SAKHA WAT ALI versus THE STATE OF ORISSA
Supreme Court of India | Decided 25 November 1954 | [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1004 | 1954 INSC 113
Key facts
- Decided
- 25 November 1954
- Bench
- MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, VIVIAN BOSE, NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI, T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR
- Bench size
- 6
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 81/1953
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1004
- Neutral citation
- 1954 INSC 113
Text of the judgment
1004
1954
Muir
Mills Co, Lttl.
v.
Suti Mills
Mazdoor
Union, Kanpur.
BhagwatiJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd. v.
Income-tax, West Bengal(').
[1955J
Commissioner
of
The result therefore is that the decision of the
Labour Appellate Tribunal appealed against must be
reversed and that of the Industrial Court (Textiles and
Hosiery), Kanpur, restored. The appeal will accordingly be allowed with costs.
Appeal allowed.
SAKHAWAT ALI
ti.
THE STATE OF ORISSA.
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J., MuKHERJEA,
S. R. DAs, VIVIAN BosE, BHAGWATI
and VENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.J
•
Constitution of India, arts. 14. 19(1) (g)-Orissa Municipal Act
1950 (Orissa Act XXlll of 1950), ss.1(3), 1(5), 16(1)(x)-Nomination
filed and rejected, effect of-Disqualification for nomination if
violates fundamental right-Orissa General Clauses Act, 1937 ( Orissa
Act I of 1937), s. 23-Scope of.
The provisions of section 16(l)(x) of the Orissa Municipal Act,
1950, by which a paid legal practitioner on behalf of or against
the Municipality is disqualified for election to a seat in such
Municipality do not violate the fundan1ental rights guaranteed to
such legal practitioner under article 14 or under article 19( 1) (g) of
the Constitution of India.
The Orissa Municipal Act, 1950, having received the Gover·
nor's assent on November 7, 1950, all preliminary steps
specified
in section 1(5) of the Act whic.:h were taken for the purpose of a
Municipal election after such assent are valid even though the
Act itself had not then come into force in terms of section 1(3).
Accordingly a nomination filed on March 15, 1951, was validly
subjected to the test of disqualification contained in section 16( 1)
(x) of the Act and the rejection of such nomination on March 25,
1951, was not defective though the Act came into force on April 15,
1951, in the area to which the rejected
nomination
relates.
Section 23 of the Orissa General Clauses Act, 1937, does not
authorise the making of rules or bye-laws, which are to come into
(1) [1955] l S.C.R. 94r.
'
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S.C.R.
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operation before the commencement of the Act, but they
'f' valid under the express provision of section 1(5).
•
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•
1005
will
be
C1v1L
APPELLATE
JuRisorcTION :
Civil Appeal
No. 81 of 1953.
Appeal under article 132(1) of the Constitution of
India from the Judgment and Order, dated the 18th
April, 1951, of the High Court of Judicature for the
State of Orissa at Cuttack in Judicial Case No. 60 of
1951.
H. J. Umrigar, Sri Narain Andlay and Rajinder
Narain for the appellant.
Poru! A Mehta and P. G. Gokhale for the
respondent.
1954. November 25. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
BHAGWATI J.-The appellant who is a legal practitioner residing within the limits of the Kendrapara
Municipality and practising as a mukhtar in the
criminal and the revenue Courts there filed his nomination paper for election as a Councillor of the Municipality on the 15th March, 1951. That nomination paper
was rejected by the Election Officer on the 25th March,
1951, on the ground that he was employed as a legal
practitioner against the Municipality in case U/S 198 of
the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act which was pending
in the Sub-Divisional Magistrate Court.. The appellant
then filed on the 4th April, 1951, a petition before the
High Court of Orissa under article 226 of the Constitution
praying that a writ or order of prohibition be issued to
the State Government and the Election Officer restraining them from holding the election to the Kendrapara
Municipality under the Orissa Municipal Act, 1950 or
the Municipal Election Rules, 1950. This petition was
rejected by the High Court but the High Court granted
the appellant a certificate under article 132(1) of the
Constitution for leave to appeal to this Court.
_
The Orissa Municipal Act, 1950 (Orissa Act 23 of 1950)
was passed by the local Legislature and received the assent of the Governor on the 7th November, 1950, and
was published in the official gazette on the 11th November 1950. Section 1 of the Act runs as under :-
1 954
Sakhawat Ali
v.
TM State of
Orissa.
1006
1 954
Sakhau,at .Ali
v.
T Ii< Stateof
Orissa.
BhagwatiJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
(1) This Act may be called the Orissa Municipal
Act, 1950.
(2) It shall extend to the whole of the State of
Orissa.
(3) It shall come into force in such area or areas
on such date or dates as the State Government may
appoint from time to time ........................... .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . .. . . . . . .. ... . . . . . . . . ..
(5) Any notification, order or rule and any
appointment to an office, may be made or election held
under this Act, after it shall have received the assent
of the Governor and shall take effect on this Act
coming into force.
..
I
Section 16 of the Act prescribes the disqualifications
of candidates for election and provides :( l) No person shall .be qualified for election to a
seat in a Municipality, if such person ................. .
