U.J.S. CHOPRA versus STATE OF BOMBAY
Supreme Court of India | Decided 25 March 1955 | [1955] 2 S.C.R. 94 | 1955 INSC 20
Key facts
- Decided
- 25 March 1955
- Bench
- SUDHI RANJAN DAS*, NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI, SYED JAFFER IMAM
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 20/1954
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1955] 2 S.C.R. 94
- Neutral citation
- 1955 INSC 20
Text of the judgment
94
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[l 955]
fl)~
a service is not an essential function of a sovereign
sta·te. It cannot be rainsaid that the Government in
v.
the Postal Department is rendering a very useful serf(. Subramanyan
vice and that the appellant has by his contract
and othtrs
with the Government undertaken to render that kind
Sinhs J.
of service on a specified route. The present case is a
straightforward illustration of the kind of contract
contemplated by section 7(d) of the Act. At all
material times the appellant has been directly concerned, for his own benefit, in the contract of carrying mail bags and postal articles entered into by him
with the Government in the Postal Department.
N. Satyt.JM1ho11
For the reasons aforesaid we have not the least
hesitation in holding that the conclusions arrived at
by the Tribunal are entirely correct. The appeal is
accordingly dismissed with costs.
A ppeaf dismiu('(f.
1955
March 25
U..T.S. CHOPRA
v.
STATE OF BOMBAY.
[S. R. OAS, BHAGWATI and IMAM JJ.]
Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (Act V of 1898), s. 439(1)(2)!6)
-Appellant convicted by Magistrate-His appeal to High ·Court
dismissed summarily-After summary dismissal of that appeal
Stat.J Government filed revision application to High Court for enhancernent of sentence-Notice issued to appellant to show cause
against enhanrnment under s. 439(2)-Whether appellant entitled to
show cause ai;ainst his conviction under s. 439!6) of Code of Criminal Procedure.
The appellant in this appeal was convicted by the Presidency
Magistrate, Bombay, of an offence under s. 66(b) of the Bombay
Prohibition Act (Act XXV of 1949) and sentenced to undergo imprisonment till the rising of the court and to pay a fine of Rs. 250
or in defaulr to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month. He
preferred an appeal to the Hi~h Court at Bombay, which was summarily dismissed. After the dismissal of that appeal, the State of
Bombay made a revision application to the High Court praying for
enhancement of the sentence. Notice was issued to the appellant
under s. 439(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure to show cause
against enhancement.
2s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
95
l9SS
Held that the summary dismissal of the appeal preferred by the
appellant did not preclude him from taking advantage of the proviU.J.~. Chdp-a
.v.
sions of s. 439(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and showing
cause against his conviction when he was subsequently called upon Slale of Bombay
to show cause why the sentence imposed on him should not be enhanced.
I
~
-
Per DAS J.-Sub-section (6) of section 439 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure confers a new and a valuable right on the accused. The language used in sub-section (6) does not, in terms,
place any fetter on the right conferre~ _by it on the accused. This
new right is not expressed to be co!1dmoned or c~n~rolled by a~y
thing that may have happened pnor to the rev1s10n apphcanon
under sub-section (1) for enhancement of sentence. Therefore, whenever there is an application for enhancement of sentence, ·a notice
must issue under sub-section (2) to the accused person to show cause
and whenever such notice is issued, the accused person must, under
sub-section (6), be given an opportunity, in showing cause against
enhancement, also to show cause against his convictiop.
It is not correct to say that sections 421, 435 & 439 of the Code
give the court a discretion not to decide the appeal or revision
brought before it. The discretion conferred on the High Court does
not authorise it to say that it will not look at the appeal or revision.
The Court's bounden duty is to look into the appeal or revision and
dedde it, although in the process of arriving at its decision it has a
very wide discretion.
There is no reason for holding that there is a merger or replacement of the Judgment of the trial Court into or by the Judgment of
the High Court only when the appeal or revision is heard on notice
to the respondent and either allowed wholly or partially or dismissed but not when it is heard without notice to the respondent and
dismissed summarily; for this purpose it makes no difference whether the dismissal is summary or otherwise, and there is a judgment
of the High Court in all the three cases. The only difference in
substance is that in the first two cases the judgment is final qua both
parties while in the third case, i.e., when an appeal or revision by
the accused is summarily dismissed without issuing notice to the
State, the judgment is final only qua the accused who preferred the
appeal or revision. This is based not on any technical doctrine of
res judicata, for there is none in criminal cases, but on the general
principle of finality of judgment. In the first two cases there can,
after the judgment, be no further application by the State for enhancement of sentence and therefore no question of the application
of section 439(6) can arise. In the last case, i.e., in case of summary
dismissal the Judgment not being final qua the State, the State may
apply for enhancement of sentence and if it does the accused becomes entitled again to show cause~ against his conviction also by
reason of the special provisions of section 439(6).
Per BllAGWATI and IMAM JJ.-A Judgment pronounced by
the High Court in the exercise of its appellate or revisional
96
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Ll955
J9jj
jurisdiction after issue oi a notice and a full hearing in the
presence
of both the parties ¥.'ould certainly be arrived at after
U.J.S. <:Mya
due consideration of the evidence and all arguments and would
• Y.
Slot< of .........,, therefore be a final judgment and such judgment when pronounced
would replace the ju_dgment of the lower court, thus constituting the only final judgment to be executed m accordance with
law by the court below. When however a petition of appeal pr<!sented by a convicted perrnn from jail is summarily dismissed under
s. 421 or a revision application made by him is dismissed summarily
or in limine without hearing him or his pleader what the High
Court does in such a case is to rl!f use to entertain the petition of
appeal or the revision application and the order passed by the High
Court-"dismissed or rejected" cannot be said to be an expression
of the opinion of the court arrived at after due consideration of the
evidence and all the arguments.
No notice for enhancement of sentence can be issued by the
High Court when a judgmont is pronounced by it after a full hearing
in the presence of both the parties either in exercise oi its appellate
or its revisional jurisdiction. Such notice for cnhanccincnt of sentence can be issued by it either suo motu or at the instance of an
interested party when the judgment of the lower court suhsim and
is not replaced by its O\VO judgment given in th!.! cxen:be of its
appellate or re•·isional juri;diction, When the Judgment of the lower
court has been under it~ scrutiny on notice being issued to 1he
opposite party and on a full hearing acrnrdecl to both the P"rtics
notice for enhancement of sentence 1...~u1 only be i~sued by ir befCJr:!
it pronounces its judgmenc replacing that of the lower court. When
such hearing is in progre$; it is incumbent upon the High (~ourt or
the opposite party to m"ke up its mind before the judgment is
pronounced whether a notice for enhancement of sentence should
issue to the accused.
Case-law discussed.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal
Appeal No. 20 of 1954.
Appeal from the Judgment and Order dated
the 26th August, 1953, of the Bombay High Court in
Criminal Revision Application No. 518 of 1953 arising
out of the Judgment and Order dated the 9th December, 1952, of the Court of Presidency Magistrate,
Bombay, in Case No. 3442/P of 1952.
S. P. Verma, for the appellant.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (Poms
A. Mehta and P.O. Cokhale, with hirnl, for the respondent.
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
97
1955. March 25. The following Judgments were
delivered.
1955
U.J.S. Chapra
v.
DAS J.-The appellant before us was on the 9th State of Bombay
December, 1952 convicted by the Presidency Magistrate, 13th Court, Bombay, of. an offence under section 66(b) of the Bombay Prohibition Act (Act XXV
of 1949) and sentenced to undergo imprisonment till
the rising of the Court and to pay a fine of Rs. 250
or to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month.
The appellant preferred an appeal to the High Court
of Judicature at Bombay but his appeal was summarily dismissed by a Bench of that Court on the
19th January 1953. After the dismissal of that appeal
the State of Bombay made a Criminal Revision
application to the High Court for enhancement of the
sentence. Notice having been issued to the appellant
under section 439(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, learned counsel for the appellant claimed the
appellant's right under section 439(6) to show cause
against his conviction. This tl1c High Court did 11ot
permit him to do. The High Court, however, did not
think fit to make any order for enhancement of sentence. · On an application made on behalf of the appellant the High Court of Bombay has given leave to
the appellant to appeal to this Court and granted a
certificate of fitness under article 134(l)(c) of the Constitution of India.
The question for our consideration in this appeal
is whether the summary dismissal of the appeal preferred by the appellant precluded him from taking
advantage of the provisions of section 439(6) of the
'Code of Criminal Procedure when he was subsequently
called upon to show cause why the sentence imposed
upon him should not be enhanced. The question
depends for its answer upon a true construction of
section 439. That section, so far as it is material for
our present purpose, reads asfoJI.ows: "439. (1) Jn the case of any proceeding the record of which has been called for by itself or which
has been reported for orders, or which otherwise comes
to its knowledge, the High Court may, in its discre-
98
1955
U.J.S.CMp/'a
v.
State <If Bombay
DasJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
tion, exercise any of the powers conferred on a Court
of Appeal by sections 423, 426, 427 and 428 or on a
Court by section 338, and may enhance the sentence;
and when the Judges composing the Court of Revision are equally divided in opinion, the case shall be
disposed of in the manner provided by section 429.
(2) No order under this section shall be made to
the prejudice of the accused unless he has had an
opportunity of being heard either personally or by
pleader in his own defence.
(3) ......................... ..
(4) ............................ ..
(5) Where under this Code an appeal lies and no
appeal is brought, no proceedings by way of revision
shall be entertained at the instance of the party who
could have appealed.
(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in this
section, any convicted person to whom an opportunity
has been given under sub-section (2) of showing cause
why his sentence should not be enhanced shall, in
showing cause, be entitled also to show cause against
his conviction".
For a correct appreciation of the real meaning, import and scope of the provisions of sub-section (6) of
section 439 it will be necessary to bear in mind its
historical background. In England there is no provision for an appeal by the Crown either against an
order of acquittal or for the enhancement of sentence.
There the person convicted has a right of appeal both
against his conviction and the sentence imposed upon
him. Under the English criminal procedure, therefore, the question of enhancement of sentence only
comes before the.Court of Criminal Appeal when there
is an appeal by the convicted accused. In this country
the provisions relating to the Court's power of enhancement of sentence have undergone radical changes
from time to time. Section 407 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1861 prohibited any appeal from acquittal.
Express power was given to the appellate Court to
reduce the sentence (sections 425 and 426) and like
power was given to the Sudder Court as a Court of
revision (sections 405 and 406). I find no provision
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
99
1955
in that Code authorising the Sudder Court to enhance
the sentence. The Code of Criminal Procedure of u;1.s~,Chopra
1872. however, by section 272 permitted the Govern- srare qf Bombay
ment to file an appeal from acquittal. This ~as
DasJ.
repeated in <;ection 417 of the Code of 1882 which
corresponds to section 417. of the present Code. Section 280 of the Code of 1872 expressly authorised all
appellate Courts to enhance the sentence. This power
of enhancement. however. was taken away from the
appellate Courts by section 423 of the Code of 1882
now reproduced in section 423 of the present Code and
was vested in the High Court under section 439 of the
Code of 1882 to be applied in exercise of its revisional
power. This has been continued in our present section
439. This shows that the Legislature thought that
this extraordinary power should be exercised only hy
the High Court and no other Court. A practice, however. appears to have grown up that in cases coming
up before it for enhancement of sentence the High
Court accepted the conviction as conclusive and proceeded to consider the question of enhancement of
sentence on that basis. (See Emperor v. Chi1110
Bhairava (') ). Then came Act XVIII of 1923 which. by
section 119. amended section 439 by adding the present
sub-section (6) and also amended section 369 by substituting the words "save as otherwise provided by this
Code or by any other law for the time being in force,
or. in the case of a High Court established by Royal
Charter. by the Letters Patent of such High Court. no
Court" for the words "No Court other than a High
Court" with which the section formerly opened. The
results of these amendments were W to make the
judgment or order of the High Court passed in exercise of its original criminal jurisdiction final which it
was not under section 369 as it originally stood and
to make this finality subject to the other provisions
of the Code or of the Letters Patent of the High Court
and (ii) to nullify the practice referred to above and
to give a statutory right to an accused person who
was threatened with the risk of having the sentence
imposed on him by the trial Court or the lower appel[I 908] 1.L.R. 32 Dom. J62.
100
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
~ate Court enhanced by the High Court~")~ exercise of
its
rcvisional jurisdiction suo motu .or at the instance
v.
Stare of Bomba)' ?f the State or in exceptional cases even of any .other
mterested person. Sub-sectioQ (6), therefore, conDasJ.
fer~ a .new ~nd a very valuable right on the subject
winch 1s ~es1gncd to be a safeguard against the State
or other interested person making frivolous revision
apphcatLon for enhancement of sentence. The State
or the person interested must, if they ask for an enhancement of sentence, be prepared to face the risk of
the accused being altogether acquitted. It is the price
or quid pro quo which the State or other interested
person must be prepared to pay for the right or privilege of making an application for enhancement of
sentence. The language used in sub-section (6) does
not, in terms, place any fetter on the right conferred
by it on the accused. This new right is not expressed
to he conditioned or controlled by anything that may
have happened prior to the rivision application under
sub-section (I) for enhancement. of sentence. The
section quite clearly says that whenever there is an
application for enhancement of sentence a notice
must issue under sub-section (2) to the accused person
to show cause and whenever such notice is issued the
accused person must, under sub-section (6), be given
an opportunity, in showing cause against enhancement, also to show cause against his conviction. The
sub-section does not say that he will have this right
to show cause against his conviction only if he has
not already done so. If the accused person appealed
against his conviction and sentence to an appellate
Court not being a High Court and lost that appeal
after a full hearing in the presence of his opponent it
must be conceded that he has had an opportunity to
show cause against his conviction but nobody will
contend that that circumstance will prevent him from
having another opportunity of showing cause agai~st
his conviction and sentence either by a substantive
application initiated by himself under sub-section (1)
or by way of defending himself when the State or
· other interested person applies to the High Court in
revision under section 439(1) for enhancement of
/9SS
U.J.S. Chopra
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
101
sentence and a notice is issued on him under section
1955
439(2). (See Kala v. Emperor (') ). Enhancement of U.JS. Chopra
sentence is undoubtedly an encroachment upon the State 0/&mbay
liberty of the subject and a very serious matter for
-an accused person and the Legislature may quite proDas!.
perly have thought that whenever an accused person
is sought to be laid open to the risk of having his sentence enhanced, the question of the legality and propriety of his conviction should be re-examined by the
High Court in the context of this new jeopardy, irrespective of anything that might have happened prior to
the application for enhancement of sentence and the
issuing of the notice on the accused to show cause. Indeed, there is. in sub-section (6) itself, an indication
in that behalf. This sub-section is to operate "notwithstanding anything contained in this section". fn some of the decisions (e.g. Emperor v.
Jorablwi ('), Crown v. Dhanna Lal ('), Emperor v.
Inderchand (') and King v. Nga Ba Saing 0 ) it has
been said that the 11011 ohstante clause refers only
to sub-section (5). I find it difficult to accept this
Sub-section (5)
limited construction as correct.
only says that where an appeal lies and no appeal
is brought, no proceedings by way of revision shall
be entertained at the instance of the party who could
have appealed. The idea is that if a person has a
right of appeal he must first pursue that' remedy. In
other words, sub-section (5) is a disabling provision.
By providing tliat no proceedings by way of revision
shall be entertained at the instance of a person who,
having a right of appeal, does not avail himself of it,
the sub-section precludes such a person from initiating proceedings by way of revision. When the accused
person under sub-section (6) shows cause against
his conviction he himself initiates no proceedings but
only exercises the right to show cause against his
conviction which is given to him because somebody
else has taken proceedings against him for enhancement and a notice has been issued on him under subsection (2). In such a &ituation the accused person
(l) A.LR. 1929 Lah. 584.
(2) [1926] I.L.R. SO Bom. 785.
(3) [1929] I.L.R. 10 Lah. 241.
(4) A.J.R. 1934 B'Jm. 471.
(S) A.I.R. 1939 Rang. 392.
14-8 SCl/ND/82
102
1955
U ..T.S. Chopra
v.
