THE DELHI CLOTH AND GENERAL MILLS CO., LTD. versus HARNAM SINGH AND OTHERS.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 21 April 1955 | [1955] 2 S.C.R. 402 | 1955 INSC 34
Key facts
- Decided
- 21 April 1955
- Bench
- VIVIAN BOSE*, B. JAGANNADHADAS, BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 200/1954
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1955] 2 S.C.R. 402
- Neutral citation
- 1955 INSC 34
Text of the judgment
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
1955
Om Prakash Gu1ta
v.
Tlie Stale of Ufla,
Prtkhsh
Imam].
1955
April 21
[1955)
dismissal and that he has been paid subsistence allowance for the entire period. Such . subsistence allowance as has been paid to the appellant from the 25th
of November, 1944, to the 31st December, 1947, inclusive, must, thertfore, be credited to the respondent
and the same must be adjusted against the salary
claimed by the appellant. A decree will accordingly
be prepared stating the amount recoverable by the
appellant.
The appellant was permitted to appeal in forma
pauperis. As he has succeeded in the appeal, the
Registrar shall calculate the amount of court fee which
would have been paid by the appellant ;f he had not
been allowed to appeal as a pauper and incorporate
it in the decree. The court fee shall be paid by the
appellant and the same will be recoverable by the
Government of India from him and shall be the first
charge on the amount decreed to him. Under Rule 7
of Order XIV of the Rules of this Court, the appellant will be allowed the fees paid by him to his Advocates, in the taxation of costs.
THE DELHI CLOTH AND GENERAL MILLS
CO., LTD.
ti.
HARNAM SINGH AND OTHERS.
(VMAN BosE, JAGANNADHADAS and BHUVANESHWAR
PRASAD SINHA, JJ.)
Priv11te International Law-Law applic11ble to contractual obligations-English and Continental schools of thought-Lex situs and
uProper I.Au/' of contract-Partition of India-Post partition debt
-Action for recovery where lies-Analogy of banking transactions and
insurance claims-Place of primary obligatio11-Debt, whether pro-
perty-Sections 3 and 130 of Transfer of Property Act-Evacuee property laws-Pakistan (Protection of Evacuee Property) Ordinance,
1948 (XV/ll of 1948)-Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Pro·
perty) Ordinance (XV) 1949-Whether confiscatory in nature
During the years in question cloth was rationed at Lyallpur,
then a part of the Punjab in undivided Tndia, ·and sales could only
be made to government nominees and other authorised persons. The
plaintiffs rcsii!cnt in Lyallpur, were the government nominees. The
2S.C.R.
SUPREME" COURT REPORTS
40.3
1955
defendant company with its. head office at . Delhi, had a branch
office and mills at Lyallpur, and supplied the plaintiffs with cloth Tire Dtlhi Cloth
from time to time in accordance with the government quota through and GtnMal Mills
Co. [Jd.
its branch manager at Lyallpur. Their dealings lasted some 4 or 5
v.
years prior to 1947.
Harnam Singh
and other1
In. accordance with their ~ontract the plaintiffs left a security
deposit of Rs. 1,000 with the defendant's branch manager at Lyallpu1,
aud deposited further sums of money with him from time to time at
Lyallpur. The defendant supplied the plaintiffs with their quota of
doth against those deposits. There was thus a running account
between the parties in which the balance was sometimes in the
plaintiffs' favour and sometimes against them; when against, they
paid the defendant interest on the "overdraft". The goods had to
be supplied at Lyallpur and all moneys were paid there. The ac.·
counts were kept at Lyallpur though copies were sent to the
defendant's head office at Delhi.
In 1947, when India was partitic.ned, Lyallpur was assigned to
The plaintiffs thereupon Red the country and entered
India as refugees. They settled in Delhi and thus became "evacuees"
according to a Pakistan ordinance. At that time there was a balance
of Rs. 11,496-6-6 in the plaintiffs favour. They accordingly made a
demand at Delhi for repayment of this sum and for return of their
security deposit.
Paki~tan.
In the meanwhile the Pakistan Government issued an Ordinance
(1) vesting all evacuee property in the Custodian of Evacuee Property in Pakistan ; (2) prohibiting the payment of money to evacuees; and (3) requiring all moneys payable to, or claimable by,
evacuees to be paid to the Deputy Custodian of Evacuee Property in
Pakistan. Payments so made were
to operate as a discharge from
further liability to the extent of the payment. Breach of this law
was punishable as an offence.
The Deputy Custodian demanded payment from the defendant
of the moneys owing to the plaintiff. After some correspondence
and demur, the payment was made as required. The- defendant
pleaded this as a defence to the action.
1Idd : (I) Lyallpur was the place of primary obligation because
under the contract the balance remaining at its termination was to
be paid there and not elsewhere, accordingly the demand for payment made at Delhi before a demand and refusal at Lyallpur \\'a';
inelfocti\·e;
(2) That the elements out of which the .contract to p~y
arose were most densely grouped at Lyallpur, so Lyallpur was tne
natural scat of the contract and the place with which it had its
closest and most real connection. Accordingly, the "proper law
of the contract" was the Lyallpur Law;
(3) Under the English doctrine also the situs of the debt was
Lyallpur; and so
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1955
[1955]
(4) either way, the Lyallpur law applied
( 5) as it obtained at Lyallpur at the time when performance
Th• D,lhi Cloth
anJ GtNTal Mills 'vas due because a upropcr law" intended as a whole to govern a
Co. Ltd.
v.
Harnam Singh
and otMrJ
contract is administcrCd as a "living and changing body of law",
accordingly, effect is given to any changes occurring in it before
pcrformancse is due;
( 6) a "debt" being a chose in action is "property" within the
meaning of the Pakistan Ordinance and so,
(7) the money was rightly paid to the Deputy Custodian and
that operated as a good discharge and exonerated the defendant
from further liability.
But quaere whether different conditions would not, arise in a
case where no payment is made and the defendant has no garnishable
assets in Pakistan out of which the West Punjab Government could
realise the debt out of the defendant's property there.
( 8) The provisions of the Pakistan ordinance relevant to the
case al!' not opposed to the public policy of India and so can be
relied on as a defence to an action of this nature.
Appeal Allowed.
Mount Albert Borough Council v. Australasian Temperance, etc.
(1938 A.C. 224), Bonython v. Commonwealth of Australia (1951 A.C.
