D. P. JOSHI versus THE STATE OF MADHYA BHARAT AND ANOTHER
Supreme Court of India | Decided 27 January 1955 | [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1215 | 1955 INSC 3
Key facts
- Decided
- 27 January 1955
- Bench
- BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA*, VIVIAN BOSE*, B. JAGANNADHADAS, T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR, BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 367/1994
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1215
- Neutral citation
- 1955 INSC 3
Text of the judgment
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1215
1955
D. P. JOSHI
January 27
ti.
THE STATE OF MADHYA BHARAT AND
ANOTHER.
\.
-/
_
C. J., VIVIAN BosE, JAGANNADHADAS,
[ MuKHERJEA
]
VENKATARAMA AYYAR and SINHA
JJ.
Constitution of India, Arts. 14 and 15-Rule laying down that
no capitation fee should be charged from students-Bona fides residents
of Madhya Bharat-But capitation fee should be charged from nonMadhya Bharat students-Whether infringes the Constitution.
The Government of the State of Madhya Bharat substituted the
following new rule for the old rule for admission to the Mahatma
Gandhi Memorial Medical College Indore, when it took over the
administration of the College from a private committee.
"For all students who are 'bona fide residents' of Madhya Bharat
no capitation fee should be charged. But for other non-Madhya
Bharat students the capitation fee should be retained as at present
at Rs. 1,300 for nominees and at Rs. 1,500 for others".
>- /
'
h
'Bona fide resident' for the purpose of this rule was defined as :
"one who is-(a) a citizen of India whose original domicile is in Madhya
Bharat, provided he has not acquired a domicile elsewhere, or
(b) a citizen of India, whose original domicile is not in Madhya
Bhara-t but who has acquired a domicile in Madhya Bharat and has
resided there for not less than 5 years at the date, on which he
applies for admission, or
( c) a person who migrated from Pakistan before September 30,
1948 and intends to reside in Madhya Bharat permanently, or
( d) a person or class of persons or citizens of an area or territory adjacent to Madhya Bharat or to India in respect of whom or
which a Declaration of Eligibility has been made by the Madhya
Bharat Government".
The question for determination was whether the rule infringed
the fundamental rights guaranteed by Arts. 14 and 15(1) of the Constitution.
Held, per VENKATARAMA AYYAR J. (MuKHERJEA C.J., VrvrAN
BosE and SrNHA JJ. concurring, JAGANNADHADAS J. dissenting) that
the rule did not infringe the fundamental rights guaranteed by Art.
15(1) because residence and place of birth are two distinct conceptions with different connotations both in law and in fact, and when
Art. 15(1) prohibits discrimination based on the place of birth, it
cannot be read as prohibiting discrimination based on residence.
1216
1955
· D. P. JosJii
v
The Stal• of
Madhya Bharat
and another
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
Domicile of a person means· his permanent home and is some~
times used in the sense of residence,
Held further, that the imposition of capitation fee on some of
the students and not on others w.as not discrimin,atory as· being in
contravention of Art. 14 of the Constitution, because the classification was based on a ground which had a reasonable relation to the
subject matter of the legislation as the object of the classification
underlying the impugned rule was clearly to help to some extent'· "
students who are residents of Madhya Bharat ill the prosecution Of
their studies and it was quite a laudable object for a State to encourage ,education within its .borders. A classification made on a
,geographical basis would be eminently just and reasonable when it
relates to .education which is the concern .primarily of the State.
Per JAGANNADHADAS J.-There is ~o place for regional domicile in the existing I.ndian Law. In the circumstances the phrase
"original domicile in Madhya Bharat" is meant to convey the "place
of birth (of the applicant) in Madhya Bharat". It is true that "domi· ~
cile of origin" and "place of birth" are two different matters. But
that is so only where, the use of the phrase "domicile of origin" conveys a definite legal meaning. In the present case however, the
phrase "domicile of origin in Madhya Bharat" conveys no legal
meaning, and if any meaning has to be attached to it, then it could
only have reference to the "place of birth".
Therefore, the rule in question has reference to place of birth in
Madhya Bharat primarily, and offends Art. 15 of the Constitution.
EvCn in l~e view that the rule has ieference to thf: juristic concept-··.,/ ""
of regional domicle and for that reason does not fall within the
scope of the inhibition of Art. 15, a distinction baSed on such domi.-cile cannot, in any way, be considered reasonable with reference to
Art. 14 of the Constitution.
Rustam Mody v. State: Sumitra Devi v. State (I.L.R. 1953
Madhya Bharat 87), Whicker v. Hume ([1859] 28 L.J. Ch. 396),
Somerville v. Somerville ([1801] 5 Ves. 750), Winans v. Attorney. General (1904 A.C. 287), Udny v • .Udny ((1869] L.R. 1 Se. & Div.
· 441), Mcmullen v. Wadsworth ([1889] 14 A.C. 631), The State of
Punjab v. Ajaib Singh and another ([1953] S.C.R. 254) and Om Pra- ~
kash v. The State (A.LR. 1953 Punjab 93), referred to.
ORIGINAL Ju&1smCTION : Petition No.. "3fi7 of 1954.
Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for
the enforcement ·of Fundamental Rights.
N. C. Chatterjee and Veda Vyas, (S. K. Kapur and
Ganpat Rai, with them), for the petitioner.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorn~y-Gen_eral of India "(Shiv rl..
Dyal and P. G. Gokhale, with him), for respondent
No. 1.
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1217
1955. January 27. The judgment of Mukherjea
C. J.,
Vivian Bose, Venkatarama Ayyar and Sinha
JJ. was delivered by Venkatarama Ayyar J.
Jagannadhadas J. delivered a separate judgment.
VENKATARAMA AYYAR J.-This is a petition under
"'· .,,, article 32 of the Constitiition. There is at Indore ,a
Medical College known as the Mahatma .. Gandhi
Memorial Medical · College run by the State of Madhya
Bharat. The petitioner who is a resident of Delhi was
admitted as a student of this College ·in July 1952,
and is now studying in the . third year class, M.B ..B.S.
Course. His complaint is that the rules' iI1 ·force in
this institution discriminate in the . matter of fees between students wh<;> are residents of Madhya :Sharat
A and. those w,ho are not, and that the latter have to
pay in addition. to 'the tuition fees <J.ild charges payable
by all the studepts a sum of Rs. 1,5QO per annum as
capitation fee, and that this 'is in contravehti9n. of
articles 14 anq . 15(1) of the Constitution. ·The petitioner accordingly prays ' that an appropriate . writ
might .. pe i~&ued prohibiting ilie respondent (from
~ / collecting from . him capitation. fee . for the , .'current
year, and directing a. refund of Rs. 3,000 colle~ted, Jrom ·
him as capitation fee for the first two years.
