BHIKAJI KESHAO JOSHI AND ANOTHER versus BRIJLAL NANDLAL BIYANI AND OTHERS.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 2 May 1955 | [1955] 2 S.C.R. 428 | 1955 INSC 35
Key facts
- Decided
- 2 May 1955
- Bench
- BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA*, VIVIAN BOSE, B. JAGANNADHADAS, T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR, SYED JAFFER IMAM
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 158/1954
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1955] 2 S.C.R. 428
- Neutral citation
- 1955 INSC 35
Text of the judgment
428
i955.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1955 J
BHIKAJI KESHAO JOSHI AND ANOTHER
"·
Ml!!' a
BRIJLAL NANDLAL BIYANI AND OTHERS.
J.,
[MuKHER.JEA C.
VIVIAN BosE, ]AGANNADHADAs,
VENKATARAMA AYYAR and fAFER IMAM JJ.]
Representation of the People Act (Act XLTII) 1951, proviso to Section 85-Section 90( 4)-Reconsideration of question of limitation by
Tribunal-Section 82-N01J-compliance with provisions-Omission
to include a party in list of respondents-Defect whether fatal-Sec-
tion 83(1)-Code of Civil Procedure, Order 6, rules 15(2) and (3)Effect o,f-Section 83(2)-"Full Particulars"-Duties of Tribunal
when particulars filed are vague-Serious allegations of corrupt practiees-Duty of Tribunal to inquire into.
The appellants, two of the electors of the Akola Constituency of
the Madhya Pradesh State Assembly, filed an Election Petition
against Respondent No. I, the successful candidate in the election
held on December 13, 1951, and the three other respondents who
having been validly nominated went to the polls but were defeated.
The Election Petition, under Section 80 of the Representation of the
People Act of 1951, was admittedly time-barred by one day. The
Election Commission condone-d the delay under the proviso to Section 85 of the Act and cOnstituted a Tribunal for the trial of the
petition. On pleadings of the parties, nine issues were framed by the
Tribunal which are covered by the following questions:
(1) Whether the election petition was presented by a properly
authorised person.
(2) Whether there was sufficient cause for presentation of the
petition' one day ouf o_f time.
( 3) Whether the petition was defective for non-joinder of certain parties as respondents.
( 4) Whether the petition was defective for want of proper verification.
(5) Whether the petition was defective for vagueness of the
particulars relating to the corrupt practices set out in Schedule A
thereto.
The Tribunal found only the first of the above points in favour
of- the petitioners by a majority. But in respect of the other four
points, it held against the petitioners unanimously. As a result of
the adverse findings on these four points, the petition was dismissed
without any trial on the merits. It is against this dismissal that
the appellants have now come up to this Court on obtaining special
leave.
When the delay in submitting an election petition is condoned
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
429
1955
by the Election Commi,Ssion in ·exc;rcise of its power under the proviso to Section 85 of the Representation of the People Act (Act
B~Kuhao
XLIII of 1951 ), it is not open to the Election Tribunal, under Sec- ]Olhi
and'aMl/wr
tion 90( 4) of the Act, to reconsider the question of limitation. Even
w
if, according to the requirement of Section 82 of the Representation B "lal .Mwllal
'll 'and olhm.
of the People Act, any of the necessary parties other than the Bi11an1
returned candidate has not been impleaded, the petition is not liable
to be dismissed in limine on that sole ground; but it is a matter to
be taken into consideration at the appropriate stage with reference
to the final result of the case.
Section 83( 1) of the Act provides that an election petition has
to be verified in the manner provided for verification of pleadings
under the Code of Civil Procedure. Clauses (2) and '(3) of rule 15 in
Order VI of the Code lay down the procedure for verification of
pleadings. Apart from those cases where the date of the pleading
and the verification may be relevant and important, it would be a
wrong exercise of discretionary power to dismiss an application on
the sole ground of the absence of the date of verification. In such
a case the applicant should normally be called upon to remove the
lacuna by adding a supplementary verification indicating the date of
the original verification and the reason for the earlier omission.
The requirement of "full particulars" of corrupt practices in
Section 83(2) of the Act, is one that has got to be complied with,
with sufficient fullness and clarification, so as to enable the opposite
party to meet the allegations against him fairly, and so as to prevent
the enquiry from being turned into a rambling and roving inquisition. The primary responsibility for furnishing full particulars of
alleged currupt practices and for filing a petition in full compliance
with Section 83(2) of the Act is that of the petitioners. If they fail to
do so initially it is their duty and responsibility to remove the defects
when opportunity is available. Tribunals, however, should not take
an all too narrow view of their function in dealing with the various
alleged defects in. the petition and dismiss it on the ground of want
of particulars. They should call for better particulars and if that
order was not complied with strike out such of the charges as arc
vague.
The petitioners also alleged that the returned candidate was disqualified to stand because he had interest in contracts with the Government. But the Tribunal ignored these allegations and without
enquiring into their truth dismissed the petition on the ground that
the allegations relating to the charge of corrupt practices were vague.
Held that it was not in the interest of purity of elections that
such allegations of disqualification should be ignored and 'that it was
a matter which called for enquiry.
Case remitted for enquiry with reference to the allegations that
the returned candidate was disqualified and the charge of corrupt
practice, which was held to be not vague.
