MAHESH PRASAD versus THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
Supreme Court of India | Decided 29 October 1954 | [1955] 1 S.C.R. 965 | 1954 INSC 105
Key facts
- Decided
- 29 October 1954
- Bench
- BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA, VIVIAN BOSE, B. JAGANNADHADAS
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 39/1954
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1955] 1 S.C.R. 965
- Neutral citation
- 1954 INSC 105
Text of the judgment
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
965
1 954
MAHESH PRASAD
October 29
ti.
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH.
.
... ' -~>
[MuKHERJEA, VIVIAN BosE, and JAGANNADHADAS JJ.J
Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 161-Accused's
power or intention to do the official act-Relevancy-ChargePrevention of Corruption Act (II of 1947), s. 6(c) (as it existed prior
to August 12, 1952)-Indian Railway Establishment Code Vol. I
(1951 Ed.), rule 1705(c)-Test of sanction.
When a public servant is charged under section 161 of the
Indian Penal Code, and it is alleged that the illegal gratification
was taken by him for doing or procuring an official act, it is not
necessary for the Court to consider whether or not the accused as
public servant was capable of doing or intended to do such an act.
In a case where the illegal gratification is alleged to have
been received by the accused as a public servant for influencing
some superior officer to do an act, the charge framed against such
accused under section 161 of the Code need not specify the particular superior officer sought to be so influenced~
In view of article 311 ( 1) of the Constitution of India and rule
1705(c) of the Indian Railway Establishment Code, Volume I
(1951 Edition) a sanction under section 6(c) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1947 (as it existed prior to August 12, 1952) may
be given either by the very authority who appointed the public
-servant or by an authority who is directly superior to such
appointing authority in the same department. But such sanction
is also legal if it is given by an authority who is equal in rank or
_grade with the appointing authority.
Sanction is invalid if it is
given by one who is subordinate to or lower than the appointing
.authority.
--
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
Appeal No. 39 of 1954.
'
(
JurusmcTION :
Criminal
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and
Order dated the 5th May, 1953, of the Lucknow Bench
of Allahabad High Court in Criminal Revision No. 200
of 1952, arising out of the Judgment and Order, dated
the 17th May, 1952, of the Special Magistrate, AntiCorruption for Uttar Pradesh at Lucknow in Case No. 40
of 1951.
Hardyal Hardy (K. L. Arora and S. D. Sekhri, with
him) for the appellant.
966
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
0. P~ Lal for the respondent.
x954
Mahesh Prasad
1954. October 29. The Judgment of the Court was
v.
delivered by
The State of'--------· ·
Uttar Pradesh\' · JAGANNADHADAS J.-The appellant in thi3 case was
·-
a clerk in the office of the Running Shed Foreman of
East· Indian Railway at Kanpur. He was convicted under section 161 of the Indian Penal Code and
sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for one year and
nine months, and also to a fine of Rs. 200. The conviction and sentence have been upheld by the Sessions
Judge on appeal and by the HighCourt in revision.
The charge against the appellant was that on the 6th
of January, 1951, he accepted illegal gratification of
Rs.150 from the complainant, Gurphekan-a retren~
ched cleaner in the Locomotive Department of the
Railway, examined as P.W. 2--as a motive for getting
him re-employed in the Railway (by arranging with
some superior officer). There was an alternative charge
under section 162 of the Indian Penal Code but it is no
longer necessary to notic.e it since the conviction is for
the main charge under section 161 of the Indian Penal
Code. The Special Police Establishment having
received information of the demand of the bribe arranged for a trap and caught the appellant just at the time
when he received the sum of Rs. 150 from the complainant and seized the amount. The appellant
admitted the receipt of the money but denied that he
demanded or accepted it as a bribe. His case was that
the complainant had previously borrowed money from
him and that this money was paid in discharge of the
debt. The Courts below have rejected the defence and
accepted the prosecution case and conviction followed
thereupon.
