DUNI CHAND RATARIA versus BHUWALKA BROTHERS LTD.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 3 December 1954 | [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1071 | 1954 INSC 118
Key facts
- Decided
- 3 December 1954
- Bench
- MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*, NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI, B. JAGANNADHADAS, T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR
- Bench size
- 4
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 61/1953
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1071
- Neutral citation
- 1954 INSC 118
Text of the judgment
:s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1071
to establish a proper system of conservancy, sanitation and watch and ward at the fair, (3) that when
issuing a permit the District Magistrate can impose
such terms and conditions as he may deem fit. The
net effect of these rules is merely to establish a system
·of ad hoc control by the District Magistrate through
the issue of a permit and by the vesting of other powers
in him under the rules. These cannot be said to be
rules which in themselves constitute a system of con.servancy, sanitation and watch and ward. Thus the
result that is brought about is not within the intendment of the section which authorises the making of
the rules. A system of ad hoc control of responsible
·officers may, possibly be one method of regulating
the sanitary and other arrangements at such large
.gatherings. But if it is intended to
constitute a
system of ad hoc control with reasonable safeguards,
the power to make rules in that behalf must be granted
to the rule-making authority by the legislative organ
in appropriate language.
The impugned order of the District Magistrate being bad on both the above grounds, this is enough to
dispose of the appeal and it is not necessary to express any opinion as to whether the impugned order
infringes also the appellant's fundamental
rights
under article 19. The appeal must accordingly be
:allowed.
Appeal allowed.
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DUNI CHAND RATARIA
v.
BHUWALKA BROTHERS LTD.
.'
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J., BHAGWATI, JAGANNADHADAS and VENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.]
West Bengal Jute Goods Future Ordinance, 1949, s. 2(1) ( b) (i)
-Actual delivery of possession-Whether includes symbolical as well
as constructive delivery of pos.<ession-lndian Sale of Goods Act, 1930
(111 of 1930), s. 2(2)-Delivery-Meaning of.
Delivery has been defined in s. 2(2) of Indian Sale of Goods
Act, 1930, as meaning voluntary transfer of possession from one per-
1 954
Captain G{lflpati
Singhji
v.
The State of Ajmer
and Another
Jagannadhwfas J.
1 954
December 3
1072
1 954
Duni Chand
Rataria
v.
Bhuwalka
Brothers Ltd.
_SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
son to another and it includes not only actual delivery but also,
symbolical or constructive delivery within the meaning of the term.
The expression "actual delivery of possession" in s. 2( I) (b) (i}
of the West Bengal Jute Goods Future Ordinance, 1949 means actualdelivery as contrasted with inere dealings in differences within the·
intendment of the Ordinance and such actual delivery of possession
included within its scope symbolical as well as constructive delivery
of possession.
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'fhe word "involving" in the expression "involving the actuaL
delivery of possession thereof" in s. 2(1) (b)(i) of the Ordinance·
means in the context resulting in and this condition would be satisfied if the chain contracts in the present case, as entered into in themarket resulted in actual delivery of possession of goods in the uJti.
mate analysis.
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The Ordinance came within Head 27 ot List 2 of the Seventh
Schedule of the Governµient of India Act, 1935:-"Trade aqd com·
merce within the Province; inarkets and fair; money lending and·
money lenders" and the Provincial Legislature was competent tolegislate on that topic.
Nippon Yusen Kaisha v. Ramjiban ([1938] L.R. 65 I.A. 263).
referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JuRISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
61 of 1953.
Appeal from the Judgment and Decree dated the
16th day of May, 1952 of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta in Appeal from Original Decree
No. 124 of 1951 arising out of the decree dated the
25th day of May, 1951 of the High Court of Calcutta·
in its Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction in Suit No ..
3614 of 1950.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, (P.
Manda/ and S. P. Varma, with him), for the appellant.
N. C. Chatterjee (A. N. Sinha and
with him), for the respondent.