-
The re~pcmdent contests . the petition. : In' the affidavit filed on its behalf, it · is stated that the· in~titu
tion in question ' had its origin in, private enterprise,
and· was ·µnd,er . the. management of a Committee; that
it .was the, Committee that had made the ruJe. 'iniposing cap~tation fee on students who did not belong to
~ Madhya Bhar~t, that the , State took <>Ver the College
subject to the ..conditions relating to reservation ·of.
seats under .which it was 'being run, and ·that the requireme,~i: of a capitation, fee from n.ori-residdni:s did
not offend either article 14 or ari:icle 15 ( 1) of the... Con,'
stitution.
A brief narration of the history of the. institution
will be useful .for· a correct appreciation of the conten-'4 tions Off·either side. The beginnings of the institution
go back· to the· year 1878, when a Dr. · Beaumont
started a Medical School at Indore under the •name of
1955
D. P.]oshi
v.
The State ef
Madhya Bharat
and another
1218
1
955
D. P.Joshi
v.
The State of
Madhya Bharat
and another
Venkatarama
Ayyar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
Indore Medical School, as an adjunct .to a hospital
called the Indore Charity Dispensary. It received
considerable financial assistance from the rulers of
Gwalior and other Indian States, and. became well
established; and it is claimed on its behalf that the
medical practitioners of Central India, Rajasthan and
neighbouring States were largely recruited from its
alumni. In 1910 the name of the school was changed ·
to King Edward Memorial School, Indore, and it was
thereafter under the management of a Committee. In
1940 the Committee decided to improve the status of
the School, and started collecting funds for equipping
it as a first-class Medical College. The arrangements
were completed in 1947, and in 1948 the institution
was affiliated to the University of Agra. It then came
to be known as the Mahatma Gandhi Memorial Medical College. In 1950 the College Council resolved to
request the Madhya Bharat Government to take. over
the running of the institution, subject to the arrangements entered into between the institution and certain States and donors for reservation of seat5 for
their nominees. The proposal was accepted by the
respondent, and by resolution dated 17-3-1951 it took ......
over the administration of the College.
__
According to the rules relating to admission to the
·College which were in force at that time, the maximum
number of students who could be admitted in any
year was 50, and they were classed into two groups,
nominees and ordinary students. The Committee had
arranged to raise funds for the institution on a promise that those who contributed Rs. 7,000 would be
entitled to nominate one student each for admission
in.to the . COilege, and that those students called nominees should pay, in addition to the usual fees and
charges, a capitation fee of Rs. 1,300 per annum. Excluding the seats which have thus to be reserved for
the nominees, the remaining seats were thrown open
to all .eligible applicants who came to be called selfnominees, and the requisite number was selected 'from
among them on the basis of merit. Then came the rl
rule which is at the root of the present controversy.
It provided that "Madhya Bharat students are
.
-~
..
S.C.R.
.
.,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1219
exempted from capitation fees". (Vide 1952 Calendar,
page 5 and Exhibit G). After the State took over
the management, it introduced certain modifications
in the rules, and it is with these new rules that the
'present petition IS concerned, the petitioner having
been admitted under them. In place of the rule that
"Madhya Bharat students are exempted from capitation fees" a new rule was substituted, which runs as
follows:
"For all students who are 'bona fide residents' of
Madhya Bharat no capitation fee should be charged.
But for other non-Madhya Bharat students the capitation fee should be retained as at present at Rs. 1,300
for nominees and at Rs. 1,500 for others". [Vide
Exhibit 6/1 quoted in Rustam Mody v. State : Sumitra
Devi v. State(1)J.
'Bona fide resident' for the purpose of this rule was
defined as:
"one who is(a) a citizen of India whose original domicile Is
in Madhya Bharat, provided he has not acquired a
domicile elsewhere, or
(b) a citizen of India, whose original domicile is
not in Madhya Bharat but who has acquired a domicile in Madhya Bharat and has resided there for not
less than 5 years at the date, on which he applies for
admission, or
( c) a person who migrated from Pakistan before
September 30, 1948 and intends to reside in Madhya
Bharat permanently, or
( d) a person or class of persons or citizens of an
area or territory adjacent to Madhya Bharat or to
India in respect of whom or which a Declaration of
Eligibility has been made by the Madhya Bharat Government".
In brief, the change effected by the new rule was that
whereas previously exemption from capitation fee was
granted in favour of all Madhya Bharat students whatever ,that might mean, ·under the revised rule it was
limited to bona fide residents of Madhya Bharat.
·Now the contention of Mr. N. C. Chatterjee for the
(
1
)T.L.R. 1953 Madhya Bharat 87, 99
~·1955
,.,~-
D. P. Joshi
v
The State of
Madhya Bharat
and another
Venkatarama
AyyarJ.
1220
1955'
D. P.Joshi
v.
The State of
Madhya Bharat
and another
Venkatarama '
Ayyar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1955]
pet:ltioner is that · this nile is in contravention of .articles 14 and 15(1);. and must therefore be struck down
as' unconstitutional and void. Article 15(1) enacts :
"The State shall not discriminate against any
citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste; sex,
place of birth or any,of them".
The argument of the petitioner is that the rule under
challenge in so far as it imposes a capitation fee on
students who do not belong to Madhya Bharat while
providing , an exemption therefrom to students of
Madhya )3harat, makes a discrimination based on the
place of birth, and that it offends artide 15 ( 1). Whatever . force there might have been · in this contention
\f the question had arisen . with reference co' the .rule
as it stood when the State took over , the administration, the rule was modified in 1952, and 'that, is , what
we are' concerned with in this petition.· The •rule 'aS
modified is clearly not open to attaclc as infringing
article 15 ( 1). The ground for exemption from payment . of capitation fee as . laid down therein. is bona
fide residence in the State of Madhya . Bharatc ,Residence and place of birth are two distinct· conceptions
with · different · connotations both in law ' and in fact,
and when article 15(1) prohibits discrimination based
on the. place of 'birth, . ii cannot be 'read as pri:ihibiting
discrimination based on residence. ,This · is nor · seriously disputed .. The argument that is pressed' ·on us
is that though the tule, purports ·w grant , exemption
based 'on residenc·e within the State, , the definition of
bona fide residence under the rule shows that' the exemption' is te.ally based on the place of birth. , Con,,iaerable emphasis' was laid on clauses (a) and '(b) of
the .rule wherein . 'residence' . is ' defined .. in terms' 0£
domicile;. ~rid ' .it was arglled .'that the otig'inal .. domicile, as it is termed in the rules, could in substance
mean only · {!lace of· birth, ·and' that' therefore the :exemption based on domicil_e was, 'in effect, an_ exemp·
tion based on place of birth under an alias. 'That,
however, is· riot the true legal positio11'.: Domicile of
a person , means his permanent · home; "D~tnicile
meant · permanent home, ·and , if that was· not· understood by itself no illustration could help to make· it
...,,._
....
