SAGHIR AHMAD versus THE STATE OF U. P. AND OTHERS.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 13 October 1954 | [1955] 1 S.C.R. 707 | 1954 INSC 90
Key facts
- Decided
- 13 October 1954
- Bench
- MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*, BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, VIVIAN BOSE, GHULAM HASAN
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 182/1954
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1955] 1 S.C.R. 707
- Neutral citation
- 1954 INSC 90
Text of the judgment
· S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
707
The learned Attorney-General argued that Ram
Narain was a native Indian subject of Her Majesty
before the 15th August, 1947, and that description
continued to apply to him after the 15th August, 1947,
whether he was in India or in Pakistan, but we think
that the. description 'Native subject of Her Majesty'
after the 15th of August, 1947, became applicable m
the territory now constituted India only to residents
of provinces within the boundaries of India, and in
Pakistan to residents of provinces within the boundaries
of Pakistan and till the time that Ram Narain actually
landed on the soil of India and took up permanent
residence therein he cannot be described to be domiciled
m India or even a Native Indian subject of His
Majesty domiciled in India.
For the reasons given above we are of the opinion
that the decision of the High Court that Ram Narain
could not be tried in any Court in India for offences
committed in Mailsi in November, 1947, is right and
that the Provincial Government had no power under
section 188, Criminal Procedure Code, to accord sanction
to his prosecution.
The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed.
-
1 954
Central Bank of
India Ltd.
v.
Ram Narain.
Mahajan C. ],
Appeal dismissed.
-
SAGHIR AHMAD
1954
ti.
October I3f
THE STATE OF U. P. AND OTHERS.
(With Connected Appeal)
[M1mR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J., MuKHERJEA,
S. R. DAs, VIVIAN BosE and GHULAM HASAN JJ.]
"'"
Constitution of India, Arts. 14, 19(1) (g), 19(6), 31(2), 301Highway-lts origin and use-Citizen's rights in respect of highways-Vis-a-vis the State-State's right to control highway-Limit
of such control-Constitution of India (First Amendment) Act, 1951
-U. P. Road Transport Act, 1951 (U. P. Act II of 1951)-Whether
ultra vires the Constit,~tion-Subsequent amendment of Constitution
if can validate a prior unconstitutional Act.
708
1954
Sa1hfr. Ahmad
v.
The State of
. U.P.
and Olhtrs.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
A highway has· its origin, apart fro1n statute, in dedication
either express or implied, by the owner of land of a right of passage
over it to the public and the acceptance thereof
by the public.
Dedication is presumed by long and uninterrupted user of a way
by the public. The presumption in such cases is so strong as to
dispense with all enquiry into the actual ownership of the land or
the intention of the owner about its user.
All public streets and roads vest in the State, but the State
holds them as trustees on behalf of the public. The members of
the public are entitled as beneficiaries to use them as a matter of
right _a~nd this right is limited only by the similar rights possessed
by every other citizen to use the pathways. The State as trustees
on behalf of the public is entitled to in1pose all such limitations on
the character and extent of the
user as may be requisite for
protecting the rights of the public generally ; but subject to
such limitations the right of a citizen to carry on business in
transport vehicles on public path\vays cannot be denied to him on
the ground that the State owns the highways.
G. S. S. Motor Service v. State of Madras ((1952] 2 M. L. J.
894) referred to with appronl.
Within the limits imposed by State regulations any member
of the public can ply motor vehicles on a public road. To that
extent he can also carry on the business of transporting passengers
lt is to this carrying on of the trade or
with the aid of vehicles.
business that the guarantee in Art. 19(1) (g) is attracted and a
citizen can legitimately complain if any legislation takes away or
curtails that right any more than is pennissible under clause (6) of
that articl'!.
-
<"
Article 19(6) as the result of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, enables the State to carry on any trade or
business either by itself or through corporations owned or controlState to the exclusion of private citizens wholly or in
led by the
part. This provision of Art. 19(6), which was introduced by the
an1endment of the Constitution. in 1951,
was not in existence
when the U. P. Road Transport Act, 1951 (U. P. Act II of 1951),
was passed and therefore the validity of the impugned Act is not
to be decided by applying the provisions of the new clause.
A1nendment of the Constitution which came later cannot be
invoked to validate an earlier legislation \Vhich 1nust be regarded
as unconstitutional when it \Vas passed, because a statute void for
unconstitutionality is dead and cannot be vitalised by a subsequent
amendment of the Constitution removing the ~onstitutional objection but 1nust be re-enacted.
Although the normal use of the word "restriction" seems to
sense of limitation and not ~xtinction but (without
expressing any final opinion on the matter) if the word 0 restric·
tion" does not include total prohibition then the impugned Act
cannot be justified under Art. 19( 6) of the Constitution and it would
-
be in the
fr'
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
7CB
be void unless supported by Art. 31. If however the word
"restriction" in Art. 19( 6) be taken in certain circumstaru:es to
include prohibition as well then the prohibition of. the right of all
private citizens to carry on the business of motor transport on
public roads within the State of Uttar Pradesh as laid down by the
impugned
Act, cannot be justified as reasonable restrictions
imposed in the interests of the general public.
Whether the restrictions are reasonable or not would depend
to a large extent on the nature of the trade and the conditions
prevalent in it. There is nothing wrong in the nature of the motor
transport trade in the present case which is perfectly innocuous.
-
· The U. P. Road Transport Act, (II of 1951) which violates the
fundamental rights of the private citizens guaranteed under Art.
19(1) (g) of the Constitution and is not protected by clause (6) of
Art. 19 as it stood at the time of enactment must be held to be
void under Art. 13(2) of the Constitution.
...
The effect of the prohibition of the trade or business of the
c1t1zens by the impugned legislation amounts to deprivation of
their property or interest in a commercial undertaking within
the meaning of Art. 31(2) of the Constitution and therefore U. P.
Road Transport Act, 1951, offends against the provision of that
clause inasmuch as no provision for compensation has been made
in the Act.
The impugned Act: is not void on the ground that it offends
against the equal protection rule embodied in Art. 14 of the
Constitution.
-
The contention whether the impugned Act conflicts with the
guarantee of freedom of inter-State and intra-State trade, commerce and intercourse provided for by Art. 301 of the Constitution
discussed and the points that could be raised and the possible views
that could be taken indicated without expressing any final opinion
thereupon.
·
Cooverjee v. The Ei:cise Commissioner, etc.
distinguished.
..
([1954] S.C.R. 873)
West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose and Others ([1954] S.C.R.
587) and Dwarkadas Shrinivas v. The Sholapur Spinning anti
Weaving Co. Ltd. ([1954] S.C.R. 674) followed.
Packard v. Banton (68 L.E. 596; 264 U.S. 140), frost v. Railroad Commission (70 L.E. 1101 ), Stephenson v. Binford (77 L.E. 288),
Motilal v. Uttar Prad.,sh Government (I.L.R. 1951 All. 257),
Municipal Corporation of the City of Toronto v. Virgo ([1896] A. C.
