INDIA UNITED MILLS LTD versus COMMISSIONER OF EXCESS PROFITS TAX, BOMBAY.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 28 October 1954 | [1955] 1 S.C.R. 810 | 1954 INSC 101
Key facts
- Decided
- 28 October 1954
- Bench
- MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, GHULAM HASAN, NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI, T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 160/1953
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1955] 1 S.C.R. 810
- Neutral citation
- 1954 INSC 101
Text of the judgment
810
Z,avtrbhai
..
.Amoid0,1
Tht State of
Bombay.
V tnkatarama
AJ'1a1 J.
1954
•October28.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
this Court which was presented under article 132(1),
the only ground that was put forward as involving a
substantial question as to the interpretation of the
Constitution was, whether the Bombay Act No. XXXVI
of 1947 was repugnant and void nnder article 254 of
the Constitution. No other question having been raised
in the petition, we must decline to permit the appellant
to raise this point.
In the resnlt, -the appeal fails and is dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
INDIA UNITED MILLS LTD.
v.
COMMISSIONER OF EXCESS PROFITS
TAX, BOMBAY.
l_JvlEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J., S. R. DAs
GHULAM HASAN, BHAGWATI and
VENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.]
Excw P,.ofits Tax Act (XV of 1940), s.<. 15, 26(3)-Meaning
and i111port of the tvord 'discovers'-Allotvance granted to assessec on
his rcprese11tatio11-Sttbsequent facts shotv that representation as
untrue, Effect of.
-
The \Vord ·'discovers' in s. 15 of the Excess Profits Tax Act,
1940, is not limited to facts discovered, which existed during the
relevant chargeable accounting period for which assessment is reopened under the section but also includes facts so discovered
which came into existence subsequent to such accounting period.
Allo\vance \Vas granted to an assessee by the Central Board of
Revenue under s. 26(3) of the 1\ct for the chargeable accounting
period during the \var on the ground that certain buildings, plant
and n1achinery provided for production of war materials will not
be required for the purposes of assessee's business after the terrn.i.nation of the war. But it \Vas discovered that even after the
termination of \Var the buildings, plant and machinery in question
\Vere actually used by the assessee for his business.
•
Held, that the Excess Profits Tax Officer had ample power to
proceed against the assessee to reassess him under s. 15 of the Act.
Dodwarth v. Dale ([1936] 2 K.B. 503: 20 Tax Cases 285);
Anderton and Halstead Ltd. v. Birrell ([1932] 1 K.B. 271: 16 Tax
Cases 200) ; Gray (H.M. Inspector of Taxes) v. Lord Penrhyn (21
·~
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
S.C.R.
a
811
Tax Cases 252); Williams v. Trustees of W. W. Grundy ((1934] 1
K.B. 524, 533); Commercial Structures Ltd. v. Briggs ([1948] 2 All
England Reports 1041) and Inland Revenue Commissioners v.
Pear.w11; Same v. Pratt ( (1?36] 2 K.B. 533), referred to.
'1' ..,
Civil Appeal
JURISDICTION :
CrvrL
APPELLATE
No. 160 of 1953.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and
Order dated the 1st day of April, 1952, of the High
Court of Judicature at Bombay in Income-tax Refere!1ce No. 49 ot 1951.
R. /. Kolah and Raiinder Narain for the appellant.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India. ( G. N.
Joshi and P. G. Gokhale, with him) for the respondent.
1954. October 28. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
VENKATARAMA AYYAR J.-This is an appeal from
the judgment of the High Court of Bombay on a
reference under section 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax
Act, and the question for determination is as to the
validity of certain re-assessments made under section
15 of the Excess Profis Tax Act, which will hereafter
be referred to as the Act.
In proceedings for assessment of excess profits for
the year 1941, the appellant Company applied for
relief under section 26(3) of the Act, which so far as is
material for the purpose of this appeal, runs as
follows:
"If on an application made to it through the
Excess Profits Tax Officer the Central Board of Revenue
is satisfied that the computation in accordance with the
provisions of Schedule I of the profits of a business
during any chargeable accounting period would be
inequitable, owing to any of the following circumstances, namely-
*
*
*
*
*
*
(b) the provisions of buildings, plant or machinery
which will not be required for the purposes of the
business after the termination of the present hostilities;
~·~
The Central Board of Revenue may direct that such
allowances shall be made in computing the profits of
1954
India Unitd
Mills Ltd.
v.
