellant had secured the largest number of votes an_d that
the contesting respondent 1\Ianmohlni came next; The
appellant '.was accordingly notified as the returned
candidate on 24th January, 1952. · ·
.·
·
. On 6th ~larch, 1952, ·the appellant filed her return
of election expenses. This was found to· be defective,
and on .17th April, 1952, tlie Election· Commission
published a notification in the Gazette of India dis-·
qualifying the appellant under Rule·ll4(5) of the Representation of the People (Conduct of Electio_ns and
Election Petitioris) Rules, 1951, ori the ground that
she had · · . .
· · '•-" • · : · · _
.
: "failed to lodge the rel urn' of election expenses
in the manner required" and that she· had· thereby
"incurred the disqualifications under clause (c)
of section 7 and section 143 of the Representation of
the People Act, 1951':, _
·
--
452
1955
Sru;hlta Jrripalairi
••
Sht'i S. S. Dulal,
J.C.S., Chairman
of the El<di°"
T ribunol, Ddhi
and oth"s
Bose].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
In view of this the appellant submitted a fresh
return with an explanation under Rule 114(6) on 30th
April, 1952.
This was accepted . by the Commission
and on 7th May, 1952, it published a notification
in the Gazette of India under Rule 114(7) stating that
the disqualification had been removed.
In the meanwhile, on 7th April, 1952, the contesting respondent Manmohini filed an election petition
praying that the appellant's election be declared void
and that she (the petitioner) be declared to have been
duly elected. It will be noticed that this was before
17th April, 1952, the date on which the Election Commission disqualified the appellant. The validity of
the election was attacked on many grounds. A number of major corrupt practices were alleged and the
return which the appellant had filed on 6th March,
1952, of her election expenses' was challenged as a
minor corrupt practice on two grounds :
(1) that the return was false in material particulars
and (2) that it was not in accordance with the rules
and so was no return at all in the eye of the law.
Particulars of the instances in which the return was
challenged as false were then set out.
The appellant filed her written statement in reply
on 7th October, 1952. It will be noticed that this was
after she had put in her second return and after the
Election Commission had removed the disqualification
due to the first return.
Her reply was as follows :
(I) That as the disqualification with respect to
the return of her election expenses had been removed
by the Election Commission under section 144 of the
Representation of the People Act, 1951, this question
could not be reopened;
(2) That a minor corrupt practice which cannot
vitiate an election and which is not capable of
materially affecting an election is wholly outside the
scope of a proper election petition and so no cognisance of. it can be taken by the Election Tribunal;
(3) That only such matters can be put in issue as
arc necessary to decide whether the election of the
returned candidate fo liable to be set aside within the
meaning of section 100(2) of the Act.
2 S.C.R
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
453
The contesting respondent Manmohini filed a replication on 15th October, 1952. In it she said:(1) that the Election Commission did hot and
could not decide whether the return was or was not
false in material particulars and so the question was
still open.
(This had reference to the first return
dated 6th March, 1952.) ;
(2) that in any event
"even the revised return is false in material particulars and the objections with regard to the original
return also apply exactly with regard to the revised
return".
The broad propositions of law raised by points (2)
and (3) in the appellant's written statement were also.
denied.
Then followed an item by item reply to the
allegations made by the appellant in the list which she
had appended to her written statement. That lisc
was a reply to the particulars of false return and
corrupt practices furnished by the contesting respondeilt Manmohini. It is evident then that Manmohini
attacked the second return on exactly the same
grounds as the first and furnished the same particulars.
Now we have spoken of these returns as the first
and the second. But counsel on both sides agreed before us that the first return was in fact no return at
all in the eye of the law and that therefore the contesting respondent's real attack was on the second return which must be regarded as the only return wi1ich
the law will recognise as a valid return. It was agreed
that there cannot be two returns of expenses: either the
one originally filed is amended or it is treated as a nullity so far as it purports to be a return. In view of this
agreement, it is not necessary for us to express any
opinion on the matter and we will concentrate our
attention on what, for convenience, we will continue
to call the second return.