SJa~e of Bonihay
Dasi.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19551
is '?n the defensive and the act of showing cause
agamst pro~eedings initiated against him cannot properly be said to be proceedings "at his instance"
which the High Court, by sub-section (5), is enjoined
not to entertain. Strictly speaking sub-section (6)
needs no exen)ption from sup-seCtion (5). In any
event and assuming that the act of showing cause
against his conviction under sub-section (6) is tantam01mt t11 an application in revision ini.tiated by him
and such application is saved from the operation of
sub-section (5) by the non obstante clause, of sub-section (6) r do not see any reason for holding that the
non ohstante clause of sub-section (6) is concerned only
with sub-section (5). Although in showing cause
against his conviction under sub-sedion (6) the
accused person can urge all that he could do in an
appeal. if not more. this act of showing cause is, nevertheless, in form at least, a continuation and indeed an
integral part of the proceedings in revision initiated
by the Court suo · motu or by the State or any other
interested party. The general rule is that the exercise of re,•-'isional power is entirely a matter of discretion which is to be exercised by the High Court not
capriciously but on sound judicial principles. Indeed,
sub-section (I) itself lays stress oil this aspect of the
matter by t~e use therein of the words "in its discretion". The 11011 ohstante clause may well have been
designed to emphasise that the new right conferred
by sub-section (6) is a matter of right and does not
rest entirely on mere discretion of the Court. Further the non obstante clause has a special significance
even in a case where the accused person has already
had an opportunity, by means of an appeal or revision filed by him in the High Court, to show cause
against his conviction. Under sub-section (1) there
can be a revision only of the judgment or order of
Criminal Courts inferior to the High Court and it
does not sanction any revision of the judgment or
order of the High Court itself. Therefore, where the
accused person has . unsuccessfully challenged the.
legality or pi:opriety of his conviction in an appeal
or revision application made by him before the High
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
103
Court he cannot again initiate a substantive applica195 5
tion before the High Court under section 439(1) of the u.1.s. Chopra
Code to re-examine his conviction or sentence, for State ofBombay
that will be to ask the Court to revise its own preDasJ.
vious judgment or order, which the High Court cannot do under section 439(1). But suppose that the
dismissal of the appeal or revision application made
by the accused takes place in such circumstances
that it still leaves it open to the State or other interested person to apply in revision for enhancement
of the sentence and proceedings are initiated hy
the Court or the State for enhancement of sentence
under section 439(1) and notice is issued on the
accused under section 439(2), there is nothing in subsection (6) which, in terms, prevents the accused, in
that situation, to again show cause against his
conviction and sentence. The only argument that
may, in those circumstances, be advanced with some
·semblance of plausibility is that to let the accused
person to again challenge his conviction or sentence
under sub-section (6) is to cut across the provisions
of sub-section (1) and in effect to permit the accused
to ask the High Court to revise its previous order
although no substa11tive application could be initiated
by him under sub-section (1). It may well be that the
non obstante clause in sub-section (6) was also designed
to negative such an argument. Although ordinarily
no substantive application can be initiated· by an accused person, whose appeal or revision application has
once been dismissed by the High Court, for revision
or review of that order of dismissal, I can find no
difficulty in construing and reading section 439<6) RS
giving to the accused person, who is faced with the
risk of having his sentence enhanced, a second opportunity to· do what he had previously failed to do. In
other words, I see no incongruity in the Legislature
giving a new right of revision to the accused person
as a w~apon of defence in the context of a new offensive taken by the State against him. ·Even if the act
of shmying cause under sub-section (6) is to be regarded as a revision, there was nothing to prevent
the Legislature, in the interest of the liberty of the
104
19S
U.J.S. Chopra
"·
State of Bombay
DasJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1955]
subject, to provide for a limited right of revision of
the judgment or decision or order of the High Court
itself. In my judgment that is what the Legislature
has done by adding sub-section (6) to section 439 and
the non obstante clause is intended to meet and repel
the objection that may possibly have been taken on
the score that, under sub-section (!), there can be no
revision by the High Court of its own order. In my
opinion, so iong as proceedings may be taken against
the accused person for enhancement of his sentence
and so long as notice may be issued on him to show
cause against enl1ancement, so Jong must he have. in
showing cause a,gainst enhancement of sentence, the
right, under sub-section (6), tb show cause against his
conviction, irrespective of anything that may have
happened previously. That is how I read the sub-section. Indeed, in Emperor v. Mangal Naran (') McLeod,
C. J ., went further and expressed the view that if,
after an appeal had been heard on its merits and dismissed, a notice to enhance sentence was issued, the
accused would still have the right to show cause against
his conviction although any attempt to set aside his
conviction would not have much chance of success.
For reasons to be stated hereafter I would rather say
that in such a situation no application for enhancement would lie at all and that consequently no que·stion would arise of th.e accused .person exercising his
right under sub-section (6). Tliis aspect of the matter
that I am trying to indicate and emphasise does not
appear to have bee.n sufficiently adverted to in the
subsequent decisions of the different High Courts in
India except in one decision of a Full Bench of the
Lahore High CourL It will be convenient at this stage
to refer to tbose decisions.
·In Emperor v:Jorabhai (supra! the accused person
was convicted by the Sessions Judge. He preferred
an appeal to the High Court and a Bench of the High
Court dismissed the appeal on merits after full hearing of both sides after notice of appeal had been
served on the State. After the· delivery of the judgment an oral application was made to the Bench by
(I) (1924] I.L.R. 49 Bom. 4SO.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
105
the Government pleader for the enhancement of the
19;5
sentence. Notice was issued to the accused under sec- U.J.s. Chopra
tion 439(2) of the Code. The accused claimed the State 0/&,,,,bay
right, under sub-section (6) to challenge his conyiction.
Dasi
It was held by Fawcett and Madgavkar, JJ:, that sec·
tion 439(6) did not justify that would be tantamount
to a rehearing of the appeal on merits.
In the case of Ramlakhan Chaudhury v. Emperor(')
the accused's appeal had been previously dismissed
after a ft.Jll hearing and following the decision in
Emperor v. Jorabhai· (supra) it was held that the accused could not, under section 439(6), challenge the
correctness of his conviction for the second time while
showing cause against enhancement of sentence. The
same principle has been extended to cases where the
appeal of the accused person had been previously
dismissed by the H~gh Court summarily but after
hearing the accused or his advocate. (See Emperor
v. /Jatubai( 2), Emperor v. Haji Khamoo('), King v. Nga
Bu Saing (supra), Emperor v. Naubat(') ), to cases
where the jail appeal of the accused had previously
been dismissed summarily without hearing the accused
or his advocate (see Emperor v. Koya Partab('), Empemr v. Abdul Qayaum('), Ramchand v. Hirata!(') and
State v. Bhavani Shankar(') ) and to cases of dismissal
of revision petition filed by the accused after hearing
the advocate (see In re Saiyed Anif Sahib('), Emperor v. Sher Singh(''), Crown v. Dhanna Lal (supra))
and also to the case of an accused whose revision petition has been summarily dismissed (see Emperor v.
lnderchand (supra)). It has been held that for the purposes of section 439(6) it makes no different whether
the judgment or order of dismissal was made by the
High Court in appeal or in revision, or whether the
appeal ()r revision was dismissed summarily or after
a full hparing on notice to the State or other interested party and that any dismissal of the appeal or
(1) [1931) I.L.R. to Pat. 872.
(2) A.I.R. 1927 Born. 666.
(3) A.J.R. 1936 Sind 233.·
· (4) I.L.R. (1945) All. 527.
(5) [1930] I,L.R. 54 Boni. 822.
(6) A.I.R. 1933 All. 485.
(7) A.I.R. 1942 All. 339.
(8) I.L.R. [1952] 2 IW. 716 ..
(9) A.I.R. 1925 Mad. 993.
(10) · [1927)1.L.R. 8 Lah. 521.
106
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19551
1953
revision prevents the accused person from availing
himself of the benefit of section 439(6). In two cases
State 'If"Bombay Emperor v. Lukman (') and Emperor v. Shidoo(') the
Sind Court took up an intermediate position that the
Dasi.
accused person whose appeal had been dismissed summarily or after full hearing could not challenge his
conviction for the second time except to the extent
that the conviction was not founded on legal evidence
or was manifestly erroneous. In other words, he could
only go up to what was ordinarily permitted in a
revision. These two decisons appear to me, with respect, to be illogical and I need say no more about
them. In the other cases noted above it has been
quite definitely held that the accused person whose
appear or revision application has been previously
dismissed, summarily or after a full hearing, is not
entitled, when called upon to show cause why the
sentence ·should not be enhanced, to question the
correctness of his conviction for the second time. In
other words, the previous dismissal, according to
these decisions, is an adjudication by the High Court
of the correctness of his conviction and on the principle of finality of judgment embodied in sections 369
and 430 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that adjudication cannot be called in question under section
439(6). It has been pointed QJJt in several cases
(Crown v. Dhanna Lal (supra), Emperor v. lnderchartd
(supra) and King v. Nga Ba Saing (supra) ) that subsection (6) opens with the words "notwithstanding
anything contained in this section" and not with the
words "nothwithstanding anything contained in this
Code" and from this the inference has been drawn that
while the sub-section is to operate notwithstanding
the provisions of sub-section (5) it cannot override the
other provisions of the Code, and, therefore, the
operation of sub-section (6) is .conditioned or controlled by the principle of finality of judgment embodied
in s~ction 369 and section 430. Some learned Judges
have expressed the view (see In re Saiyed A nif Sahib
(supra), Crown v. Dhanna Lal (supra) that the words
"unless he has already done so" are to be read in secU.J.S. Chopra
(1) A.l.R. 1927 Sind 39.
(2l A.I.R. 1929 Sind 26.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
107
tion 439 (6), for this is to be implied from the prei 9ss
sumption of finality. In some cases see Emperor v. U.J.s. Chopra
Sher Singh (supra) and Nam Lakhan v. Emperor State o1"Bombay
(supra)) the decision has been placed also on the
--ground of the inherent incapacity of one Judge of the
DasJ.
High Court to reconsider the decision of another
Judge of that Court. It is necessary to examine these
grounds a little closely to ascertain their validity.
In order to appreciate the true meaning and exact
scope of sections 369 and 430 on which the argument
of finality of judgment is founded it, is necessary to
keep in view the general scheme of the Code. Part
VI of the Code deals with "Proceedings in Prosecutions". Chapter XV lays down the jurisdiction of the
Criminal Courts in Inquiries and Trials. I pass qver
Chapters XVI to XVIII. Chapter XIX prescribes
rules for the framing and joinder of charges. Chapters
XX to XXIII deal with different kinds of trials, e.g.,
trial of summons cases, warrant cases, summary trials
and trials before High Courts and Courts of Session.
Chapter XXIV contains ·general provisions as . to Inquirie~ and Trials. Mode of taking al,'ld recording
evidence is prescribed by the sections grouped to:.
gether in Chapter XXV. Then comes Chapter XXVI
which is headed "Of the Judgment". Section 369 is
one of the sections included ·in this chapter. Chapter
provides for the submission of death sentences for the confirmation of the High Court. Rulei:
relating to the execution, suspension, remission and
commutations of the sentences are to be found in
Chapters XXVIII and XXIX. Part VI ends with
Chapter XXX which is. not material for our present
purpose. Part VII deals with "Appeal, Reference and
Revision". Chapter XXXI is concerned with Appeals
and we find section 430 in this chapter. Chapter
XXXII provides for reference and revision, section
439 being one of the sections included in this chapter.
In view of the scheme summarised above there can
be no manner of doubt that the provisions of. the sei;·
tions collected in Chapter XXVI are concerned with
judgments pronounced by the trial Court. This conclusion is certainly reinforced by the language of some
xxvn
~
108
19'5
U .J:S. Chopra
v.
Stai. qfBombay
/Jt#J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
of these sections. Thus section 366 which is the very
first section in this chapter refers to "The · .iudgment
in every trial in any Criminal Court of original jurisdiction." Section 367 provides what must be contained in "every such judgment", that is to say judgment in an original trial. Section 369 runs as follows:
·~369. Court
not to alter Judgment.-Save as
otherwise provided by this Code or by any other Jaw
for the time being in force or, "in the case of a High
Court by the Letters Patent ·Or other instrument constituting such High Court'', no Court, when it has
signed its judgment, shall. alter or review the same,
except .to correct a clerical error".
The opening words "save as otherwise provided by
this Code ...... constituting such· High Court" were
added by section 119 of the Amending Act XVIII of
1923 and were further adapted by Adaptation of Laws
Order, 1950. There can be no question that the finality
embodied in this section is only in relation to the
Court which pronounces the judgment, for it forbids
the Court, after it has signed its judgment, to alter or
review the same. In other words, after pronouncing
the judgment the Court that pronounces it become~
functus officio. There is indication in the Code' itself
that the purpose of section 369 is not to prescribe a
general rule of finality of all judgments of all Criminal
Courts but is only to prescribe finality for the judgment of the trial Court so far as the trial Court is
concerned. That this section does not, by itself,
app!y to the judgment of an appellate Court is quite
obvipus, because if it did, there would have been no
necessity for enacting section 424 specifically making
the rules contained in Chapter XXVL which includes
section 369, applicable to the judgment of any appellate Court other than High Court, nor for again prescrihing by section 430 a rule of finality for judgments
and orders passed by an appellate Court. Tt, therefore, follows that while, subject to the other provisions of the Code or any other law and of the Letters
Patent, the finality of section 369 attaches to the
judgments pronounced by all trial Courts includin2
the High Court. in the exercise of its original criminal
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
109
19.55
jurisdiction it certainly has no bearing on the question of finality of appellate judgments which is sr~ci UJ.S. ChOJ!f·"
fically provided by section 430 of 'the C0de. Again, Statd oJv.BOmbfly
the rule of finality embodied in section 369 cannot, in
DasJ.
terms, apply to the orders ma.de by the High Court
in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, for section
442 of the Code which requires the result of the revision proceedings to be certified to the Court by which
the finding, sentence or order revised was recorded or
passed refers to it as its "decision or order" and not
"judgment". It is significant that section 425 which
requires the result of appeal to be certified to the
lower Court refers to it as its ".iudgment or order".
All these considerations herein alluded to quite clearly
establish that section 369 cannot in any manner control section 439(6). Jn any case, section 369 is "subject to the other provisions of the Code" and I see no
reason why section 439(6) should not be regarded as
one of such other provisions. It cannot be overlooked
that the words "subject to the other provisions of
the Code, etc." were introduced into section 369 at
the same time as sub-section (6) was added to section
439. As I read the new sub-section, it is a substantive statutory right conferred on the subject and full
effect should be given to it unless there is any insuperable difficulty in the way of doing so. If section
369 were susceptible of as wide a meaning as is read
into it, namely, that it applies to all judgments of
all Courts, original, appellate or revisional, I would,
in that case, hold that that meaning must be taken
as cut down, by reason of the words "subject to the
other provisions of the Code, etc." by the mandatory
nrovisions of section 439(6). In other words, section
43916) must be read as controlling section 369· rather
than the other way about. Finally, section 369 being
suhiect to the other provisions of the Code must be
read as subject to section 430 and as the finality
enshrined in the latter section does not attach to
cleci~ions or orders· made in revision by reason of
Chr:tpter XXXIT being expressly excepted from its
oneration, the rule of finality embodied in section
369, even if it be as wide as it is contended to be,
15·-8 SCI/ND182
110
1955
IJJ S. Chopra
v.
State of.-Bo1.11bay
Dasi.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
cannot affect cases provided for in Chapter XXXII.
I now pass on to section 430 which is also relied on
as furnishing a principle of finality which is supposed
to control the operation of section 439(61. Section
430, in terms, applies to "judgments and orders"
passed by an appellate Court. Jt has no application to "decisions or orders" made by the High Court
in revision; It has been contended that the exception made in section 430 in respect of cases provided
for in Chapter XXXII only exempts the judgments
or orders of an appellate Court other than a High
Court from the rule of finality embodied in section
430 because they are made revis!lble by the High Court
under section 439(1). Section 439(1) does not contemplate or permit judgments or orders made by the
.High Court in exercise of its original or appellate
criminal jurisdiction to be rev.ised by the High Court.
