THAKUR AMAR SINGHJI versus STATE OF RAJASTHAN
Supreme Court of India | Decided 15 April 1955 | [1955] 2 S.C.R. 303 | 1955 INSC 28
Key facts
- Decided
- 15 April 1955
- Bench
- BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA*, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI, T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR, SYED JAFFER IMAM
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 354/1954
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1955] 2 S.C.R. 303
- Neutral citation
- 1955 INSC 28
Text of the judgment
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·THAKUR AMAR SINGHJI
v.
STATE OF RAJASTHAN
(AND OTHER PETITIONS)
[MUKHERJEA
c. ]., s. R. DAS, BHAGWATI, VENKATA-
RAMA AYYAR AND ]AFER IMAM
JJ.]
Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of /agirs Act (Rajasthan Act VI of 1952)-Validity-Rajpramukh-Competence to enact
the law-Covenant of the United State of Rafasthan, arts. Vil (3), X
(3)-"0rdinance", meaning of-Bill, whether prepared by the Rafpramukh as required by the Constitution-Resumption of jagir lands
-Legislative competence-Pith and substance of legislation-Acquisition or resumption-/agir, meaning of-Legislative practice-Implied grant-Legislative ,grants-Constitutions of India, Arts. 14,
31-A, 31(2), 212-A(2), 385, Sch. Vil, List II, entries 18, 36-Marwar Land Revenue Act (XL of 1949), s. 169-Mewar Governmenl
Kanoon Mal Act (V of 1947), s. 106-Bhomicharas, Bhomias
Tikanadars, Subeguzars, Marsubdars holders of other tenures.
The Bill which came to be enacted as the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act was prepared in the Ministerial
Department of the Government of Rajasthan. It was approved by the
Rajpramukh on 8-2-1952, and reserved for the consideration of the
President, who gave his assent to it on 13-2-1952.
By notification issued on 16-2-1952, the Act came into force on 18-2-1952. In
pursuance of s. 21 ( 1) of the Act, the State of Rajasthan issued notifications resuming the jagirs specified therein, whereupon petitions
under Art. 226 of the Constitution were filed by the persons
aggrieved challenging the validity of the Act before the Rajasthan
High Court. The petitions were dismissed and thereupon they filed
petitions before the Supreme Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution
of India, impugning the Act. They contended inter alia that the
Rajpramukh had no competence to enact the law that the Bill was
not prepared by the Rajpramukh as required by Art. 212-A(2), that
resumption was not one of the topics of legislation enumerated either
in the State List or in the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule
of the Constitution and that the Act was therefore ultra vires the
powers of the State, that the Act did not provide for ad~quate compensation nor was there any public purpose involved in it and
therefore it contravened Art. 31(2), and that as the Act was discriminatory it contravened Art. 14. There were some special contentions
that the Act was not saved by Art. 31-A, because the lands resumed
were neither estates nor jagirs nor grants similar to jagirs, inams or
muafi and that some of the properties sought to be resumed were
not jagirs as defined in the Act and therefore the notifications
under s. 21 of the Act in so far as they related to them were illegal.
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1955
Held that, (i) the Rajpramukh was competent to enact the im·
pugned law (under Art. 385 as he was the authority functioning
immediately before the commencement of the Constitution as the
Sinf/fii
legislature of Rajasthan under art. X (3) of the Covenant of the
,,.,, of /IJj<UtMn United State of Rajasthan. The expression "Ordinance" in art. X
(3) must be construed as meaning "Law". Article VII (3) of the
Covenant has reference to the executive power which the Rulers had
to resume jagirs and does not operate as a restric_tion on the legisla·
tive powers under art. X (3). The Legislature of the corresponding
State mentioned in Art. 385 refers not to the legislature under the
Constitution, but to the body or the authority which was function·
ing as the legislature of the State before the commencement of the
Constitution and under Art. X (3) of the Covenant of the United
State of Rajasthan, that authority was the Rajpramukh.
TAal;ur AMM
"·
Article 385 does not require that that authority should have had
absolute and unlimited powers of legislation. If it was functioning as
the legislative authority before the Constitution, it would, under the
article, have all the powers conferred by the Constitution on the
House or Houses of legislature of the States.
(ii) Article 212·A(2) which provides that the Rajpramukh should
prepare the Bill, does not require that he should himself draft it. It
is sufficient if he decides questions of policy which arc of the essence
of the legislation. It is open to the Rajpramukh to adopt a Bill prepared by his ministers and the only matter that will have to be considered is whether in fact he did so. There is no provision in Art.
212-A(2) for the Rajpramukh approving of a Bill and an endorsement of approval on the Bill prepared in the ministerial department
mu.<t therefore signify its adoption by him. When the Bill is produced with an endorsement of approval under his signature the
que<tion must be held to be concluded and any further discussion
about the legislative or executive state of mind of the Rajpramukh
must be ruled out as inadmissible.
(iii) The impugned Act is not ultra vires the powers of the
State Legislature as the subject-matter of the legislation is in subs.tance acquisition of properties falling under entry 36 of List II of
the Seventh Schedule. Resumption and acquisition connote two
different concepts, but whether the impugned Act is one for acquisition of jagirs or for their resumption must be determined with reference to the pith and substance of the legislation, the name given
to it by the legislature not being decisive of the matter. The resumption for which the Act provides is not in enforcement of the rights
which the Rulers had to resume jagirs in accordance with the terms
of the grant or the law applicable to it, but in exercise of the sovereign rights of eminent domain possessed by the State. Under the
circumstances, the taking of the properties is in substance acquisition notwithstanding that it is labelled as resumption.
only
The payment of compensation to the Jagirdars is consistent
with the taking being an acquisition and not resumption in
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accordance with the terms of the grant or the law applicable to it.
Though the legislation also falls under entry 18 of List II of the
Seventh Sched1de, there being an entry 36 dealing with acquisition,
it must be held that· the Act falls under that entry and is valid.
(iv) The word 'jagir' connoted originally grants made by Raj put
Rulers to their clansmen for military services rendered or to be
rendered. Later on grants made for religious and charitable purposes and even to non-Rajputs were called jagirs, and both in its
popular sense and legislative practice, the word jagir came to be used
as connoting all grants which conferred on the grantees rights in
respect of land revenue, and that is the sense in which the word
jagir should be construed in Art. 31-A.
The object of Art. 31-A as to save legislation which was
directed to the abolition of intermediaries so as to establish direct
relationship between the State and the tillers of the soil. Construing
the word in that sense which would achieve that object in full
measure, it must be held that jagir was meant to cover all grants
under which the grantec!s had only rights in respect of revenue and
were not tillers of the soil. Maintenance grants in favour of persons
who were not cultivators such as members of the ruling family would
be jagirs for purposes of Art. 31-A.
( v) Bhomicharas. The Bhomicharas arc the representatives of
Rajput Rulers who conquered the country and established their
sovereignty over it in the thirteenth century. Later on the Ruler
of Jodhpur imposed his oovereignty over the territory but permitted
the previous rulers to continue in possession of the lands on payment of an annual sum. The question was whether they held the
lands as jagirs.
Held that, there could be a jagir only by grant by the Ruling power but that such a grant need not be express, and could be
implied and when the Ruler of Jodhpur imposed his sovereignty
over the territory of the Bhomicharas but recognised their possession
of the lands, it is as if there was annexation by him and re-grant
to them of these lands.
Vajesinghji /oravar Singhji and Others v. Secretary of State
[ (1924) L.R. 51 I.A. 357] and Secretary of State v. Sardar Rustam
KhatJ [(1941) L.R. 68 I.A. 109], referred to.
Though the Bhomicharas enjoyed large powers, their status was
only that of subjects. The status of a person must be either that of
a sovereign or a subject. There is no tertium quid. The law does
not recognise an intermediate status of a person being partly a sovereign and partly a subject. And when once it is admitted that the
Bhomicharas had acknowledged the sovereignty of Jodhpur their
status can only be that of a subject.
Even if the Bhomicharas did not prior to the enactment of the
Marwar Land Revenue Act XL of 1949 hold the lands as grantees
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' of Rajasthan
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from the State, they must be deemed to have become such grantees
by force of s. 169 of the Act which provides that all lands in the
State vest in· the
Maharajah and all proprietary interests therein are
deemed to be held under a grant from him. The Bhomicharas had
by long usage and recognition and by the legislative practice of the
State come tO be recognised as jagirdars
and their tenure is a jagir
within the intendment of s. 169.
For the purposes of Art. 31-A, it would make no difference
whether the grant is made by the sovereign in the exercise of his
prerogative right or by the legislature in the exercise of its sovereign
rights. Grants whi~h are the creatures of statutes called legislative
grants are equally within the operation of that article.
Bhomicharas are, accordingly, within the operation of Art.
31-A.
(vi) The position of Bhumias in Mewar is similar to that of
Bhomicharas in Marwar and in addition it was a condition of the
terms on which their title to the lands was recognised by the rulers
of Chittoor and Udaipur, that they had to render military service
when called upon and also pay quit rent. Their title to the lands
therefore rested on an implied grant and their tenure would be jagir
even in its stricter sense.
Section 27 of the Mewar Government Kanoon Mal Act {V of
1947) enacts that all lands belong to His Highness and that no person
has authority to take possession of any lands unless the right is
granted by His Highness. Section 106( I) of the Act declares that
a "Tikanadar, Jagir<lar, Muafidar or Bhumia shall have all such
revenue rights in the lands comprised in his )agir, muafi, or Bhom
under this Act, as are granted to him by His Highness". The effect
of these provisions \Vas to impress on the Bhom tenure the characteristics of a grant.
Article 13, Clause (1) of the Constitution of Mewar provided
that, "no person shall be deprived of his life, liberty or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied equality
before the law within the territories of Mewar". It was contended
for the petitioners that the impugned Act was void as contravening
the above provisions. Held that, as the authority whirh enacted
the Constitution of Mewar was His Highness, it could be repealed
or modified by the same authority, and the impugned Act must be
held to have repealed the Constitution to the extent that it was inconsistent with it.
(vii) The Tikanadars of Shekwati got into possession of lands
as ijaradars or lessees and were subsequently treated as jagirdars~
Their tenure was; if not jagirs, at least other usimilar grants" within
Art. 31-A. It is included in Schedule I to the impugned Act as
item 6.
The nature of the tenures of lands held by Subeguzars, Mansubdars, maintenance holders (Lawazma and Kothrikarch), Tikanadars
and of Naqdirazan, Sansan grants, etc., considered.
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(viii) The Khandela estate was granted in 1836 on a permanent
lease. The definition of jagir in s. 2(h) includes the tenures mentioned in Schedule I to the Act and Istimrari tenure is item 2 therein. The question was whether the Istimrar-ijara was within item 2.
Held that, the essential features of lstimrari .tenure are that the
lands are assessed to a nominal quit rent, and that it is permanent.
The amount of Rs. 80,001 fixed as assessment under the deed of
1836 cannot be said to be nominal. The grant is, therefore, not an
Istimrari tenure, but a permanent Izara.
{ix) Objections raised as to the validity of the Act on the
ground that it did not provide for payment of compensation, that
there was no public purpose involved in the resumption and that
therefore it contravenes Art. 31(2) or that the provisions of the Act
offend Art. 14, are barred by the provisions of Art. 31-A of the
ConstitutW,n.
Even apart from Art. .31-A, the impugned Act must be held to
be supported by public purpose and is not in contravention of Art.
31(2). Nor is there a contravention of Art. 14, as under the Act all
jagirs are liable to be resumed, on power having been conferred on
the Government to grant exemption.
State of Bihar v. Maharaiadhiraia Sir Ka"!_eshwar Singh of
Darbhanga and Others [(1952) S.C.R. 889] and Biswambhar Singh v.
The State of Orissa and Others ((1954) S.C.R. 842], referred to.
The true scope of the rule of eiusdem generis is that words of a
general nature following specific and particular words should be
construed as limited to things which are of the same nature as those
specified and not its reverse, that specific words which precede are
controlled by the general words which follow.
ORIGINAL
JURISDICTION :
Petitions Nos. 354 to
359, 362, 370 to 385, 387 to 469, 471 to 475, 477 to
479, 482 to 486, 488, 490, 491, 493 to 497, 502, 503,
510, 511 to 521, 525, 527 to 529, 535 to 563, 570, 572
to 575, 577 to 584, 586 to 588, 592 to 595, 597, 600
602, 603, 606 to 610, 613 to 619, 624, 026 to 634, 637
to 645, 653, 654, 656 to 659, 661, 662, 668, 672, 675,
679, 684 to 688 of 1954 and 1 to 14, 17, 20, 21, 25 to
27, 35 to "37, 45, 47, 49 52, 55 to 57 and 61 to 66 of
1955.
Petitions under Article 32 of the
for the enforcement of fundamental rights.
Constitution
Dr. Bakshi Tek Chand (O· C. Chatterjee and
K. L. Mehta, with him) for the Petitioners in Petitions Nos. 354, 362, 382 to 385, 511 to 516, 519, 537,
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541, 543 to 547, 550, 553, 556, 558 to 562, 570, 573 to
575, 582 to 584, 587, 588, 593 to 595, 597, 602, 603,
607 to 609, 613, 614, 616 to 619, 626, 628, 631 to 633,
637, 640 to 642, '44, 645, 653, 657 to 659, 661, 662,
679, 684 to 688 of 1954 and 2 to 7, 9 to 14, 21, 25
to 27, 35, 37, 45, 47, 49, 52, 55, 57, 63 and 65 of
1955.
H. L. Mordia and K. L. Mehta, for the Petitioners
in Petitions Nos. 55 and 65 of 1955.
Frank Anthony and K. L. Mehta, for the Petitioners in Petitions Nos. 56 and 64 of 1955.
U. M. Trivedi, (K. L. Mehta, with him),- for the
Petitioners in Petitions Nos. 615 of 1954 ~d 20 of
1955.
R. K. Rastogi and K. L. Mehta, for the Petitioner in Petition No. 634 of 1954.
K. L. Mehta, for the Petitioner in Petition No.
36 of 1955.
Dr. Bakshi Tek Chand (0. C. Chatterjee and
Naunit Lal, with him), for the Petitioners in Petitions
Nos. 356 to 359, 370, 372, 373, 374, 376 to 378, 380,
389, 390, 393 to 400, 415, 417, 463, 469, 482, 484, 521,
563, 577, 578, 586, 592, 606, 610, 627 and 656 of 1954.
Achhru Ram, (Naunit Lal, with him) for the Petitioner in Petition No. 391 of 1954.
Naunit Lal, for the Petitioners in Petitions Nos.
355, 371, 375, 379, 416, 455, 468, 483, 485, 488, 491,
493 to 497, 517, 525, 529, 538, 540, 542 and 551 of
1954.
Dr. Bakshi Tek Chand, (Ganpat Rai with him),
the Petitioners in Petitions Nos. 381, 387, 388,
402 to 410, 412, 413, 418 to 423, 425, 426, 428 to 454,
456 to 459, 464 to 466, 477, 478, 486, 503, 510, 520,
548, 552, 557, 572, 580, 600, 624, 639, 668 of 1954 and
8 and 17 of 1955.
N. C. Cliatterjee, ( Ganpat Rai and S. K.. Kapur,
for
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with him), for the Petitioners in Petitions Nos. 462,
536, 549, 579, 630, 638 and 654 of 1954.
U. M. Trivedi, (Ganpat Rai, with him), for the
petitioners in Petitions No. 629, 643, 672 of 1954 and
(J6 of 1955.
Achhru Ram, (Ganpat Rai, with him), for
Petitioner in Petition No. 424 of 1954.
the
Frank Anthony and Ganpat Rai, for the Pctition7rs in Petitions Nos. 401, 460, 502, 518, 53'
and 539 of 1954.
S. K. Kapur and Ganpat Rai, for
in Petitions Nos. 411 and 675 of 1954.
the Petitioners
R. K. Pastogi and Ganpat Rai, for the Petitioners
in Petitions Nos. 427 and 461 of 1954.
0. C. Chatterji and Ganpat Rai, for the Petitioner
in Petition No. 62 of 1955.
/. B. Dadachanii and Rajinder Narain, for the
Petitioners in Petitions Nos. 473, 479, 490, 527, ·528,
554 and 581 of 1954 and Nos. 1 and 61 of 1955.
C. L. Aggarwal and Rajinder Narain, for the Petitioners in Petitions Nos. 471, 472, 474 and 475 of
1954.
K. P. Gupta, for the Petitioners, in Petitions Nos.
467 and 555 of 1954.
S. C. ltaacs (S. D. Sekhri, with him), for the
Petitioner in Petition No. 392 of 1954.
K. S. Hajela, Advocate-General for the State of
Rajasthan ·and G. S. Pathak, (Dau/at Ram Bhandari,
Porus A. Mehta, P. G. Gokhale and Kan Singh, with
them), for the Respondent (State of Rajasthan) in
all the petitions.
.
1955. April 15. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
VENKATARAMA
AYYAit J.-These are applications
under Article 32 of the Constitution impugning the
validity of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act No. VI of 1952, hereinafter referred
TW.AS'111t/tii
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ThakwASinghji
.,,,
Sl•ll of Rajasllum
Y111l;ataram11
Apar J.
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to as the Act. The history of this legislation may be
briefly stated. On 20-8-1949 the Government of India
appointed a Committee presided over by Sri C. S.
