ASSAM BENGAL CEMENT CO. LTD. versus THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,WEST BENGAL
Supreme Court of India | Decided 11 November 1954 | [1955] 1 S.C.R. 972 | 1954 INSC 110
Key facts
- Decided
- 11 November 1954
- Bench
- MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI, T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR
- Bench size
- 4
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 162/1952
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1955] 1 S.C.R. 972
- Neutral citation
- 1954 INSC 110
Text of the judgment
'l72
1954
MaMsh Prasad
v.
Tlle$fatf!of
Ult., I+a¢ah
J•gtµ1nadhadas ].
[1955J
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Code. On the material we are not satisfied that there
is any reason to reverse the findings of the courts belmf
that the sanction is valid.
All the contentions raised before us are untenable.
This appeal must accordingly fail. It has been represented to us that the appellant who has been refused
bail by this court when leave to appeal was granted but
has been granted bail subsequently has already served
nearly six months of imprisonment in the intervening
period, that he is a young man and has lost his job.
In the circumstances we consider that it is not necessary to send him back to jail. The result, therefore, is
that the appeal is dismissed subject to the modification
of sentence of imprisonment. We reduce the sentence
of imprisonment to the period already undergone. The
sentence of fine stands.
,[
.
•
Appeal dismissed
ASSAM BENGAL CEMENT CO. LTD.
f),
THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,
WEST BENGAL
[MEHAR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J., s. R. DAS,
BHAGWATI and VENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.J
Indian
Income-tax Act (XI of I922), s,
expenditure-Revenue
between the two.
expenditure-Meaning
10(2)(xv)-Capital
of
and
distinction
Section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, uses the
term 'capital expenditure' for which no allowance is given to the
assessee. The term 'capital expenditure' is used as contrasted with
the term 'revenue expenditure' in respect of which the assessee is
entitled to allowance under section 10(2) (xv) of the Act.
As pointed out by the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in
Benarsidas fagannath, In re [(1946) 15 l.T.R. 185], it is not easy
to define the term 'capital expenditure' in the abstract or to lay
down any g~neral and satisfactory test to discriminate between a
capital ancf_ a revenue expenditure. Though it is not easy to reconcile al\ the decided i;:ases on the subject, as each case had been
decided on its peculiar fac;ts, so1ne broad principles could be
\_ "
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
973
deduced from what the learned judges have laid down from time to
time:
( 1) Outlay is deemed to be capital when it is made for the
initiation of a business, for extension of a business, or for a substantial replacement of equipment: vide Lord Sands in Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Granite City Steamship Company
([ 1927] 13 T. C. I) and City of London Contract Corporation v.
Styles ([1887] 2. T. C. 239).
(2) Expenditure may be treated as properly attributable to
capital when it is made not only once and for all, but with a view
to bringing into exi~tence an asset or an advantage for the enduring benefit of a trade: vide Viscount Cave, L.C., in Atherton v.
British Insulated and Helsby Cables Ltd. ([1926] 10 T.C. 155). If
what is got rid of by a lump sum payment is an annual business
expense chargeable against revenue, the lump sum payment
should equally be regarded as a business expense, but if the lump
sum payment brings in a capital asset, then that puts the
business on another footing altogether. Thus, if labour saving
machinery was acquired, the cost of such acquisition cannot be
deducted out of the profits by claiming that it relieves the annual
labour bill, the b_usiness has acquired a new asset, that is, machinery.
The expressions 'enduring benefit' or 'of a permanent
character" were introduced to make it clear that the asset or the
right acquired must have enough durability to justify its being
treated as a capital asset.
>-
__,I
-
I
( 3) Whether for the purpose of the expenditure, any capital was withdrawn, or, in other words, whether the object of incurring the expenditure was to employ what was taken in as capital
of the business. Again, it is to be seen whether the expenditure
incurred was part of the fixed capital of the business or part of its
circulating capital. Fixed capitai is what the owner turns to profit
by keeping it in his own possession. Circulating or floating capital is what he makes profit of by parting with it or letting
it change masters. Circulating capital is capital which is turned
over and in the process of being turned over yields profit or loss.
Fixed capital, on the other hand, is not involved directly in that
process and remains unaffected by it.
One has got to apply these criteria, one after the other from
the business point of view and come to the conclusion whether on
a fair appreciation of the whole situation the expenditure incurred
in a particular case is of the nature of capital expenditure er
revenue expenditure in which latter event only it would be a
deductable allowance under section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Incometax Act, 1922. The question has all along been considered to be
a question of fact to be determined by the Income-tax Authorities
on an application of the broad principles laid down above and the
Courts of law wou:ld not ordinarily interfere with such findin,gs of
1 954
Assam Bengal
Cement Co. Lld.
v.
Commissioner of
lncomr.-tax,
. West Bengal
BhagwatiJ.
974
1 954
Assam Beng'al
· -Cement Co. Ltd.
v.
Commissioner· of
Income-tax,_
We.st Bengal.
BhagwatiJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
fact if they have been arrived at on a proper application of those
principles.
The assessee acquired from the Government of Assam a lease
for 20 ye::irs (with a clause for renewal) in respect of certain limestone quarries situated in Khasi and Jaintia Hills. In addition to
the rents and royalties for lease the assessee as the lessee had to
·pay two further sums as 'protection fees' under the covenants contained in clauses 4 and 5 of the lease. Under clause 4 the portection was in respect of another group of quarries called the Durgasii
area, and the lessor undertook not to grant for this area any lease,
permit or prospecting licence regarding limestone to any other
party except with a condition that no lin1cstone should be used for
the manufacture of cement.