201 at 219), Bank of Travancore v. Dhirt Ram (69 I.A. I at 8), New
York Life [nsurance v. Public Trustee ([1924] 2 Ch. IOI at 119),
Rex v. Lovitt (1912 A.C. 212), /oachinsons v. Swiss Bank Corporation
([1921] 3. K.B. 110), Arab Bank v. Barclays Bank (1954 A.C. 4~5
at 531), Fouad Bishara v. State of Israel ([1954] I A.E.R. 145),
Re Chesterman's Trusts ((1923] 2 Ch. 466 at 478), Re Banque Des
Marchands De Moscou ([1954] 2 A.E.R. 746), Odwin v. Forbes (1817
Buck 57) and Re. Munster ([1920] I Ch. 268), rcterred to.
CIVIL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION :
Civil
Appeal
No. 200 of 1954.
Under Article 133 of the Constitution and section
109 of the Code of Civil Procedure from the Judgment
and decree date<l the 6th December 1952, of the Circuit Bench of the Punjab High Court at Delhi (Weston
C.J. and Bhandari ).) in Regular First Appeal No. 72
of 1952, arising out of the ) udgment and Decree
dated the 14th Day of April 1952, of the Court of
Subordinate Judge, Delhi in Suit No. 657 of 1950.
B.
N. C. Chatterjee, (Tarachand Brijmohan/al
and
1'. Maheshwari, with him) for the Appellant.
R. S. Naru/a, for the Respondent.
2 S.C.R.
1955.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
April 21.
The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
Bos}. J.-The defendant appeals.
The plaintiffs were the partners of a firm known as
Harnam Singh Jagat Singh.
Before the partition of
India they carried on the business of cotton cloth
dealers at Lyallpur which is now in Pakistan.
The defendant is the Delhi Cloth and General Mills
Co. Ltd. It is a registered company carrying on
business at Delhi and other places and has its head
office at Delhi. One of the places at which it carried
on business before the partition was Lyallpur.
The plaintiffs' case is that they carried on business
with the defendant company for some three or £om
years before 1947 and purchased cloth from the company from time to time. In the course of their business
they used to make lump sum payments to the defendant against their purchases. Sometimes these were
advance payments and at others the balance was
against them. When there was an adverse balance
the plaintiffs paid the defendant interest: see the
plaintiff Sardari Lal as P. W. 3.
On 28-7-1947 the account stood in the plaintiffs'
favour. There was a balance of Rs. 79-6-6 lying to
their credit plus a deposit of Rs. 1,000 as security. On
tha~ day they deposited a further Rs. 55,000 bringing
the balance in their favour up to Rs. 56,079-6-6.
The defendant company delivered cloth worth Rs.
43583-0-0 to the plaintiffs against this amount at or
about that time. That left a balance of Rs. 11,496-6-6.
The suit is to recover this balance plus interest.
The claim was decreed for Rs. 12,496-6-6 and this
was uoheld on appeal to the High Court. The defendant appeals here.
The defendant admits the facts set out above but
defends the action on the following ground. It contends that when India was partitioned on 15-8-1947,
Lyallpur, where these transactions took place and
where the money is situate, was assigned to Pakistan.
The plaintiffs fled to India at this time and thus
1955
T/16 Delhi Cloth
and General Mills
Co. Ltd.
v.
HamamSingh
and others
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1955
The Delhi Cloth
and Gmeral Mills
Co. l.Jd.
v.
Htm1am Singh
and others
Bost].
[1955]
became evacuees and the Pakistan Government froze
all evacuee assets and later compelled the defendant
to hand them over to the Custodian of Evacuee Property in Pakistan. The defendant is ready and willing to pay the money if the Pakistan Government
will release it but until it does so the defendant contends that it is unable to pay and is not liable. The
only question is, what are the rights and liabilities of
the parties in those circumstances? The amount involved in this suit, though substantial, is not large
when compared with the number of claims by and
against persons in similar plight. The defendant itself is involved in many simllar transactions. A list
of them appears in Ex. D-11. Mohd Bashir Khan,
D. W. I, says that the total comes to Rs. 1,46,209-1-9.
The defendant has accordingly chosen to defend this
action as a test case.
The further facts are as follows. At the relevant
period, before the partition, cloth was retained and
its distribution controlled in, among other places, the
Punjab where Lyallpur is situate. According to the
scheme, quotas were allotted to different areas and
the manufacturers and suppliers of cloth could only
distribute their cloth to retailers in accordance with
those quotas, and dealers in those areas could only
import cloth up to and in accordance with the quotas
allotted to them. If the suppliers themselves had a
retail shop or business in a given area, then the qurita
for that area was divided between the supplier and a
Government quota-holder or quota-holders called the
nominated importer or importers. The local agency
of the suppliers was permitted to import up to the
portion of the quota allotted to it in that area and
the suppliers were obliged to give the balance of the
quota to the Government quota-holder or holclers.
The plaintiffs were the Government quota-holders for
Lyallpur and the defendant company also carried on
business there through the General Manager of the
Lyallpur Mills.
It is admitted that the defendant owns these mills
but it is a matter of dispute before us whether the
mills are a branch of the defendant company; but
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
4rf/
whatever the exact status of the Lyallpur mills may
be, it is clear from the evidence and the documents
that the General Manager of these mills conducted
the defendant's cotton business at Lyallpur.
It seems that the deails of the cloth distribution
scheme for Punjab, in so far as it affected the defendant company, were contained in a letter of the
24th October 1945 from the Secretary, Civil Supplies
Department, Punjab. That letter has not been filed
and so we do not know its exact contents but reference
to it is found in a series of letters written by the defendant company from Delhi to the District Magistrate at Lyallpur. Those letters range in date
from
3-1-1946 to 19-4-1947:
(Exs. P-5 to P-12). They are
all in the same form, only the figures' and dates
differ. It wiil be enough to quote the first, Ex. P-5.
It is dated 3-1-1946 and is from the Central Marketing Organisation of the defendant company, the Delhi
Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. It is written from
Delhi to the District Magistrate, Lyallpur, and is as
follows:
"The District Magistrate,
Lyallpur.
Re: Cloth Distribution Scheme.
Dear Sir
Ref: Letttr No. 15841-CL-(D)-45/8342 of
24th Oct. 1945 from Secretary, Civil Supplies Deptt., Punjab Govt., Lahore.
Kindly note that we have allotted 28 bales for your
district for the month of January 1946. Out of this
a quantity of 18 bales will be despatched to our Retail
stores in your district/State and the balance of 10
bales will be available for delivery to your nominated
importer.
