GENERAL FAMILY PENSION FUND versus THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, WEST BENGAL
Supreme Court of India | Decided 1 November 1954 | [1955] 1 S.C.R. 822 | 1954 INSC 106
Key facts
- Decided
- 1 November 1954
- Bench
- MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, GHULAM HASAN, NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI, T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 144/1953
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1955] 1 S.C.R. 822
- Neutral citation
- 1954 INSC 106
Text of the judgment
822
1954
India United
Mills Ltd.
v.
Commissioner of
Excess Prefits
Tax, Bombay.
Vtnkatarama
AYJar J,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
relief granted, and that when the Excess Profits Tax
Officer finds that an assessee to whom relief had been
granted under section 26(3) has utilised the buildings,
plant or machinery in business after the termination of
the war, he is entitled to proceed under section 15 of
the ·Act.
In the result, the appeal fails, and is dismissed with
costs.
•
Appeal dismissed.
1 954
Novttnber I.
-
GENERAL FAMILY PENSION FUND
I '
THE COMMISSIONER OF Il'iCOME-TAX,
WEST BENGAL,
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J.,
s. R. DAS,
GHDLAM HASAN, BHAGWATI
VENKATARAMA AYYAR
and
JJ.]
Indian Income-tax Act (XI of 1922), s. 10(7) and schedule Rule
2(a)(h) as published in 1939-Inco1ne-tax on insurance companyHotv ascertained-Statement of Depa1·tn1ental Representative, Effect
of-Insurance Act (JV of 1938) s. 2(11)-Life Insurance business.
In accordance with the provisions of s. 10(7) of the Indian
Income-tax Act, 1922, the profits and gains of Life Insurance business for the periods 1943-1944 to 1946-1947 are to be computed
under Rule 2(a) and Rule 2(b) of the rules published in 1939 and
contained in the schedule to the Act. This computation should be
mac1e separately and independently once under Rule 2( a) and again
under Rule 2(b ). On such computation income-tax is to be levied
on the greater of the t\VO amounts so co1nputed. It is erroneous
to adopt the computation made under Rule 2(b) as the basis for
computation under llule 2(a),
,,
•·
Mere statement of the Departn1ental Representative of the
Income-tax Department to the Tribunal referred to in the order
of the Tribunal cannot have the effect of a finding of fact by the
Tribunal.
Business of a con1pany \Vhich consists in granting terminable
of the
pensions or annuities dependent on hu1nan life in favour
subscribers or their non1inees, is an insurance business within the
meaning of s. 2(11) of the Insurance Act, 1938.
. ...t..
.S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
CIVIL
APPELLATE
No. 144 of 1953.
JuR1smcnoN :
Civil
823
Appeal
Gtmral Family
Pension Fund
Appeal from the Judgment and Order dated the
28th November, 1951, of the High Court of Judicature
at Calcutta in Reference No. 40 of 1950.
Sukumar Mitra (S. N. Mukherjee,
appellant.
·Jf
1954
with him) for the
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India,
Joshi, with him) for the respondent.
( G. N.
1954. November 1.
was delivered by
Court
The Judgment of the
VENKATARAMA AYYAR J.-This is an appeal from
the judgment of the High Court of Calcutta on a
reference under section 66(1) of the· Income-tax Act.
The appellant is a Company which came into existence
in 1870 as an unregistered association, and in 1906 it
was registt"red under the provisions of the Indian
Companies Act. Its business consists exclusively in
,granting terminable pensions or annuities dependent on
human life in favour of the subscribers or their nominees. The dispute in this appeal relates to the assessment of the profits of the Company for income-tax for
the
periods, 1943-1944, 1944-1945, 1945-1946
and
1946-47.
To follow the points in issue, it will be useful to refer
to the statutory provisions bearing on the matter.