Dinabandhu v. Jadumoni ([1955] 1 S.C.R. 140) and Jagan
Nath v. Jaswant ([1954] S.C.R. 892), followed.
430
1955
Bhik'!ii T«sluzo
7oshi aNl anothttVi
JBrijlal Nandlal
Rfyani and others
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19551
CML APPELLATE
JUR1so1CTION : Civil
Appeal
No. 158 of 1954.
Veda Vyas, (S. K. Kapur and Ganpat Rai, with
him), for the appellants.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (M. N.
Phadke and Naunit Lal, with him), for respondent
No. 1.
1955. May 2. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by.
JAGANNADHADAS J.-This is an appeal by special
leave against the judgment and order of the Election
Tribunal, Akola, Madhya Pradesh, dated the 1st May,
1953, dismissing the election petition filed by the appellants. It relates to the election for the Akola
Constituency of the State Assembly of Madhya Pradesh which was held on the 13th December, 1951, and
the result of which was notified in the Gazette on the
4th April, 1952. The two appellants are the electors
of the said constituency. The first respondent was
the successful candidate at the election. Respondents
Nos. 2, 3 and 4 were the other three candidates who,
having been validly nominated went to the polls but
were defeated. The appellants filed the election
petition under section 80 of the Representation of the
People Act, 1951 (Act XLIII of 1951) (hereinafter
referred to as the Act) for setting aside the election
on various allegations. Th~ petition was filed on the
19th April, 1952, before the Election Commission at
Delhi and was admittedly one day beyond the prescribed time. The Election Comµllssion admitted the
petition after condoning the delay under the proviso
to section 85 of the Act and thereupon constituted a
Tribunal for the trial of the petition at Akofa by
notifications dated the 30th July, 1952, and 22nd
September, 1952. In due course respondent No. 1
appeared and filed his written statement on the 6th
October, 1952, and the petitioners filed their reply
thereto on the 16th October, 1952. With reference to
these pleadings, the Tribunal was of the opinion that
it was advisable to frame certain preliminary issues
and to dispose of the same before entering on the
2S C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
431
trial of the case on its merits. Accordingly, nine preliminary issues were framed. These nine issues substantially cover the following questions: (1) Whether
the election petition was presented by a properly
authorised person.
(2) Whether there was sufficient
cause for presentation of the petition one day out of
time. (3) Whether the petition was defective for
non-joinder of certain parties as respondents.
(4)
Whether the petition is defective for want of proper
verification. (5) Whether the petition was defective
for vagueness of the particulars relating to the corrupt practices set out in Schedule A thereto. The
Tribunal found only the first of the above points in
favour of the petitioners by a majority. But in respect of the other four points, it held against the
petitioners unanimously. As a result of the adverse
findings on these four points, the petition was dismissed
without any trial on the merits. It is against
this dismissal that the appellants have now come up
to this Court on obtaining special leave.
Before dealing with the merits of the appeal, it
may be mentioned that at an early stage of these
proceedings before the Tribunal, an objection was
taken to the composition of the Tribunal on the allegation that one of the Members, Shri A. S. Athalye
was not competent to be a Member thereof on account
of his alleged bias in favour of the first respondent.
The bias was sought to be made out by showing that
shortly before the election, Shri Athalye had written
a letter to the 1st respondent offering to assist him in
his election campaign. On objection being taken, the
Tri'.mnal stayed its hands for a preliminary decision
of that question. Meanwhile, the petitioners took
proceedings in the High Court for the quashing of the
constitution of the Tribunal on the above ground by
means of an application under article 226 of the Constitution. That application was dismissed
after
hearing both sides. Thereupon the petitioners moved
this Court for special leave against the order of the
High Court. But this Court declined to grant leave.
Learned counsel for the appellants attempted to
1955
Bhikaji Kuhao
Joshi and 1J11Dthlr
"'
Brijlal Nanti/al
B!1ani and ot"4r1
Jagannall1uldas J.
432
1955
B/Jlkqji Ktshao
]oslil and """'""
Brijlal Nondlal
Bi.Jani and others
...
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
attack the validity of the decision of the Tribunal
now under appeal on the same ground. But this
having been already determined against the
petitioners in the previous proceedings, we declined to
allow the matter to be reopened. On the other side,
the .learned Attorney-General for the 1st respondent
attempted to reopen before us the question :ls to
whether the petition was presented to the Election
Commission by an authorised person, which as stated
above, was found against him by a majority of the
Tribunal. The ground on which he attempted to reopen this question was that the finding was based on
a wrong view as to the burden of proof. We were not
prepared,.. however, to permit this finding of fact to be
reopened • in this appeal on special leave, irrespective
of the question whether the burden of proof was
rightly laid on the petitioners.
The only points, therefore, that have been argued
before us are whether the view taken by the Tribunal
with reference to the following questions, viz. ( 1)
limitation, (2) joinder of parties, (3) verification, and
( 4) specification of particulars of corrupt practices in
Schedule A attached to the petition, is correct, and
if so, whether the same entailed dismissal of the petition. The questions may be taken up one after the
other.
