SHREE MEENAKSHI MILLS LTD., MADURAI versus SRI A. V. VISVANATHA SASTRI AND ANOTHER.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 21 October 1954 | [1955] 1 S.C.R. 787 | 1954 INSC 98
Key facts
- Decided
- 21 October 1954
- Bench
- MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, GHULAM HASAN, NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI, T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 330/1954
- Disposal
- Disposed off
- Citation
- [1955] 1 S.C.R. 787
- Neutral citation
- 1954 INSC 98
Text of the judgment
S.C.R.
787
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
mentioned and, as before, a second order setting out
the purpose, housing a person without accommodation,
was made in August, 1951. For the reasons already
given, we hold that there was a public purpose and
that the orders here were valid.
The only other question, namely whether a
mandamus can issue now, becomes unnecessary. Civil
Appeals Nos. 145 and 147 of 1952 are allowed and
the petitions in these two cases will be dismissed
but here also there will be no order about costs
throughout.
Civil Appeal No. 146 of 1952 will be dismissed because
of the undertaking given by the learned AttorneyGeneral, and the order of the High Court will stand.
In view of this we need not decide. whether a mandamus
can or should have been issued. As we have said, this
appeal will be dismissed but there will be no order
about costs throughout.
j
1954
The State of
Bombay
v.
Bhanji Munji
and Anothn-.
Bose].
Appeal dismissed.
SHREE
MEENAKSHI
MILLS LTD.,
MADURAI
v.
»
•
SRI A. V. VISVANATHA SASTRI
AND ANOTHER.
(With Connected Petitions.)
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J., s. R. DAS,
GHULAM HASAN, BHAGWATI
and VENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.]
Constitution of India, Art. 14-Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947 (XXX of 1947), s. 5(1)-Whether ultra
vires the Constitution-S. 5(1) of Act XXX of 1947 and Indian
Income-tax Act (XI of 1922), s. 34 as amended by Indian Incometax (Amendment) Act, 1954-Whether cover the same field-Discriminatory procedure before the date of Constitution and after the
date of Constitution-Validity thereof.
Parliament by amending s. 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act,
1922, by passing the Indian Income-tax (Amendment) Act (XXXIII
of 1954) has now provided that cases of those very persons who
originally fell within the ambit of s. 5(1) of Taxation on Income
(Investigation Commission) Act, 1947 (XXX of 1947) and who, it
1954
October 21.
788
1954
Shree Meenakshi
Mills Ltd.
v.
Sri A. V. Vi.svanatlw Sastri
and Another.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
was alleged, formed a distinct class, can be dealt with under the
amended s. 34 and under the procedure provided in the Indian
Income-tax Act. Both categories of persons, namely, those who
calne \Vithin the scope of s. 5(1) as well as those who came within
the ambit of s. 34, now form one class.
Held, that after the coming into force of the Indian Incomctax (Amendment) Act, 1954 (XXXIII of 1954) which operates on
the same field as s. 5(1) of Act XXX of 1947 the provisions of
s. 5(1) of Taxation on Income (Investigation Com1nission) Act, 1947
(XXX of 1947), assuming they were based on a rational classification, have becorne void and unenforceable as being discriminatory in character.
Article I 4 of the
Constitution not only guarantees equal
protection as regards substantive laws but procedural laws as well.
"
\
-
When an Act is valid in its entirety before the date of the
Constitution the part of the proceedings regulated by the special
procedure and taken during the pre-Constitution period cannot be
questioned however discriminatory it may have been but the discrin1inatory procedure after the coining into force of the Constitution cannot be continued.
Suraj Mal Mohta v. Sri A. V. Visvanatha Sastri (A.LR. 1954
S.C. 545), Keshava Madhava Menon v. The State of Bombay ([1951]
S.C.R. 228), Lachmandas Kewalram Ahuja and Another v. The
State of Bombay· ([1952] S.C.R. 710), Syed Qasin Razvi v. State of
Hyderabad ([1953] S.C.R. 589) and Habeeb Mohammad v. State of
Hyderabad ([1953] S.C.R. 661) referred to.
