JUGALKISHORE SARAF versus RAW COTTON CO. LTD.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 7 March 1955 | [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1369 | 1955 INSC 12
Key facts
- Decided
- 7 March 1955
- Bench
- SUDHI RANJAN DAS, NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI, SYED JAFFER IMAM
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 212/1954
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1369
- Neutral citation
- 1955 INSC 12
Text of the judgment
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1369
JUGALKISHORE SARAF
·1955
v:
111arch 7
1.
,.!
'
RAW COTTON CO. LTD.
[S. R.' DAs,' BHAGW4TI and· IMAM JJ.]
Code 'of Civil Pr6cedure (Act' V ~f 1908), s. 146; Order XXI,
rule 16-Debt transferred pending ·suit thereon-Decree not mentioned
in deed-Execution of decree-Application by transferee-Applicability .of, Or_det: XX!, rule .16 . and s. · 146-Equitable principles-:Transfer of Property, Act (IV ,of 1882), ss. 3, 5, 8. and 1~0.
-
H si. S filed a suit against th~ appellant for recovery of money
and during the. pendency of the .suit a document was executed on the
7th f'.ebruary, 1949,. wher~.by. H & S transferred to the respondents
all book and othe,r debts . due to them together with all. securities for
the debts and all other property to which they were entitled in connection with their ,.b:usiness. in. Bombay. One· of the book debts was
the subject matter of .the suit, but there was no mention in that
·docu~ent of the , sirit pr . th~ decree to. be passed in the suit.. The
respondents did. not .take. any .steps under Order XXII, rule 10, of
the Code of Civil Procedure. to get themselves substituted as plaintiffs
in the place of H. & S, but allowed the 'suit to be continued in the
name of .the original plaintiffs, and on the 15th December, 1949, a
decree was passed, in favoµr of H & S against the appellant. On the
25th April, 1951, the rcospondents filed 1n. the City Civil Court, Bombay, an application for execution of the decree under Order XXI,
rule· 11 of the Code, and a notice under Order XXII, rule 16 was
issued by the Court calling. upon H & S and the appellant to' show
cause why the decree' ~hould not be executed by the transferees, the
respondents. The appellant contended inter .alia that as the respondents were only the assignees of the debt which was the subjectmatter of .the suit .and not of the decree itself they were not entitled
to execute the decree. ·
· Held, that the respondents as the transferees of the debt which
was the subject-matter of the suit were entitled to make an application for execution of .the decree under section 146 of the Code of
Civil Procedure as persons claiming under the decree-holder.
The effect of the expression "save as otherwise provided In th'is
Code" contained in section 146 is that a person cannot make an
application under section 146 if other provisions of the Code are
applicable to it.
Per DAs and IMAM J)., BHAGWATI J. · dissenting.-Order
XXI, rule 16, by the first alternative, contemplates the actual trans"fer by an assignment in writing of a decree after it is passed
and while a transfer of or an agreement to transfer a decree that
may be passed in future may, in equity, entitle the transferee to
claim the beneficial interest in the decree after it is passed, such
1370
SUll!YEMii: C0URT REPORTS
[J1)55]
ren.4er
1955
equitable transfer does ;q.o~1
I ~he: ,1'a.ns.~ree 1 a transferee of the
]ugalkisho;e ·saraf decree by assignment in writing within the ffieaning of Order XXI,
v.
Raw Cotton
Co. Ltd.
+
rule 16.
·,
'.· , ,,. .· .. 1 ··~ ., 1 f. , ,
Per DAs J.-The transfer in writing of I property which is
the subject-matter of a su.it wi~o~t. in terms transferring the decree
passed or to be passed in the 'sUit does ndt entitle the' transferee to
apply £@r ·irxecution of the .decre~ .uqder Order._ ~XI,, ~ule ..l~, as a
a
tr;insferee. o~ the decree._Py .;in assignment in,Vfriting.
·
If :by ·reason· of any provision of law, st<~tu,tory or ·other\visc!,
interest in property passes from · one person .to another, ·. tliere is a
transfer of ·the property by oper.ition of law; There is no warrant
for confining transfers "by operation of law',' to the three cases of
de;:i.th, devolution or sutcession ·or' to transfers bY opera!ioh ·of statutory lJ.ws only. If the dOcurrient ·i_n question'; could be" ConStrued
to be .f transfer of or an .agfeement to transfer the· deCree ·to' be ·passed
iri future~ then on the decree beiD;g passed, by opetation Of·.equity,
the fespondellts would .become the 'trarisferees of the' dCcree ·by
operation of law within the mfaning of Order XXI, rule· i6.
'
Per BHAGWAT! ).-Section 5 Of the Transfer of Property Act
defines a "transfer of property" ·as ·an act by which the t'.t;insferor
conveys property in present or in future to the transferee or' transferees. The Words "in preserit ·or in future" qualify the ·word "conveys" and not the word ' 1pr'operty" in the. section. A' transfer o'f
property that is not in existence qperates as a coiltract to· be performed in the future v.~,hich may be Specifically' enforced as soon as
the property 'comes into existence. It is only by the operation oi
this equitable principle that as soOn as "the property comes int'o ex~st
ence and is capable of being identified, equity· taking as done that
which 'ought to be done, fasteris upon: the property and the contract
to assign becomes a compete equitable assignment. There is ·Iloihing in
the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure or any other law Which
prevents the operation of th~s equitable principle, and an assignment
in Writing of a decree to be passed in future would bCcome a ·complete equitable assignment on the decree being passed· and would fall
within the "assignment in writing" cc>qtemplated by : Order XXI,
rule 16 of the Code.
A mere transfer of property as such does not by itself spCU out
a transfer of a decree which has been passed or ·may be passed in
respect -of that property and it would require an assignm,ent of such
decree .in order. to effectuate the transfer. But where the pro~rty
is an actionable claim within the meaning of the definition in section 3 Of the Transfer of Propert}r Act and is transferred by lneans
of an instrument in writing, the transferee could by virtue Of section
130 of the .Transfer of Property Act step. into the shoes. of the
transferor .and· claim to be th~ transferee of the decree and apply for
execution of. the decree under Order XXI, rule 16 .of the Code of. Civil
Procedure.
Per IMAM;. J.~There ~Ust be· a decree 'irl .~xistence ~hic:h is
transfCrred before the tran'sferee" can benefit from 'the Provisions
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s:c.R.
Sl'.!PR'EME C<DURT. REP~RTS
:1371
<>f rule :16. The 01:dinary..and natural meaning i>'f the words·.of. •rule
1955
16 can oarry np other, interpretation and, the question of.a· strict. and Jugalkishore Saraf
.,,
narrow ip.~erpr~tation of .its pr<!Y~sion,s qoes. 1wt ~rise.. ' . ,
Case-law rev.lewed. ··
CrviL · · AP~ELLA'i'E.
No. 212 <?f 1$4,
1uRISDICoqON :
.
'
'Civil' . .·A.
' eal
,.PP
Appeal ftom· the Judgment· and Decree dated the
10th day of November 1953 of the High'· Court of
Judicature at· Bombay in Appeal No. 8 of · 1953 under
the Letters ·Patent, against · the ·decree dated · tlte 23rd
day of September 1952 of the said High . Court in Appeal No. 67 of 1952 from Original Decree arising out
of Order dated the 20th November 195~ of the City
Civil Court, Bombay, in Summary Suit No. 233 of
1948.
R. Subramania Iyer and K. R. Choudhry, for the
:appellant.
H. /. Umrigar, /. B. Dadachanji and Rajinder
Narain, for the respondent.
1955. March 7. The following Judgments were
delivered. ·
...
DAs J.-The facts leading up to this appeal are
few and simple. Two persons named Mahomedali
Habib and Sakerkanoo Mahomedali Habib used to
carry on business as merchants and pucca adatias in
bullion and cotton at Bombay under the name. and
style of Habib & Sons. In .1948 that firm instituted
a suit in the Bombay City Civil Court, being Summary Suit No. 233 of 1948, against the present appellant Jugalkishore Saraf, a Hindu inhabitant carrying
on business at Bombay, for. the recovery of Rs.
7,113-7-0 with interest at 6 per cent. per annum said
to be due by him ·to the firm in respect of certain
transactions in gold and silver effected by the firm as
pucca adatias. On the 7th Febmary, 1949 when that
summary suit was stiU pendii;ig a document was
exe~uted whereby it. was agreed that the two partners
would transfer ·and Messrs Raw Cotton Company,
Limited, (hereinafter called the, respondent company)
Raw Cotlmt
Co. Ltd.
1372
1955
Jugalkishore Saref
v.
Raw Cotwn
Co. Ltd.
Das
SUPREME q!)URT REPORTS
[1955}
would accept the transfer of, inter alia, all. book and,
other debts due to them in connection with their business in Bombay and full benefit of all securities for
the debts and all other property to which they were
. entitled in connection with the said business. The respondent company did not take steps under, 0. XXII, r.
10 of the Code of Civil Procedure to get themselves substituted as plaintiffs in the place and stead of Habib
& Sons, the plaintiffs on record, but allow.ed the suit
to be continued in the name of the original plaintiffs.
Evidently, the two partners migrated f,rom India to
Pakistan. and their properties vested in the. Custodian
0£ ·Evacuee Property. On the 15th December 1949 a
decree .was passed in the summary suit for the sum of
Rs. 8,018-7-0 for the debt and interest and the sum of
Rs. 410 for costs of the suit, aggregating to Rs.
8,428-7-0, and for further interest . at 4 per cent. per
annum from the date of the decree until paymertt.
Habib & Sons being the plaintiffs on record the decree
was passed in their favour.
·
On the 11th December 1950 the Custodian of Evacuee Property, _Bombay, informed the respondent mmpany that by an order made on the 2nd August·H50
the Additional Custodian of Evacuee Property had
confirmed "the transaction of transfer" of the business
of Habib & Sons to the respondent company.
On or about the 25th April, 1951 the· respondent company presented before the Bombay City Civil Court a
tabular statement purporting to be an application for
execution under Order XXI, rule 11 of the Code of
Civil Procedure. In the last column of the tabular
statement, under the heading "Th~ mode in which
the assistance of the Court is required", the respondent company prayed that the Court ''be pleased tc,>
declare the Applicants the assignees of the decree as
the decretal · debt alc,>ng with c,>ther debts hatl been
transferred by the plaintiffs to the Applicants by
a deed of assignment dated the 7th February 1949
which was confirmed by the Custodian of Evacuee
Property, Bombay, and order them to be substituted
for the plaintiffs". There was, in that column,. no (
specific~tion of any of the modes in which the assist-""
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S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1373
ance of the Court might be required as indicated in
clause (j) of Order XXI, rule 11 of the Code. On the 10th
May 1951 the Bombay City Civil Court issued a notice
under Order XXI, rule 16 of the Code to Habib & Sons,
who were the decree-holders on record, and Jugalkishore Saraf, who was the defendant judgment-debtor,
requiring them to show cause why the decree passed in
the suit on the 15th December 1949 in favour of the
plaintiffs and by them transferred to the respondent
company, should not be executed by ·the said transferees against the said defendant judgment-debtor.
The defendant judgment debtor showed cause by
filing an affidavit affirmed by him on the 15th June
1951. Amongst other things, he denied that the document in question had been executed or that the document transferred the decree to the respondent company.
The matter was tried on evidence and the execution
of the document was proved by the evidence of an attesting witness which has been accepted by the executing Court. The executing Court, however, rejected
the second contention and made the notice absolute
with costs and gave leave to the respondent company
to execute the decree against the judgment-debtor. The
judgment-debtor filed an appeal before the High Court.
The appeal was heard by Dixit, J. Before him the execution of the document was not challenged and nothing
further need be said about that. The only substantial question raised was whether the respondent company were the transferees of the decree within the
meaning of Order XXI, rule 16. The learned Judge
answered the question in the affirmative on the
authority of the decisions of the Bombay High Court
in Purmananddas f ivandas v. V allabdas W allji ( 1 ) and in
Chimanlal Hargovinddas v. Ghulamnabi(2) and affirming the order of the executing Court dismissed the
appeal. The judgment-debtor preferred a Letters
Patent Appeal before the High Court which was dismissed by Chagla, C.J., and Shah, J., following the
two earlier decisions mentioned above. They, however,
[1877] I. L. R. 11 Bom. 506.
I.L.R.[19°46]Bom. 2;6.
13-90 S. C. India/59
(1)
'(2)
1955
Jugalkishore Saraf
v.
Raw Cotton
Co. Ltd.
DasJ.
1374
1955
'Jugalkishore Saraf
v.
Raw Cotton
Co. Ltd.
SUPREME COURT .REPORTS
[1955]
•granteil, under article 133(1) (c) ·of the Constitution, a
certificate of fitness for appeal to this Court. The
prillcipal .question mged before us is as to' whether the
·respondent company .can .claim to be 'the· 'transferees
CJf ·the decree within .the meaning of Order XXI, rule
16 of .the .Code of Civil Procedure.
Order XXI, rule 16 of ·the Code of Civil Procedure,
.omitting the local ·amendments which are not material
for our .present purpose, ·provides :"16. Where a ilecree or, if a 'decree has been
passed jointly in favour .CJf two or more persons, the
interest of any .decree-holiler in the decree is transferred
by assignment in writing or by operation of law, ·the
transferee may apply for execution .of the decree to
the Court which passed it ; and the decree may be executed in the same manner and subject to .the same
conditions as if the application were made by such
decree-holder.
Provided that, where the decree or .such interest
·as aforesaid, has .been transferred by assignment,
notice <Of ,such application shall be given · to the transferor and the judgment-debtor, and the decree shall
not be executed until the Court has heard their objections {if any) to its execution :
Provided ·also that, where a decree for the payment •of money against two or more persons has 'been
ttansforred to . one of them, it shall not be executed
against the others".
The first thing that strikes the reader is the sequence
of events contemplated by this rule. It postulates,
first, that a decree has 'been passed and, secondly,
that that decree has been transferred (i) by assignment in writing 0r (ii) by operation of law. The cardinal rule of construction of statutes . is to read the
statute literally, that is by giving to the words used
rby the legislature their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. If, however, such a reading leads to
absurdity and the words are susceptible of another
meaning the Court may adopt the .same. But'if no
such alternative construction is possible, 'the Court
must adopt the ordinary rule of li~era1 interpretation.
In the present case a literal construction · of the rule
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S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT R~PQ;RTS
1375
leads to no apparent absurdity and, therefore, there
can be no compelling reason for departing from that
golden rule of construction. It is quite plain that if
Order XXI, rule 16 is thus construed the respondent
company canot possibly contend that ¢e the decree
now sought to be executed by them wa$, after ,.its
passing, transferred to them by. an assignment ir:t writing within the meaning of that rule, for the document
in question was' executed .on the 7th February 1949
but the decree was passed subsequently on die 15th
December 1949. Whether they can claim to have
become the transferees of the decree after it was
passed by operation of Jaw within the meaning of
this rule or to have otherwise become entitled to
the benefit of it is a different matter which will be
considered later on. For the moment it is enough
to say that there .had been no transfer of the decree
to the respondent company by any assignment in writing executed after the decree was passed, as contemplated and required by Order XXI, rule .16. Indeed,
Dixit, J. conceded"If the language of Order XXI, rule 16 is striCtly
construed, it seems to me that the Respondents have
no case".