LIMITATION: As stated above, the petition was
-filed on the 19th April, 1952, admittedly one day beyond time. On the 28th April, 1952, the petitioners
filed also an application for condonation of delay
setting out the reasons for the . same. In paragraphs
3, 4 and 5 th~reof the circumstances under which the
delay is said to have occurred were set out as follows:
"3. The applicants were under the belief that
Notice under Rule 113 of the Rules framed under the
above Act was published on 5th April, 1952, in the
official Gazette of the State of Madhya Pradesh. They
felt therefore that their petition was duly presented
within 14 days as prescribed by Rule 119. Applicants,
however, learn that actually the Notice under Rule
113 was published in the Official Gazette of 4th April,
1952. It therefore appears that there was a delay of
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
433
1955
one day in the representation of the election p~tition.
This delay occurred under the following circumstances:4. The applicants prepared their election petition on the 17th April, 1952. They sent the said
petition with Shri P. B. Gole, Senior Advocate, Akola,
with a written authority to present the petition
through any person of his choice at Nagpur on the
18th April. They also sent with Shri Gole Rs. 1,000
for being deposited in the Government Treasury at
Nagpur as required by section 117 of the Act and to
obtain Treasury receipt for security of costs to be filed
with the petition. The applicants were under the
belief that an officer must have been appointed by the
Election Commission under section 81 of the Act to
whom election petitions could be represented for the
State of Madhya Pradesh at Nagpur. Accordingly
Shri Gole left Akola for Nagpur by the 1 Down Nagpur Mail, reaching Nagpur at about 9-30 A. M. on 18th
April, 1952.
5. Mr.
Gole caused the · deposit of Rs. 1,000
security for costs to be made in the Government
Treasury at Nagpur through Mr. Sidhaye, Advocate,
Nagpur, and obtained the necessary Government
Treasury
receipt on the 18th April, 1952. He then
made enquiries about the officer who may have been
appointed to receive the election petitions. He consulted R. S. Rangole, who was attached to the Election Office at Nagpur. On enquiries Shri Gole learnt
that there was none at Nagpur, who was authorised
to receive election petition under the Act. Under
these circumstances Shri Gole booked a seat in the
Night Plane for Delhi and flew to Delhi on the 18th
and reached there on the morning on 19th April, 1952.
On 19th April Shri Gole caused the petition to be presented to the Secretary to the Eelection Commission".
The explanation thus furnished was accepted by the
Election Commission as appears from the intimatibn
to the petitioners by letter dated the 30th July, 1952.
The Tribunal was of the opinion that notwithstanding the order of the Election Commission condoning
the delay and admitting the petition, it was free to
Bhikoji X11/i11a
]Ol/ii Olld Ollal/rn
v.
Brijlal N andlal
Bi;,oni and al/wrs
I
434
1955
Bhikaji XtJhao
Joshi and anollur
v.
Brijlal N andlal
B!Jiani and others
Jagannadhada, ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955}
reconsider the question by virtue of the powers vested
in it under section 90( 4) of the Act. In this view it
went into the merits of the explanation furnished and
came to the conclusion that the petitioners were negligent and that the delay, even of one day, could not
be condoned. It accordingly held that the petition
was liable to be dismissed as barred by time. Now,
apart from the merits of the sufficiency of the cause
for delay, the question as to whether, notwithstanding the condonation of the delay by the Election
Commission, it was open to a Tribunal to reconsider
the matter by virtue of section 90( 4) of the Act, is
now covered ·by the decision of this Court reported in
Dinabandhtt v. fadttmoni(').
It was therein heid that
it was not open to the Tribunal to reconsider the
matter in such a case. The conclusion of the Tribunal, therefore, on this point cannot be maintained.
The learned Attorney-General attempted to argue
that the decision of this Court referred to above was
obiter as regards the legal point and required further
consideration. But we were not prepared to permit
that question to be reopened. We were also not
satisfied that there was any adequate reason for the
Tribunal to interfere wiih the view taken by the
Election Commission condoning the delay of one day
on the explanation furnished to it. This explanation
has not been found, even by the Tribunal, to be
false.
JOINDER OF PARTIES: The objection as to·
joinder of parties arises as follows. Three persons by
name Shri Sohom, Shri Kulkarni, and Shri Kothkar
were nominated as candidates at the election. Their
nominations were found to be in order on scmtiny
by the Returning Officer. But within the time allowed,.
these
three ·withdrew from the elections under
section 37 of the Act. The petitioners, while they
impleaded as respondents the three unsuccessfuI
candidates who went to the polls, did not implead
these three persons. The view taken by the Tribunal was that these were also necessary parties and
that their non-joinder rendered the petition liable for
(1) [1955] l S. C.R. 140.
2.S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
435
dismissal. In support of their view, the Tribunal
·~elied upon section 82 of the Act which is as follows:
"A petitioner shall join as respondents to his
petition all the candidates who were duly nominated
at the election other than himself if he was so nominated".
It has been argued before us that this view is erroneous and that persons who filed their nominations and
who '}'ithdrew from the contest within the prescribed
time in spite of their nominations having been found
to be in order on scrutiny by the Returning Officer,.
cannot be said to fall within the category of "candidates duly nominated at the election". In support
of this contention two decisions Sitaram v. Yograjsing(1) and Shea Kumar v. V. G. Oak(2) have been
cited. On the other side the case in Mohammad Umair
v. Ram Charan Singh(3) was brought to our notice
in support of the view taken by the Tribunal. These
three decisions have treated the decision of the question as depending on a construction of the phrase "at
the election" in section 82 of the Act. The Bombay
and Allahabad cases hold that this phrase confines
the necessary parties under this section to those who
were candidates for the actual poll, while the Patna
High -Court takes the view that the phrase "at the
election" has no such limiting significance. It appears
to us to be unnecessary and academic to go into thi~
judicial ·controversy having regard to the decision of
this Court in /agan Nath v. Jaswant Singh('). If we
were called upon to settle this controversy, we would
prefer to base the decision not on any meticulous
construction of the phrase "at the election" but on a
comprehensive consideration of the relevant provi·
sions of the Act and of the rules framed thereunder
and of the purpose, if any, of the requirement under
section 82 as to the joinder of parties other than the
returned candidate. ·we are, however, relieved from
this, since it has been decided in /agan. Nath v. /aswant Singh( ) that even if any of the necessary parties other than the returned candidate has not been
(1) A.I.R. 1953 Bombay 293.
