NARESH CHARAN DAS GUPTA versus PARESH CHARAN DAS GUPTA
Supreme Court of India | Decided 2 December 1954 | [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1035 | 1954 INSC 116
Key facts
- Decided
- 2 December 1954
- Bench
- MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, B. JAGANNADHADAS, T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 202/1952
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1035
- Neutral citation
- 1954 INSC 116
Text of the judgment
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1035
the High Court itself to have lost seisin of these cases
after the 26th January, 1950, and they had no jurisdiction to proceed with the trial. As the High Court
directed these cases to be tried by a competent court,
they could not possibly be sent back for trial to the
Special Tribunal assuming that any such Tribunal
existed or could be constituted by the Central Government. The only court which was competent to try
these cases would be the special court under Act XII
of 1952 and its jurisdiction could not be ousted as the
order of the High Court itself proceeded on the footing that no trial could be held by the Tribunal constituted under Ordinance XXIX of 1943. The jurisdiction of the special court not being ousted by section
12 of the Act or by the order of the High Court, we
are unable to hold that the proceedings before it
should be quashed.
The result is that the appeal is dismissed.
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NARESH CHARAN DAS GUPTA
v.
PARESH CHARAN DAS GUPTA
-
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J., BHAGWATI, JAGANNADHADAS and VENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.]
Will-Executed witlz due solemnities by a person of competent
• understanding-Onus of proving undue infiuence-Undue infiuence
-Meaning of-Indian Succession Act, 1925 (XXXIX of 1925),
s. 63-Due attestation-Proof of.
When once it has been proved that a will has been executed
with Jue solemnities by a person of competent understanding and
apparently a free agent, the burden of proving that it was executed
under undue influence is on the person who alleges it.
~
It is well-settled that it is not every influence which is
brought to bear on a testator that can be characterised as "undue".
It is open to a person to plead his cause before the te~tator and to
persuade him to make a disposition in his favour. And if the testator
1 33
Edward Ezra
and Another
v.
The State of
West Bengal
Mukherjea ].
1036
Naresh Charan
Das Gupta
v.
Paresh Charan
Das Gupta
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
retains his mental capacity and there is no element of fraud or
ccercion, the will cannot be attacked on the ground of undue inHuence.
All influences are not unlawful. Persuasion, appeals to the affections or ties of mankind, to a sentiment of gratitude for past services.
or pity for future destitution, or the like,~these are all legitimate
and may be fairly pressed on a testator. On the other hand pressure
of whatever character, whether acting on the fears or the hopes, if so.
exerted as to overpower the volition without convincing the judgment,
is a species of restraint under which no valid will can be made.
It cannot be laid do,vn as a matter of law that because the
attesting witnesses did not state in examination-in-chief that they
signed the will in the presence of the testator, there was no due
attestation as required by s. 63 of the Indian Succession Act. It is a
pure question of fact depending on the appreciation of evidence and
the circumstances of each case \Vhether the attesting witnesses signed
in the presence of the testator.
Boyse v. Rossborough ([1857] 6 H.L.C. 2; 10 E.R. 1192); Craig
v. Lamoureux (1920 A.C. 349) and Hall v. Hall ([1868] L.R. 1 P. &
D. 481 ), referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JuRISDICTION :
202 of 1952.
Civil
Appeal No.
Appeal from the Judgment and Decree dated the
5th day of March, 1951 of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta in Appeal from Original Decree
No. 87 of 1949 arising out of the decree dated the
20th day of January, 1949 in Suit No. 94 of 1946 of
the Court of 3rd Additional District Judge at 24Parganas.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, (Sukumar Ghose, with him), for the appellant.
Bankam Chandra Banneriee and R. R. Bistoas,
respondent No. 1.