Venkatachar to examine and report on the jagirdari
and land tenures in Rajputana and Madhya Bharat
the object avowedly being to effect land reforms so as
to establish direct .relationship between the State and
the tillers of the soil and to eliminate all intermediaries between them. By its report dated 18-12-1949
the Committee recommended inter alia the resumption of j agirs and payment of rehabilitation grants in
certain cases. (Vide report, page 62). The question
of legislation on the subject was taken up by the Government of Rajasthan in 1951, and eventually a Bill
called the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption
of Jagirs Bill was prepared, and on 31-12-1951 it was
approved by the Rajpramukh and reserved for the
consideration of the President. On 21-1-1952 the
President withheld his assent from the Bill, and in
communicating this decision, the Deputy Secretary
to the Government of India informed the Rajasthan
Government that if certain amendments wete made
in the Bill as presented and a fresh Bill submitted,
the President would be willing to reconsider the
matter. In accordance with these suggestions, a fresh
Bill was prepared in the Ministerial Department incorporating certain amendments, and it was approved
by the Rajpramukh on 8-2-1952, and reserved for the
consideration of the President, who gave his assent
to it on 13-2-1952. By notification issued on 16-2-1952
the Act came into force on 18-2-1952. Section 21(1)
of the Act provides that :
"As soon as may be after the commencement of
this Act, the Government may by notification in the
Rajasthan Gazette, appoint a date for the resumption
of any class of jagir lands and different dates may be
appointed· for different classes of jagir lands".
Acting under this provision, the State of Rajasthan
issued notifications resuming the jagirs specified therein, whereupon petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution were filed by the persons aggrieved challenging the validity of the Act. These petitions were
2 S.C.R.
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head by a Full Bench of the Rajasthan High Court,
which held overruling the contentions of the petitioners, that the Act was valid. (Vide Amarsingh · v.
State of Rajasthan (1 ).
The present applications have been filed under
article 32 impugning the Act on the following
grounds:
I. The Rajpramukh had no competence to enact
law, and the Act in question is therefore not a valid
piece of legislation.
II. The Bill was not prepared by the Rajpramukh as required by article 212-A(Z), and therefore
the law was not validly enacted.
III. Resumption is not one of the topics of legislation enumerated either in the State List or in the
Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, and the Act is therefore ultra vires the powers
of the State.
IV. The Act does not provide for adequate
compensation; nor is there any public purpose involved in it, and so it contravenes article 31(2).
It is discriminatory, and
therefore contravenes
article 14. And the legislation is not saved by
article 31-A, because the lands resumed arc neither
estates nor jagirs nor grants similar to jagirs, inams
or muafi. This contention is special to some of the
petitioners, and has reference to the specific properties
held by them.
V. The properties sought to be resumed arc not
jagirs as defined in the Act, and the notifications
under section 21 in so far as they relate to them arc
illegal. This again is a special contention urged in
some of the petitions.
These contentions will now be considered seriatim.
I. On the first question as to the competence of
the Rajpramukh to enact the law, it is necessary to
notice the events which led up to the formation of
the State of Rajasthan and the constitution of the
Rajpramukh as. its head. During the 12th and 13th
Centuries, the Rajput rulers who were then reigning
( 1)
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over various parts of Hindusthan were compelled by
pressure from the victorious Muhammadan invaders
to retreat to the regions to the southwest guarded by
the Aravali Hills and interspersed with deserts which
if less hospitable were also less vulnerable, and there
established several independent kingdoms. The period
which followed the foundation of these States was
marked by incessant wars, the powerful Sultans of
Delhi making determined efforts to subjugate the
Rajput princes and the latter offering stubborn and
more or less successful resistance thereto. The annals
of Rajputana especially of this period, present a story
of heroic deeds of men and women and are among
the most inspiring and fascinating chapters in the
history of this country. The Moghul Emperors who
established themselves later saw the wisdom of conciliating the Rajput rulers, and recognised their position as Chiefs getting in return an acknowledgement
of their suzerainty from them, and a promise to send
troops in support of the Imperial arms whenever required. When the power of the great Moghul waned
and the British established themselves as masters o£
this country, they in their turn recognised the Rajput
princes as Sovereigns, and entered into treaties with
them during the period between 1803 to 1818. (Vide
Aitchison's Treaties, Volume III). By these treaties,
the British Government accepted their status as independent rulers reserving to themselves Defence, External Relations and Communications and such other
matters as might be agreed upon. The relationship
thus created was one of "subordinate union" as it
was termed by Mr. Lee Warner, the princes being recognised as Sovereigns and they acknowledging the
suzerainty of the British. (Vide Protected Princes of
India, Chapter VI).
On 15-8-1947 India became independent, and the
paramountcy of the British Crown over the States
ceased. The question then arose as to the status of
the ruling Chiefs. It was soon realised by them that
in the larger interests of the country and in their own,
they could not afford to keep out of the Indian
Union and must throw ID their lot with it. The
...
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problem of fitting them within the framework of the
Indian Constitution was beset with considerable difficulties. The number of States which had been recognised as independent prior to 15-8-1947 was 552
excluding Hyderabad, Junagadh and Kashmir. While
a few of them were sufficiently large to be able to
function as separate State, many of them were too
small to be administered as distinct units. While some
of them had representative forms of Government,
others had not, the rulers being the sole authority,
executive, legislative and judicial. The solution which
was adopted by the Government of India was that
while the bigger States were continued as independent
units of the Union, the smaller States were, where
they formed islets within a Province, merged within
that Province, and where they were contiguous, integrated together so as to form a new State called the
Union.
One of the Unions thus newly formed was Rajasthan. There were at that time 18 independent rulers
functioning over different parts of Rajasthan. Nine
of them, rulers of Banswara, Bundi, Dungarpur
Jhalawar, Kishengarh, Kotah, Pratapgarh, Shahpura
and Tonk-entered into an agreement in March 1948
merging their States in a single unit called the United
State of Rajasthan. The ruler of Mewar joined this
Union on 18-4-1948, and the rulers of Jaipur, Jodhpur, Bikaner and Jaisalmere on 30-3-1949. The rulers
of Alwar, Bharatpur, Dholpur and Karauli who had
formed themselves on 18-3-1948 as Matsya Union dissolved that Union and acceded to the Rajasthan
Union on 15-5-1949. With that, the full strength of
the State of Rajasthan was made up.
The constitution of the United State of Rajasthan
as it finally emerged is to be found in the Covenant
entered into by the 14 rulers on 30-3-1949. As the
authority of the Rajpramukh to enact the impugned
legislation was founded on this Covenant, it is necessary to refer to the material provisions thereof bearing on the question. Under Article II, the Covenanting States agreed "to unite and integrate their territories in one State with a common executive legisla2-83 S, C. India/59
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ture and judiciary, by the name of the United State of
Rajasthan". Article VI(2) provides that the ruler of
each Covenanting State shall "make over the administration of his State to the Rajpramukh, and
thereupon all rights, authority and jurisdiction belonging to the ruler which appertain or are incidental
to the Government of the Covenanting States shall
vest in the United State and shall thereafter be exercisable only as provided by this Covenant or by the
Constitution to be framed thereunder. Article· VII
(3) provides :
"Unless other provision is made by the Act of
the Legislature of the United State, the right to
resume Jagirs or to recognise succession, according to law and custom, to the rights and titles of the
jagirdars shall vest exclusively in the Rajpramc:kh".
Them comes article X(3) which is as follows:
"Until a Constitution so framed comes into operation after receiving the assent of the Rajpramukh,
the legislative authority of the United State shall
vest in the Rajpramukh, who may make and
promulgate Ordinances for the peace and good Government of the State or any part thereof, and any
Ordinance so ma.de shall have the like force of law as
an Act passed by the legislature of the United State".
Article X(3) was subsequently modified by substituting for the words "Until a Constitution so framed
comes into operation after receiving the assent of the
Rajpramukh", the words "Until the Legislative Assembly of Rajasthan has been duly constituted and
summoned to meet for the first session under the
provisions of the Constitution of India". This modifi.
cation was necessitated by the fact that the idea of
conven.ing a Constituent Assembly for framing a Constitution for the State as contemplated in article X(l)
was dropped, and the Constitution as enacted for the
Union of India was adopted. This amendment, however, is of a formal character, and does not affect
the substan~e of the matter.
Then, there is article XIX under which the Rajasthan Government was to act "under the general
control of and comply with such particular directions,
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ·
315
if any, as may from time to time, be given by the
1955
Government of India". These are the material provisions of the Constitution which was in force in the
United State of Rajasthan before the Constitution of
India came into operation on 26-1-1950.
Thakur .ASing/ifi
Article 385 of the Constitution enacts:
"Until the House or Houses of the Legislature of
a State specified in Part B of the First Schedule has
or have been duly constituted and summoned to
meet for the first session under the provisions of this
Constitution, the body or authority functioning
immediately before the commencement of this Constitution as the legislature of the corresponding Indian
States shall exercise the powers and perform the
duties conferred by the provisions of this Constitution
on the House or Houses of the Legislature of the
State so specified".
It is the contention of the respondent that the
Rajpramukh was by reason of article X(3) of the
Covenant "the authority functioning immediately before the commencement of the Constitution as the
Legislature" of Rajasthan, and that he could under
article 385 exercise the powers which the Legislature
of the State could. It is conceded by the petitioners
that at the time of the impugned legislation no House
of Legislature had been constituted and summoned,
and that to that extent the requirements of that
Article are satisfied; but their contention is that on a
true construction of the articles of the Covenant the
Rajpramukh was not an authority functioning as
Legislature within the meaning of article 385, and
further that article VII(3) of the Covenant imposed
a prohibition on his power to enact a law of the kind
now under challenge, and that the prohibition had
not been abrogated by the Constitution.
The question then is which was the body or authority
which was functioning as the Legislature of the United
State of Rajasthan under the terms of the Covenant
Article X (3) expressly provides that the legislative
authority of the State shall vest in the Rajpramukh.
The meaning of this provision is clear and unambigu-
"·
SlaJ• of Rajulba
Ymkatarama
.War].
316
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
1955
ous; but it is argued for the petitioners that it is controlled and cut down by the expression "Ordinance" in
Singhji
article X(3) and by the terms of article VII(3) and of
v.
Siok of Rqjastlurn
article XIX. It is contended by Mr. N. C. Chatterjee
that
the legislative authority of the Rajpramukh was
Y1nkal'11'ama
A>.Par j.
only to "make and promulgate Ordinance'', that it is
a limited power conferred on him to be exercised in
case of emergency pending the constitution of popular legislature,
and that accordingly he was not a
"legislative authority" for the
purpose of article
385. But this is to import into the word "Ordinance"
what it connotes under the Government of India Act,
1935 or the Constitution of India. Sections 42 and
88 of the Government of India Act conferred on the
Governor-General
and
the
Governor
respectively
power to promulgate ordinances when the Legislature
was not in session. Similar power is conferred on the
President and the Governors by articles 123 and 213
of the Constitution. That is a legislative power exercisable by the head of the State, when it is not possible for the Legislature to exercise it. But the United
State of Rajasthan had then no Legislature, which
had yet to be constituted, and therefore in its context,
the word "Ordinance" in article .X(3) cannot bear the
meaning which it has under the Government of India
Act or the Constitution. It should be remembered
the
that before the formation of the United State,
. Covenanting rulers enjoyed sovereign rights of legislation in their respective territories; and under article
VI(2) (a), they agreed to surrender those rights and
vest them in the United State.
It was therefore
plainly intended that the State of Rajasthan should
have plenary legislative authority such as was forby the rulers; and where was it
merly exercised
lodged, if not in the Rajpramukh
If we are to construe article X(3) in the manner
contended for by the petitioners, then the anomalom
result will follow that there was in that State no
authority in which the legislative power was vested.
This anomaly would disappear if we are to construe
"Ordinance" as meaning law. That indeed is its
etymological meaning. According to the Concise OxThakur.A.,..,
.
2S.C.R.
...
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
317
ford Dictionary "to ordain" means "to decree, enact";
and "Ordinance" would therefore mean "decree, enact·
ment''. In Halsbury's Laws of England, Volume XI,
page 183, para 327 it is stated that when the Governor
assembly
of a colony which has no representative
enacts legislation with the advice and consent of the
State council, it is designated ordinance or law. That
clearly is the sense in which the word is used in arti·
de X(3), and that is placed beyond doubt by the
words which follow, that the Ordinance is to have
"the like force of law, as an Act passed by the
Legislature of the United State".
lt was next urged that under article VIl(3) the
Rajpramukh was given authority to resume jagirs
only in accordance with law and custom, that he had
no authority to enact a law for the resumption of
jagirs on grounds other than those recognised by law
and custom, that section 22 of the Act provided that
the resumption was to take effect notwithstanding
any jagir law which as defined in section 2( d) includes
also custom, that such a law was directly opposed to
what was authorised by article VII(3), that the legis·
lative powers conferred under article X(3) must be
exercised subject to the restrictions under article
VIl(3), and that the Act was therefore beyond his
competence. This contention is, in our opinion, un·
tenable. The words "according to law and custom".
cannot be held to qualify the words right to resume
jagirs", because they are wedged in between the words
"right to recognise succession" and the words "to the
rights and titles of Jagirdars", and must be construed
as qualifying only "the right to recognise succession
to the rights and titles of Jagirdars". But this may
not, by itself, be of much consequence, as the power
to resume provided in this article is what the grantor
possesses under law and custom. The real difficulty
in the way of the petitioners is that article VIl(3) has
reference to the power which rulers of States had as
rulers to resume jagirs, and what it provides is that
it should thereafter be exercised by the Rajpramukh.
That power is purely an executive one, and has nothing
to do with the legislative power of the ruler, which
1955
TluzkurAmat
Singhji
"4
State of RqjaJt!ian
Vmkatar111M
.,War J.
318
1955
T"""'6 ASing/Ui
...
Stall of Rajast/uin
Ymkalorama
..War :J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
L specially provided for in article X(3).. The fields
covered by the two articles are distinct and separate
and there can be no question of article VII(3) operating as a restriction on the legislative power under
article VII(3) expressly proarticle X(3). Indeed,
vides that it is subject to any legislation on the subject, whereas article X(3) is not made subject to
article VII(3).
Even if the petitioners are right in their contention
that article VII(3) imposes a limitation on the
powers of the Rajpramukh, that would not, in view
of article 385, derogate from the power of the Rajpramukh to enact the present law. The scope of that
article is that the body or authority which was
functioning before the commencement of the Constitution as the Legislature of the State has first to be
ascertained, and when once that has been done and
Constitution
the body or . .authority identified, the
confides to that body or authority all the powers conferred by the provisions of the Constitution on the
House or Houses of Legislature of the State. These
powers might be wider than what the body or authority previously possessed or they might be narrower.
But they arc the powers which are allowed to it under
article 385, and the extent of the previous authority
is wholly immaterial. The contention that the Act
is incompetent by reason of article VII(3) of the
Covenant must accordingly fail.
It was next argued that the powers of the Rajpramukh under article X(3) were subject to the general
control of the Government of India under article
XIX, and that he could not therefore be regarded as
legislative authority for the purpose of article 385
We see no force in this contention. Article 385 provides that the authority which was to exercise legislative powers in the interim period under that Article
should be the authority which was functioning as
the Legislature of the State before the commencement
of the Constitution. It does not further require that
that authority should have possessed absolute and
unlimited powers of legislation. It could not be, and
it was not, contended that the effect of article XIX
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
319
was to vest the legislative authority of the State in
the Government of India, and that being so, the
Rajpramukh was the legislative authority of the
State, whatever the limitations on that authority.
It was finally contended that article 385 has no
application to the present case, because under article
168 the Legislature is to consist of both the Governor
and one or more Houses, that article 238(7) extends
article 168 to Part B States substituting the Rajpramukh in the place of the Governor that accordingly
the Rajpramukh cannot by himself constitute the
Legislature, and that when article 385 refers to the
· body or authority functioning as Legislature, it could
only refer to both the Rajpramukh and the House
functioning in conjunction. Support for this contention was sought in the terms of article 212-A(l) of
the Constitution (Removal of Difficulties) Order No.
II, which excluded in relation to Part B States only
the first proviso to article 200, but not the body of it.
If this contention is sound, then article 385 must be
treated as a dead letter as regards such of the Part B
States as had no House of Legislature. But, in our
opinion, this contention is untenable, because article
385 refers not to Legislatures under th.e Constitution
but to the body or authority which was functioning
as the Legislature of the State before the commencement of the Constitution, and article 238(7) is, under
the Constitution (Removal of Difficulties) Order sub.
ject to article 385. Nor can any argument be founded
on the exclusion of the first proviso to article 200 but
not of the body of that article under article 212-A(l),
because it lays down the procedure to be followed
when a Bill has been passed by a Legislative Assembly.
or Legislative Council of a State, and is by its very
terms inapplicable when there is no House of Legislature. The contention of Mr. Frank Anthony that
the non-inclusion of the body of article 200 among
the articles excluded from application to Part B States
under article 212-A(l) imposes by implication a limitation on the power of the Rajpramukh to enact laws
unless they are passed by Legislative Assemblies is
1955
T,_,,,~J
,,.
SitlP,ii
S""4 of Rajtutha
VmA:atanmia
.4)!1111'
J.
320
1955
Thalalrbw
Sing/iii
...,.
8144 of Rajastb
Ymkalaramo
4u•1·
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
not supported by anything in the article, and must be
rejected. We must accordingly hold that the Rajpramukh had legislative competence to enact the law
under challenge.