(3) A.I.R. 1954 Patna 225.
(2) A.I.R. 1953 All. 633.
(4) [1954] S.C.R. 892.
1955
Bhilcaji Keshao
Joshi and anvtMr'
v.
Brijlal Nandlal
BiJani and olhzrs
Jagannadhadas ].
436
1955
Bhikaji K1sltao
:Jo,hi and anol/ur
v.
B.jjlal N andlal
B!Yat1i and ot/wrs
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
impleaded, the petition is not liable to be dismissed
in limine on that sole ground but that it is a matter
to be taken into consideration at the appropriate
stage with reference to the final result of the case. In
view of this ruling the decision of the Tribunal on
this point also cannot be maintained.
VERIFICATION: The view taken by the Tribunal
on this question is based on section 83(1) of the Act
which is as follows :
"An election petition shall contain a concise
statement of the material facts on which the petitioner
relies and shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for the verification of pleadings".
I
The relevant provision in the Civil Procedure Code
referred to herein is Order VI, rule 15, clauses (2) and
(3), which are as follows :
"(2) The person verifying shall specify, by reference to the numbered paragraphs of the . pleading,
what he verifies of his. own knowledge and what he
verifies upon information received and believed to be
true.
(3) The verification shall be signed by the person
making it and shall state the date on which and the
place at which it was signed".
In the present case the verification of the petition as
well as the schedule of particulars of corrupt practices
are each signed by both the petitioners and there is
now no dispute about it. The verification clause in
the petition is as follows :
"The above-named applicants hereby affirm that
the contents of the above petition are true to information received from the press reports and several other
electors and believed by them to be true.
Signed and verified at Akola on
".
The verification clause relating . to the particulars of
corrupt practices in Schedule A is as follows :
"The above-named applicants aflirm that the
contents in this schedule are true to information
received and believed by us to be true.
Signed and verified at Akola on
"
2 S.C.R.:'\·
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
437
In the view of the Tribunal there were two defects
in these verifications. They do not refer to any
numbered paragraphs nor do they bear the dates on
which they were signed. In the view of the Tribunal
the petition was liable to dismissal for non-compliance
·~ the specific provision in the Act in this behalf.
Th~t the verification neither in the petition nor in the
schedule of particulars bears any date is not disputed.
But it is contended that the view taken by the
Tribunal in so far as it was of the opinion that the
verifications do not refer to any numbered paragraphs is unsustainable. It is pointed out that the
statements in the verification were clearly meant to
convey that the various allegations in the petition
and schedule were, in their entirety, based on information and belief. It is urged, therefore, that
there was no scope and hence no need to specify which
were based on personal knowledge and which upon
information. We agree with this contention. It is to
be noticed that a verified pleading is different from
an affidavit which, by virtue of Order XIX, rule 3, is
specifically required to ' be confined to such facts as
the deponent is able of his own knowledge to prove
(except on interlocutory applications, on which statements of his belief may be admitted, provided that
the grounds thereof are stated. But there is notand in the nature of things there cannot be-any
such limitation for pleadings. Hence it became necessary in the verification of a pleading to demarcate
clearly between the two. The allegations in the petition in this case purport to be based only on information. Since the verification clauses refer to the entirety
of the petition and the attached schedule, absence of
enumeration of the various paragraphs therein as
having been based on information cannot be considered to be a defect. The verifications are accordingly defective only as regards the requirement of the
dates thereof. The question is whether the petition
is liable to dismissal on this ground. Though there
may be cases where the date of the pleading and the
verification may be relevant and important, it would
be a wrong exercise of discretionary power to dismi~
1955
Bhilcaji Kesllao
Joshi and anothn
v.
Brijlal Nandlal
BiYani and otMrs
jagaMadhadas J.
438
1955
.iBhikaji Keshao
Joshi and another
v.
Brij/a/ Nandlal
,Bi)ani and others
JagaMadhadas ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
an application on the sole ground of absence of date
of verification. In such a ease the applicants should
normally be called upon to remove the lacuna by
adding a supplementary verification indicating the
date of the original verification and the reason for
the earlier omission.
PARTICULARS OF CORRUPT PRACTICES:
The objection is based on section 83(2) of the Act
which is as follows :
''The pet1t10n shall be accompanied by a list
signed and verified in like manner setting forth full
particulars of any corrupt or illegal practice which the
petitioner alleges, including as full a statement as
possible as to the names of the parties alleged to
have committed such corrupt or illegal practice and
·the date and place of the commission of each such
practice".
The objection is that the particulars of the instances
furnished in Schedule A to the petition are all of
them vague and not in compliance with .the above
provision. The list of particulars is as follows:
SCHEDULE "A".