1954. December 3. The Judgment of
was delivered by
P. C. Dutta,.
the
Court
BHAGWATI J.-This appeal with certificate from
the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta arises out
of the suit filed on the original side of the High Court
by the appellant against the respondent to recover a
sum of Rs. 1,25,962-2-0 with interest and costs.
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S.C,R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1073
The appellant entered into three contracts, two
dated the 8th August 1949 and the third dated the
17th August 1949 with the respondent agreeing to
purchase 1,80,000 bags of 'B' twills at the price of
Rs. 134/4/- per 100 bags, 1,80,000 bags at the rate of
Rs. 135/4/- per 100 bags and 90,000 bags at the rate
of Rs. 138/- per 100 bags respectively for October,
November and December 1949 deliveries in equal
monthly instalments on terms and conditions con··
tained in the relative contract forms of the Indian Jute
Mills Association. In September 1949 the respondent
expressed its inability to deliver the goods under the
. said contracts and requested the appellant to settle
the same by selling back the goods under the said contracts to the respondent at the price of Rs. 161-8-0
per 100 bags. Three settlement contracts were accordingly entered into between the parties on the 28th
September 1949 whereby the appellant agreed to sell
the goods under the original contracts to the respondent at the rate of Rs. 161-8-0 per 100 bags on the
terms and conditions contained in the relative contract forms of the Indian Jute Mills Association. The
appellant duly submitted to the respondent his bills
for the amounts due at the foot of the said contracts
aggregating to Rs. 1,15,650 which the respondent
accepted but failed and neglected to pay in spite of
repeated demands of the appellant. The appellant
therefore filed the suit for recovery of the said sum
with interest and costs. The respondent filed its
written statement contesting the appellant's claim on
the main ground that the three settlement contracts
above-mentioned were illegal and prohibited by the
West Bengal Jute Goods Future Ordinance, 1949. The
respondent contended that it never dealt in the sale
and/or purchase of jute goods involving actual delivery of possession thereof, nor did it possess or have
control over any ,godown and other means or equipments necessary for the storage and supply of jute
goods and that therefore the said settlement contracts
were void and not binding upon it and that the appellant was not entitled to any relief as prayed. The
Trial Court negatived the contention of the respon-
Duni Chanel
Rataria
v.
Bhuwalka
Brothers Ltd.
Bhagwati ].
1074
1954
.·Duni Chand
Rataria
v.
Bhuwalka
Brothers Ltd.
Bhagwati J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
dent and decreed the appellant's claim. The learned 'r
Judges of the Appeal Court however came to the conclusion that the said settlement contracts were con, tracts relating to the purchase of jute goods made on
a forward basis by the respondent not being a person
•
who habitually dealt in the sale or purchase of jute
goods involving the actual delivery
of possession ')
.,
thereof and were therefore void and unenforceable.
The only right which the appellant had against the
respondent was to have the said original contracts
settled on the basis of the last closing rate in a notified market which was Rs. 146/14/- per 100 bags. No
such claim was however made by the appellant. A
further contention which was raised by the respondent, viz. that the Ordinance was ultra vzres was negatived by the Court. But in view of its finding on the /
mam issue the Appeal Court dismissed the appellant's
suit with costs.
The relevant provisions of the West Bengal Jute
Good Future Ordinance, 1949 were as under :Section 2. In this Ordinance, unless there rs anything repugnant in the subject or context :( 1) 'Contract relating to jute
goods
futures'
means a contract relating to the sale or purchase of
jute goods made on a forward basis(a) providing for the payment or receipt, as
the case may be, of margm m such manner and on
such dates as may be specified in the contract, or
(b) by or with any person not being a person
who,
( i) habitually deals m the sale or purchase of
jute goods involving the actual delivery of possession
thereof, or
(ii) possesses, or has control over, a godown
and other means and equipments necessary for the
storage and supply of jute goods : ....................... .
3. (1) The Provincial Government may, from
time to time, if it so thinks fit, by notification in the
Official Gazette prohibit the making of contracts, relating to jute goods futures and may, by like notification, withdraw such prohibition ..................... .
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S.C.R.