·
·
Jagannad~ad"' J. the
·
Learned counsel for the appellant has tried to persuade us, with reference to the evidence in the case,
that the view taken by the Courts below is ·unsus·
tainable. It is unnecessary to notice this argument in
any detail because this'is an appeal on special leave
and nothing so seriously wrong with the findings of fact
have been shown, which call for interference by this
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S.C.R.
I
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
967
Court. . It is sufficient to notice the main legal argur954
ments that have been advanced.
M akesh Pr asail
It is pointed out that the appellant though employed
v.
in the Railway was not himself a person who was in a The Stat•of
position to give a job to the complainant nor is it Uttar Pradesh
shown that he had any intimacy or influence with any
particular official who could give a job. It is urged Jagannadhadaa J.
therefore that the offence, if any, committed by the
appellant could only be one of cheating and not the _
receiving of a bribe. This argument is without any
substance. By the terms of section 161 of the Indian
Penal Code a person who is a public servant and accepts
illegal gratification as a motive for rendering· service, ·
with any public servant as such, is guilty of the offence
thereunder. To constitute an offence under this section
it is enough if the public servant· who receives the
money takes it by holding out that he will render
assistance to the giver "with any other public servant~'
and the giver gives the money under that belief. It
may be that the receiver of the money is in fact not in
a position to render such assistance and is even aware
of it. He may not even have intended to do what he
holds himself out as capable of doing. He may
accordingly be guilty of cheating. None the less he is
guilty of the offence under section 161 of the Indian
Penal Code.. This is clear from the fourth explanation
to section 161 of the Indian Penal Code which is as
follows:
"'A motive or reward for doing.' A person who
receives a gratification as a motive for doing what he
does not intend to do (or as a reward for doing what
he has not done) comes within these words."
Illustration (c) to section 161 of the Indian Penal
Code which runs as follows also elucidates this:
"A, a public servant, induces Z erroneously to
believe that A's influence with the Government has
obtained a title for Z and thus induces Z to give A
money as a reward for this service. A has committed
the offence defined in this section. "
Thus where a public servant who receives illegal
gratification as a motive for doing or procuring an
%8
1954
Mahesh Prasad
,,..
The Stale of
Uttar Prat!esli
Jagannodhadas J,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
official act whether or not he is capable of doing it or
whether or not he intends to do it he is quite clearly
within the ambit of section 161 of the Indian Penal
Code.
The next contention that has been raised is that the
charge does not specify the particular
public servant
who was intended to be influenced by the appellant in
consideration of his receiving the money. It is urged
that section 161 of the Indian Penal Code would not
apply to such a case. It is suggested that the phrase
"with any public servant" in section 161 of the Indian
Penal Code must relate to a specified public servant.
In the present case the evidence of the complainant
and the finding of the High Court is that the appellant "purported to attempt rendering of a service to
the complainant with another public servant, viz., the
Head-clerk at Allahabad." But even apart from such
a finding there is nothing in the terms of section 161 of
the Indian Penal Code requiring that the public servant
contemplated therein must be a specified public servant.
The material portion of the section is as follows :
"for rendering or attempting to render any service
or disservice to any person, with the Central or Provincial Government or Legislature, or with any public
I
servant as such."
The phrase "Central or any Provincial Government
or Legislature" does not contemplate any specified
individual or individuals. There is no reason why the
phrase "any public servant" used in the same context
should be taken to mean any specified public servant.
The gist of the offence under section 161 of the Indian
Penal Code (in so far as it is relevant here) is the receipt
by a public servant of illegal gratification as a motive
or reward for the abuse of official position or function,
by the receiver himself or by some other public servant
at his instance. There is, therefore, no substance in
this argument.
