HARI VISHNU KAMATH versus SYED AHMAD ISHAQUE AND OTHERS.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 9 December 1954 | [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1104 | 1954 INSC 122
Key facts
- Decided
- 9 December 1954
- Bench
- MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*, BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, VIVIAN BOSE, NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI, B. JAGANNADHADAS, T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR
- Bench size
- 7
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 61/1954
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1104
- Neutral citation
- 1954 INSC 122
Text of the judgment
1104
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1 954
HARI VISHNU KAMATH
December 9
ti,
[19551
SYED AHMAD ISHAQUE AND OTHERS.
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J., MuKHERJEA,
S. R. DAs, V1v1AN BosE, BHAGWATI, JAGANNADHADAS
AND VENKATARAMA AYYAR
JJ.]
Constitution of India, Art. 226-Powers of High Court thereunder-Writ of certiorari against Election Tribunals after they become functus offici~ertiorari against Record-Distinction between
writ of prohibition and writ of certiorari-Art. 227 of the Constitution-Superintendence of High. Court over Election Tribunals--
Superintendence-Judicial as
well
as
-
administrative-Cectiorari-
Scope and character of-Representation of the People (Conduct of
Elections and Election
Petitions)
Rules, 1951-Rule 47(1) (c)-
W hether mandatory or directory-Error manifest on the
record-Interference by certiorari.
face of
Article 226 of the Constitution confers on High Courts powerto issue appropriate writs to any person or authority within their
territorial jurisdiction, in terms absolute and unqualified, and Election Tribunals functioning within the territorial jurisdiction of the
High Courts would fall \Vithin the sweep of that power. The power
of the High Court under Art. 226 to issue writ of certiorari against
decisions of Election Tribunals remains unaffected by Art. 329(b) of
the Constitution.
The High Courts have power under Art. 226 of the Constitution, to issue writs of certiorari for quashing the decisions of Election
Tribunals, notwithstanding that they become functus officio after pronouncing the decisions.
The writ of certiofari for quashing the offending order or proceeding is directed against a record, and as a record can be brought
up only through human agency, it is ordinarily issued to the person
or authority \vhose decision is to be reviewed. If it is the record of
the decision that has to be removed by certiorafi, then the fact that
the tribunal has become functus officio subsequent to the decision
could have no effect on the jurisdiction of Court to remove the record.
i\.s the true scope of the writ of certiorari to quash is that it
merely demolishes the offending order, the presence of the offender
before the court, though proper, is not necessary for the exercise of
the jurisdiction or to render its determination effective. The writ of
certiorari being in reality directed against the record, there is no
reason why it should not be issued to whosoever has the custody
thereof.
The writ of certiorari is directed to the body or officer whose
determination is to be reviewed, .or to any other person having th~
custody of the record or other papers to be certified.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1105
The scope of Art. 226 of the Constitution is firstly that it confers on the High Courts power to issue writs · and directions and
Hari Vishnu
secondly it defines the limits of that power. This latter it does by
Karnath
enacting that it could be ex~rcised over any person or authority
v.
within the territories jn relation to which it exercises its jurisdicSyed Ahmad
tion. The emphasis is on the words "within the territory", and lshaque and Othm
their significance is that the jurisdiction to issue writs is co-extensive
with the territorial jurisdiction of the court. The reference is not
to the nature and composition of the court or tribunal but to the
area within which the power could be exercised.
There is one fundamental distinction between a writ of prohibition and a writ of certiorari. A writ of prohibition will lie when the
proceedings are to any extent pending and a writ of certiorari for
quashing will lie after the proceedings have terminated in a final
decision. If a writ of prohibition could be issued only if there are
proceedings pending in a court, it must follow that it is incapable of
being granted when the court ha.s ceased to exist, because there
could be then no proceeding on which it could operate. But it is
otherwise with a writ of certiorari to quash, because it is directed
against a decision which has been rendered by a Court or tribunal,
and the continued existence of that court or tribunal is not a condition of its decision being annulled.
Election Tribunals are subject to the superintendence of the
High Courts under Art. 227 of the Constitution and that superintendence is both judicial and administrative. While in a certiorari
under Art. 226 the High Court can .only annul the decision of the
Tribunals, it can, under Art. 227 do that, and also issue further
directions in the matter.
As respects the character and scope of the writs of certiorari the
following propositions may be taken as well established:
(1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction,
as when an inferior Court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or
in excess of it, or fails to exercise it.
(2) Certiorari will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal
acts illegally· in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it
decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or
violates the principles of natural justice.
( 3) The court issuing a writ of certiomri acts in exercise of a
supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this
is that the court will not review findings of facts reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal, even if they be erroneous.
( 4) An error in the decision or determination itself may also be
amenable to a writ of "certiorari" if it is a manifest error apparent
on the face of the proceedings, e.g., when it is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law. In other words, it is a
patent error which can be corrected by "certiorari" but not a mere
wrong decision. · What is an error apparent on the face of the record
cannot be defined precisely or ·exhaustively, there being an element
1106
Hari Vishnu
Karnath
v.
Syed Ahmad
i/Jhaque and OtherJ
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
of indefiniteness inherent in its very nature, and it must be left to
be determined judicially .on the facts of each case.
It is well-established that an ena.ctment in form mandatory
might in substance be directory, and that the use of the word "shall"
does not conclude the nlatter. There are well-known rules for determining w·hen a statute should be construed as mandatory and when
directory. All of them are only aids for ascertaining the true intention of the legislature which is the detennining factor, and that
must ulti1nately depend on the context.
The word "shall" in Rule 47(1)(c) of the
'
Representation of the
<
/
"
People (Conduct of Elections and Election Petitions) Rules, 1951
\Vhich enacts that "a ballot paper contained in a ballot box shall be
rejected if it bears any serial number or mark different from the
serial numbers or marks of ballot papers authorised for use at the
polling station or the polling booth at which the ballot box in \vhich
it was found was used", cannot be construed as meaning "may".
..
The provisions of Rule 47(1)(c) are mandatory like the provisions of
Rule 47(1)(a), Rule 47(1)(b) and Rule 47(1)(d).
Held, that in maintaining the election of the first respondent in
the present case on the basis of the 301 votes which were liable to
be rejected under Rule 47(1) (c) the Tribunal was plainly in error.
As the error was manifest on the face of the record, it called for interference in certiorari.
Held further, that the prayer of the appellant to be declared
elected must be refused under S. 97, as the respondent had pleaded
in his recrimination petition that there had been violation of Rule
23, and that by reason thereof the election of the appellant was
liable to be set aside, if he had been declared elected and that that
plea had been established.
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In the result the entire election was set aside.
N. P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency
and Others ([1952] S.C.R. 218), Durga Shankar v. Raghuraj Singh
([1955] S.C.R. 267), T. C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa ([1955] S.C.R.
250), Clifford O'Sullivan ([1921] 2 A.C. 570), Rex v. Electricity Commissioners ([1924] 1 K.B. 171), R. v. Wormwood Scrubbs
(Governor) ([1948] 1 All E.R. 438), Waryam Singh and another v.
Amarnath and.another ([1954] S.C.R. 565), Parry & Co. v. Commercial
Employees' Association, Madras (fl952] S.C.R. 519), Veerappa Pillai
v. Raman and Raman Ltd. and Others ([1952] S.C.R. 583), Ibrahim
Aboobaker v. Custodian General ([1952] S.C.R. 696), Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal T1·ibunal; Ex parte Shaw ( [ 1951] 1
K.B. 711; [1952] I K.B. 338), Rex v. Nat Bell Liquors Ltd. ([1922]
2 A.C. 128), Batuk K. Vyas v. Surat Municipality · (A.LR. 1953
Born. 133), Julius v. Bishop of Oxford ([1880] L.R. 5 A.C. 214),
Woodward v. Sarsons ([1875] L.R. 10 C.P. 733), Vashist Narain v.
