BUDHAN CHOUDHRY AND OTHERS versus THE STATE OF BIHAR
Supreme Court of India | Decided 2 December 1954 | [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1045 | 1954 INSC 115
Key facts
- Decided
- 2 December 1954
- Bench
- MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*, BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, VIVIAN BOSE, NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI, B. JAGANNADHADAS, T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR
- Bench size
- 7
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 83/1953
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1045
- Neutral citation
- 1954 INSC 115
Text of the judgment
:S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1045
held against the appellant on this contention. The
1earned Judges of the High Court were of the opinion
that as the execution and attestation took place at
one sitting at the residence of P.W. 1, where the testator and the witnesses had assembled by appointment,
they must all of them have been present until the
matter was finished, and as the witnesses -were not
-cross-examined on the question of attestation, it could
properly be inferred that there was due attestation.
It cannot be laid down as a matter of law that because the witnesses did not state in examination-in·chief that they signed the will in the presence of the
testator, there was no due attestation. It will depend
-0n the circumstances elicited in evidence whether the
attesting witnesses signed in the presence of the testator. This is a pure question of fact depending on
appreciation of evidence. The finding of the Court
below that the will was duly attested 1s based on a
·consideration of all the materials, and must be accepted. Indeed, it is stated in the judgment of the
Additional District Judge that "the fact of due execution and attestation of the will was not challenged
on behalf of the caveator at the time of the hearing
of the suit". This contention of the appellant must
.also be rejected.
In the result, the decision of the High Court is
confirmed, and this appeal 1s dismissed, but m the
-circumstances, without costs.
Appeal dismissed.
BUDHAN CHOUDHRY AND OTHERS
v.
THE STATE OF BIHAR.
•
~
[ME.HAR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J., MuKHERJEA,
S. R. DAs, V1VIAN BosE, BHAGWATI, JAGANNADHADAS
and VENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.]
Constitution of India, Al'ticle 14-Code of Criminal Procedure
(Act V of 1898), section 30-Whether ultra vires the ConstitutionArticle 14-Reasonable classification-Not forbidden-Test of permissible classification-Necessary conditions-Constitution-Whether
N ar-.sh Charan
Das Gupta
v.
Paresh Cha an
Das Gupta
Venkatarama
Ayyar J.
1 954
December
~
1046
1 954
Budhan Chaudhry
and Othm
v.
The State of
BihM
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
assures unanimity of decisions or immunity from erroneous ~ction of
courts or executive agencies of State.
It is well-settled that while Article 14 of the Constitution for~
bids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for
the purposes of legislation. In order, however, to pass the· test of
pern1issible classification two conditions must be fulfilled, namely,
(i) the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group; and,
(ii) that differentia must have a rational relation to the object
sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The classification
may be founded on different bases; namely geographical, or accord·
ing to objects or occupations or the like. What is necessary is· tltat
there must be nexus between the basis of classification and the
object of the Act under consideration. Further Article 14 cond~mns
discrimination not only by a substantive law but also by a law of •
procedure.
The Constitution does not assure unanimity of d~cisions or
immunity from merely erroneous action, whether by .the courts or
the executive agencies of a State.
Section 30 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not infringe
the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution.
Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. The Union of India ([1950] S.C.R. ·
869), The State of Bombay v. F. N. Balsara ([1951] S.C.R. 682),
The State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar ([1952] S.C.R. 284),
Kathi Raning Rawat v. The State of Saurashtra ([1952] S.C.R. 435),
Lachmandas Kewalram Ahuja v. The State of Bombay ([1952] S.C.R.
710), Qasim Razvi v. The State of Hyderabad (f1953] S.C.R. 581).
Habeeb Mohamad v. The State of Hyderabad ([1953] S.C.R. 661),
The State of Punjab v. Ajaib Singh ([1953] S.C.R. 254), Yick Wo
v. Peter Hopkins ( f1886] 118 U.S. 356; 29 L. Ed. 220), and Snowdm
v. Hughes ([19441 321 U.S. l; 88 L. Ed. 497), referred to.
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
JuRismcnoN :
Criminal
Appeal No. 83 of 1953.
Appeal under article 132 ( 1) of the Constitution
of India from the Judgment and Order dated the 25th
August 1953 of the High Court of Judicature at
Patna in Criminal Appeal No. 410 of 1951.