The only serious argument that has been advanced
and which requires a little closer examination is that
there was no valid sanction for the prosecution. There
is no doubt that this is a case to which the Prevention
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S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
969
of Corruption Act, 1947 would apply and that by
virtue of section 6 ( c) thereof the prosecution requires
the sanction of the authority "comp~tent to remove
the appellant from his office." It is urged that this
requirement was not satisfied on the facts of this case.
It has been pointed out that the appellant is a civil
servant of the Indian Union and that by virtue of
article 311 (1) of the Co_nstitution he cannot be removed
by an authority subordinate to that by which he was
appointed. This appears also to be the position under
rule 1705( c) of the Indian Railway Establishment Code,
Volume I (1951 Edition) which is as follows:
"No railway servant shall be removed (or dismissed) by an authority lower than that by which he was
appointed to the post held by him substantively."
The sanction for the prosecution in this case was
granted under Ex. 10 by one Shri L. R. Gosain,
Superintendent Power, East Indian Railway, Allahabad. The order of appointment of the appellant, Ex-F,
shows the Divisional Personnel Officer, East Indian
Railways, Allahabad, as the appointing authority. It
may be mentioned that in the appeal before the Sessions
Judge a contention was raised that the appointment of
the appellant was in fact made by the Divisional
Superintendent and that Ex. F was only signed by the
Divisional Personnel Officer on his behalf. The Sessions
Judge found against this contention and the same has
not been challenged before us. What, however, is urged
is that the Superintendent Power who gave the sanction
for prosecution is not shown to be an officer not lower
in rank than the Divisional Personnel Officer who made
the appoin!ment. The question as to the validity of
the sanction has been raised both before the Sessions
Judge as well as before the High Court. The High Court
in considering the question appears to have merely
satisfied itself that under the Railway Regulations,
Shri L. R. Gosain, Superintendent Power, was a person
compet1ent to remove the appellant from his office
within the terms of section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The High Court does not appear to have
considered the further question whether or not the
requirements of article 311(1) of the Constitution and
1 954
Mahesh Prasllll
v.
The Statt of
Uttar Pradllh
Jagannadhadas J.
970
1 954
Mahtsh Prasad
v,
The State of
Uttar Pradesh
Jagannadadhas. J• ·
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1955J ·.
rule 1705(c) of the Railway Establishment Code have
been satisfied with reference to the inter se poS1t10n as
between the authority who appointed the appellant
and the authority who sanctioned the prosecution. The
learned Sessions Judge, however, has recorded a categorical finding that the Divisional Personnel Officer is
in the same grade as the Superintendent Power. His
finding is in the following terms :
"I, therefore, hold that the accused could be and
was actually appointed by the Divisional Personnel
Officer who is in the same grade as the Superintendent
Power. It cannot therefore be said that the Superintendent Power Mr. L. R. Gosain was not authorised
to remove the accused from service by virtue of rule
1705 and this argument advanced against the validity
of sanction, Ex. 10, falls to the ground".
Learned counsel for the appellant urged that the
requirement both of the Constitution and of the rule
of the Railway Code, contemplates that the authority
competent to remove must be either the very authority
who appointed or any other auth<>rity directly superior
to the appointing authority in the same department.
We do not think that this contention is tenable. What
the Constitution r.equires is that a person should not be
removed by an authority subordinate to the one by
whom he was appointed and what the rule in the
Railway Code prescribes is substantially the same, viz.,
"the authority competent to remove should not be
lower than the one who made the appointment". These
provisions cannot be read as implying that the removal
must be by the very same authority who made the
appointment or by his direct superior. It appears to
us to be enough that the removing autl1ority is of the
same rank or grade. In the present case it does not
appear into which particular branch of the department
the appellant was taken, in the first instance in 1944
under Ex. F. But it is in the evidence of P.W. 4, the
Head-clerk of the office of the Divisional Superintend"
ent, that the office of the Running Shed Foreman in
which the appellant was a clerk in 1951 was directly
under the Superintendent Power. He was obviously
rhe most appropriate officer to grant · the sanction.;
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S.C.R.