1075
(2) When the making of contracts relating to
jute goods futures 1s prohibited by a notification
under sub-section (1) .~
(a) no person shall make any such contract or
pay or receive any margin except, 111 the case of any
such contract made pnor to the date of the notification, to the extent to which the payment or receipt,
as the case may be, of margin is allowable on the basis
of the last closing rate in a notified market : ........... .
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
( c) notwithstanding anything contained 111 any
other law for the time being in force,(i) every such contract made, and every claim
in respect of margin, in contravention of the provisions of clause (a), shall be void and unenforceable, and
(ii) every such contract made prior to the date
of publication of the notification shall be varied and
settled on the basis of the last closing rate in a notified market.
Explanation-In this sub-section,( a) "last closing rate" means the rate fixed by
the Directors of a notified market to be the closing
rate of such market immediately preceding the date of
publication of the notification under sub-section (1)
prohibiting the making of contracts relating to jute
goods futures: and
(b) "notified market"
means a jute goods
futures market recognised by the Provincial Government by notification in the Official Gazette.
The Ordinance came into force on the 22nd September 1949. In pursuance of the power conferred under
section 3 ( 1) of the Ordinance the Government of West
Bengal issued a notification, being notification No.
4665 Com. dated the 23rd September 1949 prohibiting
the making of contracts relating to jute goods futures
on and from the date of publication of the notification in the Official Gazette and by another notification No. 4666 Com. of the same date recognised' certain
jute goods futures markets for the purpose of Para.
(b) of the Explanation to section 3(2) as notified
markets. These notifications were published m the
1 954
Duni Chand'
Rataria
v.
Bhuwa/ka
Brothers Ltd.
Bhagwati J.
1076
1 954
Duni Chand
Rataria
v.
Bhuwalka
'Brotlurj Ltd.
fJhagwati J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1955]
.,,.,.
Calcutta Gazette on the same day, the 23rd September 1949.
The relevant terms and conditions of the standard
form of the Indian Jute Mills Association contracts
may be conveniently set out here :(1) Buyers to give 7 Clear . Working day's notice
to place goods alongside ........................... .
(3) P;iyment to be made in cash in exchange for
Delivery Orders on Sellers, or for Railway Receipts,
or for Dock's Receipts or for Mate's Receipts (which
Dock's Receipt or Mate's Receipts are to be handed
by a Ship's or Dock's officers to the Sellers' representatives).
( 4) The Buyers hereby acknowledge, that so
long as such Railway Receipts or Mate's or Dock's
Receipts (whether m Sellers' or Buyers' names) are
in the possession of the Sellers, the lien of the sellers,
as unpaid vendors, subsists both on such Railway
Receipts Dock's or. Mate's Receipts and the goods
they represent until payment is made in full.
There were other terms and conditions appertaining to the delivery of goods under the contracts mcluding inspection by the buyers, msurance. tender,
etc. The settlement contracts were also practically in
the same form except that in the body of the contracts it was mentioned that the particular contract
represented settlement of an original contract which
had been already entered into between the parties
and that the buyers m the settlement contract would
pay to the sellers the difference at the particular rate
on due date.
In respect of the goods deliverable under the contracts the mills would, in the case of goods sent by
them alongside the vessel in accordance with the
shippers' instructions m that behalf, obtain the
mate's receipts in respect of the same and such mate's
receipts would be delivered by the mills to their
immediate buyers who in their turn would pass them
on to their respective buyers m the chain of contracts resting with the ultimate shipper. If the mills
held the goods m their godown they would issue
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1077
.delivery orders on the due date, which delivery orders
would be dealt with in the same manner as the mate's
receipts aforesaid. Both these sets of documents
would represent the goods and would be passed on
from seller to buyer against payment of cash. As a
matter of fact on the evidence the learned Trial
Judge held that in the Calcutta jute trade mills' delivery orders are ordinarily issued by the mills against
·Cash payment and pass from hand to hand by endorsement and are used in the ordinary course of business
authorising the endorsee to receive the goods which
they represent and that they are dealt with in the
market as representing the goods .
The Appeal Court accepted this position and further
found that in the instant case "the mills who held the
goods sold them to A, A to B, B to the defendant,
<lefendant to the plaintiff, plaintiff to C and C to the
·shipper. This is what is · known as a chain contract.
