P. JOSEPH JOHN versus THE STATE OF TRAVANCORE-COCHIN.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 25 November 1954 | [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1011 | 1954 INSC 112
Key facts
- Decided
- 25 November 1954
- Bench
- MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, VIVIAN BOSE, NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI, B. JAGANNADHADAS, T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR
- Bench size
- 7
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 90/1953
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1011
- Neutral citation
- 1954 INSC 112
Text of the judgment
f
,
r
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1011
to stand as a candidate for election he shall not either
be employed as a paid legal practitioner on behalf of
the municipality or act as a legal practitioner against
the Municipality. There is no fundamental right in
any person to stand as a candidate for election to the
Municipality. The only fundamental right which is
guaranteed is that of practising any profession or
carrying on any occupation, trade or business. There
is no violation of the latter right in prescribing the
disqualification of the type enacted in section 16(1) (ix)
of the Act. If he wants to stand as a candidate for
election it is but proper that he should divest himself
of his paid brief on behalf of the Municipality or the
brief against the Municipality in which event there will
be certainly no bar to his candidature. Even if it be
taken as a restriction on his right to practice his profession of law, such restriction would be a reasonable
one and well within the ambit of artl.Cle 19 clause 5.
Such restriction would be a reasonable one to impose
in the interests of the general public for the preservation of purity in public life. We therefore see no substance in this contention of the appellant also.
The appeal accordingly fails and stands dismissed
with costs.
.1954
Sakhawat Ali
v.
The State of Orissa·
Bhagwati].
Appeal dismissed.
P. ·JOSEPH JOHN
1954
ti.
Nov1m#r25
THE STATE OF TRAVANCORE-COCHIN.
[MEHAR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J., MuKHERJEA,
S. R. DAs, VIVIAN BosE, BHAGWATI, JAGANNADHADAS
and VENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.]
Constitution of India, Arts. 166, 311, 320-0pportunity to show
cause-Consultation with Public Services · Commission-E:ctent ofTravancore Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, (Act XI of 1132)-"'0ur
Government"-Meaning of-Covenant of United Staie of TravancoreCochin-Article 20-Application of.
1012
1 954
P. Jo,.ph John
v.
The State of
T ravan&ore-Cochi11
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
An enquiry under the provisions of the Travap.core Public Servant• (Inquiries) Act, (Act XI of 1132) was held against the petitioner in pursuance of a resolution passed by the Council of Ministers. The petitioner took part in the proceedings, denied the charges
and raised legal objection to the competence of the Enquiry Commission to hold the enquiry. Some of the charges were held proved.
The petitioner was asked by the Chief Secretary to show cause why
he should not be removed from service. The petitioner's request for
extension of time to show cause was granted twice but refused a
third time. On his failure to avail himself of the opportunity to
sho\.v cause against the action proposed to be taken against him, the
report of the Enquiry Commissioner was submitted to the Public
Services Commission and the latter approved of the action proposed
to be taken against the petitioner. The proceedings relating to the
enquiry were submitted to the Rajpramukh and thereupon an order
in proper form for the removal of the petitioner from service was
made by the Rajpramukh and authenticated by the Chief Secretary
to Government.
Held, (i) that under the provisions of Art. 311 of the Constitution a civil servant is entitled to have a reasonable opportunity to
defend himself and show cause, both at the ti1ne of enquiry into the
charges brought against him and at the stage when definite conclusions have been come to on the charges and the actual punishn1ent to
follow is provisionally determined upon. The position cannot be
characterised as anomalous if the statute conten1plates a reasonable
opportunity at more than one stage.
In the present case the petitioner had reasonable opportunity to
enter upon his defence at both the stages. He fully availed himself
of the first opportunity, but refused to avail himself of the second
opportunity which was offered to him. All the rules of natural justice
were observed in the case.
.•
(ii) The provisions of Art. 166(1) and (2) are directory, not
mandatory; and, in order to determine whether there has been co1npliance with the said provisions, all that is necessary to see is that
the requirements of the sub-sections are met in substance.
(iii) After the integration of the two States of Travancore and
Cochin, the expression "Our Government" means "The Coui:cil of
Ministers" under the new set up of democratic Government in the
United State. The Rajpramukh as the head of the State is merely
a constitutional head and is bound to accept the advice of his
Ministers.