As; therefore, the appelate judgments or orders of the
High Court cannot, under section 439(1), be made the
subject-matter of any revision application. such appellate judgments or orders did not fall within the exception made in section 430 and were accordingly left
subject to the rule of finality embodied therein. Two
answers occur to me. If the effect of the new subsection (6), as I have already explained, is to confer a
new right on an accused person notwithstanding
anything contained in section 439(1), that is to say,
if sub-section (6) is read, as I think it should be.
as a >tatutory provision expressly making the judgmer)t ur decision or order of the High Court passed
in exercise of its appellate or revisional jurisdiction
subject. for the purpose of the protection of an
accused person whose appeal or revision had been previously dismissed. to re-examination bv the High
Court only as and .when he is subsequently faced with
an application for enhancement of sentence, then such
judgment, decision or order of the High Court does,
as a result of section 439(6), become the subject-matter
of a case provided for in Chapter XXXII of the Code.
In other words, the scope of Chapter XXXII having been enlarge9 by the addition of sub-section
(6) to section 439, the scope of tlie exception to sec-
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
111
tion 430 must also stand enlarged so as to inclcde
t 9s5
within the exception whatev.er, after the amt..ndment u:1.s. Chopra
of section 439, may come within Chapter XXXII and, Start bf~ombay
therefore, cases now coming within that Ghapter must
Ii -:,
stand free from the rule of finality embodied in secas •
tion 430. The other answer is to be found in two of
the decisions of the Allahabad High Court, namely,
Emperor, v. Abdul Qayum (supra) and Ram Chand v.
Hirala/(1) where it has been held that section 430 by
its own terms saves the revisional power of the High
Court to enhance the sentence. ln each of these cases
the jail appeal filed by the accused had been dismissed
by the High Court summarily. If the rule of finality
of appellate judgments does not attach to the summary dismissal of the jail appeal by the High Court
so as to prevent the State from invoking its revisional
power to enhance the sentence, surely the accused's
right t0 show cause against his conviction under
section 439(6), which is consequential and arises only
upon a rule for enhancement being issued under section 439(2) and is, therefore, a part of the revisional
proceedings for enhancement of sentence, must, on a
parity of reasoning be also free from the same principle
of finality. It, therefore, follows that section 439(6)
is not, in terms, controlled by section 369 or section
4.30. Whether the sub-section is controlled by the
general principle of finality of judgments and if so to
what extent are different questions which will be discussed later.
The seconcl ground on which some of the decisions
r~st, namely, the inherent incapacity of one Judge of
the High Court to reconsider the decision of another
Judge of the High Court may .-easily be disposed of.
The theory of . inherent incapacity must give way
to the statutory capacity conferred by section 439(6).
If on· a true con~truction a statute states, expressly
or by necessary mtendment, that one Judge or one
Bench .shall have jurisdiction and power to decide
s0methmg, the theory of inherent incapacity of such
.Tudg~ or Bench c~n~ot. ~ invoked to prevent the
exercise of such .iunsd1ction and power merely on
(0 A.J.R. 1942 All. 339.
112
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
/9SI
[1955)
the ground that the decision which may be arrived at
in exercise of this new jurisdiction or power may run
v. .
counter to the previous decision arrived at by
Sta~ qf Bombay
another Judge or Bench in exercise of another jurisDasi,
diction or powt<_r. I see no reason why section 439(6)
may not be read as a provision which, by necessary
implication, enables the High Court to re-examine its
own previous order on the happening of certain contingencies, namely, upon the_ accused person, whose
appeal or revision has been dismissed, being faced
with the risk of having his sentence enhanced and a
notice being issued to him for enhancement.
To reinforce the argument that section 439(6) is
controlled by sections 369 and 430 reference has
been made to section 423(2) and it has been contended, on the authority of various decisions, that
the right given by section 439(6) is not absolute but
is controlled by the provisions of section 423(2) which
lay down some limitations in the matter of appeal from
convictions in a jury trial. Even on that topic some
learned Judges have taken divergent views. It is not
necessary, on this occasion, to· express any opinion on
that question and I reserve my right to examine
the position as and when an occasion may; arise in
future. Even if . section 439(6) is controlled by
section 423(2), that circumstance certainly does not
indicate when and under what- circumstances the
right unde(r section 439(6) may be availed of. In any
case, that consideration has no bearing on the argument of finality of judgments sought to be founded
on sections 369 and 430.
It will be convenient at this stage fo refer to the
decision of a Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in
Emperor v. Atta Mohammad(') and to deal witli the
argument founded on and developed from some of the
reasonings adopted by the learned· Judges constituting that Full Benc;h. In that case the revision application of the accused had· been dismissed in limine by
the High Court. Subsequently the Crown applied
for enhancement of sentence. Notice having been
issued under sub-section (2) of section 439 the accused
UJ.S. c•a
(I) [1943] !.L.R. 25 Lah. 391.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
113
1955
person claimed the right, under sub-section (6), to
show cause against his conviction in spite of the fact IJ;J.s. a.,,a
that his revision application had been dismissed. The State of'B~m•y
Advocate for the Crown relied on the cases re(erred
DasJ.
to above and contended that the order of dismissal
of the l\_evision application by the High Court was
final as regards the correctness of the conviction, that
that order could not again be revised by the High
Court, that the accused was no longer entitled to
challenge his conviction and that it made no difference that' his revision petition had been dismissed in
limine. The Full Bench overruled the earlier decision
of the Court in Crown v. Dha1111a Lal (supra) and held
that the accused was, in the circumstances of the
case. entitled to show cause against his conviction,
notwithstanding the fact that his application for
re' ision had been dismissed in li111i11e. The rcasnning
adopted by Blacker, J ., was shortly as follows: That
;111 order dismissing a revision petition in limine is an
ordrr made under section 435 and not under section
43~; that such an order is not a judgment and, therefore, tht: principle of finality embodied in section 369
docs not appiy to such an order, because such a dismissal only meant that the Judge saw no adequate
grounds disclosed in the petition or on the face of the
judgment for proceeding any further; that, in the
picturesque language of the learned Judge, in such a
dismissal "there is no finding or decision unless it can
be called a decision to decide to come to no decision";
that the jurisdiction exercised by the Court under
section 439(6) was appellate jurisdiction and that an
order of acquittal thereunder did not amount to a
review of an order of dismissal under section 435; and
finally that if the order under section 435 was a judgment or if an order of acquittal under section 439(6)
was a review of such judgment, such review was not
barred by section 369, because of the saving provisions with which the section begins. Mahajan, J., as
he then was, put in the forefront of his judgment the
view that section 439(6) which was introduced by
amendment in 1923 gave a new and unlirhited right
114
1955
U.J.S. Chopra
V.
State of Bo1nbay
DasJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
to the subject; that the Judge hearing the application
for enhancement was bound to go into the facts to
satisfy himself as to the correctness of the conviction; that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction was
a mere matter of favour and a dismissal in /imi11e of
such application amounted only to a refusal to look
into the record and was in no sense a judgment. Ram
Lall, J., did not deliver any separate judgment but
concurred generally with the other learned Judges.
It will be noticed that this decision of the Lahore
High Court rests mainly on two grounds, namely, (!)
that in a dismissal of a revision application in limille
there is no finding or decision at all and that it is
nothing more than a refusal to send for the records or
to look into the matter and is, therefore, not a judgment, and (2) that, in any case, section 439(6) gives a
n~w statutory right to the accused person to challenge
the legality or propriety of his conviction, although
his previous application for revision of the order of
the lower Court had been dismissal in limine and that
such a review of that dismissal order is not barred by
section 369 because of the saving provision at the
beginning of that section. The Full Bench expressly
declined to express any opinion as to the effect of
dismissal nf an appeal on the right given by sub-section · (6). The orinciple of the first ground of the
Lahore Full Bench decision has, however, been extended by the Rajasthan High Court in The State v.
Bhawani Shankar (supra) to a case where the respondent's jail appeal had been summarily dismissed.
According to Wanchoo, C.J., the accused, whose jail
appeal had been dismissed summarily, was in the same
position as the accused, whose revision petition had
been dismissed in limine, for he too could not be said
to have had an opportunity of showing cause against
his conviction. The learned Chief Justice, however, did
not desire to go further and expressed the view that
if an appeal were dismissed summarily bnt after hearing the party or his pleader the accused could not
claim to have a second opportunity to challenge his
conviction under section 439(6), because in that case
he had been heard and, therefore, had had an oppor-
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
115
tunity to show cause against his conviction when his
appeal had been summarily dismissed.
1955
U.J.S, Clwpra
v.
It will be recalled that in Emperor v. Jorahhai State 0!.__BombaY.
(supra) and the other cases which followed
it it
DasJ.
;was said that for the purposes of determining the
applicability of section 439(6) it made no difference
in principle whether the proceeding filed by the
accused which had been dismissed was an appeal or a
revision or whether the aismissal was summary or
after a full hearing and that in none of such cases
could the accused person claim a second opportunity
to question the legality or propriety of his conviction
when he was subsequently called upon to show cause
why the sentence passed on him should not be enhanced. In the Lahore Full Bench case and the Rajasthan case referred to above a distinction has, however, been made between a summary dismissal and a
dismissal after a full hearing of the appeal or revision
filed by the accused. In my judgment there is a substantial distinction between these two kinds of dismissals as regards their effect on the rights of accused
persons as I shall presently indicate.
I am, however, unable to accept the argument
adopted by the Lahore Full Bench that a summary
dismissal of a revision application filed by the accused
must be regarded as an order made under section 435
and not one under section 439, that such a summary
dismissal is nothing more than a refusal on the part
of the High Court to go further or to look into the
application and that in such a dismissal there is no
finding or decision at all. Far less am I able to accede
to the proposition that a summary dismissal of a jail
appeal also stands on the same footing. Sections 421,
435 and 439 undoubtedly vest a very wide discretion
in the Court. Discretion, as Lord Halsbury, L.C.
said. in Sharp v. Wakefie!d<1), means sound discretion
guided by law. It inust be governed by rules of reason and justice and not according to private opinion;
according to law and not by humour or caprice. It
mu~t not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful but must
be legal and regular. This discretion is given to the
(I) L.R. [1891] A.c. 173 at p. 179.
116
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955)
/955
High Court for the purpose of dealing with and disposing of the proceeding brought before it and not
for
not deciding it. The primary and paramount
S1111,. •f Bombay
duty of the Court is to decide the apoeal or revisi<'n
DasJ.
and it is to exercise its discretion in so deciding it. Jn
deciding the appeal or revision the High Court may
chnose which of its powers it will exercise if the
circumstances of the case call for such exercise. In
a clear case. apparent on the grounds of appeal or
revision or on the face of the judgment appealed from
or sought to be revised it may cnme to the conclusion
that the case has no merit and does not call for the
exercise of any of its powers in which case it may
dismiss it summarily. If, however, it has any doubt,
it may call for the record or may admit it and issue
notice to the respondent and decide it after a full
hearing in the presence of all parties. Bnt decide it
must at one stage or the other. The discretion conferrecl on the High Court does not authorise it to say
that it will not look at the appeal or the revision. The
court's bounden duty is to look into the appeal or
revision and decide it, although in the process of
arriving at its decision it has very wide discretion.
When the Court summarily dismisses an appeal whether without hearing the accused or his pleader as in
the case of a jail appeal or after hearing the accused or
his pleader but before issuing any notice to the respondent as in an appeal presented bv the accused or his
pleader. the Court does decide the appeal. It is indeed a very serious thing to say that sections 421.
435 or 439 give the Court a discretion not to decide
the appeal or revision brought before it and J, for one,
am not prepared to countenance and much less encourage such an idea. In my judgment a summary
clismissal of an appeal or revision does involve an adjucfication by the High Court just as a dismissal after
a full hearing ~loes. The only difference. as we shall
presently see. is as to the respective nature. scope
and effect of the two ad_judications.
U.J.S. Chopra
••
rt has been said that when an appeal or revision is
dismissed after a full hearing by the High Court the
judgment of the lower Court merges in the High Court
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
117
1955
judgment and the High Court judgment replaces the
judgment of the lower Court and becomes the only U.J.S.v.Chopra
operative judgment but that when the appeal or State of Bomlta)'
revision is summarily dismissed by the High Court
Dasi.
there is, in such a dismissal, no finding or decision
which can replace the judgment of the lower Co~rt.
It is, therefore, said that there can be no showing
cause against his conviction under sub-section (6) in
the first case, for it will involve a revision of the High
Court's decision but the position will be otherwise in
the second case where the dismissal was summary.
This argument appears to me to be untenable and
fallacious. Section 425 of the Code requires that whenever a case is decided on appeal by the High Court
under Chapter XXXI it must certify its judgment or
order to the Court by whicb the finding, sentence or
order appealed against was recorded or passed and
that that Court shall thereupon make such orders as
are conformable to the judgment or order of the High
Court and that, if necessary, the record shall be
amended in accordance the1ewith. Likewise, section
442 requires that when a case is revised under Chapter
XXXII by the High Court, it shall, in the manner
provided by section 425, certify its decision or order to
the Court by which the finding, sentence or order
revised was recorded or passed and that that Court
shall thereupon make such orders as are conformable
to the decision so certified and that, if necessary, the record shall be amended in accordance therewith. This
certificate is sent in every case, whether the appeal
or revision is disposed of summarily or after a full
hearing. Where an appeal or revision is disposed of
after a full hearing on notice to the respondent ~nd
allowed wholly or in part it becomes ex facie obvious
that the judgment appealed against or sought to be
revised has been altered by the judgment or decision
of the High Court on appeal or revision and a note
is made in the record of 'this alteration. But when
an appeal or revision is dismissed after full hearing
and the sentence is maintained there is outwardly no
change in the record when the certificate is sent by
the High Court but nevertheless there is an adjudica16-s/SCI/ND1s2
118
1955
U.J.S. Chopra
v.
State qf Bombay
DasJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ l 955J
tion by the High Court. In the first case it is judgment of acquittal or reduction of sentence and in the
second case it is a judgment of conviction. Likewise,
when an appeal or revision is summarily dismissed,
such dismissal maintains the judgment or order of the
lower Court and a note is made of such dismissal in the
n~cord and in the eye of the law it is the judgment of
the High Court that prevails. To the uninstructed mind
the change may be more easily noticeable in the first
case than in the other two cases but on principle
there is no difference. I can see no reason for holding
that there is a merger or replacement of judgment
only in the first two cases and not in the last one. In
my opinion, it makes no difference whether the di8missal is summary or otherwise, and there is a judgment of the High Court in all the three cases.
It is at once urged that if the summary dismissal of
an appeal or revision is also a judgment then the rule
of finality prescribed by sections 369 and 430 will at
once apply to it and a cunning accused may by putting up an obviously untenable appeal or revision and
procuring an order of summary dismissal of it,
prevent the State or any other interested party from
making an application for enhancement of the sentence. The apprehension, to my mind, is unfounded
for reasons more than one. When an appeal or revision is filed by an accused person he sets out his
grounds in detail, challenging both his conviction and
sentence. From the very nature of things he does
not raise any question of enhancement of the sentence.
At that stage no notice or rule having been issued
the respondent is not before the Court to raise the
issue of enhancement. So the summary dismissal only
confirms the conviction and decides that the Court
sees no ground for reducing the sentence. It is in no
sense a decision that the sentence should not be
enhanced for that issue was not before the Court at all
and so it has been said, I think rightly, in several
cases, [e.g. Jn re Syed Anif Sahib (supra)], Emperor v.
Jorabhai (supra) and Emoeror v. lnderchand (suora)].