..
S.C.R.
-
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1221
intelligible" observed Lord Cranworth in Whicker v.
Hume(1 ). Domicile of origin of a person means "the
domicile received by him at his birth".· (Vide Dicey
on Conflict of Laws, 6th Edition, page 87). The learned author then proceeds to observe at page 88 :
"The domicile of origin, though received at birth,
need not be either the country in which the infant is
born, or the country in which his parents are residing,
or the country to which his father belongs by race or
allegiance, or the country· of the infant's nationality".
In Somerville v. Somerville( 2 ) , Arden, Master of the
Rolls, observed :
"I speak of the domicile of odgin rather than of
birth. I find no authority which gives for the purpose of succession any effect to the place of birth.
If the sori of an Englishman is born upon a' journey,
his domicile will follow that of his father".
·
Mr. N .. C. Ch~tt~rjee argued 'that do~icile of origin
was often caUed domicile of . birth, arid · invited . our
attentio11 to certain observations of Lofd, Macnaghten
in Winans. v.. Attorney-General(3). But then, the noble
Lord went onto add that. the. use of the words "domicile of birth" was perhaps not accurate. But. that
apart, what has to be noted is that whether the expre~sion tised is "domicile of origin" or' "domicile of
birth"' tjie conc~pt . involved in it . is something different from what· the words "place· of birth" singnify.
And if "domieile 'of birth" and "'place of· birth" canmi;t be taken as synonymous,·· then the prohibition
enacted in article 15(1) against discrimination based
on place of birth -cannot appiy to a · discrimination
based on domicile.
· ·
"
. It was argued that under the . Constitution . there
cail_ be only a single citizenship f<?r 'th2' whole of India,
an(l. that it would run counter to that notion to . hold
that the State could make laws bas~d on domicile
within their territory. But citizenship and domicile
r;".present two . ·different .conceptions. Citizenship has
reference to . the political status . 9£ 'a person, and
{I) [1859] 28 L.J. Ch. 396, 400.
(2) [1801] 5 Ves. 750 at 786, 787, 31 E.R. 839, 858.
(3) 1904 AC. 287, 290.
.-
1955
D. P. Joshi
v.
The State.of
Madhya Bharat ,
ar.d arwther
Venkatarama .
AyyarJ.
1222
1955
D. P~ Joshi
Vo
The State of
Madhya Bharal
and another
Venkatarama
AyyarJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955)
domicile to his civil rights. A classic statem';'.nt of
the law on this subject is that of Lord Westbury m
Udny v. Udny( '). He observes:
"The law of England, and of almost all civilised ·
countries, ascribes to each individual at his birth two
distinct legal statuses or conditions : one by virtue of
which he becomes the subject of some particular country binding him by the tie of national allegiance, and
which may be called his political status, another by
virtue of which he has ascribed to him the character
of a citizen of some particular country and as such is
possessed of certain municipal rights, and subject to
certain obligations, which latter character is the civil
status or condition of the individual, and may be quite
different from his political statuts. The political status
may depend on different laws in different countries;
whereas the civil status is governed universally by
one single principle, namely, that of domicil, which is
the criterion established by law for the purpose of
determining civil status. For it is on this basis that
the personal rights of the party, that is to say, the
law which determines his majority or minority, his
marnage,
succession, testacy or intestacy, must
depend".
Dealing with this question Dicey says at page 94 :
"It was, indeed, at one time hdd by a confusion
of the ideas of domicile and nationality that a man
could not change his domicile, for example, from
England to California, wit.hout doing at any rate as
much as he could to' become an American citizen. He
must, as. it was said, 'intend quatenus in illo exuere
patriam'. But this doctrine has now been pronounced
erroneous by the highest authority".
Vide also the observations of Lord Lindley in Winans
v. Attorney-General(• ). In Halsbury's
Laws of
England, Vol. VI the law is thus stated at page 198,
para 242:
"English law determines all questions in which
it admits the operation of a personal law by the test
of domicil. For this purpose it regards the organisa0)
(2)
[1869) L.R. I Sc. & Div. 441, 457.
1904 A.C. 287, 299.
...
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1223
tion of the civilised world in civil societies, each of
which consists of all those persons who live in any
territorial area which is subject to one system of law,
and not its organisation in political societies or States,
each of which may either be co-extensive with a single
legal system or may unite several systems under its
own sovereignty".
-
Under the Constitution, article 5, which defines c1tlzenship, itself proceeds on the basis that it is different
from domicile, because under that article, domicile
is not by itself sufficient to confer on a person the
status of a citizen of this country.
A more serious question is that as the l:i.w knows
only of domicile of a country as a whole and not of
any particular place therein, whether there . can be
such a thing as Madhya Bharat domicile apart from
Indian domicile. To answer this question we must
examine what the word "domicile" in law imports.
When we speak of a person as having a domicile of a
particular. country, we mean that in certain matters
such as succession, minority and marriage he 1s governed by the law of that country. Domicile has reference to the system of law by which a person is governed, and when we speak of the domicile of a country,
we assume that the same system of law prevails all
over that country. But it might well happen that laws
relating to succession and marriage might not be the
same all over the country, and that different areas in
the State might have different laws in respect of those
matters. In that case, each area having a distinct set
of laws would itself be regarded as a country for the
purpose of domicile. The position is thus stated by
Dicey at page 83 :
·
"The area contemplated throughout the Rules
relating to domicile is a 'country' or 'territory subject
to one system of law'. The reason for this is that the
object of this treaties, in so far as it is concerned with
domicile,. is to show how far a person's rights are
affected by his having his legal home or domicile within a territory governed by one system of law,
i.e. within a given country, rather than within
1955
D· P-Joshi
v.
The Siate of
Madhya Bharat
and another
Venkatarama
AY.)'ar J·
1224
1
955
1). p. Joshi
v.
"The State of
Madhya Bharat
and another
•Venkatarama
.Ayyar J·
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
another. If, indeed, it happened that one part of a
country, governed generally . by one system of law,
was in many respects subject to special rules of law,
then it would be essential to determine whether D was
domiciled within such particular part, e.g. Californi~
in the United States; but in this case, such part
would be pro tanto a separate country, in the sense in
which that term is employed in these Rules".
The following · statement ·of the. "iaw in f!:alsbury's
Laws of Eagland, Volume Vl, page 246,. para 249 may
also be quotecl : ·
..
. . . . . . . . . . where that · State comprises more than · one
system of law, a domicil is acquired" in that ··part of
thi: State 'Yhere the individual:resides".'