And so did Chagla, C.J., when he said" .... and it is perfectly clear that if one were to
construe rule 16 strictly there is no assignment of the
decree in favour of the first respondent".
The learned Chief Justice, like Dixit, J., however,
departed from the rule of strict or literal construction
as they felt pressed by the fact that the Bombay
High Court had consistently taken the view that there
might be an equitable assignment of a decree which
would constitute the assignee an assignee for the purpose of rule 16 and that what the Court must consider
is not merely a legal assignment but also an assignment which operates in equity. The equitable principle relied upon by the Bombay High Court is what
had been enunciated by Lord Westbury in Holroyd v.
Marshall(1) in the following words:
(1) [1862] 10 H.L.C. 191, 2rn, 211.
1955
Ju,galkishore ·Saraf
v.
Raw Cotton
Go. Ltd.
Das].
1376
1955
Jugalkishore SaraJ
v.
Raw Cotton
Co.Ud.
Das].
SUPREME cou1tr REPORTS
[1955]
"It is quite true ·that a deed which professes to·
convey property which is not in existence at the time
is as a conveyance void at law, simply because ·there
is· nothiiig to convey. So in equity a contract which
engages to transfer ·property, which is not in existence,
cannot operate as an immediate alienation merely
because there is nothing to transfer.
But if a vendor or mortgagor agrees to sell or
mortgage property, real or personal, of which he is
not possessed at the time, and he receives the consideration for the contract,. and afterwards becomes
possessed of property answering the description in
the contract, there is no doubt that a Court of Equity
would compel him to perform the contract, and that
the contract would, in equity, transfer the beneficial
interest to the mortgagee or purchaser immediately
on .the property being acquired. This, of course, assumes that the supposed contract is one of that class
of which a Court of Equity would decree the specific
performance".
The
same principle was thus reaffirmed by Jessel,
M.R., in Collyer v. Isaacs('):
"A man can contract to assign property which is
to come into existence in the future, and when it has
come into existence, equity, treating as done that
which ought to be done, fastens upon that property,
and the contract to assign thus be.comes a complete
assignment".
Applying the above principles to the facts of the
instant case the High Court came to the conclusion
that the document of the 7th February, 1949, on a
proper reading of it, constimted an assignment of the
decree. The reasoning, shortly put, is : that on a true
construction the document in question amounted to a
transfer of the decree that was expected to be passed
in the pending suit, that as the decree . was not in
existence at the date of the document it operated as
an agreement to transfer the decree when it would be
passed, that such an agreement could be enforced by
.~ suit for specific performance as indicated by the
(1) L. R. 19 Ch. D. 342, 351.
{
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s.c.R.
•4
)
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
.
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1377
Privy Council in Raja Sahib Perhlad v. Budhoo(1),
that as .soon 'as a decree was passed equity, treating
as done what ought to be done, fastened upon the
decree and the agreement for transfer became .. the
transfer of the decree and the transferee became a
transferee of the decree within the meaning of Order
XXI, rule 16. It is to be noted that to attract the application of this equitable principle there must be an
agreement to transfer the decree to be passed in
future. As soon as the decree is passed equity fastens
upon it and, by treating as done what · ought to be
done, that is by assuming that the transferor has executed a deed transferring the decree to the transferee
as in all conscience he should do equity regards. the
transferee as the beneficial owner of the after-acquired
decree. The equitable principle we are considei:ing
only implements or effectuates the agreement of the
parties. This equity ·does not, however, take upon
itself the task of making any new agreement for the
parties either by filling up the lacuna or gap in their
agreement or otherwise. If, therefore, there is no
agreement between the parties to transfer the future
decree the equitable principle referred to above cannot come into play at all. In order, therefore, to test
the propriety of the application of this equitable
principle to the facts of the present case we have to
enquire whether there was here any agreement between the parties to transfer the decree to be passed
in the then pending suit. This necessarily leads us
to scrutinise the terms of the document in question
and ascertain its true meaning and import.
No point has been taken before us that the document of the 7th February 1949 is only an executory
agreement and not a deed of transfer. Indeed, the
argument has proceeded before us, as before the
Court below, that the document in question ·1s a
completed . deed of transfer. This relieves us of the
task of closely examining the. form of. the document.
For our present purpose we have, therefore, only to
consider what properties were covered by the document. The High .Court has. held that the decree to be
(1) [1869) 12 )\,{. I. A. 275; 2 B.L.R. 111.
1955
:Jugalkishbre Sarqf
v•
.Raw Cotton
co. Ltd.
Das :J.
1378
·~:;:;
JugDJ!cisho;:e ·sara.f
v.
Raw CottOn
Co. £td,
Das];
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
pas~ed was also indutlecl 'in this document. The reasonmg appears to be' this. : Clause f of the 'document
comprised six several · items · of proprieties. Each of
these items referred to' '.'the•' said'. Iridian business".
The Fourth· .item was "All' the book and other debts
due"to the vendors in cciri'n'edion' with' the' said Indian
business and the foll'. benefits of· all' securities for the
debts". and· the'last ap.d. residuary' item· was' "All other
property', to w)iich the vendors · are' ·entitled iri connection ·with' the··sliid' Indian business". ·One' of the·
book debts was the siibject:matter' .of the pending suit.
The decree that the· pl~iritiff ·· woiild obtain · in that
suit \Yould, therefore, .be propertf or· 'right ''.in connection with the! said Indian b'usiness". Therefore, as
they were transferring all ·property' · in 'connection· with
their :business ·they .must have intended to transfer the
foture · decree als'o. Therefore, it must Ile· regarded as
cove'red · by the dod1mem: · I am unable· to accept this
lirie of reasonirig. 'It cannot' be" overlooked that there
was' ho mention. in that .docilmenf of any suit or
decree: to be' passed in that suit · as · one would have
expected if . t~e parties . really . intended to transfer
the foture decre.e · also. Ih this connection it · is significant" that the·· ~esiduary item covered· "All properties
to wl\.ich the' vendor{ dre' erititled"' arid not all pri>perties' to · which they might iri' foture become entitled.
Reference. may :ilso be'. niade to the provisions of the
Transfer · of Property Act: Under' section 8 of that
Act tlie trarisfe:r of property' passes· to the transferee
all the· int:'eresr which the transferor . is then· capable
of passing in the propert'y · :ind · in· the ·· ·1egal
incidents · thereof; and if d1e property transferred is
a debt ·or actionable ••clafoi, also the ·securities therefor. It• is• urged" that· a·s ·.•the respondent ·company
thus becanie entitled, by' ·VirtUe·• of· this document read
in· the "light• of section 8; to all the rights and· remedies
iricluding the right··· ·to prosecute the pehdihg suit' and
to• obtain' a-' decree· the•.: decree that was eventually
passed>" autortiatie:i.lly add immediately upori...its passing 'mu~t be taken ·as having been •transferred ·by ·this
very. dotumemi.: ·This' I 1arguthent ilppear~~ tci . me" to
really amount to a beg'gihg · of the quesrioh. The
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1379
transfer· of the debt passed' all the interest which the
transferors were then capable of passing in the . debt
and in the· legal incidents thereof. There was then
no decree in existence and, therefore, the transferors
could not then pass. any ·interest in the non-existing
decree. Therefore, section 8 of the Transfer of Property Act does · not assist the respondent .company
Upon the assignment of the debt the respondent company undoubtedly became entitled· to get themselves
substituted- under Order. XXII,, rule 10 as plaiiltiffs in
the pending suit but they. did not choose to do so and·
allowed the transferors. to continue the. _suit and a·
decree to be passed in their favour. The true . position, therefore, is that at the date of the transfer of
the debt to the. respondent company the transferors
could not transfer the decree, because. the decree did
not exist. On a true construction of the document
the transferors' agreed only to transfer,. besides.. the
five items. of spectified properties, ·"All other properties
to which· the .vendors .are entitled", that is to• sav, all'
properties to· which at the ·date of the docoment: they
were en'titled. At the date of the document they had
the right· to proceed with the · suit and to get · such
relief as the . Court by its decree. might award but no.
decree had yet been passed in that suit and, therefore,
property to which they- -were then entitled could.· not
include any decree that might in• future be passed. It
is significant that there was, in the document, no provision purporting in terms to· transfer· any ·. ·future
decree. Section 8 of · the Transfer of· Property· Act
does not operate to pass any future · property; .. for that
section .passes all interest which the transferor can
then, i.e., at the date of the transfer, pass. There was
thus no agreement for .transfer and much less a transfer of a future decree oy this. document. All that W{lS
done by the transferors by . that document was to
transfer ·only the properties . mentioned in clause 1
together •With ·all .·legaL ·incidents and· remedies. 'The
properties·. so». transferred .. included book debts. A book
debt which was·· made: the. subject-matter 0f: the. pend"
ing suit did not, for that reason, c:ease to. be a. book
debt and, therefore, it was also transfei:'red '. ·bur no
1955
:fogalkishore Saraf
v •.
Raw Cotton
Co. Ltd.
Das]:
1380
1955
Jugalkishor1 Saraf
v.
Raw CotW'fl
Co. Ltd.
Da,J.
SUPRE.ME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
decree to. be passed in respect of that book debt was
in terms transferred. In such a situation. there was
no room or scope for the application of the equitable
principle at all. The transfer in writing of a property
which is the subject-mater· of a suit without in terms
transferring the decree passed or to be passed in the
suit in relation to that ·property does not entitle . the
transferee to apply for execution of the decree as a
transferee of the decree by an assignment in writing·
within the meaning of Order XXI, or 16 See Hansrai
Pal v. Mukhrai Kunwar( 1 ) and Vithal v. Mahadeva (').
In my judgment the decree was not transferred or
agreed to be transferred to the respondent company
by the document under consideration and the latter
cannot claim to be transferees of the decree by an
assignment in writing as contemplated by Order XXI,
rule 16.
• The matter, however, has been argued before us at
length on the footing that the decree had been transferred or . agreed to be transferred by this document
and therefore, the equitable principle came into play
and that as .soon as the decree was passed the respondent company became the transferees of the decree
by assignment in writing within the meaning of Order
XXI, rule 16., As considerable legal learning has been
brought to bear on the question of the application of
the equitable principle and its effect on the prior
written agreement and as the different decisions of
the High Court are not easily reconcilable, I consider
i: ;·i;·.ht to record my views on that question.
I shall, then, assume, for the purposes of this part
of the argument, that the document of the 7th February 1949 was a completed deed of transfer covering
the decree. to be passed in future in the then pending
suit. Under the Transfer of Property Act there can
be no transfer of property which is not in existence
at the date of the transfer. Therefore, the purported
transfer of the decree that might . be· passed in future
could only operate. as a contract to transfer the decree
to be performed in future;, i.e., . after the. passing of the
(1) [1908] I. L. R: 30 All. 28.
(2) [1924] 26 Bo"1· L.R. 333.
. '-Ir
..
-
S.C.R.
•,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1381
1
decree. The question then arises : What is the effect
955
of the operation of the equitable principle on the Juga/kishore Saraf
decree as and when it is passed? Where there is a ' Raw vCotton
contract for the transfer of property which is not in
Co. Ltd.
existence at the date of the contract, the intending
DasJ.
transferee may, when the property comes into existence, enforce the contract by specific performance,
provided the contract is of the kind which is specifically enforceable in equity. It is only when the
transferor voluntarily executes a deed of transfer as
in all conscience he should do or is compelled to do
so by a decree for specific performance that the legal
title of the transferor in that property passes from
him to the transferee. This transfer of title is brought
about not by the prior agreement for transfer but by
the subsequent deed of transfer. This process obviously involves delay, trouble and expenses. To
obviate these difficulties equity steps in again to short
circuit the process. Treating as done what . ought to
be done, that is to say, assuming that the intending
transferor has executed a deed of transfer in favour
·of the intending transferee immediately after the property came into existence, equity fastens upon the
after-acquired property and treats the beneficial interest therein as transferred to the intending transferee.
The question for consideration is : Is this transfer
brought about by the earlier document whereby the
property to be acquired in future was transferred or
agreed to be transferred ? In other words, can it be
said, in such a situation, that the after-acquired property had been transferred, proprio vigore, by the
earlier document? Does that document operate as an
assignment in writing within the meaning of Order
XXI, rule 16? Learned counsel for the respondent
company contends that the answer to these questions
must be in the affirmative. He relies on several cases
to which reference may now be made.
. In Purmananddas Jivandas v. Vallabdas Wallji
(supra) the facts were these. In May 1859 one R
died leaving his properties to executors in trust for
the appellant. In August 1868 the execl,ltors filed , a
suit in the Original Side of the Bombay High Court
1382
•955
;JUgal/dshore· Sara:.
v.
Raw
Co. Cottiln
Ltd.
Das]i
SUFREME COURTi REPORTS
[1.955]:
against Luckmidas· Khimji• for recovery of mtmey lent
to him as manager of Mahajan Wadi. During the
• pendency ·of. the: suit,. the. executors on the 11th May
1870 assigned · in· very wide and general terms all the
properties of the: testator to the· appellant including
·'all movable. property,. debts claims and things. in
action· whatsoever vested in them as such. executors" ..
The. appellant ·was not . .brought on the record bµt the
suit proceeded. in the ·name of.. the executors; On · the
23rd January· 1873 a decree was · passed for the.
plaintiffs on• the ,, record; i.e.. the . executors; for Rs.
31,272-13-5 which .:was made a. first· charge on: .the
Wadi properties. · The appellant. thernupon• ·applied
for execution. "0£ ·the:· decree -under -.seGtion 232 of the
Code· of 1882 ·(con-esponding .t-0 · our Order. XXl, rule.
16), as' transferee of the. decree. The Chamber Judge
dismissed the application·.. Qn appeal Sargent,. C.J ..,. and
Bayley;. J., . held· that the appellant was competent. to.
maintain the application. After ·pointing:- 011.t that .the
assignment .was in the. most general .terms, Sargent,.
C.J.,·. observed.:~: ·
·" .... : .. .•: .- .. , .. •.:·....and the effect of this assignment.
was, in.. ·equity,,.•to vest in Purmananddas the whole
interest in· .the• decree -which . was afterwards ·,obtained.
But ·it has been suggested that Purmananddas .. is not
a transferee · of.· the- decree .under section. 232 of the
Civil Procedure Code,. because· the decree has. nat. been
transferred to him "by assignment in writing or by
operatian of law", ··and: that, therefore, he is not entitled to apply ·for execution.. There. is no doubt that,
in:· a· Court. of equity, -in .England -the decree . would be
regarded-. as assigned· to' Purmanartddas, and. he would
be .-allowed to· proceed in exerntion in.. the -name of the
assignors. Here there is· ·no distinction between· "law"
and ...'~equity";· and by the expression . 1by ... operatiou of
law'. tnust. ·be, understood .the ,operation: of law as
administered in these Coufts. We ·think : under , the
circumstances .that we must hold that this...decree has
been. transferred .. to ,Furmananddas.. 'by operation- . of
law''\... --· ,,. ·· ,,1 ·
"'
•,P• ,, .,'
Th~" -'last , ·sentence i:n the ·abo'Ve · 'qu6tati6n;" ·.standing
by•· ·."ihdf;' i ·'quitei ·"'dearly indic'aii!s •"tfo1r• 'the learned
q..