The fact the High Court simply dismisses the appeal
or revision summarily without issuinp; the notice on
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
119
1955
the accused under section 439(2) for showing cause
aaainst enhancement is a clear indication that the U.J.S. Chopra
IDgh Court has not considered the question of en- State o/ilombay
hancement. It is true that the rule of finality presDasJ.
cribed by section 430 applies to the appellate judgment
of the High Court, subject to the exception regarding
cases falling within Chapter XXXII. It is also true that
although the revisional power is not expressly or in
terms controlled either by section 369 or section 430,
the general principle of finality of judgments attaches
to the decision or order of the High Court passed in
exercise of its revisional powers. But this finality,
statutory or general, extends only to what is actually
decided by the High Court and no further. When an
appeal or revision by the accused is allowed after a
full hearing on notice to the respondent the conviction and sentence must be regarded as having been
put in issue and finally decided. When the accused
person in the presence of the State claims an acquittal
or reduction of his sentence, the State ought then and
there to apply for enhancement of sentence and its
failure to do so cannot but be regarded as abandonment of the claim. The acceptance by the High Court
of the appeal or revision on notice to the respondent
and after a full hearing is, therefore, nothing less
than a Judgment of acquittal or a judgment for
reduction of sentence. On the other hand, the dismissal by the High Court of an appeal or revision
after such a full hearing amounts to a judgment of
conviction. In both cases the judgment is final as regards both the accused and the respondent as regards
the conviction as well as the sentence in all its
aspects, namely, reduction or enhancement. In that
situation no further question of revision can arise at
the instance of either party. There can be no further
application by the accused challenging his conviction
or sentence. Nor can there be any further application
by the State for enhancement of the sentence, for that
dent prayed for acquittal or reduction of sentence
and not having then been raised it cannot be raised
ouestion could have been and should have been raised
when the accused person in the presence of the respon-
120
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
subsequently and consequently no question can
exercise of right by the accused
Sime o}iiombay under section 439(6).
This result is brought about
-·not by any technical doctrine of constructive res
D:ISJ.
judicata which has no application to criminal cases
but on the general principle of finality of judgments.
The summary dismissal of an appeal or revision
by the accused, with or without hearing him or his
pleader but without issuing notice to the respondent is,
so far as the accused is concerned, a judgment of
conviction and confirmation of his sentence and he can
no longer initiate revision petition against his conviction or sentence. The judgment or decision is a final
judgment qua the a1 cused person, for otherwise he
cou!d go on making ~uccessive appeals or revision
applications which ob> ously he cannot be permitted
to do. But the State or other interested person
who has not been ser.red with any notice of the
appeal or revision cannot be precluded, by the
summary dismissal of the accused's appeal or revision, from asking for enhancement, for in that
situation the State or the complainant not being
present the question of enhancement was not in issue
before the Court and the summary disrrussal cannot
be regarded as an adjudication on the question of
r.nhancement. That question not having been put
in issue and not having been decided by the High
Court, the finality attaching to the summary dismissal as against the accused does not affect the position.
This, I apprehend, is the true distinction between a
summary dismissal of an appeal or revision and a
dismissal of it after a full hearing. The cases of
Emperor v. Jorabhai (supra) and the other cases following it overlooked this vital distinction as also its effect
on the new statutory right conferred on the accused
person by section 439(6) and they cannot be accepted
as correct decisions. In those cases where the appeal
or revision filed by the accused had been dismissed
after a full hearing in the presence of the State and
where there was no application by the State or other
interested party for enhancement of sentence during
the pendency of that appeal or revision it should have
t9ss
u. r.s. Chopra arise for the
•
2 S.C.R.
SUPRE~lE COURT REPORTS
121
been held that the dismissal must be regarded as a
judgment which was final as against both parties on
both pomts, conviction and sentence and there could
be no further application for the enhancement of sentence and consequently no question of the accused
having a further opportunity of showing cause against
his conviction could arise. In the cases where the
appeal or revision filed by the accused had been s11~
marily dismissed without notice to the respondent, 1t
should have heen held that although such dismissal
was final as against the accused it did not preclude
the State or the complainant, who was not a party to
the dismissal, from applying for enhancement of sentence and that as soon as an application for enhancement was made subsequently and a notice was issued
to the accused, the latter, faced with the risk of having his sentence enhanced, at once became entitled,
under section 439(6), in showing cause against the
enhancement of sentence, also to show cause against
his conviction. The Lahore Full Bench case has
decided, inter alia that while the dismissal of the
accused's revision application in limine does not prevent the State from subsequently applying for enhancement ot the sentence, section 439(6) gives the accused
a fresh right to challenge his conviction when a notice
for enhancement is issued to him. That part of the
decision may well be sustained on this ground as explained above but, with great respect, I do not agree
with their view that the accused in that case had the
second right because the summary dismissal of his
revision was not a judgment at all or was not final
even as regards him. The Rajasthan High Court's
decision in so far as it extended the principle to the
dismissal of a jail appeal without hearing the accused
or his pleader under section 421 may also be supported
on the ground I have mentioned. A Bench of the
Lahore High Court in The Crown v. Ghulam Muhammad(') has held that where the accused's revision
application had been dismissed on notice to the respondent and after a full hearing and the State sub(I) Pak. L. R.[1950] Lah. 803.
1955
U.J.S. Chopra
v.
State of Bombay
Dasi.
122
1955
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
sequently applied for enhancement of sentence, the
u.J.s. Chopra accused person could again show cause against his
Stare 0J""Bombay convic~ion. With great respect I think that the better
--
DasJ.
reasomng would have been to say that such a dismissal
of the revision after a full hearing was a judgment
final against both parties on both points of conviction
ancl sentence and that as the State did not, during
the pendency of that revision, apply for revision it
had, after that dismissal which became a final judgment, no right subsequently to apply for enhancement of sentence and consequently no notice under
section 439(2) could issue and no question could
arise for the accused person asserting his right
under section 439(6).
For reasons discussed above I have to hold that the
summary dismissal of the appeal filed by the appellant in the High Court was a judgment of conviction
by the High Court and was final so far as the appelIant was concerned and he could not initiate any further revision application either against his conviction
or for reduction of sentence after that dismissal but
that it was not final so far as the State was concerned
and the State was entitled to apply in revision for
enhancement of sentence. For reasons already stated
I must further hold that as soon as the State applied
for enhancement and a notice was issued on the appellant he became entitled under section 439(6) to
again challenge his conviction. As I have said this
suh-sectton gives a new and valuable weapon of
defence to an accused person who is placed in fresh
jeopardy by reason of an enhancement application
having been filed against him and a notice to show
cause having been issued to him. I find nothing in
sections 369 and 430 to cut down that right. The
previous dismissal of his appeal had no bearing on
the ne\\< situation created by the enhancement application which the Legislature, in enacting section
439(6), may well and properly have thought to be
sufficiently serious to deserve and require a thorough,
re-examination by the High Court of the conviction
itself in this new context. There is nothing in principle that I can see which should prevent that sub-sec-
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
123
1955
tion from giving a fresh right to the accused whose
appeal or revision has been summarily dismissed to U.J.S. Chopra
defend himself by challenging his conviction when a State ofv•.
Bombay
notice for enhancement is issued to him.
Dasi.
In my judgment, for the reasons stated above, this
appeal should be allowed and the matter should go
back to the High Court so that the State's applicatio'l for enhancement may be dealt with according to
law after giving the appellant an opportunity to
show cause against his conviction.
BHAGWATI J. delivered the judgment of Bhagwati
and Imam, JJ .-This appeal on certificate under
article J 34(1)(c) of the Constitution raises an important question as to the right of a convicted person to show cause against his conviction while showing cause why his sentence should not be enhanced
under section 439(6) of the Criminal Procedure Code.
The appellant was charged before the Presidency
Magistrate, 13th Court, Bombay with having committed an offence punishable under section 66(b) of
the Bombay Act XXV of 1949 inasmuch as he was
found in possession of one bottle of Mac Naughtons
Canadian Whisky (Foreign) containing 8 drams
valued at Rs. 20. He was convicted by the learned
Presidency Magistrate and was sentenced to imprisonment till the rising of the Court and a fine of Rs. 250
in default rigorous imprisonment for one month. He
presented ·his petition of appeal to the High Court of
Judicature at Bombay through his advocate. This
petition of appeal was however summarily dismissed
by the High ·court after hearing the advocate on the
19th January 1953. On the 18th Mav 1953 a criminal
revision application for enhancement of senten~ was
filed by the State and a rule was granted by the Vacation Judge on the 12th June 1953. This rule came for
hearing and final disposal before a Division Bench of
the High Court on the 26th August 1953. After hearing the Government Pleader in support of the rule
the Court was not satisfied that there was a case for
enhancement of sentence. The learned counsel for
the Appellant then wanted to argue for an acquittal
124
SUPREMB COURT REPORTS
[1955
1955
relying upon the provisions of section 439(6) of the
U.J.S. Chopra Criminal Procedure Code. Relying however upon the
Stateo}Bomboy decisions of the Bombay High Court in Emperor v.
Bh-Jorablzai('), and Emperor v. Kaya Partab('), as also
ogwattJ.
Emperor v. Jnderchand('), the Court did not allow the
learned counsel to argue that the order of conviction
itself could not be sustained. The application for
enhancement of sentence was thereupon dismissed
and the rule was discharged. The appellant applied
for leave to appeal to this Court on the 15th October
J953. The Division Bench of the High Court, hearing
the application stated the point which arose for determination as under:"Whether a summary dismissal of an appeal preferred by an accused person precludes him from
taking advantage of the provisions of section 439( 6)
of the Criminal Procedure Code, when he is subsequently called upon to show cause why the sentence
imposed upon him should not be enhanced"
It pointed out that the consistent view taken by the
Bombay High Court in this matter had been accepted
by the Allahabad and the Patna High Courts in Emperor v. Naubat(') and Ramlakhan Chaudhury v. Emperor(') but the view taken by the Lahore High Court
in Emperor v. Atta Muhammad('), though not directly
in point prim a f acie lent support to the contention
urged by the learned counsel for the Appellant. A
certificate was therefore granted to the Appellant that
it was a fit case for appeal to this Court.
It will be convenient at this stage to briefly indicate
the relevant sections of the Criminal Procedure Code
which will fall to be considered. Section 417 provides
for ar. appeal on behalf of the State Government to
the High Court from an original or appellate order of
acquittal passed by any Court other than a High
Court. Sections 419, 420, 421, 422 and 423 Prescribe
the procedure in cases of appeals. Section 419 deals
with petitions of appeal presented by the appellant or
his pleader and section 420 with petitions of appeal
(!) r1926] I.LR. 50 Born. 783.
(2) f1930j 32 Born. L.R. 1286.
(3) [1934 36 Born. L.R. 954.
(4) I.LR. 1945 Allahabad 527.
15) r193Il I.LR. 10 Patna 872.
!6J [1943] l.L.R. 25 Lahore 391 (F.B.
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
125
presented when the appellant is in jail. Section 421
provides for summary dismissal of these appeal!l if the
Appellate Court considers that there is no sufficient
ground for interfering, save that no appeal presented
by the appellant or his pleader is to be dismissed
unless the appellant or his pleader has had a reasonable
opportunity of being heard in support of the same,
and the Court might also before dismissing an appeal
summarily call for the record of the case though not
bonnd to do so. If the Appellate Court doec; not dismiss the appeal summarily, notice of appeal is to be
given to the appellant or his pleader or to such officer
as the State Government may appoint in this behalf,
under section 422 and the powers of the Appellate
Court in dismissing the appeal are laid down in section
423, the only relevant provision for the present purpose being that in an appeal from a conviction the
Appellate Court might with or without the reduction
in sentence and with or without altering the finding
alter the nature of the sentence but ....................... .
not so as to enhance the same. Section 430 incorporates the rule as to the finality of the judgments and
orders passed by an Appellate Court upon appeal
except in cases provided for in section 417 which
relates to appeals on behalf of the Government in
cases of acquittal and Chapter XXXII which rel~tes
to reference and revision. Section 435 deals with the
exercise of the revisional powers inter alia by the
High Court to call for the records of the inferior criminal courts for the purpose of satisfying itself as to
the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding,
sentence or order recorded or passed and as to the
regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Courts.
Section 438 provides for a reference by the lower Appellate Court to the High Court recomm:)nding that a
sentence which has been imposed on a convicted person be reversed or altered. Section 439 with which we
are immediately concerned is couched in the following
terms:(1) In the case of anv proceeding the record of
which has been called for bv itself or which has been
reported for orders, or which otherwise comes to its
17-8 SCI/ND/82
19SS
U.J.S. CltO[Na
"·
State of Bombq
BltopotU.
126
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1955]
J!J3S
knowledge, the High Court may, in its discretion,
exercise
any of the powers conferred on a Court of
UJ.$. ChP,pra
Y.
Appeal
by
sections 423, 426, 427 and 428 or on a Court
S-e! Boml>ay
by section 338, and may enhance the sentence; and
~llJ.
when the Judges composing the Court of Revision are
equally divided in opinion, the case shall be disposed
of in manner provided by section 429.
(2) No order under this section shall be made to
the prejudice of the accused unless he has had an
opportunity of being heard either personally or by
pleader in his own defence.
15) Where under this Code an appeal lies and no
appeal is brought, no proceedings by way of revision
shall be entertained at the instance of the party who
could have appealed.
(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in this
section. any convicted person to whom an opportunity has been given under sub-section 12) of showing
came why his sentence should not be ~nhanced shall.
in showing cause, be entitled also to show cause
against his conviction.
Section 440 lays down that no party has any. right to
be heard either personally or by pleader before any
Court when exercising its powers of revision provided
however that tbe Court may if it thinks fit, when exercising such powers hear any party either personally.
or by pleader and nothing in that section shall be
deemed to affect section 439(2) above.
A person convicted of an offence may file in the
Hiil:h Court a petition of appeal or an ;1pplication for
revision challenging his conviction and the sentence
passed upon him. The petition of appeal mav be presented by him from jail or may be presented bv him
to the High Court in person or through his nleader.
An application for revision also mav be similarly
presented by him to the High Court. A petition of
appeal presented by him from jail or presented by him
in person or through his pleader as aforesaid mav be
summarily dismissed by the High Court after perming
the same if it considers that there is no sufficient
ground for interfering. the latter after giving him or
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
127
1955
his pleader a reasonable opportunity of being heard
in support of the same and in appropriate ('ases after U.J.S. Chopra
calling for the record of the case. A notice of appeal Stat~ ofv. Bombay
may issue only if the High Court does not dismiss the
Jlhagwati J.
appeal summarily and in that event only there would
be a full hearing of the appeal in the presence of
both the parties In the case of an application for
revision also the same may be dismissed summarily
and without even hearing the party personally or by
pleader. If however the Court deems fit to issue notice
to the opposite party there would be a full hearing in
the presence of both the parties. These proceedings
would normally be concerned with the question whether the conviction can be sustained and the sentence
passed upon the convicted person be set aside or
reduced. There would be no question here of the enhance111ent of the sentence. The question of enhancement of the sentence would only arise when the High
Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under
section 4390) thought it necessary to issue a notice
for enhancement of sentence to the convicted person.
Even through the Court exercising its powers of revision would not be bound to hear any party personally or by pleader no order under section 439(1)
enhancing the sentence could be made to the pre.iudice of the accused unless he has had an opportunity
of being heard either personally or by pleader in his
own defence. Jn that event simultaneously with the
opportu11ity given to him under sub-section (2) of showing cause why his sentence should not be enhanced he
would be entitled in showing cause also to show cause
against his conviction by virtue of the provision of
section 439(6).
The exercise of this right of also showing cause
against his conviction may arise in 4 different types
of cases:
(I) Where his petition of appeal has been summarily dismissed either without hearing him or after
hearing him or his pleader as the case may be;
(2) When his appeal has been dismissed after a
full hearing following upon the notice of appeal being
issued to the opposite party;
'
128
. SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1955}
19SS
(3) When his application for revision has been
summarily dismissed either without hearing him or
v.
Stare of Jlombtzy after hearing him or his pleader as the case may be;
an_d
BJraiwotiJ.
(4) Where his application for revision has been
dismissed after a full hearing following upor1 a notice
issued to the opposite party.
U.J.S. Cltapra
When the High Court issues a notice for enhancement of sentence it is exercising its revisional jurisdiction and the question that arises for consideration
is whether in one or more of the cases above referred
to the High Court has jurisdiction to issue the notice
of enhancement of sentence and the convicted person
is entitled while showing cause why his sentence should
not be enhanced also to show cause against his conviction.
The view taken by the Bombay High Court in the
cases noted above has been that in all the four cases
mentioned above the accused has had an opportunity
of showing cause against his <.:onviction and that he
is not entitled to a further or second opportunity of
doing so while showing cause why his sentence
should not be enlianccd. It has not made any distinction between the exer<.:ise of appellate or revisional
jurisdiction by the High Court nor between appeals
or revision applications dismissed summarily or in
limine and appeals or revision applications dismissed
after a full hearing in the presence of both the parties.