ORIGINAL JuRISDICTION : Petitions Nos. 330 to
333 of 1954.
Under article 132 of the Constitution of India for
the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
P. R. Das (B. Sen, Balaprasad Singh and Ganpat
Rai, with him) for the petitioner.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, and
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India (G. N. Joshi,
Porus A. Mehta and P. G. Gokhale, with them) for the
respondents.
1954. October 21. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J.-Writ Petitions Nos.
330 to 333 of 1954, though presented by different
persons, raise identical questions for consideration and
decision and can be conveniently disposed of by one
judgment.
-
S.C.R.
•
-
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
789
1954
In April, 1947, Taxation on Income (Investigation
Commission) Act, 1947 (Act XXX of 1947), was passed
Shree Meenakshi
Mills Laid.
by the Central Legislature. By section 3 of the Act the
v.
Central Government was empowered to constitute an
Sri A. V. Visvanatha Sastri
Income-tax Investigation Commission for investigating
and Another.
matters relating to taxation on income with particular
Mahajan C. ].
reference to the qµestion whether the existing law was
adequate for preventing the evasion thereof. Section
5(1) of the Act further empowered the Q~ntral Government to make a reference by the 30th June, 1948, to the
Commission for investigation and report of any cases
wherein it had prima facie reason for believing that a
person had, to a substantial extent, evaded payment of
taxation on ilKome. The date for making the reference
was subsequently extended to 1st of September, 1948.
By an Amendment Act passed in 1948 it was provided
that the life of the Commission, in the first instance,
would be up to the 31st of March, 1950, but that it
could be further extended to 31 of March, 1951. By
subs1~quent legislations the life of the
Commission has
been extended to December, 1955.
The procedure prescribed by the Act for making the
investigation under its provisions is of a summary and
drastic nature. It constitutes a departure from the
ordinary law of procedure and m certain important
aspects is detrimental to the persons subjected to it
and as such is discriminatorv. The substantial differences 111 the normal procedure of the Income-tax Act
for catching escaped mcome and in the procedure
prescribed by Act X~X of 1947. were fully discussed
by this Court in Suraj Mal Mohta v. Sri A. V. Visvanatha Sastri (1) and require no further discussion here.
Sub-section ( 4) of section 5 of the Act provided that
the Central Government could refer to the Commission
cases of persons other than those whose cases had been
referred to it by the 1st of September, 1948, under
Commission
section 5(1) if, after investigation, the
made a report to that effect. Thus, two categories of
cases under Act XXX of 1947 could be referred to the
investigation Commission by the Central Government, ,
[1955] I S.C.R. 448.
790
1 ~54
Shret Mteiiakhsi
Mills Ltd.
v.
Sri A. V. Visva·
nat!llJ Sastri
and Another.
Mahqjan C. J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
namely, those falling under section 5(1) and those falling
under section 5 (4) of the Act.
In accordance with the provisions of section 5 (I) of
the Act the Central Government on the 31st of
December, J947, referred to the Investigation Commiss10n the cases of the four petitioners for investigation
and report. It is alleged by each of these petitioners
that no action was taken by the Commission on these
references during the original period of its life or even
during the extended perioo provided by the Amendment Act of 1948. If a report had been submitted m
these cases during the original period of the life of the
Commission, the problems that now anse would not
have arisen, because the Act being a pre-Constitution
Act was good law before the Constitution and acts done
· thereunder before the commencement of the Constitution could not be impugned on the basis of the provis10ns of Part III of the Constitution which came into
force on the 26th January, 1950. Those provisions had
no retrospective operation and could not affect the
validity of this law or the completed proceedings taken
thereunder. Be that as it may, it appears that nothing
happened in these cases till January, 1952, when it 1s
allc;15ed an official of the Commission summoned the
petitioners for a preliminary discussion which took
place in February, 1952, and since then the petitioners
have from time to time been called upon to produce a
number of statements and books of account, but the
investigation has not proceeded beyond the preliminary
stages and the Commission itself has admittedly not
commenced any proceedings in these cases, though a
period of nearly seven years has elapsed smce the
references were made, with the result that subsequent
events have intervened and, in our opinion, have made
these references to the Commission abortive.
