THE STATE OF BOMBAY versus BHANJI MUNJI AND ANOTHER
Supreme Court of India | Decided 12 October 1954 | [1955] 1 S.C.R. 777 | 1954 INSC 89
Key facts
- Decided
- 12 October 1954
- Bench
- MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*, BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA, VIVIAN BOSE, B. JAGANNADHADAS, T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 145/1952
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1955] 1 S.C.R. 777
- Neutral citation
- 1954 INSC 89
Text of the judgment
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
777
was not binding and could not be enforced. Whatever
1954
be the merits of such a contention, it obviously cannot
Seth Gopal Das
Moh/a
be raised in an application made under the provisions
of article 32 of the Constitution. The forum for
investigating such allegations is elsewhere.
The result is that this petition fails and is dismissed
with costs.
v.
Union of India.
and Anolhtr
Mahtifan C. ].
Petition dismissed.
THE STATE OF BOMBAY
v.
BHANJI MUNJI AND ANOTHER.
1954
I MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J., MuKHERJEA,
October 12.
VIVIAN BosE, JAGANNADHADAS
and VENKATARAMA AvYAR JJ.]
Constitution of India, Arts. 19(1) (f), 31(2)-Bombay Land
Requisition Act, 1948 (Bombay Act XXXIll of 1948), ss. 5(1) and
6(4) (a) as amended by Bombay Act II of 1950 and Bombay Act
XXXIX of 1950-Whether ultra vires the Cons1;1e<tion-Requisition of premises under s. 4(3) of the Act-Validity-Onus-Statute
- l-F hether must contain in express terms the publtc purposeI<cqurstiiu,, af 1u·orn1,,-Validity.
Sections 5(1) and 6(4) (a) of the Bombay Land Requisition Act,
194/i (Bombay Act XXX!II of 19t8) as amended are not ultra
vr;·.J Arts. 19( I) (f), and 31 (2) of the Constitution.
Article 19(1) (£) read with clause (5) postulates the existence
of property which can be enjoyed and over which rights can be
exercised because otherwise the reasonable
restrictions contemplated by clause (5) cannot be brought into play. In ·the present
case the right to occupy the premises has gone, as also the right to
transfer, assign, let or sub-let. What is left is merely the husk of
title in the lease-hold. Art. 19(1) (£), therefore, is not attracted.
The Bombay Larid Requisition Act, 1948, provides for compensation in s. 8 and the requisitions were made for a public
purpese. Therefore, the provisions of Art. 31(2) of the Constitution are complied with .
.. ,
. A statute is_ not in~~l!d for .the reason that the purpose for
which prol":r'Y is reqmslt!oned 1s not stated in express terms in
the statute 1:self provided from the whole tenor and intendment
of the Act it can_ be gathered that the property is acquired either
for th_c: p.irpose ot the State or for any public pnrpose and that the
mtentlo1' was to benefit the community at large.
778
I95f
The State ef
Bern.hoy
v.
Bhanji Munji
anf/ Anothtr
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
f1955]
When prima facie an order complies with the provisions of
the statute and is not illegal the onus lies on the person who
challenges the validity of the order to sho\v that it is illegal.
Under the Act only premises-to v.·hich a special meaning is
given natncly pre1nises which were "let" or "intended to be let"
-within the meaning of s. 4(3) can be
requisitioned and
the
Government requisitioned the premises in exercise of the po\vers
under the Act, the onus rested on the person \Vho alleged that the
premises in this case were not pre1njses within the n1ean1ng of
the definition and could not be requisitioned.
The State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose ((1954] S.C.R.
587), Dwarkadas Shrinivas of Bombay v. The Sholapur Spinning
and Weaving Co. Ltd. l• Others ([1954J S.C.R. 674), A. K. Gopalan
v. The State of Madras ([1950] S.C.R. 88). The State of llihar v.
-
Maharnjadhiraja Sir Kameshwor Singh of Darbhanga ([1952]
S.C.R. 889) and Biswabhusan Naik v. The State of Orissa ([1955J
I S.C.R. 92) referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JuRISDICTION : Civil
Appeal
No. 145 of 1952.
Appeal under article 132(1) of the Constitution of
India from t'.1e Judgment and Order, dated 21st
February, 1952, of the Bombay High Court in Appeal
No. 8 of 1952 arising out of Miscellaneous Application
No. 118 of 1951.