It has also extended the same principle to a reference
made under section 438 and an order passed by the
High Court thereupon-"No order on reference",
without even issuing notice to the applicant at whose
instance the Sessions Judge made the reference. (Vide
Emperor v. Nandlal Chunilal Bodiwafa(')).
The
Allahabad and the Patna High Courts have followed
this view of the Bombay High Court in the decisions
above referred to and the Lahore High Court in
Emperor v. Dhanalaf(') also followed the same. But
this decision of the Lahore High Court was overruled
by a Special Bench of that Court in Emperor v. A Ila
(ll [1945] 48 Bombay L.R. 41 (F.B.).
(2) [1928] l.L.R. JO Lahore 241.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
129
1955
Mohammad('). The Special Bench held that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court is U.J.S.v.Chopra
entirely discretionary, that an application for revi- State '![ Bombay
sion is entertained as a matter of favour, that no BhagwatiJ.
party is entitled to be heard either himself or by
pleader when the Court is exercising its revisional
jurisdiction and that therefore a dismissal of an application for revision in limine tantamounts to a refusal
by the Court to exercise its revisional jurisdiction and
the convicted person under those circumstances is at
all events entitled while showing cause why his sentence should not be enhanced also to show cause
against his conviction. It went to. the length of holding that section 439(6) confers upon ··the convicted
person an unfettered and unlimited· right of showing
cause against his conviction, which right cannGt be
taken away unless· there is a judgment in rem which
only would operate a~ a bar to the decision of the
same matter when it arises in the exercise of what is
in effect the cxer.cise of the onlinary appellate jurisdiction. The Rajasthan ·High Court· in: State v.
JJhawa11i Shankar(') has drawn a. distinction between
cases where the accused has not been heard at all and
given no opportunity to show cause against his conviction his jail appeal having been dismissed under
section 421 or his revision application having been
dismissed without hearing him· and cases where he
has already been heard _and given an opportunity to
show cause against his cQnviction whether it be in
appeal or in revision and whether his dismissal is
summary or on the merits and held that in the former
cases he is entitled to ask the Court to hear him and
thus allow him to show cause against his conviction
under section 439(6) if a notice of enhancement is
issued to him.
The principle as to the finality of criminal judgments has also been invoked while considering this
question. This principle has been recognised by this
Court in Janardan Reddy & Others v. The State n.f
(l} f19-411 I.L.R. 25 L1h. 391 (F.B.).
(2) I.L.R [1952] 2 R<1h;tbn 7lli.
130
1955
U:J S. Chopra
v.
Stu1 e of Bonrbay
Bhagwati J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1955]
Hyderabad & Others(') at page 367 where Faz! Ali, J.
observed:-
"It is true that there is no such thing as the
principle of constructive res judicata in a criminal
case, but there is such a principle as finality of judgments, which applies to criminal as well as civil cases
and is implicit in every system, wherein provisions
are to be found for correcting errors in appeal or in
revision. Section 430, Criminal Procedure Code ..... .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........... has given express recognition to this
principle of finality by providing that "Judgments
and orders passed by an Appellate Court upon appeal
shall be final, except in cases provided for in section
417 and Chapter XXXII"."
Section 417 relates to appeals on behalf of Government in cases of acquittal by any Court other than a
High Court and Chapter XXXII relates to reference
and revision which also are powers exercised by the
High Court over the judgments or orders of inferior
Courts. thus exduding from the purview of this exception all judgments and orders passed by the High
Court as an Appellate Court. Section 430 does not
in terms give finality to the judgments of the High
Court passed in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction,
but the same principle would apply whether the High
Court is exercising its appellate jurisdiction or its
revisional jurisdiction, because in either case the High
Court which is the highest Court of Appeal in the
State would have pronounced its judgment. which
judgment would replace the judgment of the lower
Court and would be final. Even while exercising its revisional powers under section 439 the High Court exercises any of the powers conferred on a Court of Appeal
by sections 423, 426, 427 and 428 and it is in effect an
exercise of the appellate jurisdiction though exercised
in the manner indicated therein. This principle of finality of criminal judgments therefore would equally
apply when the High Court is exercising its revisional
jurisdiction. Once such a judgrnent has been pronounced by the High Court either in the exercise of
its appellate or its revisional jurisdiction no review or
(I) 1951 S.C.R. 344.
2 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
13_1
revision can be entertained against that judgment and
there is no provision in the Criminal Procedure Code
which would enable even the High Court to review
the same or to exercise revisional jurisdiction over the
same. The judgment of the High Court would replace
that of the lower Court which would no longer be'Subsisting but would be replaced by the High Court judgment and thus it is only the High Court judgment
which would be final and would have to be executed
in accordance with law by the Courts below. Sectbn
425 requires that whenever a <;:ase is decided on appeal
by the High Court it should certify its judgment or
order to the Court by which the finding, sentence or
order appealed against was recorded or passed and
the Court to which the High Court certifies its judgment or order shall thereupon make such orders as
are conformable to the judgment or order of the High
Court and, if necessary, the record shall be amended
in accordance therewith. Section 442 similarly provides .that when a case is revised under Chapter
XXXII by the High Court it shall in the same manner certify its decision or order to the Court by which
the finding, sentence or order revised was recorded or
passed and the Court to which the decision or order
is so certified shall thereupon make such orders as are
conformable to the decision so certified and, if necessary, the record shall be amended in accordance therewith. These provisions are enacted because the High
Court itself does not execute or carry into effect the
sentences or orders passed against the convicted persons but the work of such execution has necessarily
to be done in conformity with the sentences or orders
passed by the High Court by the Courts which originally passed the same. Nevertheless the latter Courts
execute or carry into etfect the sentences or orders
which are ultimately passed by the High Court and
are invested with finality. In. these cases there is no
occasion at all for the exercise of the revisional powers
by the High Court under section 439(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. That jurisdiction can only be
exercised by the High Court when the record of the
proceedings of Subordinate Courts has been called for
1955
U.J.S. Clzopra
v.
State of Bomhay
B/iagwa t i-;f.
132
SUPREM.E COURT REPORTS [1955]
1955
by itself or the case has been reported to it for orders
or has otherwise come to its knowledge and the High
V,
State of Bo1nbay Court sun motu or on the application of the party
interested thinks it fit to issue a notice for enhanceBhagwati J.
ment of sentence. This is a clear exercise of t11e
revisional jurisdiction of the High Court and can be
exercised by it only qua the judgments of the lower
Courts and certainly not qua its own judgments which
have replaced those of the lower Courts.
U.J.S. Chopra
The Criminal Procedure Code unlike the Civil
Procedure Code does not define "judgment" but there
are observations to be found in a Full Bench decision
of the Mad;as High Court in Emperor v. Chinna Kaliappa Gounden and anotherC), discussing the provisions
of section 366 and section 367 of the Criminal Procedure Code and laying down that an order of dismissal
under section 203 is not a judgment within the meaning of section 369: The principle of aurrefois acquit
also was held not to apply as there. was no trial when
the complaint was dismissed under section 203 with
the result that the dismissal of a complaint under
section 203 was held not to operate as a bar to the
rehearing of the complaint by the same Magistrate
even when such order of dismissal had not been set
aside by a competent authority. Section 366 lays
down what the language and contents of a judgment
are to be and section 367 provides that the judgment
is to contain the decision and the reasons for the
decision and unless and until the judgment pronounced by the Court complied with these requirement~ it
would not amount to a judgment and such a judgment when signed would not be liable to be altered
or reviewed except to correct a clerical error by virtue
of the provisions of section 369 save as therein provided. These observations of the Madras High Court
were quoted with approval by Sulaiman, J. in Dr.
Hori Rain Singh v. Emperor('). He observed that the
Criminal Procedure Code did not define a judgment
but various sections of the Code suggested what it
meant. He then discussed those sections and concluded that ''judgment" in the Code meant a judg(ll [1905] I.L.R. 29 Mad, 126.
(2)A.I.R. 1939 Federal Court 43.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
133
1955
ment of conviction or acquittal. ·Reference was then
made to the 6bservations of Sri Arnold White, C.J. in U.J.S. Chopra
Emperor v. Chinna Kaliappa Gounden & another(') State efv.Bombay
which were followed hy another Division Bench of the
Madras High Court in Emperor v. Maheshwara Kon- Bhagwati J.
daya(') and it was held that an order of discharge was
not a judgment as "a judgment is intended to indicate
the final order in a trial terminating in either the conviction or acquittal of the accused". A Full Bench of
the Bombay High Court in Emperor v. Nandlal Chunilal Bodiwala(') pronounced that a judgment is the
expression of the opinion of the Court arrived at after
due consideration of the evidence and all the arguments. It was pointed out that sections 366 and 367
applied to the judgments of the trial Court and section
424 dealing with the judgments of the Appellate Courts
provided that the rules relating to the judgments of
a Trial Court shall apply so far as may be practicable
to the judgment of any Appellate Court other than
a High Court. It followed therefore that there was
no definite rule as to what the judgment of a High
Court acting in its appellate as well as its revisional
jurisdiction should contain. It was quite natural
because the judgment of the High Court in its criminal jurisdiction was ordinarily final and did not therefore require the statement of any reasons whether
the High Court was exercising its appellate or revisional jurisdiction. The judgment howsoever pronounced was however the expression of the opinion
of the Court arrived at after due consideration of the
evidence and all the arguments and would therefore
either be a judgment of conviction or acquittal and
where it would not be possible to predicate of the
prono1mcement that it was such an expression of
opinion the pronouncement could certainly not be
taken as the judgment of the High Court.
A judgment pronounced by the High Court in the
exercise of its appellate or revisional jurisdiction after
issue of a notice and a full hearing in the presence of
both the parties would certainly be arrived at after
(I) [1905] LL.R. 29 Mad. 126.
(2) [19J8] I.L.R. 31 Madras 543.
·
(3) [1945] 48 Born. L.R,. 41 (F.B.)
18-8 SCI/ND/82
134
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1955]
1955
due consideration of the evidence and all the arguments and would therefore be a judgment and such
v.
judgment when pronounced would replace the judgState of Bombay
ment of the lower Court, thus constituting the judgBhagwati J.
ment of the High Court the only final judgment to be
executed in accordance with law by the Court below.
When however a petition of appeal presented by a
convicted person from jail is summarily dismissed
under section 421 or a revision application made by
him is dismissed summarily or in limine without hearing him or his pleader what the High Court does is to
refuse to entertain the petition of appeal or the criminal revision and the order passed by the High Court
-"dismjssed or rejected" cannot be said to be the
expression of the opinion of the Court arrived at after
due consideration of the evidence and all the arguments. It is a refusal to admit the appeal or the criminal revision so that notice be issued to the opr.osite
party and the matter be decided after a full hearing
in the presence of both the parties. It would be
only after the appeal or the criminal revision was admitted that such a notice would issue and the mere
refusal by the High Court to entertain the appeal or
the criminal revision would certainly not amount to
a judgment. The same would be the position when a
reference was made by the lower Court to the High
Court under section 438 and the High Court on perusing the reference made an order-"no order on the
reference"-as the High Court on a consideration of
the terms of the reference must have come to the conclusion that no prima facie case has been made out
to warrant an interference on its part. If the High
Court thought that it was a prima facie case for its
interference it, would certainly entertain the reference
and issue a notice to the parties concerned to show
cause why the judgment and order passed by the
lower Court should not be revised.
u J.S. cliop,ra
When a petition of appeal is presented to the High
Court by the convicted person or his pleader section
421 provides that no such appeal should be dismissed unless the appellant or his pleader has had a
reasonable opportunity of being heard in support of
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
135
1955
the same and the High Court might before dismissing
an appeal under that section, call for the record of U J:S. l1wpra
the case but would not be bound to do so. Even in State ofv. Bombay
such a case the· hearing accorded to the appellant or
his pleader would be with a view to determine whether Bhagwati J.
there was prima f acie case made out to warrant its
interference in appeal. The appellant or his pleader
would be heard in support of that position and if he
satisfied the High Court that there was a prim a f acie
case for its interference the High Court would admit
the appeal and order a notice to issue to the opposite
party in which event the appeal would be decided
after a full hearing in the presence of both the parties.
The calling for the records of the case also though not
compulsory but discretionary with the Court would
be for this very purpose, viz., to determine whether
a prima facie case for its interference was made out.
The whole purpose of the hearing accorded to the
appellant or his pleader even after calling for the
records of the case would be to determin·e whether a
prima facie case for its interference was made out
and it would not be within the province of the Court
at that stage to fully consider the evidence an the
record and hear arguments from the appellant or his
pleader with a view to determine whether the conviction ,could be sustained or the sentence passed upon
the accused could be reduced. The setting aside of the
conviction and the reduction, if any, in the sentence
could only be determined by the Court after notice
was issued to the opposite party and a full hearing
took place in the presence of both the parties. Even
in the case of a summary dismissal o( a petition of
appeal under these circumstances the position would
certainly not be any different from that which obtains
in the case of a summary dism·issal of the petition of
appeal presented by the convicted person from jail or
the summary dismissal of an application for criminal
revision made by him or on his behalf to the High
Court. In all ihese cases there will be no judgment
of the High Court replacing the judgment of the lower ·
Court and the action of the High Court would only
amount to a refusal by the High Court to admit the
136
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1955]
1955
petition of appeal or the criminal revision and issue
notice to the opposite party with a view to the final
v.
determination of the questions arising in the appeal
State of Bombay
or the revision. The order dismissing the appeal or
Blragwati J.
criminal revision summarily or in fimine would no
doubt be a final order of the High Court not subject
to review or revision even by the High Court itself
but would not tantamount to a judgment replacing
that of the lower Court. The convicted person would
be bound by that order and would not be able to
present another petition of appeal or application for
criminal revision challenging the conviction or the
sentence passed upon him by the lower Court. But
such order would not have the effect of replacing the
judgment or order of the lower Court which would in
that event be subject to the exercise of revisional
jurisdiction by the High Court under section 439 of
the Criminal Procedure Code at the instance of the
State or an interested party. In the cases (]) & (3)
noted above therefore there being no judgment of the
High Court replacing the judgment of the lliwer Court
section 439(]) would operate and the High Court in
exercise of its revisional jurisdiction either suo 11Jotu
or on the application of the interested party would
be in a position to issue the notice of enhancement of
sentence which would require tu be sc:rvcd on the
accused under section 439!2) so that. he would have
an opportunity of being heard either personally or by
pleader in his own defence. In that event the convicted person in showing cause why his sentence
should not be enhanced would also be entitled to show
cause against his conviction.
U.J.S. Chopra
It follows therefore that in the case of a summary
dismissal or a dismissal i11 limi11e of petitions of
appeaf or applications for criminal revision even if
the convicted person or his pleader has been heard
by the High Court with a view to determine if there
is a prima facie case for its interference, the convicted
person to whom an opportunity has been given under
section 439(2) of showing cause why his sentence
should not be enhanced would in slimvin!} cause he entitled also to show cause <1gainst his conviction. The
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
137
1955
same would also be the position when a reference made
by the lower Court to the High Court under section U.J .S. Citopra
.,
438 of the Criminal Procedure Code is rejected by the State ofv. Bombay
High Court without issuing notice to the parties concerned by merely ordering-"no order on the ref- .Bhagwatil.
erence". In cases where the petition of appeal or the
application for criminal revision is admitted by the
High Court and a notice is issued to the opposite
party and the High Court maintains the conviction
with .or without reducing the sentence passed upon
the accused the judgment of the High Court in the
exercise of its appellate or revisional jurisdiction
would replace the judgment of the lower Court and
there would be no occasion at all for the exercise by
the High Court of its revisional powers under section
439(1) which can only be exercised qua the judgments
of the lower Courts mid certainly not qua its own
judgments. The cases (2) & (4) noted above would
therefore be outside the purview of section 439(1). If
that is so there would be no question of giving the
accused an opportunity of being heard either personally or by pleader in his defence under section
439(2) and the provisions of section 439(6) would
certainly not come into operation at all. If no notice
of enhancement of sentence could issue under these
circumstances no question at all could arise of the
convicted person showing cause why his sentence
should not be enhanced and being entitled in showing
cause also to show cause against his conviction. ·
It follows by way of a necesary corollary that no
notice for enhancement of sentence can be issued by
the High Court when a judgment is pronounced by it
after a full hearing in the presence of both the parties
either in exercise of its appellate or its revisional
jurisdiction. Such notice for enhaneement of sentence
can be issued by it either suo motu or at the instance
of an interested party when the judgment of the lower
Court subsists and is not replaced by its own judgment in the exercise of its appellate or its revisional
jurisdiction. When the judgment of the lower Court
has been under its scrutiny on notice being issued to
138
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1955]
1933
the opposite party and on a full hearing accorded to
U.J.S, Chopra both the parties notice for enhancement of sentence
v
can only be issued by it before it pronounces its j udgSt11t• of ~mbay
ment replacing that of the lower Court. When such
•hatrwaJi J.
hearing is in progress it is incumbent upon the High
Court or the opposite party to make up its mind before such judgment is pronounced whether a notice
for enhancement of sentence should issue to the
accused. There would be ample time for the opposite
party to make up its mind whether it should apply
for a notice of .enhancement of the sentence. The
High Court also on a perusal of the record and after
hearing the arguments addressed to it by both the
parties would be in a position to make up its mind
whether it should issue such notice to the accused.