It is admitted by the plaintiff, that the mills give the
delivery order to A. A endorses it to B, B to the
defendant, defendant to the plaintiff and so on".
The question that falls to be determined on these
facts and circumstances is whether the settlement
<ontracts mentioned above could be called contracts
between the appellant and the respondent involving
the actual delivery of possession of the goods. It
was common ground that the contracts did not provide for the payment or receipt of margin. It was
also common ground that the respondent did not possess or have control over a godown and ·other means
and equipments necessary for the . storage and supply
of jute goods. The only point at issue was whether
the respondent was a person who habitually dealt in
the sale or purchase of jute goods involving the actual
delivery of possession thereof and the contention
which was vehemently urged on behalf of the respondent in the Courts below was that the transactions
were purely speculative, that mere delivery orders
passed between the parties, which delivery orders
did not represent the goods and the transfer thereof
did not involve as between the intermediate parties
actual delivery of possession of the goods but
I954
Duni Chand
Rataria
v.
Bhuwalka
Brothers Ltd.
Bhagwati ] •
1078
1954
Duni Chand
Rataria
v.
Bhuwalka
Brothers lld.
Bhagwati ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
differences in rates were only paid or received by the
parties.
The appellant on the other hand contended that the·
delivery orders represented the goods, that each successive buyer paid to his immediate seller the full
price of the goods represented by the delivery order
in cash before the relative delivery order was endorsed
m his favour and thus obtained not only the title
to tlle goods but actual delivery of possession thereof and that in any event when the goods were delivered alongside tile vessel or actual delivery was
taken by the ultimate buyer there was the giving and
taking of actual delivery of possession of the goods
all along the chain at the same moment.
The Trial Court accepted the contention of the
appellant that the delivery orders are dealt with in the
market as representing the goods and that they pass
from hand to hand by endorsement being ·received by
the successive buyers against cash payment and are·
used m tile ordinary course of business authorising
the endorsee to receive the goods which they represent. The learned Trial Judge furtller observed :"Now visualize tile long chain of contracts m
which the defendant's contract IS one of the connecting links. The defendant buys from its immediate
seller and sells to its immediate buyer. As seller it
is liable to give and as buyer it 1s entitled to take
delivery. As seller it receives and as buyer it gives.
shipping instructions.
Similar
shipping instruction
1s given by each link until it reaches the mills. The:
mills deliver tile goods alongside the steamer. Such
delivery is in implement of the contract between the
mills and their immediate buyer. But eo instanti it
is also m implement of each of the chain contracts.
including the contract between the defendant and its.
immediate buyer and the contract between the defendant and its immediate seller. Not only does" the mill.
give and its immediate buyer take actual delivery but
eo instanti each middleman gives and takes actual
delivery. Simultaneously the defendant takes actual
delivery of possession of the jute goods from its immediate seller and gives actual delivery of possess1011
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1079
of jute goods to its immediate buyer. Prima facie at
the moment of the delivery alongside the steamer
there is appropriation and the passing of the property
in the goods and the giving and taking of actual delivery of possession thereof all along the chain at the
'
moment".
same
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learned Trial Judge then referred to the follow" ing The
observations of Lord Wright , in Nippon Yusen
_j
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Kaisha v. Ramjiban(1) in regard to the standard form
I(
of the Indian Jute Mills Association contract:"This is a form under which the entire export
business in gunnies in Calcutta is conducted, ..... In
the present case the sale being free alongside, the pro•
perty prim a facie passes when the goods are appropriated by delivery alongside m implement of the
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contracts,"
and added:"The sale and purchases of the defendant where
there is actual shipment and delivery of possession of
the goods alongside the vessel involves actual delivery
of possessipn of the jute goods. The delivery of the
· goods alongside the vessel is physical delivery of the
goods and necessarily changes the actual custody of
the goods. It is said that there is no actual physical
delivery of the goods by the defendant himself. The
Legislature, however, does not say that the dealer
must himself give actual delivery of the goods. I
cannot read in the statute words which are not there
and say that the dealer must himself give delivery of
the definition in
the goods in order to come within
sub-section 2(1) (b) (i) of the Ordinance. The Legislature simply insists that the sales and purchases of the
dealer involve actual delivery of possession of the jute
goods. I do not see why the sales and purchases do
not involve actual delivery if such actual delivery
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is given not by the dealer but by a third party in
performance of and in relation to the sales and purchases of the dealer. Even the buyer and the seller
of jute goods over the counter rarely takes and gives
manual delivery of the goods. Very often such manual
delivery is given and taken not by the buyer and
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(1) f1938] L. R. 65 J. A. 263.