88) A. K. Gopalan v. The State ([1950] S.C.R. 88), Lokanath Misra
v. The State of Orissa (A.LR. 1952 Orissa 42), Commonwealth of
Australia and Others v. Bank of New South Wales and Others
((1950] A.C. 235) and P. and 0. Steam Navigation Co. v. The
Stcretary of State (1861 5 B.H.C.R. Appendix 1) referred to,
1954
Sa1fiir
A.hmatl
v.
The State"',,of
U.P.
11nd Others.
710
.1954
Sag/Ur Ahmad
v.
· Tm Statt ef
U.P.
and Others.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
CIVIL APPELLATE
JuRISDICTION: Civil Appeals
' Nos: 182 and 183 of 1954.
Appeals under article 132(1) of the Constitution of
India from the Judgment and Order, dated the 17th
November, 1953, of the High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad in Civil
Miscellaneous Writ No. 414 of
1953, connected with
Civil
Miscellaneous
Writs
Nos. 537, 579 to 582, 587 to 595, 597 to 603, 617 to
620, 622, 623, 626 to 629, 633, 634, 638, 639, 651 to
654, 677 all of 1952 and 339 to 342, 351 to 355, 363,
372 to 374, 397, 416 to 464, 504 and 505 of 1953.
G. S. Pathak (V. D. Bhargava and Naunit Lal, with
him) for the appellants.
K. L. Misra, Advocate-General for the State of U.P.,
and Jagdish Swarup (!. K. Srivastva and C. P. Lal,
with them) for the respondents.
1954. October 13. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
MuKHERJEA J.-The
appellant
m these two
analogous appeals, along with many others, have been
carrying on the business of plying motor vehicles, as
'stage carriages' on hire, on the Bulandshahr-Delhi
route from a number of years past. The running of
these vehicles has been regulated so long by the Motor
Vehicles Act of 1939 which provides, inter alia, for
granting of driving licences, the registration of vehicles
and exercising control over transport vehicles through
permits granted by Regional Transport Authorities.
Section 42(3) of the Act exempts transport vehicles,
owned by or on behalf of the Central Government or
the Provincial Government from the necessity of
obtaining permits unless the vehicles were used in connection with the business of an Indian State Railway.
It appears, that some time after 1947 the Government
of U. P. conceived the idea of running their own
buses on the public throughfares.
They first started
running buses only as competitors with the private
operators but later on they decided to exclude all
private bus owners from the field and establish a
complete State monopoly in respect to the road transport business.
They sought to achieve this object by
..
•
S.C.R.
;
•
..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
711
calling in aid the provisions of the · Motor Vehicles Act
itself. Under section 42(3) of the Act as mentioned
:above, the Governmrnt had not to obtain permits for
their own vehicles and they could run any number of
buses as they liked without the necessity of taking out
permits for them. The Transport Authorities, in
furtherance of this State policy, began cancelling the
permits already issued to private operators and refusing permits to people who would otherwise have been
entitled to them. Upon this, a number of private bus
owners filed petitions in the Allahabad High Court
under article 226 of the Constitution praying for appropriate relief, by way of writs, against what was
·described as the illegal use of the provisions of the
Motor Vehicles Act by the Government of U. P.
These petitions were heard by a Full Bench of five
Judges and four judgments were delivered dealing with
various questions that were raised by the parties.
A majority of the judges expressed the opinion that
the State, purporting to act under section 42(3) of the
Motor Vehicles Act, could not discriminate against
'Other persons in their own favour and that the subsection, in so far as it purports to exempt State Transport buses from the obligation to obtain permits for
their use, conflicts with article 14 of the Constitution.
All the judges concurred in holding that nationalisation
of an industry was not possible by a mere executive
order without appropriate legislation and such legisla.tion would probably have to be justified under article
19(6) of the Constitution. As a result of this decision
the Transport Authorities were directed to deal with
the applications for permits, made by the various
private bus owners, in accordance with the provisions
of the Motor Vehicles Act, without in any way being
influenced by the consideration that the State GovernmcnJ wanted to run buses of their own on certain
routes.
In view of this pronouncement of law, the State
-Government, which wanted to have the exclusive right
to operate Road Transport Services within its territory,
'SOUght the assistance of the Legislature and the U. P.
Road Transport Act (Act II of 1951) was passed and
1954
. Sag!1ir Ahmad
v.
The Stafe ef
'U.P.
and Others.
Mukherjea ].
712
1954
Saghir Ahmad
v.
The State of
U.P.
«nd -Others.
• Muk/,,rjea J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955}
became law on and from the 10th of February, 1951.
It 1s the constitutional validity of this enactment
which is the subject-matter of contest in these present
proceedings.
The preamble to the Road Transport Act (hereinaftercalled "The Act") says :
"Whereas it is expedient in the interest of the
general public and for the promotion of the suitable
and efficient road transport to provide for a State Road
Transport Services in Uttar Pradesh, it is enacted as.
follows."
Section 2 gives definitions of certain terms, while
section 3, which is the most material section 111 the
Act, embodies virtually its whole purpose. It . provides'
that where the State Government is satisfied that it is
necessary, in the interest of general public and for subserv111,g the common good, so to direct, it may declare
that the Road Transport Services 111 general, or any
particular class of such service on any route or portion
thereof, shall be run and operated by the State·
Government exclusive! y or by the State Gov,ernment
in conjunction with railway or partly by the State
Government
and partly by others
in accordance
with tl1e provisions of this Act. Section 4 provides.
for publication of a scheme framed in accordance with
the above declaration and objections to such scheme
can be made by interested persons m the manner laid'
down in section 5. As soon as the scheme is finalised,
certain consequences follow which are detailed in section 7. So long as the scheme continues in force, the
State Government shall have the exclusive right to•
operate Road Transport Services, or if the scheme so.
provides, a certain fixed number of transport vehicles
belonging to others can also be rnn on those roads. The
State Government shall be authorised in all such cases
to direct the dispensation of the State Transport
vehicles from the necessity of taking out permits, or to
cancel, alter or modify any existing permits or to add'
any fresh condition to any permit in respect of any
The remaining portion of the Act
transport vehicle.
purports to lay down how the provisions of the Act are
to be worked out and implemented. Sections 8 and 9J
•
.S.C.R.
-
..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
713
provide respectively for the appointment of a Transport
Commission and Advisory Committees. Under section
10 the State Government may delegate its powers
under the Act to an officer or authority subordinate to
it. Section 12 makes it an offence for any person to
drive a public service vehicle or allow such vehicle to
be used in contravention of the provisions of section 7.
It is not necessary to refer to the provisions of the
remaining sections as they are not material for our
present purpose.
