SHREEKANTIAH RAMA YYA MUNIPALLI versus THE STATE OF BOMBAY
Supreme Court of India | Decided 12 December 1954 | [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1177 | 1954 INSC 124
Key facts
- Decided
- 12 December 1954
- Bench
- BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA*, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, VIVIAN BOSE
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 89/1954
- Disposal
- Disposed off
- Citation
- [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1177
- Neutral citation
- 1954 INSC 124
Text of the judgment
S.C.R.
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.
..
•.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1177
have also held that there is no proof that the defendants claimed to hold under a rent-free grant to the
. knowledge of the plaintiff prior to 1931, and that
what all has been established by them is non-payment of rent for a considerable but unascertained
period of time. That, in itself, is not sufficient to
m,ake their possession adverse. It was only in 1931
that the defendants could be said clearly to have
asserted a hostile title, and the suits are within time
. from that date. There is no substance in this plea,
which is accordingly rejected .
In the result, the appeals are allowed, the decrees
of the District Court and of the High Court are set
aside, and those of the District Munsif restored with
costs in this Court and in the two Courts below. The
decrees of the District Munsif will stand as regards
. costs in that Court.
Appeals allowed.
SHREEKANTIAH RAMAYYA MUNIPALLI
v.
THE STATE OF BOMBAY
(With Connected Appeal)
-
[MuKHERJEA, S. R. DAs and V1vIAN BosE, JJ.]
Criminal Procedure Code, (Act V of 1898), s. 197-Prevention of
· Cofruption Act, 1947 (II of 1947), s. 5(2)-Charge thereunder and
charge under s.. 409 of the Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860Separated from each other-Sanction granted under s. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act-Whether could be extended as to cover prosecution under s. 409 of the Indian Penal Code-S. 197 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure-Scope and construction of-Indian Penal
Code, s. 34--Essence of-Whether the person must be. physically
. present at the actual commission of the crime.
·
•
The three accused-Government servants-were jointly charged
with an offence punishable under s. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and all three were further jointly charged with ,
having committed breach of trust in furtherance of the common intention of all under s. 409 of the Indian Penal Code read with s. 34.
Then followed a number of !!lternative charges in which each was
separately charged with having eommitted criminal breach of trust
personally under s. 409. As a further alternative, all three were
Sri Monohar Das
Mohanta
v.
Charu Chandra
Pal and Others
Venkatarama
Ayyar J .
1954
December 2a
1178
Bhreekantiah
RamaY.Jla
Munipalli
v.
TheSlate of
Bombay
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
jointly charged under s. 409. read with s. 109 for having abetted each
other in the commission of a criminal breach of trust under s. 409.
On objection taken to these charges, the trial for the offence under. s.
5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act was separated from the
trial· under s. 409 of the Indian Penal Code. The charges were reframed. One under s. 5(2) was dropped while others remained. On
27-10-1949 the Governor~General acting under s. 197 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure sanctioned the prosecution of the
first accused
,-\-"-
(appellant No. I) for offences under ss. 120-B, 409, 109 for having ,
conspired with the other two to commit criminal breach of trust in
respect of properties belonging to Government and for having thus
abetted the commission of that offence and also for having con1mitted it. Similar sanction was not given against the other two accused and was limited only to the Rrst accused. On the same date
sanction was given for the prosecution of the first accused under s.
5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and a similar sanctibn was given against the second accused. The question ·was whether this sanction. against the second accused could be extended to
cover his prosecution under s. 409 and whether his trial was valid.
-
Held, (answering the question in the n~gative) that under s.
197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the sanctioning authority
was the Governor~General. Under the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1947 the sanctioning authority was the Central Government, Either
one, or two, Government authorities were given the right and inIf two Government
vested with the duty of making an election.
authorities are given the right to' choose and neither can encroach
upon the preserve of the other, then the Governor-General has
not sanctioned the present prosecution agains.t the second accused
(appellant No. 2) and no -other authority ·has the power to do so.
Therefore the sanction given to prosecute under s. 5(2) of Act II of
1947, could not be used to cover the present trial, bec~use it was
given by an authority not competent to give it.
If, on the other hand, the twO authorities are really one, then
.the election has been made clearly. The sanction under s. 5(2) of
the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 as amended by Act LIX of
1952 and Act LXVI of 1952 is to proceed in special courts with a
special procedure so the present ,tf.ial against the second accused was
incompetent.