The first point that now arises is whether the decision of the Election Commission to remove the
disqualification attaching to the first return precludes
an enquiry into the falsity of the second return simply
because the respondent Manmohini alleged that the
1955·
Suehita Kripalart
v.
Shri S. S. Dulat,
I.C.S., Chairmart
of lire Ek&tion
Tribunal, Delhi
and others
Bose].
454
1955
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
particulars of the falsity are exactly the same as
before.
Our answer to that is No. If the first return
llwhtla Kripal<uii
v.
is
no
return
in the eye of the law, then the only reSlwi S. S. Dulal,
turn
we
are
concerned with is the second and that
1.c.s., Ch.airman
of '"' Ellai.,.
must
be
treated
in the same way as it would have
1"ri/Junal Delhi
been
if
it
had
been the only return made. If there
and others
had been no other return and this return had been
challenged on the grounds now raised, it is clear that
the truth of the allegations made would have to be
enquired into. That enquiry cannot be shut out
simply because the allegations against the second
return . happen to be exactly the same in the matter
of its falsity as in the case of the first return. We
are therefore of opinion that the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal to enquire into these matters was not ousted
on that account. Opr reasons for this are these.
Section 76 of the Act requires every candidate to
file a return of election expenses in a particular form
containing certain prescribed particulars. The form
and particulars are set out in the Rules. Section 143
prescribes the penalty for failure to observe those
requirements.
It is disqualification.
This ensues if
there is a "default" in making the return. It also
ensues:"if such a return is found ........ upon the trial
of an election petition under Part VI ........ to be
false in any material particular".
That places the matter beyond doubt. The trial of
an election petition is conducted by an Election Tribunal and this section makes it incumbent on the Tribunal to enquire into the falsity of a return when that
is a matter raised and placed in issue and the allegations are reasonably connected with other allegations
about a major corrupt practice. The jurisdiction is
that of the Tribunal and not of the Election Commission. The duty of the Election Commission is
merely to decide under Rule 114(4) wh~ther any candidate has, among other things,
"failed to lodge the return of election expenses ....
m the manner required by the Act and these rules''.
It is a question of form and not of substance. lf
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
455
the return is in proper form no question of falsity can
arise unless somebody raises the issue. If it is raised,
the allegations will be made in some other document
by some other person and the charges so preferred
will be enquired into by the Tribunal.
If the return is not in proper form, disqualification
ensues but the Election Commission is invested with
the power to remove the disqualification under Rule
114(6). If it does, the position becomes the same as
it would have been had the Election Commission
decided that the form was proper in the first instance.
That would still leave the question of falsity for
determination by the Tribunal in cases where the
issue is properly raised.
Mr. Chatterjee contended on behalf of the appellant that we were not concerned with the second
return in this appeal and strongly protested against
Mr. Pathak being allowed to argue this point. But
that has been the main bone of contention almost
from the start. When the election petition was filed,
there was only one return to attack. The second had
not been put in. Later, when it was put in, the contesting respondent, Manmohini, attacked both and the
appellant herself said that questions about the falsity
of the return could not be gone into because of the
Election Commission's order removing the disqualification. That argument applies as much to the second
as to the first return and raises an issue about the
respective jurisdictions of the Election Commission
and the Election Tribunal on this point. The Tribunal decided against the appellant on this point and
held, as we do, that the Election Commission was
not concerned with the issue of fact about the falsity
of the return. The appellant then filed a petition
under article 226 to the High Court and questioned
the Tribunal's jurisdiction to enquire into the issue
of falsity.
The High Court upheld the Tribunal's
decision and the appellant pursued the matter here
both in her grounds of appeal and in her statement
of the case. She cannot at this stage ask us to leave
1955
,,.
Suto Kripalani
Sltri S. S. Du/al,
C/iainun
1.c.s.,
oftlwEUdittti
T mllllal, Dllhi
4lld olhm
Bm].