By a notification dated the 25th of March, 1953, the
U. P. Government published a declaration in terms of
section 3 of the Act, to the effect, that the State
carriage services, among others, on the BulandshahrDelhi route, shall be run and operated exclusively by
the State Government. A further notification _issued on
the 7th of April following set out what purported to
be a scheme for the operation of the State carriage
services on these routes. Thereupon the two appellants as well as several other private bus owners
numbering 106 in all, who plied transport buses on
these routes, presented petitions under article 226 of
the Constitution before the High Court at Allahabad
praying for writs, in the nature of mandamus, directing
State Transport
the U. P. Government and the
Authorities not to interfere with the operation of the
stage carriages of the petitioners and to refrain from
operating the State Road Transport Service except in
accordance with the: provisions of the Motor Vehicles
Act. The constitutional validity of the Act was challenged on a number of grounds, the principal contentions being :
(1) that the Ace was discriminatory in its character
and contravened the provisions of article 14 of the
Constitution ;
(2) that it confhcte<l with the fundamental rights
of the petitioners guaranteed under article 19(1) (g) of
the Constitution ; and
(3) that it was an invalid piece of legislation as.
it purported to acquire the interest of the petitioners.
in a commercial undertaking without making any pro.vision for compensation as is required under article 31(2)
1954
Saghir Afzmad"
v.
The State of
U.P.
and Othen.
714
1
954
Saghir Ahmad
v.
The Stale of
. U.P.
and Others.
· Mukherje.a J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
of the Constitution. It was further argued that the
Act violated the guarantee of freedom of inter-State
and intra-State trade embodied in article 301 of the
Constitution .
All these writ petitions were heard by a Division
Bench of the High Court consisting of Mukherji and
Chaturvedi JJ. By two separate but concurring judg. ments dated the 17th of November, 1953, the learned
Judges repelled all the contention·s of the petitioners
and dismisml the writ petitions. It is against this
decision that these two appeals have come up to
this Court on the strength of certificates granted by the
High Court and Mr. Gopal Swamp Pathak appearing
in support of the appeals has reiterated practically all
the grounds which were urged on behalf of his clients
in the Court below. We will take up these points in
proper order and it will be convenient first of all to
address ourselves to the two allied questions, viz., whether the appellants could claim any fundamental right
under article 19( 1) (g) or the Constitution which can. be
said to have been violated by the impugned legislation,
and whether the Act has deprived them of any 'pmperty' which would attract the operation of article 31
of the Constitution ?
Mr. Pathak argues that a right to carry on any
occupation, trade or business is guaranteed to all
citizens by article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution. The
appellants in the present cases were carrying on the
business of plying buses on hire on a public highway
uptil now and the Act which prevents them from pursuing that trade or business conflicts therefore with the
fundamental right guaranteed under article 19(1) (g) of
the Constitution. It is said also that this beneficial
interest of the appellants in the commercial undertaking is 'property' within the meaning of article 31(2)
of the Comtitution and as the Act does not conform to
the requirements of that article, it must be held to
be void.
Mr. Pathak put forward another and a somewhat
novel argument that the right of the appellants to use
a public highway for purposes of trade is in the nature
of an easement and as such can be reckoned as property
'·
·'"•
..
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
715
in law ; consequently there has been a deprivation of
property by the impugned legislation in this sense
also.
This contention seems to us to be untenable
and it was rightly abandoned by the learned counsel.
The Advocate-General appearing for the State of
U. P. did not and could not dispute that a right
to pursue any
trade, business or occupation of
one's choice is guaranteed by the Constitution.
He
says however that this does not mean that a citizen
can carry on his trade or business anywhere he likes
and such right is also guaranteed by the Constitution.
He must have a legal right to use a particular place for
purposes of his trade or business, before he can resist
any encroachment upon it on the strength of the constitutional guarantee.
His argument in substance is,
that the bus owners, as members of the public, have no
legal right ro ply buses on hire on any public road.
The only right which a member of the public can assert
in respect of a. highway is the right of passing and
repassing over it. The State in which all public ways
vest under the law has the sole right to determine
whether it would allow any citizen to carry on a trade
or business upon a public highway and if so, to what
extent. The citizen has no inherent right in this
respect apart from any State sanction. The position,
therefore is, that the rights of the appellants, as indeed
those of the other bus owners, are created entirely by
State legislation and by State legislation they could be
deprived of the same. There is no question of any
conflict with the fundamental right guaranteed under
article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution in such cases. The
argument requires careful consideration.
It is not disputed that the Bulandshahr-Delhi route
is a part of the Grand Trunk Road which is a public
highway. According to English law, which has been
applied all along in India, a highway has its origin,
apart from statute, in dedication, either express or
implied, by the owner of land of a right of passage
over it to the public and the acceptance of that right
by the public (1). In the large majority of cases this
dedication is presumed from long and uninterrupted
(1) Vide Pratt & Mackenzie on Law of Highways, 19th edn. p. 13.
1954
Saghir Ahmat!
v.
The State of
U.P.
and Others.
Mukhnjea j.
•
716
1954
Saghi< Ahmad
v.
The State of
U.P.
and Others.
Mukheefea].
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
user of a way by the public, and the presumption in
such cases is so strong as to dispense with all enquiry
into the actual intention of the owner of the soil and it
is not even material to enquire who the owner was (1 ).
The fact that the members of the public have a right
of passing and repassing over a highway does not mean
however that all highways could be legitimately used
as foot passages only and that any other user is
possible only with the permission or sufferance of the
State. It is from the nature of the user that the
extent of the right of passage has to be inferred and
the settled principle is that the right extends to all
forms of traffic which have been usual and accustomed
.and also to all which are reasonably similar and
incidental thereto ( '). The law has thus been stated
in Halsbury's Laws of England(•) :
"Where a highway originates in an inferred dedication, it is a question of fact what kind of traffic it
was so dedicated for, having regard to the character of
the way and the nature of the user prior to the date at
which they infer dedication ; and a right of passage
Qnce acquired will extend to more modem forms of
traffic reasonably similar to those for which the highway was originally dedicated, so long as they do not
impose a substantially greater burden on the owner of
the soil."
There can be no dispute that the Grand Trunk Road
which, as a public highway, has been in existence since
the 15th Century A. D. has been used for all sorts of
vehicular traffic that were in vogue at different times.
Motor vehicles were certainly not known when the
road came into existence but the use of motor vehicles
jn modem times as means of locomotion and transport
could not, on the principle stated above, amount to an
unwarrantable extension of the accustomed user to
which the highway is subjected. If there is any
·danger to the road by reason of such user, or if such
user by one interferes with the user by others, it is up
to the State to regulate the motor traffic or reduce the
number or weight of vehicles on the road in any way it
(1) Ibid page 28.
(2) Ibid page 35.
(3) Vol. 16, p. 185.
•
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S.C.R.
j
...
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
717
likes, and to that no objection can possibly be taken.
But the right of the public to use motor vehicles on the
public road cannot, in any sense, be regarded as a right
created by the Motor Vehicles Act. The right exists
anterior to any legislation on this subject as an incident
of public rights over a highway. The State only
controls and regulates it for the purpose of cnsunng
safety, peace, health and good morals of the public.