It is well-settled tha:t a <lefecl ·of lhis nalure is falal' and cannot
be cured when s. 197 applies and, as it did, sanction was necessary
so the trial was vitiated from the start. The proceedings were ac-
cordingly quashed.
If s. 197 of the ·Code of Criminal Procedure is construed too
narrowly it can never Pe applied for it .is no part of an official's
duty to commit an offence and never can be. But it is not the duty
of an official which has .to be examined so inuch as his act, because
an official act can be performed in the discharge of official duty as
.well as in dereliction of it. The section has content and its
·-language must be given meaning.
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S.C.R.
11
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...
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1179
In the case of the first accused there was misdirection in the
-charge to the Jury under s. 34. The essence of the misdirection
consisted in the Sessions Judge's direction to the jury that even
though a person may not be present when the offence is actually
committed and even if he remains "behind the screen" he can be
convicted under s. 34 provided it is proved that the offence was
committed in furtherance of the common intention. This is wrong
because the essence of the section is that the person must be physically present at the actual commission of. the crime .
The misdirection is plain and goes to the root of the case because the jury returned a verdict of guilty under s. 409 read with
s. 34 alone and not under s. 409 read with s. 109, I.P.C .
Held, that in cases which raise questions of substance and
importance the High Courts should not pass summary orders of
rejection without giving some indication of their views on the points
raised before them.
Mushtak Hussein v. The State of Bombay ([1953] S.C.R. 809),
The State v. Gurucharan Singh (A.LR. [19521 Punjab 89), Gokul.
chand Dwarkadas v. The King (A.LR. [1948] P.C. 82), Hori Ram
Singh v. The Crown ([1939] F.C.R. 159), Madan Mohan v. The State
of Uttar Pradesh (A.LR. [1954] S.C. 637), Lieutenant Hector Thoma.<
Huntley v. The King-Emperor ([1944] F.C.R. 262), and Barendra
Kumar Ghosh v. The King-Emperor ([1924] L.R. 52 I.A. 40), referred to.
'r
)
•
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JuRISDICTION:
peals Nos. 89 and 90 of 1954.
Criminal Ap-
Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and
Order dated the 23rd November 1953 of the High
Court of Judicature at Bombay in Criminal Appeal
No. 1213 of 1953, and ·from the Judgment and Order
dated the 25th August 1953 of the High Court of
Judicature at Bombay in Criminal Appeal No. 1121
of 1953 arising out of the judgment and decree dated
the 6th August 1953 of the Court of Sessions Case No.
36 of 1952.
S. Narayanaiah and Dr. C. V. L. Narayan, for the
appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 89 of 1954.
C. Sanjeevarow Nayadu and R. Ganapathy Ayyar,
for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 90 of 1954.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India ( G. N.
Joshi and Porus A. Mehta, with him) for the respondent.
1954
Shreekanti4h
Ramayya
Munipalli
v.
The State of
Bombay
1180
: 1954
Shreekantiah
Ramayya
Munipalli
v.
The State of
Bombay
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
1954. December 22. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
BosE J.-These two appeals arise out of the same
trial. The two appellants, Shreekantiah (the first
accused in the trial Court and the appellant m Appeal
No. 89 of 1954) and Parasuram (the second accused.
and the appellant in Appeal No. 90 of 1954) were:
tried with a third accused Dawson on a number of
different charges centering round section 409 of the
Indian Penal Code: criminal breach of trust by a
public servant. The trial was by jury and all three
were found guilty of an offence under section 409
read with section 34. They were convicted and sentenced as under :
Accused No. 1. Shreekantiah to one year and a
fine of Rs. 500 with four months in default;
Accused No. 2. Parasuram to two years and a
fine of Rs. 500 with six months in default; and
Accused No. 3. Dawson to six months and a fine
of Rs. 200 with two months in default.
The appeal of the second accused to the High Court
was dismissed summarily on 25-8-1953 with the one
word "dismissed". The first and third accused al>'
pealed separately. Their appeal was heard by another
Bench and was admitted, and a reasoned judgment
followed on 23-11-1953. This, to say the least, was, in
the circumstances of this case, anomalous. The al>'
peals arise out of the same trial and are from one
judgment and relate to the same charge to the Jury,
and what is more they raise substantially the same
points. This Court was constrained to express its
disapproval of the summary rejections of appeal>
which raise issues of substance and importance. . w~·
draw attention to the remarks in Mushtak Hussein v.
