OM PRAKASH GUPTA versus THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
Supreme Court of India | Decided 21 April 1955 | [1955] 2 S.C.R. 391 | 1955 INSC 33
Key facts
- Decided
- 21 April 1955
- Bench
- VIVIAN BOSE*, NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI, B. JAGANNADHADAS, T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR, BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA, SYED JAFFER IMAM
- Bench size
- 6
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 85/1954
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1955] 2 S.C.R. 391
- Neutral citation
- 1955 INSC 33
Text of the judgment
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
391
Official Receiver.
The position was rightly summed
up by the High Court as under:"We thus reach the position that no leave of
Court was needed before the Receiver appointed by
the mortgagee debenture-holders exercised the power
of sale and that as there is no allegation of want of
bona ft.des or recklessness or fraud against the Receiver
in exercising such a power, it would follow that the
sale held by the Receiver is valid and effectual to
convey title to the purchaser and that such a sale
cannot be avoided on the ground either of want of
due notice given by the Receiver before effecting the
sale or on the ground of undervalue".
The result therefore is that the appeal fails and must
be dismissed with costs of the contesting Respondent
3. The other Respondents who have appeared before
us will bear and pay their own costs of the appeal.
OM PRAKASH GUPTA
ti.
THE ST ATE OF UTT AR PRADESH.
1955
M. K. RangQll/Jthan
""' ,,,,,,,Mr
....
G~•f
Madns ad oth6rs
~i].
1955
4jlril :u
[VIVIAN BosE, BHAGWATI, JAGANNADHADAS,
VENKATARAMA AYYAR, S1NHA and IMAM, JJ.]
Government servant-Order of dismissal-Suit fOt" declaration
that order dismissing the appellant from service was. illegal-Court
fee paid on an alte.-native claim fol" damages which was subsequently
given up-Refund of-Whether could be granted-Arrears of pay-Claim for-LApse of suspension order after order of dismissal.
The appellant, a member of the United Provinces Civil (Executive) Service, was suspended from service with effect from the 24th
August, 1944, pending aP enquiry into his conduct. As a result of
enquiry and report by the Commissioner, the Government passed an
order on the 25th November, 1944, dismissing the appellant from
service, which order was served on the appellant on the !st December, 1944.
The appellant instituted a suit for a declaration that the order
of dismissal passed against him was wrongful, illegal and inoperative,
and that he continued to be in service and was entitled to a decree
for recovery of arrears of his sal:rry. The plaint included an alternative prayer for a declaration that the order of dismissal was
~.
.
.,~·.
..
l
.
392
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1955]
' 1955
wrongful 'and. for a decree for Rs. 1,20,000/- by way of damages being
passed in his favour. .The requisite. court-fee on the valuation
Om Prakash Gupta
of
Rs.
),20,000/- ..was paid. The claim for damages was later on
v.
Tiu Staie of Uttar al>andon~<:f iii' view of "the decision of the Privy Council in High
Commissionir for India and High Commissioner for Pakistan v. /. M•
.Pr~sh ·.,
Li/{1 ) and:'fonsequentlal amendments were made in the plaint. The
Civil Judgc granted a declaration that the order of dismissal was
illegal and that the appellant continued to be in service in spite of
th:µ: order. . But he declined to grant a decree for arrears of salary on
the groui:id that a suit therefore was not maintainable. A prayer .for
the refund of 'the additional court-fee paid in respect of the claim for
damages was 'also refused. The respondent did not appeal against
the decision that the order of dismiisal was illegal. But the appellant
took the matter in appeal to the High Court which, affirming the decision of the Civil Judge, negatived his claim for arrears of salary
and also r_cfused refund of Court-fee. Leave was, however, granted
to dppeal to thi:: Supreme Court.
- :.:'' ' lf.,1.
"-·" "l
.d
''
.. dn view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of The
Siate of Bihar v.,Abdu/'Majid('), the respondent did not dispute the
right of-'ilic 'appellant to recover arrears of pay. But he sought to
support the decision on the ground that the order of dismissal dated
the 25th November, 1944, having been declared to be illegal and
void, the order of suspension dated the 24th August, 1944, became
revived and that would bar the claim for arrears of salary.