B. K. Saran and M. M. Sinha, for the appellants.
M. C. Setalvad .. Attorney-General for
Prasad, with him) for the respondent.
India ( R. C.
y
S.C.K
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SUPREME CO{.JRT REPORTS
1047
·1954
1954. December 2. The Judgment of the Court
]3udhan Chaudhry
was delivered by
· ·!Uld Other1
v.
DAs J.-This is an appeal from a judgment of
-r
he Stat~ of
the High Court of Judicature at Patna which raises a
·Bihar
substantial question of law as to the interpretation
Das].
of the Constitution of India.
The appeal arises out of a criminal trial held in
the district of Hazaribagh in the State of Bihar. The
case against the appellants was investigated by the
local police and on the 4th June, 1951 a challan was
submitted before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. The
Sub-Divisional Magistrate passed the following order
in the order-sheet:':Let the record be sent to the Dy. Commar.,
Hazaribagh for transferring it to the file of the Spl.
Magistrate for trial".
On the record being placed before the Deputy Commissioner, the latter passed following order:"Perused S.D.O's order-sheet. Withdrawn and
transferred to the file of Mr. S. F. Azam, Magte. with
powers u/s 30, Cr. P. C. for favour of disposal".
The appellants were then tried by Mr. S. F. Azam,
Magistrate of the first class exercising powers under
section 30 · of the Code of Criminal Procedure on
charges under sections 366 and 143 of the Indian
Penal Code and each of them was convicted under
both the sections and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for five years under section 366, Indian Penal
Code, no separate sentence having been passed under
section 143.
The appellants preferred an appeal to the High
Court of Judicature at Patna. The appeal was heard
by a Bench consisting -of S. K. Das and C. P. Sinha,
JJ. There was a difference of opinion between the
two learned Judges as to the constitutionality of sec.tion 30 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. S. K. Das;
·J., took the view that the impugned section. tdid not
bring about any discrimination or inequality between
persons similarly. circumstanced and consequently did
not offend the equal .protection clause of the Constitution, whi1e C. P. Sinha, J,, .was •. of ~ the opinion that
11-89 S. C. India/59
1048
i954
·-....:..
Budhan Clwiit!h,y
andOthert
v.
Tile Stat• of
Bikar
Das].·
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
the section was hit by article 14. The appeal was
thereupon placed before Reuben, C. J., who in agreement with S. K. Das, J., held that section 30 did not
violate the inhibition of article 14. The learned Chief
Justice upheld the conviction but reduced the sentence. On application by the appellants the High
Court granted them a certificate under article 132 (1)
and the present appeal has been filed accordingly.
The learned Advocate appearing in support of
the appeal wntends before us, as was done before the
High Court, that there had been an infraction of the
fundamental rights
guaranteed to the appellants
under article 14 of the Constitution of India. The
complaint is that the appellants had been tried by a
section 30 Magistrate and not by a Court of Session.
A section 30 Magistrate is enjoined by that section ·to
try the case brought before him as a Magistrate and
accordingly in cases like the present. case he will follow
the warrant procedure which is different from the procedure followed by a Court of Session. The substance
of the grievance is that a trial before the Sessions
Judge is much more advantageous to the accused person en that he gets the benefit of the commitment proceedings before a Magistrate and then a trial before
the Sessions Judge with the aid of the jury or assessors. It has not been seriously questioned before us
that in spite of the risk of imposition of a punishment heavier than what a section 30 Magistrate can
inflict, a trial by a Sessions Judge is of greater advantage to the accused than a trial before a Magistrate
under the warrant procedure. We have, therefore,
to see whether this appearent discrimination offends
against the equal protection clause of our Constitution.
The provisions of article 14 of the Constitution
have come up for discussion before this Court in a
number of cases, namely, Chiranjit Lal Chowdhurt v.
The Union of India('),
The State of Bombay v. F. N.
Balsara( '), The State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali
Sarkar( 3 ), Kathi Raning Rawat v. The State of Sau(,) [1950] S.C.R. 869.
(2) [1951] S.C.R. 682.
(3) [1958] S.C.R. 284.
