NARAIN SWADESHI WEAVING MILLS versus THE COMMISSIONER OF EXCESS PROFITS TAX
Supreme Court of India | Decided 25 October 1954 | [1955] 1 S.C.R. 952 | 1954 INSC 100
Key facts
- Decided
- 25 October 1954
- Bench
- MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, GHULAM HASAN, NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI, T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 145/1953
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1955] 1 S.C.R. 952
- Neutral citation
- 1954 INSC 100
Text of the judgment
952
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
NARAIN SWADESHI WEAVING MILLS
"·
THE COM;MISSIONER OF EXCESS
PROFITS TAX.
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C.
J., S. R. DAs,
GHULAM HASAN, BHAGWATI and
VENKATARAMA AYYAR
JJ.J
),-
...
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Excess Profits Tax Act (XV of 1940), ss. 2(5), 5, JO-A-Condition precedent to -applicability of s. 10-A-"Business" if can be
defined-What is "business", how determined.
As condition precedent to the applicability of section 10-A of
the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940, it must be proved that during the
chargeable accounting period the assessee was carrying on the kind
of business to which the Act applies by virtue of section 5 of the
Act.
Section 2(5) of the Act states what is included in the word
"business". It is not possible to lay down a general definition
which would cover all cases of business. Business involves the
fundamental idea of a continuous activity. It connotes some real,
substantial and systematic or organised course of activity with a
set purpose. Single isolated transaction may also bear the clear
indicia of trade or an adventure in the nature of trade which is
included in the word "business" mentioned in section 2(5) of the ,,__.
Act.
Hence whether a particular source of income is business or
not must be decided on the facts and circumstances of each case
according to our ordinary conception of business.
Since 1935 the assessee firm carried on the business of manufacturing ribbons and laces and for this purpose owned buildings,
leasehold rights, plant, machinery etc. On April 71 1940, a public
limited · liability· ·company was incorporated with the object of
acquiring and taking over the buildings, leasehold rights, plant,
machinery etc., from the assessee firm. The company purchased 'r'
leasehold rights in the lands and buildings where plant, machinery
etc. were installed. The assessee firm as such ceased to manufacture ribbons and laces and was left with plant and machinery
etc. whichi it did not require and which ceased to be commercial
asset in the hands of the firm. The land and the buildings having
been sold the assessee firm put it out of its power to use the plant,
machinery etc. In these circumstances the company took and the
assessee firm granted a lease of the plant, mac~inery etc., at an
annual rent of Rs. 40,000.
Held, that this lease of the plant, machinery etc., given by the
asscssee firm could not be "business" within the meaning of sec- """
tion 2(5) of the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940.
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S.C.R.
953
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Commissioner of Excess Profits Tax, Bombay City v. Shri
Lakshmi Silk Mills Ltd. ((1952) S.C.R. I), distinguishe,d.
Inland Revenue Commissioner v. Broadway Car Co., Ltd. ( (1946]
2 A.E.R. 609), relied upon.
Commissioner of Income-tax v. Shaw
I.LR. 59 Cal. 1348), referred to.
CIVIL
APPELLATE
Wallace & Co., ([1932)
JURISDICTION :
Civil
Appeal
No. 145 of 1953.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and
Order dated the 8th day of September, 1950, of the
High Court of Judicature for the State of Punjab at
Simla in Civil Reference No. 3 of 1949.
-
Achhru Ram (R. S. Narula and Naunit Lal,
him) for the appellants.
with
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, ( G. N.
Joshi and P. G. Gokhale, with him) for the respondent.
1954. October 25. The
was delivered by
......
-
Judgment
of the
Court·
DAs J.-This appeal by special leave arises out of a
consolidated reference made on the 19th April, 1949,
under section 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act read
with section 21 of the Excess Profits Tax Act by the
Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Madras Bench. . The
reference arose out of four several proceedings for· assessment to excess profits tax of the appellant, the
chargeable accounting periods being periods ending
with 31st March of each of the years 1942, 1943, 1944
and 1945.
The relevant facts appearing from the consolidated
statement of the case are as follows :Narain Swadeshi Weaving Mills, the appellant before
us (hereinafter referred to as the assessee firm), is a
.firm constituted in 1935 upon 'terms and conditions set
forth in a deed of partnership dated the 6th November,
1935. The partners were Narain Singh and two of his
sons, Ram Singh and Gurdayal Singh, their respective
shares in the partnership being 6 annas, 5 · annas and
5 annas. The business of the firm which was carried on
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Narain Swaduhi
Weaving Milli
v.