Once the position IS accepted that a member of the
public is entitled to ply motor vehicles on the public
road as an incident of his right of passage over
a highway, the question IS really immaterial whether
he plies a vehicle for pleasure or pastime or for the
purpose of trade and business. The nature of the right
in respect to the highway is not in any way affected
thereby and we cannot agree with the learned AdvocateGeneral that the user of a public road for purposes of
trade is an extraordinary or special use of the highway
which can be acquired only under special sanction from
the State.
The learned Advocate-General m support of his
contention has referred us to a few American cases on
the point. In the case of Packard v. Banton ( 1 ) , Sutherland J. observed as follows:
"The streets belong to the public and are
primarily for the use of the public in the ordinary way.
Their use for purposes of gam IS special and extraordinary and generally at least may be prohibited or
conditioned as the Legislature deems proper."
This decision was approved in Frost v. Railroad
Commi~sion (2), and again in Stephenson v. Binford (3),
where Sutherland J.. practically reiterated his observations in the previous case as follows :
"It is a well established law that the highways of
the State are public property ; that their primary and
preferred use IS for private purposes ; and that their
use for purposes of gain is special and extraordinary
which generally at least the Legislature may prohibit
or condition as it set!S fit."
(1) 68 L. E. 596; 264 U.S. 140.
(2) 70 L. E. II01, no8.
(3) 77 L. E. 288, 294.
(4) I. L. R. 1951 All. 257.
1954
Saghir Ahmad
v.
The Stak of
U.P.
and Others.
Mukheifea J.
718
1954·
Saghir. Ahfflad
v.
T k Stai. of
U.P.
and Others.
Mukhffi~a
J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19551
We do not think that this is the law of India under
our Constitution.
The cases referred to above were
noticed by the Allahabad High Court in the Full Bench
decision of Motilal v. Uttar Pradesh Government ( 1 ) , and
two of the learned Judges constituting the Full Bench
expressed their op1mon that this 'doctrine of exceptional user' might have been evolved by the American
Courts in the same way as they evolved the 'doctrine
of police powers.' They both held that this American
rule did not embody the English or the Indian law on
.
the subject.
This identical point was investigated with considerable
thoroughness m a recent decision of the Madras High
Court in C. S. S. Motor Service v. State of Madras ('),
and it was pointed out by Venkatarama Ayyar J. who
delivered the judgment of the Court, that the rule of
special or extraordinary use of highways m America
had its roots m the doctrine of 'franchise', which 1s
still a recognised institution m that country. The
doctrine of 'franchise' or 'privilege' has its ongm m
English Common Law and was bound up with the old
prerogative of the Crown. This doctrine continued to
live in the American legal world as a survival of the
pre-independence days, though rn an altered form1 The
place of the royal grants under the English Common
Law was taken by the legislative grants m America
and the grant of special rights by legislation to particular individuals or companies is regarded there as a
'franchise' or 'privilege' differing from the ordinary
liberties of a citizen. The carrymg on of transport
buses by common carriers on the public· road in Amerirn
is a 'franchise' and not a common law right, which
could be claimed by all citizens and a distinction 1s
made, as the cases cited above will show, between
contract earners who carry passengers or goods under
particular contracts and common carriers whose business
is affected with public interest. Over the latter the
State claims and exercises a plenary · power of control.
Ayyar J. has, in our opinion, rightly pointed out that
this doctrine of 'franchise' has no· place in our ConstituConstitution the contract
tion. Under . the Indian
(1) I. L. R. 1951 All. 257.
(2) (1952) 2 M. L. J. 894
...
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•
,._-
S.C.R.
,
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
719
earners as well as the common carriers would occupy
the same position so far as the guaranteed right under
article 19(1) (g) is concerned and both are liable to be
controlled by appropriate regulations under clause (6)
of that article. The law on the point, as it stands at
present, has been thus summed up by the learned
Judge:
"The true position then Is, that all public streets
and roads vest m the State, but that the State holds
them as trustees on behalf of the public. The members
of the public are entitled as beneficiaries to use them
as a matter of right and this right is limited only by
the similar rights possessed by every other citizen to
use the pathways. The State as trustees on behalf of
the public is entitled to impose all such limitations on
the character and extent of the user as may be requisite
for protecting the rights of the public generally ; ..... .
but subject to such limitations the right of a citizen to
carry on business in transport vehicles on public pathways cannot be denied to him on the ground that the
State owns the highways."
We are in entire agreement with the statement of
law made in these passages. Within the limits imposed
by State regulations any member of the public can ply
motor vehicles on a public road. To that extent he can
also carry on the business of transporting passengers
with the aid of the vehicles. It is to this carrying on of
the trade or business that the guarantee in article 19(1)
(g) is attracted and a citizen can ligitimately complain
if any legislation takes away or curtails that right
any more than is permissible under clause (6) of that
article.
The legislation in the present case has excluded all
private bus owners from the field of transport business.
Prima facie it IS an infraction of the provision of
article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution and the question
for our consideration therefore IS whether this invasion
by the Legislature of the fundamental right can be
justified under the provision of clause (6) of article 19
on the ground that it imposes reasonable restrictions
on the exercise of the right m the interests of the
geneiral public.
8-88 s. a. India/59.
1954
Saghir Ahmad
v.
The Stall of
U.P.
and Others.
Mukfinjea ].
720
1954
taghir Ahmad
v.
The State of
U. P.
and Others
Mukherjea J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1~5]
Article 19(6) of the Constitution, as it stands after
the amendment of 1951, 'makes a three-fold provision
by way of exception to or limitation upon clause ( 1) (g)
of the article. In the first place it empowers the State
to impose reasonable restrictions upon the freedom of
trade, business, occupation or profession in the interests
of the general public. In the second place it empowers
the State to prescribe the professional and technical
qualifications necessary for practising any profession
or carrying on any occupation, trade or business.
Thirdly,-and this is the result of the Constitution
(First) Amendment Act of 1951-it enables the State
to carry on any trade or business either by itself or
through a corporation owned or controlled by the State
to the exclusion of private citizens wholly or in part.
It is not disputed that the third provision which was
introduced by the amendment of the Constitution m
1951 was not in existence when the impugned Act was
passed and the High Court rightly held that the
validity of the Act is not to be decided by applying the
provision of the new clause. The learned Judges held
however that quite apart from the new provision, the
creation of a State monopoly m regard to transport
service, as has been done under the Act, could be
justified as reasonable restrictions upon the fundamental right enunciated m article 19( 1) (g) of the
Constitution imposed in the interests of the general
public. The question is, whether the view taken by the
High Court is right ?
To answer this question three things will have to be
considered.
The first 1s, whether the expression
"restriction" as used in article 19(6) and for the matter
of that in the other sub-clauses of the article, means
and includes total deprivation as well ? If the answer
is in the affirmative, then only the other two questions
would arise, namely, whether these restrictions are
reasonable and have been imposed in the interests of
the general public ?
According to the meaning given
in the Oxford Dictionary, the word "restriction" connotes a 'limitation' imposed upon a person or a thing,
a 'condition or regulation' of this nature, though the
use of the word in the sense of suppression is not
'
-
..