As already stated, the Constitution of India came
into force on the 26th January, 1950, and the preConstitution laws had then to stand the test for their
validity on the provisions of Part III of the Constitution. Article 14 of this Part guarantees to all persons
the right of equality before the law and equal protection
of the laws within the territory of India. This article not
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Qnly guarantees equal protection as regards substantive
laws but procedural laws also come within its ambit.
The implication of the article is that all litigants
similarly situated are entitled to avail themselves of
the same procedural rights
relief: a?-d. fo: defence
with like protection and without discnmmanon. The
procedural provisions of Act XXX of 1947 had therefore to stand the challenge of article 14 and could only
be upheld provided they withstoood tl1at challenge. The
·question was canvassed in this Court in April, 1954, in
Suraj Mal Mohta v. Sri A. V. Visvanatha Sastri (supra).
What happened in that case was that the Investigation
'Commission, while dealing with the case of another
assessee referred to it under section 5 ( 1) of the Act,
reported to the Central Government that Suraj Mal
Mohta and other members of the family had evaded
income-tax and their cases should be referred to it
under the provisions of sub-section (4) of section 5.
The reference was accordingly made with the result
that Suraj Mal Mohta applied to this Court under
article 32 for an appropriate writ restraining the Commission from taking any action against him under the
provisions of Act XXX of 1947. It was there contended that the provisions of sections 5(1), 5(4), 6, 7
:and 8 of the Act had become void after the coming into
force of the Constitution, being discriminatory in
·character, and that these provisions contravened the
guarantee of article 14 of the Constitution. This Court
upheld this contention and granted an appropriate
·writ to Suraj Mal Mohta. It there expressed the
·Qpinion that sub-section ( 4) of section 5, on its plain
reading, was not limited to cases of persons who, to a
substantial extent, had evaded taxation but that it
·dealt with all those persons whose cases fell within the
:ambit of section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act, and
that being so, there was no justification for discriminating them in matters of procedure from those dealt with
11mder the Indian Income-tax Act, and thus sub-section
( 4) of section 5 was hit by article 14 of the Constitution
:and was void and unenforceable. The result of this
1decision was that the Commission was restrained from
.dealing with Mohta's case. The provisions of section 5(1)
£o:
-
791
1954
Shree Meenakshi
Mills Ltd.
v.
Sri A. V. Visvanatha Sastri
and Another.
Mahajan C. J.
792
1 954
Skrte Meenakshi
Mills Ltd.
v.
Sri A. V. Visvanatha Sastri
and Another.
Mahajan C. J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955)
of the Act W!'re also attacked in that case as contravening article 14 of the Constitution, but the Court
refrained from expressing any opnuon about their
constitutionality as that question had no relevancy
then. The consequence of that decision was that a
certain provision of Act
XXX of 1947 was declared
void and unenforceable to the extent of its repugnancy
to the provisions of Part III of the Constitution under
article 13(1) thereof.
Its validity however during
the pre-constitution period was beyond q>1estion.
What this Court said in its judgment in Suraj Mal
Mohta v. Sri A. V. Visvanatha Sastri (supra) has perhaps
resulted m the filing of these petitions which were
presented to this Court on the 16th of July, 1954, after
the decision in that case had been pronounced. In the
petitions, as originally drafted, the provisions of section.
5 ( 1) of Act XXX of 1947 were impugned on the ground
that they contravened the guarantee of equal protection of the laws enacted in article 14 of the Constitution and for that reason the Commission had nojurisdiction to deal with the cases of the petitioners by
applying the discriminatory and drastic procedure of
the impugned Act. It was alleged that the petitioners
belonged to the same class, of persons as were dealt
with under the ordinary law enacted in section 34 of the·
Indian Income-tax Act. Before these petitions could
come to a hearing and a day after they were presented
to this Court, the Indian Income-tax (Amendment)
Ordinance VIII of 1954 was promulgated by the·
President and this was subsequently made into an Act
on the 25th of September, 1954. The Indian Income-.
tax (Amendment) Act, XXXIII of 1954, though
assented to by the President on the 25th of September,.