This protection was given in con:.
sideration of a sum of Rs. 5,000 annually payable by the assissee
during the whole period of the lease. Under clause S a further
protection was given by the lessor to the lessee in respect of the
whole of the Khasi and Jaintia Hills District for which lessee
was to pay annually Rs. 35,000 to the lessor for 5 years. According
to these covenants the assessee in his capacity as the lessee paid
the lessor a sum of Rs. 40,000 for the accounting years 1944-45 and
•
•
..
1945-46.
Held, that the sum of Rs. 40,000 was a capital expenditure
inasmuch as it was incurred for the acquisi.tion of an asset or
advantage of an enduring nature for the whole of the business and
was no part of the working or operational expenses for carrying on
the business of the assessee. Accordingly the payment of Rs. 40,000
was not an allowable deduction under section 10(2)(xv) of the
Indian lncome-tax Act, 1922.
Countess Wai·wick Steamship Co. Ltd. v. Ogg ([1924] 2 K.B.
292), City of London Contract Corporation v. Styles ( [ 1887] 2 T.C.
239), Vallambrosa Rubber Co .. Ltd. v. Farmer ([1910] 5 T.C. 529),
Ounsworth (Surveyor of Taxes) v. Vickers Limited ([1915] 6 T.C.
671), Atherton v. British Insulated and Helsby Cables, Ltd. ([1925]
10 T.C. 155), Usher's case ([1915] 6 T.C. 399), John Smith & Son v.:
Moore (H. M. Inspector of Taxes), ([1921] 12 T.C. 256), Anglo-Persian Oil Co. v. Dale ([1932] 1 K.B. 124), Golden Horse Shoe (New)
Ltd. v. Thurgood (H. M. Inspector of Taxes), ([1933] 18 T.C. 280).
Van Den Berghs, Limited v. Clark (H. M. Inspector of Taxes) ([1934]
19 'f.C. 390), Tata Hydro~Electri"c Agencies, Limited, Bombay v.
Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay Presidency and Aden ( [ 1937]
L.R. 64 LA. 215), Sun ·Newspapers Ltd. and the Associated Neivs-,
papers Ltd. v. The Federal Commissioner of Taxation ([1938] 61
C.L.R. 337), Munshi Guiab Singh and Sons v. Commissioner of
Income-tax ([1945] 14 l.T.R. 66), Con1missio11er of Income-tax,
Bombay v. Century Spinning Hleaving and Manufacturing Co. Ltd.
([1946] 15 l.T.R. 105), /agat Bus Service Saharanpur v. Commis-,
sioner of Income-tax, U.P. & Ajmer Merwara ([1949] .17 l.T.R. 13),
Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay v. Finlay Mills Ltd., ([1952 J
.S.C.R. 11), Commissioner of Income-tax v. Piggot Chapman & Co •.
,
S.C.R.
SUPREME ·COURT REPORTS
975
([1949] 17 I.T.R. 317) and Henriksen (Inspector of Taxes) v.
Grafton Hotel L.td. ((1942] 2 K.B. 184), referred to.
Benarsidas /agannath, In re, ([1946] 15 I.T.R. 185), approved.
"
•. > ).'
--
y
CIVIL APPELLATE JuRISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
162 of 1952.
Appeal from the Judgment and Order dated the 7th
day of June, 1951, of the High Court of Judicature at
Calcutta in Income-tax Reference No. 60 of 1950 arising
out of the Order dated the 22nd day of November,
1949, of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in LT.A.
Nos. 1026 and 1027 of 1948-49.
N. C. Chatterjee for the appellant.
Porus A. Mehta for the respondent.
1954. November, 11. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by,
BHAGWATI J.-This appeal from the judgment and
Qrder of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta with
leave under section 66-A (2) of the Indian Income-tax
Act raises an interesting question as to the line of
-demarcation between capital expenditure and revenue
expenditure.
On the 14th November, 1938, the appellant company acquired from the Government of Assam a lease
of certain limestone quarries, known as the Komorrah
quarries situated in the Khasi and Jaintia Hills District
for the purpose of carrying on the manufacture of
cement. The lease · was for 20 years commencing on the
1st November, 1938, and ending on the 31st October,
1958, with a clause for renewal for a further term of 20
years. The rent reserved was a half-yearly rent certain
<>f Rs. 3,000 for the first two years and thereafter a
half-yearly rent certain of Rs. 6,000 with the provision
for payment of further royalties in certain events. In
:addition to these rents and royalties two further sums
were payable under the special covenants contained in
dauses 4 and 5 of the lease as "protection fees".
Under clause 4 the protection was in respect of another
group of quarries called the Durgasil area, the lessor
undertaking not to grant any lease, permit or prospecting licence regarding the limestone to any other _party
1954
Assam Bengal
Cement Co. Ltd.
v.
.Commissioner. of
Income.tax,
West Bengal.
Bhagwati].
976
1 954
Assam lJf:ngal
Cement Co. Lid.
v.
Commissiqnqr of
Income-tax,
'Wt'st Bengal.