Dev Chandra ([1955] S.C.R. 509) and In Re South Newington Election Petiu"on ([1948] 2 A.E.R. 503), referred to,
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
CrVIL
APPELLATE
NQ. 61 of 1954.
JurusmcTION :
Civil
1107
Appeal
· Appeal under Article 132(1) of the Constitution
of India from the Judgment and Order dated the 4th
November 1953 of the High Court of Judicature at
Nagpur in Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 174 of
1953.
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N. C. Chatterjee, Bakshi Tek Chand and Veda
Vyas, (S. K. Kapur and Ganpat Rai, with them), for
the appellant.
G. S. Pathak, (Rameshwar
Nath and
Narain, with him), for respondent No. 1.
1954. December 9.
was delivered by
-
The
Rajinder
Judgment of the Court
VENKATARAMA AYYAR J.-The appellant and respondents 1 to 5 herein were duly nominated for election to the House of the People from the Hoshangabad
Constituency in the State of Madhya Pradesh. Respondents 4 and 5 subsequently withdrew from the
election, leaving the contest to the other candidates.
At the polling the appellant secured 65,201 votes, the
first respondent 65,375 votes and the other candidates
far less; and Returning Officer according! y declared
the first respondent duly elected. The appellant then
filed Election Petition No. 180 of 1952 for setting aside
the election on the ground inter alia that 301 out of
the votes counted in favour of the first respondent
were liable to be rejected under Rule 47 ( 1) ( c) of Act
No. XLIII of 1951 on the ground that the ballot
papers did not have the distinguishing marks prescribed under Rule 28, and that by reason of their improper reception, the result of the election had been
materially affected. Rule 28 is as follows :
"The ballot papers to be used for the purpose of
voting at an election to which this Chapter applies
shall contain a serial number and such distinguishing
marks as the Election Commission may decide".
Under this rule, the Election Commission had decided
that the ballot papers for the Parliamentary Consti-
HariVishnu
Karnath
v.
Syed Ahmad
lshaque and Othm
1108
1 954
Hori Vishnu
Kamath
v.
Syed Ahmad
Jshaque and Otheis
V111katarama
AyyarJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
tuencies should bear a green bar printed near the left
margin, and that those for the State Assembly should
bear a brown bar.
What happened in this case was that voters for the
House of the People in polling stations Nos. 316 and
317 in SobhapUr were given ballot papers with brown
bar intended for the State Assembly, instead of ballot
papers with green bar which had to be used for the
House of the People. The total number of votes so
polled was 443, out of which 62 were in favour of the
appellant, 301 in favour of the first respondent, and
the remaining in favour of the other candidates.
Now, Rule 47 ( 1) ( c) enacts that "a ballot paper contained in a ballot box shall be rejected if it bears any
serial number or mark different from the serial numbers or marks of ballot papers authorised for use at
the polling station or the polling booth at which the
ballot boi< in which it was found was used". In his
election petition, the appellant contended that m
accordance
with this prov1S1on the ballot papers
received at the Sobhapur polling stations not having
·the requisite mark should have been excluded, and
that if that had been done, the first respondent would
have lost the lead of 174 votes, and that he himself
would have secured the largest number of votes. He
accordingly prayed that he might be declared duly
elected.
The first respondent contested the petition. He
pleaded that the Returning Officer ar Sobhapur had
rightly accepted the 301 votes, because Rule 47 was
directory and not mandatory, and that further the
votes had been accepted as valid by the Election Commission, and the defect, if any, had been cured. He
also filed· a recrimination petition under section 97 of
Act No. XLIII of 1951, and therein pleaded inter alia
that at polling station No. 299 at Malkajra and at
polling station No. 371 at Bammangaon ballot papers
intended for use in the State Legislature election had
been wrongly issued to voters to the House of the
People by mistake of the polling officers, that all those
·votes had been wrongly rejected by the Returning
. Officer, and that if they had been counted, he would
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1109
1954
have got 117 votes more than the appellant.. He
accordingly challenged the right of the appellant to
lfari Vishnu
Karnath
be declared elected.
v.
The Election Tribunal held by a majority that Rule
Syed Ahmad
47(1) (c) was mandatory, and that the 301 ballot lshaque and Othm
-"papers found in the box of the first respondent bearVenkatarama
"AyyarJ.
ing the wrong mark should not have been counted;
while the third Member was of the opinion that that
rule was merely directory, and that the Returning
Officer had the power to accept them. The Tribunal,
however, was unanimous in holding that the result
of the election had not been materially affected by
the erroneous reception of the votes, and on that
ground dismissed the petition.
The appellant then moved the High Court of Nagpur under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution for
the issue of a writ of certiorari or other order or direction for quashing the decision of the Election Tribunal on the ground that it was illegal and without
jurisdiction. Apart from supporting the decision on
"the merits, the first respondent contended that having
r.egard to article 329 (b) the High Court was not competent to entertain the petition, as in substance it
called in question the validity of an election. The
petition was heard by a Bench consisting of Sinha,
C. J., Mudholkar and Bhutt, JJ., who differed in their
.conclusions. Sinha, C. J., and Bhutt, J., held that no
writ could be issued under article 226, firstly because
the effect of article 329 (b) was to take away that
power, and secondly, because the Election Tribunal
"had become functus officio after the pronouncement of
the decision, and that thereafter there was no Tribunal to which directions could be issued under that
article. Mudholkar, J., agreed with this conclusion,
but rested it on the second ground aforesaid. As regards article 227, while Sinha, C. J. and Bhutt, J.
held that it had no application to Election Tribunals,
Mudholkar, J. was of the view that they " were also
within "the purview of" that article, but that in view
of article 329 (b), no relief could be granted either
setting aside the election of the first respondent, or
" declaring the appellant elected, and that the only
1110
1 954
Hari Vishnu
Karnath
_v.
·Syed Ahmad
lShague and Others
Venkatarama
. Ayyar.J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955J
order that could be made was to set aside the decision
of the T ribuna!. On the merits, Sinha, C. f. and Bhutt,
J. took the view that the decision of the Tribunal
that the result of the election had not been materially affected by the erroneous reception of votes
was one within its jurisdiction, and that it could not
be quashed under article 226, even if it had made a
mistake of fact or law. But Mudholkar, J. held that
as in arriving at that decision the Tribunal had taken
into consideration irrelevant matters, such · as themistake of the polling officer in issuing wrong ballot
papers and its effect on the result of the election, it
had acted in excess of its jurisdiction. He was accordingly of opinion that the decision should be quashed leaving it to the Election Commission "to perform
their statutory duties in the matter of the election
petition". The petition was dismissed in accordance
with the majority opinion. The learned Judges, however, granted a certificate under article 132( 1), and
that is how this appeal comes before this Court.
., • '
The first question that arises for decision in this.
appeal is whether High Courts have jurisdiction
under article 226 to issue writs against decisions of
Election Tribunals. That article confers on High •
Courts power to issue appropriate writs to any person
or authority within their territorial jurisdiction, in
terms absolute and unqualified, and Election Tribunals functioning within the territorial jurisdiction of
the High Courts would fall within the sweep of that
power. If we are to recognise or admit any limitation on this power, that must be founded on some
prov1S1on in the Constitution itself. The contention
of Mr. Pathak for the first respondent is that such a
limitation has been imposed on that power by article
329(b ), which is as follows :
"Notwithstanding
anything in · this
Constitu··
tionno election to either House of Parliament or to theHouse or either House of Legislature of a Stateshall be called in question except by an election peti-.
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tion presented to such authori•y and in such manner
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1111
as may be provided for by or under any law made by
the appropriate Legislature".