,_,.
S.C.R.
...
\
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
721
:altogether unknown. In the case of Municipal Corporation of the City of Toronto v. Virgo( 1 ), Lord Davey while
discussing a statutory power wnferred on a Municipal
Council to make bye-laws for regulating and governing
:a trade made the following observation :
"No doubt the regulation and governance of a
trade may involve the imposition of restrictions on its
exercise ........ where such restrictions are in the opinion
of the public authority necessary to prevent a nuisance
or for the maintenance of order. But their Lordships
think that there is a marked distinction to be drawn
between the prohfoition or prevention of a trade and
the regulation or governance of it, and indeed a power
to regulate and govern seems to imply the continued
existence of that which is to be regulated or governed."
This line of reasoning receives support from the
observations made by some of the learned Judges of
this · Court in their respective judgments in the case of
A. K. Gopalan v. The State (2). The question for consideration in that case was the constitutional validity
of the Preventive Detention Act and one of the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellant in
attacking the Yalidity of the legislation was, th~t it
invaded the right of free movement guaranteed under
article 19(1) (d) of the Constitution; and as the restrictions imposed by it could not be regarded as reasonable
restrictions within the meaning of clause (5) of the
atricle, the enactment should be held to be void.
This
argument was repelled by the majority of the Judges
inter alia on the ground that a law which authorises
the deprivation of personal liberty did not fall within
the purview of article 19 and its validity was not to be
judged by the criteria indicated in that article but
depended on its compliance with the requirements of
articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution. The expression
"personal liberty" as used in article 21, it was said,
was sufficiently comprehensive to include the particular
freedoms enumerated in article 19(1) and its deprivation
therefore in accordance with the provision of article 21
would result in automatic extinction of the other freedoms also. In· this connection reference was made to
(1) [1896] A.C. 88, 93.
(2) [1950] S.C.R. 88.
1954
Saghir Ahmad
v.
The . State of
U.P.
and Others.
Mukherjea J.
722
1954
Saghir Ahmad
v.
Tile Sta" ef
U.P.
and Ot!zers.
.........
Mukhtryea ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(19551
the several sub-clauses of article 19 and Patanjali
Sastri J. expressed his views in the following words :
"The use of the word 'restrictions' in the various
sub-clauses seems to imply, in the context, that the
rights guaranteed by the Article are still capable of
being exercised, and to exclude the idea of incarceration though the words 'restriction and deprivation' are
sometimes used as inter-changeable terms, as restriction
may reach a point where it may well amount to
deprivation. Read as a whole and viewed in its setting
among the group of provisions relating to 'right to
freedom', Article 19 seems to my mind to presuppose
that the citizen to whom the possession of these fundamental rights is secured retains the substratum of
personal freedom on which alone the enjoyment of these
rights necessarily rests."
The point for consideration in that case was
undoubtedly different from the one that has arisen in
the present case and the question whether the restrictions enumerated in the several sub-clauses of article
19 could go to the length of total deprivation of these
liberties was neither raised nor decided in that case.
But a distinction was drawn by the majority of learned
Judges between negation or deprivation of a right and
a restriction upon it and although it was said that
restriction may reach a point where it might amount
to deprivation, yet restrictions would normally presuppose the continued existence-no matter even In a
very thin and attenuated form-of the thing upon
which the restrictions were imposed. Kania C.J. in
his judgment ( vide page 106) expressly said :
"Therefore Article 19(5) cannot apply to a substantive law depriving a citizen of personal liberty. I
am unable to accept the contention that the word
'deprivation' includes within its scope 'restriction' when
interpreting Article 21."
Against this view it may be urged that the use of
the words "deprivation" and "restrictions" as interchangeable expressions is not altogether unusual in
ordinary language and the nature and extent of restrictions might in some cases amount to a negation of the
right. The Orissa High Court in the case of Lokanath
•
-
•
•
/.-
S.C.R.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
723
Misra v. The State of Orissa(1) accepted this view and
made a distinction between "regulation" and "restriction". In the opinion of the learned Judges the observations of Lord Davey in Municipal Corporation of the
City of Toronto v. Virgo (supra) referred to above could
be distinguished on the ground that the expression
used in that article was not 'restriction' but 'regulation' and 'governing'. It is said that the framers of the
Constitution were aware of the distinction between the
power to 'regulate' and the power to 'restrict' and this
would be apparent from a scrutiny of sub-clause (a) of
clause (2) of article 25 of the Constitution where the
words "regulating" and "restricting" occur in juxtaposition indicating thereby that they were not intended
to convey the same meaning.
On behalf of the respondents much reliance has also
been placed on a decision of this Court in Cooverjee v.
The Excise Commissioner, etc. ( 2 ) where the point for
consideration was the validitv of the Excise Regulation
I of 1915. It was contended, inter alia, on behalf of
the appellant in that case that the Excise Regulation
and the auction sales made thereunder were ultra vires,
as the law purported to grant monopoly of that trade
to a few persons and this was inconsistent with article
19(1)(g) of the Constitution. This contention was
negatived and this Court held that for the purpose of
determining reasonable restrictions within the meaning
of article 19(6) of the Constitution on the right given
under article 19(1) (g), regard must be had to the nature
of the business and the conditions prevailing in a
particular trade. The State has certainly the right to
prohibit trades which are illegal or immoral or injurious
to the health and welfare of the public. The relevant
portion of the judgment runs as follows :
"Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution guarantees
that all citizens have the right to practise any profession or to carry on any occupation or trade or
business, and clause (6) of the article authorises legislation which imposes reasonable restrictions on this
right in the interests of the general public. It was not
disputed that in order to determine the reasonableness
(1) A.LR. 1952 Orissa 42.
(2) [1954] S.C.R. 873.
1954
Saghir Ahmad
v.
The State of
U.P.
and Others.
Mulc!wdeaJ.
724
1954
Sa1,hir Ahmad
v,
The Stat< ef
U.P.
and Ot!urs.
Muklulj;a ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(19551
of the restriction regard must be had to the nature of
the business and the conditions prevailing in that trade.
...... It can also not be denied that the State has the
power to prohibit trades which arc illegal or immoral
or injurious to the health and welfare of the public.
Laws prohibiting trades in noxious or dangerous goods
or trafficking in women cannot be held to be illegal as
enacting a prohibition and not a mere regulation."
It is contended on behalf of the respondents that
these observations clearly indicate that the expression
"reasonable restriction" as used in article 19(6) of the
Constitution might, in certain circumstances, include
total prohibition.. lt may be mentioned here that the·
Excise Regulation is not a prohibitory statute which
prohibits trading in
liquor by private citizens
altogether. It purports to regulate the 'trade in a
particular way, namely, by putting up the right of
trading in liquor in specified areas to the highest bidder
in auction sale. The general observations occurring in
the judgment cited above must therefore have to be
taken with reference to the facts of that case.