But if neither the opposite party nor the High Court
does so before the hearing is concluded and the judgn1ent is pronounced it will certainly not be open to
either of them to issue such notice for enhancement
of sentence to the accused, because then the judgment
of the High Court in the exercise of its appellate or
revisional jurisdiction would replace that of the lower
Court and section 439(1) would have no operation at
all. Even in the case of a reference by the lower Court
under section 438 of the Criminal Procedure Code
the High Court if it did not summarily rcjci.:t such
a reference would issue notice to the parties concerned
and then there would be occasion for it either suo
nwtu or on the application of an interested party to
issue a notice of enhancement of sentence before the
hearin~ was concluded and a judgment was pronounced by it. The procedure obtaining in the several High
Courts to the effect that notice for enhancement of
sentence can issue even after the appeal or the application for criminal revision is disposed of by the High
Court and judgment pronounced thereupon is not
correct and is contrary to the true position laid down
above.
It was contended that the non-obstante clause in
section 43916), viz. "notwithstanding anything contained in this section" was meant to confer upon the
convicted person a right to show cause against his
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
139
1955
conviction in those cases where a notice to show cause
why his sentence should not be enhanced was issued U.J.S. Clwpr"
against him, whatever be the circumstances under Sta/IJ •/Bomba)
which it might· have been issued. Once you had a
/Jltfllwoti J.
notice for enhancement of sentence issued against the
convicted person this right of showing cause against
his conviction also accrued to him and that right
could be exercised by him even though he had on an
earlier occasion unsuccessfully agitated the maintainability of his conviction either on appeal or in revision. This non-obstante clause could not, in our opinion, override the requirements of section 439(1)
which provides for the exercise of revisional powers
by the High Couxrt only qua the judgments of the
lower Courts. Section 439(6) would not come into
operation unless a notice for enhancement was issued
under section 439(2) and a notice for enhancement of
sentence under section 439(2) could not be issued unless and until the High Court thought it fit to exercis~ its revisional powers under section 439(1) qua the
judgments of the lower Courts. The High Court has
no jurisdiction to exercise any revisional powers qua
its own judgments or orders, the same being invested
with finality and otherwise being outside the purview
of the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, and the
only purpose of the 11011-ohstante clause in section
439(6) can be to allow the convicted person also to
show cause against his conviction when he is showing
cause why his sentence should not be enhanced in
spite of the prohibition contained in section 439(5).
Where an appeal lies under the Code and no appeal
is brought no proceedings by way of revision can be
entertained at the instance of the party who could
have appealed. If the convicted person could ·have
filed an appeal but had failed to do so he could certainly not approach the High Court in revision and
ask the High Court to set aside his conviction. If he
could not file application in revision he could not
show cause against his conviction under section 439(1)
of the Criminal Procedure Code and it was in order
to remove this disability that the 11011-obstante clause
in section 439(6) was enacted so that when the High
~.
140
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1955]
1955
Court was exercising its revisional jutisdiction the
convicted person could show cause against his conV.
State 'Qf.8omba)' viction in spite of the fact that otherwise he could
not have been able to do so, he not having appealed
JJJ1agw1W"J.
when an appeal lay and therefore not being entitled
to file an application in criminal revision and challenge the validity or maintainability of his conviction. Section 439(6) therefore confers on the convicted person a right which he can exercise in the
event of a notice for enhancement of sentence being
issued against him in the exercise of the revisional
jurisdiction by the High Court in spite of the fact that
he was not entitled to question the validity or maintainability of his conviction in a substantive application for criminal revision filed by him for the purpose
and this right is available to him only if the High
Court exe\cising its revisional jurisdiction under section 439(1) thinks it fit to issue a notice of enhancement of sentence against him under· section 439(2)
and in that event he has the right also to show cause
against his conviction when showing cause why his
sentence should not be enhanced.
·U./.S. Chopra
We shall now review the decision of the various
High Courts to which our attention has been drawn
by the learned counsel appearing before us. Turning
first to the decisions of the Bombay High Court we
were referred to Emperor v. Chinto Bhairava('), a decision given in the year 1908 which recognised the invariable practice of that Court for over 25 years according
to which the accused in showing cause why the sentence should not be enhanced was not .allowed to discuss the evidence and satisfy the Court that he had
been wrongly convicted. The practice of the Court in
such cases was to accept the conviction as conclusive and to consider the question of enhancement of
sentence on that basis. It was open to the accused
to apply for revision of the conviction, but having
failed to avail himself of that, he could not be permitted to assail the conviction in a proceeding where
the sole question was whether the sentence passed by
the lower Court was adequate or not. It may be
(1) [1908] I.L.R. 32 Born. 162.
'
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
141
1955
noted that this decision was in the year 1908 long
before the amendment of section 439 of the Crin1inal U.J.S. Chopra
Procedure Code by Act XVIII of 1923 b:, auding sub- State efv.Bombay
section (6) thereto.
Bhagwatl l.
The next decision to which we were referred was
Emperor v. Mangat Naran('). In that case simultaneously·· with the admission of an appeal filed by the
accused the Court issued a notice for enhancement of
sentence. When the appeal and the notice came for
hearing together before the Division Bench the Court
observed that such a practice was not desirable. It
was likely to produce an impression on the mind of
an illiterate accused in jail that it was proposed to
enhance the sentence because he had appealed.
MacLeod, CJ. there expressed an opinion that if after
an appeal had been heard on its merits and disn11ssed a
notice to enhance the sentence was issued, the accused
had still the right to show cause against his conviction,· though any attempt to set aside the conviction
would not have much chance .of success. He however
expressed his preference in favour of the old practice,
viz first to deal with the appeal and then to consider
whether a notice to enhance should issue. No question had arisen for consideration of the Court in that
case as to the true construction of the provision of
section 439(6) of the Criminal Procedure Code and the
only question considered by the Court there was what
should be the proper procedure to be adopted when
issuing a notice for enhancement of sentence, whether
it should be issued simultaneously with the admission of the appeal or after the appeal was finally heard
and disposed of.
·
This opinion expressed by MacLeod, CJ. was therfore treated as obiter in Emperor v. Jorabhai Kisanbhai('). The question that arose for consideration of
the Court in that case was whether after an appeal of
an accused person against his conviction and sen~
tence bad been dismissed by a Division Bench of the
High Court and a notice to enhance the sentence was
issued on an application on behalf of the Government
the application for enhancement of sentence could be
(I) [1924] 27 Dom. L R. 3SS.
19-8 SCJ/ND/82
(2) [1926] I.L.R. SO Bom. 7.83.
142
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[I 955]
1955
heard on its merits by another Division Bench of the
High Court treating the conviction as correct or the
v.
entitled
State af Bombay accused was under such circumstances not
under section 439(6) to be re-heared on the merits of
/lhalfWatiJ.
his conviction. The appeal filed by the accused
against his conviction and sentence had been dismissed on the 7th April, 1926. After judgment was
delivered by the Court, the Government Pleader
applied orally for issue of a notice· for enhancement
and that application was granted. The application
was heard on the 17th June 1926 and it was urged on
behalf of the accused that the only proper procedure
was to issue a notice for enhancement of sentence
before the appeal had been actually disposed of and
that once the appeal was disposed of by the Court
there was no legal power to enhance the sentence
under section 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
That contention was negatived the Court observing
that so far as the point of procedure was concerned
there was no hard and fast rule as to the appropriate
time for the issue of notice of enhancement of sentence by the High Court and resorting to the principle
of the ·finality of judgments as regards the accused
being concluded by the judgment of the High Court
dismissing· his appeal and confirming the sentence
passed upon him. The _judgment there was interpreted
as confirming the conviction and rejecting the appeal
as to the sentence in the sense that it saw no reason
to reduce it and that was not treated as a decision
that the-sentence should not be enhanced if a pro~r
procedure was taken such as the Code allowed for the
purpose and therefore so far as the judgment went
there was nothing which in any way tied the hands
of the Court. Sections 369 and 430 of the Criminal
Procedure Code were referred to and the Court held
that the observations of MacLeod, C.J. in Emperor v.
Mangat Naran(') above referred to were obiter dicta
not binding· upon them and the application must be
heard on the merits treating the conviction as correct
in view of the dismissal of the appeal.
IJ,J.S. Chopra
It is no doubt true as observed by Madgavkar, J.
(I) [1924] 27 Dom. L.R. 355.
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
143
19S5
in regard to the practic~ as to the proper time for
issuing of the notice of enhancement that the question U.J.S ChtJpra
of adequacy of punishment is, in the first instance, a State ofv. Bomboy
matter for the Government and for the District
Magistrate. From the time when the sentence is 8ftagwtJti J.
passed, and at all events up to the time when an appeal
is admitted and notice is received, it is open to Government to consider the sufficiency of a sentence and
before hearing of the appeal, to apply to the High
Court for enhancement of the sentence if they are so
advi'sed. In that event the appeal as well as the notice
of enhancement would be heard together and the
Court hearing the appeal would apply its mind not
only to the question whether the conviction should
be confirmed but also to the question whether the
sentence should be reduced or enhanced as the case
may be. It is only in rare instances that the High
Court considers for itself the question of enhancement
of sentence and only if no action has been taken by
the Government and if the High Court thinks that
the interests of justice imperatively demand it. In
such a case it would be a matter for consideration by
the High Court whether it should issue notice at the
very time of the admission or whether it should do so
whik disposing of the appeal on the merits as to the
conviction. The observations of the learned Judge
however in so far as they seem to suggest that the
appeal should be disposed of first and the question of
enhancement of sentence should be· considered by the.
same Bench immediately afterwards or that the
notice for enhancement could be issued by the Court
after the disposal of the appe~l on the merits as to
conviction do not take into account the fact that
after the judgment is pronounced and the conviction
is confirmed involving as a necessary corollary thereof the confirming of the sentence passed upon the
accused also if the same is not reduced, the judgment
of the High Court replaces that of the lower Court
and the exercise of any revisional powers by the High
Court by way of enhancement of the sentence is
necessarily eschewed. These revisional powers could
only be exercised by the High Court qua the judg-
144
19SS
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955)
ment of the lower Court and once that judgment is
replaced by the judgment of the High Court, the
v.
Sta,. of &mlxty High Court has no further powers to review or revise
its own judgment and enhance the sentence which is
Bhagwati.J.
thus passed by it upon the accused. The principle
as to the finality of judgments applied by the Court
by virtue of the provisions of section 369 and section
430 of the Criminal Procedure Code should not have
been confined merely to the question of confirming
the conviction but also should have been extended to
the confirming of the sentence in so far as the High
Court did rtot see any reason to reduce to sentence
already passed by the lower Court upon the accused.
When the High Court hears the appeal on its merits
it does not apply its mind only to the question whether
the conviction should be confirmed but also applies its
mind to the adequacy of the sentence passed upon
the accused by the lower Court. In thus apP,lying its
mind to the question of sentence it also considers
whether the sentence passed upon the accused by the
lower Court is adequate in the sense that it is either
such as should be reduced or is such as should ·be enhanced. The questions of the reduction of the sentence
or enhancement of the sentence are not to be viewed
as if they fall into water-tight compartments and
the mind of the Court hearing the appeal on merits is
directed to the consideration of the matter in all its
aspects including the confirming of the conviction ancl
the reduction or enhancement of the sentence as the
case may be. The principle of finality of judgments
should therefore be extended not only to the question
of the confirming of the conviction but also to the
question as to the adequacy of the sentence, whether
the sentence which is passed upon the accused by the
lower Court should be reduced, confirmed or enhanced.
Once therefore the judgment of the High Court
replaces that of the lower Court there is no question
which can ever arise of the exercise by the High
Court of its revisional powers under section 469(1) of
the Criminal Procedure Code and the proper procedure therefore if the High Court thought it fit either
suo motu or on the application of the interested party
UJ.S. Chopra
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORfS
145
1955
to issue the notice of enhancement of sentence, is lo
issue the said notice before the hearing of the appeal U.J.S. Chopra
is concluded and the judgment of the High Court in Slate qfv. Bombay
appeal is pronounced. We are therefore of the
opinion that the decision reached by the High Court B/iagwati J.
of Bombay in Emperor v. JorabhaiC) was not correct
in so far as it held that the notice of enhancement
could be issued by the High Court at the instance
of the Government after the dismissal of the appeal
on merits. The notice for enhancement issued in that
case was not competent and should not have been
issued at all by the High Court.
The decision in Emperor v. Jorabhai(') was followed
in Emperor v. Koya PartabO which extend ell the
same prindple to an appeal which had been presented
from jail and was summarilv dismissed under section
421 oi· the Criminal Proccdui·e Code. While dismissing
the saml'. the Court issued a noticl'. for cnh<incement.
.Whc11 the notice came for hearing the accused contended that he was entitled to be heard on the merits
as to whether he should ha\'e been convicted or not
relying upon the provisions of section 4J9((1). Beaumont. C..J. relied upon the provisions of ~cction UO
and observed that the accused was not at liberty to
be heard on the merits. The judgment of the Court
of Appeal dismissing the appeal on the 9th .lunt: 1930
was a llnal order which the Court was not at liberty to
differ from and the 11m1-obstm1te clause in section
439(6) did not entitle the accused to go behind section
430 and to show cause against his conviction after
his appeal had been dismissed. The learned Chief
Justice followed the decision in Emperor v. Jorah!wi()
and observed that the only distinction between that
case and the one before him was that that case had
been heard on the merits and not summarily dismissed. But in his view that distinction was not one
of principle. We are of the opinion that tht order
which had been pronounced by the Court of Appeal
on the 9th June 1930 was not a judgment of the High
Court which rcpbccd th~it of the lower Court and
(I) [1926] I.LR. 50 Bom. 783.
(2) [1930] 32 Bom. LR. 12s0.
146
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
1955
even though it might come within the description of
an order within the meaning of section 430 it was not
v.
a judgment within the meaning of the term set out
Stat~ of Bo11i~y
above and not being a judgment was no bar to the
Bhagwati J.
accused showing cause also against his conviction
when showing cause against the notice for enhancement. The matter was one falling within the category of case No. I noted above and it was open to the
accused even though his petition· of appeal from jail
was summarily dismissed under section 421 to urge
while showing cause against the notice of enhancement of sentence also to show cause against his conviction. This decision was therefore in our opinion
incorrect and the accused ought to have been heard
on the merits as to whether he should have been convicted or not.
U.J.S. Chopra
Emperor v. Ramachandra Shankarshet Urm•amei') was
a case where the High Court admitted the appeal and
at the same time issued a notice to the accused for
enhancement of sentence. The observations of MacLcod, J. in Emperor v. Mangat Nara11(') were followed
in spill! of the fact that they had been held obiter by
the Division Bench of the Court in Emperor v. Jurabhai('). Emperor v. JorabltaiCJ was also referred to and
it was held that it was neither necessary nor desirable for the High Court to issue a notice for enhancement of sentence at the time of admission of the
appeal. It was however observed that it was open
to consider the question of enhancement of sentence
after the appeal had been heard. If those observations were meant to convey that the question of enhancement of sentence could be considered after the
appeal had been disposed of and judgment was pronounced by the High Court we do not agree with the
same. But if they were meant to convey th~t the
High Court could hear the accused on the question of
enhancement of the sentence at the same time when
his appeal was heard, before pronouncement of the
judgment on the question of the conviction and the
(I) fl9J2l )5 Jlom. L.R. 174.