II. The second contention that has been pressed
by the petitioners is tha.t the Rajasthan Land Reforms
and Resumption of Jagirs Bill was not prepared by
the Rajpramukh as required by article 212-A(2), and
that the Act was therefore not validly enacted. The
facts material for the purpose of this contention arc
that the Bill was first prepared in the Ministerial
Department in accordance with the rules framed under
article !66(3) for the "convenient transaction of the
business of the State". It was approved by the. Council of Ministers on 27-12-1951 and sent to the Rajpramukh with the following note by the Secretary:
"The Bill is submitted for gracious approval and
signature and for reserving it for the consideration
of the President".
Then there is firstly an endorsement "approved"
signed by the Rajpramukh and dated 31-12-1951, and
then follows another endorsement, "I hereby reserve
this Bill for the consideration of the President" similarly signed and dated. On 21-1-1952 the President
endorsed on the Bill, "I withhold my assent from the
Bill". Thereafter, a fresh Bill was prepared and submitted to the Rajpramukh on 6-2-1952 with the following note by the Chief Secretary:
"The Bill as finally agreed to is now submitted
to His Highness the Rajpramukh for his approval
and for reserving the same for the consideration of
the President".
The Rajpramukh gave his approval on 8-2-1952, and
by a further order he reserved the Bill for the consideration of the President who gave his assent on
13-2-1952. Now, the question is whether on these
facts the requirements of article 212-A(2) have been
complied with.
Article 212-A(2) was enacted by the Constitution
(Removal of Difficulties) Order No. II, and is as
follows:
I'
r
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
321
"The Rajpramukh or other authority exercising
th(! legislative powers in any such State as aforesaid
under article 385 shall prepare such Bills as may be
deemed necessary, and the Rajpramukh shall declare
as respects any Bill so prepared either that he assents
to the Bill or that he withholds assent therefrom or
that he reserves it for the consideration of the President".
The contention of the petitioners is that as the
Bill was prepared by the Ministers and not the Rajpramukh, article 212-A(2) had been contravened, and
that, in consequence, the law had not been properly
enacted. It is conceded that under this article the
Rajpramukh has not himself to draft the Bill, and
that he might delegate that work to others. But they
insist-and in our opinion, rightly-that questions of
policy which are of the essence of the legislation
should at least be decided by him, and that even that
had not been done in the present case. They rely
strongly on the statements in t.he affidavit of Sri
Joshi, the Jagir Commissioner, that the Bill was
drafted in the Ministerial Department in accordance
with the rules framed under article 166(3), approved
by the Council of Ministers and sent on to the Rajpramukh for his assent. These allegations, they contend, preclude any supposition that the Rajpramukh had any part or lot in the settlement of the
policies underlying the Act, and the Bill must be held
therefore not to have been prepared by him.
Taking it that such are the facts, what follows?
Only that at the inception the Bill was not prepared
by the Rajpramukh. But that does not conclude the
question whether there had been compliance with
article 212-A(2), unless we hold that it was not open
to the Rajpramukh to adopt a Bill prepar('d by the
Ministers as his own, or if it was open, he did not, in
fact, do so. It cannot be disputed that whether a
Bill is in the first instance prepared by the Rajpramukh or whether he adopts what had been prepared by the Ministers as his own, the position in law
is the same. That has not been disputed by the petitioners. Their contention ts that such adoption
195S
Thahx Amor
Singhii
V•
Stale of RajastluiR
V enkatt1ramo
A.1.7"' J.
322
1955
TlubrAmar
...
Singlifi
St.II of Raj""""3
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1955)
should be clearly and unequivocally established, and
that the records do not establish it. It was argued
that when the Bill was sent to the Rajpramukh, he
was not called upon to apply his legislative mind to
it but to merely assent to it on the executive side;
that when the Rajpramukh endorsed his approval he
was, as admitted by Sri Joshi, merely assenting to it,
that assent implied that the Act assented to was not
that of the person assenting, and that therefore there
was nothing to indicate that the Rajpramukh had
adopted the Bill prepared by the Ministers as his own.
It was argued by Mr. Agarwala that when the word
"approve" was used in the Constitution as in articles
146 and 147, it signified that there were two authorities, one of which was authorised to confirm or sanction what the other had authority to do, and that when
the latter was not authorised to do the act, there
could be no approval of it by the former; and he also
relied on the statement of the law in Corpus Juris,
Volume I, page 1365 that the word 'approve' does not
mean the same thing as 'adopt'.
The fallacy in this argument lies in isolating the
word "approved" from out of i~s setting and context
and interpreting it narrowly. It will be noticed that
under article 212-A (2) the Rajpramukh has to do two
distinct acts. Firstly he has to prepare the Bill, and
secondly-leaving out of consideration the first two
alternatives, namely, . assenting to, or withholding
assent from, the Bill as not material for the present
discussion-he has to reserve it for the consideration
of the President. When he himself prepares the Bill,
he has, in order to comply with article 212-A(2)
of the
merely to reserve it for the consideration
President. In such a case, no question of approval to
the Bill by him can arise, but when the Bill has not
been prepared by him, he has firstly, if he thinks fit,
to adopt it before he could pass on to the second
stage and reserve the Bill for the consideration of the
President; and the very purpose of his endorsing his
approval on the Bill is to show that he has thought fit
to adopt it. There is no provision in article 212-A (2)
for the Rajpramukh approving of a Bill. and in
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
323
the context, therefore, an endorsement of approval on
the Bill must signify its adoption by him. We are
unable to follow the subtle distinction sought to be
made by Mr. Frank Anthony between the legislative
mind of the Rajpramukh and his executive mind. If
it is open to the Rajpramukh to adopt a Bill prepared
by his Ministers, the only matter that will have to be
considered is whether, in fact, he did so. And when
the Bi'll is produced with an endorsement of approval
under his signature, the question must be held to be
concluded, and any further discussion about the
legislative or executive state of mind of the Rajpramukh must be ruled out as inadmissible.
It must be mentioned in this connection that Mr.
Pathak for the respondent took up the position that
the function of the Rajpramukh at the stage of preparation of the Bill was purely executive, and that it
became legislative only when he had to decide whether he would assent to the Bill or withhold his assent
therefrom, or reserve it for the consideration of the
President, and that by leaving it to the Ministers to
prepare the Bill there had been no violation of article
212-A(2). We are unable to agree with this contention. When a Bill has been passed by the Legislative
Assembly of a State, article 200 enacts that it shall
be presented to the Governor who is to declare whether he assents to it or withholds his assent therefrom,
or reserves it for the consideration of the President.
When there i§ no Legislative Assembly in a State, the
matter is governed by article 212-A(2), and there is
substituted under that article in the place of the passing of the Bill by the Legislature, the preparation
thereof by the Rajpramukh, and then follows the provision that he has to. declare whether he assents to or
withholds his assent from the Bill or reserves it for the
consideration of tile President. The position under
article 212-A(2) has thus been assimilated to that
under article 200, the preparation of the Bill by the
Rajpramukh taking the place of the passing of the
Bill by the Legislative Assembly, and the one is as
much a legislative function as the other.
One other contention attacking the Act on the
1955
ThakurAmllf
Singh·;
v.
Slau of Rajaslhan
..,..
.. -
VmkattJTama
AyyarJ.
324
1955
ThakuT.A."""
SU.ghji
...
Stall of Raja.rtkan
VlftkataramG
.War].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
ground of procedural defect may now be considered.
It was argued by Mr. Trivedi that under the proviso
to article 201, the President had no power to return
a Money Bill for further consideration by a House of
Legislature, that his order dated 21-1-1952 returning
the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of
Jagirs Bill for further consideration was ultra vires as
it was a .Money Bill, that the subsequent presentation
of the Bill to him on 8-2-1952 was unauthorised, and
that the impugned Act had therefore not been duly
passed. This argument is clearly erroneous. Under
article 212-A(l), the proviso to article 201 has no application to those Part B States where there was no
House of the Legislature; and we are unable to follow
the argument of the learned counsel that even so, the
limitation imposed by the proviso is implicit in the
body of the article itself. Moreover, the order of the
President dated 21-1-1952 is not one returning the
Bill for further consideration by the House but one
refusing assent. It is true that the Deputy Secretary
sent a communication to the Rajasthan Government
suggesting some amendments. But this does not alter
the character of the order of the President as one
withholdiii.g assent. And finally the Bill which was
submitted again to the President for consideration
on 6-2-1952 was a fresh Bill, the previous Bill having
been modified as regards the, scales of compensation.
The contention, therefore, that the Act is bad for
non-compliance with article 212-A(2) or for other
procedural defects must be rejected.
III. We may now consider the third contention of
the petitioners that the Act in so far as it provides
for resumption of jagir lands is ultra vires the powers
of the State Legislature, as it is not one of the topics
mentioned either in List II or List III of the Seventh
Schedule to the Constitution. The contention of the
respondent .is that the Act is in substance a law relating to acquisition, and is covered by Entry No. 36 in
the State List. On the other hand, the petitioners
maintain that the subject-matter of the legislation is
what it avows itself to be, viz., resumption of jagirs,
that· resumption is in law totally different from
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
325
acqws1uon, and that the Act is therefore not covered
by Entry No. 36.
w_~ .agree with the pefitJ.oners that resumption and
acqws1uon connote two different legal concepts.
While resumption implies that the person or authority
which resumes the property has pre-existing rights
over it, acquisition carries no such implication, and
in general, while the effect of resumption is to extinguish the interests of the person whose property is resumed, that of acauisition is to vest that interest in
the acquirer. But -the question still remains whether
the impugned Act is one for acquisition of jagirs or
for their resumption; and to determine that, we must
see what the pith and substance of the legislation is,
the name given to it by the Legislature not being
decisive of the matter.
The provisions of the Act relating to resumption
may now be noticed. Chapter V deals with resumption
of jagir lands. Section 21 authorises the State to
issue notifications for resumption of jagirs, and section 22(1) enacts:
"As from the date of resumption of any jagir
lands, notwithstanding anything contained m any
existing jagir legislation applicable thereto but save
as otherwise provided in this Act,( a) the right, title and interest of the jagirdar
and of every other person claiming through him ...... in
his jagir lands including fore8ts, etc ............ shall stand
resumed to the Government free from all encumbrances".
Section 22(1) (g) is as follows:
"the right, title and interest of the jagirdar in all
buildings on jagir lands used for schools and hospitals
not within residential compounds shall stand extinguished, and such buildings shall be deemed to have
been transferred to the Government".
Section 23 exempts certain properties from the operation of section 22, and provides tilltt they are to
continue to belong to the jagirdars or to be held by
them Chapter VI deals with compensation. Section
26(1) enacts:
1955
Thakur AllllW
Sing/Ui
Y.
!;141t of RajaJl/um
Venkatarama
A)IJ'ar].
326
1955
Tliolcur A.mar
Singhft
• v.
Slall of Rajasl,_
Yenkalarama
41JllT J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
"Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the
Government shall be liable
to pay every jagirdar
whose Jagir lands are resumed under section 21 such
compensation as shall be determined in accordance
with the principles laid down in the second schedule".
Chapter VII prescribes the procedure for the determination of compensation and for payment of the same.
The second Schedule to the Act contains the principles on which compensation is to be determined. That
was the scope of the Act as it was passed in 1952. In
1954 certain amendments were introduced by Act
No. XIII of 1954, the most important of which was
the provision for payment of rehabilitation grant in
accordance with the principles enacted in Schedule
III to the Act.
Now, the contention of the petitioners is that the
basic assumption on which the Act is framed is that
jagirdars have no right of property in the lands themselves, but that they possess some ancillary rights in
relation . thereto, that the State is therefore entitled
to resume the lands without compensation, and that
it is sufficient to pay for the ancillary rights. These,
it is argued, were the views expressed by the Venkatachar Committee in its Report on Land Tenures in
Rajasthan, and they formed the basis of the impugned
Act. Thus, it is pointed out that the Committee had
held that "jagirs are not the property of the jagirdars" ( vide page 47, para 5), that "if the jagir system
is abolished, jagirdars would not be entitled to any
compensation on the ground of the jagirs being private
property'', and that "even though jagirs are not proproperty ........ those rights which have in many cases
been enjoyed for centuries have acquired around them
an accretion of rights by long custom and prescri ption which are entitlec to due recognition", and that
a rehabilitation grant mignt be given to the jagirdars.
(Page 47, para 6). It is contended that it is these
views that have been adopted in section 22 of the Act,
and that when section 22(1) (a) declares that the right,
title and interest of the jagirdars shall stand resumed,
it could not mean that these rights are acquired
by the State, because acquisition implies that the
2. S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
3tl
properties acquired belong to the person from whom
they are acquired, whereas the basis of the legislation
was that the jagirdars had no property in the lands,
and there could be no acquisition of what did not belong to them. Reference is made by way of contrast
to the language of section 22(1) (g) under which
certain buildings standing on jagir lands presumably
constructed by jagirdars should stand transferred to
the Government and not resumed as under section
22(l)(a).
This argument proceeds on an inadequate appreciation of the true nature and scope of the right of
resumption. under the general law and of the power of
resumption which is conferred on the State by the
impugned Act. Fnder the law, a jagir could be
resumed only under certain circumstances. It can be
resumed for breach of the terms of the grant, such as
failure to render services or perform the obligations
imposed by the grant. It can be resumed for rebellion
or dislovalty or for the commission of serious crimes.
And ag;::in, jagir was originally only a life grant and
when the holder died, it reverted back to the State
and suw:ssion to the estate was under a-fresh grant
from the State and not by inheritance, even when the
successor was the heir of the deceased holder. The
right to resume jagirs within the limits aforesaid was
founded on grant and regulated by general law. To
exercise that right, there was no need to enact any
legislation. It was a right which every ruler of the
Covenanting State had as a grantor, and that right
had become vested in the Rajpramukh under article
VII (3) of the Covenant. The contention of the petitioners that resumption was not an acquisition would
strictly be accurate, if the resumption was in exercise
of the power conferred by that article.
But the resumption for which the Act provides is
something different from the resumption which is
authorised by article VII(3). It was a resumption not
in accordance with the terms of the grant or the law
applicable to jagirs but contrary to it, or in the words
of section 21 "notwithstanding anything contained in
1955
TWw~
Singlfii
v.
Stall of RajastluM
Ymkatar.d.yyar].
328
1955
Thakur.A.mar
Singhji
Vo
Stat. of Raja.sthan
Ymkatarama
AJJ•r J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1955]
any existing jagir law applicable thereto". It was a
resumption made not in enforcement of the rights
which the rulers had as grantors but in excrci.c of the
sovereign rights of eminent domain possessed by the
State. The taking of properties is under the circumstances, in
substance, acquisition notwithstanding
that it is labelled as resumption. And this conclusion
becomes irresistable when regard is had to the provisions for payment of compensation. Section 26(1)
imposes on the Government a liability to pay compensation in accordance with the principles laid down
in the ·Second Schedule, and as will be presently
shown, it is not illusory. The award of compensation is consistent only with the taking being an acquisition and not with its being a resumption in accord.ance with the terms of the grant or the law applicable
to it, for in such cases, there is no question of any
liability to pay compensation.
It was argued for the petition_ers that the provision
for the payment of rehabilitation grant was an indication that what was paid as compensation was in
reality ex gratia.
But the rehabilitation, grant was
in addition to the compensation amount, and it was
provided by the amendment Act No. XIII of 1954.
Nor are we impressed by t:I'.e contention that the Act
had adopted the .findings of the Venkatachar Committee that the jagirs were not the properties of the
jagirdars, and fr 't no compensation need be paid for
them. Under section 22(l)(a), what is resumed is
expressly the right, title and interest of the jagirdar
in his jagir lands, and provision is made for payment
of compensation therefor. Moreover, the opinions Jn
the report of the Venkatachar Committee on the rights
of the jagirdars are clearly inadmissible for the purppse of deciding what the pith and substance ot the
impugned legislation is. That must be decided on an
interpretation of the provisions of the statute, and
that decision cannot be controlled or guided by the
opinions expressed in the report. Reading the provisions of the Act as a whole, it is abundantly plain
that what was meant by resumption was only acqui5ition. Indeed, if the Act purported to be one foe
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
329
1955
acqws1tton of jagirs, its provisions could not have
Thalcw .Amar
been different from what they are.
Sing/iii
Such being the true character of the legislation,
not much significance could be attached to the use State ef Rajasthan
Vmkatarama
of the word "resumption" in the Act. It should be
.A_l!)'OT J.
remembered that the State has a reversion in Jagir
lands, and when it takes them back in accordance
with the terms of the grant or the law applicable
thereto, its action is properly termed resumption.
When the statute enacted a law authorising the taking
of jagir lands, it is natural that it should have adopted the same term, though the resumption was not
made on any of the grounds previously recognised as
valid. In view of the peculiar relationship between
the jagirdar and the State, it cannot be said that the
word "resumption" is inadmissible to signify acquisi
tion. Section 22(1) (a) further enacts that the lands
shall stand resumed "to the Government", which
words are more appropriate for acquisition by the
Government than resumption simpliciter.
It was also contended for the respondent that the
Act is one relating to land and land tenures, and that
it would fall under Entry No. 18 in the State List:
"Land, that is to say, rights in or over land, land
tenures including the relation of landlord and tenant,
and the collection of rents; transfer and alienation of
agricultural land; land improvement and agricultural
loans; colonization".
It was argued that the heads of legislation mentioned
in the Entries should req;ive a liberal construction,
and the decision in The United Provinces v. Atiqa
Begum (1 ) was quoted in support of it. The position
is well settled and in accordance therewith, it could
rightly be held that the legislation falls also under
Entry No. 18. But there being an Entry No. 36
specifically dealing with acquisition, and in view of our
conclusion as to the nature of the legislation, we hold
that it falls under that Entry.