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT :REPORTS
1383
Chief')ustice ·was of the view that as the benefit of
the decree became available to tlic:; appellant by operation of the equitable principle it had to be held that
the decree had been transferred to the · appellant "by
operation of law" rather than by ' an assignment in
writing and that is how it was understood by the_ reporter who framed' the head-note. The learned ' Chief
Justice, however, immediately after that last sentence
added:··
"In the present 'case 'the· decree has been transferred by an· ·assignment in .· writing as construed in
the~e · Courts".
This senteace . prima f acie appears to be somewhat inconsistent with the sentence immediately preceding
and it 1has. given rise t<,> a good. deal of co~merits . in
later ,cases .. The learned. Chi.ef Justice has no.t referred
to any case . in which . the Bombay . High Court had
adopted ' such a constructfon.
'
'', '
Th~. case' 0£ A~~nd~ .Af.ohon Roy v. Pro~oiha . Nath
Ganguli-( 1 ) . follows . µie· decision of the Bombay High
Court in . Purmanan;ddas Tivandas v. Vallabdas W allji
(supra). It sliould be : noted, . however, that, in.· this
Calcutt.a \,'.ase the decree was . obtained and . the transfer was ,tµade on the' same day and it' was held that
though there was .no :J,Ssignment of the decree in so
many, words the property with all ;irrears of rent having . been , assigned to the mortgagee simultaneously
with the passing. of the <decree .th,e assignment p"ssed
the decree also.
·\
The case• of Chimanlal Hargovinddas v. Ghulamnabi {supra)· has been strongly relied upon. In that
case a ·shop was ·held by A· and B as •tenants-inc
common. In May 1936 A agreed to sell· his half. share
to C. As per arrangement A· filed a partition· suit on
the 16th January ·1937 to recover his share·.- The - disputes' in the suit were referred to arbitration· by order
of ·Court and eventually the umpire ·made hiS award
on· the 16th January 1939 declaring that · A· was• entitled1 to; a half share. .A then; on -·the· · 7th· March,
1939; stild'-ali· his riglits ;under the award (which1 was
· f1) [ig2b] 25 c.W.'N.'a63; A.1.R. '19~1 ea1. 14~·
' ' •' ·" · '· ··
19,55
Jugalkishore Saraf
v.
Raw Cotton
Co.Ltd.
Das].
1384
'955
."J?Jgo/Jcishor~ Saraf
v.
Raw Cotton
Co. LJd.
-.
Das
SUPREME COURT. REPORTS
.
'
[_1955]
called a decree) to C by a registered deed. C did not
apply for substitution of his name on the· recoid of
the suit. The Court passed a decree upon the. award
on the 1st September, 1939. On · the 24th November
1939 C applied ·for execution of the decree. Ii: was held
that C was entitled to execute the decree under Order
XXI, rule 16, for what had been transferred to him was
not merely A's half share in the property but all his
rights under the award including the right to .take a
decree. In this case, having regard to the terms of
the previous agreement and the fact that the parties
were treating the award as a decree the intention was
quite clear that by the subsequent deed of sale both
the award and the decree upon it had been transferred. It was quite clearly recognised by the Full
Bench that if the sale deed transferred only A's half
share in the property or only his right to take a· decree
C could not apply under Order XXI, rule 16.
Reading the three cases relied on by learned counsel. for the respondent company it seems to me that
they proceeded on the footing that the equitable title
related back to the earlier agreement in writing ·and
converted the agreement to transfer the future decree
into art assignment in writing of that decree as soon
as it was passed. Some support is sought to be derived
bv learned counsel for this doctrine of relation back
from the above quoted observations of Lord· Westbury
in Holroyd v. Marshall (supra) "that the contract
would, in equity, transfer the beneficial interest" and
of Jessel, M.R., in Collyer v. Isaacs (supra) that "the
contract to assign thus becomes a complete assignment". I find consider.able. difficulty in . accepting
this argument as sound. In the first place the Lord
Chancellor and the Master of the Rolls were not concerned with the question of relation qack in the form
in which it has arisen before us. In the next place it
must not be . overlooked that the equitable principle
herein alluded ,to is not a rule of ..construction of documents but is a substantive rule which confers the
benefit of the after-acquired property on the person to
w horn the transferor . had, by his agreement, promised
to transfer the same, Thus, by .treating as done that
....
'
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1385
which ought to be done, equity fastens upon the afteracquired ·property and brings about a transfer of it.
The implication of this principle, to my mind, is
clearly that the agreement, by itself and proprio
vigore, does not transfer the property when it is
subsequently acquired but that instead of putting the
intending transferee to the trouble and expense of
going to Court for getting a decree for specific performance directing the promisor to execute a deed of
transfer which when executed will transfer the afteraquired property, equity intervenes and places the
parties in a position relative to each other in which
by the prior agreement they were intended to be
placed as if a deed of transfer had been made. As I
apprehend the position, it is by the operation of equity
on the subsequent event, namely, the actual acquisition of the property on its coming into existence that
the beneficial interest therein is transferred to the
promisee. This transfer, to my mind, is brought about
by operation of equity which is something dehors the
prior agreement. It is true that that agreement makes
the application of the equitable principle possible or
I may even say that it sets the equity in motion but,
nevertheless, it is equity alone which denudes the
transferor of his interest in the after-acquired property and passes it to the intending transferee.· That
being the true position, as I think it is, the afteracquired property cannot, logically and on principle,
be said to have been transferred to the intending
transferee oy the agreement in writing. I do not see
on what principle this transfer can be said to relate
back to the previous agreement. I am fortified in my
view by the observations of Lord Cave in the case of
Performing Right Society v. London Theatre of Varieties (1). In that case, in 1916 a firm of music publishers, being members of the plaintiff society, assigned
by an indenture of assignment to the society the
performing right of every song, the right of performance of which they then possessed or should thereafter acquire, to be held by the society for the period
of the assignor's membership. Subsequently, a certain
(1)
L. R. [1924] A. C. 1.
1955
Jugalkishore Saraf
v;
Raw Cotton
Co. Ltd.
Das].
1.386
.1955
Jugalkishore Saref
Vo
Raw ·Cotton
Cu•.L/d.
~
Das].
..S-UPREME:COURT REPORTS
U955J
song was written; and ·fhe copyright in .it, . together
with the right of performance, was assigned .by . the
author to the said firm, but there was no fresJi. assignment .in writing by the firm to the plaintiff society
·such as .was required by section 5 (2) of the Copyright
Act, 1911. The defendants, who were music hall. proprietors, ·permitted this song to be publicly .sung in
their music hall without •the consent of the plaintiff
society. The plaintiff society then sued the defendants for infringement of their performing rights and
claimed a .perpetual injunction. The defence was that
as there was no assignment · .in writing of the copyril\"ht subsequently acquired· by the firm to the plaintiff
society the latter was not the legal owner and,
therefore, was not entitled to a perpetual injunction.
Discussing the nature of the right acquired by the
plaintiff .society under the indenture of 1916 and its
claim to the after-acquired copyright secured by the
firm and referring to section 5, sub-section (2) of •the
Copyright Act, 1911, Viscount · Cave, L.C., observed
at p. 13 :~
"There was on the respective dates of the· instruments under which the appellants claim no existing
copyright in the songs in question, and therefore no
owner of any such right; and this being sb, neither of
those instruments can ·be held to have been an assignment "signed hy the owner of the right within the
meaning of the section. No doubt when a person
executes a document .purporting to assign property to
be afterwards acquired •by .him, that property on its
acquisition passes in equity to the assignee : Holroyd
v. Marshall, 10 H.L.C. 191; Tailby v. Official Receiver,
13 A:C. 523; but how such a subsequent acquisition
can be held to relate back, so as to cause an instrument which on its date was not an assignment under
the Act to become. such an assignment, I am unable
to understand. The appellants have a right in equity
to have the .performing rights assigned to them and
in that sense are equitable owners .. of those rights;
but they are not assignees of the rights within the
meaning of the . statute. This contention, .-therefore,
fails".
S.C.R.
~
•
,.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1387
The above observations, to my mind, completely
-cover the .present case. On a parity of reasoning, the
respondent company may have, by operation of equity,
become entitled to the benefit of the decree as soon as
it was passed but to · say that is not to say that there
has been a transfer of the decree by the document
of the 7th February 1949. And so it has been held
in several cases to which reference may now be
made.
In Basroovittil Bhandari v. Ramchandra Kamthi( 1 )
'the plaintiff assigned the decree to be passed in the
pending suit. The assignee was not brought on the
record under section 372 of the 1882 Code corresponding to Order XXII, rule 10 of the present Code but
the suit proceeded in the name of the original plaintiff
.and a decree was passed in ·his favour. The assignee
, icn applied for execution of diat decree claiming to
·be a transferee decree-holder under section 232 of the
1882 Code. That application was .dismissed. White,
'C.J., observed:"We are asked to hold that in the event which
happened in this case die appellant is entitled to be
-rreated as the transferee of a decree from a decreeJiolder for the purpose~ of section 332, notwithstand.ing that at the time of the assignment there was nv
.decree and no decreeoholder. It seems to us that we
should not be warranted in applying the doctrine of
equity on which die appellant relies, which is stated
in Palaniappa v. Lakshmanan, I.LR. 16 Mad. 429,
for the pµrpose of construing section 232 of the Code.
We think the words "decree-holder" must be con:strued as meaning decree-holder in fact and not as
including a party who in equity may afterwards be·come entitled to the rights of the actual decree-holder,
.and that the words of the section relating to a transfer
of a decree cannot be construed so as to apply to a
case where there was no decree in existence at the
.time of the agreement".
lt is true that the case of Purmananddas Jivandas v.
Vallabdas Wallji (supra) was not cited in that case
but die case of Palaniappa v. Lakshmanan( 2 ) which
(1) [1907] 17 M.L.J. 39i.
(2) [1893) I.L. R.t6 Mad. 429.
1955
Jug4lk#hore $araf
v.
,Raw. Cotton
Co. Ltd.
Das].
1388
1955
]ugalkishort Saraf
v.
Raw Cotton
Co. Ltd.
Das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
.[1955]
adopted the equitable principle enunciated by Jessel,
M.R., in Collyer v: Isaacs (supra) on which that Bombay case had· been founded was brought to the notice
of the Court.
In Dost Muhammad v. Altaf Husain Khan(') one M
instituted a suit for recovery of some immovable property. During the pend ency of the suit M transferred
his interest in the property to the respondent. The ·
respondent did not apply to bring himself on the
record and the suit went on in the name of M· as the
plaintiff. By a compromise decree M was awarded a
portion of the property. After the decree was passed
the respondent applied to execute the decree_ as the
tr:µ15feree of the decree. The Munsiff rejected the
application but the District Judge reversed his order.
On second appeal Chamier, J., found it impossible to
tr.eat the respondent as the transferee of the decree,
for the document on which he relied was executed before the decree was passed.
Peer Mahomed Rowthen v. Raruthan Ambalam(2)
may also be referred to. In that case the Madras
High Court followed its earlier decision in Basroovittil
Bhandari v. Ramchandra Kamthi (supra).
The case of Thakuri Cope v. Mokhtar Ahmad(') does
not carry the matter any further, for it only follows•
the three earlier cases hereinbefore mentioned.
·
Mathurapore Zamindary Co. Ltd. v. Bhasaram Manda!(' ) represents the view taken by the Calcutta High
Court. In that case Hennessey and his brothers, who
were Zamindars, instituted rent suits against their
tenants. Pending those suits Hennessey and his
brothers transferred the Zamindari to the appellant
company. The appellant company did not get themselves substituted as plaintiff but allowed the suits to
proceed in the names of the original plaintiffs who
were the transferors. Eventually, decrees were passed
in favour of Hennessey and his brothers. The appellant company then applied for execution. The executing Court and the lower appellate Court held that
(1) [1912] 17 l.C. 512.
(2) [19151 30.r. a. 831.
(3) 1922 C.W.N. (Patna) 256; A. I. R. 1922 Pat. 563.
(4) [1924] I.L.R. 51 Cal. 703.
+
.,
)11
...,,.
•
-
,
S.C.K
..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1389
.the appellant company was not a transferee of the
decree. The appellant company thereupon preferredthis second appeal to the High Court; It was held
that the appellant company could not apply under
Order XXI, rule 16, for that rule could not properly
cover a case where there was no decree at the date· of
the assignment of the property and the term "decreehoJder" could not cover a party who, in equity, might
afterwards have become entitled to the rights of the
actual decree holder. The case of Ananda Mohan
Roy v. Promotha Nath Ganguli (supra) was explained as
being based really on the construction that was put
upon the convey.ance, namely, that it covered a· decree
which had been passed "simultaneously with, if not
before, the execution of the conveyance". After
pointing out that in Purmananddas f ivandas V·.
V allabdas W allji (supra) the transferor and transferee
stood in the position of trustee and cestui que·trust and
that that .circumstance might hav.e attracted the application of the equitable principle the Court could
not assent tc'· the broad proposition supposed to have
been laid down in that case that the transferee in
equity became a transferee of the decree by the prior
agreement so as to come under Order XXI, rule 16
and preferred to follow the decision of the Madra~
High Court in · Basroovittil Bhandari v. Ramchandra
Kamthi (supra) and the other decisions to which reference has been already made.
In Pandu foti Kadam v. Savla Piraji Kate(1) one
Tuljaram obtained a decree on a mortgage against the
appellant Pandu Joti. Later on, the respondent Savla
brought a suit against the appellant Pandu and
Tuljaram. In that suit a decree was passed directing
Tuljaram to transfer the mortgage decree to Savla.
The respondent Savla thereupon without having obtained, amicably or by execution of his decree, an
actual assignment of the mortgage decree sought to
execute that decree, It was held that although Savla
had a legal right, by executing his own decree, to
compel his judgment-debtor Tuljaram to assign to
him the mortgage decree obtained by Tuljaram, such
(1) [1925] 27 Born. L. R. uo9.
14-90 S. C. India/59
1955
Jugalkishore Saraf
v.
Raw Cotton·
Co. Ltd.
Das].
1390
1955
Jugalkishore Saraf
v.
Raw Cotton
Co. Ltd.
DasJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955}
right alone, without an assignment in writing, did not
make him a transferee of the mortgaged decree so as to
be entitled to execute that decree.
Even the Bombay High Court (Fawcett and Madgavkar, JJ.) in Genaram Kapurchand Marwadi v.
Hanmantram Surajmal (' ) followed the decision of the
Madras High Court in Basroovittil Bhandari v. Ramchandra Kamthi (supra). The question came up for
consideration in connection with a plea of limitation.
There in February 1914 the appellant obtained an
assignment of the rights of the plaintiff in a pending
suit which was thereafter continued by the original
plaintiff. In November 1914 a decree was passed in
favour of the original plaintiff. The appellant made
several applications for execution of the decree in
1916, 1917, 1920 and 1921 all of which were dismissed.