(2) [19241 27 Il<•m. L.R 355.
(3) [1926) i.L.R. 50 Bom. 783.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
sentence passed upon him,
order.
they were
147
perfectly in
The decision in Emperor v. lnderchandC) extended
the principle enunciated in Emperor v. Jorabhai(') further by applying it to a case where an application for
revision by the accused against his conviction and
sentence had been dismissed by the High Court. In
that case the accused· had filed an application for
revision which was summarily dismissed by the Vacation Judge on the, 30th April, 1954. After such summary dismissal of the application the Government
filed the criminal revision application for enhancement of sentence. The Division Bench held that the
criminal revision application of the accused having
been fully disposed of by the learned Vacation Judge
there was a valid order of dismissal,. that section 430
debarred the accused from having that order of dismissal reviewed by the High Court that the right
conferred by section 439(6) could not give an accused
person a right to be heard against his conviction if
such a right was in conflict with the other provisions
of the Code, that under section 369 the Court had
no power to alter the decision of the learned Vaca·tion Judge dismissing the revision petition filed by
the accused and that if the accused had already unsuccessfully exercised his right of appeal or revision
to the High Court he was not entitled in a subsequent
application by the Government for enhancement of
sentence to ask the High Court to go once more into
the merits of the case and to set aside the conviction
which the same Court had previously confirmed either
in appeal or on a revision application. Divatia, .J.
was conscious of the somewhat anomalous position
so far as the accused was concerned and referred to
the observations of the Court in Emperor v. Babu
Pandurang Mhaske(') where it was stated and rightly
that where the High Court itself wanted to enhance
the sentence, in order that the accused might have
the right to challenge his conviction before the same
bench which was hearing either the appeal or the
( 1)
[1934] 36 Bom. L.R. 954.
3
( )
[I 934] 36 Born. L.R. 382.
(') ff 926] I.LR. 50 Born. 783.
1955
U.J.S. Chopm
v.
Staf'e of Bomb{,y
BharwariJ.
148
1955
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1955]
application for enhancement, it was proper that the
application for enhancement should be heard before
v.
the appeal was finally decided, so that the accused
Stat~ of Bo1nhay
might he heard at the very time when the auesBhagwati J.
tion of enhancement was before the Court. While
approving of these observations the learned Judge
however observed that it was possible only in a
case where the High Court itself wanted to enhance
the sentence and gave notice to the accused and
n~t so in a case where Government approached the
High Court by way of a revisional application as
it was entitled to do under section 439(1 ). Government might approach the High Court in revision
under section 439( I) at any time within six months
after the decision of the lower Court and in the
meanwhile the accused might have come to the
High Court and his
application
might have
been rejected. That might result in this that the
conviction might be confirmed by one Bench or a
single Judge as might happen in a particular case and
the application for enhancement might be heard by
another Bench. But, so far as the provisions of the
section were concerned, whatever might be the
anomaly in this procedure, the learned Judge did not
think that the inconvenience or hardship to the
accused should lead the Court to construe section 439
of the Criminal Procedure Code in a manner which,
according to the view of the learned Judge, was not
intended by the Legislature. These observations
however did not take count of the fact that if a petition of appeal or a criminal revision application filed
hv the accused was dismissed summarily or in !imine
tl;ere was no question of a judgment of the High
Court replacing that of the lower Court and the order
of the High Court merely amounted to a refusal by it
to interfere either in the exercise of its appellate or
revisional jurisdiction which order though final and
not being susceptible of review or revision by the High
Court itself, did not amount to a judgment of the
High Court barring the application of section 439(1)
of the Criminal Procedure Code. In that event the
judgment of the lower Court not being replaced by a
U.J.S. Chopra
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
149
judgment of the High Court it could be the subject·
matter of criminal revision at the instance of the
Government in the matter of the enhancement of the
sentence and all the provisions of section 439 would
then come into operation. The High Court would be
bound then under section 439(2) to give an opportu·
nity to the accused to be heard in his defence before
the sentence passed upon him by the lower Court was
enhanced and the accused would under section 439(6)
be entitled in showing cause against the notice of
enhancement also to show cause against his conviction. This decision of the High Court therefore was
incorrect and the accused ought to have been
allowed in spite of the summary dismissal of his
application in revision to show cause against his conviction while showing cause against the notice for
enhancement.
One more decision of the Bombay High Court may
be referred to and that is Emperor v. Nandlal Chunilal
Bodiwafa('). That was a case where the Sessions
Judge of Ahmedabad had at the instance of the petitioner made a reference to the High Court recommending that the Additional Magistrate had no jurisdiction, power or authority to pass the order complained
against and that the High Court should quash the
same. On the reference coming before the High Court
the foHowing order was passed without issuing
notice :-"no order on this reference". The petitioner
thereupon filed a criminal revision application to the
High Court praying that the order of the Additional
District Magistrate be quashed. This revision application came for hearing before a Division Bench and
the Court requested the Chief Justice to constitute a
Full Bench to consider the following point:
"When on a reference made by the Sessions
Judge under section 438 of the Criminal Procedure
Code, a Division Bench of this Court passes an order
without issuing notice, viz., 'No order on this reference', whether the applicant at whose instance the
Sessions Judge made the reference is entitled to make
an application in revision to this Court in the same
) f1945] 48 Bom. LR. 41 (F.B.).
20-1' SCI/ND/82
\
1
1955
U.J.S. Chopra
v.
State of Bombay
Bhagwatl J.
150
1955
U.J.S. Chopra
State o}· Bombay
Bhagwati J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
matter, in view of the provisions of section 369 of the·
Criminal Procedure Code?"
The application was heard by a Full Bench and it
was contended on behalf of the petitioner that when
the High Court without issuing notice to the applicant disposed of the reference made by the Sessions
Judge by stating "no order on the reference" there
was no judgment given on the merits. The order of
the Court only meant that the Court would not allow
the matter to be brought before it on the recommendation of the Sessions Judge and merely disposed of
it on that view. If a mere order of disposal of a reference or revision application amounted to a judgment the party in whose favour a reference was made
by the Sessions Judge would be deprived of the right
he had of approaching the High Court in revision
against the order, if the Court disposed of the matter
in the manner it had done in that case. This argument was repelled by the Full Bench. It held that
section 369 of the Criminal Procedure Code debarred
the petitioner from making the criminal rev1s10n
application, that the order of the High Court passed
upon the reference amounted to a judgment within
the meaning of that term in section 369 of the Criminal Procedure Code and after it was signed it could
not be altered or reviewed in a subsequent application for revision and that even though the Division
Bench of the High Court passed the order "no
order on this reference" without issuing notice to the
applicant, the applicant in whose favour the Sessions
Judge made a reference was not entitled to make an
application in revision to the High Court in the same
matter. Even though this conclusion was reached by
the Full Bench they observed that they were not unaware that the applicant had a grievance that his
position had been worsened and not improved by the
Sessions Judge being in his favour, because if the recommendation of the Sessions Judge was turned down
without hearing the petitioner, as had happened in
that oase he was worse off, while if the Sessions
Judge would have been against him he could
have still applied to the High Court in revision
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
151
19SS
and got an opportunity to put his case before
the High Court. This was recognised no doubt U.J.S. Chopra
v.
as an anomaly but it was caused by the provision
of rule 26 of the Appellate Side Rules of the Bombay State of Bombuy
High Court which compelled a party to apply to a B/1agwati J.
lower revisional Court before applying in revision to
the High Court. This disability which the petitioner
suffered from was emphasised in that if the Sessions
Judge had dismissed his application he could then
have applied to and argued his case before the High
Court, but because the Sessions Judge was in his
fovour and had therefore got to make a reference to
the High Court recommending it to set aside the order
and because the High Court was not satisfied with the
reasons for the recommendation, and disposed of it
without issuing a rule, the petitioner was debarred
from urging his arguments before the High Court. It
might be that the reasons given by the Sessions Judge
for the recommendation might be weak or might be
insufficient, whereas the petitioner, if he appeared
might be able to urge cogent an<l sufficient reasons
for setting aside the original order. In spite of pointing out this disability the only recommendation which
was made by the Full Bench was that the Rule 26 of
the Appellate Side Rules should be properly amended
so as to issue notice to all the parties concerned when
a reference was made by a Sessions Judge recommending the setting aside of an order of the Trial
Court. We are of the opinion that the Full Bench
should not have stopped short at pointing out this
disability which the applicant suffered from but should
have gone further and held that the order passed by
the High Court on the reference, though final under
section 430 of the Crimmal Procedure Code was not a
judgment within the meaning of that term and therefore did not debar the applicant from making the
criminal revision application which he did under section 439(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. Such an
order did not amount to a judgment within the definition thereof given by the Full Bench itself which
was: "a judgment is the expression of the opinion of
the Court arrived at after the consideration of the
152
1955
U.J.S. ChlJPTa
v.
State of Bombay
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(19551
evidence and of the arguments" as pointed out eariier
in the course of this judgment. We are of the opinion
that this decision of the Bombay High Court was also
incorrect.
Bhagwatil.
Emperor v. Jorabhai(') was followed by the Lahore
High Court in Emperor v. Dhanala/('). In that case
a revision petition filed on a behalf of the convicted
person was dismissed after hearing counsel. Subsequently a report of the Sessions Judge was received
and the learned Judge who had dismissed the revision
petition issued a notice for enhancement of sentence
and the Court held that section 439(6) was meant to
give an accused person to whom a notice for enhancement was issued and who had not appealed or if no
appeal lay had not applied for revision of his conviction, an opportunity to question the correctness of
his conviction if it was proposed to enhance his sentence. But if a petition for revision against his conviction by a convict had been rejected by a Judge of
the High Court and a notice had subsequently been
issued to him to show cause why his sentence should
not be enhanced the convict was barred from showing
cause aginst his conviction and the fact that the previous order dismissing the revision was passed without
issuing notice to the opposite party made no difference
to the position. The Court also invoked the principle
of the finality of judgments and further held that the
words "unless he had already done so" though not
occurring at the end of the sub-section were to be
presumed to be implied from the ordinary presumption as to the finality of orders in criminal revision
proceedings. In arriving at this conclusion Addison, J.
observed:-
"In the present case there has been a judgment
of this Court on the very full revision application
brought by the convict. By that judgment the petition was dismissed and the conviction confirmed.
Under section 369. Criminal Procedure Code that judg1nent cannot be reviewed. It is a final judgment of
this Court. and in my opinion the provisions of sub<'1 fl926] l.L.R 50 B•. m. 7.<1.
(') [1928] J.L.R. 10 Lah. 241.
2 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
153
1955
section (6), section 439, do not give the convict another
opportunity in these circumstances to be heard as re- U J.s. Chopa
gards his conviction''.
Siate of"·Bombqy
There was no justification whatsoever for reading the
words "unless he had already done so" in the section
and the reasoning adopted by the learned Judge in
our opinon wrongly invested the order passed by the
High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction dismissing the application without issuing a notice
to the opposite party with the character of a judgment which could only be enjoyed by it if it had been
pronounced after a full hearing in the presence of
both the parties after notice issued to the opposite
party. Then the pronouncement of the High Court
would have been a judgment replacing the judgment
of the lower Court and not subject to the exercise of
any revisional jurisdiction under section 4390) of the
Criminal Procedure Code. Where the petition for revision against his conviction presented by the convict
had been rejected by the High Court in liminc the
order passed by the High Court did not tantamount
to a judgment which would debar the convict from
showing cause against the conviction when showing
cause against a subsequent notice for enhancement of
sentence issued by the High Court.
The learned Judge further observed:
"There appears to be no distinction between dismissing a revision petition in limine or after notice.
The judgment is in either case an effective and final
judgment of the Court. In this respect there is no
difference between a revision petition and a memorandum of appeal. ............. .In these circumstances I
can see no force in the argument that an order dismissing a revision petition without issuing notice is
different from an order after the issue of notice, or
that there is any distinction between a judgment of
this Court passed on the revision side and one on the
appellate side".
While agreeing with the observations of the learned
Judge that for the purposes of section 439(1)
there was no distinction between a judgment of
B/1qwaa J.
154
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
1955
the High Cour.t passed on the 'revision side 4nd one on
the
appellate side we are of the opinion that there is
U.J.S. Chopra
v.
a real distinction between orders dismissing a revision
Slate of Bo111hay
petition or a petition of appeal in /imine without issuBhagwati J.
ing notice to the opposite party and judgments pronounced by the High Court in the exercise of its appellate or revisional jurisdiction after a full hearing
in the presence of both the parties after the issue of
notice. The latter are judgments in the true sense of
the term which debar the exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court under section 439(1) of the
Criminal Procedure Code.
This decision of the Lahore High Court was however overruled by a Special Bench of that Court in
Emperor v. Atta Mohammad('). A criminal revision
application had been dismissed in limine and thereafter a notice for enhancement of sentence was issued
by the High Court. The decision of that Conrt in
Emperor v. Dhanalal(') following Emperor v. Jorublwi(') was cited as debarring the accused from showing cause against his conviction and Blacker, .I. before
whom the matter was argued in the first instance recommended a reference to a larger Bench and the
reference came up for hearing and Jina! disposal before a Special Bench of the Court. It was held that
the accused was entitled to show cause against his
conviction notwithstanding the fact that his petition
for revision of the order by which he was convicted
had already been dismissed in limine under section
435 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The question
whether an order under section 435 was a judgment
was discussed by Blacker, .J. while pronouncing the
judgment of the Special Bench. He referred to the
case of Dr. Hori Ram Singh v. Emperor(') above referred to and quoted with approval the observations
of Sulaiman, .J. that every order in a criminal matter
was not a judgment and that 'judgment' in the Criminal Procedure Code meant a judgment of conviction
or acquittal. Applying this definition the learned
Judge observed : (') [.19-nl I.L.R. 25 L:th. 391 (I' B.).
(") (1926) I.LR. 50 Born. 783.
(") 11928] I.LR. JO Lahore 241.
(') A.TR 1939 F.C. 43.
2S.C.R
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
155
"It will be seen that an order under section 435
can with difficulty be called a judgment. All that a
Judge does at this preliminary . stage is either to
send for the records of the lower Court with a view to
exaniining them under section 439(1) or to refuse to
do so. It is difficult to see how the latter qm possibly be called a judgment of conviction. When such an
order consists of the one word 'Dismissed' can it necessarily be taken as a judicial pronouncement that in
the opinion of the Judge the respondent was rightly
convicted upon the evidence? It seems to me that all
that it means is that the Judge sees no adequate ground
disclosed in the petition or on the face of the judgment
for proceeding further".
This reasoning in our opinion was quite sound. But
the learned Judge proceeded further to make a distinction between the summary dismissal of a petition
of appeal under section 421 and the summary dismissal of a criminal revision application under section
435 stating that the reasons for which the High Court
would summarily dismiss an appeal were very different from those for which it would refuse to interfere
in revision, and in the case of appeal it would only do
so when the material before it was sufficient to satisfy
it beyond any doubt of the accused's guilt, whereas,
on revision the High Court would not interfere merely
because it did not agree on every point with the
Court below, as long as the Courts below have come
to a reasonable decision on the evidence. This distinction in our opinion does not affect the position that
the order pronounced by the High Court dismissing
the petition of appeal or a criminal revision application in limine without issuing notice to the opposite
party is merely an order dismissing the same on the
ground that there is no prima facie case for interference of the High Court and does not amount to a
judgment pronounced by the High Court after full
hearing in the presence of both the parties which
only can debar the High Court from exercising its
revisional jurisdiction under section 439(1). Mr.
Justice Mahajan as he then was delivered a concurring
judgment but went a step further and observed that
19SS
U.J.S. Chopra
v.
State of Bombay
Bhagwa#J.