IV. Now we come to the contentions special to
some of the petitioners that with reference to the
.
.(I) [1940] F.C.R.110, 134.
s. c. Indiaf-!?
~-83
330
1950'
Thakur A"""
Sin.t;hJi
v.
Slate of RajaJthan
Vtnkatarama
AyyarJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955)
properties held by them the impugned Act is not
saved by article 31-A, and that it is void as being in
contravention of articles 14 and 31(2) of the Constitution. On this contention, two questions arise for
determination: (A) Is the impugned Act in so far as
it relates to the properties of the petitioners within
the protection afforded by article 31-A? (B) And is
the Act bad as infringing articles 14 and 31 (2) of the
Constitution?
IV (A). On the first question, the contention of the
petitioners is that the properties held by the them are
neither 'estates' nor 'Jagirs' nor 'other similar grants'
within article 31-A, and that therefore the impugned
A.ct falls, quoad hoc, outside the ambit of that article.
At the threshold of the discussion lies the question
as to the precise connotation of the words "jagir or
other similar grant" in article 31-A, and to determine
it, it is necessary to trace in broad outline the origin
and evolution of the jagir tenure in Rajasthan. It
has been already mentioned that during the period
of the Muhammadan invasion the Rajput princes of
Hindusthan migrated to Rajputana and founded new
kingdoms.
The system of land tenure adopted by
them was that they divided the conquered territories
into two parts, reserved one for themselves and distributed the other in blocks or estates among their
followers.
In general, the grantees were the leaders
of the clan which had followed tl1e King and assisted
him in the establishment of the kingdom or his
Ministers. Sometimes, die grant was made as a reward
for past services. The lands reserved for the King
were called Khalsa, and the revenue dierefrom was
collected by him directly through his officials. The
lands distributed among his followers were called
jagirs, and they were generally granted on condition
that the grantee should render military service to
the rulers such as maintaining militia of the specified
strengdi or guarding the passes or the marches and
the like. The extent of die grant would depend on
the extent of die obligations imposed on the grantee,
and it would be such as would enable the grantee to
maintain himself and the troops from out of the
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
331
revenues from the jagir. It was stated by Mr. Pathak
that the grants would in general specify the amount
of revenue that was expected to be re~eived from the
jagir, and that if the jagirdar received more, he was
under an obligation to account. to the State for the
excess. And the quoted the following passage in BadenPowell on Land Systems of British India, Volume I,
page 257 as supporting him:
"While a strict control lasted, the jagirdar was
bound to take no more than the sum assigned ; and if
more came into his hands, he had rigidly to account
for the surplus to the State treasury".
This statement has value only as throwing light on
the jural relationship between the State and the
jagirdar, for it does not appear that it was ever observed in practice.
It may be deduced from the
foregoing that all the lands of the State must fall
within one or the other of the two categories, Khalsa
or jagir, and that the essential features of a jagir are
that it is held under a grant from the ruler, and that
the grant is of the land revenue.
Some of the incidents of the jagir tenure have been
already touched upon. It was a life grant and succession to it depended on recognition by the ruler. It
was impartible, and inalienable. But in course of
time, however, grants came to be made with incidents
annexed to them different from those of the jagirs.
Some of them were heritable, though impartible; a
few of them were both heritable and partible. While
originally the jagirs were granted to the Rajput
clansmen for military service, the later grants were
made even to non-Rajputs and for religious and
charitable purposes. These grants were also known
as jagirs. "The term 'jagir' is used", it is observed
in the Report of the Venkatachar Committee, page 18,
para 2, "both in a generic and specific sense. In its
generic sense it connotes all non-khalsa area". The
stand taken by the petitioners in their argument was
also that the word 'jagir' had both a wider and a
narrower connotation. Thus, after quoting from the
Rajputana Gazetteer the passage that "the rest of
19~5
Tliakul-. Atnlll'
Sing/fii
Y•
Slate of Rqjasllum
Vmkatarama
AJyor ].
332
1955
T /rab8 A.,,.,,.
SinghJi
v.
Sl<>ll of RajaJlhan
V nA:.ataroma
A.yy..-J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
the territory is held on one of the following tenures,
viz, Jagir, Jivka, Sansan, Doli, Bhum, Inam, Pasaita
and Nankar" (Vide Erskine's Rajputana Gazetteers,
Volume III-A, Chapter XIII Land Revenue and
Tenures), Sri Amar Singh who presented the case of
his father Zorawar Singh, a leading Bhoomichara of
Mallani, with conspicuous ability, argued that jagir
was used in the passage in its specific sense, and that
in its generic sense, it would comprise all the other
tenures mentioned above. In the impugned Act also,
jagir land is defined in section 2(h) as meaning "any
land in which or in relation to which a jagirdar has
rights in respect of land revenue or any other kind of
revenue and includes any land held on any of the
tenures specified in the First Schedule'', and in the
Schedule, jagir is mentioned as the first of the items.
It also appears that in the laws enacted in the States
of Rajputana to which our attention has been drawn,
the word 'jagir' is generally used in its extended meaning. Thus, both in its popular sense and legislative
practice, the word 'jagir' is used as connoting State
grants which conferred on the grantees rights "in
respect of land revenue". (See section 2(h) of the
Act.)
It was argued that though the extended definition
of jagirs in section 2(h) of the impugned Act might
govern questions arising under that Act, the word
'jagir' in article 31-A must be construed as limited to
its original and primary meaning of a grant made for
military service rendered or to be rendered, ·and that
according! y other grants such as maintenance grants
made in favour of near relations
and dependents
would not be covered by it. We do not find any
sufficient ground for putting a restricted meaning on
the word 'jagir' in article 31-A. At the time of the
enactment of that article, the word had acquired both
in popular usage and legislative practice a wide connotation, and it will be in accord with sound canons
of interpretation to ascribe that connotation to that
word rather than an archaic meaning to be gathered
from a study of ancient tenures. Moreover, the object
of article 31-A was to save legislation which was
directed to the abolition of intermediaries so as to
2 S.C.R..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
333
establish direct relationship between the State and the
tillers of the soil, and construing the word in that
sense which would achieve that object i:- a full
measure, we must hold that jagir was meant to cover
all grant under which the grantees had only rights
in respect of revenue and were not the tillers of the
soil. Maintenance grants in favour of persons who
were not cultivators such as members of the ruling
family would be jagirs for purposes of article 31-A.
We may now proceed to consider the contentions
of the several petitioners with reference to the specific
properties held by them, and they may be grouped
under two categories: ( 1) those relating to the tenures
on which the properties are held, and (2) those relating to particular properties. Under category (1) fall
the estates held by (a) Bhomicharas of Marwar, (b)
Bhomats of Mewar, (c) Tikanadars of Shekhwati, and
( d) Subeguzars of Jaipur.
(1) (a) Bhomicharas: This is the subject-matter of
Petitions Nos. 462, 579, 630, 638 and 654 of 1954.
The Bhomichara tenure is to be found in Jaisalmere,
in Shekhawati in Jaipur and in Marwar. (Vide Report of the Venkatachar Committee, page 19, para 13).
But we are concerned here only with the Bhomichara
tenure in the State of Marwar. Its history goes back
to the year 1212 A.D. when the clan of Rathors led by
Rao Siaji, grandson of King Jayachander of Kanouj
ihvaded Rajputana, subjugated the territories now
known as Mallani, Yeshwantpura and Sanchora and
established itself there.
Some two centuries later, a
section of the Rathors headed by Biram Deo who was
the younger brother of Mallinath, the ruling prince
of Mallani, expanded eastwards, and established the
kingdom of Jodhpur. The elder branch which continued in Mallani, Yeshwantpura and Sanchora gradually sank in power. The descendants of Mallinath
went on partitioning the lands treating them as their
personal properties and the principality thus came to
be broken up into fragments, and its holders became
weak and disunited.
Their internecine disputes led
to the intervention of Jodhpur which had grown to
1955
Thalur AlftU'
Singhji
....
Stat1 of Rajo'llt•11
Y1nkatara""'
A7;·u J.
334
SUPREME COURT REl'ORTS
[1955]
1955
be a powerful kingdom, and they were compelled to
ThahzrAm4r
Sing/Ui
v.
Sl4le of Rajasthan
accept its ruler as their .suzerain and to pay him an
Thereannual tribute of Rs. 10,000 called "Foujbal"
after, they continued to hold lands subject to the
payment of this tribute, and came to be known as
Bhomicharas. The area continued to be 'distracted
by disputes and dissensions among its leaders, and
fell into so much anarchy and confusion that in 1835
the British had to intervene to restore order. It
should be remembered that they had entered into a
treaty of alliance with Jodhpur in 1818, and their
intervention was presumably by virtue of their obligations under the treaty. Thereafter, the territory
was put under the charge of a British superintendent
The
and latterly of the Resident at Jodhpur.
annual tribute was, during· this period, collected by
the British and paid to the Jodhpur State. Writing
on the status of the Bhomicharas during this period,
Major Malcolm remarked in his report dated 1849
thus:
" .... though the· British Government had established a claim to the District themselves, consequent
on having reduced them to order and obedience, it
was willing, out of kindness and consideration to His
Highness, to waive its just rights and to acknoUJ!edge
His Highness as entitled· to sovereignty over those districts, and the tribute they might yield ...... "
In 1891 the British withdrew from the administration
of the Province, and handed it over to the Maharajah
of Jodhpur who thereafter continued to govern it as
part of his Dominions.
On these facts, it is contended by Mr. N. C.
Chatterjee and Shri Amar Singh that Bhomicharas
are not holders of jagirs or other similar grants within the meaning of article 31-A, because a jagir could
be created only by grant by the ruler, and that the
petitioners could not be said to hold under a grant
from Jodhpur, because they had obtained the terri•
tory by right of conquest long before Jodhpur established its suzerainty, and even prior to its foundation
as a State, and that though they lost their political
independence when Jodhpur established its overlord-
VtnkatMama
Ayyarj.
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
335
ship, they had not lost their right to property, that
their status was that of
semi-independent chiefs,
not jagirdars, and that "Foujbal" was paid by them
not on account of land revenue but by way of
tribute.
We agree with the petitioners that a jagir can be
created only by a grant, and that if it is established
that Bhomichara tenure is not held under a grant, it
cannot be classed as a jagir. We do not base this conclusion on the ground put forward by Mr. Achhru
Ram that the word 'jagir' in article 31-A should be
read e;usdem generis with 'other similar grants' because the true scope of the rule of e;usdem generis is
that words of a general nature following specific and
particular words should be construed as limited to
thir.gs which are of the same nature as those specified
and not its reverse, that specific words which precede
are controlled by the general words which follow. But
we are of opinion that it is inherent in the very conception of jagir that it should have been granted by
the ruling power, and that where there is no grant,
there could be no jagir. This, however, does not
mean th,!lt the grant must be express. It may be implied, and the question for decision is whether on the
facts of this case a grant could be implied.
What then are the facts? We start with this that
the ancestors of the petitioners acquired the lands in
question by conquest and held them as sovereigns.
Then Jodhpur came on the scene, imposed its sovereignty over them, and exacted annual
payments
from them. What was their status thereafter? In
Vajesing;i foravar Sing;i and others v. Secretary of
State (1) Lord Dunedin observed :
"When a territory is acquired by a sovereign
State for the first time that is an act of State. It
matters not how the acquisition has been brought
about. It may be by conquest, it may be by cession
following on treaty, it may be by occupation of territory hitherto unoccupied by a recognised ruler. !nail cases the result is the same. Any inhabitant of
(I) (1924] L. R.51 I. A. 357, 360.
1955
ThalcUf' Amat
Singhji
v.
State of Rajasthan
Venkatarama
4J?yar].
336
1955
TftakurAmar
Sing/iii
'·
Siau of 114jastloM
vtnktllar'arNd
Ayyar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
the territory can make good in the municipal Courts
established by the new sovereign only such rights, as
that sovereign has, through his officers recognised.
Such rights as he _had under the rule of predecessors
avail him nothing".
Vide also the judgment of the Privy Council in Secretary of State. v. Sardar Rustdm Khan('). Applying
these principles when Jodhpur as a sovereign State
imposed its sovereignty over the territory, and permitted the ex-rulers to continue in possession of their
lands on payment of an annual sum, the position is
that there was, in effect a conquest of the territory
and a re-grant of the same to the ex-rulers, whose
title to the lands should thereafter be held to rest on
the recognition of it by the ruler of Jodhpur. It may
be noted that both in Vajesingji Joravar Singji and
others v. Secretary of State( 2 ) and Secretary of State v.
Sardar Rustam Khan(') the question was whether a
subject of the former State could enforce against the
new sovereign the right which he had against the former ruler, and it was held that he could not. But
here, the claimants are the representatives of the former rulers themselves, and as against them, the above
conclusion must follow a fortiori.
As already stated,
it is as if the Maharajah of Jodhpur annexed all the
territories and re-granted them to the former rulers.
They must accordingly be held to derive their title
under an implied grant.
It is argued that notwithstanding that the Bhomicharas had acknowledged the sovereignty of the ruler
of Jodhpur, his hold over the country was slight and
ineffective, and even the payment of "Foujbal" was
irregular,
and that in substance therefore they
enjoyed semi-sovereign status, and that their relationship to the Jodhpur ruler resembled that of the rulers
of Native States to the British Crown. We arc unable
to accept this argument. The status of a person must
be either that of a sovereign or a subject. There is
no tertium quid. The law does not recognise an in·
termediate status of a person being partly a sovereign
(I) [19411 L. R. 68 I.A. 109.
(2) [0924] L. R. 51 I. A. 357, 360.
~'
.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
337
and partly a subject, and when once it is admitted
that the Bhomicharas had acknowledged the sov<!reignty of Jodhpur their status can only be that of a
subject. A subject might occupy an exalted position
~d enjoY' special privileges, but he is nonetheless a
,subject; and even if the status of Bhoniicharas might
be considered superior to that of ordinary jagirdars,
they were also subjects. The contention that the
relationship between Bhomicharas and Jodhpur was
of the same kind as that which subsisted between the
rulers of Native States and the British Crown is
untenable. Whether those States could be recognised
as sovereign on the well accepted principles of international law was itself a question on which juristic
<>pinion was adverse to such recognition.
(See Mr.
Lee Warner, Protected Princes of India, 1894 Edn.,
Chapter XIII, sec. 150, pages 373-376). But those
States at least had each a distinct persona with a
ruler who possessed executive, legislative and judicial
power of a sovereign character; but the Bhomicharas
had ceased to have a distinct persona. There was no
State with a ruler acknowledged as its head, but a
number of persons holding lands independently of
each other. This is what Major Malcolm remarked
of them in his report in 1849:
"It is uncertain how long the Rawats of Kher
continued to exercise any control over the rest of the
Chiefs, or to be considered as the head of a principality; but at the period when we first become
acquainteg with them, all traces of such power had
long ceased and each Chief of the principal families
into which the tribe is divided, claimed to be independent".
When the British handed over the administration of
the territory to the State of Jodhpur in 1891, it was
in recognition of its- rights as sovereign, and on the
footing that Bhomicharas were its subjects. It is
true that in the agreement by which the British
handed over the administration they inserted a condition that the appointment of the chief officers for
Mallani and imposition of any new tax or cess other
than Foujbal by the State of Jodhpur should be made
1955
Thakr.r Ama
Singhji
v.
State of Raj1Ul1-
Y1nkalar1JtTU1
..4yy411' J.
338
1955
Thalcur Amar
Singhji
v.
Slate of Raja•tlum
Ytnkatarama
..War J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955)
with the approval of the. Resident or Agent to the
Governor-General of Rajputana, .but that was a
matter between the high contracting parties, and did
not affect the status of the Bhomicharas. On the
other hand, · it emphasises that they were themselves
without any semblance of independence.
That the status of the Bhomicharas was that of
subjects
also be clear from the subsequent course
of legislation in Marwar. . In 1922 an Excise Act
was passed for the whole of Marwar including this
area. On 24-11-1922 "The Marwar Court of Wards
Act, 1923". was passed, and that applied to the
estates of Bhomicharas. In 1937 rules were framed
for the maintenance of the wives of jagirdars, and
Bhomicharas also were subject to that Act. In 1938
the Marwar Customs Act was passed, and that applied
to these territories. In 1947 rules for assessment of
rents on iagrr estates were passed and they applied to
lands held on Bhomichara tenure. · There was again
a Customs Act in 1948, and it applied to the whole of
Marwar including this area. In 1949 a Tenancy Act
was passed, and that applied to tlie Bhomicharas. It
is thus plain that the State of Marwar was exercising
full legislative control over the Bhomichara area.
This alone is sufficient to differentiate the position of
the petitioners from that of the rulers of the Native
States. The
British Government never · exercised
legislative authority over those States.
In the argument before us, Sri Amar Singh conceded
the authority of the State of Marwar to legislate for
Mallani. But he contended that the definition of
jagirdars as including Bhomicharas in the several Acts
referred to above
was only for the purpose of those
Acts, and had no bearing on their true status, and
referred to the provisions of the Marwar Encumbered
Estates Act, . 1922, where the word 'jagir' is defined as
excluding Bhomicharas. But the question is not
whether the petitioners are jagirdars by force of the
definition in those Acts, but whether their status is
that of subjects of, Jodhpur and the only inference
that. could be drawn from the course of legislation
above noticed is that ' their status was that of
will
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
339
subjects, and if that is their position, and if d1ey ne
allowed to continue in possession of lands held by
their ancestors as sovereigns, it could only be on the
basis of an implied grant, and that is sufficient to
attract the operation of article 31-A to their estates.