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of
Excess Pro.fits ta.t
Das].
954
1954
· Narain Swadeshi
Weaving MillS
v.
The Commissioner
'f
Excess Profits Tax
Das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19551
at Chheharta, Amritsar, in the Punjab, was the manufacture of ribbons and laces and for this purpose it
owned buildings, plant, machinery, etc.
On the 7th April, 191P, a public limited liability
company was incorporated under the name of Hindustan Embroidery Mills Ltd. The objects for which the
company was established were to purchase, acquire
and take over from the assessee firm the buildings and
leasehold rights, plant, machinery, etc., on terms and
conditions mentioned in a draft agreement and the
other objects set forth in the Memorandum of Association of the said company. Out of the total subscribed
capital represented by 41,000 shares 23,000 shares were
allotted to the assessee firm. Of these, 23,000 shares so
allotted 20,000 shares were not paid for in cash but the
remaining 3,000 shares were paid for in cash. The
directors of the company were Narain Singh and his
three sons Ram Singh, Gurdayal Singh and Dr. Surmukh Singh and one N. D. Nanda, a brother-in-law of
Gurdayal Singh. Dr. Surmukh Singh was at all material times residing in South Africa. These 4 directors
between themselves· hold 33,340 shares· including the
said 23,000 shares. The company was, accordingly, a
director controlled company.
The funds available to the company were not sufficient' to enable it to take over all the assets of the
assessee firm. The company, therefore, purchased only
the buildings and the leasehold rights therein but took
over the plant, mac)linery, etc. on lease at an annual
rent of Rs. 40,000.
On the 28th July, 1940, the company executed a ..managing agency agreement in favour of Uppal & Co.,
a firm constituted on the same day with Ram Singh
and Gurdayal Singh, two of the sons of Narain Singh,
as partners with equal shares. Under the managing
agency agreement dated ·the 28th July, 1940, Uppal &
Co., was to be paid 10°lo of the net profits of the company besides salary and other allowances mentioned
therein.
On the 25th January, 1941, the company appointed
as its selling agent Ram Singh & Co., a firm which
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
955
came into existence on the same day with Ram Singh,
Gurdayal Singh and Dr. Surmukh Singh, the three sons
of Narain Singh, as partners, each having an one-third
share. The terms of this partnership were recorded in
writing on the l~th March, 1941. Ram Singh & Co.,
was to get a commission of 3% on the net sales and 6%
on the gross income of the company.
In the two new firms so constituted Narain Singh had
no share and eventually with a view to make up for his
loss the shares of the partners in the assessee firm were
modified by an agreement made ·by them on the 21st
April, 1941. Under this agreement Narain Singh was
to get a 12 annas :;hare and the two sons Ram Singh
and Gurdayal Singh 2 annas share each. All the three
firms mentioned above, namely, the assessee firm,
Uppal & Co., and Ram Singh & Co., were registered as
firms under section 26A of the Indian Income-tax
Act.
On the facts summarised above, the Excess Profits
Tax Officer came to the conclusion that the main purpose of the formation of the company and the two
firms of Uppal & Co., and Ram Singh & Co., was the
;tvoidance of liability to excess profits tax.
Accordingly, on the 16th November, 1944, the Excess Profits
Tax Officer issued notices under section IOA of the
Excess Profits Tax Act to the company and the three
firms. Eventually, however; the proceedings against
the company were dropped and the Excess Profits Tax
Officer considered the case of the three firms only. He
held that the three firms were really one and he, there..., fore, amalgamated the income of all three and proceeded to assess the as~essee firm to excess profits tax
on that basis for the four several chargeable accounting
periods mentioned above.
Under sub-section (3) of section IOA the assessee
company preferred four several. appeals to the Appellate Tribunal. In their order the Appellate Tribunal
considered the four following issues :
(1) 'Vhether the incotne of the firms styled as
"Uppal & Co.," and "Ram Singh & Co./' could be
amalgamated with the income of the assessee firm
1 954
Narain Swadeshi
Weaving Mills
v.