Bhagwati].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1955);
therein without a condition that no limestone should
be used for the manufacture of cement in consideration,
of a sum of Rs. 5,000 payable annually during the
whole period of the lease. Under clause 5 a further
protection was given in respect of the whole of the
Khasi and Jaintia Hills District, a similar undertaking
being given by the lessor in consideration of a sum of
Rs. 35,000 payable annually but only for 5 years from
the 15th November, 1940.
In the accounting years 1944-45 and 1945-46 the·
company paid its lessor sums of Rs. 40,000 in accord-·
ance with these two covenants and claimed to deduct.
the sums in the computation of its business profits.
under the provisions of section 10(2) (xv) of the Incometax Act in the assessments for the assessment years.
1945-46 and 1946-47. The Income-tax Officer, the
Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the AppellateTribunal rejected the contention of the company and"
the following question, as ultimately reframed, was at·
the instance ·of the company referred by the Tribunal
to the High Court for its decision :"Whether, in the circumstances of the case, the·
two sums of Rs, 5,000 and Rs. 35,000 paid under
clauses 4 and 5 of the deed of the 14th November, 1938,
were rightly disallowed as being expenditure of a·
capital nature and so not allowable under section 10(2)
(xv) of the Indian Income-tax Act".
The High Court answered the question in the affir-mative and hence this appeal.
Clauses. 4 and 5 of the deed of lease may be here set
out:4. The lessee shall pay to the lessor Rs. 5,000·
(Rupees five thousand) only annually during the
period of the lease on November 15th starting from
November 15th, 1938, as a protection fee. In consideration of that protection fee the lessor undertakes not to··
allow any person or company any lease permit orprospecting licence for limestone in the group of·
quarries as described in Schedule 2 and delineated in
the plan thereto annexed and therein coloured blue·
called the Durgasil area without a condition in such1
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.
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y
,
S.C.R.
,. /
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
977
lease permit or prospecting licence that no limestone
shall be used for the ma;mfacture of cement.
5. Besides the above protectiori fee the lessee sh<tll
pay to the lessor annually the sum of Rs. 35,000
(Rupees thirty five thousand) only for five years start·
ing from the 15th day of November, 1940, as a further
protection fee so long as the total amount of limestone
quarried by the lessee in a ·year does not exceed
22,00,000 maunds per year whether quarried in the
area of this lease or elsewhere or obtained by purchase
from other quarries in the Khasi and Jaintia Hills by
the lessees. Jf, however, in any year the total amount
of limestone converted into cement at the lessee's
Sylhet Factory exceed 22,00,000 maunds the lessee will
be entitled to an abatement at the rate of Rs. 20 for
every 1,000 ma,1,mds quarried in excess of 22,00,000
maunds and the lessee shall pay the sum of Rs. 35,000
less the abatement calculated on the basis hereinbefore
mentioned. Limestone which is not converted into
c.ement at the lessee's factory in Sylhet district will
not entitle the lessee to any abatement in the protection fee. The lessor in consideration of the said
payment undertakes not to allow any person or company any lease permit or prospecting licence for limestone in the whole of Khasi and Jaintia Hills district
withou1t a condition in such lease permit or. prospecting
licence that no limestone extracted shall be used
directly or indirectly for the manufacture of cement.
The lessor will be empowered to terminate this agreement for the payment of a protection fee at any time
after it has run for 5 years by giving six months' notice
in writing by registered letter addressed to 11, Clive
Street, Calcutta but the lessee will not be entitled to
terminate this agreement during the currency of the
lease except with the consent of the lessor.
It is not clear as to what was meant by the last
provision contained in clause 5, the lessee in the event
of his having paid the sum of Rs. 35,000 for the 5 years
having nothing else to do but enjoy the benefit of the
covenant on the part of the lessor during the StJbSe·
quent period of the lease. This provision is however
immaterial for our purposes.
1 954
Assam Bengai
Cement Co. Ltd.
v.
f;ommissioner of
lncome~tax,
West Bengal.
· Bhagwati ].
978
Assam Bengal
<Jement Co. Ltd.
v.
Commissioner ef
lncome·tax,
.West Bengal.
Bhagwati].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
The line of demarcation between capi.tal expenditure
and revenue expenditure is very thin and le;uned
Judges in England have from time to time pointed out
the difficulties besetting that task. Lord Macnaghten
in Dovey v. Cory('), administered the following
warning:"I do not think it desirable for any tribunal to do that
which Parliament has abstained from doing-that is, to
formulate precise rules for the guidance or embarrassment of business men in the conduct of business
affairs. There never has been, and I think there
never will be, mnch difficulty in dealing with any particular case on its own facts and circumstances; and,
speaking for myself, I rather doubt the wisdom of
attempting to do more."
Rowlatt J. also expressed himself much to the same
effect in Countess Warwick Steamship Co. Ltd. v. Ogg(2):
"It is very difficult, as I have observed in previous
cases of this kind, following the highest possible authority, to lay down any general rule which is both sufficiently accurate and sufficiently exhaustive to cover
all or even a great number of possible cases, and I shall
not attempt to lay down any such rule."
Certain broad tests have however been attempted to
be laid down and the earliest was the one indic;.ted in
the following observations of Bowen L.J. in the course
of the argument in City of London Contract Corporation
v. Styles(') :"You do not use it 'for the purpose of' your concern, which means, for the purpose of carrying on your
concern, but you use it to acquire the concern."