We shall be. obliged if you kindly issue instructions to your nominated importer to collect these
goods from us within 15 <lays of the two dates for
delivery fixed, namely by the 20th of January and
5th of February 1946 respectively. It may be noted
that th~ first half quota will lapse in case delivery is
1955
The Delhi Cloth
and General Mills
Co. I.Jc!.
v.
Hamam Sing;,
and others
Bose].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1955
The Delhi Cloth
and General Mills
Co. lid.
v.
Harnam Sin,gh
and olhers
Bose].
[195~]
not taken by you by the former date and the second
half will lapse if not taken by the latter date.
Yours faithfully,
,D.C. & Gen. Mills Co., Ltd."
In each case a copy was sent to the plaintiffs marked
as follows:
"Copy to nominated imported:Jagat Singh Harnam Singh,
Cloth Merchants,
Lyallpur".
The Indian Independence Act, 1947 was passed on
18-7-1947 and the disrict of Lyallpur was assigned to
Pakistan subject to the award of the Boundary Commission. Then followed the partition on 15-8-1947
and at or about that time the plaintiffs fled to India.
This made them evacuees according to a later Ordinance. But before that Ordinance was promulgated
the Assistant Director of Civil Supplies, who was also
an Under Secretary to the West Punjab Government,
wrote to the defendant's General Manager at Lyallpur
(the General Manager of the Lyallpur Cloth Mills) on
17-2-1948 and told him that"The amount deposited by the non-Muslim dealers
should not be refunded to them till further orders".
(Ex. D-1).
The defendant did all it could, short of litigation, to
protest this order and to try and get it set aside. Its
General Manager at Lyallpur wrote letters to the
Assistant Director of Civil Supplies on 14-4-48, 9-8-48
(Exs. D-2 and D-4), 23-4-49 (Ex. D-7) and 6-6-49 (ExD-8), but the replies were unfavourable. On 30-4-48
the Assistant Director said that "in no case" should
the sums be refunded (Ex. D-3) and on 1-11-48 directed that these amounts should be deposited with the
Custodian of Evacuee Property (Ex. D-5). This was
in accordance with an Ordinance which was then in
force. Later, on 8-11-48, the General Manager received orders from the Deputy Custodian that the
moneys should be deposited with the Deputy Custodian (Ex. D-6) and on 23-6-49 these orders were
repeated by the Custodian (Ex. D-9).
Meanwhile, the plaintiffs, who by thm had shifted
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
409
to Delhi, made a series of demands on the defendant
in Delhi for payment.
These are dated 3-1-49 (Ex.
P. W. 4/4), 27-1-49 (Ex. P.W. 4/1), 11-3-49 (Ex. P.W.
4/3) and 26-3-49 (Ex. P. W. 4/2). The defendant's
attitude i> summed up in its letter to the plaintiffs
The defendant said that it
dated 12-2-49 (Ex. P-3).
had received
orders from the West Punjab Government, through the Assistant Director of Civil Supplies, not to make any refunds without the orders of
the West Punjab Government.
On 15-10-1949 the Ordinance of 1948 was replaced
by • Ordinance No. XV of 1949 (Ex. D-26) but that
made no difference to the law about evacuee funds
and properties.
On 4-7-1950 the plaintiffs served the defendant with
notice of suit (Ex. P-14). This notice was forwarded
to the defendant's General Manager at Lyallpur by
the defendant's Managing Director in Delhi urging
the General Manager to try and obtain the sanction of
the West Punjab Government for payment of the
money to the plaintiffs; and on 27-7-1950 the defendant
wrote to the plaintiffs saying"We confirm that the sum of Rs. 11,496-6-6 and
Rs· 1,000 are due to you on account of your advance
deposit and security deposit respectively with our
Lyallpur Cotton Mills, Lyallpur, and the sum will be
refunded to you by the said Mills as soon as order
of prohibition to refund such deposits issued by the
West Punjab Government and served upon the said
Mills is withdrawn or cancelled, and that your claim
shall not be prejudiced by the usual time limit of three
years having been exceeded". (Ex. P-4).
The defendant's reply did not satisfy the plaintiffs,
so they instituted the present suit on 16-12-1950.
After the suit, the defendant's Managing Director
wrote personally to the Joint Secretary to the Government of Pakistan on 2-4-1951 but was told on
21-4-1951 that the matter had been carefully examined
and that the money must be deposited with the Custodian (Ex. D-25). A second attempt was made on
30-4-1951 (Ex. D-24) and the Joint Secretary was
again approached. Soon after, an Extraordinary
8-83 S. C. India/59
1955
The Delhi Cloth
and General Mills
OJ. Ltd.
v.
HamamSingh
and others
Bm].
410
1955
Th< Delhi Cloth
and General Mills
Co. Ltd.
v.
Harnam Singh
and others
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
Ordinance was promulgated on 9-5-1951 (Ex. D-27)
exempting "cash deposits of individuals in
banks"
from the operation of the main Ordinance. But the
Joint Secretary wrote on 2-6-1951 that this did not
apply to private debts and deposits and again asked
the defendant to deposit the money with the Custodian (Ex. D-23). Finally, the Custodian issued a.n
order on 6-11-1951 directing that the deposits be made
by the 15th of that month, "failing which legal action
will have to be taken against you". (Ex. D-10). The
money was deposited on 15-11-1951 on the last day of
grace (Ex· D-12).
The first question that we must determine is the
exact nature of the contract from which the obligation which the plaintiffs seek to enforce arises. The
sum claimed in the suit, aside from the interest, is
made up of three items :
( 1) Rs. 79-6-6 outstanding from
a prev10us
account;
(2) Rs. 11,496-6-6 being the balance of a sum of
Rs. 55,000 deposited on 28-7-1947; and
(3) Rs. 1,000 as security.
The three items appear to be linked up but we will,
for the moment, concentrate on the largest, the deposit
of Rs. 55,000. Both sides have spoken of it as a
"deposit" throughout but we will have to examine its
exact nature because deposits are of various kinds and
it will be necessary to know which sort this was before we can apply the law.
Unfortunately, the evidence is meagre and scrappy,
so we have been obliged to piece much disjointed mattrial together to form an intelligible pattern.
It is
admitted that the distribution of cloth in this area
was controlled by the Government of Punjab (in
undivided India)
at all material times.
