SRI MONOHAR DAS MOHANTA versus CHARU CHANDRA PAL AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 20 December 1954 | [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1168 | 1954 INSC 126
Key facts
- Decided
- 20 December 1954
- Bench
- MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*, NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI, B. JAGANNADHADAS, T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR, BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA
- Bench size
- 6
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 109/1952
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1168
- Neutral citation
- 1954 INSC 126
Text of the judgment
1168
1954
H. N. Rishbud and
lnder Singh
v.
1'he State ·of Delhi
Jagannadhadas J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
against the order of the High Court refusing to grant
stay of the proceedings then pen din o-, it is sufficient to
dismiss this appeal with the obsen~'ation that it will
be open to the appellants to raise the objections
before the Special Judge.
...
\- •
1954
SRI MONOHAR DAS MOHANTA
fl.
Decemher 20
CHARU CHANDRA PAL AND OTHERS.
[MEHAR
CHAND
MAHAJAN C.J.,
BHAGWATI,
JAGANNADHADAS, VENKATARAMA AYYAR
B. P. SINHA JJ.]
and
..
'(
Lost Grant-Presumption of-lVhen such presumption does or
does not arise-Legality of lost grant of Niskar from Mohunt-Pleading and proof-Findings of fact.
A presumption of a lost grant arises in favour of a person who
does not claim adversely to the o\vner but who on the other hand
proves ancient and continued possession in assertion of a title
derived from the owner without any challenge and such possession
and assertion cannot be accounted for except by referring to a legal
origin of the grant claimed.
-
But the presumption of a lost grant is not an irrebuttable presu1nption of la\V and the court cannot presume a grant where it
is convinced of its non-existence by reason of a legal i1npediment,
as where the presu1nption of a lost grant is claimed by a fluctuating
body of persons. Si1nilarly a presun1ption of a lost grant cannot
arise when there is no person capable of making such a gran.t or if
the grant pleaded is illegal or beyond the powers of the granter.
A presumption of a lost grant by way of 1\iskar cannot be in1puted to the Mohunt of an ..\sthal inasni.uch as he is legally incompetent to make any Niskar grant.
When a defendant who denies the title of the plaintiff in respect of any land, fails in that plea, he cannot fall back on the presumption of a lost grant from the very person whose title he has
denied.
Findings of fact arrived at by courts should not be \'ague.
Attorney-General v. Simpson ([1901] 2 Ch. D. 671), Raja Braja
Sunder Deb v. Mani Behara and others ([1951] S.C.R. 431), Barker
v. Richardson ([1821] 4 B. & Al<l. 579), The Rochdale Canal Com-
\.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1169
pany v. Radcliffe ([1852] 18 Q.B. 287), and Palaniappa .Chetty v.
Sreenath Devasikamony ([1917] L.R. 44 I.A. 147), referred to.
CIVIL
APPELLATE
Nos. 109 to 115 of 1952.
.-,
#
'!
'
JuRISDICTION:
CIVIL
Appeal
Appeals from the Judgment and Decree dated
the 9th day of March 1950 of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta in Appeal from Appellate Decree
Nos. 1841-1847 of 1945 arising out of the Decrees
dated the 16th day of September 1944 of Munsiff 3rd
Court, Burdwan.
P. K. Chatterjee, for the appellant.
S. C. Das Gupta, (Sukumar Chose, with him), for
the respondents in Civil Appeals Nos. 109 to 112 of
1952 and respondents 1, 2(a), 3 and 4 in Civil Appeal
No. 113 of 1952 and respondents 1 and 3 in Civil Appeals Nos. 114 and 115 of 1952.
1954. December 20. The Judgment of the
was delivered by
-
j
Court
VENKATARAMA AYYAR J.-The
appellant is the
Rajgunj
Mahant of a religious institution known as
Asthal in Burdwan, and the suits out of which the
present appeals arise, were instituted by him to recover possession of various plots of land in the occupation of the defendants, or in the alternative, for
assessment of fair and equitable rent. It was alleged
in the plaints that the suit lands were comprised in
Mouza Nala forming part of the permanently settled
estate of
Burdwan, and were Mal lands assessed to
revenue, and that more than 200 years previously
there had been a permanent Mokarrari grant of those
lands by the Maharaja of Burdwan to the Rajguni
Asthal; that in the record of rights published during
the settlement in 1931 they were erroneously described as rent-free, and that on the strength of that
entry the defendants were refusing to surrender possession of the lands to the plaintiff. It was accordingly prayed that a decree might be passed for ejectment of the defendants, or in the alternative, for
assessment of a fair and equitable rent.