Be th_at as it may, although in our opinion the normal
use of the word "restriction" seems to be in the sense
of "limitation" an<l not "extinction", 've would on tl1is
occasion prefer not to express any final opinion on this
matter. If the word, "restriction" does not include
total prohibition then the law under review cannot be
justified under article 19(6). In that case the law
would be void unless it can be supported by article 31.
That point will be dealt with under the other point
raised in the appeal. If however the word "restriction"
in article 19(6) of the Constitution be taken in certain
circumstances to include prohibition
as well, the
point for consideration then would be, whether the
prohibition of the right of all private citizens to carry
on the business of motor transport on public roads
within the State of Uttar Pradesh as laid down by the
Act can be justified as reasonable restrictions imposed
in the interests of the general public.
As has been held by this Court in the case of
Coovcrjee v. The Excise Commissioner, etc.(1) whether
(1) [1954] S.C.R. 873.
•
S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REP.ORTS
725
the restrictions are reasonable or not would depend to
a large extent on the nature of the trade and the conditions prevalent in it. There is nothing wrong in the
nature of the trade before us, which is perfectly
innocuous. The learned Judges of the High Court have
upheld the validity of the legislation substantially on
two grounds. In the first place, they have relied on
what may be said to be an abstract proposition of law,
that prohibition with a view to State monopoly is not
per se unreasonable. "In my opinion'', thus observes
one of the learned Judges, "even this total stoppage of
trade on public places and thoroughfares cannot always
be said to be an unreasonable restriction". In the
second place, it has been said that the transport services
are essential to the life of the community and it is
conducive to the interests of the general public to have
an efficient system of transport on public roads. It is
pointed out that the preamble to the Act indicates
that the legislation was passed in the interests of the
general public who are undoubtedly interested in a
suitable and efficient road transport service, and it was
not proved by the petitioners that the monopoly,
which was contemplated in favour of the State in regard
to this particular business, was not conducive to the
common welfare. As a proposition of law, the first
ground may not admit of any dispute but we think that
the observations of Lord Porter in the Privy Council
case of Commonwealth of Australia and Others v. Bank
of New South Wales and Others(1) upon which considerable reliance has been placed by the High Court would
indicate the proper way of approach to this question.
"Their Lordships do not intend to lay it down'', thus
observed Lord Porter, "that in no circumstances could
the exclusion of competition so as to create a monopoly
either in a State or Commonwealth agency or in some
other body be justified. Every case must be judged on
its own facts and in its own setting of time and circumstance, and it may be that in regard to some economic
activities and at some stage of social development it
might be maintained that prohibition with a view to
State monopoly was the only practical and reasonable
(1) (1950] A. C. 235, 311.
1954
Saghir Ahmad
v.
T!rt State of
U.P.
and Ot!rtrs.
Mukherjea j.
726
1954
Saghir A/Jmad
v,
The Stat• of
U.P.
and Others.
Mukherj1a ).
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
manner of regulation". In order to judge whether
State monopoly is reasonable or not, regard therefore
must be had to the facts of each particular case in its
own setting of time and circumstances. It is not
enough to say that as an efficient transport service is
conducive to the interests of the people, a legislation
which makes provision for such service must always be
held valid irrespective of the fact as to what the effect
of such legislation would be and irrespective of the
particular conditions and circumstances under which
the legislation was passed. It is not enough that the
restrictions are for the benefit of the public, they must
be reasonable as well and the reasonableness could be
decided only on a conspectus of all the relevant facts
and circumstances.
With regard to the second point also we do not think
that the learned Judges have approached the question
from the proper stand point. There is undoubtedly a
presumption in favour of the constitutionality of a
legislation. But when the enactment on the face of it
is found to violate . a fundamental right guaranteed
under article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution, it must be
held to be invalid unless those who support the legislation can bring it within the purview of the exception
laid down in clause (6) of the article. If the respondents do not place any materials before the Court to
establish that the legislation comes within the permissible limits of clause ( 6), it is surely not for the appellants to prove negatively that the legislation was not
reasonable and was not conducive to the welfare of the
community. In the present case we have absolutely
no materials before us to say in which way the
establishment of State monopoly in regard to road
transport service in the particular areas would be
conducive to the general welfare of the public. We do
not know the conditions of the bus service at the
present moment or the conveniences or inconveniences
of the public in regard to the same; nor we are told
how the position is likely to improve if the State takes
over the road transport service and what additional
amenities or advantages the general public would enjoy
in that event. We mention these matters . only ·to show
.v
'
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
727
that these are relevant facts which might help the Court
in coming to a decision as to the reasonableness or
otherwise of the prohibition, but unfortunately there
are no materials in the record relating to any one of
them. One thing, however, in our opinion, has a
decided bearing on the question of reasonableness <!nd
that is the immediate effect which the legislation is
likely to produce. Hundreds of citizens are earning
their livelihood by carrying on this business on various
routes within the State of Uttar Pradesh. Although
they carry on the business only with the aid of permits,
which are granted to them by the authorities under
the Motor Vehicles Acts, no compensation has been
allowed to them under the statute. It goes without
saying that as a result of the Act they will all be
deprived 0£ the means of supporting themselves and
their families and they will be left with their .buses
which will be of no further use to them and which they
may not be able to dispose of easily or at a reasonable
price. It may be pointed out in this connection that
in Part IV of the Constitution which enunciates the
directive principles of State policy, article 39( a) express! y lays down that the State shall direct its policy
towards securing "that the citizens, men and women
equally, have the right to an adequate means of
livelihood." The new clause in article 19(6) has no
doubt been introduced with a view to provide that a
State can create a monopoly in its own favour in respect of any trade or business ; but the amendment
does not make the establishment of such monopoly a
reasonable restriction within the meaning of the first
clause of article 19(6). The result of the amendment
is that the State would not have to justify such action
as reasonable at all in a Court of law and no objection
could be taken to it on the ground that it is an infringement of the right guaranteed under article 19(1)(g) of
the Constitution. It is quite true that if the present
statute was passed after the coming into force of the
new clause in article 19(6) of the Constitution, the
question of reasonableness would not have arisen at all
and the appellants' case on this point, at any rate,
would have been unarguable. These are however
1954
Saghir Ahmad
v.
The State of
U.P.
and Others.
Mukhtrjea ].
728
1954
Saghir Ahmad
v.
The State of
U.P.
and Otl1tn.
Mukherjea J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
fl955]
considerations which cannot affect our decision in the
present case. The amendment of the Constitution,
which canic later, cannot be invoked to validate an
earlier legislation which must be regarded as unconstitutional when it was passed. As Professor Cooley
has state<l in his work on Constitutional Limitations( 1 }
"a statute void for unconstitutionality is dea<l and
cannot be vitalised by a subsequent amendment of the
Constitution removing the constitutional objection but
must be re-enacted". We think that this is sound law
and our conclusion is that the legislation in question
which violates the fundamental right of the appellants
under article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution and is not
shown to be protected by clause ( 6) of the article, as it
stood at the time of the enactment, must be held to be
void under article 13(2) of the Constitution.