The expenditure in the acquisition of the concern
would be capital expenditure ; the expenditure in
carrying on the concern would be revenue expenditure.
Lord Dunedin in Vallambrosa Rubber Co., Ltd. v.
Farmer ( '), suggested another criterion at page 536 :-.
"Now, I don't say that this consideration is absolutely final or determinative, but in a rough way . I
think it is not a bad criterion of what is capital
\1) [1901] A.C. 477, 488.
(2) [1924] 2 K.B. 292. 298.
(3) (1887) 2 T. C. 239, 243.
(4) (1910) 5 T.C. 529, 536.
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S.C.R.
y
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
979
expenditure as against what is income expenditure to
say that capital expenditure is a thing that is going
to be spent once and for all, and income expenditure is
a thing that is going to recur every year."
This test was adopted by Rowlatt J. in Ounsworth
(Surveyor of Taxes) v. Vickers Ltd. (1), and after quoting the above passage from the speech of Lord Dunedin
he observed that the real test was between expenditure
which was made to ~meet a continuous demand for expenditure as opposed to an expenditure which was
made once for all. He however suggested in the course
of his judgment another view-point and that was whether the particular expenditure could be put against
any particular work or whether it was to be regarded
as an enduring expenditure to serve the business as a
whole, thus laying the foundation for the test prescribed by Viscount Cave L.C. in Atherton's case (2).
Atherton v. British Insulated and Helsby Cables
Ltd. (1 ), laid down what has almost universally been
accepted as the test for determining what is capital
expenditure as distinguished from revenue expenditure.
Viscount Cave L.C. there observed at page 192 :. "But there remains the question, which I have
found more difficult, whether apart from the express
prohibitions, the sum in question is (in the words used
by Lord Summer in Usher's case ( 8 ), a proper debit item
to be charged against incomings of the trade when
computing the profits of it ; or, in other words, whether it is in substance a revenue or a capital expenditure. This appears to me to be a question of fact
which is proper to be decided by the Commissioners
upon the evidence brought before them in each case ;
but where, as in the present case, there is no express
finding by the Commissioners upon the point, it must
be determined by the Courts upon the materials which
are available and with due regard to the principles
which have been laid down in the authorities. Now,
in Vallambrosa Rubber Company v. Farmer (4). Lord
Dunedin, as Lord President of the Court of Session,
expressed the opinion that "in a rough way" it was
(1) (1915J 6 T.C. 67i.
(2) (1925) IO T.C. 155.
(3) (1914) 6 T,C. 399·
(4) (1910) 5 T.C. 529, 536.
.lg54
·Assam Bengal
Cement Co. Lttf.
\".
Commissioner oI
Income~tax,
.West Bengal.
Bhagwati].
980
1954
Assam &ngal
CaMnt Co. Ltd.
v.
Commiulontr of
lncumt-tdx,
WtJt Btngal.
BhagwatiJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
"not a bad criterion of what is capital expenditure as
against what is income expenditure to say that capital
expenditure is a thing that is going to be spent once
and for all and income expenditure is a thing which is
going to recur every year"; and no doubt this is often
a material consideration. But the criterion suggested
is not, and was obviously not, intended by Lord
Dunedin to be a decisive one in every case ; for it is
easy to imagine many cases in which a payment, though
made "once and for all", would be properly chargeable
against the receipts for the year....... But when an expenditure is made, not only once and for all but with
a view to bringing into existence an asset or an advantage for the enduring benefit of a trade, I think that
there is very good reason (in the absence of special
circumstances leading to an opposite conclusion) for
treating such an expenditure as properly attributable
not to revenue but to capital."
Viscount Haldane however in John Smith & Son v.
Moore (H. M. Inspector of Taxes) ('),suggested another
test and that was the test of fixed or circulating capital,
though even there he observed that it was not necessary to draw an exact line of demarcation between the
fixed and circulating capital. The line of demarcation
between fixed and circulating capital could not be
defined more prec{sely than in the description of
Adam Smith of fixed capital as what the owner turns
to profit by keeping it in his own possession, and circulating capital as what he makes profit of by parting
with it and letting it change masters.
This test was adopted by Lord Hanworth M.R.
in Anglo-Persian Oil Co. v. Dale (' ), where he
observed:"I am inclined to think that the question whether
the money paid is provided from the fiJ>ed or the
circulating capital comes_ as near to accuracy as can be
suggested.
Lord Cave's test, that where money is spent for an
enduring benefit it is capital, seems to leave open
doubts as to what is meant by "enduring''.
. ...... .
(1) (1921) 12 'l'.C. 266 ;282.
f. J
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•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
981
It seems rather that the cases of Hancock (1) and of
Mitchell v. B. W. Noble, Ltd. (2) and of Mallet v.
Staveley Coal & Iron Co. (3), give illustrations that the
test of fixed or circulating capital is the true one ; and
where, as in this case, the expenditure is to bring back
into the hands of the company a necessary ingredient
of their existing business-important, but still ancillary
and necessary to the business which they carry onthe expenditure ought to be debited to the circulating
capital rather than to the fixed capital, which is employed in and sunk in the permanent-even if wasting
-assets of the business."
This preference of his was reiterated by Lord
Hanworth M.R. in Golden Horse Shoe (New) Ltd. v.