(iv) The consultation envisaged by Art. 320(3) does not extend
to review petitions which the petitioner may choose to file as many
times as he likes.
( v) The sanction of the Rajpramukh under Art.. 20 of the
Covenant of the United State of Tranvancore-Coch1n 1s necessary
only before the institution of civil or criminal proceedings. Departmental proceedings do not fall within the ambit of the said Article.
•
S.C.R,
Dattatreya
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Moreshwar
Pangarkar v. The State of
<f 1952] S.C.R. 612), referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE
90 of 1953.
1013
Bombay
P. Joseph John
JuRISDICTION: Civil
Appeal No.
Appeal under Article 132(1) of the Constitution
of India from the Judgment and Order dated the 29th
August, 1952, of the High Court of TravancoreCochin at Ernakulam m Original Petition No. 51 of
1952.
K. Thon1as and M.
appellant.
R.
Krishna
Pillai, for the
Mathew P. Muricken, Advocate-General for the
.State of Travancore-Cochin (T. R. Balakrishna Ayyar
and Sardar Bahadur, with him), for the respondent.
1954. November
was delivered by
-
25.
1954
The Judgment of the Court
MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J.-This appeal by
leave of the High Court of Judicature of TravancoreCochin at Ernakulam is directed against an order of
a Full Bench of that court dismissing an application
for the issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the order
of the Government of the united State of Travancore·Cochin removing the appellent from service of the
State and permanently debarring him from reappointment in service.
The facts giving rise to the petition and the appeal are these: The petitioner entered the service of
the erstwhile Travancore State in the year 1928. By
promotion he became the Executive Engineer, Electricity Department in August 1937 and subsequently
Electrical Engineer to Government in October 1944.
He was the Electrical Engineer to Government on the
1st July 1949 when the States of Travancore and Cochin were integrated by a Covenant entered into between the rulers of the two States. By an order of the
Government of the united State of Travancore-Cochin
dated the 11th August 1949, he was appointed as the
officiating Chief Engineer (Electricity) in the State.
In or about September 1949 the Government of the
v.
The State of
Travancore-Cochin
.1014
1 954
· P. Joseph John
v.
The State of
T ravancQf't~Cochin
Mahajan C. J.
SUPREME COURT.REPORTS
[1955]
united ·State received serious complaints about the
conduct and dealings of some of their senior officers
. and allegations
of corruption, communalism, etc.
were made against them. In December 1949 the Council of Ministers decided to take action against the
appellant on a number of charges indicated in the resolution. On the 22nd December 1949, immediately
after this resolution was passed, the pet:1t10ner was
informed that he was suspended from service pending
enquiry and he was requested to hand over charge to
Sri K. P. Sridharan Nair forthwith. The petitioner
complied with this order and handed over charge as
directed. On the 21st March 1950 the following notification was issued :"Whereas Government are of op1mon that
there are sufficient grounds for making a formal and
public inquiry into the truth of the imputation of misconduct of the officers mentioned below :
Government, under section 3 of the Travancore
Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, XI of 1122, hereby
commit the said inquiry to Sri K. Sankaran, Judge,
High Court, appointed Commissioner for the purpose.
Government are further pleased under section 4
of the said Act to nominate Sri T. R. Balakrishna
Ayyar, Government Pleader, High Court, to prosecute the inquiries on their behalf.
The inquiries shall be conducted as early as
possible.
The officers referred to in para. 1 supra are :
1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Sri P. Joseph John".
The petitioner was informed by notice of the 24th
April 1950 about this inquiry. The notification was.
signed by Shri .K. G. Menon, Chief Secretary to Government.
