DHAKESWARI COTTON MILLS LTD. versus COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, WEST BENGAL
Supreme Court of India | Decided 29 October 1954 | [1955] 1 S.C.R. 941 | 1954 INSC 103
Key facts
- Decided
- 29 October 1954
- Bench
- MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, GHULAM HASAN, NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI, T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 217/1953
- Disposal
- Remitted to Lower Court
- Citation
- [1955] 1 S.C.R. 941
- Neutral citation
- 1954 INSC 103
Text of the judgment
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
DHAKESWARI
COTTON
v.
941:
MILLS LTD.
, October 29.
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX,
WEST BENGAL
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J.,· S.R. DAs,
GHuLAM HASAN, BHAGWATI and
VENKATARAMA AYYAR
,
" I'-
!954·
JJ.]
Constitution of India, Art. 136-Appeal by Special Leave-'Supreme Court's powet-lndian
Income-tax Act (XI of 1922), s.
23(3)-Assessm'ent when invalid.
It is not possible to define with any precision the limitations
of the powe'rs conferred on the Supreme Court by Art. 136 of
the Constitution. This is an overriding and exceptional power and
should be exercised sparingly and . with caution and only in
special and extraordinary situation. Beyond this no set formula
or rule can stand in the way of or fetter the exercise of the power
conferred on the Supreme Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution.
Sufficient safeguard and guarantee for the exercise of this
power lie in the trust reposed by the Constitution in the wisdom
and good sense of judges of the Supreme Court. This power is
not hedged in by technical hurdles of any kind when it is called
in aid against any arbitrary adjudication or for advancing the
cause of justice or for giving a fair deal to a litigant so that injustice may not be perpetrated or perpetuated. Conclusiveness
or finality given to any decision by any domestic law cannot
deter the Supreme Court from exercising the power conferred
under Art. 136 of the Constitution.
The powers given to the Income-tax Officer under s. 23(3) of
the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, however wide, do not entitle
him to base the assessment on pure guess without reference to
any evidence or m~terial. An assessment under s. 23(3) of the
Act cannot be made only on bare suspicion. An assessment so
made without disclosing to the assessee the information supplied
by the departmental representative and without giving
any
opportunity to the assessee to rebut the information so supplied
and declining to take into consideration all materials . which the
assessee wanted to produce in support of his case -constitutes a
violation of the fundamental rules of justice · and tails for the
powers under Art. 136 of the Constitution.
Seth Gurmukh Singh v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Punjab
( 1944 I.T.R. 393) approved.
JURISDICTION :
Civil
Appeal
CrvrL APPELLATE
No. 217 of 1953.
Appeal from the Judgment and Order dated the
16th day of January, 1950, of the Income-tax Appellate
942
1 954
DhakJWtJri
Cotton Mills Ltd.
v.
Commissioner of
Jncomt~tax
Wesl Bengal.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955)
Tribunal, Calcutta in Income-tax Appeal · · No. 4658 of
1948-49 and E.P.T.A. No. 1137 of 1948-49.
/
\
N. C. Chatterjee and Veda Vyas, (S. K. Kapoor
and Ganpat Rai, with them) for the appellant.
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India
Joshi, with him) for the respondent.
( G. N.
1954. October 29.
was delivered by
Court
The
Judgment of the
MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J.-The appellant is a
public limited joint stock company incorporated under
the Indian Companies Act, 1913, with its registered
office at Calcutta. It carries on the business of manufacture and sale of cotton yarn and piece-goods. On
the 28th of July, 1944, the Income-tax Officer issued a
notice to it under section 22(2) of the Indian Incometax Act calling upon it to file the return of its income
for the assessment year 1944-45 (account year being
1943-44). Before the expiry of the due date for filing
the return the account books of the appellant company
together with the documents relevant to the accounts,
were taken into custody by the Sub-Divisional Officer,
Narayanganj and it is alleged that these remained. in
the custody of the court of the Sub-Divisional
Magistrate till January, 1950, when they were handed
back to the appellant. In this situation the assessee
pleaded for extension of time to furnish the return.
This request was refused, and a show cause notice was
·issued under section 28(3) of the Act calling upon the
appellant company why penalty should not· be imposed
upon it for its ofailure to file the return. An officer of
the company appeared befor.e the · Income-tax Officer
and explained the cause for this default. In order to
ascertain whether the explanation furnished by the
assessee was genuine, the Income-tax Officer made
inquiries from the court concerned about this matter.