Now, the question is whether a writ is a proceeding
in which an election can properly be said to be called
in question within the meaning of article 329 (b). On
a plain reading of the article, what is prohibited
therein is the 1nztzat1on of proceedings for setting
aside an election otherwise than by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner
as provided therein. A suit for setting aside an election would be barred under this provision. In N. P.
Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency and Others(1) it was held by this Court that
the word "election" in article 329(b) was used m a
comprehensive sense as including the entire process
of election commencing with the issue of a notification and terminating with the declaration of election
of a candidate, and that an application under article
226 challenging the validity of any of the acts forming part of that process would be barred. These are
instances of original proceedings calling in question
an election, and would be within the prohibition
enacted in article 329(b ). But when once proceedings have been instituted in accordance with article
329(b) by presentation of an election petition, the
requirements of that article are fully satisfied. Thereafter when the election petition is in due course heard
by a Tribunal and decided, whether its decision is
open to attack, and if so, where and to what extent,
must be determined by the general law applicable to
decisions of Tribunals. There being no dispute that
they are subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the
High Courts under article 226, a writ of certiorari
under that article will be competent against decisions
of the Election Tribunals also.
The view that article 329(b) is limited in its operation to initiation of proceedings for setting aside
an election and not to the further stages following on
the decision · of the Tribunal is considerably reinforced, when the question is considered with reference
to a candidate, w.hose election has been set aside
(1J [1952] S.C.R. 218.
15-89'8. C. India/59.
1 954
Bari Vishnu
Karnath
v.
Syed Ahmail
lshaque and Others
Venkatarama
AyarJ.
1112
1 954
Hari Vishnu
Karnath
v.
Syed Ahmad
lshaque and Others
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
by the Tribunal. If he applies under article 226 for
a· writ to set aside the order of the Tribunal he can.
'
not m any sense be said to call in question the election; on the other hand, he seeks to mamtam it. His
application could not, therefore, be barred by article
329(b). And if the contention of the first respondent
is well-founded, the result will be that proceedings
under article 226 will be competent m one event and
not in another and at the instance of one party and
not the other. Learned counsel for the first respondent was unable to give any reason why this differentiation should be made. We cannot accept a construction which leads to results so anomalous.
This question may be said to be almost concluded
by authority. In Durga Shankar v. Raghuraj Singh(')
the contention was raised that this
Court could not
entertain an appeal against the decision of an Election Tribunal under article 136 of the Constitution,
as that would be a proceeding m which an election IS
called m question, and that that could be done only
before a Tribunal as provided m article 329(b). In
overruling this contention, Mukherjea, J. observed :
"The 'non-obstante' clause with which article
329 of the Constitution begins and upon which the
respondent's counsel lays so much stress, debars us,
as it debars any other court in the land, to entertain
a suit or a proceeding calling m question any election
to the Parliament or the State Legislature. It is the
Election Tribunal alone that can decide such disputes
and the proceeding has to be initiated by an election
petition and in such manner as may be provided bv
a statute. But once that Tribunal has made any determination or adjudication on the matter, the powers
of this Court to interfere by way of special leave can
always be exercised".
By parity of reasoning it must be held that the power
of the High Court under article 226 to issue writ of
certiorari against decisions of Election Tribunals remains equally unaffected by article 329(b).
It is next contended that even if there IS jurisdic(1) [1955] S.C.R. 267.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1113
tion in the High Court under article 226 to ISsue
certiorari against a decision of an Election Tribunal,
it is incapable of exercise for the reason that under the
scheme of Act No. XLIII of 1951, the Tribunal is an
ad hoc body set up for determination of a particular
election petition, that it becomes functus officio when
it pronounces its decision. and that thereafter there
is no authority in existence to which the writ could
be issued. The question thus raised is of considerable
importance, on which there is little by way of direct
authority; and it has to be answered primarily on a
consideration of the nature of a writ of certiorari to
quash. At the outset, it is necessary to mention that
in England certiorari is issued not only for quashing
decisions but also for various other purposes. It is
issued to remove actions and indictment pending in
an inferior court for trial to the High Court; to transfer orders of civil courts and sentences of criminal
courts for execution to the superior court; to bring
up depositions on an application for bail when the
prisoner has been committed to the High Court for
trial; and to remove the record of an inferior court
when it is required for evidence in the High Court.
These are set out in Halsbury's Laws of England,
Volume IX, pages 840 to 851. It is observed therein
that the writ has become obsolete in respect of most
of these matters, as they are now regulated by statutes.
That that is also the position in America appears
from the following statement in Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 14, at page 151:
"At common law the writ of certiorari was used
both as a writ of review after final judgment and also
to remove the entire cause at any stage of the proceeding for hearing and determination in the superior
court. In the United States it is now the general rule
that the writ will be refused where there has been no
final determination and the proceedings in the lower
tribunal are still pending".
As we are concerned in this appeal with certiorari to
quash a decision, it is necessary only to examme
whether having regard to its nature such a writ for
1954
Bari Vishnu
Karnath
v.
Syed Ahmad
lshaque and Othlt
Venkatarama
Ay,1ar ].
1114
1 954
Hari Vishnu
Karnath
v.
Syea Ahmad
lsha'l"' and Others
Vmkatarama
AyyarJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
quashing can be issued to review the decision of a
Tribunal, which has ceased to exist.
According to the common law of England, certiorari
is a high prerogative writ issued by the Court of the
King's Bench or Chancery to inferior courts or tribunals in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction with
a view to ensure that they acted within the bounds of
their jurisdiction. To this end, they were commanded
to transmit the records of a cause or matter pending
with them to the superior court to be dealt with there,
and if the order was found to be without jurisdiction, it was quashed. The court issuing certiorari to
quash, however, could not substitute its own decision
on the merits, or give directions to be complied with
by the court or the tribunal. Its work was destructive;
it simply wiped out the order passed without jurisdiction, and left the matter there. In T. C. Basappa v.
T. Nagappa( 1 ), M:ukherjea, J. dealing with this question observed:
"In granting a writ of 'certiorari' the superior
court does not exercise the power of an appellate
tribunal. It does not review or reweigh the evidence
upon which the determination of the inferior tribunal
purports to be based. It demolishes the order which
it considers to be without jurisdiction or palpably
erroneous but does not substitute its own view for
those of the inferior tribunal. The offending order or
proceeding so to say is put out of the way as one
which should not be used to the deteriment of any person. Vide per Lord Cairns in Walsall's Overseers v.
L. and N. W. Ry. Co.(•)".
In Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 14 at page 123
the nature of a writ of certiorari for quashing is thus
stated:
"It is not a proceeding against the tribunal or an
individual composing it, it acts on the cause or proceeding in the lower court, and removes it to the
superior court for reinvestigation''.
The writ for quashing is thus directed against a
record, and as a record can be brought up only
Ir) [1955] S.C.R. 250.
(2} [1879] 4 A.C. 30, 39·
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S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1115
through human agency, it is issued . to the person or
authority whose decision is to be reviewed. If it is the
record of the decision that has to be removed by
certiorari, then the fact that the tribunal has become
functus officio subsequent to the decision could have
no effect on tlfe jurisdiction of the court to remove
the record. If it is a question of issuing directions, it
is conceivable that there should be in existence a person or authority to whom they could be issued, and
when_ a certiorari other than one to quash the decision
is proposed to be issued, the fact that the tribunal
has ceased to exist might operate as a bar to its issue .
But if the true scope of certiorari to quash is that it
merely demolishes the offending order, the presence
of the offender before the court, though proper, is not
necessary for the exercise of the jurisdiction or
to
render its determination effective.