1954. December 2.
was delivered by
The
for
Judgment of the Court
VENKATARAMA AYYAR J.-This appeal anses out
of an application filed by the first respondent for
probate of a will dated 28-11-1943 executed by one
Bhabesh Charan Das Gupta. The testator died on
27-10-1944 leaving him surviving two sons, Paresh
Charan Das (the first respondent), Naresh Charan Das
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1037
(the appellant), and a daughter, Indira (the second
respondent), The estate consisted of a sixth share in
some ancestral lands at Matta in the District of Dacca,
and a house No. 50, South End Park, Calcutta, built
by the testator on a site purchased by him. By his
will, he directed that a legacy of Rs. 10 per mensem
should be paid to his younger son, the appellant, for
the period of his life; that his daughter should be
entitled to a life estate in five specified rooms in the
house to be enjoyed either personally by her and
the members of the family, or by leasing them to
others; that a legacy of Rs. 10 per mensem should be
paid to one or the other of two hospitals ·named, and
that subject to the legacies aforesaid, tl1e first respondent should take the estate, perform the sraddha,
and pay one-sixth of the expenses for the worship
of the deity installed in the ancestral house.
The first respondent who was the sole executor
under the will, applied in due course for probate
thereof. The appellant entered caveat, and thereupon,
the application was registered as a suit. He then
filed a written statement, and on that, the following
issues were framed:
(1) "Was the
Will inquestion lawfully
and
validly executed and attested ?
(2) Had the testator testamentary capacity at
the time of the execution of the Will?
(3) Was the Will in question executed under
undue influence and pressure exerted by Paresh Charan
Das Gupta?"
The Additional District Judge of the 24-Parganas who
tried the suit held in favour of the first respondent on
issues 1 and 2, but against him on issue 3, and in the
result, probate was refused.
The first respondent took the matter in appeal to
the High Court, and that was heard by G. N. Das and
S. C. Lahiri, JI. Before them, the appellant did not
contest the correctness of the finding of the Additional District Judge that the testator had testamentary capacity when he executed the will. The two
contentions that were pressed by him were (1) that
the will in question was . executed by the . testator
Naresh Charan
Das Gupta
v.
Paresh Charan
Das Gupta
Venkatarama
Ayyar ],
1038
1954
NQrtsh Charan
Das Gupta
v.
Paresh Charan
Das Gupta
Venkatarama
Ayyar J.
SUPREME COllRT REPORTS
[1955]
under undue influence of the first respondent, and (2)
that it was not validly attested, and was therefore
invalid. On both the questions, the learned Judges
held in favour of the first respondent, and accordingly
allowed the appeal, and directed the grant of probate.
Against this judgment, the caveator prefers this appeal, and contends that the findings of the Court
below on both the points are erroneous.
The main question that arises for our decision is
whether the will in question was executed under the
undue influence of the first respondent. "When once
it has been proved", observed Lord Cranworth in
Boyse v. Rossborough( ') "that a will has been executed
with due solemnities by a person of competent understanding and apparently a free agent, the burden of
proving that it was executed under undue influence is
on the party who alleges it". Vide also Craig v.
Lamoureux('·). In the present case, it is not in dispute that the testator executed the will in question, and that he had the requmte mental capacity
at that time. The burden, therefore, is on the appellant to establish that the will was the result of
undue influence brought to bear on him by the first
respondent.
The facts so far as they are material for this
issue, may now be stated. The testator was a police
officer and retired in 1927 as Deputy Superintendent
of Police. Paresh Charan, the elder son, was married
in 1925, and lived all along with his parents with his
wife and children. Nirmala, the wife of the testator,
died in 1929, and thereafter . it was the wife of Paresh
Charan that was maintammg the home.
Naresh
Charan studied up to I.A., but in 1920 discontinued
his studies and got into employment in the workshop
of Tata & Co., at Jamshedpur on a petty salary ; and
the evidence is that t11ereafter he was practically
living apart from the family. In 1928 he married one
Shantimayi, who was a widow having some children
by her first husband. She belonged to the Kayastha
caste, whereas Naresh Charan belonged to the Baid
caste. The testator was strongly opposed to this
(1) [1857) 6 H.L.C. 2; IO E.R. 1192.
(2) 1920 A.G. 349·
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1039
intercaste marriage, and did his best to stop it but
without success. The correspondence that followed
between the appellant and his father during this
period clearly shows that the father felt very sore
·over this alliance, and wrote that it could not pain
him even if his son died.
With this background, we may turn to the will.