Section 2(11) of the Insurance Act, 1938, defines "life
insurance business" as meaning "the business of
·effecting contracts of insurance upon human life" and
as including "the granting of annuities upon human
life." The business of the appellant Company would
therefore be life insurance business as defined in section
2(11) of the Insurance Act. Under section 10(7) of the
Indian Income-tax Act, the profits and gains of any
business of insurance are to be computed in accordance
with the Rules in the Schedule to the Act. Rule 2 in
·the Schedule is as follows :
"The profits and gains of life insurance business
shall be taken to be either-
v.
The Commissioner
of lncom.-tax,
West Bengal.
824
1 954
General Family
Pension Fund
v.
T~ CommissWner
of Incom~-tax,
West Be11gal.
Vtnkatarama
Ayyar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955}
(a) the gross external incomings of the preceding
year from that business less the management expenses.
of that year,
or
(b) the annual average of the surplus arrived at
by adjusting the surplus or deficit disclosed by the
actuarial valuation for the last intervaluation period
ending before the year for which the assessment is to
be made, so as to exclude from it any surplus or deficit
included therein which was made in any earlier intervaluation period and any expenditure which may under
section 10 of this Act be allowed for in computing
the profits and gains of a business, whichever is the
'
greater.''
Rule 5(ii) defines "gross external incomings" as.
including profits on the sale or the granting of annuities.
These Rules came into force in 1939.
In 1945 the assessment of the profits of the appellant
Company for the years 1943-1944, 1944-1945 and 19451946 was taken up by the Income-tax Officer. Under
Rule 2, what the Income-tax Officer had to do was to.
compute the profits of the Company under the two·
heads (a) and (b) in that Rule and to adopt whichever
was higher as assessable profits. What he actual! y did
however is uncertain, because the orders of assessment
themselves have not been exhibited as part of the·
record. From the order of the Tribunal elated 5th
March, 1949, it appears that the Income-tax Officer
firstly determined the profits under Rule 2(b) on tl1e
basis of actuarial valuation after making certain adjustments; and secondly on the basis of the figure arrived at
under Rule 2(b ), he worked out the profits under Ruk
2(a) by making further adjustments. These orders were
made on 14th July, 1945. The company preferrccl
appeals against them to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, who held by his order dated 30th November,
1945, that the annuity business contemplated by Ruk
5(ii) was "purely annuity business", that the business
carried on by the Company was "an admixture between
an annuity and life insurance", and that there had been
no adequate investigation by the Income-tax Officer
of the nature of tlie business of the Company. He
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•
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--·
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
825
accordingly remanded °r:he case for further enquiry
and for passing fresh orders of assessment.
By the time the matters came up for further enquiry
before the Income-tax Officer in pursuance of the order
of remand, the assessment of the profits of the Company for the year 1946-47 had also to be made. By
order dated 23rd December, 1946, the Income-tax
Officer determined the assessable profits of the Company
for all the four years. He held that there was no
element of insurance in the business of the Company,
and that the computation should be made under Rule
2(a). Then he proceeded to assess the profits under
that Rule precisely in the manner adopted by him in
his order dated 14th July, 1945. He first took the
annual adjusted surplus calculated according to the
actuarial valuation under Rule 2(b) and after making
certain adjustments, adopted it as the figure under
Rule 2(a). These orders were clearly erroneous. The
statement that there was no element of life insurance
in the policies was rightly held to be erroneous by the
Tribunal and has not been sought to be supported. If
the annuity business of the Company was not life
insurance business, then even Rule 2(a) would have no
application. The Income-tax Officer was likewise in
error in adopting the figures reached under Rule 2(b)
as the basis for computing the profits under Rule 2(a)
without an independent enquiry into the materials
requisite under that Rule.
The Company took up the matter in appeal to the
Appellate Assistant Commissioner, who by his order
dated 26th September, 1947, held that the annuity
business of the appellant was life insurance business,
and that the profits should be computed under Rule 2.
He further held that in the absence of a profit and loss
statement for the previous year, the Income-tax Officer
could only act on the materials furnished by the
actuarial valuation as a guide for computation under
Rule 2(a). He therefore confirmed the orders of
assessment.