1954
Sri Monohar Du
Mohanta
v.
Charu Chandra
Pal and Others
1170
1954
:Sri Monohar Das
Mohar1ta
v.
-Charu Chandra
Pal and Others
Venkatarama
4.l!J!ar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
The defendants contested the suits; and pleaded
that the lai1ds were not Mal lands comprised within
Mouza Nala, that they did not form part of the
zamindari of Burdwan but had been granted as
Lakheraj to their predecessors-in-title long prior to
the permanent settlement,. that neither the Maharaia
of Burdwan nor the plaintiff claiming under him had
any title to them, and that the entry 1Il the record
of rights in 1931 was correct. The defendants also
pleaded that as they and their predecessors had been
in possession of the lands for over 200 vears under
assertion of an adverse title, the claim of ihe plaintiff
was barred bv limitation.
The District Munsif of Burdwan who tried the suits
held tlnt the lands were included 1Il Mouza Nala 111
Thouzi No. 1, which was comprised in the permanently
settled estate of Burdwan, that tileir 111come was
taken into account 111 fixing the revenue payable by
the estate, that they had been granted in permanent
Mokarrari by the then Maharaja of Burdwan to the
Rajgunj Asthal, and that the plea of the defendants
that they held them under a Lakheraj grant made
prior to the permanent settlement was not true. He
also held that the documents on which the defendants
claimed to have dealt with the properties as owners
under assertion of an adverse title were not proved to
relate to the suit lands, that the relationship subsisting between the parties was one of landlord and
tenant, that as there had been no determination of
tenancy, no decree 111 ejectment could be passed but
tilat the plaintiff was entitled to fair rent, and that
tile claim was not barred by reason of article 131 of
tile Limitation Act. ln the result, he granted decrees
for rent.
The defendants appealed against this decision to
the Court of the District Judge of Burd wan, who
agreed witil the District Munsif that the suit lands
were Mal lands within the zamindari of Burdwan, and
tilat they had been settled on tile plaintiff by the
Maharaja of Burdwan. But he held that as the defendants and their predecessors had been in possess10n of tile lands for a very long time witilout
•
\-'
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
payment of rent, a presQmption of a lost grant could
He accordingly dismissed the
suits. Against this decision, the plaintiff appealed
to the High Court, which agreeing with the District
Judge on both the points dismissed the appeals, but
granted a certificate under article 133(1) (c), as it
was of the opinion that the question of lost grant
raised an issue of great importance.
The substantial question that arises for our decision is whether on the materials on record the Courts
below were right _in presuming a lost grant in favour
of .the defendants. The grounds on which the District
Judge made that presumption are that the defendants, and their predecessors had been in possession
of the lands for a long time without payment of rent,
.t hat they had been asserting continuously that they
were holding under a Lakheraj grant, and that they
did so to the knowledge of the plaintiff. It must be
mentioned that in dealing with this question the
District Munsif held that the documents put forward
by the defendants as containing assertions by them
that they held under a Lakheraj grant were not
shown to relate to the suit lands. The District Judge
differed from this finding, and observed :
" . . .... . . there are some unmistakable names of
tanks, etc., by which some of the lands of these documents at least can be connected with the suit lands
........ These documents relating to these holdings
cannot, therefore, be discarded as unconnected with
the suit lands".
These observations are vague, and dq not l~ad anywhere, and ca.nnot be taken as a finding on the question. No atte.m pt was made before us on behalf of
the respondents · to connect any of the qocuments with
the lands held by them. In the circumstances, the
finding .of the District Munsif on the point must be
accepted.
On the further question whether the .plaintiff had
knowledge of the assertion of any hostile title by the
defendants, the learne<;l District Judge answered it
in the afli.rm.ative relying on Exhibits A to A-24,
be made in their favour.