The relevant recitals therein are as follows:
"My younger son Sri Naresh Charan Das Gupta
is behaving badly with me and without my knowledge
.and consent he has married a girl of a different caste
and she has given birth to two female children and
-one male child. In these circumstances my said son
Sri Naresh Charan Das Gupta and his son Sreeman
Arnn Gupta and the two daughters or any other son
-or daughter who may be born to him, will not be
entitled to perform my sradh or to offer me Pindas.
For all these reasons I deprive my second son Sri
Naresh Charan and his son Sreeman Arnn Gupta and
his two daughters and any other sons or daughters
who may be born to him as well as Naresh's wife
Sreemati Santi of inheritance from me and from all
my movable and immovable properties, ancestral as
well as self-acquired. They shall not get any share
-or interest or possession in any of my aforesaid properties".
It is not disputed that these recitals accord with
what the testator had expressed in the correspondence
at the time of the marriage and for some years thereafter. But it is argued that since then, more than a
decade had passed before the will was executed, and
that during this period the natural affection of the
testator for his son had re-asserted itself, that he had
forgiven and forgotten the past, and that when the
will was actually executed, the recitals above extracted did not correctly reflect the then mind of the
testator.
We have been taken through the entire correspondence that passed between the testator and the
appellant and the members of his family. It shows
that the testator was solicitous about the welfare of
the appellant, and was enquiring about his health and
r954
N aresh Charan
Das Gupta
v.
Paresh Charan
Das Gupta
Venkatarama
Ayyar J.
1040
1954
Naresh Charan
Das Gupta
v.
Paresh Charan
Das Gupta
Venkatarafna
Ay••ar· J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1955]:
sending him on occasions medicines; that he waso
affectionately disposed towards his children and waso
sending them presents of cloth; that latterly he had
so far modified his attitude towards the wife of the
appellant as to invite her and her children to Calcutta;
that he himself stayed with them for some time at
Jamshedpur and was giving advice to the appellant
on matters connected with his employment. It was
argued that there was thus a gradual change of heart
on the part of the father towards . the appellant and·
the members of his family, that the recitals in the
will could not be reconciled with this change of attitude, and that they must have been inspired by the·
first respondent. We are unable to agree. It is one
thing for a father who feels that he has been wronged
by a disobedient son to wish him well in life, and
quite another thing to give him any of his properties.
In the whole of the correspondence which has been
read to us, there is nothing to suggest that he wanted
the appellant to share in the estate. On the other
hand, there are indications that even when the appellant was in financial difficulties, the testator considered that he was under no sort of obligation to·
come to his help. Vide Exs. 5(c) and C(l). It may
be mentioned that after making the will oh 28-11-1943·.
the testator continued to correspond with the appellant and the members of his family precisely in the
same terms as before. Vide Exs. B(2), C( 4) and A(lO) ..
That shows that the two cnrrents of natural affection and settlement of properties flowed in distinct
channels, and that the change in the conrse of the·
one had no effect on the direction of the other.
The testator, it is clear from the correspondence,.
was a man of strong will, determined and unshakabJe.
in his resolutions. He wrote of himself in Ex. C(34)
that "I am one-third conservative, one-third liberat
and one-third
autocratic".
He
was
very
.,
.
solicitous
about the family prestige and reputation, and felt
deeply hurt when his son entered into a marnage
which was viewed by his community with disfavour.
In Ex. 6( c) he wrote, "You broke our hearts for a
woman who has no right to be in my house". And
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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as late as 25-12-1941 he wrote to the appellant that if
his wife and children came to live with him "they
must prepare themselves to meet uncalled for taunts
and unpleasant enquiries which may be made by our
near and distant village relations in our society who
will come to see us".
(Vide Exhibit C(37) ). There
cannot, therefore, be any doubt that the testator was
all along smarting under a sense of social humiliation
by reason of the inter-caste marriage, and that the
recitals in the will were manifestations of a sore 111
his heart which had remained unhealed to the last.
It was also argued that the dispositions in the
will were unnatural in that the appellant had been
practically disinherited and his children altogether
ignored. This by itself cannot lead to any inference
of undue influence on the part of the first respondent.