Held that the order of suspension made against the appellant
being one pending an enquiry, it lapsed with the order of dismissal
and the subsequent declaration by the Civil Court that the order of
dismissal Was illegal. could not revive an order_ which. had ceased to
exist.
·. ~i. · - ·
··
·
t'~··l:.. The- que"~tioil
whether the order of suspension dated the 24th
August, 1944, .was valid . and whether it was passed after due en. quiry; woold be material only with reference to the claim for salary
.for the period between the 24th August, 1944 and the. !st December,
1944, arid as the appellant did not press the claim for that period
there was no need to direct an enquiry on that point,
..
"")
. ·• Heid ·£U,ther· 'tliat the claim for refund of extra court-fee could
. not be. gianted illasmuch as the decision of. the Privy Council dari. lying the. pi>si\ion eould not be a ground for the refund of ~xcess
·rou_rt·f«: -whCQ at the time it was _paid it was in accordance with. the
:}i_w. as i~,
~~
The State of Bihar v. Abdul Majid ([1954) S.C.R. 786), Sh""um
v. ,.Smith.([188~] .A.C. 229), R. Venkata Rao v. Secretary of State for
'Jnilia. 'in CounCii (r.;.R. 64 I.A. 55), M. Gopal Krishna Naid,. v. s;f,fMadhf.a:Pr1idesh (A.I.R. 1952 Nag. 17), Provincial Government,
"i::'1itrti1 P~t/vi."cei ,and Berar through Collector, Amraoti v. Shams/Jiil
;!fps~'4n Sirifi H.uss'ain (I.LR. [1948] Nag. 576), referred ID.
thcii
(I) [1948] L.R. 75 I.A. 225.
(2) [1954] S.C.R. 786.
·
2S.C.R..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
393
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
85 ,,.of 1954.
i Appeal under
Article 133( 1) ( c) of the Constitution from the Judgment and Decree dated the 6th
November, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad in F. A. No. 141 of 1949.
S. Ramaswamy Iyer
for th~ appellant.
(K. R. Clioudhry, with him)
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India ( C. P.
Lal, with him) for the respondent.
1955. April 21.
was delivered by
The Judgment
of the Court
IMAM J.-This is an appeal against the decision of
the Allahabad High Court affirming the decision of
the Civil Judge of Allahabad.
The appellant was appointed to the United Pri>vinces Civil (Executive) Service in 1940 and in due
course was confirmed. He was posted to various stations and in 1944 he was posted to Lakhimpur Kheri,
where he joined ~n July, 1944. On the 23rd August,
1944, the Deputy Commissioner of Lakhimpur Kheri
received a telegram from Government informing him
that the appellant was suspended forthwith pending
inquiry into his conduct and that a copy of the telegram was forwarded to the appellant for information.
On the 26th August, 1944, the Deputy Commissioner
wrote to the appellant that he was required to appear
before the Commissioner of the Lucknow Division on
the 28th August, 1944. to answer the charges, a copy
of which would be forwarded to him. He further informed the appellant that he could treat his case
under rule 55 of the Civil Services {Classification Control and Appeal) Rules of 1930, published in the United
Provinces Gazette of June 28, 1930. The appellant
was further informed that in view of his suspension
his leave application was cancelled. On the 28th
August, 1944, the appellant appeared before the Commissioner at Lucknow and protested against the pri>cedure adopted by him for the inquiry. The Commis"
7-83 S. C. India/59.
1955
Om Prakash Gupta
v.
The State of Ullar
Prat/uh
394
1955
Om FTakash G•Pta
v,
The State of Uttar
Pradesh
Imam J,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
sioner having completed the inquiry on the
1st
September, 1944, submitted his report to Government.
The Commissioner, however, recommenced the inquiry
on September 11, 1944, and after completing the inquiry submitted the papers to Government on the 30th
September, 1944. The Government of the United
Provinces by an order dated the 25th November, 1944,
dismissed the appellant from the United Provinces
Civil (Executive) Service. This order was served on
the appellant on the 1st December, 1944, and he submitted a memorial to the Governor on August 7, 1945,
which
was rejected on the 28th May, 1947. During
the period of suspension the appellant was paid subsistence allowance at the rate of one-fourth of his
salary which was then Rs. 310 per month.