M. C.
Setalvad,
Attorney-General of
India,
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of Tnd;,, (J.l. J.I. Sccrvai, P. A. Mehta and P. G. Gokhale, with them) for the
appellant.
B. Sen, N. A. Palkhitoala and I. N. Shroff for the
respondents.
1954. October 12. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
BosE J.-This judgment will govern Civil Appeals
Nos. 146 and 147 of 1952 as well. We will first deal
. with the questions that are coinmnn to them all. They
arise out of three petitions made in the: Bombay High
Court for writs of mandamus under article 226 of the
Constitution. The writs have been gra.nted and the
State of Bombay appeals.
The facts are these. The Governor oi Boxnbay,
acting through the Assistant Controller of Atcommodation issued orders under section 6( 4) (a) of the Bombay
Land Requisition Act, 1948, in Civil Appeals Nos. 145
.• +
•
-
.
S.C.R.
-
I
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
779
and 146 of 1952 and under section 5(1) in Civil Appeal
No. 147 of 1952, requisitioning the premises of the three
respondents. The question is whether these orders are
ultra vire. They are attacked on a number of grounds
the first of which goes to the root of the matter. It is
contended that these two sections are ultra vires
articles 19(1) (f) and 31(2) of the Constitution.
The respondents are either the owners or the tenants
of the premises requisitioned. In Civil Appeal No. 145
of 1952 the respondents are uncle and nephew. The
uncle, who is the first respondent, is the tenant. The
second respondent is his nephew. He and his family
live >:Nith the first respondent in the requisitioned
premises. In Civil Appeal No. 146 of 1952 the premises
are owned by a trust. The first and second respondents
are the trustees and the third respondent claims to be
a licensee living on the premises. The State of Bombay
contends that he is a tenant but that is no longer of
consequence because of the assurance given by the
learned Attorney-General that the possession of the
petitioners in this case will not be disturbed for any
reason arising out of these proceedings. In Civil
Appeal No. 147 of 1952 there is only one respondent, a
private limited company which occupies the requisitioned premises as a tenant for the purposes of its
business.
The Act of 1948 would have expired in April, 1950,
but its life was extended by Bombay Act II of 1950.
Later, sections 5 and 6 were amended by Bombay Act
XXXIX of 1950. As the later Acts were after the
Constitution and as the life of the main Act was
extended after the Constitution came into force, it is
said that they are all hit by articles 19(1) (f) and 31 (2),
firstly, b~cause the restrictions imposed on the right to
hold, acquire and dispose of property are neither
reasonable nor in the interests of the general public
and, secondly, because the Act does not require that
there should be a public purpose.
We will fi,rst deal with Civil Appeals Nos. 145 and
146 of 1952 where tenants and licensees are concerned.
In our opinion, article 19(1) (f) does not apply to
them. In The State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal
1954
Tht State of
Bombay
v.
Bhanji Munji
and Anothtr
Bose J.
780
1954
Th< State of
Bomba)
v.
Bhan.Ji MunJi
and Anothtr
Bose J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
Bose('), and Dwarkadas Shrinivas of Bombay v. The
Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. & Others ('),
the majority of the Judges were agreed that articles
19(1) (f) and 31 deal with different subjects and cover
different fields. There was some disagreement about
the nature and scope of the difference but all were
agreed that there was no overlapping. We need not
examine those differences here because it is enough to
say that article 19(1) (f) read with clause (5) postulates
the exist<;_nce of property which can be enjoyed and
over which rights can be exercised because otherwise
the reasonable restrictions contemplated by clause (5)
could not be brought into play. If there is no property
which can be acquired, held or disposed of, no restriction
can be placed on the exercise of the right to acquire,
hold and dispose of it. and as clause (5) contemplates
the placing of reasonable restrictions on the exercise of
those rights it must follow that the article postulates
the existence of property over which these rights can
be exercised. In our opinion, this was
decided in
principle in A. K. Gopalan v. The State of Madras, ( 3 ),
where it was held that the freedoms relating to the
person of a citizen guaranteed by article 19 assume the
existence of a free citizen and can no longer Le enjoyed
if a citizen is deprived of his liberty "Y the law of
preventive or punitive detention. In the same way,
when there is a substantially total deprivation of pre>perty which is already held and enjoyed, one must
turn to article 31 to see how far that is justified.