456
1955
Sueheta Kripalani
Yo
Slwi S. S. Dulat,
l.C.S., Chairman
tht Election
T ribMnal, Dtlhi
and others
°"'
Bose J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955)
the matter open so that she can come here again and
re-agitate this question.
We accordingly overrule
Mr. Chatterjee's objection.
The next question argued was whether an Election
Tribunal can enquire into a minor corrupt practice
if it is of such a nature that, standing by itself,
it could not have been made the basis of an election
. petition because it could not materially affect the
result of the election. We need not go into that because the question is purely academic in this case.
The allegation about the minor corrupt practice does
not stand by itself. There are also allegations about
major corrupt practices which require investigation
and the minor corrupt practices alleged are reasonably connected with them. Section 143 of the Act is
a complete answer to the question of the Tribunal's
jurisdiction on this point when it is properly seised of
the trial of an election petition on other grounds. Whether it could be properly seised of such a trial if this
had been the only allegation, or if the minor corrupt
practice alleged was not reasonably connected with the
other allegations about major corrupt practices, doe>
not therefore arise. As the trial is proceeding on
the other matters the' Tribunal is bound under section
143, now that the issue has been raised, also to enquire
into the question of the falsity of the return. Without such an enquiry it cannot reach the finding which
section 143 contemplates. We need not look into the
other sections which were touched upon in the arguments and in the Courts below because section 143 is
clear and confers the requisite jurisdiction when a
trial is properly in progress.
The appellant has failed on every question of substance that she raised.
There was some vagueness in
the Election Tribunal's order about which of the two
returns formed the basis of the enquiry on this point
but even if the Tribunal intended to treat the first
return as the basis that did not really affect the substance because exactly the same allegations are made
about the second return and the issue of fact would
therefore have to be tried in any event. The appel-
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
457
lant's whole enc!-eavour was to circumvent such an
enquiry and oust the Tribunal's jurisdiction. In that
she has failed, so she will pay the contesting rcspondent' s costs throughout.
The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs all
through.
1955
Sw:lrda Kripalani
v.
Shri S. S. Dulat,
I.C.S., Chairman
4 the Ekction
TribunaJ, Delhi
and others
Bose].
TIRATH SINGH
ti.
1955
BACHITTAR SINGH AND OTHERS
<;tpkmb1r 15
[S. R. DAs, ACTING C. J. and VENKATARAMA
AYYAR
J.]
Election Dispute-Election petition-Contents alleged to be vague
and wanting in particulars-Mainu1inability-Naming of persons
for disqualification-Recommendation for exemption from disqualification-Notice-Jurisdiction of the Tribunal-The Representation of
the People Act (XLIII of 1951), ss. 83, 99(1)(a) proviso.
Where the respondent in an election petition contended that
the allegations in the election petition were vague and wanting in
particulars, but did not call for any particulars which it was open to
him to do and was not found to have been misled or in any way
prejudiced in his defence, it \Vas not open to him to contend that
the petition was liable to be dismissed for non-compliance with the
provisions of s. 83 of the Act.
Clauses (a) and (b) of the proviso to s. 99 of the Representation
of the People Act read together leave no scope for doubt that clause
(a) contemplates notice only to such persons as were not parties to the
election petition and it is, therefore, not obligatory on the Tribunal
under cl. (a) to issue notices on such persons as were parties in order
that it may name them for disqualification under sub-clause (ii) of s.
99(l)(a) of the Act. Clause (b) to the proviso obviously has the
effect of excluding such persons as have already had the opportunity
of cross-examining ·witnesses, calling evidence and of being heard,
which the clause seeks to afford.
The Indian and the English Law on the matter arc substantially
the same.
Ke.rho Ram v. Hazura Singh, [1953] 8 Election Law Reports
320, overruled.
The jurisdiction that sub-clause (ii) of s. 99(1)(a) of the Act
confers on the Tribunal for making recommendation for exemption
11-83 S. C, India/59.
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