The appellant gave notice under section 80 of the
Code of Civil Procedure of h.is intention to bring a
suit and on the 2nd Janua·y, 1948, he filed his suit.
He asked for a declaration that the order of dismissal
was wrongful, illegal, void and inoperative ~nd that
he still continued to be a member of the Civil Service
ontitled to full pay with all increments as they fell
due. He prayed for a decree for ,recovery of arrears
of salary amounting to Rs. 16,810-8-0 less subsistence
allowance already drawn from August 24, 1944, to
December 31, 1947. In the alternative he prayed for
a declaration that the order of dismissal was wrongful and that a decree to the extent of Rs. 1,20,000
with interest by way of damages may be passed in
his favour.
He paid the requisite court fee on the
valuation of Rs. 1,20,000. This alternative claim was
deleted from the plaint as a result of an amendment,
having regard to a rnbsequent decision of the Privy
Council* which held that a person illegally dismissed
from Government service could only get a declaration
that the order was inoperative and that he still continued to be a member of the Service.
The appellant asked for refund of the extra court
fee paid which was rejected by the Civil Judge by a
separate order. The Civil Judge, however, decreed
*High CommiJJiorttr for India and H;,gh
J. ,\f. Lal-. [1948] L.R. 75 I.A.. ~~·"·
Commissioner for
PakistaN Y.
ts.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
the appellant's suit in part declaring that the order
dismissing him from service was illegal and that he
still continued to be a member of the United Provinces
Civil (Executive) Service. The Civil Judge, however,
declined to pass a decree for arrears of salary.
Against the decision of the Civil Judge the appellant appealed to the High Court and his appeal was
dismissed.
The respondent did not appeal against
the decision of the Civil Judge or file a cross-objection.
The appeal in the High Court proceeded on the basis
that the order of dismissal made against the appellant was illegal and that it was rightly declared that
he continued to be a member of the service of the
United Provinces Civil (Executive) Service. The only
two questions which were considered and decided by
the High Court were as to whether the appellant was
entitled to a decree for arrears of salary and a refund
of the excess court fee paid by him. Both these questions were decided against the appellant by the High
Court which subsequently gave him a certificate for
leave to appeal to this court.
It may be stated at once that in view of the dedsion of this court in The State of Bihar v. Abdul
Majid(1) there can be no question now that the appellant had the right to institute a suit for recovery
of arrears of salary as he was dismissed illegally.· It
is unnecessary, therefore, to refer to the elaborate
discussion of the law in this respect to be found in
the judgment of the learned Judges of the High
Court.
When this appeal came on for hearing before this
court and the appellant had been heard, the AttorneyGeneral in the course of his argument had contended
that the order of suspension of August 1944 subsisted
although the order of dismissal had been declared
illegal by the Civil Judge and all that the appellant
was entitled to was subsistence allowance and not
salary so long as the order of suspension remained
effective. This plea was not taken in the written
statement filed in the trial court, nor was there any
issue framed in this respect. The Attorney-General
(ll [1954] S.C.R. 786.
1955
Om Prakash Gupla
v.
TM State of Utlar
Pradesh
Imam].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
!955
fi9;5]
asked for time to ·file an additional written statement
on behalf of.' the respondent. This court allowed time
v.
·
for the respondent to <lo ·So and the appellant was
Thi SlaU of Uttar
also given time to reply to .any additional written statePrad<sh
ment filed 'on behalf of the respondent. The responImam J.
dent filed the additional written statement and the
appellant filed his reply to it. Thereafter the appeal
came on for hearing again and the learned Advocate
for the appellant made his submissions on the addi0tional written statement and the Attorney-General
replied to the same.
So far as the . payment of excess court fee is
concerned, the learned. Advocate for the appellant
did riot urge this point in his opening argument
but urged it in reply after the Attorney-General
had concluded his argument. Apart from the question as to whether the Advocate can be allowed to
urge a point like this in reply when no submission
had been made by him ·in his opening, it seems there
is no merit in the submission made by the Advocate.