Commissioner of
Excess Profits
Tax, Bombay.
812
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
'tr
1954
India United
Mills Ltd.
·,.
Commissioner of
Excess Profits
Tax, Bombay.
Venkatarama
A..var ].
the business <luring that chargeable accounting period
as the Central Board of Revenue thinks just :
Provided that in making such direction the Central
Board of Revenue may impose such conditions as it
deems appropriate."
In their application under section 26(3) under the
heading "buildings, Plant and Machinery provided for
the production of War Materials, which will not be required for the purposes of the business after the termination
of the present hostilities", the assessees stated that the
production of khaki textiles for war purposes had
"necessitated additional plant in the Company's Dye
Works"; that the requirements as to canvas had
"necessitated ,additional Textile machinery for the
various doubling processes and additional winding
machinery for the Canvas waft"; that "much of the
additional plant purchased by the Company in 1941
comes under these two headings"; and that "their
manufacture in bulk will cease once the war is over
and the plant bought for their manufacture will be
idle and will have to be disposed of." The assessees
then proceeded to give particulars of' the machinery
and plant which "will undoubtedly have to be scrapped
after the war'', and whose "postwar value would be
as scrap material." Then they set out "the additional
buildings, plant and machinery which have been
installed as a war measure'', and estimated their value
at Rs. 4,85,633.
On this application, the Central Board of Revenue
passed the following order :
"The Central Board of Revenue having considered
the application of E. D. Sasoon United Mills Ltd. under
sub-section (3) of section 26 of the Excess Profits Tax
Act, 1940, that, by reason of the following circum'Stances, viz.,-
That the provision of buildings, plant or machinery
which will not be required for the purposes of the
business after the termination of the present hostilities,
the computation of the profits of that business
<luring the chargeable accounting period commencing
1st January, 1941, and ending 31st December, 1941, in
,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
S.C.R.
•
•
813
accordance with the provisions of Schedule I of the
Act would be inequitable.
I (the First Secretary, Central Board of Revenue)
hereby give you notice that the Central Board of
Revenue has directed that,
allowance of Rs. 4,06,394 shall be made in respect
of such circumstances, in computing the profits of such
be
chargeable accounting period,-such allowance to
inclusive of all depreciation allowable for excess profits
tax purpose in respect of the assets in question."
There were similar applications by the assessees for
relief under section 26(3) of the Act for the accounting
periods 1942 and 1943, and similar orders were passed
by the Central Board of Revenue granting allowance
respectively of Rs. 4,00,000 and Rs. 3,94,000.
The war terminated on 31st March, 1946. In the
course of enquiry into the assessable profits of the
Company for the chargeable accounting period ending
31st March. 1946, the Excess Profits Tax Officer found
that the buildings, plant and machinery in respect of
which relief had been granted under section 26(3) of
the Act were being actually used by the assessees for
the purposes of their business even after the termination of the hostilities. He therefore decided to take
action under section 15 of the Act, and issued the
requisite notices thereunder to them for re-opening the
assessment for the years 1941, 1942 and 1943. That
was resisted by them on the ground that the facts discovered did not relate to the years of account, and
could not therefore form the basis for re-opemng the
assessments for those years. By his order dated 28th
December, 1948, the Excess Profits Tax Officer overruled this contention, and revised the assessments for
the periods in question on the footing that there were
no grounds for granting relief to the assessees under
section 26(3) of the Act. This order was confirmed on
appeal by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, but
was reversed by the Appellate Tribunal, which held by
a majority that it was not open to the Officer to take
action under section 15 of the Act on the basis of facts,
which had come into existence subsequently. The
respondent thereupon applied for reference under
1'74
1 954
India United
Mills Ltd.
v.
CommissioMT ef
Excess Prefits
Tax, Bombay.
Venkatarama
Ayyar J.
814
1954
India United
Mills Ltd.
v.
Commissoner of
Excesr Profits
Tax, Bombay.
Venkatarama
Ayya> ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
fl955]
section 66(1) of the Income-tax Act, and section 21 of
the Act, and on tha_t application, the Tribunal referred
the following question of law for the decision of the
High Court:
"Whether the revised assessments for the chargeable accounting periods 1941, 1942 and 1943 are liable
to be cancelled on the ground that the Excess Profits
Tax Officer erred in invoking the prov1s10ns of section
15 of the Excess Profits Tax Act."