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S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1049
rashtra( 1 ), Lachmandas Kewafram Ahuja v. The" State
of Bombay(2) and Qasim Razvi v. The State of Hyderabad(3) and Habeeb Mohamad v. The State of Hyderabad ( 4 ). It is, therefore, not necessary i:o enter upon
any lengthy discussion as to the meaning, scope and
effect of the article in question. It is" now well-established that while article 14 forbids class legislation,
it does not forbid reasonable classification for the
purposes of legislation. In order, however, to pass
the test of permissible classification two conditions
must be · fulfilled, namely, ( i) that the classification
must be founded on an intelligible differentia which
distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group and. (ii) that
that differentia must have a rational relation to the
object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The classification _may be founded on different
bases; namely, geographical, or according to objects
or occupations or the like. What is ·necessary is that
there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration.
It is also well-established by the decisions of this
Court that article 14 condemns discrimination not
only by a substantive law but also by a law of procedure. The contention now put forward as to the
invalidity of the trial of the appellants has, therefore
to be tested in the light of the principles so laid down
in the decisions of this Court.
There are no less than four modes of trial prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, namely,
( i) trial of sessions cases, (ii) trial of warrant cases,
(iii) summary trials and (iv) trials before a High
Court and a Court of Session and the procedure in
each of these trials is different. Section 28 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure which is to be found in Chapter III which deals with "Powers of Courts" reads as
follows:"28. Subject to the other provlSlons of this
Code, any offence under the Indian Penal Code may
be tried(I) [ 1952] s. C.R. 435.
(3) [1953] S.C.R. 581.
(2) [1952] S.C.R. 710.
(4) [1953] S.C.R. 661.
1 954
Budhan Chourlhry
and Others
v.
The State of
Bihar
Das].
1050
1954
Bwlhan Chaudhry
and Others
v.
The State of
Bihar:
DasJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
(a) by the High Court, or
(b) by the Court of Session, or
(c) by
any
other
Court by
which
such
offence is shown in the eighth column of the second
schedule to be triable".
Section 30, as it now stands, provides :"30. In
Assam,
Madhya
Pradesh,
Punjab,
Oudh, Madhya Bharat, Hyderabad, Mysore, Patiala
and East Punjab States Union and Rajasthan, in all
Part C States and in those parts of the other States
in which there are Deputy Commissioners or Assis··
tant Commissioners the State Government may, notwithstanding anything contained m section 28 or section 29, invest the District Magistrate or any Magistrate of the first class, with power to try as a Magistrate all offences not punishable with death".
Section 34 puts a limit to the power of punishment of
a section 30 Magistrate in terms following:"34. The Court of a Magistrate, specially empowered under section 30, may pass any sentence
authorised by law, except a sentence of death or of
transportation for a term exceeding seven years or
imprisonment for a term exceeding seven years".
It will be noticed that section 28 begins with the
clause "subject to the other prov1S1ons of this Code".
This means that the section and the second schedule
referred to therein are controlled by the other provisions of the Code including the provisions of section
30. Further, the text of section 30 itself quite clearly
says that its provisions will operate "notwithstanding
anything contained m section 28 or section 29".
Therefore, the provisions of section 28 and the second
schedule must give way to the provisions of section
30. It is not, however, claimed by the learned Attorney-General that section 30 abrogates or overrides
altogether the prov1s1ons of section 28 and the second
schedule m the sense that in the specified territories
Magistrates empowered under section 30 become the
only tribunal competent to try all offences not punishable with death to the exclusion of all other Courts
mentioned in the 8th column of the second schedule.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1051
If that had been the position,
then there tould .be no
question of discrimination, for, in that situation,
section 30 Magistrate's Court would be the only Court
in which all offences not punishable with death would
become triable. As already stated, this extreme claim
is ·not made by the learned Attorney-General.
The
effect of the State Government investing the District
Magistrate or any Magistrate of the first class with
power under section 30 is to bring into being an additional court in which all offences not punishable with
death become triable. . In other words, the effect of
the exercise of authority by the State Government
under section 30 is, as it were, to add in the 8th
column of the second schedule the Magistrate so empowered as a Court before whom all offences not
punishable with death will also be triable. The question
is whether this result brings about any inequality before the law and militates against the guarantee of
article 14.
Section 30, however, empowers the State Government in· certain areas to invest the District Magis1
trate or any Magistrate of the first class with power
'--. to try as a Magistrate all offences not punishable with
death. There is an obvious classification on which
this section is based, namely, that such power may be
conferred on specified Magistrates in certain localities
only and in respect of some offences only, namely, all
offences other than those punishable with death. The
Legislature understands and correctly appreciates the
needs of its own people which may vary from place
-+ ' to place. As already observed, a classification may be
based on geographical or territorial considerations.
