ANDERSON WRIGHT LTD versus MORAN AND COMPANY
Supreme Court of India | Decided 1 November 1954 | [1955] 1 S.C.R. 862 | 1954 INSC 109
Key facts
- Decided
- 1 November 1954
- Bench
- BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA, VIVIAN BOSE, B. JAGANNADHADAS
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 205/1953
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1955] 1 S.C.R. 862
- Neutral citation
- 1954 INSC 109
Text of the judgment
862
1954
,!{oJ;embtr I
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19551
ANDERSON WRIGHT LTD.
v.
MORAN AND COMPANY.
[MuKHERJEA, VIVIAN BosE and JAGANNADHADAS
JJ. J
Arbitration Act, 1940 (X of 1940), s. 34-Application under the
section for stay of legal proceedings-Necessary conditions-Fulfilment of-First essential pre-requisite for an order of stay-Binding
arbitration agreement between the parties-Incumbent upon theCourt to decide this point.
Held, that in order that a stay inay be granted under s. 34 of
the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940, it is necessary that the following conditions should be fulfilled :-
(I) The proceeding must have been commenced by a party to
an arbitration agreement against any other party to the agreement;
(2) the legal proceeding which is sought to be stayed must be
in respect of a matter agreed to be referred ;
(3) the applicant for stay must be a party to the legal proceeding and he must have taken no step in the proceeding after
appearance. It is also necessary that he should satisfy the court
not only that he is, but also was at the commencement of the
proceedings, ready and willing to do everything necessary for the
proper conduct of the arbitration ; and
( 4) the Court must be satisfied that there 1s no sufficient
reason why the matter should not be referred to an arbitration in
accordance with the arbitration agreement.
The first and essential pre-requisite to making an order of stay
under s. 34 of the Arbitration Act is that there is a binding arbitration agreement between the parties to the suit which is sought
to be stayed. The question \.vhether the dispute in the suit falls
within the arbitration clause really pre-supposes that there is such
agreement and in\'olves consideration of two matters, viz., (1)
what is the dispute in the suit and (2) what disputes the arbitration clause covers.
•
It is incuxnbent upon the Court, when invited to stay a suit
under s. 34 of the Indian Arbitration Act, to decide first of all
whether there is a binding agreen1ent for arbitration between the
parties.
If, in the present case, it is held that the arbitration agreement and the contr_act containing it were between the parties to
the suit, the dispute in the pre_sent suit would be one relating to
the rights and liabilities of the parties on the basis of the contract
itself and would come within the purview of the arbitration clause
..,t
S.C.R1
'1
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
863
'I-' worded as it is in the widest of terms. If, on the other hand, it is
held that the plaintiff was not a party to the agreement, the
application for stay must necessarily be dismissed.
Case sent back for the decision of the question whether the
respondent was or was not a party to the arbitration agreement.
Heyman v. Darr1Jins ([1942] A.C. 356), Khusiram v. Hanutmal
( (1948) 53 C.W.N. 505), A. M. Mair and Company v. Gordhandas
((1950] S.C.R. 792) and Pat1ram v. Kankarah Company ((1915)
;. I.L.R. 42 Cal. 1050) referred to.
Appeal
Civil
CIVIL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION :
No. 205 of 1953.
Appeal from the Judgment and Order dated the
24th February, 1953, of the High Court of Judicature
at Calcutta in Appeal from Original Order No. 19 of
1952, arising out of the Order dated the 23rd day of
August, 1951, of the High Court of Calcutta in its
Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction Matter No. 157 of
1951.
K. P. Khaitan, (S. N. Mul(herjea and Rajinder
Narain, with hiin) for the appellant.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, (,.-!.. N.
Sen, V. S. Sawhney and S. P. Varma, with him) for
the respondents.
1954. November 1. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
MuKHERJEA J.-This appeal is
directed against a
judgment of an appellate bench of the Calcutta High
Court, ·dated the 24th February, 1953, reversing, on
appeal, the judgment and order of a single Judge
sitting on the Original Side of that Court, passed on
an application under section 34 of the Arbitration Act.
The material facts are not in controversy and may be
shortly stated as follows :
On the 7th of July, 1950, the respondent, Moran
and Company Limited, passed two Bought Notes tu
the appellant company, couched in identical terms,
under which the appellant purchased 12,00,000 yards
of hessian cloth, 6,00,0JO yards under each contract,
on certain terms and conditions stated therein. The
delivery was to be made every month from January,
1951, at the rate of 1,00,000 yards per month under
17-88 S.C.Tndia/59
1954
Anderson Wri1ht
Ltd.
v.