\Ve now come to the second point which is in a
manner connected with the first and the question is :
If the effect of prohibition of the trade or business of
the appellants by the impugned legislation amounts to·
deprivation of their property or interest in a commercial undertaking within the meaning of article 31 (2) of
the Constitution, does not the legislation offend against
the provision of that clause inasmuch as no provision
for compensation has been made in the Act ? It is not
serious! y disputed on behalf of the respondents that
the appellants' right to ply motor vehicles for gain is,
in any event, an interest in a commercial undertaking ..
There is no doubt also that the appellants have been
deprived of this interest. In the opinion of the High
Court, in the circumstances of the present case, there
is no scope for operation of article 31 (2) of the Constitution and the reason for taking this view is thus
given in the judgment of one of the learned Judges :
"The question is whether by depriving the private
operators of their right to run buses on certain routes'
and by deciding to run the routes itself the State
acquired the right which was of the petitioners ? T<>
me it appears that it could not be said that there was
by the State any acquisition of the right which was
formerly of the petitioners, whether such right was
(1) "\~ol. I, µ. :184 note.
•
S.C.R.
--
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
property or an interest in a commercial or industrial
undertaking. The vehicles which were being operated
by the private operators have not been acquired by the
State nor has any other tangible property which was
used by the petitioners for their business been acquired.
What has been done is that the petitioners have been
prohibited from operating their buses on certain routes.
This right of the petitioners has in no way been vested
in the State inasmuch as the State always had an equal
right with the petitioners to run their buses on these
routes."
According to the High Court, therefore, mere deprivation of the petitioners' right to run buses or their
interest in a commercial undertaking is not sufficient to
attract the operation of article 31 (2) of the Constitution
as the deprivation has been by the authority of law
\V,ithin the meaning of clause (1) of that article. Clause
(2) could be attracted only if the State had acquired or
taken possession of this very right or interest of the
petitioners or in other words if the right of the petitioners to run buses had been acquired by or had
become vested in the Government. The State, it is
pointed out, has an undoubted right to run buses of
its own on the public thoroughfares, and they do not
stand on the rights of the petitioners. This argument,
we think, is not tenable having regard to the majority
decision of this Court in the case of State of West Bengal
v. Subodh Go pal Bose and Others ( 1 ) and Dwarkadas
Shrinivas v. The S!iolapur Sp11mi11g and
•
729
Weaving Co.
Ltd.("). In view of that majority decision it must be
taken to be settled now that clauses (1) and (2) of
article 31 are not mutually exclusive in scope but
should be read together as dealing with the same subject, namely, the protection of the right to property by
means of limitations on the State's powers, the deprivation contemplated in clause (1) being no other than
acquisition or taking possession of the property referred
to in clause (2). The learned Advocate-General conceded this to be the true legal position after the
pronouncements of this Court referred to above. The
fact that the buses belonging to the appellants have
I 1) [1954] S.C.R. 587.
(2) [1954] S.C.R. 674.
1954
Saghir Ahmatl
v.
The State of
U.P.
andOthm.
M11kherjea J.
730
1954
Saghir A/imad
v,
Th< Stal• of
U.P.
and Others.
Mukh'1'jea J.
SUPREME COURT ,REPORTS
[1955]
not been acquired by the Government 1s also not
material. The property of a business may be both
tangible and intangible. Under the statute the Government may not ·deprive the appellants of their buses or
any other tangible property but they are depriving
them of the business of running buses on hire on public
roads. We think therefore that in these circumstances
the legislation does conflict with the provision of article
31(2) of the Constitution and as the requirements of
that clause have not been complied with, it should be
held to be invalid on that ground.
The next point that requires consiJeration is, whether the Act or any of its provisions are discriminatory
in their character and conflict with the rule of equal
protection emboJieJ in article 14 of the Constitution ?
Mr. Pathak has raised a two-fold contention on this
point. He has argued in the first place that no
discrimination coulJ be made in favour of the State as
against private individuals in the matter of carrying
on the business of plying buses for hire on public roads.
The State as a person, it is conceded, comes under a
different class or category from private citizens ; but
the contention is that when the State carries on trade
as merchants it occupies the same position as private
traders and its acts in this respect cannot be regarded
as acts of the sovereign. Much reliance has been placed
by the learned counsel in support of this view on the
judgment of Sir Barnes Peacock in P. and 0. Steam
Navigation Co. v. The Secretary of State('). The other
objection taken by the learned counsel is, that the Act
gives an unguided and unfettered discretion to the
State to associate such persons
as it likes in the
transport business and thereby allows it to discriminate
between one citizen and another. No rules are laid
down to regulate the choice of the State in such cases.
So far as the first ground is concerned, it is well
settled that mere differentiation does not make a
legislation obnoxious to the equal protection clause.
The Legislature has always the power to make classification and all that is necessary is that the classification
should not be arbitrary but must bear a reasonable
(1) (1861) 5 B.H.C.R. Append;x 1.
J
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
731
relation to the object which the legislation has in view.
There is no doubt that classification is inherent in the
concept of a monopoly ; and if the object of legislation
is to create monopoly in favour of the State with regard
to a particular business, obviously the
State cannot
but be differentiated from ordinary citizens and placed
in a separate category so far as the running of the
business is concerned and this classification would have
a perfectly rational relation to the object of the statute.
No doubt if the creation of a monopoly in favour of
the State is itself bad on the ground of violating some
constitutional provisions, the statute would be invalid
for those reasons and the question of discrimination
would not be material at all. In our opm1on, the
argument of Mr. Pathak that the State ceases to
function as a State as soon as it engages itself in a
trade like ordinary trader cannot be accepted as a
sound proposition of law under the Constitution of
India at the present day. In the last century, when
the laissez faire doctrine held the field, the primary
function of a State was considered to be maintenance
of law and order and all other activities were left to
private competitors. That conception is now changed
and in place of the 'police State' of old, we are now
having a 'welfare State'. Chapter IV of our Constitution which lays down the Directive Principles of State
Policy clearly indicates what the functions of a State
should be and many things which could not have . been
considered as State functions when the case of P. and 0.
Steam Navigation Co. v. The Secretary of State (supra),
was decided would certainly come within the legitimate
scope of State duties. Vide in this connection Lokanath
Misra v. State of Orissa (supra).
The other contention of Mr. Pathak in regard to
article 14 though somewhat plausible at first sight does
not appear to us to be sound. Section 3 of the Act
authorises the State Government to declare that the
road transport service in general or on particular routes
should be run and operated by the State Government
exclusively or by the State Government in conjunction
with railway or partly by the State Government and
partly by others in accordance with the provisions of
1 954
Saghir Ahmad
v.
The State of
U.P.
and Others.
Mukh.,jea ].
732
1954
Saghir Ahmad
v.
Tk Stale ef
U.P1
and Othtrs.