)
'
•
1171
1954
Sri Monohar Das
Mo!zanta
v.
Charu Chan1ra
Pal am! Otlurs
Venkatarama
Ayyar J
1172
1954
·sri Monohar Das
Mohanta
v.
Charu Chandra
Pal and Others
Vmkalarama
Ayyar ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19551
which are receipts for realisations of cesses from the
defendants. But the High Court held-and its finding
has not been attacked before us-that there was no
proof of the contents of these documents, and that
they must therefore be excluded. The position thus is
that there is no proof that the respondents set up any
adverse title prior to 1931, much less that the plaintiff
had knowledge of the same. We are therefore left
with a bare finding that the defendants and their predecessors in title had been in possession for a long
period without payment of rent; but here again, there
is no .finding as to the precise length of time during
which they held possession. The question is whether
in this situation a presumption of lost grant could be
made.
The circumstances and conditions under which a
presumption of lost grant could be made are well
settled. When a person was found in possession and
enjoyment of land for a considerable period of time
under an assertion of title without challenge, Courts
in England were inclined to ascribe a legal origin to
such possession, and when on the facts a title by
prescription could not be sustained, it was held that
a presumption could be made that the possession was
referable to a grant by the owner entitled to the land,
but that such grant had been lost. It was a presumption made for securing ancient and continued possession, which could not otherwise be reasonably accounted for. But it was not a presumptio juris et de
jure, and the Courts were not bound to raise it, if the
facts in evidence went against it. "It cannot be the
duty of a Judge to presume a grant of the non-existence of which he is convinced" observed Farwell, J.
in Attorney-General v. Simpson( 1 ). So also the presumption was not made if there was any legal impediment
to the making of it. Thus, it has been held that it
could not be made, if there was no person competent
to be the recipient of such a grant, as where the right
is claimed by a fluctuating body of persons. That
was held in Raja Braja Sundar Deb v. Moni Behara
and others( 2 ). There will likewise be no scope for this
(1) [1901) 2 Ch. D. 571. 698.
(2) [1951] s.c.R. 431, 446.
v-·
.
t·
..
•
'
i
j
·(
S.C.R.
SUPREIIIE COURT REPORTS
1173
1954
presumption, if there is no person capable of making
a grant: (Vide Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. IV,
Sri 1.Ionohar Dai
page 574, para 1074); or if the grant would have been
Mohanta
illegal and beyond the powers of the grantor. [Vide
v.
Barker v. Richardson(') and The Rochdale Canal Com- Char" Chandra
pany v. Radcliffe(')]., ~-- -- _
Pal and Others
In the light of these-prinCiples, it has now to be \~enkatara1ita
seen whether on the.facts found a lost grant could be
AyyarJ.
presumed in favour of the defendants. - The finding
is, as already stated, that they were in possession
without payment of rent for a considerable length of
time, but it has not been established precisely for how
Jong. In their written statements they pleaded that
they had been holding under a Lakheraj grant made.
prior to the permanent settlement, and had been in
possession by virtue of that title for over 200 years.
On this plea, the grant to be presumed should have
been made 200 years prior to the suit._ _There -is an
obvious difficulty in the way of presuming such a
grant on the facts of this case. There was a permanent settlement of the zamindari ofBurdwan in 1793,
and it has been found by all the Courts that in that
settlement the suit lands were included as part of the
l\Ial or assessed lands of the estate. Now, the scheme
of the settlement of the estates was to fix the revenue payable thereon on the basis of the income which
the properties were estimated to yield, and Regulation No. 8of1793 contains elaborate provisions as to
how the several kinds of property are to be dealt
with. Section 36 of the Regulation provides that "the
assessment- is also to be fixed exclusive and indepen- dent of all existing lakheraje lands, whether exempted
from the kheraje (or public revenue) with or without
due authority". Therefore, when it is shown that
lands in an estate are assessed, it must -follow that
they could not have been held on the date of the
permanent settlement as Lakheraj. It would be inconsistent with the scheme of the settlement and section 36 of Regulation No. 8 of 1793 to hold that the
assessed or Mal lands in an estate could have been
held on an anterior Lakheraj grant. It was for this
,(1) [1821) Hl. & AH
~n.