The Company then appealed to the Tribunal. By its
order dated 5th March, 1949, the Tribunal held that
the business of the Company was "in a way" msurance,
I95f
General Family
Pension Fund
v.
The Commissiontr
of Income-tax,
West [Bengal.
Venkataratna
A,Y;·ar J.
~26
1954
General Family
Pension Furul
v.;:
TW Commissioner
o.f Income-tax,
Wrst Bengal.
Venkatarama
Ayyar].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
f19551
and that computation of the ptbfits should be made in
accordance with Rule 2, after determining the profits
both under Rule 2(a) and Rule 2(b). It took exception
to the modus adopted by the Income-tax Officer in
computing the profits under Rule 2(a), and observed
that he should have made in<lependent enquiry under
Rule 2(a), and determined the profits and not merely
adopted the figures computed under Rule 2(b) as the
basis for computing the profits under Rule 2(a). The
Tribunal accordingly remanded the matter to the
Income-tax Officer for further enquiry for determining
the profits in terms of Rule 2(a). ·
Dissatisfied with this order, the respondent applie<l
for reference under section 66(1) of the Income-tax
Act, and on that application, the following questions
were referred to the decision of the High Court :
1. "\Vhether in the facts and circumstances of the
case the business of the assessee-Company consisted
wholly of annuity business or whether it contained
some elements of ordinary life insurance business as
distinct from annuity business.
2. Whether the Income-tax Officer was justified in
making an estimate for calculations under Rule 2 (a) of
the Schedule attached to section 10(7) of the Incometax Act."
The reference was heard by Chakravarti and S. R. Das
Gupta JJ. They held that the first question did not
arise on the order of the Tribunal, but all the same
expressed their opinion thereon in the following terms :
"Its business is wholly a business of granting
annuities on· human life, and no part of its business is
ordinary life insurance business."
As we are not concerned with this matter in this
appeal, there is no need to further refer to it.
On the second question, they observed that business
in annuities dependent on life as contrasted with
"annuities certain" would be insurance business as
defined in section 2(11) of the Act, and that the profits
of that business being "gross external incomings" as
defined in Rule 5(ii) must be determined under Rule
2(a). Dealing next with the objection of the appellant
that there had been no proper determination of the
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,
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S.C.R.
... J
,.
.)._.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
827
profits under Rule 2(a), they held that in the absence
of profit and loss statements for the previous years and
other materials the Income-tax Officer had no course
open to him except to adopt the figures computed under
Rule 2(b) as a basis for computation under Rule 2(a).
The second question was accordingly answered in the
affirmative. It is against this decision that the present
appeal has been preferred on a certificate granted
under section 66A (2).
Mr. Mitra for the appellant does not dispute the
position that the business of the Company on annuity
policies dependent on human life is msurance business
as defined in section 2(11), and that the profits of the
business should therefore be computed in accordance
with Rule 2 in the Sehedule to the Income-tax Act.
His contention is that the Income-tax Officer had failed
to make the computation in accordance with Rule 2( a),
and that the Tribunal was right in remanding the
matter for a correct computation of the profits in
accordance with that Rule. This contention must, in
our opinion, succeed. Under Rule 2, the Income-tax
Officer has to determine under clause (a) what the
grnss external incomings of the previous year were, and
deduct out of them the managing expenses for that year.
He has also to find out in terms of clause (b) the annual
average surplus on the basis of actuarial valuation in
the manner prescribed therein. He has then to adopt
whichever is higher as the assessable profits of the
year. Now the complaint of the appellant is that while
a computation was made under clause (b) no independent computation was made under clause (a), and that
therefore the profits had not been determined as
required by the Rules. It is a fact that no independent
computation has been made under Rule 2(a), and
therefore there has been no compliance with the Rule.