Learned counsel for the first respondent invites our
attention to the form of the order nisi in a writ of
certiorari, and contends that as it requires the court
or tribunal whose proceedings are to be reviewed, to
transmit the records to the superior court, there is, if
the tribunal has ceased to exist, none to whom the
writ could be issued and none who could be compelled
to produce the record. But then, if the writ is in
reality directed against the record, there is no reason
why it should not be issued to whosoever has the custody thereof. The following statement of the law in
Ferris on the Law of Extraordinary Legal Remedies is
apposite:
"The writ is directed to the body or officer whose
determination is to be reviewed, or to any other person
having the custody of the record or other papers to be
certified".
Under section 103 of Act No. XLIII of 1951 the
Tribunal is directed to send the records of the case after
the order is pronounced either to the relative District
Judge or to the Chief Judge of the Court of Small
Causes, and there is no legal impediment to :i. writ being issued to those officers to transmit the record to
the High Court. We think that the power to issue a
1954
Harl Vishnu
Karnath
v.
Syed Ahmad
lshaque and Others
Venkatarama
'AyyarJ~
1116
1954
~
Hari Vishnu
Karnath
v.
Syed Ahmad
lshague and Ot"'7s
Venkatarama
Apar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955}
writ under article 226 to a person as distinct from an
authority is sufficiently comprehensive to take in any
person who has the custody of the record, and the
officers mentioned in section 103 of Act No. XLIII of
1951 would be persons who would be amenable to
the jurisdiction of the High Court under the article.
It is argued that the wording of article 226 that
the High Court shall have power to issue writs or
directions to any person or authority within its territorial jurisdiction posits that there exists a person or
authority to whom it could be issued, and that in
consequence, they cannot be issued where no such
authority exists. We are of opinion that this is not
the true import of the language of the article. The
scope of article 226 is firstly that it confers on the
High Courts power to issue writs and directions, and
secondly, it defines the limits of that power. This
latter it does by enacting that it could be exercised
over any person or authority within · the territories in
relation to which it exercises its jurisdiction. The
emphasis is on the words "within the territory'', and
their significance is that the jurisdiction to issue writ
is co-extensive with the territorial jurisdiction of the
court. The reference is not to the nature and composition of the court or tribunal but to the area within which the power could be exercised.
The first respondent relied on the decision in Clifford O'Sullivan(') as authority for the position that
no writ could be issued against a Tribunal after it had
ceased to exist. There, the facts were that the appellants had been tried by a military Court and convicted on 3-5-1921. They applied on 10-5-1921 for a writ
of prohibition against the officers of the Court, and
that was refused on the ground that they had become
functi officio. The respondent contended that on the
same reasoning certiorari against the decision of an
Election Tribunal which had become functus officio
should also be refused, and he further relied on the
observations of Atkin, L.f. in Rex v. Electricity Com·
missioners; London Electricity Joint Committee Co.
(1920), Ex parte( 2 ) as establishing that there was no
!1) [1921] 2 A.G. 570.
•
,
' .
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'
'I
~ .J
\
I
S.C.R.
..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1117
difference in law between a writ of prohibition and a
writ of certiorari. \Vhat is stated there is that both
writs of prohibition and certiorari have for their object the restraining of inferior courts from exceeding
their jurisdiction, and they could be issued not merely to courts but to all authorities exerc1smg judicial
or quasi-judicial functions. But there is one fundamental distinction between the two writs, and that is
what is material for the present purpose. They are
issued at different stages of the proceedings. When
an inferior court takes up for hearing a matter over
which it has no jurisdiction, the person against whom
the proceedings are taken can move the superior
court for a writ of prohibition, and on that, an order
will issue forbidding the inferior court from continuing the proceedings. On the other hand, if the court
hears that cause or matter and gives a decision, the
party aggrieved would have to move the superior
court for a writ of certiorari, and on that, an order
will be made quashing the decision on the ground of
want of jurisdiction. It might happen that in a proceeding before the inferior court a decision might
have been passed, which does not completely dispose
of the matter, in which case it might be necessary to
apply both for certiorari and prohibition-certiorari
for quashing what had been decided, and prohibition for arresting the further continuance of the
proceeding. Authorities have gone to this extent that
in such cases when an application is made for a
writ of prohibition and there is no prayer for certiorari, it would be open to the Court to stop further
proceedings which are consequential on the decision.
But · if the proceedings have terminated, then it is too
late to issue prohibition and certiorari for quashing is
the proper remedy to resort to. Broadly speaking, and
apart from the cases of the kind referred to above, a
writ of prohibition will lie when the proceedings are to
~my extent pending and a writ of certiorari for quash~
ing after they have terminated in a final decision .
. Now, if a writ of prohibition could be issued only
if there are proceedings pending in a court, it must
follow that it is incapable of being granted. when the
r954
Hari Vishnu
Karnath
v.
Syed Ahmad
lshague and Others
V1t1katarama
Ayyar].
1118
Hari Vishnu
KamiJth
v.
Syed Ahmad
lshaque and Othirs
Venkatarama
AyyarJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
court has ceased to exist, because there could be then
no proceeding on which it could operate. But it is
otherwise with a writ of certiorari to quash, because
it is directed against a decision · which has been rendered by a court or tribunal, and the continued existence of that court or tribunal is not a condition of
its decision being annulled. In this context, the following passage from Juris Corpus Secundum, Volume
14, page 126 may be usefully quoted:
"Although similar to prohibition in that it will lie
for want or excess of jurisdiction, certiorari is to be
distinguished from prohibition by the fact that it ..... .
is directed to the cause or proceeding in the lower court
and not to the court itself, while prohibition is a preventive remedy issuing to restrain future action and
is directed to the court itself".
The decision in Clifford O'Sullivan(') which was concerned with a writ of prohibition is, therefore, inapplicable to a writ of certiorari to quash. It has also
to be noted that in that case as the military Court
had pronounced its sentence before the application
was filed, a writ of prohibition was bound to fail irrespective of the question whether the Tribunal was
functus officio or not, and that is the ground on which
Viscount Cave based his decision. He observed:
"A further difficulty is caused to the appellants
by the fact that the officers constituting the so-called
military Court have long since completed their mvestigation and reported to the commanding officer,
so that nothing remains to be done by them, and a
writ of prohibition directed to them would be of no
avail. [See In re Pope(') and Chabot v. Lord Morpeth(3)
In this connection, reference must be made to the
decision in R. v. Wormwood Scrubbs (Governor) (4 ).
There, the applicant was condemned by a court martial sitting in Germany, and in execution of its sentence, he was imprisoned in England. He applied for
a . writ of habeas corpus, .and contended that the. military Court had no jurisdiction over him. The Court
r'.
(1) [1921] 2 A.G. 570.
(3) (1848] 15 Q. B. 446.
(2J [1833) 5 B. & Ad. 681.
(4) [1948] 1 All E. R. 438c
'y
S.C.R.
r
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1119
agreed with this contention, and held that the conviction was without jurisdiction and
accordingly
issued a writ of habeas corpus. But as he was in the
custody of the Governor of the Prison under a warrant
ot conviction, unless the conviction itself was quashed
no writ of habeas corpus could issue. In these circumstances, the Court issued a writ of certiorari
quashing the conviction by the court martial. It is
to be noted that the military Court was an ad hoc
body, and was not in existence at the time of the
writ, and the respondents to the application were the
Governor and the Secretarv for War. The fact that
the court martial was dissolved was not considered a
bar to the grant of certiorari.
Our attention has also been invited to a decision of
this Court in The Lloyds Bank Ltd. v. The Lloyds Bank.