Mr. Justice Sankaran took . charge as Enquiry
Commissioner and on the 11th May 1950 forwarded ,
the articles of charges against the petitioner, the list
of witnesses and the list of documents placed before
him together with the notice regarding the commence~
ment of the enquiry to Shri K. S. Raghavan, Secre-
·t
S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1015
tary to Government, for service on the petitioner. A
few days before the date fixed for the commencement
of the enquiry the petitioner made an application to
the Enquiry Commissioner for a direction to the Prosecutor to produce the files and papers relating to the
various charges in the office of the Commissioner and
for permission to him and his counsel to inspect the
same. This application was allowed and he and his
advocate were allowed to inspect the relevant files in
the presence of the prosecutor or his deputy. On the
20th May 1950 when the enquiry commenced, the
petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charges by a
written statement. He was defended during the enquiry by Shri K. P. Abraham, a leading member of
the Bar. A preliminary objection was taken to the
Tribunal's jurisdiction on the basis of Article 20 of
the Covenant entered into between the rulers of Travancore and Cochin and it was contended that the
proceedingsi before the Commissioner were criminal in
nature and could not be commenced without the sanction of the Rajpramukh and that its absence was
fatal to the enquiry. This objection was not immediately decided by the Commissioner but was ultimately
overruled. On the 22nd November 1950 the petitioner submitted detailed answers in writing to the
various charges. The enquiry concluded on the 27th
December 1950 and the Commissioner submitted his
report to Government on the 17th February 1951.
Some of the charges were held proved, while others
were held not established. On the 5th July 1951 the
following communication was sent to the petitioner
by the Chief Secretary to Government :"I am to enclose herewith a copy of the
above report and to point out that the Government agree with the findings of the Inquiring. Commissioner on the several charges
against you. Government also agree with
the Commissioner that the objections raised
by you challenging the validity of the enquiry itself are not tenable.
2. As against the 26 charges
9-89 S. C. India/59
framed
1 954
P. ]oJeph John
v.
The State of
Travancore-Cochin
Mahajan C.J.
1 954
P:Joseph]o/m
v.
The State of
Travancore-Cochin
·Mahajan C.J.
'1016
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
'*Charges
Nos. XIII
to XVIII
& XX!Il
toXXV.
against you, the nine charges* noted in the
margin have not been established and they
are accordingly dropped. As regards Charge
No. IX in view of the extenuating circumstances, the irregularity is condoned.
3; It is evident from the remammg
charges, which have been established, that
you have misused your official position as
Electrical Engineer to Government and·
shown undue fayouritism at the expense of
State revenues, to private firms and issued
materials from Government stores to private
companies and individuals in violation of all
rules ( vide List A). It is also evident that
departmental stores and departmental lorries
have been diverted for your personal use in
a number of cases. (Vide List B). You are
also found guilty of having shown defiance
and insubordination towards the authority
of the Government by your refusal, in connection with the supply of power to the
Nagercoil Electric Supply Corporation, to
supply certain particulars which were called
for and which it was your duty to furnish
and by your refusal to withdraw the objectionable statement in your reply to the Government in spite of the Government order
directing you to withdraw the same.
4. The Government therefore
propose
to remove you from service from the date on
which you were placed under suspension with
permanent bar against future reappointment
[1955]
in service.
5. You are requested to show cause
within 15 days of the date of receipt of this
notice with enclosures why action should not
be taken against you as proposed in paragraph 4 above".
·The petitioner on receipt of this notice applied for
time till the 10th September 1951 for showing cause.
Time as prayed for was allowed. On the 10th Septem·ber 1951 when the time granted at his own request
-
..
,
S.C.R.
""'
..
.J
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1017
was due to expire, he again applied for further time
till the 10th November 1951. He was allowed further
time till the 24th September 1951. On that date he
again asked for further time till the 31st October 1951
but this request wa~ not granted. In spite of the fact
that the petitioner was granted the time which he
originally asked for and this was further extended by
a fortnight, he furnished no explanation and did not
show any cause against the notice issued to him. The
petitioner having failed to avail himself of the opportunity to show cause against the action proposed
against him, a draft of the proceedings relating to the
enquiry was submitted to H. H. the Rajpramukh on
the 30th September 1951 and thereupon an order was
issued for his removal from service from the date of
suspension and debarring him from reappointment to
service. The order was in proper form as having been
made by H. H. the Rajpramukh and was authenticated by the Chief Secretary to Government. This order is dated the 1st October 1951. It may be mentioned
that before the papers were submitted to H. H. the
Rajpramukh, the report of the Commissioner was submitted to the Public Services Commission for their
consideration. The Public Services Commission supported the action which the Government proposed to
take against the petitioner. On the 9th October 1951
the petitioner was removed from service with effect
from the 26th December 1949. Two months after the
order of his removal, the petitioner submitted an application for a reconsideration of the order removing
him from service. This was rejected by an order dated
the 25th January 1952.