MukkzyeaJ J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
the Act. The whole question is how is the last part of
the section to be implemented and carried out ? If the
State can choose any and every person it likes for the
purpose of being associated with the transport service
and there are no rules to guide its discretion, plainly
the provision would offend against article 14 of the
Constitution. The learned Advocate-General pointed
out however that the State is only to choose the rout~s
or portions of routes on which the private citizens
would be allowed to operate and the number of persons
to whom permits should be given, and that the granting
of permits would necessarily be regulated by the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act. This does not appear to
us to be an unreasonable construction to be put upon
the relevant portion of section 3 of the Act and it
receives support from what is laid down in section 7 ( c)
of the Act. On this construction the discretion to be
exercised by the State would be a regulated discretion
guided by statutory ' rules. We hold therefore that the
appellant cannot make any grievance on this score and
that the statute does not offend against article 14 of
the Constitution.
The last point that remains to he considered is,
whether the Act conflicts with the guarantee of freedom
of inter-State and intra-State trade, commerce and
intercourse provided for by article 301 of the Constitution ? Article 301 runs as follows :
"Subject to the other provisions of this Part,
trade, commerce
and intercourse
throughout the
territory of India shall be free."
Article 302 authorises the Parliament to impose such
restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce and
intercourse between one State and another or within
any part of the territory of India as may be required
in the public interests. Under article 304 (b) it is
competent even for the Legislature of a State to impose
reasonable restrictions upon the freedom of trade,
commerce and intercourse mentioned above in the
interests of the public, but it is necessary that any bill
or amendment for this purpose should first receive the
sanction of the President before it is moved or
introduced in the Legislature of a State. Article 301
S.C.R.
=--
-
,. .,.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
733
corresponds to section 92 of the Australian Constitution and is even wider than the latter inasmuch as the
Australian Constitution provides for the freedom of
inter-State trade only. The High Court has negatived
the contention of the appellants on this point primarily
on the ground that article 301 of the Constitution has
no applicattion to the present case. What is said is,
that article 301 provides safeguards for carrying on
trade as a whole as distinguished from the rights of an
individual to carry it on. In other words, this article
is concerned with the passage of commodities or persons
either within or outside the State frontiers but not
directly with individuals carrying on the commerce or
trade. The right of individuals, it is said, is dealt
with under article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution and the
two articles have been framed in order to secure two
different objects.
The question is not quite free from difficulty and in
view of the fact that we have declared the Act to be
unconstitutional on the two grounds mentioned above,
we do not consider it necessary to record our decision
on this point. We would only desire to indicate the
contentions that have been or could be raised upon
this point and the different views that are possible to
be taken in respect to them so that the Legislature
might take these matters into consideration if and
when they think of legislating on this subject.
We desire to point out that in regard to section 92
of the Australian Constitution, which so far as interState trade is concerned adopts almost the same
language as article 301 of our Constitution, it has been
definitely held by the Judicial Committee in the case
of Commonwealth of Australia v. The Bank of New
South Wales (supra), that the rights of individuals do
come within the purview of the section. It is true, as
Lord Porter observed, that section 92 does not create
any new juristic rights but it does give the citizens of
the State or the Commonwealth, as the case may be,
the right to ignore and, if necessary, to call on the
judicial power to help him to resist legislative or
executive actions which offend against the section. It
follows from this, as his Lordship pointed out, that
195.i,
Saghir Ahmad
,.,
The State of
U.P.
and Others.
Mukhtrjea J.
734
1954
Saghir Ahmad
v.
The State of
U.P.
anti Others.
Mukherjea J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19551
the application of section 92 does not involve calculations as to the actual present or possible future effect
upon the total value of inter-State trade, the difficulty
in applying such a criterion being too obvious. If this
view is adopted in regard to article 301 of our
Constitution it can plausibly be argued that the legislation in the present case is invalid as contravening the
of
reasonable
terms of .the article. The question
restrictions could not also arise in this case, as the bill
was not introduced with the previous sanction of the
President as required by the proviso to section 304(b).
It is true that the consent of the President was taken
subsequently but the proviso expressly ms1sts on the
sanction being taken previous to the introduction of
the bill.
It may be argued that freedom of trade does not, as
Lord Porter observed in the Australian Bank case
referred to above, mean unrestricted or unrestrained
freedom and that regulation of trade is quite compatible
with its freedom. As against this it may be pointed
out that the Constitution itself has provided in articles
302 and 304(b) how reasonable restrictions could be
imposed upon freedom of trade and commerce and it
would not be proper to hold that restrictions can be
imposed aliunde these provisions in the Constitution.
The question would also arise as to what interpretation
should be
put upon
the
expression "reasonable
restrictions" and whether or not we would have to
apply the same tests as we have applied in regard to
article 19(6) of the Constitution. One material thing
to consider in this connection would be that although
the Constitution was amended in 1951 by insertion of
an additional clause in article 19(6) by which State
monopoly in regard to trade or business was taken out
of the purview of article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution,
yet no such addition .was made in article 301 or article
304 of the Constitution and article 301, as it stands,
guarantees freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse
subject only to Part XIII of the Constitution and not
the other parts of the Constitution including that
dealing with fundamental rights.
.,
-
.....
•
,
...
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
_735
1954
Saghir Ahmad
The Australian Constitution indeed has no provision
like article 19(1) (g) of the Indian Constitution and it
is certainly an arguable point as to whether the rights
of individuals alone are dealt with in article 19(1) (g)
of the Constitution leaving the freedom of trade and
commerce, meaning by that expression 'only the free
passage of persons and goods' within or without a State
to be dealt with under article 301 and the following
articles.
We have thus indicated only the points that could
be. raised and the possible views that could be taken
but as we have said already, we do not desire to express
any final opinion on these points as it is unnecessary
for purposes of the present case. The result is that in
our opinion the appeals should be allowed and the
judgment of the High Court set aside. A writ in the
nature of mandamus shall issue against the respondents
in these appeals restraining them from enforcing the
provisions of the U. P. State Road Transport Act, 1951,
against the appellants or the men working under them.
There will be no order as to costs.
Appeals allowed.
THE
EDWARD
MILLS CO. LTD., BEAWAR,
AND OTHERS
v.
THE STATE OF AJMER AND ANOTHER.
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J., MUKHERJEA,
V1v1AN BosE, JAGANNADHADAS
and VENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.J
Constitution of India, Art. 372-Words "law in force"-Meaning of-Whether include regulation or order having the force of law
-An order made under s. 94(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935
-Whether "law in force" and capable of adaptation-Minimum
Wages Act, 1948 (Act XI of 1948), s. 27-"Appropriate Government"
-Given power to add to either part of schedule-Any employment in
respect of which minimum rates of wages should be fixed-Whether
such power warranted and not unconstitutional and within the limits
of permissible delegation-Advisory committee-Appointment of-Under s. 5 of the Act-Extension of its term beyond the period already
expired-Validity-Procedural irregularities-Whether vitiate the
final report.
9-88 S. C. India/59
v.
The State of
U.P.
and Others.
Mukhnjea J.
1954
October 14
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