It was also contended for the respondent that even
if on the facts aforesaid a grant from the State could
not be implied and the status of the petitioners was
different from that of jagirdars, that status had at
least been modified by section 169 of the Marwar
Land Revenue Act No. XL of 1949, which had the
effect of putting them in the same position as State
grantees, and that therefore their tenure fell within
the operation of article 31-A either as a jagir or other
similar grant. Section 169 runs as follows :
"The ownership of all land vests in His Highness
and all Jagirs, Bhoms, Sasans, Dolis or similar proprietary interests are held and shall be deemed to be
held as grants from His Highness".
Under this section, all lands in the State vest in the
Maharajah and all proprietary interests therein are
deemed to be held under a grant from him. It can- .
not be disputed that it is within the competence of
the Legislature in the exercise of its sovereign powers
to alter and abridge rights of its subjects in such manner as it may decide, subject of course to any con~ti
tutional prohibition. In Thakur /agannath Baksh
Singh v. United Provinces(1 ) which was cited by Mr.
Pathak as authority in support of the above proposition, it was held by the Privy Council that a law of
the State curtailing the rights which a talukdar held
under a sanad trom
the Crown was intra vires. This
decision was followed by this Court in Raja Suriya
Pal Singh v. The State of U. P. and Another( 1 ). But
these cases are not exactly in point, because the present
contention of the respondent arises only on the hypothesis that the petitioners did not hold under a
Crown grant express or implied. But the proposition
for which Mr. Pathak contends is itself not open to
exception, and it must be held that it was competent
(I) [1945] F. C. R. Ill.
(2) [1952] S. C. R. 1056.
955
Thakur Amar
Singhji
v.
State ef Rajastluzn
Venkatarama
AJ~var
340
1955
TMhr~
...
Singhfi
Slatl of Rajasthon
VtnAotarama
.fJ'J"•r J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
{1955]
for the legislative authority of Marwar to define and
limit the rights
which the petitioners possessed in
Bhomichara lands. It was also contended by Mr•
Pathak . that if the effect of the legislation was to im·
press on the tenure the character of a grant, that
would be sufficient to attract article 31-A, the argument being that a grant like a contract could be not
merely express or implied but also constructive. He
quoted the following statement of the law in Halsbury's Laws of England, Volume VII, page 261,
para 361:
"Contracts may be either express or implied, and
of the latter there are two broad divisions, the term
'implied contract' in English law being applied not
only to contracts which are inferred from the conduct
or presumed intention of the parties, of which examples ha<ve already been given, but also to obligations
imposed by implication of law, ·quite apart from and
without regard to the probable intention of the parties, and sometimes even in opposition to their expres~ed
or presumed intention. Strictly speaking,
the latter class, or construstive contracts, as they
are sometimes called, are not true contracts at all,
since the clement of consent is absent, but by a fiction
of law, invented for the purposes of pleading, they
are regarded as contracts, and will be treated here as
such".
It must be observed that the Indian law does not recognise . constructive contracts, and what are classed
under that category in the statement of the law in
Halsbury's Laws of England would be known as quasicontracts under the Indian Contract Act. It will be
more appropriate to term grants which are the creatures of statutes as legislative grants. We, however,
agree with the respondent that for the purpose of
article 31-A, it would make no difference whether 4'be
grant is made by the sovereign in the exercise of his
prerogative right or by the Legislature in the exercise
of its sovereign rights. They were both of them
equally within the operation of that article. The
question then is, assuming that the Bhomicharas did
not prior to the enactment of Marwar Act No. XL of
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
341
1949 hold the lands as grantees from the State, whether they must be deemed to hold as State grantees
by force of section 169 of that Act; and that will depend on whether they fall within the purview of th~t
section. The language of the section, it will be aamitted, is general and unqualified in its terms, and
would in its natural sense include them. But it is
argued for the petitioners that they are outside its
scope, because 'jagir' in that article must be interpreted in a specific sense as otherwise there was no
need to mention tenures like Bhom, Sasan and Dolis,
which would be jagirs in a generic sense, and that
further Bhomicharas could not be brought within the
category of similar proprietary interests, because in
the context 'similar interests' must mean interests
held under a grant.
Having considered the matter carefully, we are not
satisfied that there is any ground for cutting down
the scope of the section in the manner contended for
by the petitioners. We are of opinion that by long
usage and recognition and by the legislative practice
of the State Bhomicharas had come to be regarded as
jagirdars, and that their tenure is a jagir within the
intendment of section 169. In the Gazetteci:. of Mallani
by Major Walter published prior to 1891 the Bhomicharas arc referred to as jagirdars. (Vide page 94).
In the official publication called Brief Account of
Mallani, the title given to the history of Bhomicharas
is "Brief history of the iagirdars". In Sir Drake
Brockman's Report of the Settlement Operations,
1921 to 1924, he refers to the Bhomichara jagir as
"survival from a time antecedent to the establishment
of the Raj". Turning next to legislation in Marwar,
its general trend was to include Bhomicharas in the
definition of jagirdars. Vide section 3(1) of the
Marwar Court of Wards Act, 1923; rule 4 of rules
regulating claims for maintenance by ladies against
jagirdars, 1937. In the Customs Act, 1938, section
64 and Appendix E refer to the Bhomicharas as jagirdars of Mallani. In Marwar Tenancy Act No. XXXIX
0£ 1949, section 3(9) defines landlord as including a
"Bhomichara jagirdar", and in view of the fact that
1955
T "4kur A"""
Singhji
v.
Slate of Rajaslhon
Venkatar11111/.
AyyarJ.
342
1955
Th"""' A"'°'
Singhji
".
S-tau of Rajasthan
Yaskataramo
<l»ar].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
both this Act and Act No. XL of 1949 were part of a
comprehensive scheme of legislation, that both of
them came into force on 6-4-1949 and that section 4(11)
of Act No. XL of 1949 enacts that the words and
expressions used therein are to have the same meaning
as in Act No. XXXIX of 1949, it would be safe to
assume that the word 'jagir' was used in section 169
as including Bhomichara tenures.
It was argued that section 171 classifies jagirs as
listed jagirs and scheduled jagirs, that there is an
enumeration thereof in schedules I and II of the Act,
and that no estate held on Rhomichara tenure was
mentioned therein, .arid that that was an indication
that it was not intended to be included in section 169.
But section 171 does not exhaust all the jagirs or
similar proprietary interests falling within
section
169. The scheme of the Act is that for purposes of
succession and partition, jagirs are divided into three
groups, scheduled jagirs, listed jagirs and other jagirs.
Scheduled jagirs are those which are governed by the
rule of primogeniture. Section 188 and the following
sections lay down the procedure for settling succession to them. Listed jagirs are those which are held
by co-heirs but are impartible, and section 131 provides that they should not be partitioned but that
the
the income therefrom should. be divided among
co-sharers. Then ·there is the third category of jagirs
which devolve on heirs under the ordinary Hindu
law, and are partible. Section 172 applies to these
jagirs. As the Bhomichara tenure descends like personal property and is divisible among the heirs, it will
be governed by section 172, and cannot find a place
in the schedule of listed or scheduled jagirs.
It was contended that the Act was one to declare
and consolidate the law, and that such an Act should
not be construed as altel'ing the existing law; further
that clear and unambiguous language was necessary
before a subject could be depriv~d of his vested rights,
and that in case Gf doubt the statute should be construed so as not to interfere with the existing rights;
and the statements of law from Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edition, pages 20 and 2'i
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
343
-and Craies on Statute Law, 5th Edition, pages 106,
107 ~~ 111 were quoted in support of the above
propos1t10ns. These rules of construction are well
settled, but recourse to them would be necessary only
when a statute is capable of two interpretations. But
where, as here, the language is clear and the meaning
plain, effect must be given to it. It must also be
added that the Act is one not merely to consolidate
the law on the subject but also to amend it. On the
language of the section , therefore, we must hold that
Bhomichara tenure is comprehended within the 'term
'jagir' in section 169.
We are also of opinion that it will, in any event,
be "similar proprietary interests" within the language
<>f the section. It is argued that the only feature
{;Omrnon to jagirs, Bhoms, Sasan and Dolis is that
they are held under grant, and that therefore "similar
proprietary interests" must mean interests acquired
under a grant. It is true that Bhom, Sasan and Doli
:a,re held under grant from the State. (Vide Rajasthan
Gazetteer, Volume III-A, Chapter XIII); but section
169 enacts that the proprietary interests to which it
applies, shall b(: held or deemed to be held as grant
from His Highness. The word "deemed" imports
that in fact there was no grant, and therefore interests
which were held otherwise than under a. grant were
·obviously intended to be included.
Therefore, if
Bhomichara is a proprietary interest, it cannot be
taken out of the section because its origin was not in
grant. In the result, it must be held to fall within
section
169, and therefore within the operation of
article 31-A.
The respondent further contended that Bhomichara
tenure was also an estate as defined in section 4(iii)
of Act No. XL of 1949 and that therefore it fell within
the purview of article 31-A. Under section 4(iii),
"estate" means a mahal or mahals held by the same
landlord. Section 4(v) defines mahal as any area not
being a survey number which has been separately
assessed to land revenue; and 'land revenue' is defined
in section 4(iv) as "any sum payable to the Govern~
1955
Thakur Amar
S'Ulg/ifi
v.
State of Rajasthan
· Venkatarama
A»ar ]. :
344
1955
TWwASinghfi
v.
Silk •f Rajastha•
Vl'Rkalarama
Auar ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955}
ment on :account of an estate or survey number and
includes rekh, chakri and bhombab". It is common
ground that the annual payment which . is made by
the Bhomicharas to the estate is the sum of Rs. 10,000
called "Foujbal". The petitioners contend that this
amount is really in the nature of tribute and not land
tax. If it is a military cess, it is difficult to say that
it is revenue paid on account of land. It is argued
for the respondent that Bhomicharas are allowed to
conti\rne in possession of the land only on condition
that they pay this amount annually and that it is
therefore payment made in respect of lands held by
them. If this contention is right, every tribute must
per se be held to be !and revenue, and that appears
to us to be too wide a proposition. Mr. Pathak relied
on the description of this amount in the Administration Report of 1883-1884 in Hindi as "Kar" "Tax",
but that is not decisive of the true character of the
payment.
The petitioners also contend that even if Foujbal
is revenue, there has been no separate assessment of
the mahals to it, as what is paid is a consolidated
sum of Rs. 10,000 for an area of the extent of 36,000
sq. miles comprised in 550 villages and held by different holders.
It appears from the Gazetteer of
Mallani by Major Walter at page 94 that the Foujbal
amount has been apportioned among the several
holders, and it is contended for the respondent that
as this apportionment has been communicated to the
Jodhpur Durbar and accepted by it and acted upon,
there has been separate assessment of revenue. In the
view taken by us that Bhomichara is a jagir or other
similar grant within the meaning of article 31-A, we
do not think it necessary to express any opinion on
the above contentions, especially as the materials
placed before us are meagre.
In the result, it must
be held that the legislation in so far as it relates to
Bhomichara tenure is protected by article 31-A.
(1) (b) Bhomats: This tenure is to be found in
Mewar, and of this, the Report of the Venkatachar
Committee has the following :
"In Mewar those holdmg orr the Bhom tenure
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
345
may be classed under two groups, namely, the Bholllats who pay a small tribute to the State and arc
liable to be called for local service and Bhumias who
pay a n.ormal quit-rent (Bhum-Barar) and perform
such services as watch and ward of their villages,
guarding the roads, etc." (vide page 19, para 10).
Earlier, the Report had stated that Bhom tenure was
to be found in Jodhpur, Mewar and Bundi, and that
its holders were always Rajputs. The origin of Bhom
tenure is thus stated by Tod in his Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan :
"It is stated in the historical annals of this countrv that the ancient clans .... had ceased on the rising
g;eatness of the subsequent new divisions of clans, to
hold the higher grades of rank; and had, in fact,
merged into the general military landed proprietors
of this country under the term bhumiq,, a most expressive and comprehensive name, importing absolute
identity with the soil: bhum meaning 'land' .... These
Bhumias, the scions of .the earliest princes, are to be
met with .in yarious parts of Mewar ...... These, the
allodial tenantry of our feudal system, form a considerable body in many districts, armed with matchlock, sword, and shield .... All this feudal militia pay
a quit-rent to the crown, and perform local but
limited service on the; frontier garrison; and upon invasion, when the Kher is called out, the whole are at
the disposaJ of the prince on furnishing rations only.
They assert that they ought not to pay this quit-rent
and perform .service also; .but this may be doubted,
since the sum is so small". (Vol. I, .PP· 195-197).
lt would .appear from this account that the position
of the Bhumias in Mewar is in many respects similar
to that of Bhomichara~ in Marwar. They represent
presumably a section which had occupied the territory by conquest at an earlier stage and when later
the rulers of Chittoor and Udaipur established their
sovereignty over Mewar, they were allowed to continue in · possession of their lands as subjects of the
new State, Their position is not even as strong as
that of the Bhomicharas of Marwar, because it was
a condition of the tenure under which they held that
4 -83 S. C. India/59
1955
Thakur Amar
Singhji
v.
~tat1 of RqjMthan
Venkatarama
Ayyar J.
346
1955
Thakur :4.mar
Singhji
v.
State of Rqjaslhan
Venkatarama
Ayya,J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
they had to render military service when called upon
and also to pay quit rent. Their title to the lands is
thus referable to an implied gran~ from the State,
and their tenure would be jagir even in its stricter connotation.
It was further contended by Mr. Pathak that whatev-er status the Ehomats might have had prior to the
Mewar Government Kanoon Mal Act No. V of 1947,
the effect of that enactment was to modify it and to
reduce them to the position of grantees from the State
in respect of those tenures, and that article 31-A
would accordingly apply. The relevant provisions of
this Act are sections 27, 106(1) and 116. Section
27 enacts that all lands belong to His Highness, and
t\iat no person
has authority to ,take possession of
any land unless the right is granted by His Highness.
Section
106(1) occurs in Chapter XI which is
headed: "The rights of jagirdars, Muafidar,
:ind
Ehumias in Tikana jagir, muafi and Ehorn lands",
and enacts that a "Tikanadar jagirdar, muafidar or
Ehumia shall have all such revenue rights in the lands
comprised .in his jagir, muafi or Ehorn under this Act,
as are granted to him by His Highness".
Then
follow provisions relating to succession and transfer of their tenures by jagirdars, muafidars or Ehumias.
Section 116 provides that the jagir or bhom is liable
to be forfeited in the events specified therein.
The
argument of the respondent is that under these provisions the ownership of the lands vests in the Maharajah and the. tenures mentioned therein including the
Ehorn are held as grants under him.
It was argued by Mr. Frank Anthony that under
section 4(2) of the Act the lands are divided into two
categories, one category comprising jagirs, muafi and
Ehorn and the other Khalsa lands, that section 27
applies only to Khalsa lands, and . that section 106(1)
applies to grants which may thereafter be made by
the State, and that the rights of the persons who held
jagirs, muafi or Ehorn before this Act were unaffected
by it. We are unable to accede to this contention.
No statute was needed to declare the rights of the
sovereign over Khalsa lands. Nor was resort to kgis--
:
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
347
lation necessary to define the rights of the future
grantees of those lands, because that could be done
by inserting appropriate terms in the grants. The
language of the enactment read as a whole leaves no
doubt in our mind as to what the legislature intended
to do. It declared the State ownership of lands, both
Khalsa and non-Khalsa lands, and defined the rights
of the holders of the non-Khalsa lands; and the result
of that law was clearly to impress on the Bhom
tenure the characteristics of grant. It must accordingly fall within the operation of article 31-A either
as jagir or as other similar grant.
It was next contended by the petitioners that the
Kanoon Mal Act No. V of 1947 was void, because on
23-5-1947 a Constitution had been established in
Mewar which prnvided that "no person shall be
<leprived of his life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied equality before the law within the territories of Mewar".
(Article XIII, Clause 1), and that Act No. V of 1947
which came into force on 15-11-1947 was void as being
repugnant thereto. Article JT ( 1) of the Constitution
itself provides that the Maharajah shall exercise "all
rights, authority and jurisdiction which appertain to
or are incidental to such sovereignty except in so far
as may be otherwise provided for by or under this
Constitution or as may be otherwise be directed by
Shriji'', and when Shriji (the Maharajah) enacted Act
No. V of 1947, it must be taken that he had in the
exercise of sovereign authority abrogated the Constitutional
provisions enacted earlier.
The authority
.which enacted the Consritution on 23-5-1947 being
His Highness himself, any Act passed subsequently
by the same authority must be taken to have repealed
or modified the earlier enactment to the extent that
it is inconsistent with the later. It does not also appear that the Constitution was ever put into force.
It is not known whether :my Leg!~lature was constituted under the Constitution, or any other step taken
pursuant thereto; and though acquiescence is not a
ground for giving effect to a law which is ultra t 1ires,
it is not without significance that the validity of Act
1955
Thakur Amar
Singhji
v.
State of Rajas than
Vankatarama
Ayyar ].
348
1955
Thakur J'Jmar
Singhji
v.
State of Rajasthan
Venkatarama
Ayyar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955}
No. V of 1947 was not challenged on the ground that
it was repugnant to the Constitution dated 23-5-1947
until the present petitions were filed. There is no
substance in this belated contention, and it must bcrejected.