156
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1955]
1955
the true interpretation of section 439(6) was that it
gave
an unlimited right to the accused to whom a
U..l.S. Ch•pra
v.
notice
of enhancement was issued under section 439(2)
State of Bombay
to show cause against his conviction and the Judge
Bha,•·arl J.
was bound to go into the evidence with a view to find
for himself whether the conviction could be sustained. This right accrued to the convict on service
of notice of enhancement of sentence and could not
be negatived by anything that had preceded the issue
of that notice. It was the Judge hearing the enhancement petition who had to give an opportunity
to the convict to challenge his conviction before him
and to satisfy him that the conviction was unsustainable. That Judge could not substitute for his satisfaction the satisfaction of some other Judge in the
matter. It was a condition precedent to the passing
of a prejudicial order against an accused person that
he had another opportunity of establishing his innocence, even if he had failed to do so before. The
learned Judge rightly observed that an order made in
the exercise of an extraordinary discretionary jurisdiction, unless it be a .iudgment in rem, could not in
any way operate as a bar to the decision of the same
matter when it arose in the exercise of ordinary appellate jurisdiction, and that therefore an order dismissing a criminal revision application 'in limine
could not amount to a .iudgment of the High Court.
The learned Judge then invoked the principle of the
finality of judgments and observed: "On the other hand if the view be correct that
all orders passed in exercise of revisional jurisdiction
whether they be of dismissal of the petition in limine,
or otherwise take away the right of the convict to
challenge his conviction in view of section 369,
Criminal Procedure Code as in such cases a decision
given already cannot be altered or reviewed, then
I do not see how for purposes of enhancement of
• the sentence, the previous decision can be altered.
Any Judge deciding a petition for revision under section 43.:,( 11 must consider the propriety of the sentence as well as the propriety and legality of the conviction, and in my opinion he must be presumed to
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
157
have done so. If a previous decision on the question
of conviction bars the applicability of section 439(6),
it also bars the power to enhance the sentence. Once
it has been held that the sentence was proper, it cannot be enhanced. I have not been able to see the
ratio decidendi of the decisions which take the view,
that the question of enhancement of the sentence is
something distinct and separate from that of conviction, and that the question of the adequacy and pr0priety of sentence which comes before the court on a
petition for re\,ision presented by the accused is a
matter different from the matter of enhancement.
The Judge has to see if a proper sentence has been
passed before he decides the case, and the questicm
whether a sentence passed is adequate or inadequate
cannot be split up in two different compartments.
The question is only one of the quantum of punishment and such a question can only be decided but
once. Therefore in my view either there is no power
of re-revision in the High Court, in that case there is
no power to enhance the sentence on a separate petition made for the purpose; or there is such a power
in that case it is available to the Crown as well as to
the accused".
This reasoning again was in our opinion sound but
led only to the conclusion that there- was no power of
re-revision in the High Court and in that case there
was no power to enhance the sentence on a separate
petition made for the purpose. The learned Judge
therefore ought to have held that if the order dismissing the criminal revison petition in limine tantamounted to a judgment pronounced -by the High
Court it was not open to the High Court to issue a
notice· for enhancement of sentence subsequently
under section 439(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code.
Having held however that the order dismissing the
criminal revision application in limine was merely an
order and not a judgment pronounced by the High
Court and also having held that the High Court was entitled to issue a notice for enhancement of sentence
under section 439(] ), under those circumstances the
only logical conclusion to which the Court could come
21--8 SCI/ND/82
1955
U.J.S. Chopra
v.
State .ef BQmbay
Bhogwa!il.
158
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
1955
was that under section 439(6) the accused while showing cause against the enhancement of sentence was
v.
entitled also to show cause against his conviction.
State qf Bomba.v
Mr. Justice Mahajan confined his decision only to the
B'1111wati J.
case of a dismissal of a criminal revision application
in limine and left open the question whether a decision on the Appellate Side of the High Court would
bar the exercise of the right under section 439(6) inasmuch as no arguments were heard on the point. The
principle of this judgment in our opinion is not confined merely to cases where a criminal revision application has been dismissed in !imine but also extends
to cases where a petition of appeal whether presented
from jail or presented to the Court by the appellant
or his pleader has been similarly dismissed summarily
or in !imine without issuing notice to the opposite
party and also to cases of references made by the
lower Courts to the High Court where the High Court
has merely passed an order without issuing notices,
to any of the parties concerned-"no order on this
reference".
U J.S. Chopra
The Patna High Court in Ramlakhan Chaudhry v.
The King-Emperor(') followed both these dec.isions
Emperor v. Jorabhai(') and Emperor v. Dha11a!af(') in
holding that the dismissal of an appeal by the High
Court did not debar it from subsequently enhancing
the sentence in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction
after issuing notice to the accused. In that case an
appeal had' been dismissed after full hearing by the
High Court. At the hearing of the appeal however
the Court asked the counsel for the accused to show
cause why the sentence passed upon them should not
be directed to run consecutively thus in effect issuing
a notice for enhancement of the sentence. When the
matter came on for hearing it was contended on behalf of the accused that with the disposal of the appeal the Bench and indeed the High Court was functus
officio and had no jurisdiction to hear the matter at
all. This contention was repelled by observing that
the appellate judgment was not concerned with the
(I) [1931] I.L.R. 10 Pa'na 872.
(2) [1926] J.L.R. 50 Born. 783.
(3) (1928] I.L.R. 10 Lahore 241.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
159
question of enhancement of the sentence which only
arose in the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction and
the sentence to be revised and enhanced was the sen"
tence passed not by the High Court but by the Court
of Sessions. These observations run counter to the
observations of Mr. Justice Mahajan which we have
quoted above and ignores the fact 'that once the High
Court pronounced· its judgment in the appeal after
fuli hearing in the presence of both the parties
the j11dgment of the High Court replaced that of the
lowe1 Court and the High Court had thereafter no
power to issue a notice of enhancement of sentence
purporting to exercise the revisional powers vested in
it under section 439(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code
·which could be exercised only qua the judgments of
the lower Courts and not its own .iudgments.
The Allahabad High Court also in Emperor v.
Nauhar(') followed the decisions of that Court which
had approved of and followed Emperor v. Jorabhai(')
and repelled the contention which had been urged on
behalf of the accused that the application in revision
filed bv the Government for enhancement of their sentence "was inco)npetent, because their appeal from
their convictions had been dismissed by the Court and
it was not open to them again to show cause against
their convictions. The decisions above referred to were
held by the Court to be an authority for the proposition that the Court could under the circumstances
proceed to consider whether the sentence imposed
upon the accused should be enhanced, even though it
was not open to the accused to show cause against
their conviction. This decision was in our opinion not
correct for the simple reason that once the judgment
of the Appellate Court replaced that of the lower
Court it was not competent to the High Court to
issue H notice for enhancement of sentence in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under section 439(1)
and no question could therefore arise of the accused
being called upon to show cause why their sentence
should not be enhanced.
(I) I.LR. 1245 Allah:•bad 527.
(2) [1926 I I. LR. 50 B.im. 7~3.
1955
U.J.S. Clioprtt
"·
Stille ef Bombay
Bl1a1wd1i J.
160
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955)
The High Court of Rajasthan in The State v.
Bhawani Shankar(') tried to reconcile the various
sr 1 ,J·8 ba point~ of view above noted by laying stress on the
~ • __ •m Y aspect of the accused having ha.d an opportunity to
Bhagwali J.
5hovv cause against his conviction and it observed
that where an accused person had already been heard
and thus given an opportunity to show cause against
his conviction, whether it be in appeal or in revision
· and whether the dismissal was summary or on the
merits, he could not be heard against his conviction
a second time under section 439(6) as the principle of
finality of orders in criminal proceedings would apply.
But if the accused had not been heard at all and
given no opportunity to show cause against his conviction and his jail appeal had been dismissed under
section 421 of the Criminal Procedure Code, or his
revision had been dismissed without hearing, he was
entitled to ask the Court to hear him and th us allow
him to show cause against his conviction under section
43916). if a notice of enhancement was issued to him.
The real question however in our opinion is not
whether an opportunity has been given to the :accused
to show cause against his conviction at any time but
whether the High Court is entitled to exercise its
revisional powers under section 439( l) and issue a
notice of enhancement of sentence upon the accused.
If the accused had an opportunity of showing c<)use
dgainst his conviction either in an appeal or a criminal
revision application filed by him or on his behalf and
the conviction was confirmed on a full hearing in
the presence of both the parties after the issue of the
requisite notice by the Court to the opposite party
the judgment of the High Court would replace that
of the lower Court which judgment could not be
reviewed or revised by the High Court at all in exercise of its revisional powers under section 43911 l. If
however an order dismissing the petition of appeal or
criminal revision application or even a reference made
bv the lower Court was made dismissing the same sumn1arily or in limine without issuing notice to the
opposite party or the parties concerned it v;ould tanta1'155
u.J.s..cllorra
(ll J.L.R. [1952] 2 Rnjasihnn 716.
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
161
1955
mount to the High Court not entertaining any of
these proceedings on the ground that no prima f acie U.J.S.v.Chopra
.
case had been made out for the interference of the Stat~ of Bombay
Court. If such a prima facie case had Been made out B/iagwali J.
the High Court would admit the appeal or the revision
application or entertain the reference and hear the
matter fully in the presence of both the parties, ultimately pronouncing its judgment which would take
the place of the judgment of the lower Cqurt which
would certainly not be subject to the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under section 439(1) of the Criminal
Procedure Code. We are of the opinion that the conclus10n reached by the High Court of Rajasthan was
correct and the accused in that case was rightly
allowed by it to show cause against his conviction in
spite of his petition of appeal from jail having been
dismissed by it summarily, though we differ from the
reasomng adopted by the Court in reaching that conclusion. Section 439(6) gives the accused a right to
show cause against his conviction. It does not merely
give him an opportunity to show cause against the
same. The opportunity is given to him w show cause
against the enhancement of sentence under section
439(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code and once he
has got that opportunity, while showing cause against
the enhancement of his sentence he has a right to
show cause against his convictiou which right he can
exercise whether he had on an earlier occasion an
opportunity of doing so or not. The real test is not
whether the accused ha~ had an opportunity of showing cau~e agai~st his conviction but whether a judgment ot the High Court pronounced after a full hearing in the presence of both the parties after notice
issued in that behalf has replaced the judgment of the
lower Court. Jf the judgment of the lower Court is
so replaced there is no occasion at all for the exercise of the revisional powers under section 439(1) of
the Criminal Procedure Code. If however no such
judgment has replaced that of the lower Court the
Hiqh Court has got the power to issue a notice for
enhancement of the sentence and the accused lias, in
162
-SUPREl\IE COURT REPORTS
\
[1955)
spite of whatever has h~ppened in the past, while
showing cause against the notice of enhancement also
U.J. S. Chopra th
. ht to s h ow cause agamst
.
h.1s convICt10n.
. .
v.
e rig
State of Bombay__ The right which is thus conferred upon the accused
under section 439(6) cannot be taken away by having
Bhagu·atiJ.
resort to the principle of finality of judgments incor- porated in-section . 369 of the Criminal Procedure
Code. As _we have observed above that principle
comes into operation when ·once a judgment of thet
High Court has replaced that of the lower Court and
in those cases the High Court would not be competent tci review or revise its own judgment. The High
Court would also not be then entitled to issue any
notice for.enhancement of sentence in the exercise of
its revisional powers under section 439(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. - \Vhere however th-e High Court·_
in ·exercise of its revisional power over the judgments
of the lower Courts under section 439(1) issues a notice for enhancement of sentence and gives an opportunity to the accused of being heard either personally
or by pleader in his own defence under section 439(2)
the right which is given by section 439(6) to him also
to show cause against his conviction comes into existence and this right of his cannot be negatived by
having resort to the provisions of either section 369
or section 430 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Section
369 in terms provides, "save as otherwise provided
in this Code" and section 439(6) would be an otherwise provision which is saved by this non-obstante
clause appearing in section 369. · It is significant to
note that both these amendments, the one in section
369 and the other in section 439 were enacted by section II9 of Act XVIII of 1923 and the very purpose
. of these simultaneous amendments would appear to
be to effectuate the right given to the accused to show
cause ·against his conviction as enacted in section
439(6) of the Criminal Procedure Code. It may also be noted that the right which is thus
conferred on the accused under section 439(6) is not
an unlimited or unfettered right as observed by l\Ir.
Justice·- l\Iahajan in Emperor v. Atta .!tfohammad(').
1ass
(I) (1943] I.LR. 25 Lah. 391 (F.Il.).
•
.
-
l
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
163
In the case of trials by jury where an accused person
h<!s been convicted on the verdict of a jury and is
called upon under section 439(2) of the Criminal
Procedure Code to show cause why his sentence should
not be enhanced he is entitled under section 439(6) to
show cause against his conviction, but only so far as
section 423(2) of the Code allows and has not an unlimited right of impugning the conviction on the evidence. It has been held by the Allahabad High Court
in Emperor v. BlzishwanathC) that the combined efTect
of sections 43916) and 423(2) is to entitle the accused
to question the conviction by showing only that the
Judge misdirected the jury or that the jury misunderstood the law laid down by the Judge in hi~ charge.
A similar conclusion was reached by the majorit;.y
of the Judges in The Superintendent and Rememhrancer
of Legal Affairs, Bengal 'v. Jnanendra Nath Ghose &
Another('), where it was held that a person who had
been convicted on his own plea of "guilty" under
section 271 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, in
·showing cause against a notice for enhancement of
sentence, could only while showing cause against his
conviction attack the propriety or legality of sentence
but could not withdraw the plea of 'guilty' or go behind
such a plea as a confession of the facts charged.
There are no doubt two other judgments, one of
the Bombay High Court· in Emperor v. Ramchandra
Shankarshet Uravane(') and the other of the Rangoon High Court in Nga Ywa and another v. KingEmperor(') which appear to run counter to the ratio
decidendi of these decisions of the Allahabad and the
Calcutta High CourJs respectively but we are not called
upon to resolve that conflict if any. Suffice it so say that
the right which . is conferred on the accused of
sh0wing cause against his conviction under section
439<6l of the Criminal Procedure Code is a right which
accrues to him on a notice for enhancement of sentence being served upon him and he is entitled to exercise the same irrespective of what has happened in
the past unless and until there is a judgment of the
(1) T.L.R. 1937 Al!l1:ibad 308.
(3) [1932) 35 Bom. LR. 174:
(2) J3 Calcutta W.N. 509.
(4) [1934}1 L.R. 12 Rangoun 616.
1955
U J.S. Chopra
I/,
Sttne df Bombay
Bhagwa1 i J.
. ·•
'\
\ .
)
'. \
'''
164
SUPREME COURT .REPORTS
[1955]
•,
High Court already pronounced against his conviction
after a full hearing in the presence of both the parties
. u.!.s~~hoJ>ra on notice being issued by the High Court in that bestate of &mbay half.· This right of his is not curtailed by anything
contained in the earlier provisions of section 439 nor
BhagwatiJ.
by anything contained in either section 369 or section
·· 430 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
We are therefore of the opinion that the decision
reae,hed by the High Court of Bombay in the case
under appeal was wrong and must be reversed. We
accordingly allow the appeal and remand the matter
back to the High Court ofJudicatureatBombaywith .
a direction that it shall allow the Appellant to show
cause'against his conviction and dispose of the same
ticcording tq law.
· ·· · ·
· 1955
BY THE CouRT.-The appeal is allowed and the
order of the High Court of Bombay is .set aside, and
thematter is sent back to the High Court with a direction that it shall allow the appellant an opportunity
to show cause against his conviction and dispose of
the matter according to law.
.
1955
A}ril 6
l\IAHARAJ UMEG SINGH AND OTHERS
v.
THE STATE OF BOl\IBAY AND OTHERS.
[l\ImrnERJEA, C.J., DAS, BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA
·
AYYAR and JAFE~ lllIAM JJ.]
Bombay Merged Territories and Areas (Jagirs Abolition) Act, 1953
(Bombay Act XXXIX of 1954)-Whether ultra vires-Agreement of
Merger with, and letters of guarantee to, .Rulers of States by the G<YL. ernment of India-Clause 5 of the letters of guarantee-Scope-Legislative powers of States under Article iU6 of the Constiiution-Limita•
· tion• thereon-Article'363 of the Constitution-Bar to Courts' jurisdiction-Fundamental rights-Articles 14, 19(1)(/), 31(2) of Con·
stitution-Applicability in view of Article 81-A(2)(a). ·
·
·
Under Article 246(2) and (3) of the Constitution, the Legislature of a State has plenary powers to legislate with respect to
matters enumerated in Lists II and III of the Seventh Schedule to
~he Co11stitutio11.
The legislative competence of the State Legisl~·
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