(ix) is employed as a paid legal practitioner on
behalf of the Municipality or as legal practitioner
against
the Municipality ........................... .
On the 11th November, 1950, the Secretary to the
Government,
Local
Self-Government
Department
addressed to all District Magistrates of the State letter
No. 1336/L.S.G. intimating that the Government had
decided that general elections should be held on the
basis of adult suffrage as provided in the Act in 12
Municipalities including the Kendrapara Municipality.
Notification No. 2015 L.S.G. was issued on the 13th
section 13 read with secDecember, 1950, under
tion 1 (5) of the Act fixing the 1st day of March, 1950,
as the relevant date for voters in the election as
regards their residential qualification in the Municipality. Notification No. 65 L.S.G. issued on the 4th
January, 1951, published rules made in exercise of the
powers conferred by clauses (1) and (2) of sub~sec
tion (2) of section 387 of the Act called the "Municipal
Election Rules, 1950." Redistribution of wards was
effected by Notification No. 167 L.S.G. dated the 10th
January, 1951, and two Notifications Nos. 519 and. 521
L.S.G. were issued on the 24th January, 1951, fixing
J..
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S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1007
the numbers of Councillors and of the reserved · seats
for each Municipality. The 15th March, 1951, was fixed
:as the date for filing the nominations and the 25th
March, 1951, for scrutiny of nomination papers. The
20th April, 1951, was the date fixed for the holding of
the election.
All these steps were taken by the Government in
:anticipation acting under the powers reserved under
section 1 (5) of the Act and it was only on the 15th
April, 1951, that the Act was extended to the Kendrapara Municipality by a notification under section 1(3)
-0f the Act.
The appellant contended ( 1) that the Act had not
-come into operation in the Kendrapara Municipality
till the 15th April, 1951, that the disqualification prescribed by section 16(1) (ix) could not consequently
have been incurred by him on the 15th March, 1951,
when he filed his nomination paper, that the rejection
·of his nomination paper therefore on that ground by.
the Election Officer on the 25th March, 1951, was_
illegal and no election could be held on the 20th April,
1951, as was sought to be done under the provisions
of the Orissa Municipal Act, 1950, or the _ Municipal
Election Rules, 1950, and (2) that in any event the
·disqualification prescribed under section 16(1) (ix) of
·the Act violated his fundamental rights guaranteed
under article 14 and article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution.
Both these contentions were in our opinion rightly
negatived by the High Court. Section 1 (5) of the Act
in express terms provides that after the Act has
received the assent of the Governor elections could be
held under the Act but were only to take effect on the
Act coming into force, which means the coming into
force of the Act in such area or areas on such date or
«:lates which the State Government migfit appoint from
time to time under section 1 (3) of the Act. There is
thus contemplated under the very provisions of section 1 (5) the holding of elections under the Act in spite
'()f the fact that the Act had not come into force in a
particular area. Ordinarily the statute enacted by a
State Legislature comes into force as soon as it receives
1 954
Sakhawat Ali
v.
The State of
Orissa
Bhagwati].
1008
1954
Sakhawat Ali
v.
The State of
Orissa
Bhagwati].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955J
the assent of the Governor. Section 1 (3) of the Act
however postpones the commencement of the Act
which means that section 1 (3) came into operation
immediately the Governor gave his assent to the Act•.
Section 1(5) is nothing but a proviso to section 1(3)
and must be regarded also to have come into operation
simultaneously with section 1 (3). Section 1 (5) having
thus come into force at once on the Act having received
the assent of the Governor on the 7th November, 1950,.
if elections were to be held under the Act before the
rest of the Act came into force in any particular area,.
all incidental steps for the holding of such elections
were certainly contemplated to be taken and those
steps which would be thus taken in anticipation of the
Act coming into force in a particular area were certainly authorised by the terms of section 1(5) by necessary implication, because no elections could be held
unless all the preliminary iteps for holding the same
were taken. It would be necessary for holding elections
to prescribe the residential qualification, to distribute the·
wards, to fix the numbers of Councillors and of reserved
seats, to frame election rules with reference to the filing of nominations, the scrutiny of the nomination
papers and also the holding of elections. All these preliminary steps would ·have to be taken if the election&
were to be held and section 1(5) clearly contemplated'
the taking of these steps in authorising elections to be
held under the Act.
No doubt the Act was not to be in force in a particular area until the relevant notification was issued by
the State Government and until the Act came into·
force the disqualifications prescribed in section 16(1) of
the Act would not normally attach to candidates for
election. The election rules also would be framed in
exercise of the power reserved under the Act and if the
Act had not come into force much less could the election rules come into operation and bind the candidates ..
This argument could have availed the appellant if the
State Legislature had not enacted section 1(5) of the
Act and the defect could not have been cured by the
provisions of section 23 of the Orissa General Clauses
Act ( Orissa Act I of 1937) which was relied upon by
l
S.C.R.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1009
the respondent. That section only enables the making
of rules or bye-laws or the issue of the preliminary
orders in anticipation of the Act coming into force,
which rules, bye-laws or orders however would not
come into effect till the commencement of the Act. The
clear provisions of section 1(5) of the Act however expressly empowered the State Government to hold elections and thereby validated all the preliminary steps
taken for the purpose of holding such election, the only
reservation made being that even though the election
under the Act be held such election was not to take
effect till the Act came into force in the particular area.