The State of Bombay ( 1 ). Those observations apply.
with even greater force in the present case.
The three accused are Government servants. At
all material times, the first was the Officer Command~
ing the Military Engineering Stores Depot at Dehu
Road near Poona. He was in over-all charge. The
1) [1953) S.C.R. 809, 820.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1181
second was under him as· the officer -in charge of the
Receipts and Issue control section. The third worked
directly under the · secon<;l as the Assistant Stores
Officer.
The depot is maintained by the Central Government and covers an area of some 150 acres. Government stores worth several lacs of rupees are kept
there. On 11-9-1948 iron stores worth about Rs.
4,000 were illegally passed out of the depot and were
handed over to one Ibrahim Fida Hussain,. an agent
of the approver Mohsinbhai (P.W. 1). The case for
the prosecution is that the three accused, who were
in charge of these stores and to whom they had been
entrusted in various capacities, entered into a conspiracy to defraud Government of these properties and .
that in pursuance of this conspiracy they arranged to
sell them to the approver (P.W. 1) for a sum of Rs.
4,000. The money is said to have been paid and then
the stores were passed out of the de;pot. The money
is said to have been pocketed by the three accused
and not credited to Government.
On these facts a number of charges were framed.
The first set was drawn up on 9-7-1953. All three
accused were jointly charged with an offence punishable under section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and all three were further jointly
charged with having committed criminal breach of
trust in furtherance of the common intention of all
under section 409 of the Indian Penal Code read
with section 34.
Then followed a number of alternative charges m
which each was separately charged with having committed criminal breach of trust personally under section 409.
As a further alternative, all three were jointly
charged under section 409, Indian Penal Code read
with section 109 for having abetted each other in the
commission of a criminal breach of trust under section 409.
Objection was at once taken to these charges an_d
the one which concerns us now was couched in the
following terms:
·1
954
· Shreekantiah
Ramayya
Munipalli
v.
The State of
Bombay
. Bose].
ns2
ShretkfJhliah
Rama)ya
Murzipnlli
v.
The Sltitl oj
·Bombay
Bose].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1955]
'".Jt is ftinher submitted that the trial under secti01i 5(2), Corruption Act, 1947 with Indian Penal
Code seetion 409 is likely to ·embarrass the accused in
their defence as it would be difficult to efface the
evidence (if any) of the accused persons given on oath
from the lnilids of the Jurors when consideting the
charge under section 409, lhdian Penal Code.
1t is therefore prayed that the charges under section
409, Indian Penal Code and section 5(2) of the Corruption Att may not be tried together in one trial".
The Assistant Public Prosecutor said he had no objection to separating the charges and leaving the one
under section 5(2) for another trial. 'the Court then
made the following order on 10-7-1953 :
"Thus, though a joint trial for offence under section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and the
offences under the Indian Penal Code is legal and
valid, I think, in view of the circumstances mentioned
above, it would be in the interest of justice and also
in the interests of the accused themselves it the trial
for the offence under secticili 5(2) of . the Prevention
of Corruption Act i~ separated. I therefore grant the
application to this extent and order that the charge
should be amended accordingly".
In view of this the charges were .re-framed on
11-7-1953. The only difference of substance is that
the charge under section 5(2) was dropped. The
others remained.
Now it will be observed that the accused are all
public servants and they contend that as, according
to the prosecution, they purported to act in the discharge of their ·official ·duties, sanction was necessary
under section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Gode.
There is ·sanction so far as the first accused is concerned btit the ·second accused contends that there is
none -in his case· .to justify tht present trial, so his
trial, conviction and sentence 'are bad.
The position about this is as follows : On 27·10..1949
the 'Gbverhor-Gefietal, act·ihg under settion 197 .of the
'Code of Criminal Procedure, sa:naioned the prosecU'
tion of the first accused for offences under sections
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:S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1183
120-B, 409, 109 and so forth, for having conspired
with the other two to commit criminal breach of trust
in respect of the properties with which this case is con·cerned and thus for having abetted the commission of
:that offence, and also for having committed it. Similar
sanction could easily have been given again~t the other
·two accused but it was not. The sanction for these
·offences was limited to the first accused .