It is also
admitted that the plaintiffs were, what were called
"Government nominees" for Lyallpur. In the plaint
the plaintiffs also called themselves the "reserve
dealer". This term has not been explained but the
use of these words and the words "nominated importer'', indicates that the plaintiffs occupied a privileged position. The letters (Exs. P-5 to P-12), on
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
411
which the plaintiffs relied very strongly, also point to
that; Ex. P-5, for example, shows that the defendant
was obliged to give 10 bales out of a quota of 28 for
that area to the plaintiffs under the orders of the
Punjab Government and could only keep 18 for its
own retail stores in the month of January 1946. In
April the defendant was allowed to keep all 28 but in
July the distribution was 35 : 25 in the plaintiff's
favour. In September, November (1946) and April
1947 it was half and half. In February and March
1947 it was 10 : 26 and 29 : 26 for the plaintiffs and
the defendant's stores respectively.
Now, ordinarily, a privilege has to be paid for and it
seems that the price of this privilege was (1) payment
of a security deposit of Rs. 1,000 and (2) payment
of a second deposit against which cloth was issued
from time to time in much the same way as a banker
hands out money to a customer against deposits of
money in a current account, only here the payments
were issues of cloth instead of sums of money. We
draw this inference from what we have said abovt
and from the following facts:
(1) Both sides have called the payment a "deposit"
in their pleadings;
(2) The plaintiffs speak of receiving goods "against
this deposit" (paragraph 3 of the plaint) and Mohd.
Bashir Khan (D. W. 1) of delivery being made "against
this advance";
(3) The plaintiff Sardari Lal (P. W. 3) says that
the parties have been carrying on dealings for 3 or 4
years and that "advances used to be macie to the
mills from time to time. Sometimes our balance stood
at credit";
(4) Sardari Lal says that when their balance was
on the debit side, they paid the defendant's interest
but defendant paid no interest when the balance
was in the plaintiffs' favour. (This is the position
when there is an overdraft in a bank) ;
(5) There was a balance of Rs. 79-6-6 standing in
the plaintiffs' favour when the deposit of Rs. 55,000
was made;
(6) The plaintiffs said in their letter (Ex. P. W. 4/1)
1955
The Delhi Cloth
and Genlral Mills
Co. Ltd.
v.
HamamSingh
and olhtrl
412
1955
The D1lhi Cloth
and General Mills
Co. Lid.
v.
HamamSingh
and othlrs
&se].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955J
to the defendant that they had a "current account"
with the defendant in which a sum of Rs. 11,496-6-6
was in "reserve account". This figure of Rs. 11,496-6-6
is made up by including the old balance of Rs. 79-6-6
in this account;
(7) In their letter Ex. P-14 the plaintiffs said that
they had "deposited" money in the plaintiffs' account
at Lyallpur "as reserve dealers", against that they
received goods leaving a balance of Rs. 11,496-6-6.
Again, this figure includes Rs. 79-6-6.
All tJiis shows that the payment of Rs. 55,000 was
not just an advance payment for a specified quantity
of goods but was a running account very like a customer's current account in a bank. The only matter
that can be said to indicate the contrary is the fact
that the defendant has listed this 1 money in Ex.
D 11 under the head "Purchaser's\:._ advance"~-:- But
the . -mere use;o£. this term cannot alter the substa~ce
of the trarisa~ons - any more than the mere use of
the. word "deposit". The fact that the parties choose
to call it this or that is; of course, relevant but is not
conclusive, and in order to determine the true nature
of a transaction it is necessary to view it as a whole
.and to consider other factors. But in this case we
need not speculate because the plaintiffs have themselves ' "!<plained the sense in which the term "Purchasers advance account" is used. In their statement
of the case whieh · they filed here, they say"The defendants
maintained a 'Purchasers advance account' in their books at Delhi. The plaintiffs
used to pay the defendants advance amounts against
which cloth was supplied and the balance had to be adjusted periodically".
But the banking analogy must not be pushed too
far. The stress laid by the parties on the terms
"Government
nominees'',
"nominated
importer''
and
"reserve dealer", both in the correspondence and in
the pleadings and evidence, suggests that the defendant was dealing with the plaintiffs in their capacity
of "Government nominees" and that, in . its turn,
imports the condition that the dealings would stop
that prithe moment the plaintiffs ceased to occupy
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
413
1955
vileged position. As we · have seen, the import of
cloth was controlled by the Punjab Government at Thi Delhi Cloth
Milli
all relevant times with the result that the defendant and Gaural
Co. l.Jd.
could not sell to anybody it pleased. The salr.s had
v.
Hatn1Jm Singh
to be to the Government nominees. Therefore, if
and othtts
Government withdrew their recognition, the defendant
BOii J.
would not have been able to sell to the plaintiffs any
longer and it is fair to assume that the parties · did
not contemplate a continuance of their relationship
in such an eventuality. But, as this was not a definite
contract for the supply of a given quantity of goods
which were to be delivered in instalments but a course
of dealings with a running account, it is also reasonable to infer that the parties were at liberty to put
an end to their business relationship at any time they
pleased by giving due notice to the other side and in
that event whichever side owed money to the other
Would have to pay. But, either way, the place of performance would, in these circumstances, be Lyallpur.
We say this because all the known factors were situate
in Lyallpur. The plaintiffs were the Government nominees for Lyallpur and they were resident there. The
defendant carried oh business there and the goods had
to be delivered at Lyallpur and could not be delivered
elsewhere, and so performance was to be there. The
accounts were kept at Lyallpur, and though copies
appear to have been forwarded to Delhi from time to
time, the books were situate there and the Lyallpur
office would be the only place to know the up-tothe minute state of the accounts. In the circumstances, it is reasonable to assume, as in the case of
banking and insurance
(matters we shall deal with
presently), that on the termination of the contract
the balance was to be paid at Lyallpur and not elsewhere. That localises the place of primary obligation.
This also, in our opinion, imports another factor.
The defendant in Delhi would not necessarily know
of any change of recognition by the Lyallpur authorities. The correspondence with the Collector indicates that the Government nominee cleared the goods
from the defendant's Lyallpur godowns under the <
orders of the District Magistrate. If, therefore, the
414
1955
The Iklhi Cloth
and Genr.al Mills
Co. Lid.
v.
Harnam Singh
anti othtrJ
Bose].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
nominee was suddenly changed, intimation of this fact
would have to be given to the defendant at Lyallpur
and not at Delhi, otherwise there would be a time lag in
which the
defendant's Lyallpur office might easily
deliver the goods to the plaintiffs as usual despite
withdrawal of the recognition.
Everything therefore
points to the fact that the notice of termination
would have to be given at Lyallpur and the obligation
to return the balance would not arise until this notice
of termination was received. That obligation would
therefore necessarily arise at Lyallpur.