There was also another question referred by the
Tribunal to the High Court, and that was answered
adversely to the appellant. But ~s no argument was
addressed before us on that question, there is no need
to refer to it.
The reference came before Chagla C. J. and
Tendolkar ]., who disagreeing with the Tribunal held
that the fact "the assessee had obtained excessive relief"
and the discovery of the fact that it has used buildings,
plant or machinery for the purpose of its own business
after the war" were sufficient to bring the case within
the purview of section 15 of the Act, and accordingly
answered the question in the negative. The correctness
of this decision is challenged in this appeal, which comes
before us by special leave, on the ground that on a proper
construction of that section the Excess Profits Tax
Officer had, on the facts found, no power to revise the
assessment for the accounting periods 1941, 1942,
and 1943.
Section 15 of the Act is as follows :
"If, in consequence of definite information which
has come into his possesswn, the Excess Profits Tax
Officer discovers that profits of any chargeable accounting period chargeable to excess profits tax have escaped
assessment, or have been under-assessed, or have been
the subject of excessive relief, he may at any time serve
on the person liable to such tax a notice containing all
or any of the requirements which may be included 111
a notice under section 13, and may proceed to assess
or re-assess the amount of such profits liable to excess
profits tax and the provisions of this Act shall, so far
as may be, apply as if the notice were a notice issued
under that section."
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
815
For this section to apply, two conditions must be
satisfied : (1) the profits of any chargeable accounting
period must have escaped assessment or must have
been under-assessed, or must have been the subject
of excessive relief ; and (2) that must have been
discovered by the Excess Profits Tax Officer in consequence of definite information. There is no question
that on the facts found, the first condition has been
satisfied. The representations on which the appellant
obtained relief under section 26(3) of the Act were that
the buildings, plant and machinery would not be fit
for use after the war. It was only on that ground that
relief could be granted under that provision. And
when the appellant continued to use the machinery in
business after the termination of the war, the very
basis on which relief had been granted to it had disappeared, and the result was that the assessable profits
for the chargeable accounting periods had been the
subject of excessive relief.
•
•
The controversy is thus limited to the question
whether on the facts found the Excess Profits Tax
Officer could be held to have discovered that there was
grant of excessive relief. The contention of Mr. Kolah
on behalf of the appellant was that discovery for the
purpose of section 15 of the Act must be of facts which
were in existence during the chargeable accounting
period, and that facts which came into existence
subsequent to the chargeable accounting period could
under no circumstances be made the basis for reassessment of the profits of that period. On behalf of the
respondent, the learned Attorney-General contended
that the words "If the Excess Profits Tax Officer discovers" in section 15 of the Act meant nothing more
than that "if the Excess Profits Tax Officer finds or
satisfies himself"; that there was no justification for
importing into the section a limitation that discovery
should relate to facts in existence during the chargeable accounting period ; and that when once it was
found by the Excess Profits Tax Officer that the
buildings, plant and machinery were in use after the
war, and that accordingly there had been a grant of
14-88 S. C. India/59.
1954
India United
Mills Ltd.
v.
Commissioner of
Excess Prefits
Tax, Bombay.
Venkatarama
Ayyar J.
816
1954
India United
Mills Ltd.
v.
Commissioner of
Excess Profits
Tax. Bombqy.
V enkatarama
A1;1ar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
excessive relief, the
fully satisfied.
requirements
of the
[1955]
section
were
Considering the question on the language of section
15 of the Act, it is difficult to find therein any support
for the contention, which has been urged on behalf of
the appellant. It is general in its terms, and would
apply whenever. there is,. as a result of definite information, a finding by the Excess Profits Tax Officer that
chargeable profits had escaped assessment, or had been
under-assessed, or had been the subject of excessive
relief. There is nothing in the wording of the section
which would exclude its application, when that finding
is based on facts which come into existence subsequently. It is argued by Mr. Kolah that the word
"discovers" can aptly be used only when the facts on
which the discovery is made were in existence during
the chargeable accounting period. In its natural and
ordinary sense, the word "discovers" carries no such
limitation. The meaning given to it in the Oxford
English Dictionary is "the finding out or bringing to
light that which was previously unknown." (Vol. 3,
page 433). It will therefore be correct to say that when
a person comes to know of a fact of which he had no
previous k_nowledge he discovers that fact, whether his
want of knowledge is due to its not having been in
existence during the material period, or to its having
been unknown to him even though it might have been
in existence. The word thus being one of wide import,
what meaning it bears in any particular enactment
must depend on the context.