He also made a request to the court to allow · him
access to the books of account. The court, however,
neither acceded to the demand that books of account
be made available to the assessee nor did it permit the
Income:tax Officer to. have ..access . .to them.. The
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
943
Income-tax Officer having thus satisfied himself about
the genuineness of the- assessee's explanation, condoned
the default in filing the return and dropped the
proceedings taken against the company under section
28(3) of the Act.
It seems that no further action in the matter was
taken by the department till the year 1947. During
that year the company requested the department to
revive the proceedings. The proceedings having been
revived the appellant company furnished - the return of
its income for the assessment year 1944-45 on the 16th
March, 1948. This return, however, was not a complete document as without the assistance of the books
the profits could not be computed according · to the
provisions of law. On receipt of the return the Incometax Officer issued a notice under section 23(2) of the
Act calling upon the company to supply further information on a number of points and to prepare certain
statements indicated in the notice. This requisition
had to be complied with by the 19th · March, 1948. On
that date the Chief Accounts Officer of the company
appeared before the Income-tax Officer and asked for
further time till the middle of the following wt:ek for
furnishing the requisite particulars. This request was,
however, · refused and assessment was completed on the
20th March, 1948. The excess profits . assessment was
also made final on the 23rd March, 1948. The relevant
part of the assessment order is in these terms :~
"From the point of view of profits, 1943 -was -a
very good year, if not the best, for all cotton - mills.
Expenses on cotton and fuel shows that - production
was undoubtedly higher whereas it is found that the
gross profit disclosed- by this company is low. · I conclude that full amount_ of sales have not been- accounted for. It is expected that actually the rate of gross
profit ,should have been higher this year. In view of
the higher costs of. establishment, I take -it that the
rate of about 40%, i.e., near about ·the -rate disclosed
in 1942 accounts, should have been maintained.• I add
back the Rs. 36 la:khs for unaccounted sales".
It may be mentioned - that in the. return the company had disclosed a gross profit of 28 per cent. on
Dhakeswari
Cotton Mills Ltd.
v.
Commissioner of
Income-tax
Wes.t Bengal.
Mehr Chand
Mahajan C.J.
944
1 954
·Dhaktswari
Cotton Mills Ltd.
v.
Commissioner of
Income-tax,
West Bengal.
Mehr Chand
.Mahajan C. J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
sales amountin·g · to Rs. 1,78,96,122. The total amount
of sales in the year 1942 was of the amount of
Rs. 1,15,69,582, disclosing a gross profit of 41 per cent;
The _establishment expenses, however, during that year
were in the sum of Rs. 15,94,101, while during the·
accounting. year relevant to the year under. assessment
these had gone up to Rs. 34,74,735 on account of
labour troubles. A number of other causes were
mentioned by the assessee for the low rate of profit
during the relevant period; but the Income-tax Officer
took no notice of them. On appeal this order was;
upheld by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The.
assessee then appealed to the Tribunal against these
decisions. What happened .before the Tribunal may
well be stated in terms of the Tribunal's order itself.
This is what is mentioned in the judgment of the
Tribunal:,"At the end of the hearing of this appeal on 25th
of November, 1949, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal
requested the departmental representative to produce
for the examination of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal the gross profit rates shown or assessed in
the cases of other similar cotton mills. The departmental representative wanted 3/4 day's time to collect
information on this point. On this the appellant also
wanted to be allowed to produce information regarding the gross profit rates shown or. assessed by other
similar cotton mills, and he was also allowed to produce
On or about the 29th
information on the point.
November the counsel for the appellant requested that
he should be allowed time till Saturday the 3rd of
December to file the above information and time for·
this purpose was allowed to him. On the 3rd December
Mr. Banerjee the appellant's counsel saw the Accountant Member in his chamber and wanted to produce
written arguments and · a trunk full of books and
papers in support of his case. Mr. Banerjee was told
that the arguments in the case had finished on the 25th
and he was allowed time only to supply to the court
the gross profit rates sho~n or assessed in the cases of
other similar cotton mills. He was told that it was
not fair to the other side to take notice of any
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S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
945
additional :evidence or ·record at that
stage and
his trunk of books · and papers . was . returned to
him. During the discussion of Mr. Banerjee with the
Accountant· M.ember Mr. Banerjee produced ·a report
showing that the gross profit rates of some mills
in Bengal on the average amounted to 23 per cent. In
the statement showing 23 per cent. gross profit rates
there was another item called 'Pool profit' which was
bigger than the gross profits rate. Mr. Banerjee was
asked to explain what this word 'Pool profit' meant
but he had no information on this point .......... For
want of this information we are afraid it is not possible
for us to attach_ a great deal of importance to the gross
profit percentage of 23 per cent. mentioned in the books
produced by Mr. Banerjee.