Moran •nd
Company.
864
1 954·
Atidfrson IVright
Ltd.
v.
Moran Gnd
Compa1!V
MukherjeaJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955)
each of these notes and payments were to be made in
cash on delivery, each delivery being treated as a
separate and distinct contract. The Bought Notes
commenced thus :
"Dear Sirs,
We have this day Bought by your order and on
your account from our Principals."
The particulars of the goods, the price, the time of
delivery and other terms of the contract are then set
out and amongst the terms is an arbitration clause
worded as follows :
"All matters, questions, disputes, differences and/
or claims arising out of and/or concerning and/or
in connection with and/or in consequence of or relating to this contract, whether or not the obligations of either or both parties under this contract
be subsisting at the time of such dispute and whether
or not this contract has been terminated or purported
to be terminated or completed, shall be referred to
the arbitration of the Bengal Chamber of Comi:1erce
under the rules of its Tribunal o( Arbitration for the
time being in force and according to such rules the
arbitration shall be conducted.
The notes were signed by the respondent, Moran and
Company, describing themselves as brokers.
It is admitted that the goods covered by the Bought
Notes were delivered to the appellant in all the months
from January to June, 1951, with the exception of
the goods due to be delivered for the month of March,
1951. The appellant required from the respondent
delivery of goods in respect of the month of March
but the latter informed the appellant, by a letter dated
the 27th March, 1951, that its principals disowned any
liability in this respect as there was default on the
part of the appellant in not giving shipping instructions
for the said goods within the time mmtiot1ed ir1 the
contracts. The appellant denied any default on its
part and did not also accept the position that the
respondent had any principal, and on the 27th of
April, 1951, it sent its bills to the respondent claiming
Rs. 1,13,042-3-0 as damages for non-delivery of the
...' >
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
865
goods. As the respondent did not comply with this
demand, the appellant contemplated referring the
matter in dispute to the arbitration of the Bengal
Chamber of Commerce as provided in the contracts
and while it was preparing to take steps in that direction, the respondent, on the 11th of June, 1951, filed
a suit against the appellant in the Original Side ot the
Calcutta High Court (being Suit No. 2516 of 1951,) and
it is in respect of this suit that the application under
section 34 of the Arbitration Act has been made. It
was alleged in the plaint that the plaintiff acted merely
as broker and in that capacity brought about the two
contracts of sale and purchase evidence by the two
Bought Notes mentioned above, that the real seller
was a firm known as Gowarchand Danchand, and that
the plaintiff not being a party to the contract could
not incur any liability under its terms. There were
prayers in the plaint for a dechration that the plaint- \
iff was not a party to the said contracts and that it
had no liability under the same. There was a further
prayer for an injunction restraining the respondent from
claiming any damages in respect of the said contracts.
•
The writ of summons was served on the appellant
on the 23rd of June, 1951. On the 19th July, 1951, it
filed an application under section 34 of the Arbitration
Act praying that the proceedings in the suit may be
stayed in order that the matter in dispute between the
parties may be dealt with under the arbitration clause
contained in the contracts. The application was beard
by Das Gupta J. who allowed the prayer of the appiicant and stayed further proceedings in the suit. In
the opinion of the learned Judge ~he dispute in this
case was not whether there was any contract entered
into by and between the appellant and the respondent,
but whether the respondent, who admittedly passed
the two Bought Notes to the appelhnt, could be made
liable under the contract by reason of the fact that it
described itself as broker. The answer to this question
depended according to the learned Judge upon the
interpretation of the contract itself and the dispute
arising as it did out of or concerning or relating to the
1954
Andewn Wright
Ltd.
v.
Aforanand
Company
Mukherjea ].
866
1954
-'.ndlrson Wri::/d
Ltd.
v.
MCJran and
Company.
.11.fuklurjcaJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
f1955]
contracts would come within the purview of the arbitration clause.
Against· this judgment the respondent took an
appeal to the Appellate Division of the High Court
and the appeal was heard by a bench consisting of
By two separate
Chakravartti C. J. and Sarkar J.
judgments which concurred in the result, the Chief
Justice d.nd the other learned Judge allowed the appeal
and vacated the order for stay. It is against .this judgment that the appellant has come to this Court on the
strength of a certificate under article 133 ( 1) (a) of the
Constitution. The short point for our consider<.tion
is, whether on the facts of this case, the appellant is
entitled to an order unrler section 34 of the Arbitration
Act, staying the proceedings of the suit commenced by
the respondent.