This contention of the appellant therefore fails.
The contention that the disqualification prescribed in
section 16(1) (ix) violates the fundamental rights of the
appellant under article 14 and article 19(1) (g) is equally untenable. Article 14 forbids class legislation but
does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation. That classification however cannot
be arbitrary but must rest upon some real and substantial distinction bearing a reasonable and just
relation to the things in respect of which the classification is made. In other words the classification must
have a reasonable relation to the object or the purpose
sought to be achieved by the impugned legislation.
The classification here is of the legal practitioners who
are employed on payment on behalf of the Municipality or act against the Municipality and those legal
practitioners are disqualified from standing as candidates for election. The object or purpose to be achieved
is the purity of public life, which object would certainly
be thwarted if there arose a situation where there was
a conRict between interest and duty. The possibility
of such a conflict can be easily visualised, because if a
Municipal Councillor is employed as a paid legal practitioner on behalf of the Municipality there is a likelihood
of his misusing his position for the purposes of obtaining Municipal briefs for himself and persuading the
Municipality to sanction unreasonable fees. Similarly,
if he was acting as a legal practitioner against the
Municipality he might in the interests of his client
misuse any knowledge which he might have obtained ·
1 954
Sakhawat Ali
v.
The State of
Orissa
Bhagwati J.
1010.
1 954
:Sakhawat Ali
v.
The State of
Orissa
_}Jhagwati:J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
11955]
as a Councillor through his access to the Municipal
records or he might sacrifice the interests of the Municipality for those of his clients. No doubt having regard
to the best traditions of the profession very few legal
practitioners would stoop to such tactics, but the
Legislature in its wisdom thought it desirable to eliminate any possibility of a conflict between interest and
duty and aimed at achieving this object or purpose by
prescribing the requisite disqualification. The classification thus would certainly have a reasonable relation
to the object or purpose sought to be achieved.
It was however urged that besides this category there
are also other categories where there would be a possibility of conflict between interest and duty and that
in so far as they were not covered by the disqualifications prescribed by section 16 ( 1) of the Act the provision disqualifying the category to which the appellant
belonged
was
discriminatory. It was particularly
pointed out that a client who had a litigation against
the Municipality was not prevented from standing as
a candidate for election whereas the legal practitioner
who held a brief against the Municipality was disqualified, though the ban against both these categories
could be justified on ground of avoidance of conflict
between interest and duty. The simple answer to this
contention is that legislation enacted for the achievement of a particular object or purpose need not be all
embracing. It is for the Legislature to determine what
categories it would embrace within the scope of legislation and merely because certain categories which would
stand on the same footing as those which are covered
by the legislation are left out would not render
legislation which has been enacted in any manner
discriminatory and violative of the fundamental right
guaranteed by article 14 of the Constitution.
The right of the appellant to practise the profession
of law guaranteed by article 19( 1) (g) cannot be said to
have been violated, because in laying down the
disqualification in section 16(1) (ix) of the Act· the
Legislature does not prevent him from practising. his
profession of law but it only lays down that if he wants
f
,
r
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1011
to stand as a candidate for election he shall not either
be employed as a paid legal practitioner on behalf of
the municipality or act as a legal practitioner against
the Municipality. There is no fundamental right in
any person to stand as a candidate for election to the
Municipality. The only fundamental right which is
guaranteed is that of practising any profession or
carrying on any occupation, trade or business. There
is no violation of the latter right in prescribing the
disqualification of the type enacted in section 16(1) (ix)
of the Act. If he wants to stand as a candidate for
election it is but proper that he should divest himself
of his paid brief on behalf of the Municipality or the
brief against the Municipality in which event there will
be certainly no bar to his candidature. Even if it be
taken as a restriction on his right to practice his profession of law, such restriction would be a reasonable
one and well within the ambit of artl.Cle 19 clause 5.
Such restriction would be a reasonable one to impose
in the interests of the general public for the preservation of purity in public life. We therefore see no substance in this contention of the appellant also.
The appeal accordingly fails and stands dismissed
with costs.
.1954
Sakhawat Ali
v.
The State of Orissa·
Bhagwati].
Appeal dismissed.
P. ·JOSEPH JOHN
1954
ti.
Nov1m#r25
THE STATE OF TRAVANCORE-COCHIN.
[MEHAR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J., MuKHERJEA,
S. R. DAs, VIVIAN BosE, BHAGWATI, JAGANNADHADAS
and VENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.]
Constitution of India, Arts. 166, 311, 320-0pportunity to show
cause-Consultation with Public Services · Commission-E:ctent ofTravancore Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, (Act XI of 1132)-"'0ur
Government"-Meaning of-Covenant of United Staie of TravancoreCochin-Article 20-Application of.
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