We must accordingly examine what indications there
are in the Act, which will show the precise connotation
of the word "discovers" in section 15 of the Act. That
section is, it should be emphasised, not a charging
section, but a machinery section. And a machinery
section should be so construed as to effectuate the
charging sections. Section 15 is. intended to vest 111
the Excess Profits Tax Officer a power to amend the
assessment, when it is found that the relief granted
is in excess of what the law allows. One of the sections
·.under which relief could be granted under the Act is
,
•
S.C.R.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
817
section 26(3), and therefore section 15 must be so interpreted as to confer a. power on the Excess Profits Tax
Officer to revise the assessment when relief had been
erroneously granted under that section. Now, section
26(3) provides for relief being granted when the
buildings, plant or machinery would not be required by
the assessee for his business after the war. And when
it is found that after obtaining a relief under that
section, the assessee uses buildings, plant and machinery
in his business after the war, and that he has in
consequence obtained a relief to which he was not
entitled under the Act, where is the machinery set up
by the Act for imposing the correct charge, unless it
be under section 15 ? And how is that section to be
invoked if "discovery" is to be limited to facts, which
were in existence during the
chargeable accounting
period ? The relief to be granted under section 26(3) is
by its very nature with reference to a state of affairs
in futuro; and a finding that it has been erroneously
granted could be reached only on the basis of facts
which must arise subsequent to the chargeable accounting period. To hold that no action could be taken in
such cases under section 15 is to hold that the stz,tute
has provided no machinery for carrying into effect the
conditions prescribed in section 26(3).
It was contended that the Central Board of Revenue
might, acting under the proviso to section 26(3), have
imposed appropriate conditions for safeguarding their
interests before granting a relief under that section,
that when there was a failure to observe the conditions
of that section, the only course open to the respondent
was to proceed under that proviso, and that action
under section 15 was incompetent. This argument
proceeds on a misconception of the true scope
of
section 26(3). if a condition had been imposed under
the proviso to that section, and that condition was
subsequently broken, the only action that could be
taken thereon is initiation of proceedings for reassessing the profits, ignoring the relief granted under
section 26(3) ; and the machinery therefore is provided
only in section 15 of the Act. The scope of the two
sections being different, the proviso to section 26(3)
1954
India United
Mills l.td.
v.
Commissioner of
Excess Pro.fits
Tax, Bombay.
Venkatarama
AyyarJ
818
1
954
India United
M;/ls Ltd.
v.
Commissioner of
Excess Profits
Tax, Bombay.
Venkatarama
Ayya,J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
r19551
cannot be construed as affecting, to any extent, the
jurisdiction conferred by section 15 of the Act.
We may now examine the decisions which have been
cited by Mr. Kolah in support of his contention. In
Dodworth v. Dale('), the assessee, Dale, married one
Kathleen Richards in 1921 and lived with her till
1933, in which year he obtained a decree declaring the
marriage null and void on the ground of her incapacity.
From 1921 to 1932 he had obtained reliefs under
section 18(1) of the Finance Act under which a claimant
is entitled to a deduction if he proves that "for t!ie
year of assessment he has his wife living with him or
that his wife is solely maintained by him during the
year of assessment." In 1934 the Inspector of Taxes
made additional assessments in respect of the deductions made during ~he years 1928 to 1932 on the
ground that the marriage having been declared void ab
initio, Dale must be held to have "obtained a deduction
not authorised by this Act" as provided in section 125
of the Income Tax Act, 1918. It was held by Lawrence J.
that the additional assessments were not justified under
section 125, because the effect of a decree declaring
marriage a nullity was not to wipe out the past and to
undo what had been done, and that under section 18(1)
of the Finance Act, the basis of relief was a de facto
marriage. Then follow certain observations, on which
the appellant relies :
"There is, however, another difficulty in the way
of the Crown. In my opinion it is not lawful for an
additional assessment or an original assessment to be
made by reference to facts which arise after the year
of assessment. In my view that is the reasoning of the
decision of Rowlatt J. in Anderton and Halstead Ltd. v.
Birrell(') ......... . In my view it is incompetent to
the revenue authorities to make a fresh assessment on
him by reason of a fact which is a real fact which arose
after the year of assessment."