List of particulars of instances referred in the
accompanying petition.
1. That in the month of December, 1951, respondent No. 1 has been to the premises of Akola
Shree Gurudwara, where the Local Sikh Community
had assembled to listen to the recitation of the holy
book 'Granth Saheb' on the 7th day of the death of
daughter of one Sardar Suratsingh. At this meeting respondent No. 1 canvassed for votes for himself
and paid Rs. 201/-, apparently as donation to the
Gurudwara, but really as gift for inducing the Sikh
Community in the Akola Constituency in general and
the Sikhs assembled in particular to induce them to
vote for himself at the ensuing election. Respondent
No. 1 was guilty of bribery within the meaning of
that term in section 123 of the Representation of the
People Act.
Similar instances of giving illegal gratifications
for securing votes of respective groups arc(a) Donation to Hariharpeth Akhada ;
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
439
(b) Payment to Panch-bungalow Committee of
Bhangis of Old City.
( c) Donation to Bhaji Bazar Association.
( d) Distrib~tion of blankets and sanes and
money to voters.
2. At the instance of respondent No. 1 a meeting of workers in Berar Oil Industries-a concern of
Birla, was called by its manager on the eve of the
dection and they were threatened to vote for respondent No. 1 on pain of losing their service or suffer
pecuniary loss, in case they did not vote for respondent No. 1. The poster of the rival candidate affixed
,on the post-office within the premises of the Berar
Oil Industries was removed and stolen away.
3. Respondent No. 1 caused groups and sections
of castes and communities, such as Bohara, Lohars,
Marwaries, Muslims, Rajasthanies, Bhangies, to issue
appeals stating that resolutions were passed for voting
for respondent No. 1, coercing the voters by threats,
,etc., to vote for respondent No. 1 and openly canvassing on communal and caste lines and using undue
influence.
4. Issuing pamphlets and
handbills without
names of printer or publisher.
5. At the time of counting votes in Polling Station No. 53, several folded bundles amounting to
-about 20 in number, of ballot papers were found in
the ballot box of respondent No. 1, when it was opened
for counting votes. This was noted by the Returning
Officer. Each bundle consisted three or more than
three ballot papers, folded to gether. Obviously each
of the bundl.! of these. ballot papers were put in the
ballot box by one person, as the ballot papers put in
the ballot box by different voters could not automatically fold themselves into a compact bundle in
the ballot box. The ballot papers issued to voters
were not put in the box by the voters themselves, but
were illegally brought back by the voters and handed
over to persons working for and on behalf or respondent No. 1 on payment of illegal gratification. These
ballot papers thus collected were bundled together
,56
1955
Bhikaji KeJhao
Joshi and another
••
Brijlal Nandlal
Biyani and ot!rtrl
Jagannadhadas J.
440
1955
Bhikaji Keshao
Joshi and another
v.
Brijlal Nartdlal
Biyani and olhtrs
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955J
and put in the ballot box by persons working for and
on behalf of respondent No. 1 by taking illegal gratifications. This was done· on 31st December, 1951, at
Chandur by persons with the connivance of respondent No. 1.
6. False personation of several dead voters and
voters absent in Pakistan has taken place, in Ward
No. 12 and 15.
7. The respondent No. 1 resorted to false propaganda. His man announced on loud speakers from
place to place that rival candidate Dr. Joglekar was
of the caste and party of Godse, the murderer of M.
Gandhi and a vote for him was a vote for Gandhi's
Murderer. Another false propaganda was that Dr.
Joglekar was Mishra's man, supported by Mishra's
money.
Lectures for respondent No. 1 in public
meetings, including respondent No. 1 have freely made
these false defamatory and
malicious
statements
against Dr. Joglekar, the rival candidate and thus
prejudiced the prospects of Dr. Joglekar's election.
Personal character and conduct of Dr. Joglekar was
also falsely attacked, thus prejudicing his prospects
of election.
8. Voters were carried in hired carts at many
polling stations, particularly at Kapshi Polling Station. This was arranged by persons working for and
on behalf of respondent No. 1 at his expense and connivance.
A written objection for police enquiry was
given at Kapshi and one in Rifle Range area.
9. Respondent No. 1 spent lacs of rupees over
his election transgressing the prescribed limit of Rs.
6,000. He has given a totally untrue .return of election expenses. This is in contravention of law.
10. Mohota Mills released workers and paid
them for canvassing work for respondent No. 1 on
polling day. Substitutes for these workers were engaged by the mills and they were also paid. This was
done at .the instance of respondent No. l".
There can be no doubt that almost all the instances
herein-above set out are extremely vague and lack
sufficient particulars.
Learned counsel for the appel-
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
441
lants invited our attention to the fact that the Tribunal, while considering the question of vagueness dealt
only with the instances of corrupt practices specified
in paragraphs l(a), l(b), l(c), l(d), 2, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8
and not others. He accordingly contended that, by
implication, the Tribunal was not prepared to hold
that items mentioned in paragraphs 1, 3, 9 and 10
were vague. He urged that at least these four items
must be taken not to be vague and that there is no
reason why the petitioners should not have been called
upon to amend the schedule by furnishing better
particulars as to the rest. He further urged that, at
any rate, they were entitled to a trial in respect of
those four items of corrupt practices. We cannot
agree with learned counsel for the appellants that the
items set out in paragraphs 3, 9 and 10 are not vague.