In November 1923 the appellant obtained a fresh
assignment in writing from the plaintiff and made a
fresh application for execution. The judgment-debtor
pleaded that the earlier applications were not in accordance with law and did not keep the decree alive.
It was held that although the appellant was entitled,
in equity, to the benefit of the decree he did not, before he actually obtained an assignment of the decree
in 1923, become a transferee of the decree by an assignment in writing within Order XX!, rule 16 and,
therefore, the applications made by him prior to 1923
were not made in accordance with law and, therefore,
the last application was barred by limitation. This
decision clearly proceeded on the ground that Order
XX!, rule 16 contemplated only the transfer of a
decree after it had been passed.
The case of Abdul Kader v. Daw Yin(•) does not
assist the respondent company, for in that case the
Court took the view that, on its true construction,
the deed under consideration in that case actually
transferred the decree that had already been passed.
In Prabashinee Debi v. Rasiklal Banerji('), Rankin,
C. J., considered the previous cases and preferred to
(x) A..!.R. 1926 Born. 406; 28 Born. L.R. 776.
(2) A.I.R.1920 Rang. 308.
;~) [1931) .l.L.R ..19 Cal. 297.
t
..
S.C.R.
;
.., •
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1391
follow the case of Mathurapore Zamindary Co. Ltd. v.
Bhasaram Manda! (supra).
The case of Purna Chandra Bhowmik v. Barna
Kumari Debi(1) does not, when properly understood,
afford any support to the contention of the respondent company. There the defendant No. 1 had exe•
cuted a mortgage bond in favour of the plaintiff assigning by way of security the decree that would be
passed in a pending suit which he, the defendant No.
1, had instituted against a third party for recovery of
money due on unpaid bills for work done. After this
mortgage a decree was · passed in that suit in favour
of the defendant No. 1 who had continued that suit
as the plaintiff. The plaintiff daiming to be the
assignee by way of mortgage of that decree instituted
this suit against two defendants. The defendant
No. 1 was the plaintiff in the earlier suit who had
mortgaged to the plaintiff the decree to be passed in
that suit and the defendant No. 2 was a person who
claimed to be a transferee of the same decree under a
conveyance subsequently executed in his favour by
the first defendant. The judgment-debtor under the
decree in the first suit was not made a party defendant in this suit. The first c::lefendant did not contest this suit and it was only contested by the second
defendant. One of the points raised by the contesting defendant was that this subsequent suit which
was one for a pure declaration of title was bad under
section 42 of the Specific Relief Act inasmuch as the
plaintiff did not pray for consequential relief in the
shape of a permanent injunction restraining him, the
contesting defendant, from executing the decree. In
repelling that argument as manifestly untenable
Mukherjea, J., as he then was, said :"All that the plaintiff could want possibly at the
present stage was a declaration that she was an assignee of the decree and if she gets a declaration it
would be open to her to apply for execution of the
decree under Order XXI, rule 16, of the Code of Civil
Procedure. No other consequential relief by way of
(1) I.L.R. [1939] 2 Cal. 341.
1955
Jugalkishore Stlt'af
v.
Raw Cotton
Co. Ltd.
DasJ.
1392
1955·
7¥galkishore·_ Sa~af.
v.
Raw Colton~
Co. Ltd.
Da ].
SUPREME COURT REiPORT,S
[1955]
miunction or otherwise could or. should have been
prayed for by the plaintiff in, .tpe present · suit".
It will be noticed that· the •construction of Order XXI,
rule 16; was not in issue at all. The question was.
not between the person claiming to be the transferee
of the decree and the judgment-debtor. Indeed, the
judgmentcdebtor was not a party to this suit at all.
The simple question was whether the suit was maintainable under section. 42 by reason. of the absence of.
a prayer for consequential relief. In view of the
facts of that case · · the observation . quoted above appears to· me to be· a passing• one not necessary for the
decision of the· question then before the Court and
not an expression of considered opinion on· the meaning, scope and effect· of Order XXI, rule 16.
Al!. the cases, except the three cases relied on by
learned counsel for the respondent company, quite
clearly lay down-and I think correctly-that Order
XXI, rule 16, by the. first alternative, contemplates
the actual transfer of the decree by. an assignment in
writing executed after the decree is passed and that
while a transfer of or an agreement to. transfer a decree
that may be passed in future may, in. equity,. entitle
the. intending transferee to claim the beneficial interest in the decree after it. is passed, such equitable
transfer .does not relate back to the priqr . agreement
and does not_ render the transferee a transferee of the
decree by an assignment in writing within the meaning of Order XXI, rule 16.
'" ~,
Learned counsel for the respondent company then
contends that even if the respondent company did
not, by force of the prior agreement in writing read
in . the light of the equitable principle alluded to above
or of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act,
become the· transferees of the decree by an assignment
in writing, they, nevertheless, became the·· transferees
of the· decree "by operation of' law" within the meaning of Order XXI, rule 16. That phrase has been considered by the different High Courts in numerous
cases but the interpretations put upon It are. not· at
all uniform and it is difficult to reconcile all of them.
-
S;C.R.
1393
'SUPREME GOURT ,REPORTS
In this judgment in the present case the executing
Court exprnssed the view that the ·.phrase could ·only
mean that •the Tights had been transferred "on account
of devolution of interest on death, etc" .. In delivering the judgment in the Letters ·Patent Appeal,
Chagla, C.J.., said :~
"The operation of law contemplated by Order
XXI, rule 16 is not any equitable principle but operation by devolution as in the case of death or insolvency "..
The learned . Chief Justice does not ·give any mason
for the view expressed by him but assumes the law to
be so. The genesis for such assumption is . probably
traceable to the observations of Sir Robert P. Collier
who delivered the judgment of the Privy Council in
Abedoonissa Khatoon v. Ameeroonissa Khatoon(1). The
question arose in that case in this way. One Wahed
sued his father Abdool for possession of ·certain properties. The trial Court dismissed the suit and Wahed
appealed to the High Court. During the pendency
of the appeal Wahed died and his widow Abedoonissa
was substituted in the place of W ahed for prosecuting the appeal. The High Court allowed the appeal
and by its decree declared that W ahed was in his
lifetime and those who became his heirs were entitled
to recover the properties in suit. Abedoonissa applied
for execution of the decree for herself and for one
W ajed who was said to be the posthumous son of
Wahed born of her womb. Objection was taken, inter
alia, that Wajed was not the legitimate son of Wahed.
This . objection was overruled and it was held that
Abedoonissa was entitled ·to execute the decree for
herself and as the guardian of Wajed. Then the judgment-debtor .Abdool died. Abdool's widow .. Ameeroonissa filed a suit for a declaration that Wajed was
not the· legitimate son of Wahed and for: setting aside
the last mentioned ·order. Abedoonissa took the point
.that the matter was concluded by principles • of res
judicata. To that Ameeroonissa's reply was that . the
proceeding in which the the question of the legitimacv of
Wajed was decided was wholly incompetent .so far as
(1)
[1876] L. R. 4 I. A. 66, l.L.R. 2 Cal. 327. '
·
1
"1955
Jugalkishore Samf
v.
Raw Cotton
Co. Ltd.
Das J
1394
•955
JugalkishOf'e Saraf
v.
Raw Cotton
Co. Ltd.
Das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
Wajed was concerned because, the decree being in
favour of Abedoonissa, Wajed was not a transferee of
the decree within the meaning of section 208 of Act
VIII of 1859 corresponding to Order XXI, . rule 16 of
the present Code and could not apply for execution
and that being so any adjudication on his status in
such proceeding was not binding at all. The question for decision in the suit was whether Wajed was
a transferee of the decree within the meaning of
section 208 of the Code of 1859. It was in that connection . that Sir Robert P. Collier in delivering the
judgment of the Privy Council, after quoting that
section, observed :- ·
"It appears to their Lordships, in the first place,
that, assuming Wajed to have the interest asserted,
the decree was not, in terms of this section, transferred
to him, either by assignment, which is not pretended,
or by operation of law, from the original decree-holder.
No incident had occurred, on which the law could
operate, to transfer any estate from his mother to
him. There had been no death ; there had been no
devolution ; there had been no succession. His mother
retained what right she had ; that right was not transferred to him ; if he had a right, it was derived from
his father ; it appears to their Lordships, therefore,
that he is not a transferee of a decree within the terms
of this section".
The above observations ·seem to put upon the phrase
"by operation of law" an interpretation which, in the
language of Chakravartti, J., in his judgment in Sailendra Kumar v. Bank of Calcutta(! ) "suggests that it
would apply only in cases where certain events, not
connected with any act on the part of anybody towards' making a transfer, happen and the law, operating on those events, brings ·about· a transfer". Some
of the decisions of certain High Courts to be presentlv
cited seem to assume that their Lordships of the
Privy Council .were out to give an exhaustive enumeration of the cases of transfer of property by operation of law but I find myself in agreement with
Chakravartti, · L that there is no reason for making
(•) I. L. R. [1948] I Cal. 472.
,,
...
f
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1395
such an assumption and treating these observations
as the text of a statute.
In Dinendranath Sannyal v. Ramcoomar Ghose( 1 ) Sir
Barnes Peacock pointed out the great distinction between a private sale in satisfaction of a decree and a
sale in execution of a decree. One of the principal
distinctions so pointed out was :"Under the former the purchaser derives title
through the vendor, and cannot acquire a better title
than that of the vendor. Under the latter the purchaser notwithstanding he acquires merely the right,
title and interest of the judgment-debtor,, acquires
that title by operation of law adversely to the judgment-debtor. and freed from all alienations or incumbrances effected by him subsequently to the attachment of the property sold in execution".
Here the act of the decree-holder in seeking execution
by attachment and sale and the act of the Court in
directing attachment and sale cannot possibly be
said to be the happening of an event unconnected
with the act of making a transfer such as death or
devolution or succession referred to· in Abedoonissa's
case (supra) could be said to be. By the act of applying for execution the decree-holder quite dearly
desires that the judgment-debtor should be stripped
of all his right, title and interest in the property
attached and sold and the order of the Court has the
effect of so denuding the judgment-debtor and of
passing his right. title and interest to the purchaser
of the property at the Court sale. This transfer of
property is not by any assignment in writing executed by the transferor in favour of the transferee
but is brought about by the operation of the statutory provisions relating to and governing execution
of decrees. Thus this Privy Council decision itself
shows that transfers "by operation of law" were not
intended bv it to be confined to the three cases of
death, dev~lution or succession..
More often than not transfers "by operation of
law" will be found to be brought obout by the opera( x) [1889] L. R. 8 I.A. 65,75.
1955
}ugalkis/,ore Saraf
v.
Raw Cotton
Co. Ltd.
Das].
.1396
. 1955
· Ju'galkishore .faref
v·
Raw Co!ton
·C1. Ltd.
'/Jas J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
·tion .of cstatutor.y law. '.fhus when .a :person .dies
testate there is a devolution ,of :his ;Properties to his
legal representatives by operation of the law of
.testamentary succession which is now. mainly statu.tory .in .this country. When a person Is adju_dged
·insolvent his properties vest in the official assignee
and that transfer is brought about by the operation
of the insolvency laws which have been codified.
Court ·s~le of property in execution of a decree vests
the right; title and interest cif the judgment-debtor In
that property in · the
auction-purchaser ·thereby
effecting a trarisfer ·by operation of the hw embodied
in the Code of Civil Procedure. Likewise, statutes m
some cases provide for the forfeiture of property, e.g.
property in -relation to which an offence has been
committed, namely, ·illicit liquor or opium, etc., and
thereby effect a transfer of such property from ·the
delinquent owner to the State. It is neither necessary
nor ·profitable to try and enumerate exhaustively the
'instances of transfer 'by operation of law. Suffice it
to say that there in no warrant for confining transfers
'"by operation of law" to transfers by operation of
statutory laws. When a Hindu or a Mohammaden
dies intestate and 'his heirs succeed to his estate there
is a transfer not by anv statute but by the operation
of their respective personal law. In order to consti:tute a transfer of property "by operation· of law" all
that is necessary 'is that there must be a passing of
one person's rights in ·property · to · another person by
·the force df some law, statutory or otherwise.
Reference has already been made to the case of
Purmananddas /ivandas v. Vallabdas Wallji (supra)
where, by applying the equitable principle, Sargent,
C.J., upheld the appellant's right to maintain the
application 'for · execution. In the beginning the
'learned 'Chief Justice · founded his decision on the
ground that the appellant had become the transferee
·of the decree "'by operation of law". 'This view appears to me to be logical, for 'it was ·by the operation
of the · ·equitable principle that the · ·right~ title and
-interest 1of the .transferor in the after-acquired decree
became the property of the appellant. ,Jn .other iwords,
S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1397
it was equity which operated on the decree as soon as
it was passed and passed the interest -0f the decreeholder to the appellant. The result of this transmission was to transfer the property from the decreeholder to the appellant and this transfer was brought
about by the operation of the equitable principle dis.c;ussed above which is as good as any rule of law. The
actual decision in Purmananddas Jivandas v. VaUabdas Wallji (supra) may well be supported as ari instance of transfer by operation of law and indeed
Sargent, C.J., himself first described the transfer in
that case as being one by operation of law. The same
remarks apply to the other two cases of Ananda
Mahon Roy v. Promotha Nath Ganguli (supra) and
Chimanlal Hargovinddas v. Ghulamnabi (supra) relied
·On by learned counsel for the respondent company.
In Abdul Kader v. Daw Yin (supra) in July 1928
the plaintiff obtained a decree that a certain sale deed
be set aside on payment of a certain sum and for
possession of the properties and mesne profits. In
August 1928, i.e., after the passing of the decree the
plaintiff executed a deed for the sale of the properties
to the appellant who by the terms of the deed was
to . obtain possession of the properties through Court
on· payment of the amount mentioned therein. The
plaintiff deposited the necessary amount and applied
for execution of the decree but she died shortly there:after. Thereupon the appellant applied for execution
of the decree. On a construction of the terms of the
sale deed the Court came to the conclusion that the
sale deed covered the decree and, therefore, the
appellant was. a transferee of the decree by assignment i.n writing. This was sufficient to dispose of the
case but the learned Judges tried to reconcile some of
the earlier cases by deducing two propositio.11.s :
(1) that the words "by operation of law" cannot
be invoked so as to make an assignment operative to
transfer the decree and · the right under it which
would upon the true construction of its terms; otherwise, be inoperative in that regard; and
(2) that although in certain cases principles . of
equi1y may be relied on, e.g., in the case of .a transfer
tg,55
]ilgalkishore Saraf
v•
.Raw Cotton
.co.lid.
.fJasJ.
1398
1955
Jugalkishore Saraf
v.
Raw Cotton
Co. Ltd.
Das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
by trustees and ·a beneficiary, such principles cannot
be considered as rendering a transfer valid "by
operation of law".