Though these observations appear at first sight to
support the contention of Mr. Kolah, when examined
closely it will be seen that that is not their true effect.
(>) (1936] 2 K. B. 503; 20 Tax Gas. 285.
(2) [1932] I K. B. 271; 16 Tax Cas. 200.
\,,,<;.;._ ....
i,.~-
•
S.C.R.
••
..
..
....
-,...
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
819
The assessee had been granted relief for the years 1928
to 1932, because he was in fact living with his wife or
maintaining her during that period. The decree passed
in 1933 could not alter that fact. If on that fact the
assessee was entitled to relief for those years . under
section lS(l) of the Finance Act, then no question arose
of his having obtained a deduction to which he was
not entitled under the Act, in which event alone there
could be further assessment under section 125. The
decree passed in 1933 could not therefore be said to be
"discovery" on which action could be taken under
section 125, not because it was a subsequent event, but
because it could have had no effect on a relief which
depended on facts then in existence. That that is the
ratio of the decision will appear from the following
passages in the judgment :
"I apprehend that there 1s no distinction in this
matter between an original assessment and an additional assessment under section 125. Taking section 125
of the Income Tax Act, 1918, for the purposes of
illustration, and because it was the section under which
the additional assessments were made in this case, it
seems to me that section 18 of the Finance Act, 1920,
and the Income Tax Act, 1918, relate to the facts as
they exist at the time. The person chargeable was
allowed a deduction, and he was rightly allowed a
deduction at the time. He proved within the terms of
section 18 of the Act of 1920 that his wife was living
with him, and he was rightly allowed a deduction at that
time."
The principle of this decision is that assessments
should not be reopened on the basis of subsequent
events, when the facts on which the assessments had
been made remained unaffected therebv.
In this connection, reference ~ay be made to the
decision in Gray (H. M. Inspector of Taxes) v. Lord
Penrhyn(' ), where it was held that action under section
125 could be taken with reference to events which
happened subsequently, those events having relation
to the facts on which the assessments had been made.
There, the assessee, who was the owner of a slate
(1} (1937) 21 True Oas. 252.
1954
India United
Mills Ltd.
v.
Commissioner ef
Excess Prqfits
Tax, Bombay,
Venkatarama
Ayyar J.
820
•1954
India United
A!fills Ltd.
.v.
CommissW11cr of
Excess Profits
Tax, Bombqv.
Venka!arn.ma
AyJar ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955}
quarry ha<l shown in his income-tax returns various
amounts as paid to labourers, and those amounts had
been allowed as business expenses.
In fact, sums
amounting to £ 5,201 had been misappropriated by the
officers. employed by him and had not been ~xpended.
The defalcations were subsequently discovered, and in
1934 the asscssee realised that amount from his auditof'
and his insurer as damages for negligence. The Incomet:ix Inspector sought to revise the assessments from
1930 to 1933 by claiming that amount as wrongly
deducted during those years, or in the alternative, to
assess it as a business income in 1934. The Commissioner held that the assessments for 1930 to 1933 could
not be reopened on the basis of the receipt in 1934, as
that was an event subsequent to the period of assessment, one of the cases relied on by him in support of
his conclusion being Dodtl)Orth v. Dale (1). Finlay J.
disagreed with this view. He held firstly that the
amount could be treated as a business receipt and
added :
"If I felt any <liflicnlty about that, which I do not,
I should be prepared to say that there is nothing in the
authorities which prevents that re-opening which
manifestly ought to be made, if necessary, and that if
necessary the previous years ought to be re-opened".
Then there is the decision in Anderton and Halstead
Ltd. v. Birrell (') referred to in Dodworth v. Dale (')
and relied on by Mr. Kolah. There, the assessees had
written off certain debts as irrecoverable in 1921 and
1922. The· Inspector of Taxes had, on a consideration
of all the facts, agreed to this, and assessments were
made on the footing that they were bad debts. Thereafter, tl1e assessees continued to have dealings with
those debtors, and gave them further credit in subsequent years. On this, the
Inspector sought to
review the assessments on the ground that the debts
were not, in fact, bad debts.
In negativing this
observed that "the word
contention, Rowlat\ J.
'discover' does not, in
my view, include a mere
change of opinion on the same facts and figures
(1) [1936) 2 K. B. 503; 20 'I'ax Cases 285.