An instructive d.~ci;iop bearing "on' thiS 'point . is
Somervilk v, Som.erVille( '). There,' .the dispute related
to the .i)ersonal . estate of Lord Somerville, who . 'had
died intestate in · Lond9n, his domicile ·of origin ·being
Scotch. The. contest was between those . who 'were
entitled to. inherit . if ' his domicile was Scotch;" and
thos~ who were entitled to !nb,erlt 'if ,hi.s ddmi~i1e was
English. It was urged . in support ·of . the claim of the
latter that by reason · of the death of Lord Soi:netville
at L~ndon,' suc~ession was gove~ned by ' English. dbrriicile. In ·discussing ·this question· tlfr learned' ' Master
of t:he R.ou; ·re£etr~<l to the fact thar tlie law cif'successiort in. the .. Pro'virice of.York was dlfferent from· that
prevailirig _iii. othe~ p~ts' of Enghnd, ,and was 'akip io
Scotch . law', and posed the question whethe'r · if a
Yorkshire ·man dlei:I intestate in. Loridbil, 'succession
to his per~'onal estate would: be. govep;1ed ,by the. Law
of the Province' of ·York. of England:'.' He observes:
"lt is surprising that questions of this so;t_. ha~e
not arisen· in this country when we · consider that till
a very fate ' period and even now for some ptiropses a
different succession prevails in the' Province of York.
The custom' i's very analogous to the" law of Scotland.
Till a ' very late period the inhabitants . of York were
restrained from ·disposing of their· 'property 'by · · testa•
ment ........·, ... And the question ·then would have been
·(1) 11ao1rsn:.R. as9.
·
-
or
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1225
whether during the time the custom and the restraint
of disposing by testament were in full force, a gentleman of the county of York coming to London for the
winter and dying there intestate, the disposition of
his personal estate should be according to the custom
or the general law".
The principle that was laid down was that "succession to the personal estate of an intestate is to be
regulated by the law of the country, in which he was
a domiciled inhabitant atthe time of his death; without any regard whatsoever to the place either of the
birth or the death or the situation of the property at
that time". On the facts, the decision was that the
domicile of origin which was Scotch, governed the
succession. What is of interest in this decision is
that it recognises that for purposes of succession there
can be within one political unit, as many domiciles as
there are systems of law, and that there can be a
Scotch domicile, an English domicile and even a York
domicile within Great Britain.
Under the Constitution, the power to legislate on
succession, marriage and minority has been conferred
under Entry 5 in the Concurrent List on both the
Union and the State Legislatures, and it is therefore
quite conceivable that until the Centre intervenes and
enacts a uniform code for the whole of India, each
State might have its own laws on those subjects, and
thus there could be different domiciles for different
States. We do not, therefore, see any force in the
contention that there cannot be a domicile of Madhya
Bharat under the Constitution.
It was also urged on behalf of the respondent that
the word "domicile" in the rule might be construed
not in its technical legal sense, but in a popular sense
as meaning "residence", and the following passage in
Wharton's Law Lexicon, 14th Edition, page 344 was
quoted as supporting such a construction:
"By the term 'domicile', in its ordinary acceptation, is meant the place where a person lives or has
his home. In this sense the place where a person has
his actual residence, inhabitancy, or commorancy, is
some times called his domicile",
1955
D. P. Joshi
v.
The State of
Prfadhya Bharat
'utd another
Venkatara1na
Ayyar J.
1226
1955
· D. P.Joshi
v.
The State of
Madhya Bharat
arrd another
Venkatara111a
Ayyar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
In Mcmullen v. Wadsworth(1), it was observed by the
Judicial Committee that "the word 'domicil' in
article 63 (of the Civil Code of Lower Canada) was
used in the sense of residence, and did not refer to
international domicile". What has to be considered
is whether in the present context "domicile" was used
in the sense of residence. The rule requiring the payment of a capitation fee and providing for exemption
therefrom refers only to bona fide residents within the
State. There is no reference to domicile in the rule
itself, but in the Explanation which follows, clauses
(a) and (b) refer to domicile, ·and they occur as part
of the definition of "bona fide resident". In Corpus
Juris Secundum, Volume 28, page 5, it is stated:
"The term 'bona fide residence' means the residence with domiciliary intent".
There is therefore considerable force in the contention of the respondent that when the rule-making
authorities referred to domicile in clauses (a) and (b)
they were thinking really of residence. In this view
also, the contention that the rule is repugnant to
article 15(1) must fail.
There was a good deal of argument before us on the
validity of clause (d) of the rule. It was contended
by the petitioner that that clause introduced a new
element unconnected with domicile or residence which
formed the basis of the previous clause, that it put
foreign nationals on a more advantageous footing
than Indian citizens, and that the entire rule niust be
discarded as based on no rational or intelligible principle. No doubt, clause (d) strikes a new note. And it.
may be that as a matter of policy the management
of the institution decided that it would be an advantage to associate citizens of other countries with
Indian citizens in educational institutions, and therefore reserved a few seats for them on the most-favoured nation treatment basis. The validity of this
reservation, however, does not arise for decision in
this petition, and as clauses (a) to (c) rest on a classification based on domicile and residence, and are
(1) [1889] 14 A.C. 631,
-·
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1227
distinct and severable from clause (d), they would be
valid even if clause (d) were to be held bad.
It must be mentioned that the rule relating to the
payment of capitation fee discussed above was again
modified by the management as a result of the decision of the High Court of Madhya Bharat in Rusf,am
Mody v. State: Sumitra Devi v. State('). The rule as
amended-and that is what is now in force-runs as
follows:
"Only those students, who are bona fide residents
of Madhya Bharat and have been selected for being
admitted in accordance with the allocation scheme
and the rules of admission to the seats specifically
reserved for the residents of Madhya Bharat are
exempted from the payment of Capitation Fees. All
other students admitted to seats other than those
reserved for the residents of Madhya Bharat shall be
liable to pay Capitation Fees as prescribed".
Under tbis rule also, tlre exemption is in favour of
bona fide residents of Madhya Bharat", and therefore
with reference to the points now under consideration,
the position under the present rule would appear to
be the same as under the previous one. It is unnecessary to consider this matter further, as learned counsel on either side were agreed that the rights of the
petitioner must be determined in accordance with the
rule which was in force when he was admitted.
It is next contended for the petitioner that the imposition of capitation fee on some of the students and
not on others is discriminatory, and is in contravention of Article 14 of the Constitution, and therefore
void. The impugned rule divides, as already stated,
self-nominees into two groups, those who are bona
fide residents of Madhya Bharat and those who are
not, and while it imposes a capitation fee on the
latter, it exempts the former from the payment thereof. It thus proceeds on a classification based on residence within the State, and the only point for decision is whether the ground of classification has a fair
and substantial relation to the purpose of the law, or
whether it is purely arbitrary and fanciful.