On these facts and in these circumstances an application was made before the High Court of Travancore-Cochin at Ernakulam on the· 2nd June 1952 praying that the court may be pleased to issue a writ in the
nature of certiorari or any other writ, directions or
orders calling for the records relating to the orders
dated the 9th October 1951 and the 25th January 1952
and to quash the same and direct the respondent to
restore the petitioner to the office which he was lawfully to hold. It was contended in the application
1954
P. Joseph John
v.
The State of
Travancore-Cochin
Mahajan C. ].
1018
1 954
P. Joseph John
v.
The State ·of
Travancore-Cochin
Maha}an C. J,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
that the applicant had no reasonable opportunity of ?'
showing cause against his removal and that he was
entitled to show cause twice, once after he was found
guilty and next after the punishment had been decided and that the denial of this right rendered the
order of dismissal illegal and void and that it offended
against the principles of natural justice. It was further contended that the consultation with the Public
~
Services Commission was not held in terms of the
provisions of procedure for disciplinary action against
Government servants and prescribed in Article 320,
sub-section 3 ( c) of the Constitution of India. A number of other grounds were also taken against the order
of dismissal. The High Court negatived all the contentions of the petitioner and dismissed the petition.
It however certified that the case involved substantial
questions of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution and was a fit one for appeal to this Court.
Mr. Thomas who argued the appeal on behalf of
the appellant raised a number of points against the (_
validity of the order removing the appellant from
service and contended that the enquiry conducted into the charges made against him was wholly illegal
and void. In our judgment, none of the points urged
by the learned counsel was of a substantial character
and all of them CQncerned matters of mere form and
no valid reasons have been shown for disturbing the
decision of the High Court.
The question of the validity of an order of removal of a person employed in a civil capacity under
the Union or a State falls to be determined on the
provisions of Article 311 of th~ Constitution of India.
This Article is in these terms :
"(l) No person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or an all-India service or a civil
service of a State or holds a civil post under the Union
or a State shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed.
(2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank until he has
been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1019
against the action proposed to be taken in regard to
him ...................... "
1 954
P. Joseph John
v.
~
It is not said that the petitioner was removed by an
authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. There was no occasion to raise this issue
because the order of removal had been made by the
Rajpramukh and was expressed according to the provisions of Article 166 of the Constitution. The requirement therefore of sub-clause (1) of Article 311
was fully satisfied.
~"
"'
y
-...
.-\
1
,;,
As regards the question whether the petitioner
was .given reasonable opportunity of showing cause
against the action proposed to be taken in regard to
him, the legal position in that respect and the nature
of opportunity to be granted was stated by the Privy
Council in the case of High Commissioner for India v.
I. M. Lall(1) and it was held that when a stage 1s
reached when definite conclusions have been come to
as to the charges, and the actual punishment to follow is provisionally determined on, that the statute
gives the civil servant an opportunity for which subsect.ion (3) of section 240 of the Government of India
Act, 1935 (which corresponds to Article 311) makes
provision, and that at that stage a reasonable opportunity has to be afforded to the civil servant concerned. It was also held that there was no anomaly in
the view that the ~tatute contemplates a reasonable
opportunity at more than one stage. In our opinion,
in the present case the petitioner had reasonable opportunity at both stages to enter upon his defence.
He fully availed himself of the first opportunity and
though a reasonable opportunity was also given to
him at the second stage, he failed to avail himself of
it and it is not open to him now to say that the requirements of clause (2) of Article 311 have not been
satisfied. It was not denied that
the petitioner was
given by the Enquiry Commissioner all facilities for
entering on his defence. Before filing his written statement before the Enquiry Commissioner the petitioner
and his counsel were afforded facility to inspect the
(1) [1948] F.C.R. 44.
Thi State of
Travancore-Cochin
Mahajan C. J.
1020
1 954
,.