(2) [1932] I K. B. 271; 16 T'ax Cases 200.
•
\
•
S.C.R•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
821
upon the same question of accountancy, being .a question of opinion", that under the Rules, the estimate to
what. extent a debt is bad was "not a prophecy to be
judged by after events, but a valuation of. an asset .de
praesenti upon an uncertain future to be 1udged with
regard to its soundness as an estimate upon. the then
facts and probabilities'', and that an estima~e on~e
made could not, on the same materials, be revised m
sub~equent years.
.
Apart from the fact that some of the observations
contained in this judgment were considered by Finlay J.
in Williams v. Trustees of W. W. Grundy (1) and by the
Court of Appeal in Commercial Structures Ltd. v.
Briggs("), to have been widely expressed, the decision
itself has no application to the facts of the present
case. We are concerned here not with a valuation in
praesenti of a debt estimated to be bad, but with a
relief granted with reference to a state of facts which
were anticipated to come into existence only in the
future. Moreover, foland Revenue Commissioners v.
Pearson : Same v. Pratt(3) and Anderton and Halstead
v. Birrell( 4 ) are decisions on section 125 of the English
Income Tax Act of 1918. There has been quite a
literature on the meaning of the word "discovers"
occurring in that section and in the corresponding sections of other English Income Tax statutes, and the
question has also been considered in the Indian Courts
on the language of section 34 of the Indian Income-tax
Act, as it stood prior to the amendment of 1948.
Whatever the position if the question were to arise
under the Indian Income-tax Act-and there is no need
to express any final opinion on it-having regard to the
nature and scope of the provisions of the Excess
Profits Tax Act and in particular section 26(3), we are
of opinion that the word ''discovers" in section 15 of
the Act is of sufficient amplitude to take in subsequent
events which have a material bearing on the facts and
circumstances on which assessment had been made or
>.•
(1) [1934] I K. B. 524, 533.
(2) [1948] 2 A. E, R. 1041 at 1oi5, 1048 and 1049.
\3) [1936] 2 K. B. 533.
(4) [1932] 1 K. B. 271; 16 Tax Cas. 200.
1954
India United
Mills Ltd.
\'.
Commissiotur of
Excess Profits
• Tax, Bombay.
Ver.katarama
Ayyar].
822
1954
India United
Mills Ltd.
v.
Commissioner of
Excess Prefits
Tax, Bombay.
Vtnkatarama
AYJar J,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
relief granted, and that when the Excess Profits Tax
Officer finds that an assessee to whom relief had been
granted under section 26(3) has utilised the buildings,
plant or machinery in business after the termination of
the war, he is entitled to proceed under section 15 of
the ·Act.
In the result, the appeal fails, and is dismissed with
costs.
•
Appeal dismissed.
1 954
Novttnber I.
-
GENERAL FAMILY PENSION FUND
I '
THE COMMISSIONER OF Il'iCOME-TAX,
WEST BENGAL,
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J.,
s. R. DAS,
GHDLAM HASAN, BHAGWATI
VENKATARAMA AYYAR
and
JJ.]
Indian Income-tax Act (XI of 1922), s. 10(7) and schedule Rule
2(a)(h) as published in 1939-Inco1ne-tax on insurance companyHotv ascertained-Statement of Depa1·tn1ental Representative, Effect
of-Insurance Act (JV of 1938) s. 2(11)-Life Insurance business.
In accordance with the provisions of s. 10(7) of the Indian
Income-tax Act, 1922, the profits and gains of Life Insurance business for the periods 1943-1944 to 1946-1947 are to be computed
under Rule 2(a) and Rule 2(b) of the rules published in 1939 and
contained in the schedule to the Act. This computation should be
mac1e separately and independently once under Rule 2( a) and again
under Rule 2(b ). On such computation income-tax is to be levied
on the greater of the t\VO amounts so co1nputed. It is erroneous
to adopt the computation made under Rule 2(b) as the basis for
computation under llule 2(a),
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•·
Mere statement of the Departn1ental Representative of the
Income-tax Department to the Tribunal referred to in the order
of the Tribunal cannot have the effect of a finding of fact by the
Tribunal.
Business of a con1pany \Vhich consists in granting terminable
of the
pensions or annuities dependent on hu1nan life in favour
subscribers or their non1inees, is an insurance business within the
meaning of s. 2(11) of the Insurance Act, 1938.
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