An instance of such territorial classification is to be
found in the Abducted Persons (Recovery and Restoration) Act, 1949 which came up for discussion· before
this Court and was upheld as valid in The State of
Punjab v. Ajaib Singh( 1 ). S. K. Das, J., and the learned
Chief Justice· have in their respective judgments referred to certain circumstances, e.g. the ·distance between
-...:;
the place of occurrence and the headquarters. ;where
(1) [1953] S.C.R. 254.
i95.f
Budhan Chaudhry ·
and Others
v.
The State of
Bihar
Das J.
1052
'!954-:
Budh,,,;°Ch~wihty
' and ·Othirs
v.
Th~ ·state of
Bihar
zi~,j.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS.
[I955J
the Court of Session functions at considerable . intervals, the inconvenience .of bringing up witnesses from
the interior, the difficulty of .finding· .in .the backward
or out of the way places sufficient .number· of suitable
persons to .act as jurors .or assessors, all of which make
this classification . quite a· reasonable one; In this
sense, the section -itself does not bring ··about any discrimination whatever. · The • section only authorises.
the State Government · to invest certain · Magistrates
with poweF .to try all offences · not , punishable with
death ·and this authority . the State·. can: exercise only
in the . specified ·places. .. ' If the:· State invests any
Magistrate with powers under section 30 anybody who
commits any offence not punishable: with 'death and
triable by a Court of .·•Session under section '28 read
with the second schedule is also liable to be tried by
the section 30. Magistrate. The risk of such liability
falls alike .. upon all persons committing such ·an offence.
Therefore, there is no discrimination m the · section .
itself.
The learned counsel for the appellants, however,
contends,. on the .strength of the decision of the
Supreme 'Court of America in Yick Wo 'v. Peter· Hopkins(') that "though a law. be fair on its face and impartial in operation,. yet, if it is administered by
public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand
so as practically to· make illegal discrimination between persons in similar circumstances materially to
their rights, the denial· of. equal justice is still within
the prohibition of the . :Constitution". The contention
is that although the section· itself may not be discri- ·
minatory, it may lend itself to. abuse bringing about
a discrimination between per.sons accused .. of offences·
of the saine kind, .for the. police may send up a person
accused·: of an offence under section 366- to a· section 30
Magistrate and the police may send another person
accused of an offence· under · the same section to a
Magistrate who can commit .the accused to .. the Court
of Session. ,It is necessary. to examine this contention
·
with dose scrutiny.
When a .case. ·under section· 366, Indian .Penal.
(1) [1886] 118 U.S. 356; 29 L. Ed. 220.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1053
Code, which is a case triable by a Court of Session
under the second schedule, is put up before a· section
30 Magistrate, the section 30 Magistrate is . not necessarily bound to try the case himself. Section 34 limits
the power of .the section 30 Magistrate in .the matter
of punishment. · If the section 30 Magistrate after ·recording the evidence and before framing a charge
feels that in the facts and circumstances of the case
the maximum sentence which he . can inflict ·will not
meet the ends of justice he may, ·. instead · of disposing
of the case himself, act under section 347 and commit
the accused to the Coun of Session. Here, .:whether
the accused person shall be tried by the section 30
Magistrate.. or by the Cowt of Session is decided not
. py the executive but is decided according to the discretion judicially exercised by the section 30 Magistrate
himself. Take the case of another .person accused of
an offence under section 366 which is sent up by the
police to a Magistrate .who is not empowered under
section 30. Such Magistrate after· perusing. the challan
and other relevant papers may, if he thinks . that the
ends of justice will be met 'if the case is tried . by a
section 30 Magistrate, submit the case to the District
Magistrate with his own recommendations
for such
action as the latter may think fit to take under section 528 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. That is
what was done in the instant case. On the other hand,
he may take evidence under section 208 and after the
evidence has been taken, make up his •mind judicially
whether he should proceed · under section 209 or section 210.
He may consider that in the facts and
circumstances of the case disclosed in the evidence
the ends of justice require that the accused person
should be committed to the Coun of Session and in
that event he will · proceed to frame a charge and
follow the provisions of sections 210 to 213. If, however,· the Magistrate is satisfied on the facts of the
case that the ends of. justice will be sufficiently met if
the accused is tried by a section 30 Magistrate having
jurisdiction in, the matter, •the Magistrate may report
to the : District Magistrate .and the latter may, in his
discretion, withdraw the case under · section 528 · 9f the
•.1954
BUtihaii Choiit/hiy
and Others
v.·
The State of
Bi!uzr
"Das].