The plaintiff's learned counsel argued very strongly
that the· defendant's Lyallpur business was carried
on from Delhi and that the accounts were kept there,
that there was no branch office at Lyallpur and that
Lyallpur had no independent local control of the business. He relied on the letters written by the defendant
to the District Magistrate, Lyallpur, about the allotments of quotas (Exs. P-5 to P-12) and also on Ex. D·7,
a letter written by the defendant's General Manager
at Lyallpur to the Deputy Custodian of Evacuee
Property at Lyallpur in which he say that a
"complete list showing' the list of all non-Muslims
falling under item (3) with the amount to be paid has
been asked for from our Head Office and will be submitted as soon as received".
Counsel contended that the Lyallpur people had so
little to do with the accounts that they were not able
to supply even a list of the persons who dealt with
them. They had to find that out from Delhi.
These matters should have been put to the defendant's witnesses. Ex. D-7 was written in reply to a
letter from the Deputy Custodian of Evacuee Property. That letter is Ex. D-6 and in it the Deputy
Custodian refers to some earlier correspondence with
the Under Secretary to the West Punjab Government,
Lahore, which has not been filed. When we turn ro
the list that was eventually supplied from Delhi (Ex.
D-11) we fin• t that it relates to accounts from all over
Pakistan such as, Multan, Peshawar, Lahore, Sialkot,
Rawalpindi and even Karachi and Sukkar. Obviously,
a local office like the Lyallpur office would not be in
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
415
a pos11:1on to supply that sort of information. The
defendant's accountant at Lyallpur, Sewa Ram
(P. W. 4), says that-"Purchasers' deposits at Lyallpur were not recorded in the books of the defendant at Delhi but
statements used to be despatched from there to Delhi.
An account book was prepared from statements
received from Lyallpur. That book is known as
'Reference Book'".
Presumably, that would also be the practice of the
other branch offices, so the head office would be the
only place from where a general overall picture (which
appears to be what was asked for) could be obtained.
Now, the plaintiffs resided at Lyallpur at all relevant times and the defendant carried on business
there through a local General Manager. We do not
know where the contract was made but we do know
that the plaintiff's contracted in a special capacity
that was localised at Lyallpur, namely as the Government nominees for Lyallpur. We know that the
goods were to be delivered at Lyallpur and could not
be delivered anywhere else. We know that there was a
running account and that that accom;1t was kept at
Lyallpur, and we have held that the "debt" did not
become due till the defendant was given notice at
Lyallpur that the business relationship between the
parties had terminated. The termination came about
because of acts that arose at Lyallpur, namely the
assignment of Lyallpur to the newly created State of
Pakistan and the flight of the plaintiffs from Lyallpur
which made further performance of the primary contract impossible. The only factors that do not concern Lyallpur are the defendant's residence in India
and the demands for payment made in Delhi. The
fact of demand is not material because the obligation
to pay arose at the date of termination and arose at
Lyallpur, but if a demand for payment is essential
then it would, along the lines of the banking and
insurance cases to which we shall refer later, have to
be made at Lyallpur and a demand made elsewhere
would be ineffective. On these facts we hold that the
clements of this contract, that is to say, the contract
1955
The Delhi Cloth
and General Mills
Co. Ltd.
v.
Harnam Singh
and others
Bose].
416
1955
The Delhi Cloth
and General Mills
Co. Ltd.
v.
Harnam Sinz'i
and otherJ
Bose].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
out of which the obligation to pay arose, were most
densely grouped at Lyallpur and that that was its
natural seat and the place with which the transaction
had its closest and most real connection. It follows
from this that the "proper law of the contract", in
so far as that is material, was the Lyallpur law.
We have next to see when notice to close the account and a demand for return of the balance was
made and where. The plaintiff Jagat Singh (P. W. 5)
says that he made a written demand in October 1947.
But the earliest demand we have on record is Ex.
P.W. 4/4 dated 3-1-1949. It is understandable that
the plaintiffs, who had to flee for their lives would
have no copies of their correspondence, but it is a
matter for comment that the demand which is filed
(Ex. P.W. 4/4) does not refer to an earlier demand or
demands. The defendant was asked to produce all
the correspondence because the plaintiffs had lost their
own files. The defendant produced all we have on
record and no suggestion was made that anything had
been suppressed. Consequently we are not prepared
to accept the plaintiffs' statement and we hold that
there was no demand before 3-1-1949.
Another point is that the earlier demand, even if
made, could not have been made at Lyallpur. The
plaintiff Jagat Singh says he made the demand to the
defendant's Managing Director. He resides in Delhi
and the plaintiffs had by then fled from Pakistan.
Therefore, Jhe demand could not have been made at
l yallpur, and "apart frqm those demands, there is no
other notice of termination, so technically, the defendant would have been justified in declining to pay
on the strength of a demand made in Delhi. The same
'defect attaches to Ex. P.W. 4/4. However, we are
fortunately absolved from the need to base on so
technic!al a ground.
Now at the date Qf the demand the Pakistan Ordinance (Ex. D-26) was in force and under it the defendant was prohibited from paying the money to the
plaintiffs who were evacuees according to Pakistan
laws. The defendant was directed, instead, to deposit
the money with the Deputy Custodian of Evacuee
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
417
Property. This was done on 15-11-1951 (Ex. D-12)
and the deposit was made along with other similar
deposits.
We now have to determine the legal liabilities
which arise out of these facts.· This raises complex
questions of private international law, and two distinct lines of thought emerge. One is that applied by
the English Courts, namely, the lex situs; the other
is the one favoured by Cheshire in. his book on Private
International Law, namely, the "proper law of the
contract".
The English approach is to treat the debt as property and determine its situs and then, in general, to
apply the law that obtains there at the date when
payment is due. But the difficulty of the English
view is that they have different sets of rules for ascertaining' the situs, with the result that the situs shifts
from place to place for different purposes, also that
it is determined by intention. Thus, it can be in one
place for purposes of jurisdiction and in others for
those of banking, insurance, death duties and probate.
The situs also varies in the cases of simple contract
debts and those of speciality.
That a debt is property is, we think, clear. It is
a chose in action and is heritable and assignable and
it is treated as property in India under the Transfer
of Property Act which, calls it an "actionable claim":
section 3 and 130. But to give it position in space
is not easy because it is intangible and so cannot
have location except notionally and in order to give
it notional position rules have to be framed along
arbitrary lines.