(1) I.L.R. 1953 Madhya Bharat 67,
1955
D. P. Joshi
v.
The State of
Madhya Bharat
and another
Venkatara1na
Ayyar J.
1228
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955)
1955
The object of the classification underlying the im, pugned rule was clea.rly to help to some extent
D. P.Joshi
students who are residents of Madhya Bharat in the
v.
prosecution
of their studies, and it cannot be disTire State of
JUadhya Bharat puted that it is quite a legitimate and laudable
and another
objective for a State to encourage education within
its borders. Education is a State subject, and one of the
Venkatara111a
directive principles declared in Part IV of the ConAyyar J,
stitution is that the State should make effective provisions for education within the limits of its economy.
(Vide article 41). The State has to contribute for the
upkeep and the running ofits educational institutions.
We are in this petition concerned with a Medical
College, and it is well-kuown that it requires considerable finance to maintain such an institution. If the
State has to spend money on it, is it unreasonable
that it should so order the educational system that
the advantage of it would to some extent at least
enure for the benefit of the State? A concession given
to the residents of the State in the matter o'f fees is
obviously calculated to serve that end, as presumably
some of them might, after passing out of the College,
settle down as doctors and serve the needs of the
locality. The classification is thus based on a ground
which has a reasonable relation to the subject-matter
of the legislation, and is in consequence not open to
attack. It has been held in The State of Punjab v.
Ajaib Singh and another(') that a classification might
validly be made on a geographical basis. Such a classification would be eminently just and reasonable,
where it relates to education which is the concern
primarily of the State. The contention, therefore,
that the rule imposing capitation fee is in contravention of article 14 must be rejected.
We have proceeded so far on the assumption that
the impugned rule is a "law" as defined in article 13.
Ifit is not that, article 14 would have no application.
It was indeed contended by the learned AttorneyGeneral on behalf of the respondent that the rule in
question is a mere administrative or executive order,
and that however liberally the word "law" might be
(! i ~1953) S.C.R. 254.
....
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1229
construed, it should be limited to what is an expression of the legislative power and cannot comprehend
what is an executive order. In support of this contention he relied on the decision in Om Prakash v. The
State('). In the view which we have taken that even
on the footing that it is a law, the rule does not
offend article 14, we do not consider it necessary to
express any opinion on this question.
One other contention put forward by the respondent
remains to be noticed. It was urged that as the institution was originally under private management
and the State took it over subject to the conditions
under which it was run, it was bound to enforce the
rule relating to the payment of capitation fee which
was previously in operation. But the terms under
which the State took over expressly reserve only the
agreement for reserving seats for the nominees of
participating States and donors, and do not contain
any undertaking to maintain the rule relating to imposition of capitation fee. Whether if such an undertaking had been given it could have been set up in
answer to a fundamental right, does not therefore
arise for decision.
In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed; but
in the circumstances there will be no order as to costs.
JAGANNADHADAS J.-I regret that I feel obliged to
differ.
The question that arises is whether the petitioner
who is a resident of Delhi and has been admitted in
July, 1952, by the State of Madhya Bharat as a
student in the :Mahatma Gandhi Memorial Medical
College at Indore and who has been called upon to
pay a sum of Rs. 1,500 per annum as capitation fee,
in addition to the tuition fees and other charges payable by all the students of the college in general,
is entitled to a writ restraining the authorities
concerned from levying that capitation fee on the
ground that the rule under which he is asked to pay
is repugnant to the Constitution. The history of the
(1) A.LR. 1953 Punjab 93.
1955
D. P.Joshi
v.
The State of
Madhya Bharat
and another
Venkataratlla
Ayyar J.
1230
1955
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
institution and the relevant rules have been set out in
the judgment of the majority just delivered and it is
D. P. Joshi
unnecessary
to· repeat them. It is desirable, however,
v.
to mention, at the outset two matters, The exact
The State of
Madhya Bharat authority for these rules, that is to say, the question
and another
whether they are rules made under a rule-making
power having a legislative basis, or whether they are
Jagannadhadas J.
merely executive orders, which it is open to the State
Government to change as they please, has not been
clearly elucidated. Though the learned AttorneyGeneral suggested, in the course of his arguments,
that these were merely executive orders and that as
such they did not come within the scope of article 14
of the Constitution, the material placed before us
throws no light thereon. Nor has the question as to
whether these executive orders which are issued by
the State and are general in their application within
the ambit of their subject matter constitute laws
falling within the scope of article 14, been sufficiently
canvassed before us. The discussion has proceeded on
the assumption that the validity of these rules may be
judged with reference both to the article 14 and article 15, no other article obviously having any direct
bearing.
Now, as has been pointed out in the majority judgment, the relevant original rule by the date when the
College was taken over by the State from private
management was that "Madhya Bharat students are
exempted from capitation fees". On the State taking
over the College, this rule was substituted by the following new rule:
"For all students who are 'bona fide residents' of
Madhya Bharat no capitation fee should be charged.
But for other non-Madhya Bharat students the capitation fee· should be retained as at present at Rs.
1,300 for nominees and at Rs. 1,500 for others".
"Bona fide resident" for the purposes of the above
rule was defined as
"(a) a citizen of India, whose original domicile
is in Madhya Bharat, provided he has not acquired a
domicile elsewhere, or
(b) a citizen of India, whose original domicile is
S.C.R.
4"' -·
~
.
-
)(
SUPREME COl]RT REPORTS
1231
1955
not in Madhya Bharat but who has acquired a domiD; P. Joshi
cile in Madhya Bharat and has resided there for not
v,
less than 5 years, at the <;late on which he applies for
The State of
Madhya Bharat
admission, or
and another
( c) a person who migrated from Pakistan before
September 30, 1948 and intends to reside in Madhya ,Jagannadhadas J.·
Bharat permanently, or
·
( d) a person or class of persons or citizens of an
area or territory adjacent to Madhya Bharat or to
India in respect of whom or which a Declaration of
Eligibility has been made by the Madhya Bharat Government".
This, it is said, was the rule in force when the applicant was admitted into the College. This rule is again
said to have been modified recently and the same is
as follows:
"Only those students, who are bona fide residents
of Madhya Bharat and have been selected for . being
admitted in accordance with the allocation scheme
and the rules of admission to the seats specifically reserved for the residents of Madhya Bharat are ex- ·
empted from the payment of capitation fees. All other
students admitted to seats other than those reserved
for the residents of Madhya Bharat shall be liable to
pay capitation fees as prescribed".
In the affidavit filed in this Court by Shri H. L.