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of
Excess Profits Tax
DasJ.
956
1 954
Narain Swadeshi
·Weaving Mills
v.
The Commissioner
of
Excess Profits Tax
Das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[195'5]
under the provisions of section IOA of the Excess
Profits Tax Act ?
(2) Whether the share of income of Dr. Surmukh
Singh, a partner in the selling agency of Ram Singh &
Co., could be included under section lOA in the excess
profits tax assessment of the assessee firm ?
( 3) Whether the lease money obtained by the ).::-.
,.
assessee firm could be legally treated as business profits
liable to excess profits tax ?
( 4) Whether proper opportunity under section
lOA had been given to the assessee firm ?"
Before the Appellate Tribunal, as before the Excess
Profits Tax Officer, the assessee firm objected to the
application of the prov1S1ons of section IOA of the
Excess Profits Tax Act. The contention was that as
the assessee firm did not, during the relevant charge,
able accounting periods, carry on any business within
the meaning of section 2(5) of the Excess Profits Tax
Act, section lOA had no application and, therefore, the
profits of Uppal & Co., and Ram Singh & Co., could
not be amalgamated with its own income. In other
words, the argument was that there must be an existing business of an assessee during the relevant period
before section lOA could be applied in respect of transactions concerning that business. The Appellate Tri,
bunal took the view that instead of using the plant;
machinery,. etc., for its own manufacture
the assessee
firm turned that revenue yielding asset into another
use by letting it out on an annual rent of Rs. 40,000
and that this was certainly an adventure m the nature
of trade as contemplated by section 2(5) of the Excess ..Profits Tax Act read with rule 4 of Schedule I thereto.
Accordingly, it decided issue No. 3 4gainst the. assessee
firm holding that the assessee firm carried on busine.ss
in the letting out of the plant, machinery, etc., on hire
and the lease money obtained thereby could be legally
treated as business profits liable to excess profits tax;
On issue No. 1 the Appellate Tribunal agreed with the
Excess Profits Tax :Officer that it was evident beyond
'
doubt that a definite scheme ·was adopted creating
separate charges in order to aYoid excess profits ·tax
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S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
957
by the three firms, namely, the assessee firm, Uppal
& Co., and Ram Singh & Co., taken together. The first
step in the scheme was the formation of the company.
The second step was the appointment of Uppal & Co.,
as managing agents instead of appointing the assessee
firm itself. The third step was the creation of the firm
Ram Singh & Co., for taking up the selling agency of
the company and the final step was to adjust the shares
of the partners of the assessee firm so as to equalise, as
far as possible, the share of Narain Singh with the
shares which his sons got in the several firms. The
Appellate
Tribunal held that all the various steps
noted above need not necessarily have been fictitious
or artificial but they were certainly transactions so as
to attract the operation of section lOA. The Appellate Tribunal decided issues Nos. 2 and 4 against the
assessee. All the four appeals were accordingly dismissed by the Appellate Tribunal.
The assessee firm thereupon preferred four several
applications under section 66(1) of the Income-tax Act
read with section 21 of the Excess Profits Tax Act
praying that the following questions arising out of the
order of the Appellate Tribunal be referred to the High
Court:-'(1) Whether, under the facts and circumstances of
the case, the application of section lOA with a view to
amalgamating the income of the firms "Uppal & Co."
and "Ram Singh & Co.", with the income of the appellant firms was correct and valid in law ?
(2) Whether, in view of the facts admitted on
record, the share of income of Dr. Surmukh Singh, a
partner in the selling agency and not a partner m the
appellant firm, could be legally included along with the
share of income of S. Ram Singh and S. Gurdial Singh
and is this inclusion at all within the purview of section
lOA ?
(3) Whether, in view of the facts, circumstances
and observations on record, the lease money obtained
by the appellant firm could be legally treated as business profits or profits from an adventure in trade -liable
to excess profits tax ?
1 954
Narain Swadesh i
Weaving Milts
v.
The CommisJioner
of
E"cess Profits Tax
Das].
1 954
Narain Swadeshi
Weaving Mills
v.
TM Commissioner
of
Exuss·Profits Tax
Das].
958
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
( 4) Whether the type of a notice served on the
appellant, under the facts and the circumstances of the
case, legally amounts to a proper opportunity under
section IOA of the Excess Profits Tax Act, and if not
what is the legal effect of such opportunity being not
afforded ?