There is no specification therein of the requisite details
which the Act in terms requires. Section 83(2) requires not only what may reasonably be considered
"full particulars" having regard to the nature of each
allegation, but enjoins in terms that the following
particulars should also be given. (1) Names of the
parties alleged to have committed the corrupt or
illegal practice.
(2) The date of the commission of
each such corrupt or illegal practice. (3) The place
of commission of each such corrupt or illegal practice.
There can be no reasonable doubt that the requirement of "full particulars" is one that has got to be
complied with, with sufficient fullness and clarification so as to enable the opposite-party fairly to meet
them and that they must be such as not to turn the
enquiry before the Tribunal into a rambling and roving inquisition. On a careful scrutiny of the list in
Schedule A we are satisfied that none of the items
except that which is set out in paragraph 1 of item
No. 1 can be said to comply with the requirements of
section 83(2). In this view of -the contents of Schedule A, the contention of the learned counsel for the
appellants is that even so the Tribunal should have
called upon the petitioners to furnish better particulars as regards all the other items, by virtue of the
powers conferred on it under section 83(3), and in the
10-83 S.C. lndia/59
1955
B'""4ji K11hoo
]Olm atuJ _,,,,..
.,..
Brijlal N aMlal I
Bi1oni ottd olhm
J«gotinodhadu J.
442
1955
Bhikaji Kesh4o
]Dlhi and another
v,
Brijlal }fandlal
Biyani and olher1
Jagannadhadas J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
alternative, it should have at least called upon them
to substantiate the allegation in paragraph 1 in item
No. 1, which was sufficiently specific and which, if
made out, might have resulted in the election being
set aside. On the question whether or not the Tribunal
should have called upon the petitioners to amend the
schedule by furnishing better particulars, the learned
Attorney-General for the 1st respondent has invited
our attention to the objection taken in the written
statement as regards the vagueness of the, particulars
and to the various orders made by the Tribunal as
appears from the order-sheet of the, .case. In the
written statement of the 1st respondent-: paragraph 9
is as follows :
"9. (a) It is, further, submitted that the petition ought to be dismissed as it does not contain
concise statement of material facts on which the petitioners rely. Similarly the list of particulars given in
the schedule or in the petition are not in compliance
with section 83(2).
(b) Without prejt.dice to the generality of this
objection, it is further submitted that para V of petition read with para VI ( e) will show that the particulars given in Schedule relate to corrupt and illegal
practices alleged to have been committed by respondent No. 1 and by his agents and persons working on
behalf of respondent No. 1 with his connivance. Such
particulars are bad in law. The applicants are bound
to state the names of the persons who are alleged to
have actually committed the corrupt or illegal practice.
( c) Paras 1 and 2 of the petition allege that there
was no free election by reason of general bribery
and undue influence exercised by and on behalf of
respondent No. 1. Similarly the allegation in para 2
is that the coercion was the result of manipulation by
or at the instance of respondent No. 1. Thus these
allegations must be supported by giving the necessary
particulars regarding the names, date and place of
commission of corrupt or illegal practice alleged. The
allegations in paras 1 and 2 of the petition are allegatior.s of corrupt and illegal practice within the mean-
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
443
ing of sections 123, 124 and 125 of the Act, and are
not allegations of a general charactj:r which do not
implicate the candidate personally.
( d) Further by way of example, para 1 of the
schedule, no names, date of the alleged practices are
given.
Same is the case with the · allegations in
paras 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 & 10 .
( e) It is for the petitioners to satisfy the Election Commission and the Tribunal that the particulars
given are according to law. This has not been done
and the petition, therefore, ought to be dismissed on
this ground".
Now the order-sheet of the proceedings before the
Tribunal discloses the following. By order dated
the 16th October, 1952, the Tribunal decided that the
case was in the first instance to be taken up for decision on the preliminary issues. Having so decided it
passed the following order:
"We call upon the parties whether they want to
add by way of amendment to the pleadings on facts
which they have already made, as in some of the
preliminary points the question of fact is involved.
The respondents do not want to add to their
pleadings on facts in respect of the above preliminary
issues.
The petitioners have made an application
under Order VI, rule 16, Civil Procedure Code for
striking out spmc i}ortion in paras 3-b and para 4-(d)
(2) of the written statement of the respondent No. 1".
On. the 17th January, 1953, the Tribunal passed the
following order:
"The respondent No. 1. prays for time to amend
his written-statement and to ask for particulars. In
the interests of justice the time is granted .... The
application for amendment and for particulars to be
filed five days before the date of hearing and copies
thereof given to the petitioners. The petitioners
shall be ready with their replies on the date of
hearing".
On the 27th January, 1953, the order is
"The petitioners have filed their reply to the
amendment application of the respondent No. 1. The
1955
BJ.ikaji Kesh.a
Joshi aN/ anollllr
v.
Brijlal Nandltd
Bi1atti and olhert
Jagannadhadas ].
·+14
1955
ll/rikqji Kn/tao
]DJ/ri """
v. -
Brjjlol NllllllW
Bi1alli and olhns
Jllplrl1ltldWas ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19551
latter has amended his application, to· which there
was no objecion".
On the 29th January, 1953, the order is
"The petitioners do not want to amend their
pleadings in view of the amendment of the written
statement".