Section 34 of the Arbitration Act is in these terms :
"Where any party to an arbitration agreement or
any person claiming under him commences any legal
proceedings against any other party to the agreement
or any person claiming under him in respect of any
matter agreed to be referred, any party to such legal
proceedings may, at any time before filing a written
statement or taking any other steps in tbe proceedings,
apply to the judicial authority before which the proceedings are pending to stay the proceedings ; and if
satisfied that there is no sufficient reason why the
matter should not be referred in accordance with the
arbitration agreement and tha.t the applicant was, at
the time when the proceedings were commenced, and
:f"
still remains, ready and willing to do all tl1ings necessary to the proper conduct of the arbitration, such '
authority may make an order staying the proceedings."
Thus in order that a stay may be granted under this
section, it is necessary that the following conditions
should be fulfilled :( 1) The proceeding must ha vc been commenced by
a party to an arbitration agreement against any othec
party to the agreement ;
(2) the legal proceeding which is sought to be
stayed must be in re£pect of a matter agreed to be
referred ;
...
S.C.R.
.,
....
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
86i
(3) the applicant for stay must be a party to the
legal proceedings and he must have taken no step in the
proceeding after appearance. It is also necessary that
he should satisfy the Court not only that he is but also
was at the commencement of the proceedings ready and
willing to Jo everything necessary for the proper conduct of the arbitration ; and
( 4) the Court must be satisfied that 'here is no
sufficient reason why the matter should not be referred
to an · arbitration in accordance with the arbitration
agreement.
The third condition can be taken to have been fulfilled on the facts of the present case, and the fourth is
one which is exclusively for the determination of the
Court. The controversy between the parties centres
round the other two conditions, namely, conditions (1)
and (2) ; and unless· the applicant for stay succeeds in
establishing that the respondent is a party to an arbitration agreement and that the subject-matter of dispute
in the suit is a matter coming within the scope of such
agreement, it cannot possibly ask the Court to order a
stay of the proceedings, under section 34 of the Arbitration Act. The learned Ju<lges of the appellate bench
of the High Court have taken the view that the only
matter in dispute between the parties to the suit is
whether the plaintiff was a party to the contract. It
was definitely alleged by the plaintiff that the contract
was not between it and the appellant but was one
between the appellant and a third party and since the
arbitration agreement is contained in the contract, it is
an agreement between those parties Qnly, which could
not bind or affect the plaintiff in any way. The dispute,
it is said, which is the subject-matter of the suit does
not arise under the contract and does not relate to it ;
it is outside the contract altogether and does not come
within the scope of the arbitration agreement. The
decision in the appeal therefore rests entirely on the
finding of the learned Judges that the matter in dispute
between the parties to the suit does not come within
the ambit of the arbitration clause. In view of this
decision the learned Judges did not consider it necessary to go into the first point as to whether in fact
-LI,.
1954
Andmon Wriz~t
v.
Moran and
Compan,,,
Mukherjeo. J.
868
1y;:i4
Andersdn Wright
Ltd.
v.
Moran and
C,,pmpan.:v.
1'.lukherjea J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19551
there was a binding arbitration agreement between the
parties to the suit. The learned Chief Justice no doubt
did in a manner consider that point also, but he
refrained from pronouncing any decision upon it, being
of opinion that a decision on this question which was
the only issue in the suit itself might prejuJicc the
parties and create a bar of res judicata against one or
the other.
\Ve think that on the facts of this case it was necessary for the learned judges of the appellate bench to
decide the question as to whether or not the plaintiff
in the suit which the applicant wants to stay was a
party to the arbitration agreement. This would haye
a material bearing on the decision of the other question
upon which the learned Judges rested their judgments.
The first and essential pre-requisite to making an
order of stay under section 34 of the Arbitration Act is
that there is a binding arbitration agreement between
the parties to the suit which is sought to be stayed.
The question whether the dispute in the suit falls
within the arbitration clause really pre-supposes that
there is such agreement and involves consideration of
two matters, viz., ( 1) what is the dispute in the suit
and (2) what disputes the arbitration clause covers? (1).