•
r -l
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
971
provided he was of a rank not less than the Divisional
Personnel Officer.
Counsel for the appellant urges that the evidence
does not support the finding of the learned Sessions
Judge that Shri L. R. Gosain, Superintendent Power,
was of the same grade as the Divisional Personnel Qfficer
who made the appointment. P.W. 4 in his evidence,
however, quite clearly speaks to this as follows :
"Divisional Superintendent is the head of the entire
administrative
division. The
Divisional
Personnel
Officer is under him. The Superintendent Power and
Superintendent Transport are also under him and also
such other officers of the same rank . ........... Divisional
·Personnel Officer and the various Superintendents are
officers of the same rank. They are not subordinate to each
other".
It has been commented that this should have been
substantiated by the official records and not by oral
evidence. That no doubt would have been more satisfactory. The learned Sessions . Judge on appeal, in
order to satisfy himself, has referred to the Classified
List of Establishment of Indian Railways and the same
has also been produced before us for our information.
This shows that both the Divisional Personnel · Officer
as well as Superintendent Power are officers in the senior
scale drawing equal scales of pay, Rs. 625-50-1375.
This is an indication that they are officers of the same
rank and confirms the oral evidence of P.W. 4 who
being the Head-cle_rk of the Divisional Superintendent's.
office must be competent to speak about these matters.
It certainly cannot be said that the Superintendent
: Power who has granted the sanction for prosecution of
. the appellant at the time working under him, is of a
rank or a grade lower than the Divisional Personnel
Officer who appointed the appellant. This matter would
probably have been more satisfactorily clarified in the
trial court if the question as to the validity of the
sanction had been raised not merely with reference to_
the wording of section· 6 of the Prevention of Corrup-·'
tion Act but also as read with article 311(1) of the Con- ·
stitution and rule 1705(c) of the Railway Establishment
1 954
· Mahesh PraSad
v. ·-The State_ of
Uttar Pradesh
·JagonnOdhadas J.
'l72
1954
MaMsh Prasad
v.
Tlle$fatf!of
Ult., I+a¢ah
J•gtµ1nadhadas ].
[1955J
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Code. On the material we are not satisfied that there
is any reason to reverse the findings of the courts belmf
that the sanction is valid.
All the contentions raised before us are untenable.
This appeal must accordingly fail. It has been represented to us that the appellant who has been refused
bail by this court when leave to appeal was granted but
has been granted bail subsequently has already served
nearly six months of imprisonment in the intervening
period, that he is a young man and has lost his job.
In the circumstances we consider that it is not necessary to send him back to jail. The result, therefore, is
that the appeal is dismissed subject to the modification
of sentence of imprisonment. We reduce the sentence
of imprisonment to the period already undergone. The
sentence of fine stands.
,[
.
•
Appeal dismissed
ASSAM BENGAL CEMENT CO. LTD.
f),
THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,
WEST BENGAL
[MEHAR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J., s. R. DAS,
BHAGWATI and VENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.J
Indian
Income-tax Act (XI of I922), s,
expenditure-Revenue
between the two.
expenditure-Meaning
10(2)(xv)-Capital
of
and
distinction
Section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, uses the
term 'capital expenditure' for which no allowance is given to the
assessee. The term 'capital expenditure' is used as contrasted with
the term 'revenue expenditure' in respect of which the assessee is
entitled to allowance under section 10(2) (xv) of the Act.
As pointed out by the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in
Benarsidas fagannath, In re [(1946) 15 l.T.R. 185], it is not easy
to define the term 'capital expenditure' in the abstract or to lay
down any g~neral and satisfactory test to discriminate between a
capital ancf_ a revenue expenditure. Though it is not easy to reconcile al\ the decided i;:ases on the subject, as each case had been
decided on its peculiar fac;ts, so1ne broad principles could be
\_ "
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