The court fee had been paid on Rs. 1,20,000 ·which
was claimed as damages. At the · time the suit was
instituted" the law as then understood permitted such
.a claim to be made. The decision of the Privy Council, however, made it clear that no such claim could be
made and all that ·a Government servant could ask for
was a declaration that the order of dismissal was
· illegal and that he still continued to he a member of
• the Civil Service. The decision of the Privy Council
clarifying the position could not be a ground for re.fund of court fee when at the time it was paid it was
in accordance .with the law as then understood. Indeed
the appellant did .. not appeal or file an application
'against the order of the Civil Judge refusing to pass
Lan order.of 'refund. In the' High Court he did not i ask
1•foi this relief on 'the basis of any statutory provision.
;lHe invoked ·. the inherent powers of the High Court.
bThe: . Court Fees. Act contains,, certain provisions for
irefund of court ·fee paid by a party but admittedly
the present case is not covered by any of those provi1 sions.
It ·seems, · therefore, that the High Court in
the circumstances of the present case rightly refused
Om Prakash Gupta
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
397
to order a refund of the excess court fee paid by the
appellant. .Jt also does not appear that the Civil_
Judge acted illegally in refusing to order a refund.
On the additional written statement filed in this
Court by the respondent a question has arisen whether · the order of suspension was valid and during the
period it was in
force the appellant could recover
arrears of salary.
The learned Advocate for the
appellant contended that an order of suspension is a
penalty under rule 49 of the Classification Rules and
it was against all sense of natural justice to impose a
penalty upon a Government servant pending an inquiry against him under rule 55 of the said rules.
An order imposing the penalty of suspension was an
appealable order under rule 56 of the Classification
Rules and under rule 59 of the said rules, an appellate authority was bound to consider whether the
facts on which the penalty was imposed had been
established and whether those facts disclosed sufficient
grounds for imposing such a penalty. Rule 54 of
the Fundamental Rules authorises a rev1smg or an
appellate authority, when it finds that the penalty of
suspension was unjustified or not wholly justified, to
make an order granting to the Government servant
his full pay and any allowance to which he was entitled if he was honourably acquitted and in other
cases such proportion of pay and allowances as it may
prescribe. The penalty of suspension, it was urged
involved serious loss in the matter of salary and
allowances and to impose this penalty pending an
inquiry was to prejudge the case against a Governme9-t servant and in effect to make his right of appeal
a meaningless remedy.
It was pointed out that in
some of the rules framed by a Government or quasiGovernment authority
the penalty of suspension
pending an inquiry was specifically provided for, such
as rule 95 of the Bihar and Orissa Service Code referred to in Abdul Majid's case and rule 1711 of the
Indian Railway Establishment Code. On behalf of
the appellant reference was also made to certain decisions to the effect that as between master and servant, the master had no power of suspension unless
1955
Om Prakash Gupta
v.
Till State of Uttar
Praduh
Imam].
398
!955
·Om PrakashGupaJ
.v.
The Stat, of UUar
had<sh
lmam J.
SUPREME COURT REPo;R.TS
119.55]
there was· an e;rrpress term to that effect in the contract between them.
The Attorney-General conceded that apart from the
Classification Rules and the Fundamental Rules he
was not aware of any other rules under which the
penalty of suspension could be imposed upon a Government servant. He also conceded that under the
Classification Rules an order of suspension was a
penalty. He further conceded that as between master
and servant the former had no power of suspension
unless the terms of the contract between them permitted it or a statute or a rule provided for it but
his principle, he said, did not apply to a person in
the service of the Crown in India. He, however, contended that under rule 49 of the Classification Rules
a penalty of suspension could be imposed pending an
inquiry. There was nothing in the rule itself which
enjoined that a penalty could only be imposed at the
conclusion of an inquiry. The penalty could be imposed for good and sufficient reasons which may be
based on materials already existing pending an inquiry. After the inquiry there may be the imposition
of a severer penalty or a definite period of suspension
may be fixed or there may be cancellation of the order
of suspension. No doubt there was a right of appeal
against an order imposing a penalty of smpension
pending an inquiry but the provisions of rule ~4 of
the Fundamental Rules did not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that the penalty of suspension could only
be imposed after an inquiry. Clause (a) of the said
rule might contemplate a case where the penalty had
been impo».rl after an inquiry but clause (b) could
cover a case where the penalty had been imposed
pending an inquiry. In the present case, he said, the1e
was no contravention of any principle of natural
jnstice as the appellant had an opportunity of explaining the accusation marle against him. The letter
of the Commissioner of Lucknow Division with its
annexure, marked Exhibit A in the trial court, clearly
showed
that the Deputy Commissioner, Lakhimpur
Kheri
had recorded statements of persons with reference to three cases and the appellant saw him in
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
connection therewith. He admitted the facts but
tried to explain them. He, however, declined to give
his ~tatement in writing. The order of suspension
made against him was based on materials of which he
was fully aware.
