STATE OF PUNJAB versus MOHAR SINGH
Supreme Court of India | Decided 20 December 1954 | [1955] 1 S.C.R. 893 | 1954 INSC 127
Key facts
- Decided
- 20 December 1954
- Bench
- BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA*, VIVIAN BOSE, B. JAGANNADHADAS
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 61/1953
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1955] 1 S.C.R. 893
- Neutral citation
- 1954 INSC 127
Text of the judgment
,.
. [MuKHERJEA, .VIVIAN. BosE, and . JAGA~ADHAnAS JJ.]
•
General .Clauses Act (X of 1897), .s. 6(c)(d)(e)-Repeal of lawRepeal and simultaneous . enactment-Temporary Law running out
by efflux of time-Such /all! repealed before running out,. Effect of~
East Punjab Refugees (Registration ·of Land ·Claims) · Ordinance
Vil of 1948, 's. 7-0ffence committed under exisiing /awe-Prosecution started after repeal-Validity-East Punjab Refugees (Registration of Land Claims) Act, 1948 (Punjab Act XII of 1948), s. 11'Anything done', Meaning of.
·
·
The provisions 'of s. 6( c) ( d) and. (e) .of the. General 'clauses Act,
1897 '(same as s. 4 of the .Punjab General Clauses Act; 1898) rel~t
ing to the consequences of the repeal of a law are. applicable · not
only when an Act or Regulation is repealed simpliciter but also to
a case of repeal and simultaneous enactment · re.:eriacting · all the
provisions of the repealed law.
On the repeal of a law the consequences mentioned in: s. 6(c)(d)
and ( e) of the Act follow unless a different or contrary intention
app~ars from the repealing statute.
· ·
·
··
... •
'
For ascertaining. the -above contrary · intention one has to look
to the provisions of the new enactment iri order to see whether
the rights and liabilities under the repealed law have been· put an
end to by the new enactment. It is an erroneous and incorrect
approach to enquire if the new enactment has by its provisions
positively kept alive . the . rights and liabilities under. the . repealed
l~w. The absence of a saving clause in the new enactment preserving the rights and liabilities under the repealed law is neither
material nor decisive on the question.
·
· .. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, has no application
to a temporary law . which automatically expires by effiux of time
but the section would apply if the temporary law is repealed before
it' so expires. The .Punjab Ordinance VII of 1948 .was :i temporary
law and· the same having been repealed before it expired by efflux
of time a prosecution for an offence committed under s. 7 of the
Ordinance prior to its · repeal could be validly started even after
the repeal.
·
·
The term "anyt.hing done" occurring :in s. 11 of. .the Punjab
Act XII of 1948 does not mean any act done by a person in contravention of the provisions of the. East Punjab Refugees (Registration· of Land Claims) Ordinance VII of 1948. The term "anything
done" refers to official acts ·· done in the exercise .of the · powers
conferred. by or under the Ordinance.
. : Danmal, Parsh,otamdas v•. Babura'm ( ,(1935) I.L.R. 58 All. 495),
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894
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1 954
The SilJU ef
Pu,Yab
v.
Mohar SiTzgh.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
CRIMINAL
. APPELLATE
. • JurusorcTmN :
[1955]
Criminal
Appeal No. 61 of 1953. :·.
Appeal under aiticie 134(1)(~)· of the Constitution. of
India from the Judgment and Order dated the 7th
· August, 1952, of the High· Court of Judicature, for the
State of Punjab at Simla in Criminal Revision No. 78.
of 1952 arising .out of the case r,epoited by , t:l)e District
Magistrate; Jullundur, with. his . No. · 301-M,D. Reader
· dated the 9th .January, 1952, for revision of the Order
dated ·the 20th July, 1951, of Magistrate 1st Class.
S. M. Sikri, Advocate-General for the State of
Punjab (Porus A. Mehta and P. G. Gokhale, with him)
for the appellant.