On the same date sanction was also given for the
_prosecution of the first accused under section 5(2) of
the Prevention of Corruption Act and a similar sanc:tion was given against the second accused. The question is whether this sanction against the second ac•Cused can be extended to cover his prosecution under
section 409 of the Indian Penal Code. In our opinion,
it cannot.
At the date of the sanction the unamended Preven'.tion of Corruption Act (II of 1947) was in force.
•Criminal breach of trust under section 409 of the
Indian Penal Code was included in the definition of
"''criminal misconduct" under section 5 ( 1) ( c) of the
Act of 1947. Therefore, an offence under section 409
·could be tried under the Act of 1947 and the question
:arose whether it would have to be tried under that
Act, or whether it could also be tried in the ordinary
way by the ordinary Courts. The Punjab High Court
.held in The State v. Gurucharan Singh(1) that it could
not. Because of this the Act of 1947 was amended in
1952 by Act LIX of 1952 and section 4 of the amending Act makes it clear that the trial can be under
•either law. But in the same year the Criminal Law
Amendment Act, 1952 (Act XLVI of 1952) was passed
.and because of this Act trials under section 5(2) of
the Prevention of Corruption Act must be before a
.Special Court and a special procedure must be followed. Therefore, the position which these various
Acts created was this.
First, a choice was conferred
.on some authority to choose whether any given ·accused should be tried in a special Court with a special
.Procedure and be subject to a lesser punishment under
:section 5(2) or vvhether he should be tried in the ordi( 1) A.LR. 195~ Put.jab 89.
ig54
Shreekantiah
Ramqva
Munipalli
v.
The State of
Bombay
Bose J.
.1184
1 954
Shreekantiah
··Ramayya
Munipalli'
v.
· The.State of
Bomhf!Y
. BoseJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
.(1~55)
nary way under section 409 ·of the Indian Penal Code
with the risk of a higher pnnishment.
The question then 1s . who 1s to do the choosing.
Under section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
the Governor-General was at that date the sanction. mg authority though the words "exercising his .individual judgment" had by that time been deleted .
Under the Prevention of Corruption Act the sanctioning authority was the "Central Government".
Now it may well be that the two mean the same
thing because of section S(a) of the General Clauses
Act but that makes no difference at the moment. The
fact remains that either one, or two, Government
authorities were . given the right, and invested with
the duty, of making an election. They had the right
to say whether a certain class of public servant who
had committed criminal breach of trust should be
tried for that offence under section 409 "of the Indian
Penal Code in the ordinary courts of the land according to the normal procedure obtain.ing there and be
subject to a maximum penalty of ten years plus an
unlimited fine or be tried for the same offence under
another name in a special court by a special procedure and be subject to no more than seven years plus
a fine which is also unlimited.
At this stage of the arguments we asked the learned
· counsel for the appellants whether they intended to
challenge the vires of this law under article 14 of the
Constitution because, if they did, the matter would
have to go to a Constitution Bench as we, being only
three Judges, would have no power to decide it. The
learned Attorney-General at once objected because the
point had not been raised at any stage and was not
. to be found even rn the grounds of appeal to this
Court. The learned counsel for the appellants replied
· that they did not wish to take the point. Accordingly,
we have to proceed in this case on the assumption
that the amending Act of 1952 (Act LIX of 1952) is
valid. That results in the position we have outlined
above. There is a choice, not only of forum, but also
. of procedure· ~d the extent of the maximum penalty.
If two separate authorities are give_n ...t;h~. _ii~h~ 1 · fo
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S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1185
· choose arid neither can encroach upon the preserve of
the other, then the Governor-General ·has · not ·sanctioned - the present prosecution against . the second
accused and no other authority has the power ·to do
so. Therefore, in that event, the sanction given tQ
prosecute under section 5(2) cannot be used to cover
the present trial because it is given by another
authority not competent to give it.
On the other hand, if the two authorities ai:e really
one, then the election has been made clearly and unequivocally. The sanction is to proceed in the special
courts with the special procedure and the second
accused is not to be exposed to the risk of the higher
penalty. In that event, the present trial against the
second accused is incompetent.