In the alternative the Attorney-General urged that
in the year 1944 the appellant was a member of the
Civil Service of the Crown in India holding office
during the pleasure of the Crown. There was, therefore, inherent power in the Crown and its representative to pass an order of suspension against the appellant pending an inquiry. The Classification Rules and
Fundam_s:ntal Rules were merely directions for general
guidance and they did not constitute a contract between the Crown and its servants. For this propositi_on
he referred to the observations of Lord Hobhouse in
the case of Shenton v. Smith( 1 ). He also relied upon
the following observations of Lord Roche in the case
of R. Venkata Rao v. Secretary of State for India in
Council('). "Section
96-B in express terms states
that office is held during pleasure. There is, therefore, no need for the implication of this i:erm and no
room for its exclusion. The argument for a limited
and special kind of employment . during pleasure but
with an added contractual term that the rules are to
be observed is at once too artificial and too far-reaching to commend itself for acceptance. The rules are·
manifold in number and most minute in particularity,
and are all capable of change .................. Inconvenience is ·not a final consid4'.ration in a matter of
construction, but it is at least worthy of consideration, and it can hardly be doubted that the suggested.
procedure of control by the Courts over Government
in the most detailed work of managing its services
would cause not merely inconvenience but confusion".
In the courts below the principal question for consideration was whether the appellant could recover
It
arrears of salary having been illegally dismissed.
was not pleaded that the order of suspension V.'as
(1) (18951 A.C. 22~.
('' J•. R. li4 I .A. 55·
1955
Om Prakash Guf11a
v.
The State of Uttar
Pradesh
Imam].
400
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
valid and during the period it was in force the appellant could not recover arrears of salary and no specific
v.
issue was framed in this respect. '- If the decision of
Tk Stal• of Uttar
this court in Abdttl Majid's case had been available to
Praduh•
the
courts below, they would have held that the appelImam f
lant was entitled to recover arrears of salary when he
had been illegally dismissed and they would have had
further to decide whether the order of suspension was
valid and during 'the period it was in force the appellant could recover arrears of salary. On the additional
written statement filed ,by the respondent in this
court, the submissions of the Advocate for the appellant _ and. the Attorney General would require examination and_ it might have been necessary to consider
whether the case should 'not be remanded to the court
of trial. It is unnecessary, however,. to record a decision ' on.these'
.
. submissions .having
. regard to · the attitude adopted by the Advocate for the appellant.
He
objected to the case being ' remanded as such a course
would involve the ·appellant· in heavy · expenditure. and
harassment.
The appellant preferred to give up his
claim for arrears of salary less subsistence allowance
paid to him from the date of the order of suspension
until the date of the order of dismissal. He, however,
contended that the '. order of, suspension continued to
be in force only until the 25th November, 1944, the
date of the order of dismissal. On that date the order
of suspension ceased . to exist and the appellant was
entitled to recover arrears of salary from the 25th
November, 1944, to - the 31st December, 1947, inclusive.
The Attorney-General strongly ·contended that _it
continued to be in force and that it was not at all
affected by the declaration of the- Civil Judge that
the order of dismissal was illegal. In view of that
decision the order of dismissal must. be regarded as a
nullity and non-existent in the eye of law. The inquiry,
the outcome of which was ·-the order of dismissal, had
not therfore ended. It could only end with a valid
order which would- replace the order of suspension.
Until that happened the accusation against ·the appellant remained and the inquiry had not ended. He
referred to the case of M. Copa! Krishna' Naid11 v.