'Thurgood (H. M. Inspector of Taxes) ( 4 ) : "The above cases serve to establish the difficulty
of the question rather than to affirm any principle to
be applied in all cases. Indeed, in the last case cited,
Atherton v. British Insulated and Helsby Cables Ltd. ( 5)
Lord Cave says that a payment 'once and for all'-a
test which had been suggested by Lord Dunedin in
Vallambrosa Rubber Company v. Farmer ( 8 ), was not
true in all cases, and he found authority for that statement in Smith v. Incorporated Council of Law Reporting
for England and Wales (7) and the Anglo-Persian case( 8 )
already referred to is another. The test of circulating,
as contrasted with fixed capital, is as good a test in
most cases, to my mind, as can be found ; but that
involves the question of fact, was the outlay in the
particular case from fixed or circulating capital ?"
Romer L.J. at page 300 pointed out the difficulties
in applying this test also.
"Unfortunately, however, it is not always easy to
determine whether a particular asset belongs to the
one category or the other. It depends in no way upon
what may be the nature of the asset in fact or in law.
Land may in certain circumstances be circulating
..J
'·
(1) [1919] I K.B. 25.
(2) [1927] I K.B. 719.
(3) [1928] 2. K.B. 405.
(4.) [1933] 18 T.C. 280, 298.
(5) '[1925] IO T.C. 155, 192 .
16) [1910] 5 T.C. 529.
(7) [1914] 3 K.B. 674.
(8) [1932] l K.B. 124·
1 954
Assam Bengal
Cement Co. Ltd.
v.
Commissioner ef
lru;ome-tax,
West Bengal•
Bhagwati].
982
1954
A,ssa~ Beng~l
Cement Co. Ltd.
v.
Commissioner of
, Income-tax,
West Bengal.
BhagwatiJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955i
capital. A i:hattel or a i:hose in ai:tion may be fixed
i:apital. The determining factor must be the natur.e of
the trade in which the asset is employed. The land
upon which a manufacturer carries on his business is
part of his fixed capital. The land with which a dealer
in real estate carries on his business is part of his
circulating capital. The machinery with which a
manufacturer makes the ·articles that he sells is part of
his fixed capital. The machinery that a dealer in
machinery buys and sells is part of his circulating
capital, as is the coal that a coal merchant buys and
sells in the course of his trade. So, too, is the coal that
a manufacturer of gas buys and from which he extracts
his gas."
In Van Den Berghs, Limited v. Clark (H. M. Inspector of Taxes) ('), Lord Macmillan however veered round
to Viscount Cave's test and expressed his disapproval
of the test of fixed and circulating capital. He reviewed
the various authorities and stated :
"My
Lords, if the numerous
decisions are
examined and classified, they will be found to exhibit
a satisfactory measure of consistency with Lord Cave's
principle of discrimination."
As regards the test of fixed and circulating capital
he observed, at page 432 :"! have not overlooked the criterion afforded by
the economists' differentiation between fixed and circulating capital which Lord Haldane invoked in fohn
Smith & Son v. Moore('), and on which the Court of
Appeal relied in the present case, but I confess that
1 have not found it very helpful."
The Privy Council in Tata Hydro-Electric Agencies,
Income-tax,
Limited, Bombay v. Commissioner of
Bombay Presidency and Aden('), pronounced at page
226 :"What is 'money wholly and exclusively laid out
for the purposes of the trade' is a question which must
be determined upon the. principles of ordinary comJ
mercial trading. It is ·necessary, accordingly, to attend
(1) (1935) 19 T.C. 390.
(2) (•921) 12 T.C. 266.
(3) (1937) L. R. 64 I.A. 215.
,.,
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
983
to the true nature of the expenditure, and to ask
oneself the question, 1s 1t a part of the company's
working expenses; is it expenditure laid out as part of
the process of profit earning ?"
In the case before them they came to the conclusion
that the· obligation to make the payments was undertaken by the appellants in consideration of their
acqu.isition of the right and opportunity to earn profits,
i.e., of the right to conduct the business and not for the
purpose of producing profits in the conduct of the business. The distinction was thus made between the acquisition of an incq_me-earning asset and the process ~f
the earning of the income. Expenditure in the acquisition of that asset was capital expenditure and expenditure in the process of the earning of the profits was
revenue expenditure. This test really is akin to the
one laid down by Bowen L.J. in The City of London
Contract Corporation Ltd. v. Styles(1).
Dixon J. expressed a similar opinion in Sun Newspapers Limited and the Associated Newspapers Limited
v. The Federal Commissioner of Taxation( 2 ), at page
360 :-
•
"But in spite of the entirely different forms,
material and immaterial, in which it may be expressed,
such sources of income contain or consist in what has
been called a 'profit-yielding subject,' the phrase of
Lord Blackburn in United Collieries Ltd. v. Inland
Revenue Commissioners( 3 ). As general conceptions it
may not be difficult to distinguish between the profit
~ j . yielding subject and the process of operating it. In the
. · same way expenditure and outlay upon establishing,
replacing and enlarging the profit-yielding subject may
in a general way appear to be of a nature entirely
different from the continual flow of working expenses
which are or ought to be supplied continually out of
the returns of revenue. The latter can be considered,
estimated and determined only in relation to a period
or interval of time, the former as at a point of time.
For the one concerns the instrument for earning profits
(1} (.1887; 2 T.C. 239.
