DHIRENDRA CHANDRA PAL versus ASSOCIATED BANK OF TRIPURA LTD.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 6 December 1954 | [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1098 | 1954 INSC 121
Key facts
- Decided
- 6 December 1954
- Bench
- MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI, B. JAGANNADHADAS, T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR
- Bench size
- 4
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 91/1953
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1098
- Neutral citation
- 1954 INSC 121
Text of the judgment
1098
•954
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1955]
DHIRENDRA CHANDRA PAL
"·
· Dectmber 6
ASSOCIATED BANK OF TRIPURA LTD.
(IN LIQUIDATION)
(MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J., BHAGWATI, JAGANNADHADAS and VENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.]
J
Banking Companies Act (X of 1949), ss. 45-B, 45·G (insmed by
Act XX of 1950)"-Claims decided under s. 45-B-Procedure to be
followed.
-
The object of the Banking Companies Act, 1949 is to provide a
machinery for expeditious and speedy termination 9£ proceedings in
liquidation and in the absence of any specific provisions of the Act
to the contrary or any rules framed by the High Court under s. 45.G
of the Act {inserted by Act XX of 1950) the normal procedure for
deciding all claims under s. 45-B of the Act (inserted by Act XX of
1950) should be a summary proceeding originating with an application. But the court in its discretion may think fit to direct or the
rules of the High Court may provide that a suit is the proper
remedy in view of the nature -0£ claim made and the questions in·
volved in such claim.
Sree Bank v. Mukherjee ([1950] 55 C.W.N. 400), referred to.
CIVIL
APPELLATE
No. 91 of 1953.
JURISDICTIOJ< :
Civil
Appeal
Appeal from the Judgment and Decree dated the
the 12th day of June 1951 of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta in Appeal from Original Decree
No. 56 of 1951 arising out of the Decree dated the
8th day of March 1951 of the saicl. High Court exercising its Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction in Suit
No. 3993 of 1950.
H. f. Umrigar, Rameshwar Nath and Rajinder
Narain for the appellant.
A. N. Sinha and P. C. Dutta for the respondent.
1954. December 6.
was delivered by
The judgment of the
Court
JAGANNADHADAS J.-This is an appeal, by leave
of the High Court of Calcutta under article 133(1) (c)
*For these two sections 45-B and 45-G (inserted by Act XX of 1950) two
new sections 45-B and 45-U \Vere inserted bys. 10 of Act Lil of 1953.
r
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1099
'( of the Constitution, from its judgment in its appellate
jurisdiction confirming that of a Single Judge of the
Court. The point involved is a short one and arises on
the following facts. The respondent before us, Associated
Bank of Tripura Ltd., went into liquidation
(•
on the 19th December, 1949. A month prior to the
liquidation, i.e., on the 19th November, 1949, the
'' 'i ' appellant before us and the Bank entered into an
agreement whereby the appellant became a tenant of
the Bank in respect of a certain parcel of land. One of
the terms of the tenancy-agreement was that the appellant should vacate the land demised on 24 hours'
notice. After the Bank went into liquidation the
Liquidator served on the appellant on the 18th April,
1950, a notice terminating his tenancy and calling
upon him to vacate the land and to hand over possession by the end of April, 1950. This not having
been done, the Liquidator filed an application on
the original side of the High Court under section 45-B
of the Banking Companies Act for ejectment of the
appellant and obtained an ex parte decree against him
on the 10th July, 1950. On the 28th August, 1950,
the appellant applied for setting aside the ex parte
--. decree but the application was dismissed on the 7th
September, 1950. Consequently the appellant filed the
present suit on the 12th September, 1950, in the original
side of the High Court, asking for a declaration
,
that the ex parte decree against him was made without jurisdiction and was a nullity and that he continued to be a tenant notwitl1standing the · said ex parte
decree. The plaint does not specifically mention the
reason for claiming the decree to be without jurisdiction or nullity. But the point taken at the trial was
that the Court had no power to deal with a question
relating to the ejectment of the appellant from the
demised land, in a summary proceeding initiated on
an application but could pass the decree only on a
suit regularly instituted. This contention was raised
on the basis of a judgment of the Calcutta High Court
given on the 24th August, 1950, that in respect of
I
Y-"t
such a relief under section 45-B a summary proceed-
..