P. Joseph John
The Sta"te of
T rauancore-Cochin
Mahajan C. J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1955]
various files concerning the charges which he had to
meet. After inspecting those files he filed a full written
statement explaining those charges. He was defended in the enquiry by a leading lawyer and was afforded fullest opportunity to examine and cross-examine
the witnesses examined by the Commissioner. He
was able to satisfy the Enquiry Commissioner that
out of the charges levelled against him a number of
them were not established; but he failed to satisfy the
Commissioner as regards the rest and the Enquiry
Commissioner held them proved. After the enquiry
was concluded the petitioner was furnished with a
copy of the report of the Commissioner and was as.ked
to show cause against the action proposed to be taken
against him. He applied for two months' time to show
cause. This was granted. He made a ·further application for further time. This was also partially
granted. He again asked for further time which was
refused. It is difficult to say that the time allowed to
him was not reasonable in view of the fact that he
had taken part in the enquiry before the Commissioner and all the evidence had been taken in his presence and he had full opportunity to defend himself.
All the material on which the Commissioner had reported against him on the charges found proved, was
given in the report of the Commissioner and that was
supplied to him with a show cause notice. The time
allowed, in our opinion, was more than sufficient for
him to enter on his .defence and having failed to do
so, he cannot be heard to sav that he was not given a
reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the
action proposed to be taken in regard to him.
Mr. Thomas argued that the show cause notice
was not in accordance with the provisions of Article
166 of the Constitution inasmuch as it was not
expressed to have been made in the name of theRajpramukh. As above mentioned, this notice was
issued on behalf of the Government and was signed
by the Chief Secretary of the united State of Travancore-Cochin who had under the rules of business
framed by the Rajpramukh the charge of the portfolio
of "service and appointments" at the Secretariat level
,.,, ....
·'
.
(~
(
-
•
-
-
S.C.R.
Y·
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1021
in this State. This was m our opinion substantial
compliance with the directory prov1S1ons of Article
166 of the Constitution. It was held by this court in
Dattatreya Moreshwar Pangarkar v. The State of Bombay(1) that clauses (1) and (2) of Article 166 are directory only and non-compliance with them does not
result in the order being invalid, and that in order to
determine whether there is compliance with these provisions all that is necessary to be seen is whether there
has been substantial compliance
with those requirements. In the present case there can be no manner
of doubt that the notice signed by the Chief Secretary
of the State and expressed to be on behalf of the
Government and giving opportunity to the petitioner
to show cause against the action proposed to be taken
against him was in substantial compliance with the
provisions of the article. The petitioner accepted this
notice and in pursuance of it applied for further
time to put in his defence. He was twice granted
this · time. In these circumstances,
the contention
of Mr. Thomas that as the notice was not expressed
as required under Article 166 it was invalid and
therefore the requirements of Article 311 were not
satisfied in this case must be held to be devoid of
force. We arc satisfied that all the requirements of
Article 311 have been fully complied with in this
case. It may also be mentioned that the High Court
held that H. H. the Rajpramukh had intimation of
the decision of the Council of Ministers and the
action proposed to be taken against the petitioner
and that in fact His Highness approved of the proposed action.
Mr. Thomas further contended that the enquiry
at the first stage also was invalid and irregular. He
argued that the order appointing the Enquiry Commissioner was not expressed in proper form and that
the Commissioner did not conduct the enquiry in
accordance with the provisions of the Act. The
notification ordering an enquiry set out above was
issued after the Council of Ministers had passed a
resolution to that effect. It must be presumed that in
(1) (1952] S.C.R. 612.
1954
P. Joseph John
v.
The State of
T ravancore-Cochin
Mahajan C. J.
1022
1 954
P. Joseph John
v.
The State of
Travancore-Co'Chin
Mahajan C. J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
the normal course of business that resolution was
communicated to the Rajpramukh. The order thus
substantially complies with the requirements of law
and in any case the effect of its not being expressed
as directed by Article 166 does not vitiate the notification. The appellant, as already stated, took part in
the enquiry, defended himself and fought every inch
of the ground. That being so, it is not possible to hold
that he was not given reasonable opportunity at the
first stage to defend himself. It was contended that
under the Travancore Public Servants (Inquiries) Act,
1122, it was only the Maharaja who could make an
order under the provisions of that Act, and that the
Ministers could not take any action. Emphasis was laid
on the expression "Our Government" in the different
provisions of the Act. We are unable to see any force
in this contention. The expression "Our Government"
means the Maharaja's Government, in other words,
the Government of the State of Travancore. After the
integration of the two States of Travancorc and Cochin
and the formation of the United State of Travancore-Cochin the expression "Our Government" has to
be construed according to the new set-up of Government and when the Council of Ministers had come into
being, it is obvious that the expression "our Government" as adapted to fit in with the new Constitution
means "The Council of Ministers". It is an elementary
principle of democratic Government prevailing in
England and adopted in our Constitution that the
Rajpramukh or the Governor as head of the State is
in such matters merely a constitutional head and he
is bound to accept the advice of his Ministers. In this
situation it cannot be held that the order of the Government appointing the Enquiry Commissioner was
ultra vires and without jurisdiction.