N. S. Bindra for the respondent. '
1954. October 20. The Judgment of the Court was
· delivered · by
MuKHERJEA J.-This appeal, which has come before
us, on a certificate granted by the' High Court of the
State of Punjab at Si'mla,, under article 134 (1) (c) of the
Constitution, raises a short point· of law. On the 3rd
of March, 1948, an Ordinance .(being Ordinance No. VII
of 1948) was promulgated by the Governor of East
Punjab, under section 88 of the Government of ·India
. Act, 1935, making provisions for the registration of
hnd claims of the East Punjab refugees. On the 17th
March, 1948, the respondent, Mohar Singh, who purports to be a fefl)gee from West Pakistan, filed a claim
in accordance. with the . provisions . of this Ordinance,
stating therein; that he had lands measuring 104 kanals
situated within the district of Mianwali in West Punjab.·
. On the 1st of April, . 1948, this Ordinance was repealed
and Act XII of 1948 ·(hereinafter called 'the Ad) was
. passed by . the East Punjab Legislature re-enacting all
the provisions of .the repealed · Ordinance.. The claim
filed by the respondent was investigated in due course
and it was . found, after enquiry, . that the .statement
made by him was absolutely false and that as a matter
of fact there was no land belonging to him in West
. Pakistan. Upon this,. a prosecution was started. against
him on the 13th of May, 1950, under section 7 of the
•
S.C.R.
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)
SUPREME: COURT REPORTS
895
Act; which makes ·it ail'" offence for· any · ·person to
submit, with regard· fo his. · claim under 1the. Act, any
information which is false. The accused•: was' tried . by
S. Jaspal Singh, Magistrate, First Class, .Jullundur,
before whom he confessed· his guilt and: ' pleaded for
mercy. · The trying Magistrate by his order dated the
20th of July, 1951, convicted" the respondent · under
section 7 of the Act' and sentenced him to. imprisonment till the rising of the ·Court and a fine . of Rs. 120,
in default of which he .was to suffer rigorous· imprisonment for one month.
The District Magistrate of Jullundur considered the
sentence to be inadequate .and referred the case. to the
High Court at Simla under section 438 . of .the Criminal
Procedure Code with a recommendation that'. a deterrent sentence might be imposed upon the accused. · The
matter first came up before a single Judge of that Court
and a preliminary point was raised on behalf of . the
respondent that it was not within the competence of the
trying Magistrate to convict him at all under the . provisions of the Act, as .the offence was committed against
the Ordinance before the Act came into force and the
prosecution was started long after the Ordiµance had
come to an end. Having. regard to the . di v.ersity of
judicial opinion on the point, the single. Jud,ge referred
the case for. decision by a Division Bench: TJie. learned
Judges constituting the Division Bench accepted the
contention rais~d on behalf of th.e respondent;. and by
their judgment, . date.cl .the 7th of August, i952, set
aside the convic;ti@ of the respondent and ~he sentence
imposed upon him under section .7 of the Act. It is
against this judgment that the present appeal has ~een
taken to this ,Court by the. State of Punj.ab.
.
·
It is not disputed that the respondent dia submit,
with regard to the claim filed by him uridei: the provisons of the Ordinance; an information' which .'was ·false
and that such act' was . punishable'' a~ an offence. under
section 7 of the Ordinance. The Ordinance however
was repealed soon after the 'filing of the claim and was
substituted ·by the Act which incorporated · all · the proVtsions of the ·ordinance: · The High Court 'in' decidii'ig
the case in .favour of the respondent proceeded oti, the
1 954
Tht State of
Punjab
. v.
Mohar Singh.
Mukherjea J.
8%
1
9M
Statl'Of Pu•jab
v. Mohar ·.·Singh.
Mukh•dea J.
SW'REME C01)R'f REPORTS
ground .that as Act . XII of 1948 was not in existence at
the date when·.the·· claim. was. filed ·bt the. ·tespondent,
he could not possibly be _.convicted of all offence under a
ktw . which was not in force at the time of the commi.!7
sion of .the offence. The 'State Government attempted t0
meet this argument by invoking ·the provisions of section 6 of the General .Clauses Act which is in the sam~
term.s as ·section 4 of the Punjab.- General · Clauses Act.
Section 6 of the General Clauses Act lays down the
effect of .the repeal of an enactment. . .The section . :runs
thus:
"6.. Where this Act or any Central Act or regulation made after the commencement of .this Act, repeals
any enactment. hitherto .made or hereafter to be mad.e;
then, unless a different intention appears, the. repeal
shall not-,
••• i
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
· ( c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or 'iiabi'
lily a'cquired, accrued · or incurred under any enactment
so repealed; or
· ( d) affect -any · penalty, forfeiture ·or punishment
incurred in respect of any offence committed · against
any enactment so repealed ; or
( e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or
remedy in . respect of any such right, privilege, obliga:
tion, ·liability, ' penalty, forfeiture or punishment as
aforesaid."