(2) (1938) 6I C.L.R. 337.
7-89 S.C. India/59
(3) (1930) S.C. 215, 220.
1954
Assam Bengal
Cement Co. Ltd.
v.
Commissioner of
Income-tax,
West Bengal.
Bhagwati].
984
1954
.Assam Bengal
Cement Co. Ltd.
v.
Commissioner of
Jncomt-tax,
West Bengal.
Bhagwati].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
and the other the continuous process of its use
employment for that purpose."
or
These are the three criteria adopted for distinguishing
capital expenditure from revenue expenditure though
it must be said that preponderance of opinion is to be
found in support of Viscount Cave's test as laid down
in Atherton's case(').
Viscount Cave's test has also been adopted almost
universally in. India: vide Munshi Gulab Singh &
Sons v. Commissioner of Income-tax(2), Commissioner of
Income-tax, Bombay v. Century Spinning, Weaving &
Manufacturing Co. Ltd.( 3 ), Jagat Bus Service, Saharanpur v. Commission'r of Income-tax, U. P. & Ajmer
Merwara(•), and Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay
v. Finlay Mills Ltd. (').
y
1
In Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay v. Century
Spinning,
Weaving
&
Manufacturing Co. Ltd.(3 ) ,
Chagla J. observed, at page 116 :"The legal touchstone which is almost invariably
applied is the familiar dictum of Viscount Cave in
Atherton's case(') .............. Romer L. J. felt that this
definition had placed the matter beyond all controversy
-see remarks in Anglo-Persian Oil Co.'s case( 0 ). But
Lord Macmillan in Van Den Bergh's case('), felt that
Romer L. J. had been unduly optimistic and the learned
Law Lord was of the opinion that the question whether
a particular expenditure fell on one side of the line or
other was a task of much refinement. But on the
whole I think that the definition of Viscount Cave is a
good working definition ; and if one were to supplement it with the definition suggested by Mr. Justice
Lawrence in Southern v. Borax Consolidated Ltd.(•),
whether an expenditure had in any way altered the
original character of the capital asset, we have a legal
principle which can be applied to any set of given
facts."
(1) (1925) rn T.C. 155·
(2) [1945] 14 I.T.R. 66.
(3) [1946] 15 I.T.R. rn5.
(4) [1949] 18 !.T.R. 13.
(5) [1952] S.C.R. II.
(6) [1932] 1 K.B. 124.
(7) (1935) 19 T.C. 390.
(8) [1942] 10 l.T.R. Suppl. 1, 6.
4
'I'
S.C.R.
-
•
,,.I
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
985
In Benarsidas Jagannath, In re( 1 ), a Full Bench of the
Lahore High Court attempted to reconcile all these
decisions and deduce.cl the following broad test
for distinguishing capital expenditure from revenue
expenditure. The opinion of the Full Bench was
delivered by Mr. Justice Mahajan as he then was, m
the terms following :
"It is not easy to define the term 'capital expenditure' in the abstract or to lay down any general and
satisfactory test to discriminate between a capital and
a revenue expenditure. Nor is it easy to reconcile all
the decisions that were cited before us for each case has
been decided on its peculiar facts. Some broad principles can, however, be deduced from what the learned
Judges have laid down from time to time. They are as
follows:1. Outlay is deemed to be capital when it is made
for the initiation of a business, for extension of a
business, or for a substantial replacement of equipment :
vide Lord Sands in Commissioners of Inland Revenue v.
Granite City Steamship Company( 2 ). In City of London
Contract Corporation v. Styles( 3), at page 243, Bowen L.J.
observed as to the capital expenditure as follows :
"You do not use it 'for the purpose of' your
concern, which means, for the purpose of carrying on
your concern, but you use it to acquire the concern."
2. Expenditure may be treated as properiy
attributable to capital when it is made not only once
and for all, but with a view to bringing into existence
an asset or an advantage for the enduring benefit of a
trade : vide Viscount Cave L. C. in Atherton v. British
Insulated and Helsby Cables Ltd.( 4 ). If what is got rid of
by a lump sum payment is an annual business expense
chargeable against revenue, the lump sum payment
should equally be regarded as a business expense, but
if the lump sum payment brings in a capital asset,
then that puts the business on another footing
altogether. Thus, if labour saving machinery was
acquired, the cost of such acquisition cannot be
(1) [1946] 15 I.T.R. 185.
(2) (1927) 13 T.C. 1, 14.
(3) (1887) 2 T.C. 239.
(4) (1925) 10 T.C. 155.
1 954
Assam Bengal
Cerrll!nt Co. IJd.
v.
Commis•ioner of
Income-tax,
We5tBengal.
BhagwatiJ.
986
1 954
Assam Bengal
Cement Co. Ltd.
v.
Commissioner of
· Income-tax,
West Bengal.
BhagwatiJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
deducted out of the profits by claiming that it relieves
the annual labour bill, the business has acquired a new
asset, that is, machinery.
The expressions 'enduring benefit' or 'of a permanent character' were introduced to make it clear
that the asset or the right acquired must have enough
durability to justify its being treated as a capital asset.
3. Whether for the purpose of the expenditure,
any capital was withdrawn, or, in other words, whether
the object of incurring the expenditure was to employ
what was taken in as capital of the business. Again,
it is to he seen whether the expenditure incurred was
part of the fixed capital of the business or part of its
circulating capital. Fixed capital is what the owner
turns to profit hy keeping it in his own possession.