Another point taken by Mr. Thomas was that
without the sanction of the Rajpramukh the proceedings could not be started against the petitioner and
reliance for this contention was placed on Article 20
of the Covenant of the united State of Travancore
and Cochin. This article is in these terms :
"Except with the previous sanction of the Raj-
•
>
S.C.R.
.
...
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1023
pramukh, no proceedings, civil
or criminal, shall be
instituted against any person in respect of any act
done or purporting to be done in the execution of his
duty as a servant of either Covenanting State before
the appointed day".
fhe High Court negatived this contention with the
following observations:
"Article 20 refers to the institution of civil and
criminal proceedings,
two well-known
expressions
which are terms of art and clearly relate to civil and criminal proceedings before civil and criminal courts. The
said two kinds of proceedings do not exhaust the totality of matters which can be called proceedings. It
is only in respect of civil and criminal proceedings
that the sanction of the Rajpramukh is required
under Article 20 of the Covenant. It is not contended
on behalf of the petitioner that the proceedings before
the Commissioner are criminal proceedings. The only
contention is that they partake of the nature of
criminal proceedings. In our judgment, Article 20 of
the Covenant does not apply to proceedings which
are not criminal but ·merely partake of that character".
In these observations we fully concur. In our view
departmental proceedings do not come within the
ambit of the Article.
Lastly it was urged that there was non-compliance
with the provisions of Article 320, clause 3 ( c) of the
Constitution which provides that on all disciplinary
matters affecting a person serving under the Government of India or the Government of a State in a civil
capacity, including memorials or petitions relating to
such matters, the Union Public Service Commission
or the State Public Service Commission, as the case
may be, shall be consulted. In this case the Public
Service Commission was in fact consulted in the matter
of the action proposed against the pet1t1oner by
removing him.
The Public
Service Commission
agreed to the proposed action. This consultation
and the agreement as before the petitioner was asked
to show cause why he should not be removed from
service. The complaint .of the petitioner is that the
1954
P. Joseph John
v.
The State qf
T ravancore-Cochin
Mahajan C. J.
1024
195~ '
P. Joseph John .
v.
TheSta.1of
T ravancore-Cochi1'
Mahajan C. J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]:
consultation . with the Public Service Commission
should ·have been after he was asked to show cause
but the petitioner did not show cause and that being
so, no question arose of consulting the Public Service
Commission over again. It was contended that the
Public Service Commission should have been consulted
on the review petition. To accede to his argument
will mean that the State will have to consult the
Public Service Commission as many times as he may
choose to file review petitions. In our opinion the
consultation envisaged by Article 320 does not extend
so far. In this case the report of the Commissioner
was placed before the Public Service Commission and
the latter approved of the action proposed to be
taken. The appellant was given another opportunity
to show cause but he did not avail himself of that
opportunity or submit any explanation or show any
cause on which the Public Service Commission could
be consulted. The order of dismissal having been
made there was in the
circumstances no further
necessity to consult the Public Service Commission.
In our opinion therefore there is no force in this contention as well.
After having examined all the arguments of Mr.
Thomas, we are of the opinion that all the rules of
natural justice were fully observed during the enquiry in this case, and the petitioner had the fullest
opportunity to put in his defence both before the
Enquiry Commissioner and against the action proposed to be taken against him. It was by reason of
his own default that he failed to avail himself of the
second opportunity. He put in a belated review but
such a review is not provided for under the rules and
in .our opinion, it was not necessary to consult the
Public Service Commission at that stage. Such petitions are not within the contemplation of the Constitution.
For the reasons given above this appeal fails and
is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case we
make no order as to costs.
Appeal dismissed.
..,_,
.(
;.-
Report an error or ask for masking: grievance@lawgrids.org