Dhirendra
Chandra Pal
v.
Associated Bank of
T ripura Ltd.
Jagannadhadas J.
llOO
1954
Dhirmdrd
Chandra Pal
v.
Associated Bank of
Tripura IJd.
Jagaanadhadas ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955J
ing is not maintainable but that a suit has to be filed.
This decision has since been reported in Sree Bank. v.
Mukherjee('). The learned trial Judge before whom
the present suit came up was of the opinion that
though the ex parte decree for ejectment was obtained
on a wrong proceeding, there was no inherent lack of
jurisdiction in the Court and that the fact of the ·c·
decree having been obtained in a wrong proceeding , ~
did not render it a nullity. This view of the learned
"Judge was affirmed by the Appellate Bench.
It has not been disputed before us that the relief
by way of enjectment of the appellant from the land
demised is one which would fall within the scope of
section 45-B of the Banking Companies Act and that
the Liquidator could obtain the said relief by an appropriate proceeding in the High Court. Indeed, the I"
learned appellate Judges specifically held that the
Court had by virtue of section 45-B, jurisdiction over
the subject-matter of the dispute and this view has not
been challenged having regard to the wide and comprehensive language of the section. Bnt what is urged
is that the Court having followed the view taken in
r
the Sree Bank Case (supra) (whose correctness was
not challenged before it) that the appropriate pro- '
ceeding to obtain such a relief was only a suit, it
should have, consistently therewith, held the decree
obtained on a mere application to be invalid. In the
Court below the question as to whether the decree
obtained on a wrong proceeding was one so wholly
without jurisdiction as to be a nullity or whether it was
vitiated only by a mere irregularity in the mode of
obtaining the relief. and hence not open to attack in
collateral proceedings was the subject-matter of elaborate consideration. It appears to us, however, that
it would be more satisfactory to consider and decide
whether the basic assumption which gave rise to this
argument, viz. that the appropriate proceeding under
section 45-B was only a suit and not an application,
is correct. It is necessary for this purpose to notice
the relevant sections. Section 45-A of the Banking
~
Companies Act, 1949, as amended by Act XX of 1950
(•) [•950] 55 C.W.N. 400.
-
S.C.R.
(•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1101
defines 'Court' for the purposes of Part III and Part
III-A of the Act as "the High Court exercising jurisdiction in the place where the registered office of the
Banking Company concerned, which is being wound
up, is situated". The said section also provides that
"notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained
in the Indian Companies Act, 1913, or in any notification, order or direction issued thereunder or in any
other law for the time being in force, no other court
(i.e. a court other than the one as above defined) shall
have jurisdiction to entertain any matter relating to
or arising out of the winding up of a banking company". Next is section 45-B (1) which is in the following terms:
"Notwithstanding
anything
to
the
contrary
contained in the
Indian
Companies Act, 1913,
or in any other law for the time being in force,
the · Court shall have full power to decide all
claims made by or against any banking company and
all questions of properties and all other questions
whatsoever, whether of law or fact, which may relate
to or arise in the course of the winding up of the banking company coming within the cognizance of the
Court".
Section 45-G authorises the Court to make rules consistent with the Act concerning the mode of proceedings for the decision of claims and other proceedings
under the Act. This group of sections in Part III-A
constitute a wide departure from the corresponding
provisions of the Indian Companies Act. Under various sections thereof the liquidator, after an order for
winding up of a company is made, can approach a
Company-Court for exercising certain powers in aid of
and to expedite the process of liquidation. The procedure normally adopted for the purpose is by way of
application. But the scope of matters in respect of
which the liquidator can obtain the help of the Company-Court by summary procedure is rather limited.