Gupta, Assistant Secretary to the Government of
Madhya Bharat, it is stated that this was meant to
be only a restatement by the Government of their
real intention in order to clarify what the prior rule
was meant to convey. Now, with reference to these
rules, it is necessary to notice the suggestion made in
the course of the argument that the rules by the use
of the word "exemption" indicate that some students
get the benefit of not paying what would otherwise
have been payable and that therefore others cannot
complain of any hostile action constituting discrimination. But a copy of the rules for admission to the
regular M.B.B.S. courses (copied from Mahatma
Gandhi Memorial Medical College, Indore, Calendar of
1954) with which we have been furnished as one of the
1232
1955
fJ. p, Joshi
v. .
t'he State •f
MaJhy• Bharat
and anothet
•]agannaJhadas J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
enclosures to the affidavit of the . petitioner, and which
is at pages 34 to 3!! of the paper-book, on a perusal
thereof, clearly shows at page 37 that the capitation
fee is in addition to the normal fees and that this is
payable only in respect of some students, while all
the students in general pay certain prescribed fees.
But whether the rule is in the nature of an exemption
for some . students or is by way of an addition for the
others, there is clearly discrimination between the
two groups which affects the one adversely. The very
use of the phrase "·capitation fees" for this additional
amount levied from some, is indicative of its discriminatory character. The only question accordingly
is whether this discrimination falls within the mischief · of either article 14 or article 15. It is desirable
for this purpose to have a clear understanding of what
exactly the relevant rule at the date of the admission
of the applicant .into the College signifies.
It has been stated that this rule has to be understood with reference to. t!J.e allocation scheme for
admission of students which is said to be as follows
in the affidavit of Shri . H. L. Gupta, Assistant Secretary to the Government of Madhya Bharat:
"The basis of allocation of seats at the time of
admission each year is that out of the total number of
candidates to be newly admitted a certain number of
seats is reserved for 'nominees' of· such States as also
of such individuals with whom there is
contract of
reservation of seats, and a certain number of seats is
reserved for Madhya Bharat. The rest go to what are
called 'self-nominees'. All candidates (except Central Government nominees) are, however, admitted by
a competitive examination and are selected in order
of merit for each category".
a
It has been stated by the applicant in his reply affidavit that, while· the competitive examination is the
same for all, it is only the marks of the candidates in
each separate group that · ate taken into consideration
i'ttter se. However this may be, there appear to be,
as· stated :by the Assistant Secretary to . the .Madhya
Bharat Government, three broad · categories : (1) A
'
.
S.C.R.
-
}
-
_._.111"
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1233
certain number of seats reserved for "bona fide students of Madhya Bharat". (2) A certain number of
seats reserved for some specified States and the original donors, who in respect of their nominees have to
pay capitation fees, somewhat lower in amount, ·and
(3) The rest of the students who have to pay the
higher capitation fees. The second category above
mentioned may be left oqt of consideration for , the
present case, since · that depends on certain pre-existing contractual obligations and different considerations may arise and the present. ·petitioner does not
fall wihin this category. The question of discrimination in this case arises really with reference to categories 1 and 3 above and turns upon the exact ·meaning of the· phrase "bona fide residents" as defined in
the rules. If this definition was meant to convey
fairly and substantially, the qualification of residence
in Madhya Bharat and nothing else, it may be, :that
this is not hit by article 15 and that it may also be a
reasonable classification, on the facts and circumstances of a particular State, for purposes of artide
14.
The learned Attorney-General himself based his
arguments, at one stage, on this view of the definition
of "bona fide resident" in the rules. But the difficulty
is that the learned Attorney-General . has not . committed himself, on behalf of the State, as to this being
the only reasonable meaning of the definition. He put
it as a . kind of alternative. The Assistant Secretary to
the Madhya Bharat Government, Shri H. L. Gupta; in
his affidavit clearly and categorically says that the
charging of capitation fee, truly speaking, is not on
the basis of residence. The restatement of the rule
by the Government is not also definite or clear about
it inasmuch as it uses again the phrase "bona fide residents of Madhya Bharat". Bona fide residents of
Madhya Bharat, as defined, is clearly something quite
different · from .the class which can be designated ordinarily as "residents of Madhya Bharat". Now out
of the four categories. comprised in the .. definition
o~viously ( c) a1:1d ( d) have absolutely nothing to d~
with actual residence. It is also difficult to <liscover
any principle with reference to which discrimination
can be justified in favour of (1) a Pakistan migrant
1955
· D.lP• Joshi
v.
The State of
Madhya Bharat
· and another
Jagannadhadas J.
..
1234
. 1955
:v,·p, Joshi
.v.
- TheStakOf
Madhya Bhiual
and another
Jagannad/uulas J.
"
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
with the mere intention. to make Madhya Bharat his
P=anent residence, and (2) a- person, belonging to
the contiglious areas of Madhya Bharat, or the. contiguous areas of India (and excluding citizens of
India from the - non-contiguous areas of -Madhya
Bharat, like the applicant), The main categories,
however, are those which fall within (a). and (b) of the
definition. But it is difficult to say •even of these categories that they -are based merely on residence, as
such, · of the - person .concerned. Category - ·(b) has
reference to "Domicile in · Madhya Bharat" plus residence in Madhya _Bharat -for the .preceding five years.
Category (a) . has reference only to "original domicile
-in ·Madhya Bharat" and by contrast with category
(b) which requires precedent residence, is dearly intended not to insist on any precedent residence. Even
if it be assumed that ·"domicile" -means "permanent
_home" as stated by Lord Cranworth in Whicker v.
Hume( 1 ) this has no necessary reference to the applicant's actual residence at the relevant time. It is
difficult to see why the fact of the applicant's father
having had his permanent home in Madhya Bharat
at -the time of applicant's birth should be a ground
of preference or why a person who has made Madhya
Bharat his permanent home but left it for a· time and
returned only, say, an year previously should be denied it. Thus the definition of "bona -fide resident"
taken as a whole or even confining it to categories (a),
(b) and ( c) cannot be said to- be based merely on residence in Madhya Bharat. Nor can any intelligible
basis of grouping be gathered therefrom by imputing
to the word "domicile" the meaning "residence" or
"permanent home"'.. It is interesting to notice, in this
connection; that category (b) in requiring Madhya
Bharat domicile and -precedent residence for five years
follows- closely the pattern of Indian citizenship based
on category· ( c) of article 5 of the Constitution with
"domicile of Madhya Bharat"· substituted for "domicile of _India" and this raises the question of the concept •of . regional domicile (tending to the growth of
the idea of - regional citizenship) which
be discussed. -pt:esently; .
..:-: -
will
" (·1)'<(1859)28 L-;·J. Ch. 396;398
-
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1235
· Now confining our attention to the category (a)
which has given rise to the main controversy in this
case, it appears to me quite clear that the phrase
"original domicile in Madhya Bharat" used therein
could not have been meant to indicate either the residence or the permanent home of the applicant in
Madhya. Bharat. . What then is the meaning intended
to be conveyed thereby. Is the word "domicile" in
this phrase to be understood in the legalistic sense or
as the likely framer of the relevant rule-possibly a
lay man like the Director of Public Instruction of the
State-would have .understood it to mean. It is necessary for this purpose to have a clear idea of the concept of "domicile" and its applicability in relation to
any particular region within a country like India.