Having regard to the character of the testator and
his feelings in the matter it is not a matter for · surprise that he should have cut ofl the appellant with
a small legacy. It must also be mentioned that the
net value of the assets as given in the probate petition is Rs. 23,865-10-9, and if the other legacies and
charges are deducted, what was bequeathed to the
first respondent cannot be said to be very considerable. It also appears that at that time his salary was
Rs. 60 per mensem and that he had a number of
children, whereas the appellant is stated to have had
a basic salary of Rs. 250 per mensem then. The first
respondent, his wife and children have all along been
dependants of the testator, whereas the appellant had
lived apart from him from 1920. And it is not unnatural for the testator so to order the distribution of his
estate as to secure the continuance of the ex1stmg
state of affairs. The terms of the will, therefore, cannot be relied on as intrinsic evidence of undue influence, as contended for by the appellant.
Then there is the evidence of Indira, the daughter
of the testator, which was taken on commission. She
deposed that the testator had told her that there
were troubles in the house, that the elder son had
objection to stay with the younger one, "because if
they live together, there will be social trouble regard-
Naresh Charan
Das Gupta
v.
Paresh Charan·
Das Gupta
Venkatarama
Ayyar J.
1042
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19551
/
1 954
N aresh Charan
Das Gupta
v.
Yaresh Charan
Das Gupta
Venkatarama
Ayyar J.
ing his daughter's marriage", and that he therefore
wanted to make a will. She went on to add that the
father subsequently wanted to alter the will, and sent
for her repeatedly for discussions, but that she
generally excused herself, because she did not like to
intervene in the matter, and that on those occasions,
he told her, "At present this will stand, but I want
to modify it in future". Indira also deposed that the
first respondent and his wife used to tell the testator
that there was no change in the conduct of the appellant, that he was extravagant in his habits and incurred debts, and that he had taken away some articles. We do not consider that it is safe to act on this
evidence. It is clear from Exhibit 1 that Indira and
her husband had taken sides with the appellant as
against the first respondent, and wrote to him that
in spite of the will the appellant "should have his
share as early as possible in order to avoid further
complication", though it may be noted that they 111sisted on their rights under the will. Stripped of all
its embellishments, the evidence of Indira, if true,
comes only to this that the first respondent told
his father that he could not live under the same
roof with his brother, and that in view
of that attitude, the testator gave no share to the appellant in
the house. We are unable to see any undue influence
in this. The first respondent was entitled to put forward his views in the matter, and so long as the ultimate decision lay with the testator
and his mental
capacity was unimpaired, there can be no question of
undue influence.
It is elementary law that it is not every influence
which is brought to bear on a testator that can be
characterised as "undue". It is open to a person to
plead his case before the testator and to persuade
him to make a disposition in his favour. And if the
testator retains his mental capacity, and there is no
element of fraud or coercion-it has often been
observed that undue influence may in the last analysis
be brought under one or the other of these two categories-the will cannot be attacked on the ground of
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1043
undue influence. The law was thus stated by Lord
Penzance in Hall. v. Hall(1):
"But all influences are not unlawful. Persuasion, appeals to the affections or ties of kindred, to a
sentiment of gratitude for past services, or pity for
future destitution, or the like,-these are all legitimate and may be fairly pressed on a testator. On the
other hand, pressure of whatever character, whether
acting on the fears or the h-0pes, if so exerted as to
overpower the volition without convincing the judgment, is a species of restraint under which no valid
will can be made. Importunity or thr~ats , such as the
testator has the courage to resist, moral command
asserted and yielded to for the sake of peace and
quiet, or of escaping from distress of mind or social
discomfort,-these, if carried to a degree in which the
free play of the testator's judgment, discretion, or
wishes is overborne, will constitute undue influence,
though no force is either used or threatened. In a
word, a testator may be led, but not driven; and his
will must be the offspring of his own volition, and
not the record of some one else's".
Section 61 of the Indian Succession Act (Act XXXIX
of 1925) enacts that,
"A will or any part of a will, the making of
which has been caused by fraud or coercion, or - by
such importunity as takes away the free agency of the
testator, is void".