Mr. Banerjee during this discussion further produced a book showing the wastage expected. In that
book certain quality of cotton had been mentioned and
it was said that wastage of 34 per cent. was normal.
In the case of the assessee he has shown a wastage of
9 per cent. in. 1942, 26 per cent. in 1943 and 19 per cent.
in 1944. The figure of 34 per cent. shown in that book
would therefore seem to refer to a particular quality
of cotton very much inferior to the cotton generally
used by the appdlant. The department's main case on
the question of wastage is based on the appellant's
own books according to which "his wastage Tn the year
under review amounted to three times the wastage in
the year previous. In the light of all this information
it appears to us that the Incomeci:ax Officer was justified in making a substantial addition to the gross profit
shown by the appellant.
Coming to the question of what the amount of
addition should be the departmental representative has.
on our request filed a number of cases of other cotton
mills which show a gross profit rates varying between
49 per cent. and 22 per cent. and in one case even
13 per cent. has been shown ....... .
In the face of all the above facts it appears to us
that ·the Income-tax Officer was justified in coming to
the condusion that all sales had not been brought into
1954
· Dhakeswari
Cotton Mills Ltif.
v.
·Commissioner of
Income-tax,
West Bengal.
Mehr Chand
Mahqjan C. JA
946
1954
Dhaktswari
Cotton Mills Ltd.
v.
Commissioner of
Income-tax,
.West Bengal.
Mehr Charul
Mahajan C. J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
the books. We have, however, considered all facts
relevant to this case and are of the opinion that the
addition to the sales should be reduced from Rs. 36
lakhs made by the Income-tax Officer to Rs. 16 lakhs
which would reduce the ·gross profit rate to· about
35 per cent."
The sum and substance of these decisions is that the
Income-tax Officer estimated ·the gross profit on sales at
40 per cent. by a pure guess, while the Tribunal reduced
it to 35 per cent.· by applying some other rule of thumb.
It is not clear from either of these judgments on what
material these estimates were based.
Dissatisfied with the decision of the Tribunal, the
assessee wanted the Tribunal to state a case and refer
to the High Court for its decision ten questions· of law.
It seems that Dr. Pal who represented the assessee
before the Tribunal had only argued one question
namely, whether the estimate of profit made by the
Income-tax Officer · was excessive or whether 1t was
justified on the material on the record. The other points
raised in the memorandum of appeal regarding the
validity or the correctness of the procedure of assessment had been abandoned. . The .questions which were
submitted to the Tribunal and which it was asked to
refer to the High Court concerned all the points including those abandoned before the '.fribunal. The Tribunal came to the conclusion that ho question of. law arose
on its order, and it, therefore, dismissed the application made by the assessee.. It appears that the assessee
then applied to the High Court under section 66(2) of
the Act for the issue of a mandamus to the Tribunal
directing It to refer to the High Court the very same
questions of law which it had refused to refer. This
application was summarily rejected. The High Court
also refused an application for leave to' appeal ·to this
Court. Having exhausted all die remedies that were
available to him under the· Income-tax Act, the assessee
then made an application to this Court for special leave
against the order of the Income-tax Tribunal under the
provisions of article . 136 ·of the Constitution. Leave
was allowed and ·this appeal is •now before us by virtue
of. that leave.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
947
Mr. Chatterjee, the learned counsel for the appellant,
contended inter alia that the assessment order made
under section 23(3) of the Income-tax Act had been
made in violation of the principles of natural justice,
inasmuch as it was not based on any material whatsoever and that the evidence tendered by the appellant
had been improperly rejected. It was further said that
the Trib11n:i \ acted without jurisdiction in relying on
the data supplied by the
Income-tax department
behind the back of the appellant company, and without giving it an opportunity to rebut or explain the
same. Reliance was placed on the decision of a Full
Bench of the Lahore High Court in Seth Gurmukh
Singh v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Punjab( 1 ), for the
proposition that while proceeding under sub-section (3)
of section 23, the Income-tax Officer, though not bound
to rely on evidence produced by the assessee as he
considers to be false, yet if he proposes to make an
estimate in disregard of that evidence, he should in
fairness disclose to the assessee the material on which
he is going to found that estimate; and that in case he
proposes to use against the assessee the result of any
private inquiries made by him, he must communicate
to the assessee the substance of the information so
proposed to be utilized to such an extent as to put the