Now the juristic concept of domicile is one which can
be best gathered from the following passage in the
classic judgment of Lord Westbury in Udny v. Udny(1).
"The law of England, and of almost all civilized
countries, ascribes to each individual at his birth two
distinct legal statuses or conditions; one by virtue of
which he becomes the subject of some particular
country, binding him by the tie of natural allegiance
and which may be called his political status; another
by virtue of which he . has ascribed to him the character of a citizen of some particular country, and as such
is possessed of certain municipal rights, and subject to
certain obligations, which latter character is the civil
status or condition of the individual, and may be
quite differ~nt from his political status. The political status may depend on different laws in different
countries; whereas the civil status is governed universally by one ~ingle principle, namely, that of domicil,
which is the criterion established by law for the purpose of determining civil status. For it is on this basis
that the personal rights of the party, that is to say,
the law which determines his majority or minority,
his marriage, succession, testacy, or intestacy, must
depend".
Thus domicile is that attribute of a person's status
which according . to International Law. deten~ines
, (1), [1869) L.R. I Sc. & Div. 441, 457.
1955
D. P.Joshi
v.
Tht State of
Madhya Bhflf'at
and another
Jagannadhat!as J.
'1236
1955
.'D· p; Joshi
v •.
T Ill State of ,
Madhya Bharat
and another
Jagannadhadas J·
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
the personal 1aws ·by which he is governed and on
which his personal laws depend. The question for
·consideration is· whether this concept of domicile can
apply to the word . "domicile" in the· phrase "domicile in Madhya Bharat". Dicey in his Conflict of
Laws (6th Edn.), at pages 43 and 78 says as follows :
. '"A person's domicile (meani_ng thereby the place
of domicile) is the country which is considered by law
to be his permanent home"
and at 'page 82 he says
"the area contemplated· · relating to domicile 1s
a ·'counqy' or 'territory subject to one system of
law'".
Farnsworth in his book on the Residence and Domicil
of Corporations ( 1939 Edition) says as follows at
page 1:
. "In any consideration of domicil, ·the area contemplated has always been taken to be .a 'country'· or
·'a territory subject to one system of law'".
It is no doubt true that there are countries which
though politically one unit have different personal
laws, in different areas thereof. In such a case the
sub-unit which is governed by one system of law is
the area of domicile. Thus for instance, as has been
pointed out, though Great Britain is one single political unit, the personal laws in· Scotlana are different
and therefore Scotch domicile is recognised. But. this
is a matter of historical growth. Now, so far as India
is concerned it appears to me that there has so far
been no such concept of domicile of sub-units known
or recognised by law, for the only · purpose for which
it is normally relevant and ·which attracts it, viz.
personal laws of the ·citizens of India. The personal
laws in India, as is well known, depend mostly on
religious affiliations. This has been ' so . from pre·British period. The earliest British regulations have ·
recognised this and the same has been continued by
a specific provision being incorporated in the Civil
Courts Act or analogous Acts of the .various Provinces
or States · to the effect that the ·Courts are to decide
matters relating to Hindus· and Muhammadans,' etc.
with reference to their ·· personal laws. · These · Acts
-
.:y-
'
S.C.R.
·'
..
•
y
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1237
have invariably a provision by way of a direction
to the Courts concerned, more or less in the following terms:
"To decide any question regarding succession,
inheritance, marriage, or caste, or any religious usage
or institution or the like by the Muhammadan law in
cases where the parties are Muhammadans and by
Hindu law in cases where the parties are Hindus".
In respect of some of these matters as well as in respect of other matters which properly fall within the
category of personal laws such as for instance minority, succession, etc., there have been legislative modifications. But it is noteworthy that those modifications are almost entirely of an all-India character and
not on any regional basis (viz. Indian Majority Act,
Indian Succession Act). So far as I am aware there
are only a few instances of Provincial or State legislation on any matters relating to personal laws and
that too, to an extremely small and limited extent.
Thus it will be seen the the Province or the State of
India to which a Hindu or Muslim belongs has no
relevance or relation to his personal laws. Indeed, the
contrary is emphasised by the fa.ct that, a Hindu at
any rate, carries with him even his own school of
Hindu law in spite of migration to a different Province or State. Now, so far as Indian citizens who
are neither Hindus nor Muslims are concerned, such
as, Indian Christians or Anglo-Indians, they are governed by personal laws which are all~India in charac•
ter and not r.egional, as for instance the Indian Succession Act. (It may be mentioned that even in
Europe until the middle ages, personal laws depended
on race and not on domicile. See Phillimore on
International Law, page 36). In this state of the
factual situation as regards the personal laws of the
various categories of persons who comprise the . bulk
of the population of . India, it appears to me to be
clear that th~re has been in India up to the· present
moment no scope for growth of any concept of State
or Provincial domicile as distinct from Indian domicile.
There is thus no place for regional domicile, in
the existing Indian law. Nor is there any .reason
1955
D. f'. Josh_i
v.
The State of
Madhya Bharat
and anot/¢r
Jagannadha4as J.
1238
SUPREME (;OURT REPORTS
[1955}.
1955
to think that such .a situation will arise in the future
under the present Constitution. . For this purpose, it
D.P.-Joshi
v.
may be noticed that the exclusive legislative power
TM Slate Of
of the State does not extend to personal laws. PerMadhya Bharat
·and atUJthw
sonal laws are the subject matter of item No. 5 of the
Concurrent Legislative . List. It is relevant· in this
• Jagannadhadas J.
connection also t9 notice that article 44 of the Constitution enjoins · that "the . State · shall endeavour to
secure for the citizens a uniform civil code throughout
the .territory of India". It is extremely unlikely
therefore that regional personal laws will be allowed
to become operative in any substantial measure. It
may. be also mentioned that there is single citizenship
under · the Constitution for the whole of India and
that "citizenship and naturalisation" have been listed
within the exclusive competence of the Union Legislat:Ure. Of course citizenship is different from domicile. But I mention this here only to emphasize the
view, that consistently with the Constitution, the
concept of regional domicile which does not exist at
the present day and which if recognised would tend
to the growth of. claims of regional citizenship (as for
instance in the .United States of America) .would be
entirely foreign to the intendment of the Constitution.
It is with reference to the above considerations that
the phrase "domicile in Madhya Bharat" in the relevant rule defining the phrase "bana fide resident of
Madhya Bharat" has to be' considered and understood.