It is difficult to appreciate the implication of the first
proposition. When on a true construction of the deed
it actually operates to transfer a decree then in existence, no equitable principle need be invoked, for m
that case the transfer is by the deed itself and as such
is by an assignment in writing. It is only when the
deed does not effectively transfer the decree because,
for instance, the decree 1s not then in existence, but
constitutes only an agreement to transfer the decree
after it is passed that the invocation of the equitable
principle becomes necessary and it is in those circumstances that equity fastens and operates upon the
decree when it is passed and effects a transfer of itIf, however, the learned Judges meant to say that if
on a· true construction of the deed it did not cover·
the decree then the equitable principle would not come
into play at all and in that case the principle of transfer by operation of law could not be invoked, no·
exception need then be taken. As regards the second
proposition which appears to be founded on the observations of Mukherji, J., in Mathurapore Zamindary
Co.'s case (supra) I do not see why the equitable·
principle may be relied on only in the case of a transfer by· trustees to cestui que trust. Indeed, it was
applied in the two earlier English cases as between
mortgagor and mortgagee and m Performing Right·
Society v. London Theatre of Varieties (supra) to an
indenture of assignment of copyright to be acquired'
in future made between persons who did not stand m
the relationship of trustee and beneficiary. Nor do I
see why, in cases where the equitable principle applies,
the transfer should not be regarded as one by operation of law.
In Mahadeo Baburao Halbe v. Anandrao Shankarrao
Deshmukh(') .the judgment confined transfers by operation of law to cases of death, devolution · or succession. for which, as already stated, I see no warrant.
(1) [1933] I. L. R. 57 Bom. 513.
-
S.C.R.
•
1
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1399
The decision in Periakatha Nadar v. Mahalingam()
1s somewhat obscure. There a receiver appointed in
a partnership action filed a suit against a debtor of
the firm and obtained a decree. Thereafter the assets
of the firm mcluding the decree were directed to be
sold by auction amongst the partners. This order
was made in spite of the objection of the partners.
The decree was purchased by one of the partners who
was defendant No. 2. The purchaser then applied for
execution of the decree. Pandrang Rao, J. said, at
p. 544 :"It appears to us that the words 'operation of
law' cannot apply to a case where a person ha~
become the owner of a decree by some transaction
inter vivas. It applies to cases where the decree has
been transferred from one to another by way of succession or where there is a bankruptcy or any similar
event which has the effect in law of bringing about
such a transfer".
If the purchaser of a property in execution sale
becomes the transferee of the property by operation
of law I, for one, cannot see why the purchaser of a
property at an auction sale held in a partnership
action under the order of the Court made in invitum
will not be a transferee by operation of law. If an
involuntary execution sale is not a transaction inter
vivas why should an auction sale held in a partnership
action in the teeth of opposition of the parties be a
transaction inter vivas? The learned Judges concluded
that as no particular form of assignment was prescribed for transfer, the order of the Court might be
treated as an assignment in writing of the decree. I
find it much easier to hold that there was in that case
a transfer by operation of law than that the Court
acted as the agent of the partners and the order of
the Court was the assignment in writing. The law
authorised the Court in a partnership action to order
the sale of the partnership assets and consequently
the sale passed the interest of all the partners other
than the purchasing partner in the decree solely· to
(1: A.I.R. 1936 Mad. 543.
1955
Jugalkishore
v.
Sara
Raw Cotton
Co. Ltd.
Das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1955
:fugalkishom'Sari!f.
.v•.
Raw Cottan
.c•. Lt~.
Das(].
[1955]
the latte>. •l do not ·see why .a transfer .·thus brought
.about -Should not, ·like a transfer ·effected by a ·Court
·sale in ·execution, ·be regarded .as a transfer by ·operation of .<law. ·Further, as I have already said, there is
·no valid ·reason for confining •transfer by operation of
-law to succession and bankruptcy or the ·like.
In G. N. Asundi v. Virappa Andaneppa Manvi('.) a
,father sHed his sons for a declaration of his sole tide
·to a clecree previously .obtained by the ·sons against a
·third party on •promissory notes. The parties came to
a cgmpromise and a joint petition signed by the father
and the sons was filed in Court in which it was Stated
that the sons, had no objection to surrender -all their
rights in the decree to the father. The Court passed
a •decree in accordance with the compromise. On an
application for execution by the father of the decree
·on -the promissory notes it was held that on its ·true
·construction the .compromise ·petition amounted. to an
assignment of the decree within the meaning -of Order
XXI, rule 16. So far there -can be no difficulty; but
.the learned Judges went. on -to .say, without, I ·think•
.any good reason, that transfer by operation of law
was obviously intended to be confined to testamentary
.and intestate .succession, forfeiture, insolvency and
the like. This was only because •the Court felt bound
to hold that the decision in Abedoonissa's case had so
limited it. .It ·was als0 pointed out-I .think correctly
-th-at ·a decree declaring the title .of the decree·holder to another decree previously · passed in .another
suit did not effect a transfer of the earlier .decree by
operation of. law and the decree-holder under the latter
decree did not become the transferee of the ·earlier
<lecree by ·operation .of law within the meaning of
Order X~I, rule 16. This was aiso held in a number
-,)f .c:ises .including Mahadeo 'Baburao Halbe's case
(.<upra) · and .Finn Kusha!das 'Leklzraj v. Firm -Jhamandas Maherchandani{' ). This must follow frotn the
very nature of a declaratory _decree. . A · declaratory
detree. does not ·create .or confer any .new . right but
<leclares a pre-existing -t<ight. Therefore, ·when a
(!) I.L. R. [19391 Born. 271,
(•) A.l.R, 1944 Sind 230·
'
_,
_
T
S.C.R.
>-
,.
SUPREME 80URT REPORTS
1:401
declaratory decree declares the right of the decreeholder to another decree passed in an earlier suit;
there is no divesting of interest of one person and
vesting of it in another. There is no transfer at all
and, therefore, the person in whose favour the declaratory decree ·is passed· does not fall within Order
XXI, rule 16, Code of Civil Procedure.
The last case to which reference need be made is
that of Maya Debi v. Rajlakshmi Debi( 1 ). There a
Darpatnidar deposited under section 13 ( 4) of the
Bengal Patni Taluqa Regulation (VIII of 1819) the
arrears of revenue to avoid a putni sale and entered
into possession of the putni as he was entitled to do
under the above section. He then filed a suit and
obtained a decree for arrears of rent due to the Patnidar from another Darpatnidar.
Subsequently he
relinquished possession in favour of the Patnidar by
giving a notice to the Patnidar. The question was
whether the Patnidar, after he got back the possession
of the putni, could be regarded as the· assignee of the
decree which had been obtained by the Darpatnidar
against another Darpatnidar. It was held that in view
of the provisions of section 13( 4) the Patnidar on
getting back possession of the putni became the transferee of the decree by operation of law. It was also
held that the notice given by the Darpatnidar to the
Patnidar could also be construed as an assignment in
writing.
The result of the authorities appears to me to be
that if by reason of any provision of law, statutory
or otherwise; interest in property passe.~ from one
person to another there is a transfer of the property
by operation of law. There is no reason that I can
see why transfers by operation of law should be regarded as confined to the three cases referred to by
the Privy. Council in Abedoonissa's case. If, therefore;
I were· able to construe the document of the 7th
February 1949 to be a transfer or an agreement to
transfer the decree to be passed in future then I
would have had· no difficulty in holding that by operation of equity the beneficial interest · in the decree
(1) A.I.R. 1950 Cal. 1.
1955
Jugalkishore Saraf
v.
Raw Cotton
Co. lid.
Das].
1402
1955
Jugalkishore Saraf
v.
Raw Cotton
Cod,td.
Das).
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
was immediately after its passing taken out of the ' ' ,
transferors and passed to the respondent company
and that the latter had become the transferees of the
decree now sought to be executed by operation of law.
As, however, I have held that that document did not
cover the decree, there was no room for the application of the equitable principle and the respondent
company - cannot, therefore, claim to come under
~'
Order XXI, rule 16 as transferees by operation of law
and cannot maintain the application for execution.
There is another ground on which the right of the
respondent company to maintain the application for
execution has been sought to be sustained. This
point was not apparently taken before the High Court
and we have not had the advantage and benefit of the
opinion of the learned Judges of that Court. Section
146 of the Code of Civil Procedure on which this new
point is founded provides as follows :
"146. Proceedings by or against representatives.Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any
law for the time being in force, where any proceeding
may be taken or application made by or against any
person, then the proceeding may be taken or the application may be made by or against any person
claiming under him".
There are two questions to be considered before the
section may be applied, namely, (1) whether the Code
otherwise provides and (2) whether the respondent
•
company can be said to be persons claiming under the
decree-holder. As regards (1) it is said that Order XX!,
rule 16 specifically provides for application for execution by a transferee of decree and, therefore, a trans--1
feree of decree cannot apply under section 146 and
must bring himself within Order XX!, rule 16. This is
really begging the question. Either the respondent
company are transferees of the decree by an assignment in writing or by operation of law, in which case
they fall within Order XX!, rule 16, or they are not
such transferees, in which event they may avail themselves of the provisions of section 146 if the other
condition is fulfilled. There is nothing in Order XX!,
rule 16 which, expressly or by necessary implication
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1403
-.f' precludes a person, who claims to be entitled to the
...
...
benefit of a decree under the decree-holder but does
not answer the description of being the transferee of
that decree by assignment in writing or by operation
of law, from making an application which the person
from whom he claims could have made. It is said:
what, then, is meant by the words "save as otherwise
provided by this Code" ? The answer is that those
words are not meaningless but have effect in some
cases. Take, by way of an illustration, the second
proviso to Order XXI, rule 16 which provides that
where a decree for payment of money against two or
more persons has been transferred to one of them it
shall not be executed against the others. This is a
provision which forbids one of the judgment-debtors
to whom alone the decree for payment of money has
been transferred from making an application for execution and, therefore, he cannot apply under section
146 as a person claiming under the decree-holder. As
the respondent company do not fall within Order
XXI, rule 16 because the document did not cover the
decree to be passed in future in the then pending suit
that rule cannot be a bar to the respondent company
making an application for execution under section
146 if they satisfy the other requirement of that section, namely, that they can be said to be claiming
under the decree-holder.
A person may conceivably become entitled to the
benefits of a decree without being a transferee of the
decree by assignment in writing or by operation of
law. In that situation the person so . becoming the
owner of the decree may well be regarded as a person
claiming under the decree-holder and so it has been
held in Sitaramaswami v. Lakshmi Narasimha( 1 ),
although in the earlier case of Dost Muhammad v.
Altaf Husain (supra) it was held otherwise. The case
of KanKati Mahanandi Reddi v. Panikalapati Venkatappa( 2 ) also held that the provisions of Order XXI,
rule 16 did not prevent execution of the decree under
section 146. In that case it was held that the appli(1) [1918] J.L.R. 41 Mad. 510.
(2) A.LR. 1942 Mad. 21.
1955
Jugalkishore Saraf
v.
Raw Cotton
Co. Ltd.
Das].
1404
1955•
Jugalkishore Saraf
v.
RlWJ Cotton
Co. Ltd:
Das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]1
cant could not execute the decree under Order XXI,
rule 16 but he could execute the same under section
146. The main thing to ascertain is as to whether
the respondent company had any right, title or interest in the decree and whether they can be said. to
be persons. claiming under the decree-holder.
I. have already held that the document under consideration did not transfer the· future decree and;
therefore, the equitable principle did not apply and,
therefore, the respondent company did not become a
transferee of the decree within the meaning of Order
XXI, rule 16. What, then, was the legal position of
the respondent company? They had undoubtedly, by
the document of the 7th February 1949, obtained a
transfer of the debt which was the subject matter of
the then pending suit. This. transfer, under the
Transfer of Property Act; carried all the legal incidents and the remedies in relation to that debt. The
transferors no longer had any right, title or interest
in the subject matter of the suit. After the transfer
it was the respondent company which had the right
to continue the suit and obtain a decree if the debt
was really outstanding. They, however, did not bring
themselves on the record as the plaintiffs in the place
and· stead of the transferors but allowed the latter to
proceed with the· suit. The transferors, therefore,
proceeded with the suit although they had no longer
any interest in the debt which- was the subject matter
of the suit and which had been transferred by them
to the respondent Company. In the premises, in the
eye of the law, the position of the transferors, vis-a-vis
the respondent company, was nothing more than
that of benamidars for the respondent company and
when the. decree was-· passed for the recovery of that
debt it was. the respondent company who were the
real owners of the decree. As between the respondent
company and· the transferors the former may well
claim a. declaration of their title; Here there ·is no
question of transfer. of the decree by the transferors
to the respondent company by assignment· of the
decree in writing or by operation of law and. the respondent company cannot apply for execution of the
...
...
.-
S.C.R.
..
,i.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1405
decree under Order XXI, rule 16. But the respondent
company are, nontheless, the real owners of the decree
because it is passed in relation to and for the recovery
of the debt which undoubtedly they acquired by
transfer by the document under consideration. The
respondent company were, after the transfer, the
owners of the debt which was the subject matter of
the suit and the legal incidents thereof and consequently were the real owners of the decree. The
respondent company derived their title to the debt by
transfer from the transferors and claimed the same
under the latter. When the respondent company became the owner of the decree immediately on its passing they must, in relation to the decree, be also
regarded as persons claiming under the transferors.
The respondent company would not have become the
owner of the decree unless they were the owners of
the debt and if they claimed the debt under the transferors they must also claim the relative decree under
the transferors as accretions, as it were, to their
original right as transferees of the debt. . In my opinion, the respondent company are entitled under section 146 to make the application for execution which
the original detree-holders could do.
In Mathurapore Zamindary Co. Ltd. v. Bhasaram
Manda! (supra) Mukherji, J., felt unable to assent to
the broad proposition that Courts of execution have
to look to equity in considering whether there has
been an assignment by operation of law. I see no
cogent reason for taking this view. If the executing Court can and, after the amendment of Order
XXI, rule 16 by the deletion of the words "if that
Court thinks fit'', must deal with complicated questions relating to transfer of decree by operation of
statutory provisions which may be quite abstruse,
I do not see why the executing Court may not apply
its mind to the simple equitable principle which
op,erates to transfer the beneficial interest in the
after-acquired decree or to questions arising under
section 146. Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure does require that the executing Court alone
must determine all questions arising between the
15-90 S.C. India/59
1955
Jugalkishore Saraf
v.
Raw Cotton
Co. Ud.
Das].
1406
1955
Jugalkishore Sara}
v.
Raw Cotton
Co .. Ltd.
Das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
parties or their representatives · and relating to the
execution, discharge or · satisfaction of , the decree
and·. authorises it even to treat the proceedings as
a suit. As the assignees from the plaintiff of the
debt which was the entire subject matter of the suit
the respondent company were . entitled to be brought
on the record under Order XXII, rule 10 and must;
therefore, be also regarded as a representative of. the
plaintiff within the meaning of section 47 of the
Code;
Learned Counsel for the appellant contends that
the application for execution was defective in that
although it purported to be an application for exe'cution under Order XXI, rule 11, it did not comply with
the requirements of that rule in that it did not ·specify
any of the· several modes in which the ·assistance of
the Court was required. The application was imdoubtedly defective · as the decision in the case of
Radha Nath Das v. Produmna Kumar Sarkar(' ) 'and
Krishna Govind Pati v. Moolchand Keshavchand
Gujar( 2 ) will show but this objection was not taken
before the executing Court which could then have returned the application, nor was any objection taken
by the appellant at any later stage of the proceedings.