On the strength of this provision in the General
Clauses Act it was contended on behalf of the State
that the .repeal .of the· Ordi:nante could not in any way
affect the liability· already incurred by the respondent,
in respect of an offence; committed ' against the provi•
sions of the Ordinance and any penalty or punishment
consequent' thereon. .
.
'!'h~Jearne,d Judges .;£the High ·.Court negativ~d thi~
contention by holding thai section. ·6 0 f the Gene.ral
Clauses. Act could. be attracted _only ,. wlien an Act or
regulation is.repealed _ simp#citer but not . when, as iri
the present. case, -.the repeal is 'followed . by re-enactment.
The , R,epep.ling Act, it is poin~ed qut,. reproduces the
provis1ons 9£ tht;, .Qrdi,J:iance .in their ent:frery, but it
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s.~.}l:;
..
.•
sµ:pREME COURT REPORTS
897
nowhere .proyides· that offence!;. committed, ·when.: the
Ordinance was in force, could be punished after· its
repeal. The language of section . 11 of the Act, which
contains its saving provisions, does not, it is said, indicate that a criminal liability incurred when the Ordin~
ance was in force would . continue after it came to an
end. It is the propriety of this view that · has · been
challenged. before .us in this appeal. . ·
· It is not disputed that in i:he present case the prosecution was started against the respondent under section
7 of the Act and not under the · corresponding· provision
of the Ordinance. The offence was committed at a time
when the Act was not in force and obviously no man
could be prosecuted or punished under a law which
came into existence subsequent . to the commission of
the offence. But this by itself might. not . raise any
serious difficulty, for the · Court would have, ample
authority to alter the conviction of the· accused,. under
the Act, to one under the Ordinance which contained
the identical provision, provided he could be prosecuted
and punished . under the Ordinance ·after . it was
repealed, and this is the material point that requites
consideration in this case.
·
Under th<; law of England, as it stood prior to the
Interpretation Act of 1889, · the effect of repealing a
statute was said to be to obliterate it as completely
· from the records of Parliament as if it had never been
passed, except for the purpose of those actions, which
were· commenced, prosecuted and concluded while it.
was an existing law(1 ). A repeal therefore without any
saving cla1Jse would destroy . any . proceeding · whe.ther
not yet begun or whether pending at the time of the
eflactment of the ·Repealing · Act and not ·already prose.:.
c11ted to a final· .judgment so. as to create a. vested.
right(2). Tei .obviate such results .a practice came into
existence in · England to insert a saving clause in · the".
n::pealing statute . with a . view to . presei-Ve rights and
liabilities already accrued or incurred~ under the repealed,
·. ehactment. . Later on, to dispense with the . necessity:.
of having to insert a saving clause. on each · occasion,.,
'.: .(1j Vide Crai'es on -Statute Law, 5t!) edn.,· page ~s,-:
·,;
(2) Vide Crawford on Statutory Constructic>n,_page 599:.600.·
.•,
r954
Stal• ·of Punja;,..
v·r
·Mohar Singh_
Mukherjea j.o
898
1954
Stak offU11jab
v.
SUP:REME C:OUR'P REPO&TS
[1955]
sei:tion . .38(2).:was .inserted,;n the 'Interpretari0n Att of
1889 which .provic\es th;rt' .a repeal,.: unless .. the ' conrrary
intention appears, . d©es .not affect; the•· previous operation. of. tile repealed., enactment ' or •anytliing duly· done
or .suffered under.•it" and• any investigation;··, legal·• proceeding or .remedy may · •be instituted, continued or
enforced ·in respect of ·any right, liability· and penalty
under the repealed Act as ihhe Repealing •Att' had" 'not
been ,passed.. Sec,tion. ,6 .of the General.. Clauses Act, as
is well k.nown, .is. on .the same lines as.section 38(2) of
the Interpretation A~t of England. . .
. Under section .. 30 of the General Clauses ·Act, which
corresponds to section.-27 of thei Punjab. Act, the provisions· of the. Act are applicable to Ordinances as' well.
Of course, · the .consequences laid down· in ·section 6 of
the Act will·apply.only when a.statutecYor regulation
having . the• force of a statute is actually repealed.. It
has .no application when .a statute, - which is-·of a tern·
porary. nature,.. ·automatically expires by effiux of. ·time.