1955
Om Prakash Gupta
.2 .S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPdRTS
401
State of Madhya Pradesh(1). On behalf of the appellant reliance was· placed on the case of Provincial Government, Central Provinces and Berar through Collector,
Amraoti v. Shamshul Hussain Sirai Hussain(2). The
order of suspension made against the appellant was
clearly one made pending an inquiry.
It certainly
was not a penalty imposed after an enquiry. As the
result of the inquiry an order of dismissal by way of
penalty had been passed against the appellant. With
that order, the order of suspension lapsed. The order
of dismissal replaced the order of suspensio-9- which
then ceased to exist. That clearly was the position
between the Government of the United Provinces and
the appellant. The subsequent declaration by a Civil
Court that the order of dismissal was illegal could
not revive an order of suspension which did not exist.
The case referred to by the Attorney-General is not
directly in point and that decision does not conflict
with the case relied upon by the appellant. The
appellant is, therefore, entiled to recover arrears of
salary from the 25th of November, 1944, to 31st
J)ecember, 1947.
The appeal is accordingly allowed in palt with costs
throughout and th~ decree of the courts below is set
aside. The , plaintiff's suit is decreed for arrears of
salary from the 25th of November, 1944, to the 31st
of J)ecember, 1947, inclusive. The appellant had
claimed Rs. 16,810-8-0 less subsistence allowance
already drawn as arrears of pay from the 24th of
August, 1944, to the 31st J)ecember, 1947. As his
claim for arrears of salary from the 24th of August
1944, to the 25th of November, 1944, is given up, the
total salary payable to him during thi$ period less
subsistence allowance already
drawn,
must be
deducted from the sum of Rs. 16,810-8-0. The judgment of the High Court as well as the additional
written statement filed by the respondent in this
court show that subsequent to the decree passed by
the Civil Judge the appellant was treated as under
suspension until he was dismissed by a fresh order of
1
( )
(1)
A.I.R. 1952 Nag. 170.
I.L.R.1948 Nag. 576; A.I.R. (36) 194r1 :Sag. 118.
1955
Om Prakash Gupta
v.
The State of Utlar
Pradtsh
Imam].
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
1955
Om Prakash Gu1ta
v.
Tlie Stale of Ufla,
Prtkhsh
Imam].
1955
April 21
[1955)
dismissal and that he has been paid subsistence allowance for the entire period. Such . subsistence allowance as has been paid to the appellant from the 25th
of November, 1944, to the 31st December, 1947, inclusive, must, thertfore, be credited to the respondent
and the same must be adjusted against the salary
claimed by the appellant. A decree will accordingly
be prepared stating the amount recoverable by the
appellant.
The appellant was permitted to appeal in forma
pauperis. As he has succeeded in the appeal, the
Registrar shall calculate the amount of court fee which
would have been paid by the appellant ;f he had not
been allowed to appeal as a pauper and incorporate
it in the decree. The court fee shall be paid by the
appellant and the same will be recoverable by the
Government of India from him and shall be the first
charge on the amount decreed to him. Under Rule 7
of Order XIV of the Rules of this Court, the appellant will be allowed the fees paid by him to his Advocates, in the taxation of costs.
THE DELHI CLOTH AND GENERAL MILLS
CO., LTD.
ti.
HARNAM SINGH AND OTHERS.
(VMAN BosE, JAGANNADHADAS and BHUVANESHWAR
PRASAD SINHA, JJ.)
Priv11te International Law-Law applic11ble to contractual obligations-English and Continental schools of thought-Lex situs and
uProper I.Au/' of contract-Partition of India-Post partition debt
-Action for recovery where lies-Analogy of banking transactions and
insurance claims-Place of primary obligatio11-Debt, whether pro-
perty-Sections 3 and 130 of Transfer of Property Act-Evacuee property laws-Pakistan (Protection of Evacuee Property) Ordinance,
1948 (XV/ll of 1948)-Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Pro·
perty) Ordinance (XV) 1949-Whether confiscatory in nature
During the years in question cloth was rationed at Lyallpur,
then a part of the Punjab in undivided Tndia, ·and sales could only
be made to government nominees and other authorised persons. The
plaintiffs rcsii!cnt in Lyallpur, were the government nominees. The
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