Further, it appears that the respondent company
actually presented another tabular statement for. execution specifying the mode in which the assistance of
the Court was required. In these circumstances, it is
not open· to the appellant to contend that the application is not maintainable.
The result, therefore, is that this appeal must be
dismissed with costs.
BHAGWATI J.-I agree that the appeal be dismissed
with costs. I would however' like to record my own
reasons for doing so;
Habib & Sons, a partnership firm which carried on
business as merchants and Pukka Adatias in bullion
and cotton iii Bombay filed a .suit against the Ap'pellant in the City Civil Court, Bombay being Summary
(1) I. L. R. (1939) 2 Cal. 325·
(2) A. I. R. 1941 Born. 302.
-
S.C.R.
..
1/
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1407
Suit No. 233 of 1948, to recover a sum of Rs. 7,113-7-0
with interest and costs. During the penden:cy of the
suit an · agreement was arrived at between Habib &
Sons and the Respondents on the 7th February, i949
under which Habib & Sons transferred to the Respondents inter alia .... ''Fourthy :-All the book and
other debts due to. the Vendors in connection with
the said Indian business and the full benefit of all
securities for the debts .. , ......... Sixthly :-All other
property to which the Vendors are entitled in connection with the said Indian business". As consideration
for the said transfer the Respondents undertook to
pay satisfy, discharge and fulfil all the debts, liabilities contracts and engagements of the vendors in relation to the said Indian business and to indemnify them
against all proceedings, claims and demands in respect thereof. The Respondents did not take any steps
under Order XXII, rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure to bring themselves on the record of the suit as
plaintiffs in place and stead of Habib & Sons and a
decree was passed in favour of Habib & Sons against
the Appellant on the 15th December, 1949 for Rs.
8,428/7/- inclusive of interest and costs with interest
on judgment at 4 per cent. per annum till payment.
Both the partners of Habib & Sons were declared
evacuees and by his order dated the 2nd August, 1950
the Custodian of Evacuee Property, Bombay confirmed the transaction of transfer of the business of Habib
& Sons to the Respondents as evidenced by the agreement dated the 7th February, 1949. A communication to that effect was addressed by the Custodian to
a Director of the Respondents on the 11th December,
1950.
On the 25th April, 1951 the Respondents filed in the
City Civil Court, · Bombay an application for execution
under Order XXI, rule 11 of the Code of Civil Pro·
cedure to execute the decree obtained by Habib &
Sons against the Appellant. That application was by
the Respondents as assignees of the decree and the
mode in which the assistance of the Court was required was that the Court should declare the Respon-
-
1955
Jugalkishore Saraf
1(.
Raw Cotton
·ca. Ltd.
Bhagwati],
1408
~ 195_5
:Jugalki'shore Saraf
v.
Raw Cotton
Co. Ltd.
Bhagwati],
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
dents the assignees of the decree as the decretal debt
along with other debts were transferred by Habib &
Sons to them by a deed of assignment dated the 7th
February, 1949 which was confirmed by the Custodian
of Evacuee Property, Bombay and should order them
to be substituted for the plaintiffs. A notice under
Order XXI, rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure
was issued by the Court on the 10th May, 1951, calling upon Habib & Sons and the Appellant to show
cause why the decree passed in favour of Habib &
Sons and by them transferred to the Respondents, the
assignees of the decree should not be executed by the
said transferees against the Appellant. The Appellant showed cause and contended ( 1) that the deed of
assignment in favour of the Respondents was not
executed by Habib & Sons and (2) that the assignee
of the subject-matter of the suit and not of the decree
itself was not entitled to apply for leave under Order
XX!, Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The
Chamber Summons was adjourned to Court in order
to take evidence whether the document in question
was executed by Habib & Sons or not. Evidence was
led at the hearing and the Court held the document
duly executed by the two partners of Habib & Sons
and as such duly proved. On the question of law the
Court followed the decisions in Purmananddas Jiwandas v. Vallabdas Wallii(') and Chimanalal Hargovinddas
v. Gulamnabi(') and held that the Respondents were
entitled to execute the decree under Order XXI, rule
16 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
An appeal was taken by the Appellant to the
High Court against this decision of the City Civil -'
Court. The appeal came for hearing before Dixit, J.
The finding that the deed of assignment was duly
proved was not challenged. But the contention that
inasmuch as there was no transfer of the decree itself
but only of the property the Respondents were not
entitled to apply to execute the decree was pressed
and was negatived by the learned Judge. The learned
Judge observed that if the language of Order XXI,
(1) [1877] l.L.R. l l Bom. 5o6.
(2) I.L.R. [1946] Born. 276.
•
1·
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1409
rule 16 was strictly construed it seemed to hini that
the Respo~dents had no case. But he followed the
decisions m Purmananddas Jiwandas v. V allabdas
Wallji( 1 ) and Chimanlal Hargovinddas v. Gulamnabi ( 2 )
and dismissed the appeal.
A Letters Patent Appeal was filed against this decision of Dixit, J. and it came on for hearing and final
disposal before a Division Bench of the High Court
constituted by Chagla, C.J. and Shah, J. The Division Bench also were of the opinion that if one were
to construe Order XXI, rule 16 strictly there was no
assignment of the decree in favour of the respondents.
They however were of the opinion that the High
Court had consistently taken the view that there could
be an equitable assignment of a decree, which would
constitute the assignee an assignee for the purpose
of Order XXI, rule 16 and that what the Court must
consider was not merely a legal assignment but also
an assignment which operated in equity. They then
considered the two Bombay decisions which had been
relied upon by the City Civil Court as well as by
Dixit, J. and came to the conclusion that the deed of
assignment fell within the principle of those two
decisions, that it constituted an eqliitable assignment
of the decree which was ultimately passed in favour
of Habib & Sons, that the application for execution
was maintainable under Order XXL rule 16 and dismissed the appeal. The Appellant. applied for and
obtained the necessary certificate under article 133
( 1) ( c) of the Constitution.
Order XXI, rule 16 provides for an application for
execution by transferee of a decree and runs as
under:"Where a decree: ................... is transferred
by assignment in writing or by operation of law, the
transferee may apply for execution of the decree to
the Court which passed it; and the decree may be executed in the same manner and subject to the same
conditions as if the application were made by such
rlecree-hloder:
(1) [1877] I.L.R. I I Bom. 506.
('l) I.L.R. [1946] Bom. 276.
. 1955
Jugalkishore Saraf
.v.
Raw Cotton
Co. Ltd.
BhagwatiJ.
1410
1955
Jugalkishore Saraf
v.
Raw Cotton
'Co. Ltd.
·Bhagwati J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19551
Provided that, where .the decree ................. .
has been transferred by assignment, n.otice of· such
application shall be given to the transferor and the
judgment-debtor, and the decree shall not be executed
until
(if any) to
. the .Court has heard their objections
,,
its execuaon ......................... .
The transfer contemplated under this rule is either
by assignment in writing or by operation of law. It '.was not contended by the Appellant at any stage of
the proceedings that there was in this case a transfer
by operation of law or that the agreement dated the
7th February 1949 was not an assignment of all -the
rights which Habib & Sons had in connection with
the Indian business. The question therefore that falls
to be considered is whether the deed of· assignment
dated the 7th February 1949 operates as
a transfer
of. the decree by assignment in writing within the
meanirig of Order XXI, rule 16 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
A strict and narrow construction has been put
upon. the. worc\s "where a decree.·... is transferred by
assignment in writing" by the High Court of Madras
in Basroovittil Bhandari v. Ramchandra Kamthi(") and
.the , decisions following. it, pa~ticular)y Kangati Ma~a
nandi Reddi v. Panikalap.ati Venkatappa .& Another ( 2 )
and by the High :c0urt of. Calcutta in Mathurapore
Zamindary .Co. Ltd, v. Bhasaram Manda! (") which is
followed . in Prabashinee Debi v. Rasiklal Banerji ·(').
They · have held that 'the words "decree-holder" rhust
be construed as meaning decree-holder 'in fa2t and
not as including ·a .Party .who in equity rriay. afterwards become entitled to the rights of the · actual
decree-holder and that the language of Order XXI,
rule 16 (old· section 232) cannot be construed so as to
apply ·to a case ·where there was no decree· in existence
at the time of .the ·:assignment and this ·position was
in effect conGeded by Dixit, J. and by· the Division
-Berich when -they observed that on •a strict construe· ( ;) (;907) i7 Madra~ L'aw .Journal"391.
(2) A.LR. 1942 Madras 21.
(3) (1924) I.L.R. 51 Calcutta 703.
(4) (1931) I.L.R. 59 Calcutta 297.
-
-
S.C.R.
-
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Hll
tion of Order XXI, rule 16 there was no assign_ment of
the decree in favour of the Respondents.
A contrary view has however been taken by the
High Court of Bombay in Purmananddas Jiwandas v.
Vallabdas Wallji(1) and Chimanlal Hargovinddas v.
Gulamnabi (2). These two decisions have applied the
equitable principle enunciated 'by Sir George Jessel,
M. R. in Collyer v. !Jaacs( 3 ) as under:"The creditor had a mortgage security on existing chattels and also the benefit of what in form was
an assignment of non-existing chattels which might
be afterwards brought on to the premises. That
assignment, in fact, constit:Uted only a contract .to
give him the after-acquired chattels. A mar.i cannot
in equity, any more than at law, assign what has no
existence. A man can contract to assigri property which
is to come into existence in the future, and when it
has come irito existence, equity, treating as done that
which ought to be done, fastens. upon that property,
and the contract to assign 'thus becomes a complete
assignment". ·
·
The ·High Court of Calcutta also applied the same
principle in Purna Chandra Bhowmik v. Barna Kumari
Debi(') and the High Court of' Madras . in Kangati
Mahanandi Reddi v. Panikalapati Venkatappa and
another(") observed that if the matter were res integra
much might perhaps be said for the contention that
the assignee under simi_lar · circumstances . .could execute the' decree under Order XXI, rule 16.
The decision in Purmananddas Jivandas v. V allabdas Wallji( 1 )' and the equitable principle enunciate_d
therein was brought to the notice of the learned
Judges who decided· the case of ·Mathurapore· Zamindary Co. Ltd. v. Bhasaram Mandal( 6 ) but was· negatived · by them and they relied upon the observations
of the Privy Council in dealing ·with a somewhat
similar provision contained in Section 208 of Act . VIII
of 1859 in the, case of Abedo.onissa Khatoon v. Ameeroonissa Khatoon (7): •
:(1) (1877) l.L.R: 11 Born. 506.
.
(3) L, R. 19 Ch. D. 342.
(2) l.L.R. 1946 Born. 276.
(4) I. L. R. [1939] 2 Calcutta 341.
(:i) A.;I.R. 1942 Madras 21:
(6) [1924] I.L.R. 51 Calcutta 703.
(7) (1876) L..R.,4 L.A. 66. ··' . ;
1955
Jugalkishore Saraf
v.
Raw Cotton
Co. Ltd.
Bhagwati ].
1412
1955
Jugalkishore Saraf
v.
Raw Cotton
Co. Ltd.
' BhagwatiJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
"Their Lordships have· further to observe, that
they agree with the Chief Just;ce in the view which
he expressed,-that this was not a section intended
to apply to case~ where a serious contest arose with
respect to the rights of persons to an equitable interest in a decree".
Rankin, C.J. laid stress upon this aspect of the question and delivered a similar opinion in Prabhashinee
Debi v. Rasiklal Banerji(' ) at page 299 :"There seem to be two possible views of the rule.
One view would be to say that there must be a decree
in existence and a . transfer in writing of that decree.
That is the strict view-a view which the courts in
India have taken. The. only other possible view
would be to say that, while other cases are within the
rule-such as cases where a person claims to be entitled 'in equity under an agreement to the benefit of
the decree-it is optional with the courts to give
effect to the rule according as the case is a clear one
or one which requires investigation of complicated
facts or difficult questions of law unsuited for discuss10n on a mere execution application. In that
view, if it were understood that the court had a complete discretion to apply the rule or not, it might be
that the rule would be workable; but I do not think
that any such discretion as that is !ntended to be
given by the rule" and he fortified himself in his
conclusion by relying upon the deletion of the words
"if that Court thinks fit the de.cree may be executed"
when the Civil Procedure Code of 1908 was
enacted.
Order XXI, rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure is a statutory provision for execution by the
transferee of a· decree and unless and until a person
applying for execution establishes his title . as the
transferee of ·a decree he cannot claim the. benefit
of that provision. He may establish his title by proving
that he is a transferee of a decree by assignment in
writing or by operation of law. Section 5 of the
Transfer of Property Act defines a "transfer of pro(1) [1931] I. L. R. 59 Calcutta 297.
..1,
-
S.C,R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1413
perty" as an act by which the transferor conveys property in present or in future to the transferee or transfern~s. A transfer of a decree by assignment in writing may be effected by conveying the decree in present
or in future to the transferee. But even for the transfer to operate in future the decree which is the subject matter of the transfer must be in existence at
the date of the transfer. The words "in present or
in future" qualify the word "conveys" and not· the
word "property" in the section and it has been held
that a transfer of property that is not in existence
operates as a contract to be performed in the future
which may be specifically enforced as soon as the property comes into existence. As was observed by the
Privy Council in Rajah Sahib Perhlad v. Budhoo(1) :-
-
l
"But how can there be any transfer, actual or
constructive, upon a contract under which the vendor
sells that of which he has not possession, and to which
he may never establish a title? The bill of sale in such
a case can only be evidence of a contract to be performed in future, and upon the happening of a contingency, of which the purchaser may claim a specific
performance, if he comes into Court shewing that he
has himself done all that he was bound to do".
It is only by the operation of the equitable principle
that as soon as the property comes into existence
and is capable of being identified, equity taking as
done that which ought to be done fastens upon the
property and the contract to assign thus becomes a
complete equitable assignment. In the case of a decree
to be passed in the future therefore there could be no
assignment of the decree unless and until the decree
was passed and the agreement to assign fastened on
the decree and thus became a complete equitable
assignment. The decree not being in existence at the
date of the transfer cannot be said to have been transferred by the assignment in writing and the matter
resting merely in a contract to be performed in the
future which may be specifically enforced as soon as
the decree was passed there would . be no transfer
( 1) [1869] 12 M. I. A. 275.
1955
Jugalkishore Saraf
v.
Raw Cotton
Co. Ltd.
Bhagwati].
1414
1955
Jugalkishore Saraf
v.
Raw Cotton
Go. Ltd.
Bhagwati ).
SUf']lEME QOURT REPORTS
[1955J
automatically in. favour of the "transferee" of the
decree when passed. It would .require a further act on
the part of the "transferor" to completely effectuate
the transfer and if he did not do so the only remedy
of the "transferee" would be, to sue for specific performance of the contract to transfer. There would
therefore be no legal transfer or assignment of the
decree to be passed in future. by virtue of the assignment in writing executed before the. decree came into
existence and the only way in which the transferee
could claim that the decree was transferred to him by
assignment in writing would ·be by the operation of
the equitable principle above enunciated and .the contract to assign having become a complete equitable
assignment of :the de~ree.