(5) Whether the proceedings under section IOA
were not null and void ab initio, for want of necessary
previous sanction from the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Excess Profits Tax, the fact of such previous sanction having been obtained · being neither
mentioned in the order nor proved before the Appellate Tribunal at the time of hearing although expressly
. required by the Court.
The Appellate Tribunal declined to refer questions
( 4) and (5) sought to be rais~d by the assessee firm and
no grievance has been made before us on that score.
The Appellate Tri_bunal referred the earlier three
questions after reframing the same so as to read as
follows:(1) Whether there is any evidence before the Tribunal· to ·support the · conclusion · that ·the main purpose
of· the transactions was the avoidance of excess profits tax ?
(2) Whether on the facts ·admitted or proved the
share of income of Dr. Surmukh Singh in the firm c;if
Ram Singh & Co., can be legally included along with
the share of income of Ram Singh and Gurdayal
Singh ?
(3) Whether on the facts and circumstances of the
case the leasing of machinery, etc., by the assessee firm
to the company was a business within the meaning of
section 2(5) of the Excess 'Profits Tax Act ?
The 1earned counsel appearing for the assessee firm
submitted befo• : the High Court that the third of the
referred questions should be discussed and decided first,
but the High Court· took the ·view that the decision of
the· first question ·was a necessary preliminary to · the
wnsideration of the third question. Taking up, then,
the first question first · the High Court referred to the
several facts found by the Appellate Tribunal· and
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
959
-described as steps and regarding them as circumstantial evidence came to the conclusion that it could not
be said that there was no evidence upon which the
Tribunal was justified in coming to the conclusion that
the formation of the firms, Uppal & Co., and Ram Singh
& Co., was mainly for the purpose of avoidance or
reduction of liability to excess profits tax. In the
result, the High Court held that the three firms, the
assessee firm, Uppal & Co., and Ram Singh & Co., were
in fact one and the same and on that basis proceeded
next to take up the third question. After referring to
section 2(5) and certain judicial decisions, the High
·Court concluded as follows :"The argument of Mr. Pathak when applied to
the present case would have force were it a fact that
the sole concern of the assessee firm was the receipt of
hire of machinery from a company or firm, in which
the assessee firm had no interest. But this is not the
state of affairs. On the finding under the first question
referred, the assessee firm, the firm of managing agents
:and the firm of selling agents are really one and the
same firm. This firm and its partners held the majority of shares in the company. The agreement for payment of Rs. 40,000 as rent of machinery is an agree"
ment between the assessee firm and the company which
the a~sessee firm controls. The business of the assessee
firm was, and in effect still is, the manufacture of
ribbons and laces, and the receipt of Rs. 40,000 is a
profit from that business diverted into the pockets of
the assessee firm."
The High Court accordingly answered the third
-question in the affirmative and against the assessee
firm. The necessary certificate of fitness for appeal to
this Court having b.een refused by the High Court, the
:assessee firm obtained special leave of this Court to
prefer the present appeal.
The learned counsel appearing for the assessee firm
·has submitted before us-and we think rightly-that
the approach of the High Court was erroneous in that
they took up the discussion of question No. 1 first .
.That question, as framed, proceeded on the assumption
1 954
Narain Swadeshi
Weaving Mills
v.
The Commissioner
of
Exce.is Pr'!fits Tax
Das].
960
1 954
Narain Swadeshi"
Weaving Mills
v.
The Commiuione1
of
&:cess Profits Tax
DaJ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955}
that section lOA applied to the case and only raised
the question as to whether there was any evidence to
support the finding of the Appellate Tribunal arrived
at as a result of the enquiry under that section, namely,
that the main purpose of the transaction was the avoidance of excess profits tax. The long title and the
preamble of the Excess Profits Tax Act refer to the
imposition of tax on excess profits arising out of certain
businesses. Section 4, which is the charging section and
section 5 which lays down the application of the Act to
certain business, clearly postulate the existence of a
business carried on by the assessee on the profits of
which the excess profits tax can be imposed. Therefore, if there is such a business during the relevant
period, then and then alone can arise the question of
the applicability of section lOA. If there is no such
business as is contemplated by the Act, then the Act
does not apply and section lOA cannot come into operation at all. Before the Excess Profits Tax Officer call'.