\2) [1852] 18 Q. B. 287.
.--. j"·, ·,,--.~ ' .. '-,
',_.,.·.
~-
"
,
'
1174
1954
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
reason that the defendants pleaded that the suit lands
Sri Monohar Das - were not comprised in the l\lal lands of the zamindari
Mohantaof Burdwan. But that plea has been negatived, and
v. --
- , it has been found that they are part of the l\lal lands
Charn Chandra 'within the zamindari assessed to revenue, and in view
- Paz ana Others of that finding there is no scope for the presumption
Venkatard,;;~Anar J,
of a lost grant. Learned counsel for the respondents relied strongly
on the record of rights made in 1931 with reference to
the suit lands as supporting his contention. The entry
in· question describes the lands as "Bhog Dakhal Sutre
Niskar", and has been translated as "without rent by
virtue of possession and enjoyment"; - The plaintiff
attacked this entry as made at the instance of the
defendants acting in collusion with one of his agents.
The Courts below, however, have held that that had
not been established, and therefore the entry must
be taken as properly made. The respondents contended that a strong presumption should be made in
favour of the correctness of the entry, because it was
made in the ordinary course of business, and that it
was sufficient to sustain a presumption of lost grant.
Giving -the entry its full value, does the word
"Niskar" import a rent-free grant? Rule 37 of the
Technical Rules and Instructions issued by the Settlement Department for observance by the settlement
-authorities provides that if property is found in the
possession of a person who is not actually paying rent
for it, it should be described as "Niskar", and if no
sanad or title deed is produced by the occupant show-ing a rent-free title, the words "Bhog Dakhal Sntre"
(by virtue of enjoyment and possession) should be
added. In the written statement it was stated that
"as the d!)fendants could not produce any 'revenuefree grant', they (Settlement Officers) recorded Niskar
Raiyati right in a general way". Reading Rule 37_:
-along with the written statement it is clear that the
-entry in the record of rights in 1931 was made in comIJliance with _that Rule, and that what it imports is
not that there was a rent-free grant, but that the person in possession was not actually paying rent. 'Whatever.weight might attach to tht;l word "Nislmr" in ii.
S.C.R.
I'"'"'
~'
'
•
)
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1175
record of rights in other context, where the question
is whether a presumption of a lost pre-settlement
Lakheraj grant could be made, the inference to be
drawn from that word cannot outweigh the effect of
the non-exclusion of the lands from the Mal or the
regularly assessed estate. We are therefore of opinion
that a presumption of lost grant cannot be founded
on the entry in the record of rights.
There are also other difficulties in the way of presuming a lost grant in favour of the predecessors of
the defendants. The suit properties formed part of
Mauza Nala within the zamindari of Burdwan, and if
a grant had been made in favour of the predecessors
of the defendants, it must have been made by the
Maharaja of Burdwan or by the Rajgunj Asthal. But
the defendants have in
their
written statements
denied the title of both the Maharaja and the Asthal,
and having failed in that plea, cannot fall back on a
presumption of lost grant by the very persons, whose
title they have repudiated.
This does not exhaust all the difficulties of the
defendants. According to the District Judge, the
suit properties had been settled on the Rajgunj Asthal
more than 200 years ago. Therefore, the grant to be
presumed must have been made by the Mahant of
Asthal in favour of the predecessors of the defendants.
But before raising such a presumption, it must be
established that the grant was one which could have
legally been made by him. It is well settled that it
is beyond the powers of a manager of a religious institution to grant perpetual lease binding the institution
for all times to a fixed rent, unless there is a compelling necessity or· benefit therefor. Vide Palaniappa
Chetty v. Sreenath Devasikamony( 1 ). And what is
pleaded in the present case is not even so much as a
permanent lease, because there is neither premium
paid nor rent reserved but a Lakheraj granl unsupported by any consideration. That would clearly be
beyond the powers of a Mahant, and no presumption
of a lost grant could be made in respect thereto. In
Barker v. Richardson( 2 ), an easement was claimed
(1) [1917] L.R. 44 I.A. 147·
19-89 S. C. India/59
(2) [1821] 4 B. & Ald. 079·
Sri Monohar Das
Mohanta
V•
Charu Chandra
Pal and Others
Venkatarama
Ayyar J.