Circulating or floating capital is what he makes profit
of hy parting with it or letting it change masters.
Circulating capital is capital which is turned over and
in the process of being turned over yields profit or loss.
Fixed capital, on the other hand, is not involved directly in that process and remains unaffected by it".
This synthesis attempted by the Full Bench of the
Lahore High Court truly enunciates the principles
which emerge from the authorities. In cases where the
expenditure is made for the initial outlay or for extension of a business or a substantial replacement of the
equipment, there is no doubt that it is capital expenditure. A capital asset of the business is either acquired
or extended or substantially replaced and that outlay
whatever he its source whether it is drawn from the
capital or the income of the concern is certainly in the
nature of capital · expenditure. The question however
arises for consideration where expenditure is incurred
while the business is going on and is not incurred either
for extension of the business or for the substantial
replacement of its equipment. Such' expenditure can
be looked at either from the point of view of what is
acquired or from the point of view of what is the source
from which the expenditure is incurred. If the expenditure is made for acquiring or bringing into existence
in asset or advantage for the enduring benefit of the
......
·-
S.C.R.
--
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
987
business it is properly attributable to capital and is of
the nature of capital expenditure. If on the other hand
it is made not for the purpose of bringing into existence
any such asset or advantage but for running the business or working it with a view to produce the profits it
is a revenue expenditure. If any such asset or advantage for the enduring benefit of the business is thus
acquired or brought into existence it would be immaterial whether the source of the payment was the
capital or the income of the concern or whether the
payment was made once and for all or was made
periodically. The aim and object of the expenditure
would determine the character of the expenditure whether it is a capital expenditure or a revenue expenditure.
The source or the manner of the payment would then
be of no consequence. It is only in those cases where
this test is of no avail that one may go to the test of
fixed or circulating capital and consider whether the
·expenditure incurred was part of the fixed capital of
the business or part of its circulating capital. If it was
part of the fixed capital of the business it would be of
the nature of capital expenditure and if it was part of
its circulating capital it would be of the nature of
revenue expenditure. These tests are thus mutually
exclusive and liave to be applied to the facts of each
particular case in the manner above indicated. It has
been rightly observed that in the great diversity of
human affairs and the complicated nature of business
operations it is difficult to lay down a test which would
apply to all situations. One has therefore got to apply
these criteria, one after the other from the business
point of view and come to the conclusion whether on a
fair appreciation of the whole situation the expenditure incurred in a particular case is of the nature of
capital expenditure or revenue expenditure in which
latter event only it would be a deductable allowance
under section 10(2) (xv) of the Income-tax Act. The
question has all along been considered to be a question
of fact to be determined by the Income-tax authorities
on an application of the broad principles laid down
above and the courts of law would not ordinarily
interfere with such findings of fact if they have
1 954
Assam Bengal
Ctment Co. Ltd.
v.
Commissioner of
Income-tax,
West Bengal
Bhagwati].
988
1954
Assam Bengal
Cement Co. lid.
v.
Commissioner of
lncume-tax,
Wist Bengal.
Bhagwati].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955J
been arrived at on a proper application of those
principles.
The expression "once and for all" used by Lord
Dunedin has created some difficulty ·and it has been '
contended that where the payment is not in a lump
sum but in instalments it cannot satisfy the test.
Whether a payment be ·in a lump sum or by instalments, what has got to be looked to is the character of
the payment. A lump sum payment can as well be
made for liquidating certain recurring claims which are
clearly of a revenue nature, and on the other hand
payment for purchasing a- concern which is prima facie
an expenditure of a capital nature may as well be
spread over a number of years and yet retain its
character as a capital expenditure. (Per Mukherjea J.
in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Piggot Chapman &
Co.(')). The character of the payment can be determined by looking at what is the true nature of the
asset which has been acquired and not by the fact whether it is a payment in a lump sum or by instalments.
As was otherwise put by Lord Greene M.R. in Henrik-.
sen (Inspector of Taxes) v. Grafton Hotel Ltd.(') :
"The thing that is paid for is of a permanent
quality although its permanence, being conditioned by
the length of the term, is shortlived. A payment of this
character appears to me to fall into the same class as
the payment of a premium on the grant of a lease, ·
which is admittedly not deductible".
The case of Tata Hydro-Electric Agencies. Ltd:,
Bombay v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay Presidency and Aden ( •) affords anothel' illustration of this
principle. It was observed there :"If the purchaser of a business undertakes to the
vendor as one of the terms of the purchase that he will •
pay a sum annually to a third party, irrespective of
whether the business yields any profits or not, it would
be difficult to say that the annual payments were made
solely for the purpose of earning the profits of the
business".
(1) [1949] 17 I.T.R. 317, 329.
(2) [1942] 2 K.B. 184.
(3) (1937) L.R. 64 I.A. 215.
~·.
~·
·•
S. C.R;
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
989
The expression "once and for all" is used to denote
an expenditure which is made once and for all for procuring an enduring benefit to the · business as distinguished from a recurring expenditure in the nature
of operational expenses.