Cheshire points out in his book on Private International Law, 4th edition, pages 449 to 451 that the
situs rule is not logical and leads to practical difficulties when there is a succession of assignments because it is not possible to fix the situation of a debt
under the situs rule in one place and only one place.
Speaking of that Cheshire, quoting Foote, where Foote
says that the assignment of a chose in action arising
out of a contract is governed by the "proper law of
the contract" paraphrases Foote thus at page 450-
1955
The Delhi Cloth
and General Mills
Co. Ltd.
v.
HamamSfogh
and oth~s
BoseJ.
418
1955
TM Delhi a.th
and C-aJ Mills
Co. lid.
v.
Harnam Singh
and others
Bose].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1955]
"If we understand him correctly, the appropriate
law is not the 'proper law' (using that expression in
its contractual sense) of the assignment, but the
proper law of the original transaction out of which the
chose in action arose. ·It is reasonable and logical to
refer most questions relating to a debt to the transaction in which it has its source and to the legal system
which governs that transaction ... . One undeniable merit
of this is that, where there have been assignments m
different countries, no confusion can arise from a
conflict of laws, since all questions are referred to a
single legal system".
The expression the "proper law of the contract" has
been carefully analysed by Cheshire in Chapter VIII
of his book. In Mount Albert Borough Council v.
Australasian
Temperance and General Mutual Life
Assurance Society (1 ) Lord Wright defined it at page
240 as
"that law which the English or other Court is to
apply m determining the obligations under the
contract",
that is. to say, obligation as contrasted with performance. Lord Wright drew the distinction between
obligation and performance at page 240. In a later
case. Lord Simonds described it as
"the system of law by reference to which the contract was made or that with which the transaction
has it~ closest and most real connexion". Bonython v.
Commonwealth of Australia(').
Cheshire sets out the definition given by some
American Courts at page 203 and adopts it:
"It is submitted that, at any rate with regard to
the question of valid creation, the proper law is the
law of the country in which the contract is localized.
Its localization will be indicated by what may be
called the grouping of its elements as reflected in ·its
formation and in its terms. The country in which its
elements are most densely grouped will represent its
natural seat .... the country with which the contract
is in fact most substantially associated and in which
lies its natural seat or centre of gravity".
(I) 1938 A. C. 224.
(2) 1951 A. C. 201, 219.
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
419
This involves two considerations. The first is whether the proper law is to be ascertained objectively
or whether parties are free to fix it subjectively by
ranging over the world and picking out whatever laws
they like from any part of the globe and agreeing
that those laws shall govern their contract. Cheshire
points out at page 202 that "the subjective theory
may produce strangely unrealistic results." It is also
obvious that difficulties will arise if the contract is
illegal or against public policy according to the laws
of the country in which it is sought to be enforced
though lawful according to the laws . of the country
which the parties choose: see Lord Wright in Mount
Albert Borough Council
Australasian Temperance, etc.
Society( 1 ) at page 240. Cheshire prefers the view of
an American Judge which he quotes at page 203-"Some law must impose the obligation, and the
parties have nothing whatsoever to do with that, no
more than with whether their acts are torts or crimes".
The contract we are considering is silent about these
matters. There is no express provision either about
the law that is to obtain or about the .situs. We
have therefore to examine the rules that obtain when
that is the case.
The most usual way .of expressing the law in that
class of case is to say that an intention must be implied or imputed. In the Bank of Travancore v. Dhrit
Ram( 1 ), Lord Atkin said that when no intention is
expressed in the contract the Courts are left to infer
one by reference to considerations where the contract
was made and how and where it was to be performed
and by the nature of the business or transaction to
which it refers. In the Mount Albert Borough Council
case(1 ), Lord Wright put it this way at page 24{}.o"The parties may not have thought of the matter
at all. Then the Court has to impute an intention,
or to determine for the parties what is the proper law
which, as just and reasonable persons, they ought or
would have intended if they had thought about the
v.
question when they made the contract".
(1) 1938 A. C. 1111+
(11) 6g I. A. 1, 8.
1955
T Ill Dtlhi Clot!t
and Gmeral Mills
Co. Ltd.
Y1
HamamSingh
and otlwrs
Bose].
420
1955
Thi Delhi Cloth
and C-al Mills
Co. Lid.
,y•
. Harnam Singh
and others
Bost J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
But, to us, it seems unnecessarily artificial to impute an intention when we know there was none,
especially in a type of case where the parties would
never have contracted at all if t\ley had contemplated
the possibility of events turning out as they did. In
our opinion, what the Courts really do, when there is
no express provision, is to apply an objective test,
though they appear to regard the intention subjectively, and that is also Cheshire's conclusion at page
201 where, after reviewing the English decisions, he
says"In other · words, the truth may be that the
judges, though emphasising .in unrestricted terms the
omnipotence of intention, in fact do nothing more
than impute to the parties an intention to submit
their contract to the law of the country with which
factually it is most closely connected".
If driven to a choice, we would prefer this way of
stating the law but we need not deCide this because,
so far as the present case is concerned, the result is
the same whether we apply the proper law of the
contract or the English rules about the lex situs. It
may be that in some future case this Court will have
to choose between these two views but the question
bristles with difficulties and it is not necessary for us
to make the choice here. All we wish to do here is to
indicate that we have considered both and have envisaged case> where perhaps a choice will have to be
made.
We gather that English judges fall back on the lex
situs and make rules for determining the position of a
debt for historical reasons. Atkin, L. J. said in Netu
Yark Life Insurance Company v. Public Trustee(') that
the rules laid down in England are derived from the
practice of ecclesiastical authorities in granting ad·
ministration because their jurisdiction was limited
territorially.
"The ordinary had only a jurisdiction within a
particular territory, and the question whether he
\'lhould issue letters of administration depended upon
whether or not assets were to be found within his
(1) [1924] 2 Ch. 101, 11g.
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
421
jurisdiction, and the test in respect of simple contracts
was: Where was the debtor residing? ...... the reason
why the residence of the debtor was adopted as that
which determined where the debt was situate was
because it was in that place where the debtor was
that the creditor could, in fact, enforce payment of
the debt".
(See also Dicey's Conflict of Laws, 6th edition, page
303). ·The rules, therefore, appear to have been
arbitrarily selected for practical purposes and because
they were found to be convenient.