assessee in possession of full particulars of the case he
is expected to meet and that he should further give
him ample opportunity to meet it. It was said that
the Tribunal failed to disclose to the assessee the
material that the departmental
representative had
given to it regarding the rates of gross profit of cotton
mills varying between 49 per cent. and 13 per cent.,
and that if that disclosure had been made, the assessee
would have satisfied the Tribunal that the mills which
had shown gross profits at rates mentioned above · had
no similarity of any kind with the appellant company's
mill or to other mills in Bengal and therefore those
rates had no relevancy in the enquiry as to gross profits
of the assessee company's mill. It was also argued that
both the Income-tax
Officer and the
Tribunal
acted
arbitrarily and on suspicion in estimating the rate
(I) [1944] 12 I. T. R. 393·
of
1 954
Dhakeswari
Cotton Mills Ltd.
v.
Commissioner of
Income·tax,
West Bengal.
Mehr Chand
Mahajan C. J.
948
1 954
Dhakeswari
Cotton Milll Ltd.
v.
Commissioner of
Income-lax.
JVest Ben,14al.
Mehr Chand
Mahajan G.J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
gross profit. In conclusion the learned counsel urged
that now that the books of account of the company
were available, it was only just and fair that the
Income-tax Officer and the Tribunal should examine
these books in order to determine the correctness of the
return furnished by the assessee.
The learned Solicitor-General who appeared for the
Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal, combated
the contentions raised by Mr. Chatterjee on a two-fold
ground : ( 1) in the first instance, without questioning
the jurisdiction of this Court to grant special leave
against an order of an Income-tax Tribunal, he argued
that such leave should not be granted when remedies
provided by the Income-tax Act itself were available
for correcting errors of the Tribunal, and had been
taken but without success. It was said that the power
conferred on this Court by article 136 of the Constitution being an extraordinary power, its exercise should
be limited to cases of patent and glaring errors of procedure, or where there has been a failure of justice
because of the violation of the rules of natural justice
or like causes but that this discretionary power should
not be exercised for the purpose of reviewing findings
of fact when the law dealing with the subject has
declared those findings as final and conclusive. (2) That
the finding given by the Income-tax Officer and affirmed
by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the
Tribunal was based on material and it could not be said
that these bodies had acted arbitrarily in this matter.
It was contended that the Income-tax Officer has very
wide powers and is not fettered by technical rules of
evidence and pleadings, and that the only restnct10n
on his judgment is that he must act honestly on the
material however inadequate before him, but not
rnpriciously or arbitrarily. It was suggested that
owing to the disparity of the rate of wastage the
Income-tax Officer was entitled to
reach the
assessee had not disclosed
conclusion that the
the full sales made by him during the accounting year,
and that on that basis he was entitled on his own
information to make an estimate of the rate of gross
profit'.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
949
As regards the first contention of the learned
Solicitor-General, we are unable to accede to it. It is
not possible to define with any precision the limitations
on the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested
in this Court by the · constitutional provision made in
article 136. The limitations, whatever they be, are
implicit in the nature and character of the power itself.
It being an exceptional and overriding power, naturally
it has to be exercised sparingly and with caution and
only in special and extraordinary situations. Beyond
that it is not possible to fetter the exercise of this
power by any set formula or rule. All that can be said
is that the Constitution having trusted the wisdom and
good sense of the Judges of this Court in this matter,
that itself is a sufficient safeguard and guarantee that
the power will only be used to advance the cause of
justice, and that its exercise will be governed by well
established principles which govern the exercise of
overriding constitutional powers. It is, however, plain
that when the Court reaches the conclusion that a person has been dealt with arbitrarily or that a Court or
tribunal within the territory of India has not given a
fair deal to a litigant, then no technical hurdles of
any kind like the finality of finding of facts or otherwise can stand in the way of the exercise of this power
because the whole intent and purpose of this article is
that it is the duty of this Court to see that injustice is
not perpetuated or perpetrated by decisions of Courts
and tribunals because certain laws have made the
·decisions of these Courts or tribunals final and conclusive. What we have said above sufficiently disposes
of the first contention raised by the learned SolicitorGeneral.