Indian Staff Association and others (1 ). In that case,
following the decision in Clifford O'Sullivan (2 ) the
Calcutta High Court had refused applications for the
· issue of writs of certiorari and prohibition against the
decision of the All India Indµstrial Tribunal (Bank
Disputes) on the ground, amongst others, that the
Tribunal had ceased to exist. In appeal to this Court
against this judgment, it was contended for the appellant that on a proper construction of section 7 of
the Industrial Disputes Act, the Tribunal must be
deemed to be not an ad hoc body established for adjudication of a ·particular dispute but a permanent
Tribunal continuing "in a sort of suspended animation" and "functioning intermittently". This Court
agreeing with the High Court rejected this contention. But the point was not argued that certiorari
could issue even if the Tribunal had become functus
officio, and no decision was given on the question,
which is now under consideration.
Looking at the substance of the matter, when once
it is held that the intention of the Constitution was
to vest in the High Court a power to supervise decisions of Tribunals by the issue of appropriate writs
and directions, the exercise of that power cannot be
(1) Civil Appeal No. 42 of 1952.
{2) {1921) 2 A.C. 57~.
1 954
Hari Vishnu
Karnath
v.
Syed Ahmad
lshaque and Oth8rs
Venkatarama
Ayyar.J.
1120
1954
Hori Vishnu
Karnath
v.
Syed Ahmad
hhaque and Othe13
Y enkatarama
.Ayyar :J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
defeated by technical considerations of form and procedure. In T. C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa(' ), this Court
observed:
"In view of the express provisions in our Constitution we need not now look back to the early history or the procedural technicalities of these writs in
English law, nor feel oppressed by any difference or
change of opinion expressed in particular cases by
English Judges. We can make an order or issue a
writ in the nature of 'certiorari' in all appropriate
cases and in appropriate manner, so long as we keep·
to the broad and fundamental principles that regulate the exercise of jurisdiction in the matter of
granting such writs in English law".
It will be in consonance with these principles to hold
that the High Courts have power under article 226 to
issue writs of certiorari for quashing the decisions of
Election · Tribunals, notwithstanding that they become
functus officio after pronouncing the decisions.
We are also of opinion that the Election Tribunals
are subject to the superintendence of the High Courts
under article 227 of the Constitution, and that that
superintendence is both judicial and administrative.
That was held by this Court in Waryam Singh and
another v. Amarnath and another('), where it was observed that in this respect article 227 went further
than section 224 of the Government of India Act, 1935,
under which the superintendence was purely administrative, and that it restored the position under section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915. It may
also be noted that while in a certiorari under article
226 the High Court can only annul the decision of the
Tribunal, it can, under article 227, do that, and also
issue further directions in the matter. We must
accordingly hold that the application of the appellant
for a writ of certiorari and for other reliefs was maintainable under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.
Then the question is whether there are proper
grounds for the issue of certiorari in the present case.
(r} [r955) S.C.R. 250.
(2} [1954) S.C.R, 5()5.
.
r
S.C.R.
'r
)
1-""
'--.
,~
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1121
There was considerable argument before us as to the
character and scope of the writ of certiorari and the
Hari Vishnu
Karnath
conditions under which it could be issued. The quesv.
tion has been considered by this Court in Parry & Co.
Syet! Ahmat!
v. Commercial Employees' Association, Madras( 1), /shaque anti Others
Veerappa Pillai v. Raman
and Raman Ltd. and
Ymkatarama
AyyarJ.
Others( 2 ), Ibrahim Aboobaker v. Custodian General( 3 )
and quite recently in T. C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa( 4 ).
On these authoriti:es, the following propositions may
be taken as established: (1) Certiorari will be issued
for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or
in excess of it, or fails to exercise it. (2) Certiorari
will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal acts
illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction,
as when it decides without giving an opportunity to
the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of
natural justice. (3) The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the
Court will not review findings of fact reached by the
inferior Court or Tribunal, even if thev be erroneous.
This is on the principle that a Court ~hich has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when the Legislature
does not choose to confer a right of appeal against
that decision, it would be defeating its purpose and
policy, if a superior Court were to re-hear the case
on the evidence, and substitute its own findings in
certiorari. These propositions are well settled and
are not in dispute.
(4) The further question on which there has been
some controversy is whether a writ can be issued,
when the decision of the inferior Court or Tribunal is
erroneous in law. This question came up for · consi-.
deration in Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Shaw( 5 ), and it was held that
when a Tribunal made a "speaking order" and the
reasons given in that order in support of the decision·
(1) [1952] S.C.R. 519.
\2) [1952] $.C.R. 583.
(2) [952] S.C.R. 696.
(4) [1955] S.C.R. 1150.
. (5) [1951] I K.B. 711.
. . . . ..
1122
1954
Hari Vishnu
Karnath
v.
Syed Ahmad
4shaque and Others
Venkatarama
Ayya.J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
were bad in law, certiorari could be granted. It was
pointed out by Lord Goddard, C. J. that that . had
always been understood to be the true scope of the
power. Walsall Overseers v. London and North Western
Ry. Co.(') and Rex v. Nat Bell Liquors Ld.( 2 ) were
quoted in support of this view. In Walsall Overseers
v. London and North Western Ry. Co.(1 ), Lord Cairns,
L.C. observed as follows:
"If there was upon the face of the order of the
court of quarter sessions anything which showed that
that order was erroneous, the Court of Queen's Bench
might be asked to have the order brought into it, and
to look at the order, and view it upon the face of it,
and if the court found error upon the face of it, to
put an end to its existence by quashing it".
In Rex v. Nat Bell Liquors Ld. (') Lord Sumner said:
"That supervision goes to two points; one is the
area of the inferior jurisdiction and the qualifications
and conditions of its exercise; the other is the observance of the law in the course of its exercise".
The decision in Rex v. Northumberland, Compensation
Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Shaw(•) was taken in appeal,
and was affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Rex v.
Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal; Ex
parte Shaw('). In laying down that an error of law
was a ground for granting certiorari, the learned
Judges emphasised that it must be apparent on the
face of the record. Denning, L.J. who stated the
power in broad and general terms observed:
"It will have been seen that throughout all the
cases there is one governing rule: certiorari is only
available to quash a decision for error of law if the
error appears on the face of the record".
The position was thus summed up by Morries, L.J.:
"It is plain that certiorari will not issue . as .the
cloak of an appeal in disguise. It does not lie in order
to bring an order or decision for rehearing of the issue
raised in the proceedings. It exists to correct error of
law where revealed on the face of an order or decision,
(1) [1879) 4 A.O. 30.
(3) [1951] l K.B. 71 I.
(2) [1922] 2 A.O. 128.
(4) [1952) l K.B. 338.
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S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1123
or irregularity, or absence of, or excess of, jurisdiction
where shown".
In Veerappa Pillai v. Raman & Raman Ltd. and
Others(1), it was observed by this court that under
article 226 the writ should be issued "in grave cases
where the subordinate tribunals or bodies or officers
act wholly without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or
in violation of the principles of natural justice, or
refuse to exercise a jurisdiction vested in them, or
there is an error apparent on the face of the record". In
T. C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa( 2 ) the law was thus
stated:
"An error in the decision or determination itself
may also be amenable to a writ of 'certiorari' but it
must be a manifest error apparent on the face of the
proceedings, e.g., when it is based on clear ignorance
or disregard of the provisions of law. In other words,
it is a patent error which can be corrected by 'certiorari'
but not a mere wrong decision".
It may therefore be taken as settled that a writ of
certiorari could be issued to correct an error of law.
But it is essential that it should be something more
than a mere error; it must be one which must bf
manifest on the face of the record. The real difficulty
with reference to this matter, however, is not so much
in the statement of the principle as in its application
to the facts of a particular case. When does an error
cease to be mere error, and become an error apparent
on the face of the record ? Learned Counsel on either
side were unable to suggest any clear-cut rule by which
the boundary between the two classes of errors could
be demarcated. Mr. Pathak for the first respondent
contended on the strength of certain observations of
Chagla, C. J. in Batuk K. Vyas v. Surat Municipality(s)
that no error could be said to be apparent on the face
of the record if it was· not self-evident, and if it
required an examination or argument to establish it.