13-89 S. C. Jndia/59
1954
Duni Chana
Rataria
v.
Bhuwalka
· Brothers Ua.
Bhagwati J.
1080
1954
Duni Chand
Rataria
v.
Bhur,valka
Brothers Ltd.
.:Bhagwati J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
seller but by their respective servants and agents. I
do not see why instead of the buyers' and sellers' employees and servants giving and taking delivery of
the goods somebody else on their behalf gives and
takes delivery; such delivery is not actual delivery of
possession of the goods".
The learned Judges of the Appeal Court however
.did not accept this view and misdirected themselves
both in regard to the facts and the position in law.
They took it that none · of the parties in the chain
contracts paid the actual price of the goods except the
shipper who took delivery of the goods from the mills
against payment. They wrongly assumed that A endorsed the delivery order over to B and took the
difference, B in his turn endorsed the delivery order
to the defendant and took the difference and so on
and concluded that nobody was concerned to pay the
actual price or take delivery of the goods except the
shipper who took the goods and paid the price to the
mills. This assumption was absolutely unwarranted,
the evidence on record being that each of the successive buyers paid to his immediate seller the full price
of the goods represented by the delivery order in cash
against th.e endorsement of the relative delivery order
in his favour by the seller.
The learned Judges of the Appeal Court also laid
unwarranted emphasis on the words "actual delivery
of possession" and contrasted actual delivery with
symbolical or constructive delivery and held that
only actual delivery of possession meaning / thereby
physical or manual delivery was within the intendment of the Ordinance. Delivery has been defined in
section 2(2) of the Indian Sale of Goods Act as meaning voluntary transfer of possession from one person
to another and if nothing more was said delivery
would not only include actual delivery but also symbolic or constructive delivery within the meaning of
the term. The use of the word "actual" in section
2(1) (h) (i) of the Ordinance was considered by the Appeal Court as indicative of the intention of the - Government to include within the scope of the exemption
<lnly cases of actual delivery of possession as
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
·1081
contrasted with symbolical or constructive delivery.
This construction m our opinion ts too narrow. Even
if regard be had to the mischief which was sought to
be averted by the promulgation of the Ordinance, the
Government intended to prevent persons who dealt in
differences only and never intended to take delivery
under any circumstances, from entering into the
market. Provided a person habitually dealt m the
sale or purchase of jute goods involving delivery of
the goods, he was not to be included in the ban. This
could be the only intendment of the Ordinance, because otherwise having regard to the ordinary course
of business, business in jute goods would become absolutely impossible. The manufacturer of jute goods
does not come normally into direct contact with the
shipper. It ts only through a chain of contracting
parties that the shipper obtains the goods from the
manufacturer and if only actual delivery of possess10n
as contrasted with symbolical or constructive delivery
were contemplated it would be impossible to carry on
the business. If the narrow construction which was
put by the Appeal Court on the expression "actual
delivery of possession" was accepted it would involve
each one of the intermediate parties actually taking
physical or manual delivery of the goods from their
sellers and agam m their turn givmg physical or
manual delivery of the goods which they had thus
obtained to their immediate buyers. Such an eventuality could never have been contemplated by the
Government and the only reasonable interpretation
of the expression "actual delivery of possession" can
be that actual delivery as contrasted with mere dealings in differences was within the intendment of the
Ordinance and such actual delivery of possession mcluded within its scope symbolical as well as constructive delivery of possession.