The contention raised by the plaintiff in the present
suit is, that the contract was really between the appellant and another party a:Jd not between it and the
appellant and consequently it was not bound by the
contract and could not be made liable for any damages
in terms thereof. In substance therefore the controversy between the parties in the suit is whether' the
plaintiff did incur any liability in terms of the contracts
evidenced by the two Bought Notes to which it was a
signatory no matter in whatever capacity. The question whether the plaintiff was a party to the agreement
at all is undoubtedly one which cannot go before the
arbitrators and with that question they cannot possibly
deal. But as Lord Porter pointed out in Heyman v.
Darwins (2), "this does not mean that in every instance
(1) \7ide per Viscount Simon in Heyman
al 360.
l_o) [1940] A. C. 356, 393
V.
Darwins, [1942] A. C. 356
>
.•
S.C.R.
..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
869
in which it is claimed that the arbitrator has no jurisdiction the Court, will refuse to stay an action. If
this were the case such a claim would always defeat an
agreement to submit disputes to arbitration, at any
rate until the question of jurisdiction had been decided.
The Court to which an application for stay is made is
put in possession of the facts and arguments and must
in such a case make up its mind whether the arbitrator
has jurisdiction or not as best it can on the evidence
before it. Indeed, the application for stay gives an
opportunity fo: putting these ar.J otht1 considerations
before the court that it may determine whether the
action shall be stayed or not." Section 34 of the Arbitration Act as is well known is a virtml reproduction of
section 4 of the English Arbitration Act of 1889. The
observations quoted above were approved of by Mr.
Justice S. R. Das in the case of Khttsiram v.
H anutmal (1) and it was held by the learned Judge
that where on an application made under section 34 of
the Arbitration Act for stay of a suit, an issue is raised
as to the formation, existence or validity of the contract containing the arbitration clause, the Court is not
bound to refuse a stay but may in its discretion, on the
application for stay, decide the isrne as to the existence
or validity of the arbitration agreement even though it
may involve incidentally a decision as to the validity
or existence of the parent contract.
We are in entire agreement with the view enunciated
above. As we have said already, it is incumbent upon
the Court when invited to stay a suit under section 34
of the Arbitration Act to decide first of all whether
there is a binding agreement for arbitration
between
the parties to the suit. So far as the present case is
concerned if it is held that the arbitration agreement
and the contract containing it were between the parties
to the suit, the dispute in the present suit would be
one relating to the rights and liabilities of the parties
on the basis of the contract itself and would come
within the purview of the arbitration clause worded as
it is in the widest of terms, in accordance with the
principle enunciated by this Court in A. M. Mair and
(1) (194.8) 53 C. W. N. 505 at 318.
111
1954
Anderson Wright
Ltd.
v.
Moran and
Company,
Mukher}ea ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1934
Anderson Wright
Ltd.
v.
Mor.. . Cumpany.
Mukherj••J.
[1955]
Company v. Gordhandass ( 1 ). If on the·other hand it
is held that the plaintiff was not a party to the agreement, the application for stay must necessarily be
dismissed.
The appellate Judges of the High Court in our
opinion held right! y that the decision in A. M. Mair
and Company \. Gordhandass (') was not in any sense
conclusive in the present case on the question of the dispute in the suit being included in the arbitration agreement. The report shows that the dispute in that case was
whether the appellants had made the contract in their
own right as principals or on behalf of the Bengal Jute
Mill Company as agents of the latter. The decision of
this question· was held to turn upon a true construction of the contract and consequently it was a dispute
under or arising out of or concerning the contract. The
judgment proceeds on the footing that there was in
fact a contract between the parties and the only dispute
was in which character they were parties to it, the respondents contending that the appellants were not bound
as principals while the latter said that they were. Mr.
Justice Faz! Ali in delivering the judgment pointed out
that the error into which the learned Judges of the
appellate bench of the High Court appeared to have
fallen was their regarding the dispute raised . by the
respondent in respect of the position of the appellants
under the contract as having the same consequence as
a dispute as to the contract never having been entered
into.
In this case it is certainly not admitted that the
respondent was a party to the contract. In fact that
is the subject-matter of controversy in the suit itself.
But, as has been said already, the question having been
raised in this application under section 34 of the
Arbitration Act, the Court has undoubted jurisdiction
to decide it for the purpose of finding as to whether or
not there is a binding arbitration agreement between
the parties to the suit.