Mr. Frank Anthony appearing for some of the
Mewar petitioners contended that their status was
that of Chiefs with semi-sovereign powers, and that
it could not be said that they held the lands under
grants
from the State. He referred to certain kow ls
and agreements brought about by the British Government between their ancestors described therein as
Chiefs and the Maharajah of Udaipur, providing for
their jointly drawing up a code of law subject to approval by the Political Agent and for the settlement
in future of all civil and criminal cases in accordance
therewith, (vide Aitchison's Treaties, Vol. III, pp. 33
and 35) and for compensation being awarded to them
for taking over their right to manufacture salt ( vide
Aitchison's Treaties, Vol. III, pp. 38 to 42). He argued
that the payments made by them to the State were
not revenue but their contribution for purposes of
common defence, and that that had not the effect of
reducing their status as feudatory chiefs to that of
subordinate tenure holders.
Certain observations in
Biswambhar Singh v. The State of Orissa and others(' )
were relied on as supporting this contention.
We have had considerable difficulty in following
this argument, as it was general in character and unrelated to specific tenures or the claims of individual
petitioners. The kowls which were relied on as showing that their status was not that of subordinates are
not conclusive of the matter, . because the value to be
attached to them would depend on the previous status
of the Chiefs with whom they were entered into, and
no materials have beeri placed before us as to what
that was. Two hypotheses are possible: they were
the successors, either of the conquerors who had occuoied the territory earlier than the foundation of
the Udaipur Raj in which case they would be Bhoms
and their rights would be identical with those of
(1) [1954] s. c. R. 842, 870.
2. S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
349
Bhomats, or of the Rajput clansmen who followed the
ruling dynasty of Mewar and obtained estates as rewards for their service in the establishment of the kingdom, in which case the grants would clearly be jagirs.
The facts forming the background of the agreements as
narrated in Aitchison's Treaties, Vol. III, pp. 10 to
13 are that for sometime prior to the treaty which
was entered into by the Maharajah of Udaipur with
the British in 1818, the authority of the Government
of Mewar was rather low. Taking advantage of it,
the neighbouring States had occupied most of its
territories, and the Chiefs had also become lax in the
performance of their obligations to the Durbar. This
led to considerable friction between the Maharajah
and the Chiefs and after the conclusion of the treaty
in 1818, the Political Agent Mr. Tod, with a view to
restore good relationship between the Maharajah and
his Chiefs, prevailed upon them to settle their differences, and the kowls relied on by Mr. Anthony are
the outcome of his efforts. These kowls read in the
bacRground of the facts stated above unmistakably
establish that the position of the Chiefs had preYiously
been that of grantees from the State. subject to certain
obligations. If so, the agreements did not bring about
a change in that status. They merely provided for
the carrying out of the obligations arising out of that
status. On this basis, the properties held by them
would be jagirs even according to the original and
narrow sense of that word; and in fact, they are so
described in the very kowls relied on by Mr. Frank
(Vide Aitchison's Treaties, Volume
III,
Anthony.
page 35, article 29). They are clearly within article
31-A. The respondent also contended that the pr~
perties held by the Chiefs would be estates as defined
in article 31-A. That would prima facie appear to be
so; but it is unnecessary to express any opinion on
the question, as the resumption
would be protected
by article 31-A on the ground that it related to jagirs
or other similar grants.
(1) (c) Tikanadars of Shekhwati: The northern
section of Jaipur forming the trans-Aravali region of
the State is known as Shekhwati. It consists of large
1955
Thakur Amar
Singhji
v.
Stal1 of Rajaslhan
Vmkatarama
AyyarJ.
350
1955
Thakur Amar
Singhji
v.
State ef Rajasthan
V1nkatarama
.Ay;ar ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
estates known as Panchpana Singhana, Sikar, Udaipurwati, Khandela ~nd others. These estates are
known as Tikanas and their holders as Tikanadars.
The petitioner in Petition No. 424 of 1954 is one of
them, his estate being the Tikana of Malsisar and
Mandrela in Panchpana Singhana. His contention
is that he is a ruler with semi-sovereign status sub-·
ject only to the obligation to render military service
and to pay tribute called Maumla to the State of
Jaipur, that he is accordingly a Maumlaguzar and not
jagirdar, and that he is not grantee from the
State.
The history of these estates is narrated in great detail by Mr. Wills in his report on "The Land Tenures
and Special Powers of Certain Tikanadars of Jaipur
State, 1933". To state it briefly, these estates originally formed part of the Khalsa lands of the Moghuls.
During the period of their decline, King Sawai Jai
Singh who ruled over Jaipur from 1700-1743 with great
distinction acquired them from the Moghul Emperors
on izara, and in his turn granted them on sub-leases or
izaras to various persons mostly his clansmen, on condition that in addition to the payment of izara amount
fixed they should render military service to the rulers.
Subject to these obligations they were entitled to collect revenues from the villages comprised in the izara
and maintain themselves. In course of time, when
tbe hold of the Moghul Empire on the outlying territories became weak, the Jaipur rulers assumed practically sovereign powers over the izara lands, which
came to be . regarded as part of the royal domain.
There was a corresponding rise in the status of the
sub-lessees who continued in possession of the estate
as permanent grantees. Towards the end of the 18th
Century when the power of Jaipur waned and it&
authority weakened, the · holders of these estates in
Shekhwati attempted in their ·turn to shake off their
allegiance to Jaipur, asserted . an independent status
in themselves, and began to seize the territories belonging to the State. Before their . plan succeeded,
Jaipur concluded a treaty with the British which re-cognised its position as sovereign of the whole State
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
351
including Shekhwati. "The first duty urged on the
Maharaja after the conclusion of the treaty was the
resumption of the lands usurped by the nobles and
the reduction of the nobles to their proper relation of
subordination to the Maharaja. Through the mediation of Sir David Ochterlo11y Agreements were
entered into in 1819 similar to those made at Udaipur.
·The usurped lands were restored to the Maharajah
and t.he nobles were guaranteed in their legitimate
rights and possession".
(Aitchison's Treaties, Vol.
III, p. 55).
Even after the conclusion of the agreement of 1819
there were disputes between the Maharajah and the
Chiefs in respect of various matters, such as the right
of the ruler to revise the amount payable by the
Tikanadars and the right of the latter to minerals and
to customs; but this did not affect the nature of the
relationship established between them under the agreement of 1819. Thus, the true position of the Tikanadars · is that they got into possession of the properties
izaradars under the rulers of Jaipur, improved that·
position latterly and became permanent holders of the
eStates and were eventually recognised as chiefs subordinate to the Maharajah. They were not like the
Bhomicharas of Marwar or the Bhumias of Mewar the
previous conquerors and occupants of the territory
before they were subjugated by Jaipur, as erroneously
supposed by Col. Tod; nor were they the clansmen
of the ruling dynasty who assisted in the establishment of the Raj. They derived their title to the properties only under grants made by the rulers of Jaipur,
and evc_n if their estates could not be considered, as
they shaped themselves, as jagirs, they were at least
"other similar grants" within article 31-A. That was
the view which the State took of their position. Section 4(15) of the Jaipur State-Grants Land Tenures
Act No. I of 1947 defines "State grant" as including
a jagir, muamla, etc. Muamla is, already stated,
the amount payable by the Tikanadars of Shekhwati
to the ruler of Jaipur. Section 4(7) defines an estate
as meaning "land comprised in a State grant".
as
1955
Thakur Amar
Singlifi
v.
State of Rajasthan
Vmkatarama
Ayyar J•
..
"
352
1955
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955 l
According to this definition, the properties in question
would be 'estate' as defined in article 31-A of the
Thakur A...,
Singhji
Constitution.
The Matmi Rules of 1945 provide for
v.
recognising
succession
to State grants, and they inS'at1 of Rqjasthan
clude
Muamlaguzars.
(Vide
Part III in Appendix A)Vmkatarama
Describing
the
tenures
in
the
non-Khalsa area, the
A)'Jar J.
Administration Report of Jaipur 1947-1948 stares
that "Muamla is the grant of an interest in land' for
which a fixed amount ~s payable under a settlement:
arrived :it with the State": (Vide page 35). The
position taken up by the petitioner both in the petition and in the opening argument that his stattJS is
that of an independent Chieftain holding the properties by right of conquest and not under ·grant cannot
therefore be maintained~ In his reply, however, Mr.
Achhru Ram shifted the ground, ·and contended that
the ancestors of the petitioner having come in a~'
izaradars, the impugned Act had no application to
him, as izara is not one of the tenures mentioned in
the first schedule to the Act. But Muamla is mentioned as item 6 in the schedule, and that is the name
under which the tenure of the petitioner is known. It
must accordingly be held that his lands are within
the purview or article 31-A.
(1) ( d) Subeguzars : The question as to the statm
of subeguzar is raised in Petitions Nos. 471, 472 and
473 of 1954. The petitioner in Petition No. 473 of
1954 is the holder of the .estate of Isarda in Jaipur_
It is stated that in the beginning of the 18th Century
his ancestor Mohansinghj i migrated from Bagri,
settled in the hilly regions at Sarsop, built a fortress
at Isarda and ,established an independent principality_
In 1751 the ruler of Isarda acknowledged the suz~
rainty of the Maharaja of Jaipur who, in turn, ''recognised the ancestor of the petitioner as Subcguzar",
subject to a liability to pay tribute every year to
Jaipur. (Vide . para 2 of th~ petition). The result of
this arrangement was, as in the case of Bhomich;iras.
to put the Chieftain in the position of a grantee from
the State, and that is also the position under the
Jaipur State-Grants Land Tenures Act No. I of 1947.
Section 4(15) includes within the definition of 'grant'
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
353
"suba" tenure, and the Matmi Rules of 1945 also
apply to this tenure. (Vide Appendix A, Part III).
While the tenure is called 'Sube', its holder is caUed
not Subedar which has a different meaning but
Subeguz:u.
In the Administration Report of Jaipur
1947-48, Sube is described as follows :
"Suba is a tenure peculiar to Nizamat Sawai
Madh0 pur. It is analogous to the istimrar tenure in
other p;,irts of the State. The subeguzars pay a fixed
annual amount for the grant held by them". (Vi de
p. 35).
The · position therefore is that the petitioner who is
admittedly a subeguzar holds under a grant from the
State and falls within article 31-A. It was argued that
the family of the petitioners had always enjoyed a
special distinction in that the adoption of the ruling
house of Jaipur was always made from among the
members in this family. That, however, would not
affect the status of subeguzars who must be held to be
grantees from the State.
A special contention was raised with reference to
12 villages which are stated to have been purchased
in 1730 by Raja Jaisingh the then holder of Isarda
for a sum of Rs. 20,000; and it was argued that these
villages at least could not be treated as held under
grant from the State. Isarda was a new State founded
by Mohansinghji, and its area was extended from time
to time by incorporation of fresh villages, and when
in 1751 the Chief acknowledged the suzerainty of J:i.ipur and held the estate as subeguzar under him, that
title must have related to the entire estate including
these villages, and there is therefore no ground for
treating them differently from the rest. It must be
mentioned that this contention was raised only in
the reply statement. It must be overruled.
Petitiom Nos. 471 and 472 of 1954: The petitioner
in Petition No. 471 of 1954 is the Tikanadar of Jhalai.
In para 2 he admits that he is styled as a subaguzar,
and for the reasons given in Petition No. 473 of 1954
his estate must be held to fall within article 31-A.
But it is argued that the Tikana consists of 18
villages, and that only two of them are held as 'Sube'.
1955
Thakur Amar
Singhji
v.
State of Rajas than:
Venkatarama
A'!)'ar J.
354
1955
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
But what is the case put forward in the petitions as
regards the other villages? The schedule to the petiSinghji
tion mentions that four of them are held as maintenv.
ance grants, and two as muafi. They are clearly
State of Rajasthan
within article 31-A. As regards the others, there is
Venkatarama
no specific case put forward as to the nature of their
Ayyar J.
tenure. But it is admitted that the Tikana is a permanently settled estate paying a fixed annual revenue of Rs. 1,681, and it is therefore an estate hoth
under section 4(7) of the Jaipur State-Grants Land
Tenures Act No. I of 1947 and article 31-A. This
decision will also govern Petition No. 472 of 1954 in
which the petitioner owns the
village of Bagina as
"Subeguzar" and the village of Siras as jagirdar.
(2) We now come to the second category of cases
wherein the contention is that the particular properties held by the petitioners do no fall within the purview of article 31-A.
(a) Petitions Nos. 391 and 417 of 1954 : Petition
No. 391 of 1954 relates to the estate of Yeshwantgarh
in the State of Alwar. It was settled on 11-8-1941 by
its then ruler on his son for maintenance. The grant
is described in the deed as jagir, and the Gazette
Notification dated 25-8-1941 publishing it states :
""'e are also faced with the problem of arranging
for our second Maharaj Kumar, a Jagir, which
in the matter of size and powers, should be on a much
higher fonting than the existing Jagirs. Accordingly
with the object of creating a new Jagir for him, we
have today gifted to him in perpetuity and from genera ti on to generation, all the villages included in the
Thikana of Thana together with ali other properties
· enjoyed by the deceased Raja Sahib during his lifetime. This ~new Jagir shall remain free from liability
for rates and cesses for all time, and shall also never
be required to· maintain any horses"·
In 1944 some more villages were added to this grant,
and the resumption relates to all these properties.
The contention of Mr. Achhru Ram for the petitioner is that the grant is not an estate under the law
relating to land tenures in Alwar, and that it is outside article 31-A· Under section 2(a) of the Alwar
Thakur Amar
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
State Revenue Code, 'estate' means "an area for which
there is a separate record of rights or which is treated
as such under orders of His Highness' Government".
It is stated by the petitioners that there has been no
separate record of rights in the State of Alwar and
that therefore there could not be an estate as defined
in the Code. The respondent, however, does not
admit this, and contends that, in any event, the
grants are jagirs and are therefore within article
31-A. The question is whether the grant is a jagir.
The deed dated 11-8-1941 describes it as a jagir, and
so does the Gazette Notification publishing it; and
that is also how the estate is described by the petitioner himself. Section 3(3) of the Alwar State Jagir
Rules, 1939 defines jagir as meaning . "grant of land
Highness or
or money granted as such by His
recognised as such by His Highness". Section 2(k) of
the Alwar Revenue Code defines "assignee of land revenue" as meaning "a Muafidar or a Jagirdar". Thus,
all the requirements of a Jagir are satisfied, and the
grant would fall within the scope of article 31-A.
It was next argued that even if the grant was a
jagir within article 31-A, the rights of the petitioner
in it could not be resumed under section 22(1) (a) of
the Act, inasmuch as what could be resumed under
that section was not the jagir lands, but the right,
title and interest of the jagirdars therein, and that
the petitioner was not a jagirdar as defined in section
2(g) of the Act, as he had not been recognised as a
jagirdar as required therein. This contention was
also raised by the petitioners, whooe p;-cpc;~l.:s ·wouki
not be jagirs in the specific sense of the word, but
would fall within the extended definition of that
word under section 2(h) as including the several
tenures mentioned in the first schedule to the Act.
The contention is that while their estates would be
jagirs within the inclusive portion of the definition,
they themselves would not be jagirdars as defined in
the Act, . because they were recognised not as jagirdars but as holders of the specific tenures enumerated
in that schedule, and that therefore their interests
could not be resumed under section 22(1) (a) even
1955
Thakur Amar
Singhji
v.
State qf Rajasthan
Venkatarama
A;:i-ar .].
356
1955
Thakur Amar
Singhji
v.
•State of RajaJthan
Venkatarama
Ayyar ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19551
though their estates might be notified as jagirs. In
other words, for the section to apply, there must not
merely be an estate which is a jagir but also a holder
who is a jagirdar.
It is conceded that this contention, if accepted,
would render Chapter V providing for resumption inoperative except as regards jagirs in the specific sense
and mentioned as item 1 in the first schedule to the .
Act. But it is argued that it is a case of casus omissus,
and that it is not within the province of this Court to
supply it. But the definition of jagir in section 2(h)
is, as provided therein, subject to any contrary intention which the context might disclose; and when
section 22(1) (a) enacts that on the resumption of jagir
lands the rights of the jagirdar in the lands should
cease, it clearly means that the holders of jagirs are
jagirdars for the purpose of the section. There cannot be jagirs without there being jagirdars, and therefore the word 'jagirdar' in section 22(1)(a) must mean
all holders of jagirs including the tenures mentioned
in the schedule to the Act. Section 20 exempts from
the operation of the Chapter properties whose incomes
are utilised for religious purposes. Those properties
would be held on tenures such as Sasan, Doli and so
forth which are enumerated in the schedule. There
was no need for exempting them under section 20 if
the Legislature did not understand them as falling
within th~ operation of section 22(1) (a), and they
would fall under that section only if the word 'jagirdar' is interpreted as meaning all persons who hold
rror>erties which are jagirs as defined in the Act. Iii
the result, the resumption must be held to be valid.
Petition No. 417 of 1954 relates to properties in
. Alwar, and the contention raised therein is the same
as in Petition No. 391 of 1954 that they are not an
estate within article 31-A. But the petitioner describes himself in the petition as the "proprietor jagirdar of the jagir known as Garhi", and states in para
(9) that his jagir is unsettled and pays neither revenue
nor tribute, and the prayer in para 21 (3) is that the
State should be restrained by an injunction from interfering with the rights of the petitioner as jagirdar.
•
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
357
In view of these allegations, it is idle for him now co
contend that the · properties do not fall within article
31-A.
(b) Petitions Nos. 401, 414, 518, 535 and 539 of 1954:
The properties comprised in these petitions are situated wholly or in part in the former State of Bikaner,
and the contention raised with reference to them is
that they are not estates according to the law of
Bikaner, and are therefore outside aricle 31-A. Section 3(1) of the Bikaner State Land Revenue Act No.