J054
:1954
BiJilhan Chouabiy
and. Others
V•
"l;"he St.U'.of
Bihilr
Das]•
SUPREME 'COURT REPORTS
[1955]
Co?e ?f Criminal Procedure to himself . and may en~
qmre mto or try such case himself or refer it for ·enquiry or trial ·to any -other Magistrate competent to
try the same. · fo such ·a case there is exercise of judicial discretion at two stages, namely; under section
209 by the Magistrate before whom the accused was
sent up for enquiry and also by the District Magistrate acting under section 528 of the · Code of Criminal
Procedure. · It is thus clear· that the ultimate decision
as to whether a person charged · under section 366
should be tried by the Court of Session or by a section
30 Magistrate does not depend merely on the whim
or idiosyncracies of the police or the executive Government but depends ultimately on the proper exercise of judicial discretion by the Magistrate concerned.
It is suggested that discrimination may be brought
about either by- the Legislature or the Executive or
even the Judiciary and the inhibition of article 14
extends to all actions of the State denying equal protection of the laws whether it be the action of anyone
of the three limbs of the State. It has, however, to
be remembered that, in the' language of Frankfurter,
J., in Snowden v. Hughes('), "the Constitution does
not assure uniformity of decisions or immunity from
merely erroneous , action, whether by the Courts or
the executive agencies of a State". The judicial decision must of necessity depend on the facts and circumstances of each particular case and what may superficially appear to be an unequal application of the
law may not necessarily amount to a denial of equal
protection of law unless there is shown to be present
in it an element of intentional and purposeful · discnnunation. (See per Stone, C.J., in Snowden v.
Hughes (supra). It may be mentioned at once that
in the present case there is no suggestion ·whatever
that . there .has been at any stage any intentional or
purposeful discrimination as against . the appellants
by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or the District Magistrate or the section 30 Magistrate who actually tried
the accused. Further, the: discretion of judicial ·officers
is not arbitrary arid the law provides for revision by
(1) (1944) 321 JJ.S. 1; 88 L. Ed.497.
.. A-.
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S.C.R.
1055
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
superior Courts of orders passed by the Subordinate
Courts. In such circumstances, there is hardly any
ground for · apprehending any capnc1ous discrimination by judicial tribunals.
On the facts and circumstances of this case we find
<>Urselves in agreement with S. K. Das, J., and Reuben,
C.J., and hold that no case of infringement of fundamental right under Article 14 has been made out. In
the circumstances, we dismiss this appeal. .
Appeal dismissed.
1
Bihar
Das].
Dectmber 3
It is wrong and inappropriate to implead the Judges of the High
"" Court as respondents in an appeal preferred to the Supreme Court by
an Advocate against whom .an order of suspension was passed by the
High Court under s. 12 of the Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926. In
such appeal the proper respondents are the complainant if any, the
Bar Council or Secretary thereof and the Advocate-General of the
State concerned.
CIVIL
APPELLATE
No. 146 of 1954.
.,.:;
TheSta~'oj
fl.
Procedu·re-Supreme Court-Suspension of Advocate by High
Court-Appeal to Supreme Court-Respondents to be impleaded in
such appeal-Indian Bar Councils Act (XXXVIII of 1926), s. 12.
·-+
Budhan GhOudhry
and Others
v·.
1954
[MuKHERJEA, S. R. DAs and VIVIAN BosE JJ.]
..
954
BHATARAJU NAGESHWARA RAO
THE HON'BLE JUDGES OF THE MADRAS
HIGH COURT AND OTHERS.
y
1
JURISDICTION :
Civil
Appeal
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and
Order dated the 17th day of December, 1952, of the
High Court of Judicature at Madras in Referred Case
No. 45 of 1952 arising out of the Report dated the
27th day of March, .1951, of the Court of District
Judge, Krishna in C.M.P; No. 123 of 1951.
S. P. Sinha, (K. R. Chaudhary and Sardar
dur, with him), for the appellant.
Baha-
R. Ganapathy Iyer and P. G. Gokhale, for
dent No. L
respon-
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