Once this conclusion ts reached it ts easy to visualise the course of events. The mate's receipts or the
delivery orders as the case may be, represented the
goods. The sellers handed over these documents to
the buyers against cash payment, and the buyers
obtained these documents m token of delivery of
1 954
Duni Chand
Rataria
v.
Bhuwalka
Brothers Ltd.
Bhagwati ].
1082
1954
Duni Chand
Rataria
v.
Bhuwalka
Brothers I.Jd.
Bhagwati :J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
possession of the goods. They in turn passed these
documents from hand to hand until they rested with
the ultimate buyer who took physical or manual delivery of possession of those goods. The constructive
delivery of possession which was obtained by the" intermediate parties was thus translated into a physical
or manual deli,ery of possession in the ultimate
analysis eliminating the unnecessary process of each
of the intermediate parties taking and in his turn
giving actual delivery of possession of the goods in
the narrow sense of physical or manual delivery
thereof.
It is necessary to remember in this connection that
the words used in section 2(1) (b) (i) are "involving the
actual delivery of possession thereof". The word
"involving" in the context means resulting in and
this condition would be satisfied if the chain contracts
as entered into in the market resulted in actual delivery of possession of goods in the ultimate analysis.
The Appeal Court was therefore clearly in error when
it put a narrow construction on the expression "actual
delivery of possession" and held that the transactions
were purely speculative and the parties in no event
contemplated actual delivery of possession of the
goods. The learned Trial Judge was in our opinion
correct in his appreciation of the whole position on
facts as well as in law and in negativing the contention of the respondent.
In view of this conclusion it is unnecessary to consider the argument which was submitted
before ·us
based upon the definition of "documents of title" in
section 2(4) and the provisions of section 30, proviso
to section 36(3) and the proviso to section 53(1) of
the Indian Sale of Goods Act tl1at all the documents
of title enumerated in section 2 ( 4) were assimilated
to a bill of lading and a mere transfer of the ·documents of title in favour of a buyer was tantamount
to a transfer of possession of the goods represented
thereby.
The contention that the Ordinance was ultra vires
was not seriously pressed before us. We may however
add that the Appeal Court rightly held that the
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1083
Ordinance came within Head 27 of List 2 of the Seventh
Schedule of the Government of India Act:-"Trade
and commerce within the Province; markets and fair;
money lending ahd money lenders'', and that the
Provincial Legislature was competent to legislate on
that topic.
The result therefore is that the appeal will be
allowed, the decision of the Appeal Court will be reversed and the decree passed by the Trial Court in
favour of the Appellant will be restored with costs
throughout.
Appeal allowed.
1 954
Duni Chand
Rataria
.,.
I Bhuwalka
Brothers lJd,
Bhagwati J.
PANDURANG, TUKIA AND BHILLIA
1954
ti.
THE STATE OF HYDERABAD.
[MuKHERJEA, S. R. DAs and VIVIAN BosE JJ.)
Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 34-Prior concertCommon intention-Same or similar intention-Distinction between.
It is well-settled that common intention in s. 34 of the
Indian Penal Code presupposes prior concert.
It requires a prearranged plan because before a man can be vicariously convicted for
the criminal act of another, the act must have been done in furtherance of the common intention of them all. Accordingly there must
have been a prior meeting of minds. Several persons can simultaneously attack a man and each can have the same intention, namely
the intention to kill, and each can individually inflict a separate
fatal blow and yet none would have the common intention required
by the section because there was no prior meeting of minds to form
a pre-arranged plan. In a case like that, each would be individually
liable for whatever injury he caused but none . could be vicariously
convicted for the act of any of the others; and if the prosecution
cannot prove that his separate blow was a fatal one he cannot be
convicted of the murder however clearly an intention to kill could be
proved in his case.
Care must be taken not to confuse same or similar intention
with common intention; the partition which divides their bounds is
often very thin, nevertheless the distinction is real and substantial,
and if overlooked will result in miscarriage of justice.
The plan need not be elaborate, nor is a long interval of time
required. It could arise and be formed suddenly. But there must
139
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Decembet 3.
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