This test might afford a satisfactory basis for decision
in the majority of cases. But there must be case5 in
11) [1952] S.C.R. 583.
(2) [1955] S.C.R. 250.
(3) A.LR. 1953 Born. 133.
1 954
Hari Vishnu
Karnath
v.
Syed Ahmad
lshaque and Other.;
Venkatarama
AyyarJ.
1124
,1954
Hari VUhnu
Karnath
v.
Syed Ahmad
lshaque and Others
Vtnkatarama
AJ!)'ar ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
which even this test might break down, because judicial opinions also differ, and an error that might be
considered by one Judge as self-evident might not be
so considered by another. The fact is that what is an
error apparent on the face of the record cannot be
defined precisely
or exhaustively, there being an
element of indefiniteness inherent in its very nature,
and it must be left to be determined judicially on the '
facts of each case.
These being the principles governing the grant of
certiorari, we may now proceed to consider whether
on the facts found, this is a fit case for a writ being
issued. The Tribunal, as already stated, held by a
majority that Rule 47(1) (c) was mandatory, and that
accordingly the 301 ballot papers found in the box of
the first respondent should have been rejected under
that rule on the ground that they had not the distinguishing marks prescribed by Rule 28. It had also
held under section 100(2) ( c) of Act No. XLIII of 1951
that the result of the election had not been materially
affected by the failure of the Returning Officer to
comply with Rule 47(1) (c). It accordingly dismissed
the petition. Now the contention of Mr. N. C.
Chatterjee for the appellant is that in reaching this
conclusion the Tribunal had taken into account matters which are wholly extraneous to an enquiry under
section 100(2) ( c), such as the mistake of the polling
officer in issuing wrong ballot papers and its possible
effect on the result of the voting, and that accordingly
the decision was liable to be quashed by certiorari both
on the ground of error of jurisdiction and error in the
construction of section 100(2) (c) apparent on the face
of the record. The first respondent, on the other
hand, contended that the decision of the Tribunal that
the 301 ballot papers found in his box should have
been rejected under Rule 47(1) (c) was erroneous, because that rule was only directory and not mandatory and because the Election Commission had
validated them, and that its decision was finaL
He
also contended that even if the ballot papers in question were liable to be rejected under Rule 47(1) (c),
for the purpose of deciding under section 100(2) (c}
/
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S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1125
whether the result of the election had been materially
:affected the Tribunal had to ascertain the true intention of the voters; and the mistake of the polling
officer under Rule 23 and its effect on the result of
the election were matters which were within the scope
·of the enquiry under that section. The correctness
·of these contentions falls now to be determined.
On the question whether Rule 47 (1) ( c) is mandatory, the argument of Mr. Pathak is that notwithstanding that the rule provides that the Returning Officer shall reject the ballot papers, its real
meaning is that he has the power to reject them, and
that on that construction, his discretion in the matter
·of accepting them is not liable to be questioned. He
relies on certain well-recognised rules of construction
.such as that a statute should be construed as directory if it relates to the performance of public duties,
or if the conditions prescribed therein have to be performed by persons other than those on whom the
right is conferred. In particular, he relied on the
following statement of the law in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edition, pages 381 and
382:
"To hold that an Act which required an officer
to prepare and deliver to another officer a list of
voters on or before a certain day, under a penalty,
made a list not delivered till a later day invalid,
would in effect, put it in the power of the person
charged with the duty of preparing it to disfranchise
the electors, a conclusion too unreasonable for ac·ceptance".
He contended that to reject the votes of the electors
for the failure of the polling officer to deliver the
correct ballot papers under Rule 23 would be to disfranchise them, and that a construction which involved such a consequence should not be adopted.
It is well-established that an enactment in form
mandatory might in substance be directory, and that
the use of the word "shall" does not conclude the
matter. The question was examined at length in
Julius v. Bishop of Oxford(1), and various rules were
(1) [1880) 5 A.O. 214.
Hari Vishnu
Karnath
v.
Syed Ahmad
lshaque and Others
Venkatarama
AyyarJ.
•
1126
1954
Hari Vishnu
Karnath
v.
Syed Ahmad
lshaque and Others
Venkatarama
Ayyar].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955}
laid down for determining when a statute might be
construed as mandatory and when as directory. They
are well-known, and there is no need to repeat them.
But they are all of them only aids for ascertaining
the true intention of the legislature which 1s the detennining factor, and that must ultimately depend
on the context. What we have to see is whether in'
Rule 47 the word "shall" could be construed as me~.ning "may". Rule 47 (1) deals with three other categories of ballot papers, and enacts that they shall be
rejected. Rule 47(1) (a) relates to a ballot paper
which "bears any mark or writing by which the elector can be identified". The secrecy of voting being
of the essence of an election by ballot, this prov1S1on
must be held to be mandatory, and the breach of it
must entail rejection of the votes. That was held m
Woodward v. Sarsons( 1 ) on a construction of section
2 of the Ballot Act, 1872. That section had also a
provision corresponding to Rule 47 ( 1) (b), and it was
held in that case that a breach of that section would
render the vote void. That must also be the position
with reference to a vote which is hit by Rnle 47(1) (b).
Turning to Rule 47 ( 1) ( d), it provides that a ballot
paper shall be rejected if it is spurious, or if it is so
damaged or mutilated that its identity as a genuine
ballot paper cannot be established. The word "shall"
cannot m this sub-rule be construed as meaning
"may", because there can be no question of the Returning Officer being authorised to accept a spurious
or unidentifiable vote. If the word "shall" 1s thus
to be construed in a mandatory sense m Rule 47(1)
(a), (b) and ( d), it would be proper to construe it in
the same sense in Rule 47(1) (c) also. There is another reason which clinches the matter against the
first respondent. The practical bearing of the distinction between a provision which is mandatory and one
which is directory is that while the former must be
strictly observed, in the case of the latter it is sufficient that it is substantially complied with. How is ·
this rule to be worked when the Rule provides that a
ballot paper shall be rejected? There can be no degrees .
(1) [1875] L.R. 10 C.P. 733·
•f
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1127
of compliance so far as rejection is concerned, and
that is conclusive to show that the provision is manHari Vishnu
Karnath
datory.
v.
It was next contended that the Election CommisSyed Ahmad
sion had validated the votes in question, and that in · lshague and Others
consequence the acceptance of the · ballot papers by
Venkatarama
Ayyar].
the Returning Officer under Rule 47 (1) (c) was not
It appears that interchange of
open to challenge.
ballot papers had occurred in several polling stations
where election was held both for the House of the
People and the State Assembly, and the Election
Commission had issued directions that the rule as
to the distinguishing mark which the ballot paper
should bear under Rule 28 might be relaxed, if
its approval was obtained before the votes were actually counted. The Returning Officer at Hoshangabad
reported to the Chief Electoral Officer, Madhya Pradesh that wrong ballot papers had been issued owing
to the mistake of the polling officers, and obtained
the approval of the Commission for their being included, bdore the votes were counted. It is contended
by Mr. Pathak that the power of the Election Commission to prescribe a distinguishing mark includes
the power to change a mark already prescribed, and
substitute a fresh one in its stead, and that when the
Election Commission approved of the interchange of
ballot papers at Hoshangabad, it had, in effect, approved of the distinguishing mark which those ballot
papers bore, and that they were therefore rightly
counted as valid by the Returning Officer.
There is no dispute that the Election Commission
which has the power to prescribe a distinguishing
mark for the ballot papers has also the power to
change it. But the question is, was that done? The
Commission did not decide in terms of Rule 28 that
the ballot paper for election to the House of the People
should bear a brown bar and not a green bar. The
green bar continued to be the prescribed mark for the
election under that rule, and the overwhelming majority of the ballot papers bore that mark. What the
Commission has done is to condone the defects m a
specified · number of ballot papers issued in the
16-89 S. C. India/59
1128
1 954
Hari Vishnu
Karnath
v.