embark upon an enquiry as to whether a transaction
was effected for the avoidance or reduction of liability
to excess profits tax and to make such adjustments.
as he considers appropriate there must be proof that
.the assessee was, during the chargeable accounting
period, carrying on any business of the kind referred to
in section 5 of the Act. Logically, therefore, the Appellate Tribunal as well as the High Court should have
taken up question No. 3 first, for on a decision of that
question would depend the applicability of section lOA
and if that question were answered in favour of the
assessee firm the further question of law as raised in
question No. 1 would not, in such event, arise. The
approach of the High Court was, therefore, logically
misconceived on the facts of this case.
What then are the facts found· by the Appellate
Tribunal apart from its findings under section lOA ?•
The findings are that after the formation of the company the assessee firm was left with no business at all.
The company purchased the leasehold rights in the
lands and buildings where the plant, machinery, etc.,
·were installed. The firm as such ceased to manufacture
·any ribbons and laces. It was left with the plant,
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
961
machinery, etc., which it did not require and which
ceased to be a commercial asset in its hands, for it had
no longer any manufacturing business at all. Further,
the assessee firm had put it out of its power to use the
plant, machinery, etc., for it had no right in the lands
and buildings where the plant, machinery, etc., had
been installed. In these circumstances, the assessee
firm let out the plant, machinery, etc., to the company.
It was thenceforth the company which was carrying on
the business of manufacturing ribbons and laces and
for that purpose hired the plant, machinery, etc., from
the asses see firm. Prima facie it was the company
which appointed the managing agents and the selling
agents. Ex facie and apart from the alleged result of
any enquiry under section 10 or section lOA of the
Excess Profits Tax Act those were not transactions of
the assessee firm. The assessee firm was, therefore.
left only with some property which at one time was a
commercial asset but had ceased to be so. The assessee
firm thereupon let out that property on rent. The
question is whether such letting out in such circumstances amounted to carrying on of a business.
"Business" as defined in section 2(5) of the Excess
Profits Tax Act includes amongst others, any trade,
commerce or manufacture or any adventure in the
nature of trade, commerce or manufacture. The first
part of this definition of "a business" in the Excess
Profits Tax Act is the same as the definition of a business in section 2 ( 4) of the Indian Income-tax Act.
Whether a particular activity amounts to any trade,·
commerce or manufacture or any adventure in the
nature of trade, commerce or manufacture is _always a
difficult question to an&wer. On the one hand it has
been pointed out by the Judicial
Committee in·
Commissioner of Income-tax v. Shaw Wallace & Co. (1),
that the words used in that definition are no doubt
wide but underlying each of them is the fundamental
idea of the continuous exercise of an activity. The
word "business" connotes some real, substantial and·
systematic or organised course of activity or conduct·
with a set purpose. On the other hand, a single and
(1) (1932) I.L.R. 59 Cal. 1343.
.
1954
Narain Swadeshi·
W1aving Mills
v.
Thi Commissioner·
of
.
Excess Profits Tax:
Das].
962
1 954
Narain Swadeshi
Weaving Mills
v.
The Commissioner
of
Excess Pro.fits Tax
D.asJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
isolated transaction has been held to be conceivably
capable of falling within the definition of business as
being an adventure in the nature of trade provided the
transaction bears clear indicia of trade. The question,
therefore, whether a particular source of income is
business or not must be decided according to our
ordinary notions as to what a business is. The case of
Commissioner of Excess Profits Tax; Bombay City v.
Shri Lakshmi Silk Mills Ltd.('), decided by this Court
is clearly distinguishable. There, the respondent company which was formed for the purpose of manufacturing silk cloth installed a plant for dying silk yarn as a
part of its business. During the relevant chargeable
accounting period, owing to difficulty in obtaining silk
yarn on account of the war, it could not make any use
of this plant and it remained idle for some time. In
August, 1943, the plant was let out to another company
on a monthly rent. The question arose whether the
income received by the respondent company in the
chargeable accounting period by way of rent was income
from business and assessable to excess profits tax. It
should be noted that in that case the respondent company was continuing its business of manufacturing silk
cloth. Only a part of its business, namely, that of
dying silk yarn had to be temporarily stopped owing
to the difficulty in obtaining silk yarn on account of
the war. In such a situation, this Court held that that
part of the assets did not cease to be commercial assets
of that business since it was temporarily put to different
use or let out to another and accordingly the income
from the assets would be profits of the business irrespective of the manner in which that asset was exploited
by the company. This Court clearly indicated that no
general principle could be laid down which would be
applicable to all cases and that each case must be
decided on its own circumstances according to ordinary
common sense principles. In the case before us the
assessee firm's business had entirely closed. It no
longer manufactured
any ribbons and laces.