IV of 1945 defines 'estate' as meaning an area (a) for
which a separate record of rights has been made, or
(b) which has been separately assessed to land revenue
or would have been assessed if the land revenue had
not been released, compounded for or redeemed. Section 28 of the Act provides for record of rights, and
section 45 enacts that "all land, to whatever purposes
applied and wherever situated, is liable to the payment of land revenue to His Highness' Government".
Then there are provisions for assessment of land revenue. It is argued for the petitioners that the
record of right as contemplated by section 28 has
not been made, and that the lands have not been
assessed to revenue, nor has it been released, compounded for or redeemed, and that therefore the properties are not estates within section 3 ( 1) of the
Bikaner Act No. IV of 1945. The contention of the
respondent is that they are, at any rate, jagirs, and
so fall within article 31-A. The preamble to the Act
proceeds on the basis that whatever is not Khalsa is
jagir land. In three of the Petitions Nos. 414, 518
and 535 of 1954, the properties are described in the
schedule as jagirs and the petitioners as jagirdars.
In Petitions Nos. 401 and 539 of 1954 there are no
such admissions, there being no schedules to the petitions. But in the petitions for stay of notification filed
in all the above petitions, it is alleged that "notification under the impugned Act with respect to the jagir
,of the petitioners has not yet been made". (Vide para
(16). In view of these admissions, we are unable to
accept the contention of Mr. Frank Anthony based
on the narration in Tod's Annals of Rajasthan,
1955
Thakur Amar
Singhji
v.
State of Rajasthan
Venkata
,,,
1Yya1 •
358
1955
Thak"Mr Amar
Singh1i
v.
State of Rajasthan
Venkatarama
Ayyar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
Volume II, pp. 25, 26, 140 an~ ~41 that the properties of the petitioners are not pgm.
(c) Petition No. 634 of 1954: In this petition
there are 192 petitioners, some of whom are from
Kishangarh. The special contention urged as regards
the petitioners from Kishangarh is that their properties are not estates according to the law of Kishangarh, and that they are therefore outside article 31-A.
Rule 4(1) of the Jagir Rules for the Kishangarh
State, 1945, defines a 'jagirdar' as a person who has
been granted a village or land as jagir by the Durbar
in consideration of his past and future services, and
Rule 5 classifies jagirdars into five categories. The
argument of the petitioners is that they have not
been shown to fall within any of these categories.
Not merely is this contention not distinctly raised in
the petitions, but it is admitted in para 1 that "the
petitioners' properties are
known as Jagirs, Bhoms,
Muafi, etc." which will clearly bring them within
the operation of article 31-A. In the schedule to
the petition also, the petitioners are described as
jagirdars, and the particular villages held by them
are noted as jagir villages. The contention that they
do not fall within article 31-A must be rejected. It.
is stated that the 128 petitioner, Pratap Singh, does
not make any payment in respect of his estate, and
that it is not a jagir. If that is so, then on the admission extracted above, it must be muafi, and will
be within article 31-A.
(d) Petition No. 536 of 1954: The petitioner is the
holder of an estate in Mewar known as Bhaisrodgarh
Tikana, and he alleges that there was a dispute between Rawat Himmat Singhji the then holder of the
estate, and the Maharajah of Udaipur, and that it was
settled in March 1855 through the mediation of the
then Agent to the Government, Sir M. Montgomery,
and that under the terms of the settlement, the
Tikana was recognised as the exclusive property of
the holder. The agreement itself has not been produced, and it could not, even on the allegations in
the petition, have · had the effect of destroying the
character of the estate as a jagir grant. Moreover,
2.S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
359
this estate is mentioned as item 8 in the list of jagirs
mentioned in the schedule under section H7 in Mewar
Act. No. V of 1947, and that by itself is sufficient to
bring it within article 31-A.
( e) Petition No. 672 of 1954 : The petitioner is a
13humia holding an estate called "Jawas". Its history
is given "Chiefs and Leading Families of Rajputana", page 36, and the argument of Mr. Trivedi
based on it is that the Chiefs of Jawas occupied a
special position as feudatories, and that they could
not be considered as grantees. But their position is
not different from that of the other Bhomats,
and
indeed it is admitted in para 14 that the lands are
comprised in the Bhomat area. This estate is expressly
included in the schedule under section 117 in Mewar
Government Kanoon Mal Act No. V of 1947 being
item No. 25 and is within article 31-A.
(f) Petitions Nos. 483, 527, 528 and 675 of 1954
.and 1 and 61 of 1955: The question that is raised in
these petitions is whether grants made for maintenance are 'jagirs or other similar grants' falling within
the purview of article 31-A. In Petition No. 483 of
1954 the grant was made by the ruler of Uniaara, and
in Petition No. 528 of 1954 by the then ruler of
Katauli before it was merged in the State of Kotah.
We have held that maintem.nce grants would be jagirs
according to their extended connotation, and th~y are
therefore within article 31-A.
In Petition No. 527 of 1954 the grant was made
in favour of certain members of the Ruling House of
Jaipur. According to the respondent, they were
illegitimate issue called Laljis, and the grants were
made for Lawazma and Kothrikharch, which .expressions mean maintenance of paraphernalia and household expenses. (Vide the Administration Report of
Jaipur 1947-1948, page 36). The grant in favour of
the 33rd petitioner in Petition No. 1 of 1955 and the
17th petitioner in Petition No. 61 Qf 1955 are similar
in character. Apart from the general contention that
maintenance grants are not within article 31-A, the
further argument of Mr. Dadachanji on behalf of these
1955
Thakur Amar
Singhj
v
State of Rajastha11!
Venkatarama
Ayyar J.
360
1955
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
petitioners is that Lawazma and Kothrikharch are
tenures no! · mentioned in the first schedule to the
Singhji
Act, and that the resumption of these lands was
v.
therefore without the authority of law. But these
Stale of Rajaslhan
expressions meaning maintenance expenses· are indiVenkatarama
cative
of the purpose of the grant and are not desA_yyar J.
criptive of the tenure. A gtant can both be a jagir and
a maintenance grant, and the fact that it was granted
for Lawazma and Kothrikharch does not militate
against its being a jagir. It was suggested that the
question whether Lawazma and Kothrikharch are
tenures different from those mentioned in the schedule
to the Act might be left open and that the right of
the petitioners to establish their contention in other
proceedings may be reserved. That would undoubtedly
be the proper course to adopt when the point for determination is not whether the Act itself is unconstitutional and void, but whether the action taken
under it was authorised by its pro\'isions. But then,
there are no allegations in the petition that. the properties were hdd under a tenure, which i• outside the
schedule to the Act. On the other hand, some at
least of the petitions ·proceed on the footing that the
estates ·tire jagirs.
In Petition No. 675 of 195~ the petitioner is the
Raj Mata of the ruler of T cink. She was receiving a
monthly allowance of Rs. 762/- for her maintenance
and in lieu of it, the village of Bagri with its hamlets,
Anwarpura and Ismailpura, was granted to her by
resolution dated 6-3-1948. Being a maintenance grant
it will be a jagir, and that is the footing on which
the petition is drafted. Mr. S. K. Kapur who appeared for the petitioner put forward a special contention that the Government was cstopped from
resuming the lands. The facts on which this plea is
founded arc that on 28-11-1953 the Secretary to the
Government wrote to the Collector of Tonk that the
pet1t1oner was not to be disturbed in her enjoyment
of the jagir for her lifetime. In a later communication dated 24-11-1954, however, addressed to the
petitioner, the Government expressed its inability to
stay resumption, and the argument is that the resThakur Amar
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
361
pondent is estopped from going back on the assurance
and undertaking given in the letter dated 28-11-1953.
We are unable on these facts to see any basis for a
plea of estoppel. The letter dated 28-11-1953 ·was not
addressed to the petitioner; nor does it amount to an
assurance or undertaking not to resume the jagir.
And even if such assurance had been given, it would
certainly not have been binding on the Government,
because its powers of resumption are regulated by the
statute, and must be exercised in accordance with its
provlSlons. The Act confers no authority on the
Government to· grant exemption from resumption, and
an undertaking not to resume will be invalid, and
there can be no estoppel against a statute.
One other contention advanced with reference to
this petition might be noticed. It was argued that
under rule 2(f) in schedule II, no compensation is
awarded in respect of the abadi lands, which remain
in the possession of the jagirdar, whereas, if they are
sold, the income from the sale proceeds is taken into
account. This, it was argued, is discriminatory. The
principle underlying this provision is that compensation is to be fixed on the basis of the income which
the properties produce, and that while abadi lands in
the hands of the jagirdar yield no income, if they are
sold the sale proceeds are income-producing assets.
Whether this principle of assessing compensation is
open to attack is another question, and that will be
considered in its due place.
(g) Petitions Nos. 371, 375, 379, 416, 455 and 461
raise in general terms the
contention that tl:ie properties to which they relate
are not estates as defined in article 31-A.
Petition No. 371 of 1954 relates to the estate of
Doongri in Jaipur, and it is contended that it is not
an estate because the liability of the holder is only to
pay Naqdirazan, and it is argued that this is not
revenue. Naqdirazan is money commutation for the
obligation of maintaining a specified number of horses.
This is clearly a grant for military servi':~, :;od will
be a jagir, and that is admitted in para l where the
of 1954 : These petitions
5-83 S. C. India/59
1955
ThakurA~r
Singhji
Stale of )ajastlratr
Venkatalama
Ayyar ].
362
1955
Thakur Amar
Singl,ji
v.
Stat' of Rajasthan
Yenkatarama
AJ.?"'r ].
SlJPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
petitioner is described as the jagirdar of Doongri and
in para 9 where it is stated that the jagir is unsettled.
The prayer is that an injunction might be issued restraining t.'ie State from interfering with the rights
of the petitioner as jagirdar. It is also alleged in
para 19 of the stay petition that "the whole family is
to be supported from this jagir". Article 31-A clearly
applies.
Petition No. 375 of 1954 relates to the estate of
Renwal, and the special contention raised is that the
petitioner pays no revenue but only Naqdirazan. But
he describes himself in para 1 as jagirdar of Renwal,
admits in para 9 that it is a jagir, and claims relief in
para 21 (3) on that footing. The properties are clearly
jagirs within article 31-A.
The petitioner in Petition· No. 379 of 1954 is also
stated to be holding the estate on payment of Naqdirazan. He describes himself as owner of the properties
in Khera as jagirdai-, admits in paras 9, 14, 16 and 19
that the estate is a jagir, and prays for an injunction
restraining the State from interfering with his rights
as jagirdar. His estate is clearly within article 31-A.
Petition No. 416 of ,J954 relates to an estate called
Sanderao. The payment made by the holder is called
Rekchakri, and the contention is that this is not
revenue. But it is admitted in paras 1, 2, 9 and 21 (3)
of the petition that the properties are jagir lands.
Petition No. 455 of 1954 relates to properties in Mewar.
There are 13 petitioners, and it is argued that the
payments made by them called chakri chatund and
Bhom-barad are not revenue, and their properties are
not estates. But they admit that they are "owners as
petty jagirdars" of the properties. mentioned .in the
schedule, and this statement is followed by others
which also contain clear admissions that the estates
are jagirs. (Vide paras 12, 17(e), 19 and 21(3) of the
petition and paras 16 and 19 of the stay petition),
In Petition No. 461 of 1954 the petitioner adinits that
he holds ten villages as jagirs, seventeen as istimrar
and two as muafi. Istimrar is one of the tenures
mentioned in the first schedule to the Act, and is item
No. 2 therein, and that would be "other similar grant"
2S.C.R.
SUPREME CCURT REPORTS
363
within .article 31-A, while jagir and muafi arc
expressly included therein. In conclusion, we must
hold that the petitioners have failed to establish that
the impugned Act, in so far as it relates to properties held by them, is not within the pro~ection of
article 31-A.
IV. (B) V.le may now consider the contention of
the petitioners that the Act is bad on the ground that
the compensation provided
therein is
inadequate.
The provisions of the Act bearing on this matter may
now be reviewed. The second schedule to the Act
lays down the principles on which compensation has
to be assessed. Rule 2 enacts how the gross income
is to be ascertained, and enumerates the several heads
of income which are to be included therein,
and
rule 4 mentions the deductions which are admissible.
Rule 4(3) provides that 25 per cent. of the gross income may be deducted for "administrative charges
inclusive of the cost of collection, maintenance of
land records, management of jagir lands and irrecoverable arrears of rent"; and there is a proviso to that
rule that "in no case shall the net income be computed
at a figure less than 50 per cent. of the gross income". Under rule 5 compensation payable is seven
times the net income calculated under rule 4. Rule 6
provides that any compensation paid to the jagirdar
for customs duties during the basic year shall contirme to be payable. Under section 26(2) the compensation amount carries interest at 2! per cent.
from the date of resumption, and under section 35 it
is payable in instalments. Under section 35(A) the
payment may be made in cash or in bond or partly
in cash and partly in bond. In addition to this, there
is provision for the payment of rehabilitation grant
on the scale mentioned in schedule III.
The complaint of the petitioner is that the compensation provided by the rules is inadequate, being far
less than the market value of the estate, that rule 2
takes into account only the income which was being
actually received from the properties and omits altogether potential income which might arise in future,
as for example, from vacant house sites and unopened
1955
Thakur Amar
Singhji
v.
Stat• of Rqjasthan
Y1nkatara111J1
Ayyar J.
364
1955
Thakur Amar
Singhji
v.
State of RajaJthan
Venkatarama
Ayyar ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955)
mines; and reliance was placed on the decision of this
Court in State of West Bengal v. Bela Banerjea( 1 ) where
it was held that the compensation guaranteed under
article 31(2) was just compensation, equivalent of
what the owner had been deprived of. But we have
held that the impugnecl Act is protected by article
31-A, and that article enacts that no law providing for
acquisiti'on of properties falling within its purview is
open to attack on the ground that it violates any of
the provisions of Part Ill.
It was held by this Court
in State of Bihar v. Maharajadhira1a Sir Kameslnuar
Singh( 2 ) and Visveshwar Rao v. The State of Madhya
Pradesh(") that an objection to the validity of an Act
relating to acquisition of property on the ground that
it did not provide for payment of compensation
was an objection based on article 31 (2), and that it
was barred when the impugned legislation fell within
articles 31(4), 31-A and 31-B. It was further held in
Raja Suriya Pal Singh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh(')
that when the acquisition was of the whole estate, it
was not a valid objection to it that the compensation
was awarded on the basis of the income actually received, and that nothing was paid on account of properties which did not yield an income.
It is argued that the compensation payable under
the rules is so inadequate as to be illusory, and that
the Act must be held to amount to a fraud on the
We are un:ible to agree with this conConstitution.
tention. Under the Act, the jagirdar is entitlcJ to
compensation equal to seven years' net income, and
in addition to it he is awarded rehabilitation grant
which may vary from 2 to 11 times the net income.
Under section 18 of the Act he will also be allotted a
portion of the khudkhast lands in the jagir, the extent
of the allotment being proportionate to the . total
extent thereof. He is also to get compensation for
loss of customs. The utmost that can be said of these
provisions is that the compensation provided thereunder is inadequate, if that is calculated
on the
basis of the market value of the properties. But that
(I) [1954] S. C.R. 558.
(2) (1952] S. C.R. 889.
(.1) [19.>2] S. C.R. 1020.
(4) [19.52] S. C. R. 10"6.
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
365
is not a ground on which an Act protected by article
31-A could be impugned. Before such an Act could
be struck down, it must be shown that ti,e true intention of the Jaw was to take properties without
making any payment, that the provisions relating to
compensation are merely veils concealing that intention, and that the compensation payable is so illusory
as to be no compensation at all. (Vide State of Bi.liar
v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwai Singh of Darbhanga and others (')). We are clear that this cannot
be said of the provisions of the impugned Act, and
the contention that it is a fraud on the Constitution
must, in consequence, fail.
It was argued by Mr· Achhru Ram that the impugned Act suffered from a fundamental defect in
that it treated all the 41 tenures classed as jagirs in
the schedule as of the same character, and on that
basis laid down the same principles of compensation
for all of them. It is argued that these tenures differ
widely from one another as regards several incidents
such as heritability, partibilitv and alienability, :md
that different scales of compensation should
have
been provided suitably to the nature and quality of
the tenure.
There is considerable force in this contention. But this is an objection to the quantum of
compensation,
and that is
not justiciable
under
article 31-A. We may add that even if it was open
to the petitioners to go behind article 31-A and to
assail · the legislation on the ground that the compensation awarded was not just, they have failed to
place any materials before us for substantiating that
contention, and on this ground also, the objection
must fail.
It was also argued that there was no public purpose
involved in the resumption, and that therefore article
31(2) had been contravened. This again is an objection which is barred by article 31-A; and even on the
merits, .the question is concluded against the petitioners by the decision of this Court in State of Bihar
v. Maharaiadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga
(I) [1952] S. C.R. 889, 946-948.
1955
Thakur Amar
Singhji
v.
Stale of Rajaslhan
Venkatarama
A_yyar J.
366
1955
Thakur Amar
Si.ngfUi
v.
Slate of Rajasthan
Vmkatarama
Ayyar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
and ot/2ers(') that legislation of the character of the
present is supported by public purpose.