As regards the second contention, we are in entire
agreement with the learned Solicitor-General when he
says that the Income-tax Officer is not fettered by
technical rules of evidence and pleadings, and that he
is entitled to act on material which may not be
accepted as evidence in a Court of law, but there the
agreement ends; because it is equally clear that in
making the assessment under sub-section (3) of section
23 of the Act, the Income-tax Officer is not entitled to
' 1 954
Dhakeswari
Cotton Mills Ltd.
v.
Commissioner of
lncome-t@1
West Bengal.
Mehr Chand
Mahajan C. J.
950
1 954
Dhakeswari
Cotton Mills Ltd.
v.
CommiJJioner of
income·tax,
West Bengal.
Mehr Chand
Mahajan C. J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
make a pure gues·s and make an assessment without
. reference to any evidepce or any material at all. There
must be something more than bare suspicion to _support the ~ssessmeni:- unde_r section _23(3). The rule· of
law on this subiect has, m our opm1on, been fairly and
rightly stated by the Lahore High Court in the case of
Seth Gurmukh Singh v. Commissioner of Income-tax,
Punjab (supra).
In this case we are of the opinion that the Tribunal
violated certain fundamental rules of justice in reaching its conclusions. Fi.rstly, it did not disclose to the
assessee what information had been supplied to it by
the departmental representative. Next, it did not give
any opportunity to the company to rebut the material
furnished to it by him, and lastly, it declined to take
all the material that the assessee wanted to produce in
support of its case. The result is that the assessee had
not had a fair hearing. The estimate of the gross rate
of profit on sales, both by the Income-tax Officer and
the Tribunal seems to be based on surmises, suspicions
and conjectures.
It is somewhat surprising that tl1e
Tribunal took from the representative of the department a statement of gross profit rates of other cotton
mills without showing that statement to the assessee
and without giving him an opportunity to show that
that statement had no relevancy whatsoever to the case
of die mill in question. It is not known whether the
mills which had disclosed these rates were situate in
Bengal or elsewhere, and whether diese mills were
similarly situated and circumstanced. Not only did
the Tribunal not show the information given by the
representative of the department to the appellant, but
it refused even to look at the trunk load of books and
papers which Mr. Banerjee
produced
before the
Accow1tant-Member in his chamber. No harm would
have been done if after notice to the department the
trunk had been opened and some time devoted .to see
what it contained. The assessment in this case and in
the connected appeal,* we are told, was above die
figure of Rs. 55 lakhs and it was meet and proper when
dealing widi a matter of this magnitude not to employ
*Civil Appeal No. 21Rof 1953, not reported.
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
951
unnecessary haste and show impatience, particularly
when it was known to the department that the books
of the assessee were in · the custody of the SubDivisional Officer, Narayanganj. We think that both
the Income-tax Officer and the Tribunal in estimating
the gross profit rate on sales did not act on any material
but acted on pure guess and suspicion. It is thus a fit
case for the exercise of our power under article 136.
In the result we allow this appeal, set aside the order
of the ·Tribunal and remand the case to it with directions that in arriving at its estimate of gross profits
and sales it should give full opportunity to the assessee
to place any relevant material on the point that it has
before the Tribunal, whether it is found in the books of
account or elsewhere and it should also disclose to the
assessee the material on which the Tribunal is going to
found its estimate ~nd then afford him full opportunity
to meet the substance of·any private inquiries made by
the Income-tax Officer if it is intended to make the
estimate on the foot of those enquiries. It will also be
open to the department to p1a·cc any evidence or material on the record to support the 11'.stimate made by the
Income-tax Officer or by the Tribunal in its judgment.
The Tribunal if it thinks fit may remit the case to the
Income-tax Officer for making a fresh assessment after
taking such further ~vidence as is furnished by the
assessee or by the department. The costs of these
proceedings will abide the result.
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5-89 S. C. Jndia/59.
•
1
954
· Dhakesu:ari
Cotton Mills Hf.
v.
Commission<r of
Income-tax,
West Bengal.
Mehr Chand
MahajanC.J
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