The learned Judges declined to uphold this objection on
the ground that the Company did not place any
materials before the Income-tax Officer so as to enable
him to make a determination under Rule 2(a), and
that in the absence- of any materials the Income-tax
Officer was justified in acting on the actuarial report
for computing the profits even under Rule 2(a).
1954
General Family
Pension Fund
v.
The Commissionerof lnrome·tax,
West Bengal.
Venkatarama
AY.1ar ].
828
1954
General Fami(y
Pensi-on Fund
v.
T ht Commissioner
'!,f Income·lax,
l1'est Bengal.
Venkatarama
Ayyar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
f1955]
The argument of the appellant is that having regard
to the stand taken by either side at the stage of
investigation and to the opinion expressed by the
Income-tax Officer that there was no element of insur·ance in the annuity business of the Company, the true
position under the Rules had been missed by all of
them, with the result that there was no attempt made
to compute the profits in terms of the provisions of
Rule 2(a), that the appellant had not wilfully failed to
produce any evidence, and that the observation of the
learned Judges that no profit and loss statement had
been produced was based on a misapprehension, as no
such statement had to be prepared by an Insurance
Company.
V.f e must now turn to the statement of the case by
the Tribunal to see what had really happened before
the Income-tax Officer, for the last word on questions
of fact is with it, and that is binding on the Courts.
Neither in the statement of the case by the Tribunal,
nor in its order of remand is there any finding that the
requisite materials had been withheld by the appellant.
The only statement bearing on this question in the
order of the Tribunal is as follows :
" ...... the Departmental Representative admitted
before us that the calculations purported to have been
made under Rule 2(a) were not in accordance with the
requirements of Rule 2(a), but it was explained that as
the information necessary for determining income under
Rule 2 (a) was not available, an estimate was made and
the income determined under Rule 2 (b) was adopted
for determining the income under Rule 2(a)."
What is referred to in this passage is only a statement of the Departmental Representative and not a
finding. On the other hand, the whole tenor of the
judgment of the Tribunal is that there had been no
determination of the profits under Rule 2(a) by reason
of the erroneous view taken by the Income-tax Officer
as to the true nature of the business of the Company.
If there had been a finding by the Tribunal that the
requisite materials had been called for and withheld by
the appellant, the decision of the High Court would be
unassailable, and, indeed, that was the only one that
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\
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
829
1954
General Family
could have been reached. But in the absence of such
a finding, we are unable to see any ground on which
the order of the Tribunal could be upset in a reference
under section 66 ( 1). Vvhen once it is found that there
was no proper determination of the profits as required
under Rule 2(a)-and that was indeed conceded-and
there was no justification for it such as the High Court
thought there was, the only order that could properly
be made was to remand the case for further enquiry
and fresh disposal in accordance with law. That was
the order which was passed by the Tribunal, and that,
in our opinion, was right.
This appeal will accordingly be allowed, and the
second question referred by the Tribunal answered in
the negative. The result of this will be that the
Income-tax Officer will proceed to enquire into the
profits of the appellant Company for the years in
question in accordance with the requirements of Rule 2.
Under the circumstances, we direct that the parties do
bear their respective costs both here and in the High
Court.
Appeal allowed.
NAVINCHANDRA MAFATLAL
Pension Fund
v.
The Commissionr
of Income-tax,
West Bengal
Vmkatarama
4vyar J.
1954
November 1.
THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,
BOMBAY CITY.
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J., s. R. DAS,
.
GHULAM HASAN, BHAGWATI
and VENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.]
Indian Income-tax Act (XI of 1922) s. 12-B-Government of
India Act, 1935 (26 Geo. 5 CH. 2) Seventh Schedule, List I, Item
54-Tax on capital gains, if ultra vires-Capital gains, if income
-Legislative practice-Interpretation of words-Words used in
Constitution Act.
Section 12-B of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (inserted by
Act XXII of 1947) which imposed tax on 'Capital gains' is not
ultra vires the Government of India Act, 1935. The term 'Capital
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