The Ordinance in the present case. was ·undoubtedly· a
temporary statute but· it is admittecl that ·the· period
during which it was to .continue had ·not expired when
the Repealing Act was passed. The repeal · · therefore
w.as an effectiYe one whiCh would normally attract · the
operatiofl of section. 6 .of the General Clauses Act. . The
contro-.:ersy thus . narrows down. to the short point a~ to
whether the fact' of the repeal of the Ordinance· being
followed by re-enactment would make the provisions . of
section 6 of the General Clauses . Act inapplicable •to >the
present case. ·
.
The High · Court, in support of the view that..it .took,
placed great rdiance ·•upon· certain , observations• of
Sulain;ian C.J. in D,_anmal •Parshotamdas v. Baburam{' ).
The question raised in .. .that· case· was· whether a suit·· by
an unregistered· firm against a third party; after .coming
into force. of· .section 69 ·of .the: Partnership Act, ··would
be. barred :by that section in· spite of· the .saving I' clause
contained .in section 74.(b} 0£ the •Act.· The•Chief Justice
felt .some doubts on the point and was inclined •'tO• hold
that .,section 74.(b). would · operate to save ·the · · suit
although the right . sought to .be enforced· by it had
(I) (1935) I.L.R.. 58 All.:495,
S.C.R.
,
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-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
899
accrued prior to the commencement of the Act; but
eventually he agreed with his colleague and held that
section 69 would bar the suit. While discussing the
provision of section 74(2) of the Partnership Act, in
course of his judgment, the learned Chief Justice referred by way of analogy to section 6( e) of the General
Clauses Act and observed as follows at page 504:
"It seems that section 6(e) would apply to those
cases only where a previous law has been simply repealed
and there is no fresh legislation to take its place. Where
an old law has been merely repealed, then the repeal
would not affect any previous right acquired nor would
it even affect a suit instituted subsequently m respect
of a right, previously so acquired. But where there is
a new law which not only repeals the old law, but is
substituted in place of the old law, section 6(e) of the
General Clauses Act is not applicable, and we would
have to fall back on the provisions of the new Act
itself."
These observations could not undoubtedly rank
higher than mere obiter dictum for they were not at all
necessary for purposes of the case, though undoubtedly
they are entitled to great respect. In agreement with
this dictum of Sulaiman C.J. the High Court of Punjab,
in its judgment in the present case, has observed that
where there is a simple repeal and the Legislature has
either not given its thought to the matter of prosecuting old offenders, or a prov1S1on dealing with that
question has been inadvertently omitted, section 6 of
the General Clauses Act will undoubtedly be attracted.
But no such inadvertence can be presumed where there
has been a fresh legislation on the subject and if the
new Act does not deal with the matter, it may be
presumed that the Legislature did not deem it fit to
keep alive the liability incurred under the old Act. In
our opinion the approach of the High Court to the
question is not quite correct. Whenever there 1s a
repeal of an enactment, the consequences laid down in
section 6 of the General Clauses Act will follow unless,
as the section itself says, a different intention appears.
In the case of a simple repeal there is scarcely any room
But when the
for expression of a contrary opinion.
1954
Stau of Punjab
v.
_Mohdr Singh.
Afuk!zerjea J.
'900
!!95"4
·\.State OJ Piinjah
·V.
Mohar Singh.
.Mukiie;jea j.
'SUPREME '-COURT REPORTS
{1955}
:repeal is followed .. by fresfr•legislatiorr·on the.: same· 'stib:ject we· would undoubtedly have.to look' tothe ·provisions
:of the riew Act, buf;'"only'for the purpose of determining
whether they indicate a : different -intention:•: Tlie " line
-of enquiry would be, not· whether the -new Act expressly
'keeps alive old rights· ·and liabilities but whether it
manifests · an in~ention ·to destroy thein. · We· ·cannot
:therefore . subscribe to :·the · broad · proposition that
:settionc-6:of the··· General Clauses Act is ruled out when
there is repeal of an enactment. followed by a fresh
'legislation. Section 6 would be applicable ·in such' cases
also unless the new legislation ·manifests a_n -intention
incompatible with _or contrary ·to · the provisions of the
Such incompatibility would have to be
section.
ascertained from · a consideration of all' the relevant
·provisions of the new" law and the. mere absence of
'a saving clause is by itself not material. It is in the light
of these principles that we now proceed to examine the
facts of the present case.