That a defect of this kind is fatal and cannot be
cured is well settled. See the Privy Council in Gokulchand Dwarkadas v. The King( 1 ), the observations of
'Varadachariar, J. in Hori Ram Singh v. The Crown(2)
and tl1e decision of this Court in Madan Mohan v.
The State of Uttar Pradesh(3). But the learned AttorneyGeneral argued that no sanction was necessary because,
according to him, despite what the second accused
says, by no stretch of imagination can he be said to
have been acting, or even purporting to act, in the
discharge of his official duty. The argument ran as
follows :-The act complained of here is the breach of
trust and the prior abetment of it: the breach occurred
:ls soon as the goods were loaded on Mohsinbhai.'s
lorries: it was no part of this accused's official duties
to permit an unauthorised removal of the goods:
therefore, when he allowed that he neither acted, nor
purported to act, in the discharge of_ his official
duties. Reference was made to the decision of the
Federal Court in Lieutenant Hector Thomas Huntley. v.
The King-Emperor( 4 ) where Zafrullah Khan, J. held
that "it must be established that the ·act complainea
of was an official act"' and to the observatio11s of
Varadachariar, J. in Hori Ram Singh v. The Crown(•}
(1) A.LR. 1948 P.O. 82.
(2) [1939] F.C.R. 159, 184. ·
. .. (4) [1944] F.Q.R. 262, 269.
•(5)"[i9391 F.C.R.:t59;186; - -
~)_ A.LR. 1954 S.C ..637, 641.
• - : . ,_- , ,;_
Shreekantiah
. Ramay;•a
Munipalli
v,
The State of
Bombay
Boie].
ll86
· 1 954
·Shreekantiah
Ramayya
Muhipalli
v.
"Thd!ta/i of
Bombay~
Bo<e].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
where, dealing with section 409 of the Indian Penal
·Code, he says"Though a reference to the capacity of the accused as a ·public servant is involved both m the
charge under section 409 and in the charge under section 477-A, there is an important difference between
the ·two cases, when one comes to deal with the act
complained of. In the first, the official capacity 1s
material only m connection with the 'entrustment' ·
and does not necessarily enter into the later act of
misappropriation or convers10n, which 1s the act complained of".
What this .argument overlooks is that the stress m
the passage quoted is on the word "necessarily" which
we have underlined. A later passage at page 187 explains this:
"I would observe at the outset that the question
is substantially one of fact, to be determined with
reference to the act complained of and the attendant
circumstances; it seems neither useful nor desirable
to paraphrase the language of ·(he section m attempting to lay down hard and fast tests".
With that we respectfully agree. There are cases and
cases and each must be decided on its own facts.
Now it is obvious that if section 197 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure is construed too -narrowly it can
never be applied, for of course it ·is no part of an
official's duty to commit an offence and never can be.
But it is not the duty we have to examine so much
as the act, because an official act ·can be performed in
the discharge of official duty as well as m dereliction
of it. The section has content and its language must
be given meaning. What it says is"when any public servant ...... is accused ·of any
offence alleged to have been committed by him while
acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his
official duty .... ,,
We have therefore 'first to concentrate on the word
..
-
'~offence"-.
Now an offence seldom consists of ·a single act. It
is usually composed of several elements and, as a rule,
a whole series of acts must be proved before it can be
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S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1187
established. In the present case, the elements alleged
against the second accused are, first, that there was
an "entrustment" and/or
"dominion"; second, that
the entrustment and/or dominion was "in- his .capacity as a public servant"; third, that there was a
"disposal"; and fourth, that the disposal was "dishonest". Now it is evident that the entrustment and/
or dominion here were in an official capacity, and it
is equally evident that there could in this case be no
disposal, lawful or otherwise, save by an act done or
purporting to be done in an official capacity. Therefore, the act complained of, namely the disposal, could
not have been done in any other way. If it was innocent, it was an official act; if dishonest, it was the
dishonest doing of an official act, but in either event
the act was official · because the second accused could
not dispose of the goods save by the doing of an
official act, namely officially permitting their disposal;
and that he did. He actually permitted their release
and purported to do it in an official capacity, and
apart from the fact that he did not pretend to act
privately, there was no other way in which he could
have done it. Therefore, whatever the intention or
motive behind the act may have been, the physical
part of it remained unaltered, so if it was official in
the one case it was equally official in the other, and
the only difference would lie in the intention with
which it was done: in the one event, it would be done
in the discharge of an official duty and in the other,
in the purported discharge of it.