In view of the specific objection taken in the written
statement and the opportunities which the petitioners
had for amending the petition which the above orders
disclose, there is considerable force in the contention
of the learned Attorney-General that the pet1ttoners,
for some reasons best known to themselves, have come
forward
with a somewhat irresponsible petition
and that while the Court has undoubtedly the power
to permit amendment of the schedule of corrupt
practices
by permitting the furnishing of better
particulars as regards the items therein specified, there
was no duty cast upon the Tribunal to direct suo
motu the furnishi.ng of the better particulars. It is true
that the petitioners in the reply that they filed to the
written statement of the 1st respondent and in
answer ·to the objection that the particulars as to the
alleged corrupt practices were vague, said as follows :
"The petitioners are prepared to give further
particulars if the Tribunal is pleased to permit under
section 83(3) of the Representation of the People
Act".
This reply was filed on the 16th October, 1952, which
is the very date on which the first of the above orders
extracted from the order-sheet was passed. It is also
true that the order dated the 17th January, 1953,
shows that the respondent No. I at one stage, indicated an intention .. · himself. to ask for particulars. But
':i a matter of/this kind the
primary responsibility
for furnishing ·full particulars of the alleged corrupt
practices and to file a petition in full compliance
with section 83(2) of the Act was on the petitioners.
While undoubtedly the Tribunal has, in our opinion,
·taken all too narrow a view of their function in deal; ng with the various alleged defects in the petition
and in treating them as sufficient for dismissal, the
petitioners are not absolved from their duty to
2 S.C.R.
' REPORTS
SUPREME COURT
445
J55 '
comply, of their own accord, with the requirements
of section 83(2) of the Act and to remove the defects
B/tikqji Ka!IM
anolhlr
when opportunity was available. They cannot take Joshi and
v.
shelter behind the fact that neither the Tribunal nor
11'ijlal N and14l
the respondent No. 1 has, in terms, called upon them Bipi and OIMn
to furnish better particulars.
Jagannadhadas J.
The position, therefore, on the question of compliance or otherwise of the requirements of section 83
of the Act is that (1) the verifications in the petition
and schedule are defective inasmuch as the dates
thereof are not specified, and (2) the schedule of particulars consists of a number of items of which only
one at best could have been taken up for inquiry by
the Tribunal. But all the rest were not only extremely
vague but no amendment was applied for nor was an
opportunity for amendment of pleadings in general,
open on two occasions, availed of. Learned counsel
for the appellants urges that however this may be,
there Was no justification for the Tribunal dismissing
the petition in toto and that it was bound to have
called upon the petitioners to substantiate the first
allegation by evidence after striking out, if need be,
the rest of the particulars, under the powers vested
in it under Order VI, rule 16, Civil Procedure Code.
On the other hand the learned Attorney-General for
the respondent No. 1 urges that in such a situation
it was open to the Tribunal to consider whether,
taking the petition as a whole and in its total effect,
there was substantial compliance with the requirements of section 83. He contends that if, in exercise ·
_ of its judgment, it thought ·that there was substantial
non-compliance, notwithstanding that one out of the
various items may have been specific, it was not bound
to exercise its discretion in favour of the petitioners
by ordering a striking out of the various items and to
direct the trial of the petition to be confined to one
single item which may be in order. The learned
Attorney-General urgues that this would be really
making out for the petitioners a different petition
from what they brought up before the Election Commission and that in this class of case$ the Tribunal
had the right and the duty to exercise great strictness
"--
446
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1955]
in order that the machinery for setting aside elections
might not be abused for the purpose of maligning the
Bhikajf Keshao
Joshi and another successful candidate _by levelling vague and irresponv.
sible. charges against him. _\Vhile there is consider. Bdjlal Nandlal able force in this argument,. we think ·that in a case
Biyani and others of this kind the Tribunal when dealing with the
-;;: d J matter .in the early stages should riot have dismissed
1 aganna a as • th'e application~ It should have exerCised its powers
and called for better particulars. On non-compliance
therewith, it should have ordered a striking out of
such of the.'charges which remained vague and called
upon the petitioners ·to substantiate the allegations
in respect-of those which were reasoncibly specific.
\Ve are, therefore, of the opinion that the order of
the .tribunal in dismissing the petition outright was
clearly erroneous. : Notwithstanding this opinionwe
-\vould, in the normal course,. not have felt called
upon to interfere fo this case under article 136 after
this lapse of time arid at the instance of persons
like the appellants before us who are mere voters
having no direct personal interest in the result of
the election.·
But there is one other circumstance .in· this case
which we.have noticed and which we feel 'we ought
not to overlook, though in the course of, the arguments the same was riot brought to our notice. Para~
graphs 6(a), (b) and (c) _of the application for setting
aside the election sets out certain_ grounds of alleged
disqualification of the returned candidate to stand for
the election. · It is also stated therein that objections
in this _behalf were taken at the. time of scrutiny of
the nomination papers bufthat they were summarily
,ov:erruled by the Returning Officer. without any
enquiry and that accordingly the objections to the ·
._. _ disqualification have been raised in the ,application. ·
The objections are as follows:
... 6. The material facts in support of the grounds
·
are as follows:~
. '
. ' ' . .
"
· · (a) The .election of candidate for the Madhya
Pradesh State Assembly in the single member Akola
Constituency was announced to be held on31-12-1951.