Is there any warrant for importing tllis equitable
principle while construing the statutory provision
enacted in Order XXI, rule 16 ·of· the Code of Civil
Procedure? The Code of Civil · Procedure does not
prescribe · ahy mode in · which. an assignment in
writing has got to be executed 'in order to effectuate a transfer of ·a decree. The only other statutory
provision i;, regard to assignments .in writing is ·to
be found in Chapter VIII of the Transfer, of Property
Act which ·relates to transfers' of actionable Claims
and an actionable claim has been defined in section
3 of the Act as "a claim to . any debt. ........... or to
any ·beneficial :interest in moveable property not in
the possession, . either . ·actual or constructive; of the
claimartt, which the Civi-1 Courts recognize as ·affording 'grounds for relief ...... : ... ". ·A judgment debt or
decree is not· ·an actionable · claim· for no· action is
necessary to tealise it. It has already been the subject :of . an action and is · secured ·by · the · decree.·· A
decree to be ··passed in future· also does not tome ·as
such' within ·rhe definition of an ·actionable claim -and
an assignment or -transfer thereof need 'not ·be effected
in the manne~ prescribed hy sectidn 130 of the Transfer of Property -Act. If therefore the assignment· ·or
transfer of a decree to- ' be ' passed in the -future ·does
hcit" require to ·be effectuated in the manner prescribed
in the stan1te there would be no objection to the
...
y
S.C.R.
-
...
SUPREME COURT REJ?ORT,S
1415
operation of the equitable principle above enunciated
and the contract to assign evidenced by the assignment in writing becoming a complete equitable assignment of the decree when passed. The assignment in
writing of the decree to be passed would thus result in a contract to assign which contract to assign
would become a complete equitable assignment on
the decree being .passed and would fulfil the requirements of Order XXI, rule 16 in so far· as the
assignment or the transfer of the decree would in
that. event be cfiectuated by an assignment in writing
which became a complete equitable assignment of the
decree when passed. There is nothing in the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code or any other law
which prevents the operation of this equitable principle and in working out the rights and liabilities of the
transferee of a decree oh the one hand and the decreeholder and the judgment debtor on the other, there
is no warrant for r.eading the words "where a decree
.............. is transferred by assignment in writing"
in the strict· and narrow sense in· which they . have
been read ·by the High Court of Madras in Basroovittil Bhandari v. Ramchandra Kamthi(1) and the High
Court of Calcutta in Mathurapore Zamindary Co. ·Ltd.
v. Bhasaram Mani:lal(2) and Prabashinee · Debi v. R.asiklal Banerji( 3 ). It is significant to observe that the
High Court of Calcutta in Purna Chandra Bhowmik v.
Barna 'Kumari Debi( 4 ) ·applied this equitable principle
and held that the plaintiff in whose favour the defendant had executed a mortgage bond assigning bv way
of sec:unty the decree tha.t would be passed ' in a
suit . instituted by him against a third party · for recovery of money .due on unpaid bills for work done
wa.s entitled ·to: a .declaration that he was the assignee
of 'the decree passed ·. in · favour of the defendants ·and
was as such entitled to ·realise the decretal debt either
amic·ably or by execution. ·If the ··plaintiff was thus
declared to be the assighee of the •decree< subsequently
passed in favour of the defendant and · entitled · to
realise the :decteta:l amount by. execution he could
(1) [1907] 17 M.L.J. 391.
(3) [1931] l.L.R. 59 Cal. 297.
(2). [1924] I.L.R.51 Cal. 703.
(4) I.L.R. [1939] .2 Cal. 341.
1955
Jugalkishore Saraf
v.
Raw Cotton
Co. Ltd.
Bhagwati J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1955
Jugalkishore Saraf
v.
Raw Cotton
Go. Ltd.
·-
BhagwatiJ.
[1955]
apply for execution of the decree and avail himself
of the provisions of Order XXI, rule 16 as . the assignee
of the decree which was passed subsequent to the date
of the assignment in writing in his favour. There
could be no objection to decide questions involving
investigation of complicated facts or difficult questions of law in execution proceedings, as section 47 of
the Code of Civil Procedure authorises the Court executing the decree to decide all questions arising therein and relating to execution of the decree and subsection (2) further authorises the executing Coiirt · to
treat a proceeding under the section as a suit thus
obviating the necessity of filing a separate suit for the
determination of the same. The line of decisions of
the High Court of Bombay beginning with Purmana11ddas /ivandas v. Vallabdas 'Wallji(') and ending
with
Chimanlal Hargovinddas
v. Gulamnabi(') · importing
the equitable principle above enunciated therefore
appears to me to be more in consohance with law and
equity than the strict and narrow interpretation put
on the words "where a decree ............ is transferred
by assignment in writing" by the High . Courts of
Madras and Calcutta in the decisions above noted.
Even if an equitable assignment be thus construed
as falling within an "assignment in writing" contemplated by Order XXI, rule 16 of the Code of Civil
Procedure it would in terms. require an assignment of
the decree which was to be passed in the future in
favour of the assignor. In the present case, it is impossible to read the deed of assignment dated the 7th
February, 1949 as expressiy or by necessary implication assigning in favour of the Respondent the decree
which was going to be ·passed by the City Civil Court
in favour ·of Habib & Sons. There is however another
aspect of the matter which was not urged before the
Courts below in the present case nor does it appear
to have been considered in most of the judgments
above referred . to.
There is no .doubt on the authorities that a mere
transfer of property as such does not by itself spell out
(1) [1877] I.L.R: 11 Born. 506,
(2) I.L.R. 1946 Born. 276.
...
...
l
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1417
a transfer of a decree which has been passed or may
be passed in respect of that property/ and it would
require an assignment of such decree in order to
effectuate the transfer (vide Hansraj Pal v. Mukhraji
Kunwar & others(1), Mathurapore Zamindary Co. Ltd. v.
Bhasaram Mandal(2), and Kangati Mahanandi Reddi v.
Panikalapati Venkatappa & another( 3 ). Where however
the property which is transferred is an actionable
claim within the meaning of its definition in section 3
of the Transfer of Property Act the consequences of
such transfer would be different. An actionable claim
means a claim to any debt, or to any beneficial interest in moveable property not in the possession, either
actual or constructive, of the claimant, which the
Civil Courts recognize as affording grounds for relief,
and a transfer of an actionable claim when effected
by an instrument in writing signed by the transferor
is under section 130 of the Act complete and effectual
upon the execution of such instrument, and thereupon
all the rights and remedies of the transferor, whether
by way of damages or otherwise, vest in the transferee, whether such notice of the transfer as is therein
provided be given to the debtor or not. If the book
debt or the property which is an actionable claim is
thus transferred by an assignment in writing all the
rights and remedies of the transferor in respect thereof including the right to prosecute the claim to judgment in a Court of law either in a pending litigation
or by institution of a suit for recovery of the same
vest in the transferee immediately upon the execution
of the assignment as a necessary corollary thereof.
Not only is the actionable claim thus transferred but
all the necessary adjuncts or appurtenances thereto
are transferred along with the same to the transferee.
Section 8 of the Act provides that unless a different
intention is expressed or necessarily implied, a transfer of property passes forthwith to the transferee all
the interest which the transferor is then capable of
passing in the property and in the legal incidents
thereof. These incidents include where the property is
(1) [1908] I. L.R. 30 AU. 28.
(2) [1924] I.L.R. 51 Cal. 703.
(3) A.LR. 1942 Mao. 21.
1955
...,...,,,.
Jugalkishore Saraf
y.
Raw Cotton
Co. Ltd.
Bhagwati].
1418
-
1955
Jugalkiihore Saraf
v.
ROw·Cotton
C•. Ltd.
Bhagwati].
SuPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955)
a debt or other ·actionable claiin, the securities!·: therefor. ............... but not arrears of interest ·accrued
before the transfer. In cases· of transfer of book debts
or property coming within the definition. of ': a<:tionable claim there is therefore necessarily involved also
a transfer· of the transferor's right in a decree which
may be passed in his favour in a pending litigation
and the moment a decree is passed in his favour by
the ·court of law, that decree· is also automatitall y
transferred . '1 favour of the transferee by virtue of
the assignment in writing already executed by the
transferor. The debt which is the subject-matter of
the' claim· is merged in the decree and the transferee
of the actionable claim becomes entitled by virtue of
the assignment in writing in his favour not only to
the book debt but :also to the decree in which it has
merged. The book debt does not lose its · character
of a debt by its being merged in the decree and the
transferee is without anything more entitled to the
benefit of the decree passed by the court of law in
favour of the transferor. It would have been open
to the transferee after the execution of the ·deed of
assignment in his favour to take steps under Order
XXII, ·rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure to have
himself substituted in the pending litigation as plaintiff in place and stead of the transferor and prosecute
the claim to judgment; but even if he did not do so
he is not deprived of the benefit of the decree ultimately passed by the court of law in favour of· the
transferor, the only disability attaching to his position being that under section 132 of the Act he would
take the actionable claim subject to all the liabilities
and equities to which the transferor was subject in
respect thereof at the date of the transfer. The
transferee of the actionable claim thus could step
into the shoes of the transferor and claim to be the
transferee of the decree. by virtue of the assignment
'in writing executed by the transferor in his. favour
and could therefore claim to execute the decree as
transferee under Order XXI, rule 16 of the Code of
Civil Procedure.
This aspect could not be considered by the High
..
...
S.CR.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1419
Court of Bombay in Purmananddas- /ivandas v: Vallabdas Wallji(1) because the assignment there was executed on the 11th May, 1870, i.e. before the enactment
of the Transfer of Property Act in 1882. The Court
therefore applied the equitable principles and came
to the conclusion that the equitable assignment which.
was completed on the passing of the decree was covered
bv the old section 232 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
lt was also not considered by the Full Bench of the
High Court of Bombay in Chimanlal Hargovinddas v.
·Gulamnabi(2) nor by Dixit, J. or by the Division Bench
in the present case. The High Court of Patna in
Thakuri Cope and Others v. Mokhtar Ahmad & An-0ther( 3) , went very near it when it observed that all
that was transferred was an actionable claim, but did
not work out the consequences thereof and its reasoning was deflected by the consideration of the equitable principles and the applicability thereof while construing the provisions of Order XXI, rule 16 of the
Code of C!vil Procedure. The High Court of Calcutta
in Purna Chandra Bhowmik v. Barna Kumari Debi (4)
definitely adopted this position and observed at p.
344:-
.
"In my opinion, what was transferred was the
daim to a debt and as such would come within the
definition of actionable claim as given in section 3 of
the Transfer of Property Act. The mere fact that
the claim was reduced by the Court did not make; in
my opinion, any difference".
It no doubt applied the equitable principle also and
held that the mortgage must be deemed tu have attached itself to the decree which was for a definite
amount as soon as the decree was passed, but further
observed that the plaintiff was entitled to a declaration that she was an assignee of the decree and if she
got that declaration it would be open to her to apply
for execution of the decree under Order XXI, rule 16
of the Code of Civil Procedure. I am sure that if this
aspect of the question had been properly presented to Dixit, J. or the Division Bench in the
(1) [1877] I.L.R. 11 Born. 506.
(3) A.LR. 1922 Patna 563.
(2) I.L.R. 1946 Born. 276.
(4) I. L. R. [1939] 2 Cal. 341.
1955
Jugalkishore Saraf
v.
Raw Cotton
Co. Ltd.
BhagwatiJ;
1420
:055
Jugalkis!Wie Saraf
v.
Raw.Cotton
Co. Ltd.
BhagwahJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
'19-~1
l J~_,
present case they also would have come to the same
conclusion.
Mr. Umrigar, learned counsel for the Respondents;
further urged that even if the Respondents were not
entitled to the benefit of Order XX!, rule 16 of the
Code of Civil Procedure they were the true owners of
the debt and the decree which was ultimately passed
by the City Civil Court in favour of Habib and Sons
by virtue of the deed of assignment dated the 7th
February 1949 and that under section 146 of the Code
of Civil Procedure execution proceedings could be
taken and application for execution could be made by
them as persons claiming under Habib & Sons. The
deed of assignment transferred the debt which was
the subject matter of the pending litigation in the
City Civil Court between Habib & Sons and the
Appellant. Habib & Sons could have taken proceedings in execution and made the application for execution of the decree against the Appellant and the Respondents claiming under Habib & Sons by virtue of
the deed of assignment were therefore entitled to take
the execution proceedings and make the application
for execution under Order XXI, rule 11 of the Coc!e
of Civil Procedure. He also urged that Order XXI,
rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure did not prohibit
such execution proceedings at the instance of the
Respondents and for this purpose relied upon the
observations of the learned Judges of the High Court
of Madras in Kangati Mahanandi Reddi v. Panikalapati
Venkatappa & another (') at page 23 :"We are unable to hold that merely because rule
16 has been interpreted as applying only to ·decrees
m existence at the time of the transfer, it prohibits
an application by a transferee who obtained the transfer of a decree, a transfer which is legally valid and
is embodied in a written deed (as rule 16 requires) before the necree was actually passed. To permit execution by mch a transferee, in our opinion, in no way
violates the principles which are embodied in rule 16
or in Order XXI generally. The appellant here is the
(1) A.LR. 1942 Mad. 21
-.'
••
~·
...
..
~
S.C.R.
-
-
SUPREME'COURT REPORTS
1421
195:,
true owner of the · decree,· and he has his written title
-deed, and that· is all that the law requires''..
Jugalkishore S•,a.f
v.
It was however urged on behalf of the Appellant that
Raw Cotton
section 146 did not apply because Order XXI, rule 16
Co. Ltd.
was a specific provision in the Code of Civil Procedure
BhagwatiJ
which applied when a person other than a decreeholder wanted to execute the decree and if the Respondents could not avail themselves of Order XXI, rule
16 of the Code of Civil Procedure they could not avail
themselves of section 146 also. Reliance was placed
in support of this contention on a decision of the High
Court of Patna in Thakuri Gope and others v. Mokhtar
Ahmad and another( 1 ) and another decision of the High
Court of Allahabad in Shib Charan Das v. Ram
Chander & Others(2). This contention of the Appellant is obviously unsound. Order XXI, rule 16 provides · for execution of a decree at the instance of a
transferee by assignment in writing or by operation
of law and enables such transferee to apply for execution of the decree to the Court which passed it. If a
transferee of a decree can avail himself of that provision by establishing that he is such a transferee he
must · only avail himself of that provision. But if he
fails to· establish his title ·as a transferee by assignment in writing or by operation of law within the
meaning of Order XXI, rule 16 of the Code of Civil
Procedure there is nothing in the provisions of Order
XXI, rule 16 which prohibits him from availing himself of section 146 if the provisions of that section can
be availed of by him. That is the only meaning of
the expression "save as otherwise provided by this
Code". If a person does not fall within the four
corners of the provision of Order XXI, rule 16 of the
Code of Civil Procedure that provision certainly does
not apply to him and the words "save as otherwise
provided in this Code" contained in section 146 would
not come in . the way of his availing himself of section .