1176
1
95~
Sri Monohar Das ·
Moha.nta ·
v.
.
Charu Chandra
Pal and Othefi -
Venkatarama'
Ayyar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
both on the ground of prescription and presumption
of a lost grant by a rector. In negativing this claim,
Abbot, C. J. observed that a grant could not be presumed, because the rector had no right to bind. his
successor by it, and it would therefore be invalid. In
The Rochdale Canal Company v. Radcliffe( 1 ), where the
Court was asked to presume that a company had made
a grant of its surplus waters for use by the Duke of
Bridgewater, Lord Campbell, C. J. observed that "if
they had made a grant of the water in the terms of
this plea, such a grant would have been ultra vires
and bad'', and on that ground, he refused to raise the
presumption.
We are accordingly of opm10n that on the facts
found, no presumption of a lost grant could be made
in favour of the defendants, and that the plaintiff
was entitled to assessment of fair and equitable rent
on the holdings in their possession.
Learned counsel for the respondents also raised the
plea of limitation. The Courts below have held that
the suits were within time under article 131 of the
Limitation Act, as the final settlement of records
was published on 16-6-1931, and the present suits
were filed within 12 years thereof for establishing
the right of the institution to assessment of rent.
It was observed by the learned Judges of the High
Court who heard the application for leave to appeal
to this Court that it was not suggested before them
that the decision on the ques(ion of limitation was
erroneous. The contention that is now pressed before us is that in the view that there was no rent-free
grant in favour of the predecessors of the defendants
they were all trespassers, and that the title of the
·Asthal had become extinguished by adverse possession for long over the statutory period. But the question of adverse possess10n was not made the subject
of an issue, and there is no discussion of it in the
judgments of the Courts below. We have already held
that the documents relied on by the defendants as
containing assertions that they held under a Lakheraj
grant are not shown to relate to the suit lands. We
(1) [1852] 18 Q.B. 287.
L~
\~
•
'
,
'
S.C.R.
-
.
..
•.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1177
have also held that there is no proof that the defendants claimed to hold under a rent-free grant to the
. knowledge of the plaintiff prior to 1931, and that
what all has been established by them is non-payment of rent for a considerable but unascertained
period of time. That, in itself, is not sufficient to
m,ake their possession adverse. It was only in 1931
that the defendants could be said clearly to have
asserted a hostile title, and the suits are within time
. from that date. There is no substance in this plea,
which is accordingly rejected .
In the result, the appeals are allowed, the decrees
of the District Court and of the High Court are set
aside, and those of the District Munsif restored with
costs in this Court and in the two Courts below. The
decrees of the District Munsif will stand as regards
. costs in that Court.
Appeals allowed.
SHREEKANTIAH RAMAYYA MUNIPALLI
v.
THE STATE OF BOMBAY
(With Connected Appeal)
-
[MuKHERJEA, S. R. DAs and V1vIAN BosE, JJ.]
Criminal Procedure Code, (Act V of 1898), s. 197-Prevention of
· Cofruption Act, 1947 (II of 1947), s. 5(2)-Charge thereunder and
charge under s.. 409 of the Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860Separated from each other-Sanction granted under s. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act-Whether could be extended as to cover prosecution under s. 409 of the Indian Penal Code-S. 197 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure-Scope and construction of-Indian Penal
Code, s. 34--Essence of-Whether the person must be. physically
. present at the actual commission of the crime.
·
•
The three accused-Government servants-were jointly charged
with an offence punishable under s. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and all three were further jointly charged with ,
having committed breach of trust in furtherance of the common intention of all under s. 409 of the Indian Penal Code read with s. 34.
Then followed a number of !!lternative charges in which each was
separately charged with having eommitted criminal breach of trust
personally under s. 409. As a further alternative, all three were
Sri Monohar Das
Mohanta
v.
Charu Chandra
Pal and Others
Venkatarama
Ayyar J .
1954
December 2a
Report an error or ask for masking: grievance@lawgrids.org