It has been said by
Chakravartti C. J. and in our opinion rightly, that if
the person whose concern with the agreement is in
question is a signatory to the contract and formally a
(1) [1950] S. C.R. 79<-
•
.
S.C.R:
..
)
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
871
contracting party, that will be sufficient to enable the
Court to hold for purposes of section 34 that he is a
party to the agreement. It was the contention of the
respondent in the Court below that this test was not
fulfilled in the present case. The point has been
canvassed before us also by Mr. Sen and it has been
argued on the authority of several decided cases that
in cases of this description the Bought Note is a mere
intimation to the buyer, that the orders of the latter
have been carried out ;md purchases have been made
from other persons and not from them. The writer
does not thereby become a party to the contract of
He remains a
purchase and sale even as an agent.
mere broker or intermediary and the provision of section
230(2) of the Contract Act cannot be invoked against
him. Mr. Khaitan on the other hand argues that the
English law being quite different from the Indian law
regarding the liability of an agent contracting on behalf
of an undisclosed principal, the English authorities are
no guide to a solution of the problem. It is said that the
case of Patiram Banerjee v. Kanknarrah Co., Ltd.( 1 ),
upon which the respondent relies, was wrongly decided
being based upon English authorities which have no
applicc•ion to India. The respondent here, it is pointed
out, s16 ,1d an elaborate document setting out in full
every particular of the contract entered into and it is
impossible to say that he was not an agent executing a
contract on behalf of another whose identity he did
not disclose but was a mere intermediary conveying an
information to the buyer. In our opinion, the point is
not free from doubt and requires careful consideration
and as it was not decided by the learned Judges of the
High Court and we have not the advantage of having
their views upon it, the proper course for us to follow
would be to send the case back for a hearing of and
decision on this point. We, therefore, illow the appeal
and set aside the judgments of both the Courts below.
The matter will go back to the appellate bench of the
Calcutta High Court which will decide as ?Il issue in the
proceeding under section 34 of the Arbitration Act the
question whether the respondent was or was not a party
(1) [1915] I. L. R. 42 Cal. 1050.
18-<!8 S. C. India/59.
1954
Anderson Wrignt
Ltd.
....
Moran and
Company.
Mukher,jea J.
872
1954
.Anderson Wright
Ltd.
••
Moran aii.d
Company.
Mukherjea ].
1954
October 8.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19551
to the arbitration agreement. If the Court 1s of opinion
that the respondent was in fact a party, the suit shall
be stayed and the appellant would be allowed to
proceed by way of arbitration in accordance with the
arbitration clause. If on the other hand the finding is
adverse to the appellant, the application will be
dismissed. The appellant will have its costs of this
appeal. Further costs between the parties will abide
the result.
Appeal allowed.
KUNJILAL AND ANOTHER
"·
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH.
[S. R. DAs, GHuLAM HASAN and BHAGWATI JJ.]
Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 403 (!) and (2)Appellants convicted for offences under ss. 392 and 332 l.P.C. while
exporting conti·aband g(!ods-Previous acquittal
for
prosecution
under s. 7 of the Ersential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946
-JlVhether a bar to the subsequent trial for offences under ss. 392
and 332 l.P.C.
The appellants were tried and convicted for offences
under
ss. 392 and 332 of the Indian Penal Code committed when they
were exporting certain essential supplies, the export of \vhich \Vas
prohibited and constituted an offence under s. 7 of the Essential
Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946. It was contended that
the appellants were already prosecuted for an offence under s. 7 of
the Essential Supplies (Ten1porary Powers) Act, 1946, and though
Additional
convicted by the Magistrate, v.·ere acquitted by the
Sessions Judge, S:igar, and on the basis of that judgment which
'vas not brought to the notice of the High Court the appellants
'vho had once been tried for the same offence and acquitted could
not be tried again under the provisions of s. 403( 1) of the Code of
Crin1inal Procedure for the same offence nor on the same facts for
any other offence for 'vhich a different charge fro1n the one made
against them might have been nlade under s. 236 of the Code of
Criininal Procedure or for \vhat they 1night ha,'c been convicted
under s. 237 of the Code of Crirninal Procedure.
Held, that neither s. 236 nor s. 237 'vas applicable and that
sub-section (2) of s. 403 of the C.Ode of Crin1inal Procedure \Vas a
complete answer to the contention because the appellants "''ere not
tried for the same offence as contcn1plated under s. 403( 1) but for a
distinct offence as conte1nplated by sub-section (2).
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