But despite that the English Courts have never
treated them as rigid~ They have only regarded them
as prima facie presumptions in the absence of anything express in the contract itself: see Lord Wright's
speech in Mount Albert Borough Council case(t) at page
240. Also, many exceptions have been engrafted to
meet modern conditions. Aktin, L. J. draws attention to one in New York Life Insurance Company v.
Public Trustee(2) at page 120 where he says-.'therefore, cases do arise where a debt may be
enforced in one jurisdiction, and the debtor, being an:
ordinary living person, resides elsewhere".
So also Lord Wright in Mount Albert Borough Cottnci!
case( 1 ) at page 240--"lt is true that, when stating this general rule,
there are qualifications to be borne in mind, as tor
instance, that the law of the place of performance
will prima facie govern the incidents or mode of performance, that is, performance as contrasted with
obligation".
and at page 241 he says"Again, different considerations may arise in
particular cases, as, for instance, where the stipulated
performance is illegal by the law of the place of performance".
And so also Lord Robson in Rex v. Lovitt( 8 ) at page
220-"lt cannot mean that for all purposes the actual
situation of the property of a deceased owner is to be
(1) 1938 A. C. 2~.
(2) [11924) 2Cb. 101, 119.
(3) 1912 /'..
c. 212.
1955
T!d D1/hi Clolh
atld Gmeral Milli
Co. Ltd.
v.
Harnamrsingh
and others
Bose].
422
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1955
[1955]
ignored and regard had only to the testator's domicil,
for executors find themselves obliged in order to get
dlld ·G•newal MiU1
the property at all to take out ancillary probate acCo. Lid.
cording to the locality where such property is properv.
Harnam Singh
ly recoverable, and no leg! fiction as to its 'following
and Dl/i4rl
the owner' so as to be theoretically situate elsewhere
JJ4UJ.
will avail them".
And he says at page 221 that these rules are only "for
certain limited purposes".
In banking transactions the following rules are now
settled: ( 1) the obligation of a bank to pay the
cheques of a customer rests primarily on the branch
at which he keeps his account and the bank can
rightly refuse to cash a cheque at any other branch:
Rex v. Lovitt (1 ) at 219, Bank of Travancore v. Dhn't
'R.am( ') and New York Life Insurance Company v.
Public Trustee(') at page 117; (2) a customer must
make a demand for payment at the branch where his
current account is kept before he has a cause of
action against the bank: /oachimson v. Swiss Bank
Corporation(•) quoted with approval by Lord Reid in
Arab Bank Ltd. v. Barclays Bank("). The rule is the
same whether the account is a current account or
whether it is a case of deposit. The last two cases
refer to a current account; the Privy Council case
(Bank of Travancore v. Dhrit Ram( 1 ) ) was a case of
deposit. Either way, there must be a demand by the
customer at the branch where the current account is
kept, or where ..the deposit is made and kept, before
the bank need pay, and for these reasons the English
Courts hold that the situs of the debt is at the place
where the current account is kept and where the
demand must be made.
This class of case form~ an exception to the rule
that a debtor must seek his creditor because, though
that is the general rule, there is nothing to prevent
the parties from agreeing, if they wish, that that
shall not be the duty of the debtor and, as Lord
Ried explains in the Arab Bank case( 6 ) at page .531,
a contract of current account necessarily implies an
T 1u Delhi Cloth
(•l
[1912] A.G. 212.
(2) 69 I. A. 1, 8 and q.
(3 [1924] 2 Ch. 101, 110.
.
(4) [1921] 3 K.B. 119.
(5) 1954A.C.49s, 531.
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
423
agreement that that shall not be the bank's duty,
otherwise the whole object of the contract would be
frustrated.
We have stressed the word "primarily" because the
rules we have set out relate to the primary obligation.
If the bank wrongly- refuses to pay when a demand
is made at the proper place and time, then it could
be sued at its head office as well as at its branch office
and, possibly, wherever it could be found, though
we do not decide that. But the reason is that the
action is then, not on the debt, but on the breach of
the contract to pay at the place specified in the
agreement: see Warrington, L. J. at page 116 and
Atkin, L. J. at page 121 of New York Life Insurance
Co. v. Public Trustee(1).
Now the rules set out above are not confined to the
business of banking. They are of wider application
and have also been applied in insurance cases: Fouad
Bishara Jabbour v. State of Israel( 1 ) and New York
Life Insurance Co. v. Public Trustee( 1. ) .
Similar considerations obtain in England when an
involuntary assignment of a debt is effected by garnishment. Cheshire has collected a list of English
cases at pages 460 to 463 of his Private International
Law from which we have quoted above. He sums up
the position at page 461 thus"It is difficult to state the rule with exactitude,
but it is probably true to say that a debt is properly
garnishable in the country where, according to the
ordinary usages of business, it would normally be
regarded as payable".
But when all is said and done, we find that in every
one of these cases the proper law of the contract was
applied, that is , to say, the law of the country
in which its elements were most densely grouped and
with which factually the contract was most closely
connected. It is true the judges purport to apply thC!
lex situs but in determining the situs they apply rules
(and modify them where necessary to suit changing
modern conditions) which in fact are the very rules
(2) [1954] I A. E. R. 145.
1955
Thi D•lhi Cloth
and General Milli
Co. Ltd.
v.
HamamSingh
and othus
Bo11].
424
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
1955
which in practice would be- used to determine the
proper law of the contract. The English Judges say
anti G11Mral Mills
that
wh~n the intention is not express one must be
Co. IJd.
inferred and the rules they have made come to this:
v.
Harnam Singh
that as reasonable men they must be taken to have
and olMrs
intended that the proper law of the contract should
Bos1].
obtain.· The other view is that the intention does
not govern even when express and that the proper
law must be applied objectively. But either way, t'ie
result is the same when there is no express term. The
"proper law" is in fact applied and for present
purposes it does not matter whether that is done for
the reasons given by Cheshire or because the fluid
English rules that centre round the lex situs lead to
the same - conclusion in this class of case.
That, however, raises a further question. Which is
the proper law? The law that obtains when the contract was made and the obligation fashioned or the
law in force at the time when performance is due?
Here again, we think the answer is correctly given by
Cheshire at page 210, quoting Wolff's Private International law, page 424, and Re. Chesterrhan's
Trusts( 1 ) :
"A proper law intended as a whole to govern a
contract is administered as 'a living and changing
body of law' and effect is given to any changes occurring in it before performance falls due".
This is what the English Courts did in New York
Insurance Co. v. Public Trustee("), Re. Banque Des
Marchands De Moscou( 8 ), Fouad Bishara Jabbour v.