N:ominations
. were to be filed
.. qn or before 15-11-1951;
.1955
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
447
and scrutiny of nomination was due on 17-11-1951.
At this time of scrutiny objection was taken to the
nomination paper of respondent No. 1 on several
grounds but the material grounds were that respondent No. 1 was disqualified for being chosen as and
for being a Member of Madhya Pradesh State Assembly
under Chapter III, section 7 ( d) of the Representation
of the People Act, 1951 (Act XLIII of 1951). That the
respondent No. 1 is disqualified to fill the seat under
the Act, because he is the Managing Agent or Managing Director of Rajasthan Printing and (Litho Works
-private limited company under the Indian Companies Act. He has, as a share-holder and director,
interest, in contracts for supply of goods, viz. stationery, paper and printing materials, etc., to the
State Government of Madhya Pradesh. He has also
interest in contracts for the execution of works or
performance of services, such as printing; etc., undertaken by the State Government of Madhya Pradesh.
The respondent No. 1 gets a share by way of commission on sales effected by the Limited Company
He has, therefore, by himself interest in the contracts
of the company with the State Government of Madhya
Pradesh.
(b) The respondent No. 1 is a partner in the firm
Berar General Agency. The said firm has entered
into a contract for the performance of cloth distribution on behalf of the State Government to retailers
and holds a licence for the same. The respondent
No. 1, therefore, has interest by himself in the said
contract for the performance of services unpertaken
bv the Government.
· ( c) The respondent No. 1 is the proprietor of the
monthly Journal "Prawaha" and a by-weekly paper
"Matru-bhumi"
These publications
print Government
advertisements
on contract
basis. The
respondent No. 1 has, therefore, interest in the
said contract for the performance of services undertaken by the State Government Madhya Pradesh.
The income derived from these contracts by the respondent No. 1 are noted in the private accounts of
1955
Bltikaji K.sliao
Juhi and anotlrlr
v.
Brjjlal N and/al
Biyani and ot/rlrs
Jazannadhadas J.
...
448
1955
Bltiiqji K1Moo
.]ol/ti """~
...
/hiflal NOIUll4l
BIJOni and otlrlrs
j111~j.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
the respondent No. 1 and their details are shown in
the profit and loss .statements filed with income-tax
return of the respondent No. 1 for the relevant year
and current year.
The sales and other details of the "Matru-bhumi"
concern are noted in the private accounts of the respondent No. L
These objections were summarily overruled by
the Returning Officer, without any inquiry or any
reason".
These allegations, if made out with such further details as may be necessary, might well prove serious
and bring about the setting aside of the election of
the returned candidate . The 1st respondent in answer
to these allegations states as follows:
"It is denied that there was any improper acceptance of the nomination paper of respondent No. 1
and in particular it is denied that any of the allegations made in paragraph 6(a), (b) & (c) of the petition constitute in law a disqualifications of section 7
of the Representation of the People Act. Without prejudice to this it is submitted that the respondent
No. 1 was not suffering from any of these disqualifications in fact on the date of the submission of the
nomination paper".
Having regard to the nature of the alleged disqualification, which is substantially to the effect that the
returned candidate had interest in contracts with the
Government at the relevant dates, it was very necessary that the matters should have been cleared up in
the enquiry before th~ Election Tribunal. It is not
in the interest of purity of elections that such allegations oi disqualification should be completely ignored
without cnqufry and it appears rather surprising that
the Tribunal should have ignored them and exercised
its powcc to dismiss the petition. However reluctant
·we might be to interfere in a matter like this after the
lapse of three years and four months and with only
an year and eight months before the general elections,
we feel constrained to send this matter back for due
aiquicy. But bc£«e doing so and in view of the delay
and other circumstances that have already happened,
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
449
we, in exercise of the powers which the Tribunal in
•he normal course might itself have exercised, direct
the striking out of all the items of alleged corrupt
practices set out in Schedule A excepting the one
covered by paragraph 1 of item 1, i.e., as follows:
"That in the month of December, 1951, respondent No. 1 had been to the premises of Akola Shree
Gurdwara, where the Local Sikh Community had assembled to listen to the recitation of the holy book
'Granth Saheb' on the 7th day of the death of
daughter of one Sardar Suratsingh. At this meeting
respondent No. 1 canvassed for votes for himself and
paid Rs. 201, apparently as donation to the Gurudwara, but realy as gift for inducing the Sikh Community in the Akola constituency in general and the
Sikhs assembled in particular to induce them to vote
for himself at the ensuing election. Respondent No. 1
was guilty of bribery within the meaning of that term
in section 123 of the Representation of the People
Act".
The case will, therefore, go back for enquiry and trial
with reference only to (1) the allegations in paragraphs 6(a), (b) and (c) of tbe application for setting
aside the election, and (2) the allegations in paragraph 1 of item 1, in Schedule A attached to the application as set out above.
The Election Commissioner will now reconstitute
an appropriate Tribunal for the purpose. The Tribunal when constituted and before proceeding to trial
will call upon the petitioners to rectify the lacuna as
to dates in the verification clauses in the petition and
the schedule.
It is to be hoped that the fresh proceedings before the Tribunal will be disposed of at a
very early date.
The appeal is allowed as stated
above but in the circumstances without costs.
1955
Bhikaji Keshao
Joshi and anolhu
v.
Brijlal N andlal
Bi1ani and others
Jagannadharlas ].
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