In respect of other matters and particularly in the
matter of collecting assets or recovering properties
from third parties, (not covered by sections 185 and
186) the liquidator has to invoke the help of the
Dhirendm
Chandra Pal
v.
Associated Bank ef
Tripura Ltd.
Jagannadhadas J.
1102
1954
Dhirentba
Chandra Pal
v.
Associated Bank of
T ripura Ltd.
Jagannadhadas J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
appropriate Court in the ordinary way. This as is wellknown leads to a great deal of inevitable delay and
expense. ·when in 1949 special legislation in respect
of Banking Companies was taken up, it was one of the
stated objects, to provide a machinery by which proceedings in liquidation of Banking Companies could
be expedited and speedily terminated. It was found,
however, that the Act of 1949, as originally enacted,
was inadequate to achieve that purpose. It is in this
situation that the Amending Act of. 1950 introduced
ihto the Act of 1949 an entire Chapter, Part III-A,
consisting of sections 45-A to 45-H under the heading
"Special provisions for speedy disposal of winding up
proceedings".
It appears to us
that, consistently
with this policy and with the scheme of the Amending Act, where the liquidator has to approach the
Court under section 45-B for relief in respect of
matters legitimately falling within the scope thereof, elaborate proceedings by way of a suit involving
time and expense, to the detriment of the ultimate
interests of the company under liquidation, were not
contemplated. In the absence of any specific provision in this behalf in the Act itself and in the absence
of any rules framed by the High Court concerned
under section 45-G, the procedure must be taken to
be one left to the judgment and discretion of the
Court, having regard to the nature of the claim and
of the questions therein .involved.
In the Sree Bank Case (supra), the question that
arose for direct consideration was one of limilation.
But in considering it and when pressed with the
argument that, if the appropriate proceeding was
by way of an application and not a suit, difficulties might arise as to the question of limitation,
the learned Judges felt it unnecessary to consider
whether or not the Limitation Act applies to the applications under section 45-B and if so what would be
the period which would govern such applications.
They proceeded to decide the particular case before
them, viz. a case relating to a debt due to the Ban_k,
on the view that "there is nothing in the Companies
Act or the Banking Companies Act which permits a
.,
.
y
.
.•
S.C.R.·
'
•
,
y
'
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1103
liquidator to recover debts from debtors of a Banking Company by a summary proceeding such as an
.application to the Company Judge" and therefore
held that no application for recovery would lie and
that only a suit should have been brought for which
the period of limitation was the ordinary period provided in the Limitation Act. It appears to us, with
great respect to the learned Judges, that this approach as to the nature of the proceeding required or
permitted under section 45-B of the Banking Companies Act was not correct. The question is not whether section 45-B permitted s\1mmary proceedings but
the question is whether the section prescribed definitely a particular method of proceeding and whether consistently with the policy of the Act it was not to be
presumed that a speedy and cheap remedy was to be
available to the Liquidator, unless the Court in its
discretion thought fit to direct or the rules of the High
Court provided that a claim of a particular nature
had to be pursued by a suit. It is to be remembered
that section 45-B is not confined to claims for recovery
-of money or recovery of property,· moveable or immoveable, but comprehends all sorts of claims which
relate to or arise in the course of winding up. Obviously the normal proceeding that the section contemplated must be taken to be a summary proceeding by
way of application.
We are clearly of the opinion that in the present
case the Court which passed the ex parte decree was
fully competent to decide the matter raised before it
on summary application and to pass the ex parte decree
which has been challenged by the suit and that the
decree of the Courts below dismissing the suit is correct. We are not to be supposed to have expressed
any opinion on the question of limitation which was
raised before the High Court in the Sree Bank Case
{supra). That is a question which may have to be
decided m an appropriate case when it is raised
directly.
The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
1 954
Dhirendra
Chandra Pal
v.
Associated Bank of
T ripura Ltd.
Jagannadhadas J.
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