The offence cornrniued by the respondent consisted
·in filing a false claim. The claim was filed in accordance with the provision of section 4 of the · Ordinance
and under section 7 of the Ordinance, any false information in regard to a claim was a punishable offence.
The High Court is certainly right in holding that
section 11 of the Act does not make the claim filed
under the Ordinance a claim under the Act so · as.. to
.attract the operation of section 7. Section 11 of the
Act is in the following terms :
"The East Punjab Refugees (Registration of Land
Claims) Ordinance No. VII of 1948 is hereby repealed
.and any rules made, notifications issued, anything
done, any action taken in exercise of the powers conferred by or under the said Ordinance shall be deemed
to have been made, issued, done or taken in exercise of
·the powers conferred by, or under this Act as .if this
Act had come into force on 3rd day of March, 1948."
We agree with the High Court that expression
·"anything done" occurring in the section does not mean
-or include an act done by a person in contravention of
the provisions of the Ordinance. What the section
-eonternplates and keeps alive are rules, notifications · or
'
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s:c.it:
....-
•
901
other official acts ·done ·in exercise · of the · powers • conferred 'by or under the · Ordinance •and these powers are
mentioned in several sections of ·the· Act. But. although
the lodging of the, claim doe~· not corne :within the purview of section 11 of the Act, we are of .opinion that
the proviso to section· 4 of the Act clearly shows that a
claim filed under the . Ordinance would . be .. treated as
one filed under the Act with ·all the · consequences
attached thereto. Section 4 of the Act provides for the
registration of land -claims. The first sub-section lays
down how the claim is to be filed. The proviso attached
to it then says that. "a refugee who· has .previously
submitted a claim under Ordinance VII of 1948 to any
other authority competent to register such claim shall
not submit another claim in respect of the same land
the Registering Officer." Such claim · would be
reckoned and registered as a claim under the Act and
once it is so treated the incidents and corollaries
'.attached to the filing of a claim, as laid down in the
Act, must necessarily follow. The truth or falsity of
the claim has to be investigated in the usual way and
·if it is found that the information given by the claimant
is false, he can certainly be punished in the manner
laid down in· sections 7 and 8 of the Act. If we are to
hold that the penal provisions contained in the Act
cannot be attracted in case of a claim filed under the
·Ordinance, the results will be anomalous and even if
-on the· strength of a false claim a refugee has succeeded
in getting an allotment in his favour, such allotment
could not be cancelled under section 8 of the Act. We
think that the provisions of sections 4, 7 and 8 make it
apparent that it was not the intention of the Legislature that the rights and liabilities in respect of claims
filed under the Ordinance shall be extinguished on the
passing of the Act, and this is sufficient for holding that
the present case would attract the operation of section 6
-0£ the General Clauses Act. It may be pointed out
that section 11 of the Act is somewhat clumsily worded
and it does not make use of expressions which are
_generally used in saving clauses appended to repealing
:Statutes ; but as has been said above the point for our
to
'--t
SUPREME 'COURT "REPORTS
1 954
:siate of Punjab
•V,
. Mohar Singh
MukherjedJ..
902
1954
Slate of Punjab
v.
Moh"' Singh.
M•id1etfea ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1955}
consideration is whether the Act evinces an intentiol\
which is inconsistent with the continuance of rights
and liabilities accrued or incurred under the Ordinance
and in our opinion this question has to be answered in
the negative.
The Advocate-General of Punjab has drawn our
attention to certain American authorities which hold
that in case of simultaneous repeal and re-enactment,
the re-enactment is to be considered as reaffirmation of
the old law and the provisions of the repealed Act which
are thus re-enacted continue in force uninterruptedly.
It appears that judicial opinion in America on this
point is not quite uniform and we do not consider it
necessary to express any opinion upon it. The provisions of section 6 of the General Clauses Act will, in
our opinion, apply to a case of repeal even if there is
simultaneous enactment unless a contrary intention
can be gathered from the new enactment. The result
is that the appeal is allowed and the judgment of the
High Court set aside. The Advocate-General does not
press for enhancement of sentence passed on the
respondent. Consequently it is unnecessary for the High
Court to hear the reference made to it by the District
Magistrate, Jullundur any further.. The sentence
already passed upon the respondent by the trying
Magistrate shall stand and if the fine of Rs. 120 has not·
already been paid, it shall be paid now. In default, the
respondent shall suffer rigorous imprisonment for one
month.
Appeal allowed.
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