The expression "enduring benefit" also has been
judicialiy interpreted. Romer L.J. in Anglo-Persian
Oil Company, Limited v. Dale(1) agreed with Rowlatt J.
that by enduring benefit is meant enduring in the way
that fixed capital endures :
"An expenditure on acquiring floating capital is
not made with a view to acquiring an enduring asset.
It is made with a view to acquiring an asset that may
be turned over in the course of trade at a comparatively
early date".
Latham C. J. observed in Sun Newspapers Ltd. &
Associated Newspapers Ltd. v. Federal Commissioner of
Taxation(2) :
"When the words 'permanent' or 'enduring' are
used in this connection it is not meant that the advantage which will be obtained will last for ever. The distinction which is drawn is that between more or less
recurrent expenses involved in running a business and
an expenditure for the benefit of the business as a
whole" ....... . e.g ...... . -"enlargement of the goodwill
of a company."-"permanent improvement i11 the
material or immaterial assets of the concern".
To the same effect are the observations of Lord
Greene M. R. in Henriksen (H. M. Inspector of Taxes)
v. Grafton Hotel Ltd.( 8) above referred to.
These are the principles which have to be applied in
order to determine whether in the present case the
expenditure incurred by the company was capital
expenditure or revenue expenditure. Under clause 4
of the deed the lessors undertook not to grant any
lease, permit or prospecting license regarding limestone
to any other party in respect of the group of quarries
called the Durgasil area without a condition therein
that no limestone shall be used for the manufacture of
(1) [1932] I K.B. 124, 146.
..
(2) (1938) 61 C.L.R. 337, 355·
(3) (1942) T.C. 24 453·
Assam Bengal
Cement Co. Ltd.
v.
Commissioner of
Income-tax,
West Bengal.
Bhagwati].
990
r954
. Assam Bengal
Cement Co. Ltd.
v.
Commissioner of
lncome·tax,
West Bengal.
Bhagwati].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
cement. The consideration of Rs. 5,000 per annum
was to be paid by the company to the lessor during the
whole period of the lease and this advantage or benefit
was to enure for the whole period of the lease. It was
an enduring benefit for the benefit of the whole of the
business of the company and came well within the test
laid down by Viscount Cave. It was not a lump sum
payment but was spread over the whole period of the
lease and it could be urged that it was a recurring payment. The fact however that it was a recurring payment was immaterial, because one had got to look to
the nature of the payment which in its turn was determined by the nature of the asset which the company
had acquired. The asset which the company had
acquired in consideration of this recurring payment
was in the nature of a capital asset, the right to carry
on its business unfettered by any competition from outsiders within the area. It was a protection acquired by
the company for its business as a whole. It was not a
part of the working expenses of tlie business but went
to appreciate the whole of the capital asset and make it
more profit yielding. The expenditure made by the
company in acquiring this advantage which was certainly an enduring advantage was thus of the nature
of capital expenditure and was not an allowable deduction under section 10(2) (xv) of the Income-tax Act.
The further protection fee which was paid by the
company to the lessor under clause 5 of the deed was
also of a similar nature. It wa; no doubt spread over
a period of 5 years, but the advantage which the company got as a result of the payment was to enure for
its benefit for the whole of the period of the lease unless determined in the manner provided in the last part
of the clause. It provided protection to the company
against all competitors in the whole of the Khasi and
Jaintia Hills District and the capital asset which the
company acquired under the lease was thereby appreciated to a CO!lsiderable extent.
The sum of
Rs. 35,000 agreed to be paid by the company to the
lessor for the period of 5 years was not a revenue expenditure which was made by the company for working the capital asset which it had acquired. It was no
J
,,.
" ...
\!
\
"\
..
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
991
_part of the working or operational expenses of the company. It was an expenditure made for the purpose of
:acquiring an appreciated capital asset which would no
doubt by reason of the undertaking given by the lessor
make the capital asset more profit yielding. The
period of 5 years over which the payments were spread
did not make any difference to the nature of the acquisition. It was none the less an acquisition of an advantage of an enduring nature which enured for the benefit
of the whole of the business for the full period of the
lease unless terminated by the lessor by notice as
prescribed in the last part of the clause. This again
was the acquisition of an asset or advantage of an
enduring nature for the whole of the business and was
of the na~ure of capital expenditure and thus was not
an allowable deduction under section 10(2) (xv) of the
Act.
We are therefore of the opinion that the conclusion
reached by the Income-tax authorities as well as the
High Co_urt in regard to the nature of the payments
was correct and the sums of Rs. 40,000 paid by the
company to the lessors during the accounting years
1944-45 and 1945-46 were not allowable deductions
under section 10(2) (xv) of the Act.
The appeal therefore fails and must be dismissed
with costs.
Appeal dismissed .
MUIR MILLS CO., LTD.
"·
SUTI MILLS MAZDOOR UNION, KANPUR.
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J., S. R. DAs,
BHAGWATI and VENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.]
Bonus -Meaning of-Necessary conditions for the demand
. thereof-Industrial claim-Principles for the grant of it-Social
Justice-Meaning of-Industrial Tribunals-Whether
Tribunal.<
within the meaning of Art. 136 of the Constitution.
The term bonus is applied to a cash payment made in addition
to wages.
It generally represents the cash incentive given conditionally on certain standards of attendance and efficiency being
attained.
1 954
Assam Bengal
Cement Co., Ltd.
v.
Commissioner of
Income-tax,
West Bengal.
Bhagwati],
1 954
November 19.
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