It was next urged that the provisions of the Act
offend article 14 and are therefore bad. Even apart
from article 31-A which renders such an objection
inadmissible, we are satisfied that it is without substance. The contention of the petitioners is that the
Act according to its title is one to provide for resumption of jagir lands, not all of them; that section 21
provides that _ the Government "may appoint a date
for the resumption of any class of jagir lands", which
means that under this section it is not obligatory on
it to resume all jagirs, and that it would be within its
powers in resuming some of them while leaving others
untouched, and thus the Act is discriminatory. Th<:
prov1S1ons of this Act bearing on this questi;,n are
sections 20 and 4. Section 20 enacts that "the provisions of this Chapter apply to all jagirs except jagirs
the income of which is utilised for the maintenance
of any place of religious worship or for the performance of any religious service". We have held that
the Act confers no power on the Government to grant
exemption.
All the jagirs therefore are liable to be
resumed under section 20, no option being left with
the Government in the matter. Section 4 of the Act
enacts that all jagir lands become liable to pay assessment from the commencement of the Act, and the
liability of the jagirdar to pay tribute also ceases as
from that date. There cannot therefore be any doubt
that it was the intention of the Legislature that all
jagir lands should be resumed under section 21.
It was also urged that under section 21 the State
is authorised to resume different classes of jagir lands
on different dates, a.nd that must result in the law
obviously
operating unequallv. This provmon was
dictated by practical considerations such as administrative
convenience and facilities for payment of
compensation, and onnot be held to be discriminatory. It was held by this Court in Biswamblzar Singh
v. T lze State of Orissa and others(') that a similar
(l) [1952] S. C.R. 889.
(2) [1954] S. C.R. 842, 855.
. ''
2 S.C.R.
(
...
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
367
·· 1955
provision in the Orissa Estates Abolition Act No . .1
of 1952 was not obnoxious to article 14. The obi"ec- Thaku,. Amar
tion must accordingly be overruled.
·
Singhji ·
Petitions Nos. 629 and 643 of 1954: These are petiv.
tions by jagirdars of J\Iewar, and the special con ten- State of Rajasthan
tion urged on their behalf by J\Ir. Trivedi is that their Venkatarama
jagirs had been taken possession of by. the State in
Ayyar J.
1949 under section S(A) of the Rajasthan Ordinance
No. 27 of 1948, that by its judgment dated 11-12-1951
the High Court of Rajasthan had held that. that
enactment was void under· article 14, that that judgment had been affirmed by this court in The State of
Rajasthan v. Rao JJianohar Singhji('), thatthe present
Act came into force on 8-2-1952, and that. the Government having wrongly taken possession of the jagirs
in 1949 under the provisions of the Ordinance, instead
of returning. them to ·the· petitioners notifie<j. them
• first under section 21 of the Act, and thus managed
to continue in possession, and that in the result,
these jagirdars had been treated differently from the
jagirdars in other States of Rajputana to whom section S(A) did not apply and article 14 had been contravened. There is no substance in . this contention.
The l\Iewar jagirdars having lost possession under a
legislation which has been held to be void, the rights
·which they had over the jagirs until the date of the
present notifications would remain.unaffected; and no
unequal treatment could result therefrom. And,
moreover, the present Act makes no discrimination
in the matter, as it applies to all the jagirs in Raja. sthan .. There is no ground, therefore,. for holding
that the Act in any manner contravenes articleJ4.
v. It now remains to deal with "the contention
. of some of the petitioners that even if the impugned
- Act is valid, their estates do not fall within its mischief; and that their resumption is therefore miauthorised.
.
. . .
.
· .
· . (a) Petition No. 392 of 1954: The subject:matter
of this petition is the estate of Khandela in the former State of Jaipur. By.a deed of the year 1836, it
(1) [195!] S.C.R. 996.
~7
368
1955
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
was settled by the Maharajah of Jaipur on Raja
Abayasingh and Raja Lakshmansingh on izara i•timrar on an annual assessment of Rs. 80,001. The
State of Rqjaslhan
present petitioner 1s the successor-in-interest of Raja
Abayasingh,
and is entitled to three-fifths share in
Venkatarama
the estate. The contention that is urged on his
Ayya;J.
behalf by Mr. Isaacs is that the Act does not apply to
him, because he is neither a Jagirdar nor a holder of
any of the tenures mentioned in schedule I to the Act.
The history of this estate is set out in Mr. Wills's Report at pp. 75-79. Khandela was an ancient principality held by the members of the Raisalot family as
Mansubdars under the Moghul Emperor.
In 1725
Sawai Jaisingh of Amber obtained an izara of Khandela from the Moghul Emperor, and the Raisalot-holders became subordinate to him. In 1797 the Raisalot family lost possession of the estate, which became
incorporated in the Khalsa lands of Jaipur, and administered as such till 1812. Thereafter, it was leased
to .the Chieftain of Sikar and others on short term
leases till 1836 when the grant under which the petitioner claims was made. The occasion for the· grant
was that there were ·negotiations for marrying a princess of the Bikaner royal family to the ruler of Jaipur,
and the Bikaner Durbar insisted that the Khandela
estate
should be restorec! to the Raisalot family.
Though the marriage itself did not eventually materialise, <he princess having in the meantime died,
the negotiations which had been going on with the
Jaipur State for ,the handing over of the Khandela
estate to its old holders resulted in the izara of 1836.
Now the question is whether the grant of 1836 was
that of a jagir. It was clearly not a grant for services
renderd or to be rendered, nor was there an assignment of any right to collect revenue. The grantees
were to enjoy the income from the lands and pay a
fixed annual amount to the Durbar. It is true that
the estate had some of the incidents of a jagir tenure
attached to it. It was impartible, it was inalienable,
and in matters of succession it was governed by the
Matmi Rules.
All this did not affect the true character of the grant which was both in name and in
Thakur .Amar
Singhji
v.
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
369
substance a permanent lease and not a jagir.
Mr. Pathak contends that even if what was granted
under the deed was not a jagir, it was at least a grant
of istimrari tenure, which is item 2 in schedule I to
the Act. This argument is mainly founded on certain
proceedings which were taken with reference to the
Khandela estate during the years 1932 to 1939. The
occasion for these proceedings was a dii\J'Ute between
the Thikanadars of Shekhwati and the Durbar with
reference to their respective rights, and the status of
the lzaradars of Khandela also came up for investigation. There was an enquiry and report by Mr. Wills
in 1933, and on that report the matter was ~gain investigated by a Committee which submitted its report
in 1935. Therein, it was held on an examination of
.all the materials that the status of the holders of
Khandela differed from that of other Thikanadars,
who paid Muamla and claimed semi-independent
status as "Muamlaguzars", that they held merely as
istimrar Izaradars uncer a "permanent and specific
izar" and not as istimrar Muamlaguzars, that the
grant of Mal, Sayer, Bhom and Kuli habubayat under
the deed did not add to their status as lzaradars.
(Vide para 5). This report was accepted by the Maharajah of Jaipur on 14-4-1939.
Mr. Pathak contends that the effect of the finding of
the Committee that the grantees held as istimrar
lzaradars was to bring them within item 2 of schedule
I to the Act, and that therefore the resumption is
within the Act. But the report emphasises that the
grantee held as "istimrar Izaradar" and not as
. "is.timrar Muamlaguzar'', and in the context the
word "istimrar" has reference not to the character of
the tenure but its duration as permanent. The precise
nature of the tenure called 'istimrari' is thus set out
in Venkatachar's Report:"Permanently q14it-rented estates and
landsThese are denoted by various terms as Dumba, Chukota, Suba and . Istimrari. Of these the Istimrari
tenure merits some attention. The largest number of
lstimarari estates in Rajasthan lies in Ajmer-Merwara
1955
Thakur ..t.ar
Singhji
v.
Stall of Rajaslhan
y mtkal<lrlftllll
A_gar J.
SUPREME. COURT REPORTS
(1955]
'
1955
which area is outside the scope of this report. The
original tenure. of the Istimrari estate in Ajmer is
Thakur Atnar
exactly like the Jagirs in Rajasthan. None of the Singhji
Ajmer estates ever pa.id revenue till 1755, but were
v.
State of Rajasthan held on condition of military service ................ Under
British rule, the estate holders were made liable to
Venkatarama
pay an annual fixed and permanent quit-rent and
AyyarJ; ·" - were converted into Istimrari tenure holders". (Page
22, para 24).
"This quit rent or fixed revenue is a nominal
assessment, not related to the income from the holding, but with the condition of confirmation of grant;
the amount is invariable. This class oL persons are
known as 'Istimrardars' ". (Page 24, para 36).
It is clear from the above that the essential features
of istimrari tenure are that the lands are ·assessed to
a nominal quit rent and that is permanent.
The
amount of Rs. 80,001 fixed as assessment under· the
deed of 1836 cannot be said to be a nominal amount,
and as found in the report of the 1933 Committee, it
was not a permanent assessment. It cannot therefore be held that what was created by thedeed of 1836
was istimrari tenure.
·
It was argued for the respondent that Khandela
was clearly an estate· as defined in article 31-A, that
the policy of the law was to abolish all intermediaries,
and that section 2(h) should be so construed as to comprehend all holders of intermediate tenures. The answer t" this is that whatever the legislature intended,
effect can be given only to its expressed intention, and
that the definition of "jagir" in section 2(h) is not
sufficiently wide to catch the petitioner. The notification under section 21 in so far as it relates to the pro-·
perties held by the petitioner under the izara of 1836
must be held to be not within the purview of the Act
and therefore unauthorised. _
(b) Petition No. 427 of 1954: Three villages, Haripura, Khata and Niradun, are comprised in this peti- ·
tion; Lands in Haripura belonged to certain Bhumias
of Jaipur.
The petitioner acquired them under a
number of purchases, the last of them being in 1915. _
:Bhom ti;inure is item 17 in schedule I to the Act 1 and
370
,
--
.
--~ __ .:,_
. 2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
___
--·---·
371
the~e lands would therefore be within the purview of
1955
the Act. It is argued by l\Ir. Rastogi that as the peti- Thakur Amar
tioner had acquired lands from the Bhomias long prior
Singhfi
to the Act his rights in them could not retrospectively
v.
be affected by subsequent legislation. \Ve are unable Stateof Rafasthan
to see where the question of retrospective operation
comes in. If Bhom. is a tenure-and that is what it Venkatarama
is under the first schedule to the Act, andif the intenAyyarJ.
tion of the Legislatnre was to bring it within the
operation of the Act, then the only .question· to be
considered is whether the particular properties noti. fied under the Act are held under that tenure. And
if that is answered in the affirmative, the Act_ would
clearly apply, and it would make no difference ill-the ·
result that the holder derived title to them by purchase and not by inheritance. On the admission of
the petitioner that the lands notified belonged to his
vendors as Bhom, the Act will dearly apply.
With reference to the lands in the village of Kha ta,
the contention of the petitioner is that it is held on
izara tenure, and that it is therefore outside schedule
I to the Act. This village is a Thikana in Shekhwati,
and though the estates in that area were originally
held on izara, they had, as already stated, risen to the
status of jagirs and had been recognised as such. This
village is stated to have been granted formaintaining
horses, and is really a Mansab jagir and must be held .
to be covered by item I in schedule I.
· .·
.The village of Niradun is stated to be held as Javad,
and the contention is that it is not one of the tenures
·mentioned in schedule I to the Act. The respondent
contends that Javad is not the name of any tenure,
and that it means only. a sub-grant. In the petition
it is not stated that Javad is a tenure; nor is there a
mention of its incidents. . The· word· 'javad' is not
noticed either in \Vilson's Glossary or in Ramanatha
lyer's Law Lexicon. In the Jagir Rules of Kisban~
garh, section 4(xiii) defines 'javad' as "a jagir confiscated by or reverted to the State", and that has
reference to the practice of making a grant of a small
portion of the jagir to the jagirdar when it is contiscated1 or to the mt;lmbers of the family when it
372
1955
Th'"akur Amar
Singhji
'Fl
Slate of Rajasthan
Vtnkalarama
A.Yy•r J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
reverts back to the State. We are satisfied that there
is no tenure called Javad, and it will not assist the
pet1t10ner whether Javad is a sub-grant or a grant
of jagir of the nature mentioned in section 4(xiii) of
the Kishangarh Rules. We may add that this contention was raised by the petitioner in a· supplemental
statement.
( c) Petition No. 468 of 1954 : The petitioner is the
holder of an estate known as Jobner. He contends
that he is a Mansubdar and not a jagirdar, and that
his tenure is not included in schedule I to the Act.
During the Moghul administration persons to whom
assignments of land revenue were made subject to an
obligation to maintain horses for Imperial service
were called Mansubdars. The petitioner states that
Akbar the Great granted three paraganas, Narayana,
Kolak and Jobner, to his ancestors as Mansub for
maintaining 1000 horses, that in 1727 they came under
"the
subordination of
the Amber Durbar"-which
was the name of the State prior to the foundation of
Jaipur in 1728, and that they had continued to hold
the estate thereafter as Mansubdars and not as jagirdars. But the grant will clearly be a jagir as there is
an assignment of land revenue for the rendering of
military service, and Mansub is only another name
for a jagir. It is classified as a jagir in the Jaipur
Administration Report 1947-1948, page 35, and even
though the Report has not the force of legislation, it
is valuable ·as showing that Mansub is recognised as
a jagir. The estate is therefore covered by item 1 in
schedule I.
With reference to one of the villages forming part
of this estate, Jorpura, a special contention was put
forward by Mr. Naunit Lal that it was dedicated for
worship of the Devi, and was therefore within the
exemption enacted in section 20. A document is also
produced in support of this claim. The respondent
claims that under this . deed the grant is not in its
entirety in favour of the Deity, but the petitioner disputes it. This is not a question which can be determined in this petition. It will be open to the petitioner to establish in appropriate proceedings that the
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
373
village or any portion thereof is within the exemption
of section 20 of the Act.
( d) Petitions Nos. 474 and 475 of 1954: In 1948
the Maharajah of Jaipur granted to the petitioners,
who are his sons, the Thikanas of Bhagwatgarh and
Mangarh consisting of 20 villages revenue-free. Now
the contention that has been urged before us in
these and other similar petitions is that in the first
schedules to the Act, only Thikanas of Dholpur are
mentioned, being item II, and that therefore Thikanas in other States are excluded. But the expression
'Thikanadar' is a honorific and 'Thikana' does not,
except in Dholpur, mean anything more than an
estate and that estate can as well be a jagir. The petitioners, in fact, admit in their petitions that they are
jagirdars. The grant is clearly a jagir, and falls
within item 1 in the schedule.
( e) Petition No. 488 of 1954 : The petitioners are
interested in two of the villages, Dadia Rampur and
Tapiplya comprised in the izara of Khandela of the
year 1836, which forms the subject-matter of Petition
No. 392 of 1954, and their title rests on Chhut Bhayas
or sub-grant from the izaradar. Their - rights are
therefore precisely those of the izaradars, and for the
reasons given in Petition No. 392 of 1954 these petitioners must succeed.
(f) Petition No. 36 of 1955 : The properties to
which this petition relates are held as "Sansan" which
is one of the tenures mentioned in the first schedule
being item 25, arid would therefore fall within the
operation of section 21. The contention of the petitioner is that they are dedicated for the worship of
Lord Shiva and Goddess Shakti, and that he is a
Brahmacharan utilising the income from the lands for
the above religious service. The properties comprised
in the grant are sai<l to be of a small extent, and the
dedication is not improbable. There has been no
denial by the respondent of the allegation in the petition, and on the materials placed · before us, we have
come to the conclusion that the dedication pleaded
by the petitioner has been established, and that the
1955
Thakur Amar
Sing.yi
v.
State of'.,Rajas than
Venkatarama
Ayyar J.
374
1955
Thakur Amar
Singhji
v.
'State of Rajasth•n
Venkataram•
Ayyar J.
1955
April 20
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
properties are within the exemption enacted in section 20.
To sum up: The impugned Act is not open to attack either on the ground that the Rajpramukh had
no legislative competence to enact it, or that the pr<>cedure prescribed in article 212-A for enactment of
laws had not been followed. The Act is, in substance,
one for acquisition of property, and is within the
legislatiYc competence of the State, and it is protected
by article 31-A. But the notification is bad as regards
properties comprised in Petitions Nos. 392 and 488
of 1954, as izoras are not within the impugned Act.
The properties mentioned in Petition No: 36 of 1955
are declicatcJ for religious services, and are
exempt
tmdcr section 20 of the Act. Appropriate writs will
issue in these three petitions.
In Petition No. 468 of 1954 the right of the peritioner to c!oim cxem ption under section 20 for the
villa!ic of Jorpur:1 on the ground that it is dedicated
for worship of the Deity is reserved, and the petition
is otiH~r\vise dis1nis.sed.
All the other !JCt1t1ons will stand dismissed. The
parties wiil b(ar their own costs m ali the petitions.
C\f. K. RANGANATHAN AND ANOTHER
ti.
GOVERNMENT OF MADRAS AND OTHERS.
[S. R. DAs, RHAC'NATJ and SJNHA JJ.]
Indian Companies Act, (Act VII of 1913), s. 232(1) as amended
by Act XXll oj l936-'F/1e iuords "or any sale held without leave of
the Court of any of the propc;·tit"-·s of the Co1npa11y" added in the section-FVhethcr lef!islaturc intended to 1nake alteration £n the !atu as
respects sales effected by secured creditor-Secured creditor-TVhcther
ouiside the toinding up--Construction_:Presumption against i111plied
r1fteratict1 of law.
The secured creditor is outside the winding up and can realise
his securir:v \vithout the ieave of the winding up Court, though if he
files a suit or takes other legal proceedings for the realisation of his
security he is bound under s. 171 of the Indian Companies Act to
obtain the leave of the winding up Court before he can do so although
such leave \V1uld alinost automatically be granted.
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