Syed Ahmad
!shaque and Others
Vtnkatarama
AyyarJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
Hoshangabad polling stations. That is not prescribing
a distinguishing mark as contemplated by Rule 28, as
that must relate to the election as a whole. There can
be no question of there being one distinguishing mark
for some of the voters and another for others with
reference to the same election and at the same polling
station.
There is another difficulty in the way of accepting
the contention of the first respondent. The approval
of the Election Commission was subsequent to the
actual polling, though it was before the votes were
counted. Rule 23 throws on the polling officer the
duty of delivering a proper ballot paper to the voter.
If a distinguishing mark had been prescribed under
Rule 28, the ballot paper to be delivered must bear
that mark. Therefore, if any change, or alteration of
the original distinguishing mark is made, it must be
made before the commencement of the poll, and the
ballot paper should contain the new distinguishing
mark. The approval by the · Election Commission
subsequent, to the polling, therefore, cannot render
valid the 301 ballot papers which did not bear the
distinguishing mark prescribed for the election, and
they are liable to be rejected under Rule 47 (1) ( c).
The conclusion of the majority of the Tribunal that
in accepting the ballot papers in question the Returning Officer had contravened that rule must therefore
be accepted.
·
It remains to deal with the contention of the appellant that the decision of the Election Tribunal under
section 100(2) ( c) that the result of the election bad
not been materially affected is bad, as it is based on
considerations extraneous to that section. This opens
up the question as to the scope of an enquiry under
section 100(2) (c). That section requires that before
an order setting aside an election could be made, two
conditions must be satisfied: It must firstly be shown
that there had been improper reception or refusal of
a vote or reception of any vote which is void, or noncompliance with the provisions of the Constitution or
of the Act (No. XLIII of 1951) or any rules or orders
made under that Act or of any other Act or rules re-
'y
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..
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
'y
1129
lacing to the election or any mistake in the use of the
prescribed form. It must further be shown that as a
consequence thereof the result of the election had
been materially affected. The two conditions are
cumulative, and must both be established, and the
"
burden of establishing them is on the person who seeks
\
, to have the election set aside. That was held by this
;> Court in Vashist Narain v. Dev Chandra( 1 ). The Tribunal has held in favour of the appellant that Rule 47
(1) (c) is mandatory, and that accordingly in accepting the 301 ballot papers which had not the requisite
distinguishing marks the Returning Officer had contravened that rule. So, the first condition has been
satisfied. Then there remains the second, and the
question is whether the appellant has established that
the result of the election had been materially affected
by contravention of Rule 47 ( 1) ( c). The contention
of Mr. Chatterjee is that when once he has established
that the Returning Officer had contravened Rule 47
( 1) ( c), he has also established that the result of the
election had been materially affected, because the
"-'
marginal difference between the appellant and the first
, respondent was only 174 votes, and that if the ballot
papers wrongly counted under Rule 47(1) (c) had been
excluded and the valid votes alone counted, it was
he and not the first respondent that should have been
declared elected under Rule 48, and that the result of
the election had thus been materially affected.
In reply, Mr. Pathak contends that this argument,
though it might have proved decisive if no other
factor had intervened, could not prevail in view of
the other facts found in this case. He argued that
Rule 47 was not the only rule that had been broken;
that owing to the mistake of the polling officer wrong
ballot papers had been issued, and thus Rule 23 had
been broken; that the printing of the distinguishing
mark was faint and that Rule 28 had not also been
properly complied with; that there was thus a chain
of breaches all linked together, the final phase of it
~
being the breach of Rule 47 (1) .( c) and the effective
cause thereof being the violation of Rule 23, and that
..
-
--
(1) [1955] S.C.R. 509.
Hari Vishnu
Kamath
v.
Syet! Ahmad
lshaque and Other1
Venkatarama
AyyarJ.
ll30
195:1
Bari Vishnu
Karnath
v.
Syed Ahmad
.lt/iagU4 and
o•.,,.,
Venkatarat(UJ
Ayyar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19551
v
in judging whether the result of the election had been
affected, these were matters relevant to be taken mto
consideration. The object of the election, he contended, was to enable the majority of the voters to send
a representative of their choice and for that purpose
it was necessary to ascertain the intention of the
voters from the ballot papers, irrespective of the , y '
question whether they were formally defective or
not; that it was accordingly open to the Tribunal to
look behind the barriers created by Rules 23, 28 and
47 ( 1) ( c), discover the mind of the voters, and if that
was truly reflected m the result of the election as
declared under Rule 48, dismiss the petition under
section 100 (2) (c).
Mr. Chatterjee disputes this position, and contends
that the enqwry under that section must be limited ·'
to the matters raised in the election petition, and that
as there was no complaint about the breach of Rule
23 m that petition, it was outside the scope of the
enquiry. It is unnecessary to consider whether it
was open to the Tribunal to enquire into matters
other than those set out m the petition, when the
returned ·candidate merely seeks to support the declaration. He has in this case presented a recrimination
petition under section 97 raising the question of breach
of Rule 23, and that is therefore a matter which has
to be determined. The Tribunal has gone into that
question, and has held that there was a violation of
that rule, and its conclusion 1s not open to attack m
these proceedings, and has not, in fact, been challenged. The real controversy 1s as to the effect of that
finding on the rights of the parties. The answer to
this is to be found m section 97. Under that section,
all matters which could. be put forward as grounds for
setting aside the election of the petitioner if he had
been returned under Rule 48 could be urged m answer
to the prayer m his petition that he might be declared
duly elected. And the result of this undoubtedly 1s
that the first respondent could show that if the appel\ant had been returned under Rule 48 his election
would have been liable to be set aside for breach of
Rule 23, and that therefore he · should n.ot be declared
-
-
S.C.R.
SUPRE:KiE COURT REPORTS
1131
elected. That according to the Tribunal having been
shown, it is open to us to hold that by reason of the
violation of Rule 23, the appellant is not entitled to
be declared elected.
.,
,.
-
-
,.
-..,
Can we go further, and uphold the election of
the first respondent under section 100(2) ( c) on the
,. ground that if Rule 23 had not been broken, the
wasted votes would have gone to him ? The argument of the appellant is that that would, in effect,
be accepting the very votes which the Legislature
says in Rule 47(1) should be rejected, and that it is
not warranted by the scheme of the Act. We think
that this contention is well-founded. Section 46 of
the Act provides that "when the counting of the
votes has been completed, the Returning Officer shall
forthwith declare the result of the election in the
manner provided by this Act or the rules made thereunder". The rule contemplated by this section is
Rule 48. That provides that the Returning Officer
should after counting the votes "forthwith declare the
candidate or candidates to whom the largest number
of valid votes has been given, to be elected". Under
this rule quite clearly no candidate can be declared
elected on the strength of votes which are liable to
be rejected under Rule 47. The expression "the· result
of the election" in section 100( 1) ( c) must, unless there
is something in tl1e context compelling a different
interpretation, be construed in the same sense as m
section 66, and there it clearly means the result on
the basis of the valid votes.
This conclusion is further fortified when the nature
of the duties which a Returning Officer has to perform under Rule 47 is examined. Under that Rule,
the Returning Officer has to automatically reject
-certain classes of votes for not being in conformity
with the rules. They are set out under Rule 47 ( 1) (b)
-and ( c). lh other cases, the rejection will depend on his
decision whether the conditions for their acceptance
have been satisfied. Thus in Rule 47(1) (a) he must
decide whether the mark or writing is one from which
the elector could be identified; under 'Rule 47 (1) ( d),
Bari Vishnu
Karnath
v.
Syed Ahmdd
Ishaqt11J and Others
V enkatarama
AyyarJ.