1954, came into force with effect from the 17th of July,
1954. The provisions of this Act furnished an additional ground of attack to the petitioners on the·
continuance of proceedings by the Commission in these·
cases under the prov1s10ns of Act XXX of 1947. An
application was therefore made seeking permission to.
urge additional grounds. This was not opposed by the
learned Attorney-General and was allowed. In the
additional grounds it was urged that the relevant:
•
....
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
793
sections of Act XXX of 1947, which affected the petitioners, had been impliedly repealed by the amended
Act of 1954 and ceased to have any legal force and that
the Commission could no longer proceed under those
prov1S1ons against
the petitioners. It was further
contended that the amended section 34 of the Indian
Income-tax Act was comprehensive in its scope, and
all persons that were dealt with under section 5 ( 1) of
Act XXX of 1947 had been brought within its ambit,
and that being so, there was no basis left for giving
them discriminatory or special treatment different from
those similarly situated, and who were to be dealt with
under section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act as
amended. It was said that assuming but without
admitting that section 5(1) of Act XXX of 1947 was
based on a rational classification and was not hit by
article 14 of the Constitution because of that circumstance, it had now, because of the amendment in section
34 of the Income-tax Act, become void, as the classification which saved it from the mischief of article 14 if
at all, had become ineffective, its distinctive characteristics having disappeared, and that the persons falling
within the class defined in section 5 (1) now belong to
the same class as is dealt with by section 34 as amended.
Two questions were thus canvassed before us :
(1) Whether section 5(1) of Act XXX of 1947
infringes article 14 of the Constitution inasmuch as it
is not based on a rational classification ?
(2) Whether, after the coming into force of the
Indian Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1954, which
operates on the same field as section 5(1) of Act XXX
of 1947, the provisions of section 5(1) of Act XXX of
1947, assuming they were based on a rational classification, have not become void and unenforceable, as
being discriminatory in character ?
In our opinion, for the purpose of deciding these
petitions, it is not necessary to express any opm10n on
the first question because we think the second contention is well founded and is sufficient to determine the
case in favour of the petitioners.
The provisions of section 5 ( 1) of Act XXX of 1947
could only be supported, if at all for a differential
1954
Skree Memakshi
Mills Ltd.
v.
Sri A. V. Visv,,..
natha Sastri
and Another.
Mahqjan C. J.
794
1954
Sbree Meenakshi
Mills Ltd.
v.
Sri .A. V. Visoanatha Sastri
and Anotha'.
Mahajan C. J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19551
treatment of persons dealt with in that section in
matters of procedure, on the ground that these persons
constituted a separate class, and the classification was
Parliament has, however, by amending secrational.
tion 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act, now provided
that cases of those very persons who originally fell
within the ambit of section 5(1) of Act XXX of 1947,
and who it was alleged formed a distinct class, can be
dealt with under the amended section 34 and under
the procedure p~ovided in the Income-tax Act. Both
categories of persons, namely, those who came within
the scope of section 5 ( 1) as well as those who came
within the ambit of section 34, now form one class. In
other words, substantial tax-dodgers or war profiteers
who were alleged to have formed a definite class
according to the contention of the learned AttorneyGeneral under section 5(1), and whose cases needed
special treatment at the hands of the Investigation
Commi;sion. now clearly fall within the ambit of
amended section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act.
That being so, the only basis for giving them differential treatment, namely, that they formed a distinct
class by themselves, has completely disappeared, with
the result that continuance of discriminatory treatment
to them comes within the mischief of article 14 of the
Constitution and has thus to be relieved against. All
these persons can now well ask the question, why are
we now being dealt with by the discriminatory and
drastic procedure of Act XXX of 1947 when those
similarly situated as ourselves can be dealt with by the
Income-tax Officer under the amended provisions of
section 34 of the Act. Even if we once bore a distinctive label that distinction no longer subsists and the
label now borne by us is the same as is borre by
persons who can be dealt with under section 34 of the
Act as amended ; in other words, there is nothing uncommon either in properties or in characteristics
between us and those evaders of income-tax who are
to be discovered by the Income-tax Officer under the
provisions of amended section 34. In our judgment,
no satisfactory answer can be returned to this query
because the field on which amended section 34 op~rates
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S.C.R.