Since the concept of domicile in Madhya Bharat, is,.
in my view, unknown to the exiscing Indian law, I
do not think it permissible to construe the phrase
"domicile in Madhya Bharat" used in the relevant
rule as having any thing to do with the regional domicile of the kind known to the English system of law.
The recognition of such a concept of regional domicile
in English or 'American law does not necessitate that
we should import the same idea into ·otir country contrary to the intendment of the Constitution. ·we have
got to consider 'the· meaning of the phrase "original
d9inicile in Madhya Bharat" used ·in the relevant rule
with reference to the existing state of 'law in India,
which; I conceive, does not recognise such a regional
domicile
·
' ·
..
S.C.R.
...
,• -~- ...·
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1239
I have already given my reasons for thinking that
the meaning of "residence" or "permanent home" of
the applicant cannot be read into the phrase "domicile in Madhya Bharat" used in clause (a). In the circumstances it appears to me to be reasonably clear
that
the phrase "original domicile in Madhya
Bharat" is meant to convey the. "place of birth (of the
applicant) in. Madhya Bharat". It it perfectly true
that "domicile of origin" and "place of birth" are two
different matters. · But that is so only where the use
of the phrase "domicile of origin" conveys a definite
legal meaning. But where, as in the present case, the
phrase "domicile of origin in Madhya Bharat"· conveys no legal meaning, as I have pointed out above,
and if any meaning has to be attached to it, then it
could only have reference to the "place of birth".
This would accord with what was likely to have been
contemplated by the framer of the rule. Normally a
person's domicile of origin is the place of his birth
except in a few and exceptional cases. In this context
the following passage from Corpus Juris Secundum,
Vol. 28 at page 1095 may be noticed:
"A person's domicile of origin is the domicile of
his birth. It is generally but not necessarily the place
of birth".
In this connection it is to be remembered that the
relevant rule is a substinite for the pre-existing rule
which was as follows:
"Madhya Bharat students are exempted from
capitation fees".
The phrase "Madhya Bharat students" has no
reference either to residence or domicile, and there
can be no doubt . that it normally connoted students
who were born in Madhya Bharat.
In my opinion when .the State authorities took over
the management of the institution from private hands
and made a change in the rule by coining a hybrid
definition of the phrase "bona fide residents of Madhya
Bharat" placing the ·category of citizens whose original domicile is in Madhya Bharat in the forefront of
that definition; ·they only attempted· ·to· camouflage the
·1955
'D. P .. Joshi
v.
The State of
.Madhya Bharat.
·and another
.' Jagannadhadas J.
1240
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
implication· thereof so as to accord with the pre-existing rule, viz. that the benefits of the exemption from
v.
capitation fees should be available only to persons
Th.. Stat• ef
born in Madhya .Bharat and the burden of the capitaMadhya. Bharat
and another
tion fees should · be borne by persons .not born in
Jagannadhadas J. Madhya Bharat. In the view I take of the real meaning and effect of the rule, which is , under discussion,
neither an attempt at subsequent · clarification · nor
the actual manner in which it is said to ·be administered or intended to be administered, as stated by the
AS5istant Secretary to the Madhya Bharat Government, · Shri H. L. Gupta, in ·his , affidavit, even if
accepted as correct, ·can have any bearing. The· fact
that some of · the admitted students of the Medical
College who are residents of Madhya Bharat may not
be entitled to .exemption from capitation fee under
the rule as now sought to be interpreted is not reh
vant so long as a student in the position of the applicant cannot have the benefit of the exemption,
even if he got the highest marks in the competition. In my view, therefore, the rule in question has
reference to place of birth in Madhya Bharat primarily, though .a number of other miscellaneous
categories might also come in under other and different heads. Hence the rule offends article 15 · of the
Constitution. Even in the view . that the rule . has
·reference to the juristic concept of regional domicil
and for that reason does not fall within the scope , of
the inhibition of article 15, I am unable to see how,
with reference to article 14, the distinction based on
such domicile can be considered reasonable. · No suggestion has been put forward ho:w '.'original domicile in
·Madhya .. Bharat" is a reasonable ground for classification. In my opinion, therefore, the primary wntent
of the rule relating to capitation fees · which is contained in clause (a) of .the definition of "bona fide resident of Madhya 'Bharat" does operate to · the · disadvantage · of the petitioner by way · of unconstitutional
discrimination. Hence · the State Government' ·cannot
validly seek to levy capitation fees on . the. peti,tiOner
with reference· to that rule.
.
· ·
· .
I. would, th~efo~e, allow this applieation. .
1953
D. P.Jos!#
...
~
I
S.C.R.
SUPREl\IE COURT REPORTS
1241
1955
I think it right to add that the question as to the
existence or admissibility of the concept of regional
D. P.Joshi ·
domicile as distinguished from Indian domicile and as
v.
to the bearing of this on the meaning of the concerned The state of
rule \vere not canvassed or suggested at the hearing ~Iadhya Bharat
before us and that the Court has not had the benefit and another
of arguments on these and the connected matters. If, J " -;;;; a J
therefore, I have ventured to differ, notwithstanding a.anna a as •
my respect for the views of the majority and potwithstanding the absence of assistance from the Bar, it is
'.
' ··out of the conviction that the recognition, express or
implied, of regional domicile by a decision ()f this
Court would be contrary to the intendment of the·
Constitution.
BY CoURT.::.:..In accordance with the opinion of the
majority, the Petition is dismissed without costs.
Petition dismissed.
THE AUTO~IOBILE PRODUCTS OF INDIA LTD.
v. .
RUKl\IAJI BALA AND OTHERS
(And connected Appeal)
[S. R. DAs, BnAGWATI and SYED JAFER I~tAM JJ.]
Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) ti.ct, 1950 (XLVJII
of 1950), s. 22-Whether Labour Appellate Tribunal has iurisdic·
tion to impose conditions when granting pe1·mission-Industrial Di~
putes Act, 1947 (XIV of 1947), s. 83 and lndustrial Disputes (Ap·
pellate Tribunal) Act, 19.50-S. 23-Jurisdiction of authority not
only to decide whether there has been failure to· obtain permission but
also to give decision on the merits of an industrial dispute-Indus·trial Disputes Act, 1947 (as amended), s. 88 and s. 88·A-Ind1istrial
Disputes ·(Appellate Tribunal) Act--Ss. 22 and 28-Meaning and
scope of.
Held, (i) that the ordinary and primary jurisdiction of the .
Labour Appellate Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes ·
(Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 is appellate; (ii) that s. 22 of the Act
confers on the appellate tribunal a special jurisdiction which is in the
nature of original jurisdiction; (iii) that s. 23 also vests in the
tribunal an additional jurisdiction to decide the complaint as if it
were an appeal pending before it; and (iv) that s. 23 confers on the
1955
February 3
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