146 because Order XXI, rule 16 cannot then be construed as an "otherwise provision" contai11ed in the
Code. I am therefore of the opinion that if the Respondents could not avail themselves of Order XXI,
(1) A.I.R. 1922 Patna 563.
16-9) ·s. C. India/59
(2) A.I.R. 1922 All. 98.
[1!955]
11122
•955
Jugdlkislzore · Saraf
v.
Raw Catton
Co. Ltd.
B~agwatiJ.
rule .Hi' of, the• C0 de ;of 1Ci,vil ,ProGedµre they p;iµJd .certainly under ;the. ,circumstan\:es ·•@f the, ·prqent ...case
~ake the ··:execJ.ition. :pr.©ceedUi;gs .and .make ,):he. :1ppli·cation for execution of .the decree pa5ied , by: ..the City
Civil Court in fa"our of Habib & Sons under section
.146 •©f the Civil P.i;ocedure Code.
'
,
. A.n objection was however. taken •on behalf of the
:Appellant during ·the .course : 1of. the argu!'l}~nts before
:us though'. ll'to such objection was taken ip ·the Couns
below, .ihat :the ·application :for execution ,made by the
Respondents was u;ldeative inasmuch as it was ·not an
application 'in proper form . under Order XXI; 'rule 11
.of the Code. nf. Civil .Procedure. Qrder XXI, rule 11.(2)
('j) prescribes that· :particulars in r.egard to the. mode
in whicli. the :assistance of the ·Court was required
should be set out therein. The .respondents had . in
their application for ·execution filed. before .the City
Civil , Court not mentioned .any of these particulars
·but had only stated that the Court should declare
them the assignees ·of .the decree as the , decretal debt
:alon:g with ·other ·debts were transferred ,by Habib ,&
Sorrs to ,.tihem by :the deed caf assignment dated the
.7th February 1949 which was ·con'firmed by, the Custoaia:n :of Evacuee Property, Bombay and should
order :them to be substituted for Habib & .Sons.· This
was mo compliance with the provisions ,of -Order XXI,
'.rule 11'(2) (j) . and therefore there was no .proper. ·application for execution before the Court and n:he same was
liable to be dismissed. Reliance was place.cl ·in support
:of this contention ,on .a decision, of the High ·Court ·of
Calcutta ~n J$.adha Nath ]}as v. Produmna .Kumar Sar1'\ar('), ;where >it was held dissenting from a decision
of the High Court of Bombay .in Baijnath . Ramchander· "" Binjraj foowarmal Batia.& Co:(') that under
Order XXI, mle 16 •of the Code ·of Ci.vii Procedure. the
.assignee.. : of. ·a ·decree cannot . make two. :applications,
:one for- 'teG©rding . the :assignment and ·another for
executling ..'the «lecree. 'The as.siguee ·df . a decree, could
.only ma'ke,.one•'application for :execution •under •Order
XXI, .. r;uk 11. .of the Code :of·.Civil Prncedure specifying
;fuerein,;the. mode .·in which ;the assistance .. of the.•Court
(') I. L. R. [rg39) 2' C~lcutta 325.
.
'
'
•
' - .1
l. {'
.
(2) I.L.R.i93,7 Bombay 09>.
.
- ' ''
' ~ '·
'
.
i
....
was . !!~.quired and it was :only ·;after. 1such applimtiqn
had been made to the ·C0urt. ·which . passed the. .decree
tha,t the Court woµld issue notice under, Order ,XXI,
rule 16 . to the . transferor aqd . the judgment debtor and
the. decree would not •be .executed until the Court had
heard . their obfeccions if any to :its 'execution. Sen~ J.
in that case observed at page 327 :-·
"It seems to me to be o,bvious from the wording
of t11e rule that there. can be no notice to the transfewr
or ' judgment-debtor and'
he;µ-ing of any ' objection
unless and until there is an application for execution.
The notice and the entire proceedings · under Order
XXI, rule 16, orjginate from an application for .execution. If .there -is no sµch application .the proceedings are. without . any foundation. Order XXl, rule
16, of the Code nowhere provides for an application
to :record an assignment .or for an application for leave
.to execute a decree ~y .an assignee or for an application for substitution".
,
This in my opinion correctly sets out the position ·in
law .and in so .far as the two decisions of the High
Court <Gf Bombay in Baijnath Ramchander v.. Binjnzj
Joowarmal Batia & Co.(1) and Krishna Govind Patil v.
Moolchand Keshavchand Gujar( 2 ) .decide anything to
the .contrary they are not .correct. The .position was
clarified by a later decision of the High Court of
Bombay in Bhagwant Balajirao and -Others v.. Rajaram Sajnaji & Others(3) where Rajadhyaksha and
Macklin, JJ. held, following Radha Nath !Jas v,. Pmdumna Kumar $arkar( 4 ) .that an application made by
-an assignee of a .decree must under O.r.der X:XI, rule
16 be for the executioa of the decree and not merely
for the recognition of the assignment and for leave to
execute the decree. Lt ·was .urged before . the .learned
Judges· that .the practice in the High Courl of ,Boµibay
was to. entertain :applications of _this kirid, but; they
observed that the ,practice if such a practice· prevfii)ed
v,vas: opposed . to :the, pi:oyisions .of the Order. X~,
. rule 16. of the Co.de of. Civil Pr9cedu,t:e. The ~ont(1Iltion
t~erapi::e :i,i,rged on.· be,half ro.f . the. · AppeJ,l~nt ,,.;1:µ<1r.1, the
no
(1) I.L.R. 1937 Born. 691.
(3) A.LR. 1947 Born. 157·
(2) A.I..R. 194i ,B<>1r» 302 ,(l'.B.).
(4) I. L ... R. '[193g.); z 'C:a\;. 325.
.'
-,
.. -·· - "
~
11955
:jt;galkiskore ..Sartif
v.;
:Raw Catton
Co. Ltd.
'B,hagwatiJ.
1424
1955
:JugalkishMC ·sartfJ
v.:
Raw Cotton
Co. Ltd.
Bhagwati ],
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[-19551
application for· execution :·in the present case ·.was defective appears to have some foundation.: •
_ ..
·'
This defect however · was· not ·such as lo preclude
the Respondents from obtaining the ·necessary " rdie[
The application which was filed by' them 'in -the" Cicy
Civil Court ·was headed "application for· ·execution
under Order XXI, rule 11 of the Code of Civil · _Pi:oce'
dure" and the only defect ·was in the specification _of
the mode in which 'the assistance ·of the Court was re'
quired: The particulars which were required· to be filled
in column ·l were not in accordance with the requirements of Order XXI, rule ll(Z)(j) and· sh:oiild have
specified one· of the modes therein prescribed ·and certainly 'a declaration· that the respondents •were the
assignees of the decree and · the order for their substitution af the pliintiffs was certainly . not one of the
prescribed modes which· were required to be ·specified
in that column. · ·The. 'practice 'which prevailed in the
Bigh Court of J3ombay as recognised· in · Baijnath
Ramchander v. Binjraj foowarm·at Batia & Cb.C1) and
also in Bhagwant Balajirao :and. others v.. Rajaram
Sajnaji & others(') appears to have been the only
justification for making the application: iri the manner
which · the respondents · did. That defect however
according to the very same ·decision in Bhagwant Ealajirdo and others v. Rajaram Sajnaji & others(') ·was
purely technical and might be allowed to l:le cured by
amendment of the application. As ·a matter of fact
Order XXt, rule 17 lays down the procedure on .receiv-ing applications for execution of a decree and enjoim
upon the Court the duty 'to ascertain whether · such
of -the requirements of rules 11 to 14 as may be arplicable to the case have been complied with and ·if
they have not been complied with the Court has ·to
reject the application or allow the defect to be remedied then and there or within a time to be fixed by it.
When the application for execution in the present
case was received by the City Civil Court, the Court
should have scrutinised the application as required by
Order XXI, rule 17(1) and if it was found that the
(1) I.LR. 1937 Born. 691.
(21 A.I~R. 1947 Born. 157.
-
S.G;R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
H25
requirements of rules U to 14. as may be applicable
were not complied with as .is . contended for by the
Appellant; the. Court should have rejected. the application or allowed the· defect to be remedied then and
there or within a time to be fixed by the Court. Nothing of the kind was · ever .done by the City Civil Court
nor was any objection in that behalf· .taken on behalf
of the Appellant at -,any time until the mat£er - came
before this Court. . · .
.
. . . · . . . .. . .
On. the . 27th March, 1952 however a further application for . execution was filed . by the . Respondents. in
the City Civil Court specifying in column 'J' .the mode
in which .the assistance of the Court . was required
and it was by ordering attachment.and sa.le . of the
moveable property of. the Appellant therein specified.
This further applicatio.µ for execution was a sufficient
compliance with the provisiqns of Order XXI, rule 11
(2) (j) and was sufficient under the . circumstances to
cure the defect, if any, in the . original application. for
execution made by the Respondents to the City Civil
Court on . the 25th April, 1951. This objection of the
Appellant therefore is devoid of any substance . and
does· not avail him.
The appeal accordingly fails and 1s dismissed · with
costs.
..,.
•
IMAM J.-I have had the advantage of perusing
the judgments of my learned brethren·. I agree .that
the appeal must be dismissed with costs and in the
view expressed by them that the respondent should be
permitted under the provisions of section 146 of the
Code of Civil Procedure to execute the decree passed
in favour of Habib & Sons, as one claiming under the
latter.
The document under which the respondent· claimed
to exernte the· decree· was treated as a deed of transfer
in the .courts below and not merely ·as an agreement to
transfer, By. this document there was a· transfer of all
the book and. other debts due to Habib & Sons in connection wich the Indian business and the full benefit
of all securities . for the debts. The · document, however, neither in terms, nor by any reasonable inter-
·1955
Jugalkishore ·Sarqf
y.,
Raw Cotton
Co. Ltd.
BhagwatiJ.
,
142U:
.,
rgss·
.'.
'
SUPREl\IE .COURT REPORTS
'
.
..
'. \
.
.
..
[1955]'
..
. · pretation of its contents :purported
to· transfer ·any
1
; . alkishore·s~,; _decree which Ha.bib & Sons may obtain in the fu.ture.
g
..-.·
It seems. to me, therefore, that the respondent. cankaw Cotton • not claim to be a transferee of the decree; which was
Co.Lta.'· \ subsequently 'obtained by Habib & Sons, by.an assign- .
ment in writirig within the meaning ·of Order XXI,
rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure. · .
..
·, Order XXI of the Code of Civil' Procedure' relates
to execution of decrees and orders. . ·Rule 1 of that
Order relaies to payments under a decree which· has
been passed:· Rules 4 to 9. relate to the transfer of an
existing decree for execution.· The normal rule is that
a decree can be executed only by the person in whose
nanie it ·stands and rule IO enables him to do so, :while
l'ule 16 of Order XXI; enables· the transferee of the
decree 'to execute it in the same manner · and subject
to the same conditions as
application for execution made by the decree-holder. · It seems· to ·.me,
therefore, that there must be a decree· iii·' existence
which is transferred before the transferee• can benefit
from the provisions of rule 16.' ~ ·. The . ordinary : and
natural meaning ·of tlie· words' of rule' 16 can carry: no
.. other interpretation and the question' a strict and
narrow interpretation of its provisions .does not arise.
The position of an assignee, before a decree is passed,
is amply safeguarded by the provisions of Order XXII,
rule 10, which enables him' to obtain. the leave of the
Courtto coritinue:the suit. Thereafter the decree, if
any,would be in his name which he'could execute. I
agree with my learned brother Das, J., that the pro•
visions of Order· XXI, rule 16 contemplate the actual
transfer by a·n assignment in writing of a decree after
it' is passed and that while a transfer of or an agreement to transfer a decree that may be passed in
future may; in equity, entitle the intending transferee
to claim. the beneficial interest in the decree after it is
·passed; such equitable transfer does not :render· the
transferee a transferee of the decree by assignment in
·writing •within tire .meaning of Order XXI, rule 16. In
this respect the decisions of:the Madras High Court
in . Basroovittil Bhandari v. Ramchandra Kamthi(')
an'
of
(1) (1907) 17 M.L.J. 391_,
.. ,
...
...
!
-oj
.I
S.C~R ..
SUPREllIE COURT REPORTS·
1427
and of the Calcutta High Court in. 11Iathurapore
19;5
Zamindary Co. Ltd. v. Bhasaram · lllandal(') and
lk"-h·
5
Prabashinee Debi v. Rasiklal Banerji(') are correct. Juga '' v":'. ara/
As at present advised, I would like to express no
RawC-Otton
opinion as to whether the expression "by operation
· Co. Ud.
of law" can be given the interpretation suggested by
ImamJ.
my learned brother Das, J., as it is uiinecessary to do
so in the present appeal. .
·
·
· ·
·. Appeal di;"inissed.
·
·
··
·
·
1955
SHIVNANDAN ·SHARl\IA
. v.
THE PUNJAB NATIONAL
BANK LTD.· ·
.
-
March 15
--
[ViviA:N Bos~, JAG~NNADHADAS and SINIIA JJ.].
-. ' . Master and servant-Banker-Agreement .. between Bank and
.
'
TreasUrers~Treasurers, wheth'e:Y sirvantS or independent - contractors
-Cashier appointed by Treasitrer-Whether servant of the Bank.
l
_ .
. ,
{.
•
·l
. The appellant was appoiµted head. cashier in one of the branches
.
..
I
.
•
'
•
•
of the .respondent Ballk by,'tbe Tfeasurers who .wer_e ~D. charge Qf~h6
Cash Department of the Bank by virtue of an agreeffient between
them .. The question arose as to whetner the appellant' was' an•: em·
p!oyee of the Bank.
•. · ' ·
·
.1
Held, (i) that the te~s oi the ~gree~ent ciearly showecl that
the Treasurers were servants ofthe Bank and not fodependent con~
tractors; and tha~
-
·1
. (1) [192!] I.L.R. 51 Cal. 703.
(2) [1931] I.L.R. 59 Cal. 297.
!
t
•
1
t
:-" · ... ,
(ii) as the direction and control of the appellant ancl of the
ministerial staff in charge of tlie· Cash Departl!lent of the Bank was
··entirely vested.in:the Bank, the appellan~was an.employee of the
Bank. ·
... ·
., ,
. .... .
t
· · , ·
.
If a ma."sier employ"s a s~rvant and autho.rizes hiin-to e~ploy·a
number of persons to do a. particular job and -to guarantee_the_ii fide~
lity and efficiency for a cash consideration, the ·employe8s thUS appointed by the servant would be, equally with the employer, servants
of the master. ·
... i
. ! · ·;
Th.e question a3 to whose employe0 a parlicUlar :person'; hi h~~
to be determined with reference to tb6 facts ·and( circUmstarices 'of
·each individual case, and among the many ~sts · by which to as~r
tain who is the employer, the most satisfactory one is to ask who fa
entitled to tell the employee the way in which ha is to .do the work
upon which he is enga:;ed. ·
· .
:
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