.,
#
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
795
now includes the strip of territory which previously
was occupied by section 5(1) of Act XXX of 1947 and
two substantially different laws of procedure, one being
more prejudicial to the assessee than the other, cannot
be allowed to operate on the same field in view of the
guarantee of article 14 of the Constitution.
The learned Attorney-General attempted to combat
this contention on a two-fold ground : (I) That the
class of persons dealt with under section 5(1) of Act
XXX of 1947 was not only the class of substantial taxdodgers but it was a class of persons whose cases
the Central Government, by 1st of September, 1948,
had referred to the Commission and that class had
thus become determined finally on that date, and that
that class of persons could be dealt with by the
Investigation Commission under the drastic procedure
of Act XXX of 1947, while section 34 of the Indian
Income-tax Act as amended empowered the Incometax Officer to deal with cases other than those whose
cases had been referred under section 5 ( 1) to the
Investigation Commission : (2) That in any case the
proceedings having started before the Commission in
pursuance of the reference under section 5 ( 1) of Act
XXX of 1947 those proceedings cannot be affected by
the amendment, it having no retrospective operation.
Both these contentions, in our opinion, are not well
founded.
As regards the first contention canvassed by the
learned Attorney-General it seems to us that it cannot
stand scrutiny. The class of persons allege.cl to have
been dealt with by section 5(1) of the impugned Act
was comprised of those unsocial elements in society
who during recent years prior to the passing of the Act
had made substantial profits and had evaded payment
of tax on those profits and whose cases were referred
to the Investigation Commission before 1st September,
1948. Assuming that evasion of tax to a substantial
amount could form a basis of classification at all for
imposing a drastic procedure on that class, the inclusion
of only such of them whose cases had been referred
before 1st September, 1948, into a class for being dealt
with by the drastic procedure, leaving other tax evaders
1
954
Shru Meenaksht
Mills Ltd.
v.
Sri A. V. Visva-.
natha Sastri
and Another.
Mahqjan C. J.
7%
1 954
Sfirtt Munakshi
Mills Ltd.
v.
)' ·j A. V.
Visvaa
natka Sastri
md Another.
~ll W.jan C. ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
to be dealt with under the ordinary law will be a clear
discrimination for the reference of the case within a
particular time has no special or rational nexus with
the necessity for drastic procedure. Further it seems
that this very class of persons is now included within
the ambit of the amended section 34 of Act XXXIII
of 1954. The draftsman of this section has apparently
attempted to remedy whatever defects in the classification made under section 5(1) of Act XXX of 1947
had been pointed out during the discussion in Suraj
Mal M ohta's case in this Court. The preamble of the
Act states that the Act is intended to provide for
assessment or re-assessment of persons who to a
substantial extent had evaded payment of tax during a
certain period and for matters connected therewith.
The language employed here bears close likeness to
that employed in section 5(1) of the impugned Act.
The Act has inserted the following sub-section in
section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act :
"(1-A) If, in the case of any assessee, the Incometax Officer has reason to believe(i) that income, profits or gains chargeable to
income-tax have escaped assessment for any year m
respect of which the relevant previous year falls wholly
or partly within the period beginning on the 1st day
of September, 1939; and ending on the 31st day of
March, 1946 ; and
(ii) that the income, profits or gain which have so
·escaped assessment for any such year or years amount
or are likely to amount to one lakh of rupees or more ;
he may, notwithstanding that the period of eight years
or, as the case may be, four years specified in subsection ( 1) has expired in respect thereof, serve on the
assessee ........ a notice containing all or any of the
requirements which may be included in a notice under
sub-section (2) of section 22, and may proceed to assess
<>r reassess the income, profits or gains of the assessee
for all or any of the years referred to in clause ( 1) and
thereupon the provisions of this Act ...... shall, so far
as may be, apply accordingly ...... "
It was argued in M ohta's case as well as in these
petitions that the classification made in section 5 ( 1) of
.