State of Israel('), and Arab Bank Ld. v. Barclays
Bank(')· They were all cases in which the law changed
because of the outbreak of war and where performance became impossible because of local legislation.
In the last two cases, the debts vested in the Custodian because of local legislation and payment by the
debtor to the Custodian was regarded as a good disCharge of the debt. The position in those two cases
was just what it is here.
(1) [1923) •Ch. 466, 478.
(o) f19•4) • Ch. 101.
Th• Delhi Cloth
(3) [1954) • A. E. R. 746.
(4) 1954) 1 A. E. R. 14?;(5) [1954) A. c. 495, 509.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
425
Counsel argued that as Lyallpur was part of India,
when the contract was made, the Indian law must be
applied and that no different intention can be.imputed
to the parties. But that is not the law, as we understand it, whether we apply the "proper law" or the
situs rules. The proper· law will be the law at Lyallpur applied as a living and changing whole, and this
would have been the case even if India had not been
divided, because each State had the right to make
different local laws even in undivided India, as witness
the different money lending laws and the cloth and
grain control orders : indeed this very case is an
illustration of that, for the controls which gave rise
to this very contract were not uniform throughout
India. But even apart from the "proper law" the
decision of the Privy Council in Arab Bank Ld. v.
Barclays Bank._(1) and of the Queens Bench Division in
Fouad Bishara Jabbour v. State of lsrael(2) negatives
this contention when .an intention has to be imputed
or a clause in the contract implied.
It is necessary however, to bear in mind that,.
under modern conditions, choses in action arising out
of contract have two aspects : ( 1) as property and
(2) as involving a contractual obligation for performance. The property aspect is relevant for purposes
of assignment, administration, taxation and the like ;
the contractual aspect for performance. In the
present case, we are primarily concerned with the
property aspect because the Pakistan Ordinance regards debts as property and vests all evacuee property in the Custodian and requires every person
holding such property to surrender it to the Custodian
on pain of penalties prescribed by the Ordinance, and
section 11 (2) states that"Any person who makes a payment under subsection ( 1) shall be discharged from further liability
to pay to the extent of the payment made".
The payment was made and that, in our opinion,
exonerated the defendant from further liability. Such
payment would operate as a good discharge even
under the English rules : see Fouad Bishara fflbbour. v.
(1) [1954) A. C. 495, 529.
9-83 S. C. India/59
(2) [1954] 1 A. E. R. 1~5-
1955
Thi Dtlhi Cloth
and G1116ral Mills
Co.Ud.
....
Homtlfli Singh
andotltns
Bou].
'126
1955
T Ir< Delhi Clolh
and Genesal Mills
Co. !Jd.
ti
HomamSingh
and other•
Bose],
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
State of Israel(') at page 154 where a number of English authorities are cited, including a decision of the
Privy Council in Odwin v. Forbes,(2). That was also
the result of the decisions in the following English
cases, which are similar to this, though the basis of
the decisions was the situs of the debt and the multiple residence of corporations: Fouad Bishara Jabbour
v. State of Israel('), Re. Banque Des Marchands De
Moscou(•) and Arab Bank Ld. v. Barclays Bank(').
The same result follows from the decision of the
Judicial Committee in the Bank of Travancore Ltd. v.
Dhrit Ram(") where Lord Atkin said"When consideration is being given to the question, what law did the parties intend to govern the
contract? It seems proper to bear in mind that the
promisor is a bank incorporated under Travancore law
with, apparently, some connection with the State of
Travancore, and governed as to its business by any
law of Travancore that may affect banking .... ".
The only difference between that case and this is that
at the date of the deposit in this case there was no
difference between the laws of Punjab and Delhi on
the present point. But they could have differed even
if India had not been divided, as we have just pointed
out. The English cases are, however, in point ,and
we can see little in principle to distinguish them from
this case.
The learned counsel for the plaintiffs-respondents
argued ' that even if the law is what we have said, the
Pakistan Ordinance does not apply to this case be-1
cause " a cash deposit in a bank" is excluded. The
argument was basec1 on the definition of "property"
in section 2(5) ·of the Ordinance. But this is not a
cash depo.sit in a bank as between the plaintiffs and
the defendant. It is a debt which the defendant owes,
or ower', to the plaintiffs, and the same definition
states that "property" means, among other things,
"any debt or actionable claim". The portion of the
definition which speaks of a "cash deposit in a bank"
meam that such a deposit is not to be treated as
(1) [1954l 1 A. E. R. 145.
(3) [1954 2 A. E. R. 746.
(2) i817 Buck. 57.
(4) 1954 A. C. 495, 529.
(5) 69 I. A. 1, 9·
..
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
427
"property" for the purposes of the Ordinance as between the bank and the customer who owns or controls
the deposit. We hold, therefore, that whether the
proper law of the contract applies, or the English law
-0f situs in a case of this kind, the defendant is exonerated because, the debt being "property", the Ordinance ~ivested the plaintiffs of ownership in it and
vested the debt in the Custodian and at the same time
interfered with the obligation for performance by
providing that payment to the Custodian shall operate
as a discharge of the obligation.
But we wish to emphasize that we decide this because payment was in fact made to the Custodian
and that we express no opinion about what would
happen in a case where there is no payment and the
defendant has no garnishable assets in Pakistan out
of which the West Punjab Government could realise
the debt by attachment of the defendant's property.
Different conclusions might possibly arise in such a
case.
Lastly, it was urged that the Pakistan Ordinance
is a penal law and is confiscato;-y in character, therefore, no domestic tribunal will recognise it or give
effect to it. That proposition is, in any event, too
widely stated, but we are. unable to condemn this law
as opposed to the public policy of this country because we have exactly the same kind of laws here, as
do other civilised countries which find themselves in
flimilar predicament or at the outbreak of war; see
Arab Bank Ltd. v. Barclays Bank(1) and also Fouad
· Bishara fabbour v. State of Israel(2) and Re. Munster(8)
where a like argument was repelled. We hold that
this legislation is not confiscatory.
The same rules apply to the item of Rs. 79-0-6 and
to the deposit of Rs. 1,000 as security.
The appeal succeeds. The decrees of the lower
Courts are set aside. A decree will now be passed
dismissing the plaintiffs' claim, but in the special circumstances of this case the parties will bear their
own costs throughout.
(2) [1954] 1 A.E.R. 145, 157,
(3) [1920] I Ch. 268.
1955
TM DdAf"clatla
and General MiUs
Co.[)d.
"·
HamtJm Singh
and olhm
Bo11J.
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