The act of abetment alleged against him stands on
the same footing, for his part in the abetment was to
permit the disposal of the goods by the doing of an
official act and thus "wilfully suffer" another person
to use them dishonestly: section 405 of the Indian
Penal Code. In both cases, the "offence" in his case
would be incomplete without proving the official act.
We therefore hold that section 197 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure applies and that sanction was
necessary, and as there was none the trial is vitiated
from the start. We therefore quash the proceedings:
1 954
Shreekantiah·
Ramayya
Munipalli
v.
The State ef
Bombay
Bose].
1188.
1954
Shreekantiah'
Ramayya
MUnipalli
v.
The State of
Bombaj
Boie].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
against · the second accused as also his conviction and
sentence.
We now turn to the appeal of the first accused. He
has been convicted under section 409 of the Indian
Penal Code read with section 34. The main poi!\t
here concerns a vital misdirection m the charge to
the jury about section 34. The learned Additional
Sessions Judge misunderstood the scope and content
of this section and so misdirected the 1ury about the
law.
The section was expounded at length in paragraphs
15 and 16 of the charge and though some of the illustrations given are on the right lines, there 1s much
there that 1s wrong and which, if acted on, would
cause a mtscarnage of justice. The essence of the.
misdirection consists m his direction to the jury that
even though a person "may not be present when the
offence is actually committed" and even if he remains
"behind the screen" he can be convicted under section 34 privided it 1s proved that the offence was
committed in furtherance of the common intention.
This is wrong, for it is the essence of the section that
the person must be physically present at the actual
comnuss1on of the crime. He need not be present· in
the actual room; he can, for instance, stand guard by
a gate outside ready to warn his compamons
about
any approach of danger or wait in a car on a nearby
road ready to facilitate their escape, but )le must be
physically present at the scene of the occurrence and
must actually participate m the commission of the
offence in some way or other at the time the crime is
actually being committed. The antithesis 1s between
the preliminary stages, the agreement, the preparation,
the planning, which is covered by section 109, and the
stage of commission when the plans are put into
effect and carried out. Section 34 1s concerned with
the latter. It is true there must be some sort of prelinunary plarming which may or may not be at thl:'
scene of the cnme and which may have taken place
long beforehand, but there must be added to it the
element of physical presence at the scene of occurrence coupled with actual participation which, of
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S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS-
1189;
course, can be of -a passive character such as standing
by a door, provided _that is done with the intention of
assisting in furtherance of the common intention of
them all and there is a readiness to play his -part in
the pre-arranged plan when the time comes for him to
" act.
,
The emphasis in section 34 is on the word "done":
, -'-.
"When a criminal act is done by several persons ...... "
... It is essential that they join in the actual doing of the
act and not merely in planning its perpetration. The
section has been elaborately explained by Lord Sumner
in Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. The King-Emperor(1). At
page 52, he explains that "participation in action" is
the' leading feature of section 34. And at page 53 in
explaining section 114 of the Indian Penal Code, he
says"Because
participation de facto (as this case
shows) may sometimes be obscure in detail, it is
-established by the presumption 7uris et de jure that
actual presence plus prior abetment can mean nothing
else but participation. The presumption raised by
section 114 brings the case within the ambit of section 34".
At page 55 he says about section 34 that"participation and joint action in the actual commission of crime are, in substance, matters which stand
in antithesis to abetments or attempts".
The misdirection is plain and it goes to the root of
the matter because the jury returned a verdict of
-guilty· under section 409 of the Indian Penal Code
-read with section 34 alone and not under section 409
read with section 109.
It is part of the defence of the first accused that he
was not present when the goods were loaded nor was
he present when they were allowed to pass out of the
gates, that is to say, that he was not present when
the offence was committed. It is true there is evidence
to show that he was there when the lorries left but
apart from the fact that there is a small discrepancy
on the point, there is nothing to indicate that this
evidence was believed. If he was not present he
-
(1) [1924] L.R. 52 I.A. 40.
Shreekantiah
Ramayya
Munipalli
v.
The State of
BomhD:Ji
Bose].
ll90
1 954
Shreekantiah
Ramayya
Munipalli
v.
The Stale of
Bombay
Bose].