Illustration (vii) to the section is very instructive,
and is as follows:
"A, being in such a state of health as to be
capable of exercising his own judgment and volition,
B uses urgent intercession and persuasion with him
to induce him to make a will of a certain purport. A,
in consequence of the intercession and persuasion,
but in the free exercise of his judgment and volition,
makes his will in the manner recommended bv B.
The will is not rendered invalid by the intercession
and persuasion of B" .
..-:,
(1) (1868) L. R. IP. & D. 481 & 482.
134
1954
Naresh Charan:
Das Gupta
v.
Paresh Charan
Das Gupta
Venkatarama
Ay:iar J.
1044
1954
J{arcsh Charan
Das Gu.Ota
v.
Paresh Charan
Das Gupta
Venkatarama
AyyarJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
Even if we accept the evidence of Indira, the
case would, on the facts, fall within this Illustration.
It is not disputed that the testator was in full possession of his mental faculties. There is no proof that
the first respondent did or said anything which would
have affected the free exercise by the testator of his
volition. On the other hand, it is proved that the first
respondent had no act or part in the preparation,
execution, or registration of the will. It is a holograph
will, and the evidence of P. W s. 1 and 2 is that if was
the testator himself who made all the arrangements
for its execution, and that it was actually executed at
the residence of P.W. 1. The document was presented
for registration by the testator, and he kept it with
himself, and it was taken out of his cash box after his
death. He lived for nearly a year after the execution
of the will, and even on the evidence of Indira, he
was often thinking of it, and discussing it, but declared
that it should stand. The cumulative effect of the
evidence is clearly to establish that the will represents
the free volition of the testator, and that it is not the
result of undue influence by the first respondent or his
relations. It should be mentioned that Indira herself
sought to enforce his rights under the will shortly
after the death of the testator, and that the appellant
also obtained payment of legacy under the will for a
period of 15 months. No ground has been established
for our differing from the High Court in its appreciation of the evidence, and we agree with its conclusion
that the will is not open to question on the ground
of undue influence.
It was also argued for the appellant that there
was no proof that the will was duly attested as required
by section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, and that
it should therefore be held to be void. P .Ws. 1 and
2 are the two arrestors, and they stated in examination-in-chief that the testator signed the will in their
presence, and that they attested his signature.
They
did not add that they signed the will in the presence
of the testator. Now, the contention is that in the
absence of such evidence it must be held that there
was no due attestation. Both the Courts below have
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1045
held against the appellant on this contention. The
1earned Judges of the High Court were of the opinion
that as the execution and attestation took place at
one sitting at the residence of P.W. 1, where the testator and the witnesses had assembled by appointment,
they must all of them have been present until the
matter was finished, and as the witnesses -were not
-cross-examined on the question of attestation, it could
properly be inferred that there was due attestation.
It cannot be laid down as a matter of law that because the witnesses did not state in examination-in·chief that they signed the will in the presence of the
testator, there was no due attestation. It will depend
-0n the circumstances elicited in evidence whether the
attesting witnesses signed in the presence of the testator. This is a pure question of fact depending on
appreciation of evidence. The finding of the Court
below that the will was duly attested 1s based on a
·consideration of all the materials, and must be accepted. Indeed, it is stated in the judgment of the
Additional District Judge that "the fact of due execution and attestation of the will was not challenged
on behalf of the caveator at the time of the hearing
of the suit". This contention of the appellant must
.also be rejected.
In the result, the decision of the High Court is
confirmed, and this appeal 1s dismissed, but m the
-circumstances, without costs.
Appeal dismissed.
BUDHAN CHOUDHRY AND OTHERS
v.
THE STATE OF BIHAR.
•
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[ME.HAR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J., MuKHERJEA,
S. R. DAs, V1VIAN BosE, BHAGWATI, JAGANNADHADAS
and VENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.]
Constitution of India, Al'ticle 14-Code of Criminal Procedure
(Act V of 1898), section 30-Whether ultra vires the ConstitutionArticle 14-Reasonable classification-Not forbidden-Test of permissible classification-Necessary conditions-Constitution-Whether
N ar-.sh Charan
Das Gupta
v.
Paresh Cha an
Das Gupta
Venkatarama
Ayyar J.
1 954
December
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