It had
accordingly no further trading or commercial act1V1ty.
It could not in fact use the plant, machinery, etc.,
(1) [1952] S.C.R. I.
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963
after the land and the buildings where they were
installed had been sold to the company. In these
circumstances the assessee firm let out the plant,
machinery, etc., on an annual rent of Rs. 40,000. These
facts are very similar to those found in Inland Revenue
Commissioners v. Broadway Car Co., Ltd.(1). There the
w;u conditions had reduced the company's business to
very small proportions. In that situati_on it was
observed that in that case the company dealt with
part of its property which had become redundant
and was sublet purely to produce income--a transaction quite apart from the ordinary business act1V1t1es
of the company. The ratio decidendi in that case which
was noticed in the judgment of this Court appears to us
to apply to the facts found in the present case apart
from the findings under section lOA. Applying also
the common sense principle to the fact so found it is
impossible to hold that the letting out of the plant,
machinery, etc., was at all a business operation when
its normal business activity had come to a close. It is
interesting to note that sub-sections ( 3) and ( 4) of
section 12 of the Indian Income-tax Act recognise that
letting out of plant, machinery, etc., may be a source
of income falling under the head "other sources"
within that section and not necessarily under the head
"business" dealt with in section 10 of that Act. In the
facts and circumstances of this case, therefore, the
letting out of the plant, machinery, etc., cannot be
held to fall within the body of the definition of
"business" under section 2(5) of the Excess Profits Tax
Act. In this view of the matter it is not necessary for
us to express an opinion as to the meaning or implication of the proviso to that definition or rule 4 ( 4) of
Schedule I to the Act. In our opinion, in the facts and
circumstances of this case, question No. 3 should have
been answered in the negative.
The question of law raised in the third question being
answered in favour of the assessee firm, the question of
the npplicability of section lOA of the Excess Profits
Tax Act could not arise, for the assessee firm having,
during the relevant period, no business to which that
(1) [1946) 2 A. E. R. 609.
1 954
.Narain Swadeshi
Weaving Mills
v.
The CommiJsioner
of
Excess Prefits Tax
DasJ.
964
1954
Narain Swaddslai
Weaving Mills
v.
·The Omzm/Jrioan
of
E:teus Profits T""
Das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
Act applied section IOA could not be invoked by the
revenue and, therefore, the question whether there was
evidence to support the finding of the Tribunal under
that. section could not arise. On the contrary, the
further question of law which would really arise out of
the order of the Appellate Tribunal consequent upon
the aforesaid answer to question No. 3 would be whether under the facts and circumstances of the case the
application of section IOA with a view to amalgamating the income of the firms Uppal & Co., and Ram
Singh & Co., with the income of the assessee firm was
correct and valid in law and that was precisely the first
question which the assessee firm sought to raise by its
application. In our view the High Court should not
only have answered question No. 3 in the negative but
should also have raised, as a corollary to that answer
to question No. 3, the further question of law on the
the assessee's
lines indicated in question No. I of
petition. In other words, the High Court should have,
after answering question No. 3 in the negative reframed
the referred question No. I by restoring question No. I
as suggested by the assessee firm in its petition and
should have answered the question so restored in the
negative and in favour of the assessee.
For the reasons stated above, we allow this appeal,
reframe question No. I by restoring the first question
suggested by the assessee firm, namely"Whether under the facts and circumstances of
the case the application of section IOA with a view to
amalgamating the income of the firms Uppal & Co.,
and Ram Singh & Co., with the income of the appellant
firm was correct and valid in law ?"
and we answer the question so reframed in the
negative. Question No. 2 must be answered in the
negative and in favour of the assessee by way of necessary corollary. We also answer question No. 3 in the
negative. The appellant will be entitled to the costs
of this appeal and we order accordingly.
Appeal allowed.
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