SUPREME C01JRT REPORTS
[1955]
carm0t be convicted with the aid of section 34. He ,,_'
could hav.e been convicted of the abettnent had the
jury returned a verdict to that effect becaus.e there is
evidence 0f abetment and the charge about abetment:
is right in law, But the jury ignored the abetment
part of the charge and we have no means of knowing
whether ·they believed :this part of the evidence or "1vnot.
·
There is also non-directi0n on .an important point
which may have caused a miscarriage of justice. The
case for the prosecution is that the accused disposed
of the goods to Mohsinbhai for a sum of Rs. 4,000
which was duly paid to the second accused on the
10th. The learned trial Judge told the jury that"the evidence led by the prosecution about the
payment of the Rs. 4,000 is proved to be utterly use,
,,
1
-
less",
.and in telling them why he gave them a number of
reasons. But he omitted to follow this up by telling
them that if they rejected this part of the prosecution
case, as he invited them to do, then the strongest part
of the case against ·the accused collapsed because
officers in the position of the accused do not commit -·'-"
illegal acts like this and expose themseJyes to a
prosecution and possible disgrace unless they .are
prompted by some strong m@tiv.e, usually self interest;
and though a conviction can be based on evidence
which does not disclose a moti v.e if the facts proved
justify such a .course, yet it would ordinarily be unsafe to convict in a case like the present in the .absence of proof indicating an adequate reason. for
criminal behaviour on the part of the accused. Had
the jury been told this, as they should have .been, it
is p0ssible they would not have returned a. verdict 9£
guilty.
In the .circumstances, we have no alternative but
.,
to quash this .con¥iction also.
We have now to consider whether there should be
a retrial. As the present tr-ial cannot proceed against
the second .accused, and as all the accused are said to
have acted in concert each playing an appointed part
t.
in a common plan, we do not .think it would be right
...
-
S;C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1191
to direct a retrial though this is. the rionnal course .
when jury frial is set aside on the grounds of i:nisdirection and non-direction. We tl).erefore discharge
(nqt acquit) both the appellants leaving it to Government ~ither to drop t.he e.ntire matter or to p~oceed
in such. manner as it may be advised.,. We do .this
because the accused· expressly asked that the •· charge·
under the Prevention · of ·Corruption Act shbuld· be''·
left over ··for a separate ~rial,. ·The two convictioµ:s ~re, '
~e. are .
therefore quashed and. ·also . the sentences:
told that the first accused has already .served out his.;
sentence. The fine if paid, will be refunded. The
bail bond of the second accused will .be cancelled.
a
<;
1 954
· Shreekanliak
.Ramayya
· Munipalli
v.
The Stale of
Bomha.J
Bose].
)
I
MAHANT SALIG RAM
v.
MUSAMMAT MAYA DEVI.
' (~: ~· DAS, BHAGWAT! and SYED JAFER IMA¥
..>.y·
1955
January
JJ.] '.'
Custom-succession-Non-ancestral
property-Daughter
virsus
collateral within fourth degree-Saraswat Brahmins of Pathahl{ol •in
the
District of Gurdaspur-Riwaj-i-am-Entries ih'erein-Value of
-Riwaj-i-am of Gurdaspur District of the year 1913-Whether a
t·eliable document-,-Answer to questions 16 and 17.-Value of,
It is now well-settled that the general custoin of the P~njab,
being that a daughter excludes the collaterals from succession to the
self-acquired property of her father. the initial onus, therefore, must,
on principle, be on. the. collaterals to show that the general custom in
favour of the daughter's succession to the. self-acquired property <1f
her tather has been varied by a special local .custom . excluding· t~c,
daughter which is binding on the parties. .
. .
, . •
It is also well-settled that though the entri~s ·in the'· Riwaj-i~am
are entitled to an initial presumption in favour of their cortectne,s·
irrespective of the question whether or not the custom, 'as recorded,
is in accord ·with the general custom, the quantum of evidence neces'
sary to rebut that presumption will, however, 'vary with the ·facts
and circumstances of each case. Where, for instance; the Riwaj-iam lays down a custoin in consonance with the general agricultural
custom of the province, very strong proof would be required to dis- ·
place that presumption; but where, on the other hand, the custom
as recorded in the Ri waj'i-am is opposed to the custom generally
prevalent; the presumption will be considerably weakeneq, Likewise1
40-89 S. C. India/59
~1
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