1132
t954
Bari Vishnu
Karnath
v.
Syed Ahmad
lshaque and Others
Venkatarama
Ayyar ],
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19551
whether the ballot paper is spurious or mutilated beyond identification; and under Rule 47(2),
whether more than one ballot paper has been cast by
the voter. Rule 47(4) is important. It provides that
"the decision of the Returning Officer as to the valid•
ity of a ballot paper ...... shall be final subject to any
decision to the contrary given by a Tribunal on the
trial of an election petition calling in question the '
Tribunal
1s
election". Under this provision, the
constituted a Court of appeal against the decision of
the Returning Officer, and as such its jurisdiction
must be co-extensivem with that of the Returning
Officer and cannot extend further. If the Returning
Officer had no power under Rule 47 to accept a vote
which had not the distinguishing mark prescribed by
Rule 28 on the ground that it was due to the mistake
of the presiding officer in delivering the wrong ballot
paper-it is not contended that he has any such
power, and clearly he has not-the Tribunal reviewing this decision under Rule 47 ( 4) can have no such
power. It cannot accept a ballot paper which the
Returning Officer was bound to reject under Rule 47.
It is argued with great insistence that as the object
of the Election Rules is to discover the intention of
the majority of the voters in the choice of a representative, if an elector has shown a clear intention to
vote for a particular candidate. that must be taken
into account under section 100(2) (c), even though the
vote might be bad for non-compliance with the formalities. But when the law prescribes that the intention should be expressed in a particular manner, it ran
be taken into account only if it is so expressed. An
intention not duly expressed is, in a Court of law,
in the same position as an intention not expressed
at all
The decision in Woodward v. Sar sons( 1 ) was cited in
support of the contention that for deciding whether
the result of the election had been affected it was
permissible to take into account votes which had been
rendered invalid by the mistake of the polling officer.
That was a decision on section 13 of the Ballot Act,
(1) [1s1 5J L.R. rn c.P. 733.
...
-
y
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1133
1872 which provided that no election should be
declared invalid by reason of non-compliance with the
rules, if it appeared to the Tribunal "that· the election
was conducted in accordance with the principles laid
down in the body of this Act, and that such noncompliance or mistake did not affect the result of the
election". What happened in that case was that. all
the ballot papers issued at polling station No. 130
had been marked by the polling officer and had become invalid under section 2 of the Act. It was contended on behalf of the unsuccessful candidate that
the mistake of the polling officer rendered the whole
election void, without · reference to the question
whether the result of the election had been affected.
In repelling this contention, the Court observed at
page 750:
"Inasmuch, therefore, as no voter was prevented
from voting, it follows that the errors of the presiding officers at the polling stations No. 130 and No.
125 did not affect the result of the election, and did
not prevent the majority of electors from effectively
exercising their votes in favour of the candidate they
preferred, and therefore that the election cannot be
declared void by the common law applicable to
parliamentary elections".
This was merely a decision on the facts that the depanure from the prescribed rules of election at the
polling stations was not so fundamental as to render
the election not one "conducted in accordance with
the principles laid down under the body of this Act".
Reliance was placed on certain observations in Re
South Newington Election Petition(1). In that case,
the ballot paper had been rejected by the Returning
Officer on the ground that it did not bear the requisite
official mark. The Court in a petition to set aside the
election held on an examination of the ballot paper
that the official stamp had been applied, though imperfectly, and that it should have been accepted.
The actual decision is in itself of no assistance to the
respondent; but the Court observed in the course of
its judgment:
(t) [1948] 2 All E.R. 503.
1954
Hari V ishtiu
Kamlith
v:.
Syed Ahmad
lshaque and Other
Venkatarama
AyyarJ.
1134
1 954
Hari Vishnu
Karnath
v.
Syed Ahmad
lshaqu~ and Others
Venkatarama
Ayyar ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
119551
"We think that, in a case where the voter is in
no sense to blame, where he has intended to vote and
has expressed his intention of voting in a particular
way, and, so far as his part of the transaction is concerned, has done everything that he should, and the
only defect raised as a ·matter of criticism of the
ballot paper is some defect on the part of the official
machinery by which the election is conducted, special
consideration should (and, no doubt, would) be given,
in order that the voter should not be disfranchised".
These observations are no authority for the proposition that if there was no mark at all on the ballot
paper it could still be accepted on the ground of intention. On the other hand, the whole of the discussion is intelligible only on the hypothesis that if
there was no mark at all on the ballot paper, it must
be rejected.
In the result. we must hold that in maintammg
the election of the first respondent on the basis of the
301 votes which were liable to be rejected under Rule
47(1) (c) the Tribunal was plainly in error. Mr .
Chatterjee would have it that this error is one of .iunsdiction. We are unable to take this view, because
the Tribunal had jurisdiction to decide whether on .a
construction of section 100 (2) ( c) it could go into the
.fact of breach of Rule 23, and if it committed an error,
it was an error in the exercise if its jurisdiction and
not in the assumption thereof. But the error is manifest on the face of the record, and calls for interference in certiorari.
We have held that the election of the first respondent should ·be set aside. We have further •held that
if the Returning Officer had, after rejecting the 301
ballot .papers which did not bear the correct marks,
declared the appellant .elected, his election also would
The combined effect of sechave to be declared voiil.
. tion 97 and section 100(2) ( c) is that there is no valid
election. Under the circumstances, the proper orde1
to pass is to quash the decision of the Tribunal .anti
remove .it out of the way by ·certiorari under article
226, and to set aside the election of the ·.first respondent in exercise of the powers .conferred by article
v
.•
y
r
•
:s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1135
227. A.s a result of our decision, the Election Commis·sion will now proceed to hold a fresh election.
This appeal must accordingly be allowed, the decisions of the High Court and the Tribunal quashed
.and the whole election set aside. The parties will bear
their own costs throughout.
Appeal allowed.
'I954
Hari Vishnu
Karnath
v.
Syed Ahmad
lshaque and Ot/ws.
Venkatarama
Ayyar J·
GURUNATH alias BHIMAJI
-
ti.
KAMALABAI, KOM KENCHANGAUDA
NADGAUDAR AND OTHERS.
'
'
:[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J., MuKHERJEA, S. R. DAs,
VIVIAN BosE, BHAGWATI, JAGANNADHADAS and
VENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.]
Hindu Law-Adoption--Widow's power to adopt-When such
power terminates.
It is well-settled according to Hindu Law that a widow's power to adopt comes to an end by the interposition of -a grandson
or the son's widow competent to continue the line by adoption.
The mother's authority to adopt is not extinguished by the mere
fact that her son had attained ceremonial competence.
The power to adopt does not depend upon any question of vesting or divesting of property.
The decision of
the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council in Anant Bhikappa Patil v. Shankar Ramchandra Patil
(L.R. 70 I.A. 232) is not sound in so far as it relates to the properties inherited from collaterals prior to adoption. In respect of such
properties the adopted son can lay no claim on the ground of relation back.
Shrinivas Krishnarao Kango v. Narayan Devji Kango ([1955] 1
S.C.R. 1), followed.
Amarendra Mansing v. Sanatan ( [ 1933] L. R. 60 I.A. 242),
explained,
Anant Bhikappa Patil v. Shankar Ramcliandra Patil ([1943]
LR. 70 I.A. 232), not relied on in part.
Bhoobun Moyee v. Ram Kishore ([1865] 10 M.I.A. 279); Pudma
Coomari v. Court of Wards ([1881] L.R.81.A.229); Thayammaland
Kuttisami Aiyan v. Venkatarama Aiyan ([1887] L.R. 14 I.A. 67);
Tarachum v. Suresh Chunder ( [ 1889] L.R. 16 I.A. 166); Ramkrishna
Dtcemb..- 10.
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