•
•
S.C.R.
•
SUPREME -COURT REPORTS
797
the impugned Act was bad because the word "substantial" used therein was a word which had no fixed
meaning and was an unsatisfactory medium for carrying the idea of some ascertainable proportion of the
whole, and thus the classification being vague and
uncertain, did not save the enactment from the mischief
of article 14 of the Constitution. This alleged defect
stands cured in the amended section 34 inasmuch as
the Legislature has clearly indi9ted in the statute what
~t means when it says that the object of the Act is to
catch persons who to a substantial extent had evaded
payment of tax, in other words, what was seemingly
indefinite within the meaning of the word "substantial"
has been made definite and clear by enacting that no
evasion below a sum of one lakh is within the meaning
of that expression. Again, the classification of section
5(1) was criticized on the ground that it did not necessarily deal with persons who during the period of war
had made huge profits and evaded payment of tax on
them. The amendment made in section 34 has
remedied this defect also. The amended section clearly
states that the amended section will operate on income
made between the 1st September, 1939, and the 31st
March, 1946, and tax on which has been evaded. It
is thus clear that the new sub-section inserted in section
34 by the provisions of Act XXXIII of 1954 is intended
to deal with the class of persons who were said to have
been classified for sp~cial treatment by section 5(1) of
Act XXX of 1947. The learned Attorney-General
frankly conceded that to a certain extent the two
sections overlapped, but he urged that the overlapping
was not complete and that these remained still outside
it whose cases had already been referred to the
Investigation Commission. We are unable to uphold
this contention in view of the clear language employed
in the amended Act and this contention is therefore
negatived.
The second contention raised by the learned
Attorney-General is, in our opinion, concluded by a
number of earlier decisions of this Court wherein it has
been held that when an Act is valid in its entirety
before the date of the Constitution, the part of the
proceedings regulated by the special procedure and
1954
Shree Meenakshi
Mills Ltd.
v.
Sri A. V. Visva·
natha Sastri
and Anolhn'.
Mahajan C. ].
798
1954
Shree Munakshi
Mills Ltd.
v.
Sri ..4.. V. Virva~
natha Saslri
and Another.
MahqjanC.J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
taken during pre-Constitution ,reriod cannot be questioned however discriminatory It may have been, but
that if the discriminatory procedure is continued after
the date of the Constitution, then a person prejudicially
affected by it can legitimately ask why he is now being
differently treated from others similarly situate-vide
Kesava Madhava Menon v. The State of Bombay('), and
Lachmandas Kewalram Ahuja and Another v. The State
of Bombay(2). The same propositions were re-stated by
this Court in Syed Quasim Razvi v. State of Hyderabad( 8 ),
and in Habeeb Mohammad v. State of Hyderabad(•). In
the cases of these petitioners, as already pointed out,
the proceedings taken by the Investigation Commission against them under the discriminatory procedure
of the impugned Act against them have not been completed and are pending and that being so, no justification remains for continuing these proceedings against
them under the procedure of the impugned Act when
other persons of th.eir class and having the same
common characteristics can be dealt with by the
Income-tax Officer under the provisions of the amended
Act and the procedure of the ordinary law of the land.
For the reasons given above we are of the opinion that
assuming the provisions of section 5(1) of Act XXX of
1947 could be saved from the mischief of article 14 of
the Constitution on the basis of a valid classification,
that defence is no longer available in support of it after
the introduction of the new sub-section in section 34
of the Income-tax Act, which sub-section is intended
to deal with the same class of persons dealt with by
section 5 ( 1) of the impugned Act. The result is that
proceedings before the ·Investigation Commission can
no longer be continued under the procedure prescribed
by the impugned Act. We therefore direct that an
appropriate writ be issued against the Commission
prohibiting it from proceeding further with the cases of
these petitioners under the provisions of Act XXX of
1947. In the peculiar circumstances of this case we
make no order as to costs in these petitions.
Writ issued.
(1) [1951l S.C.R. 228.
(2) [195 2 s.c.R. 710.
(3) [1953] S.C.R. 589
(4) [1953].R. 661.
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