It was argued as against this that this rule can only
apply when there is a total deprivation of property and
article 19(1) (f) cannot . be excluded if there is the
slightest vestige of a right on which the article cm
operate. This has also been answered in substance in
Dwarkadas Shrinivas of Bombay v. The Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. & Others (2 ) . These articles
deal with substantial and substantive rights and not
with illusory phantoms of title. When every form of
enjoyment which normally accompanies an interest in
this kind. of property is taken away leaving the mere
(') ['954] S. C.R. 587.
c.) ['954] S. C.R. 674.
(3) [1950] 0 • C.R. 88.
•
•
S.C.R.
•
..
•
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
781
husk of title, article 19(1) (f) is not attracted. As was
said by one of us in Dwarkadas Shrinivas of Bombay v.
The Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. &
Others( i ), at page 734"By substantial deprivation is meant the sort of
-deprivation that substantially robs a man of those
:attributes of enjoyment which normally accompany
rights to, or an interest in, property. The form is
unessential. It is the substance that one must seek."
In the present case, the right to occupy the premises
has gone as also the right to transfer, assign, let or
sub-let. What is left is but the mere husk of title in
the leasehold intertst : a forlorn hope that the force of
this law will somehow expend itself before the lease
runs out.
That brings us to article 31. The Act provides for
compensation in section 8, so all we have to see is
whether the requisition was for a public purpose.
The main Act is pre-Constitution and at that time
there were no fundamental rights, accordingly it is
understandable that the Act as then framed did not
require or specify a public purpose but despite that it
<lid say, in the preamble.
"whereas it is expedient to provide for the
requisition of land",
and sections 5 and 6 as now amended contain the
words
"for the purpose of the State or any other public
purpose."
Our present Chief Justice (Mahajan J. as he then
was) pointed out in The State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga (2 ) that"It is unnecessary to state in express terms in the
statute itself the precise purpose for which property is
being taken, provided from the whole tenor and
intendment of the Act it could be gathered that the
property was being acquired either for purposes of the
State or for purposes of the public and that the intention was to benefit the community at large."
Following that decision we hold that the Act is not
invalid for this reason.
. ( 1)
(1954) S. C.R. 674.
(') (1952) S. C.R. 889, 940
1 954'
TM Stal• of
Bombay
v.
Bhanji Munji
and Anoth<r
Bos<].
782
1954
Tht State of
Bomboy
v.
Bhmdi Munji
and Another
Bose J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
f1955J
We now turn to the orders of requisition. They can
only be upheld if they conform to the provisions of
the Act. The first question, therefore, is, whether they·
were made for a State or public purpose as set out in
sections 5(1) and 6(4) ? Civil Appeals Nos. 145 and 146
•
of 1952 have similar orders. We will examine them
first. They are of different dates but in each case the
order runs:
"Whereas, on inquiry, it is found that the premises
specified below had become vacant on/or after-the
month of May 1950.
Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred
by clause (a) of sub-section ( 4) of section 6 of the
Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 (Born. XXXIII
of 1948) the Government of Bombay is pleased to
requisition the said premises etc."
The petitions in these two cases were filed on the
30th and 4th of April, 1951, respectively. Affidavits in
reply were made on the 18th and 19th of June, and
then in August, 1951, the following order was served on
the petitioners :
"In continuation of the order dated etc. . ..... the
Government of Bombay is pleased to declare that the
premises mentioned in that order' were requisitioned
for a public purpose, namely housing a person, having
no housing accommodation on the date of the said
order cited above."
It was argued that this subsequent specification of
the purpose is of no avail and that in any case it is an
evident afterthought and not true.
In our opinion, it is not necessary to set out the
purpose of the requisition in the order. The desir- •
ability of such a course is obvious because when it is
not done proof of the purpose must be given in other
•
ways and that exposes the authorities to the kind of
charges we find here and to the danger that the Courts
will consider them well founded. But in itself an
•
om1ss1011 to set out the purpose in the order is not
fatal so long as the facts are established to the satisfaction of the Court in some other way. The underlying
principle of our decision in Biswabhusan Naik_ v. The;
State of Orissa(') applies here.
•
(') [1955] ' s. a. R. 92.
S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
783
. In the present set of cases there is proof of a public
purpose. It is given in the affidavits made on behalf
of the State and in the subsequent orders just quoted,
namely to house the homeless. At that time the housing
situation in Bombay was acute, largely due to the
influx of refugees. Questions of public decency, public
morals, public health and the temptation to lawlessness
and crime, which such a situation brings in its train,
at once arose ; and the public conscience was aroused
on the ground of plain humanity. A race of proprietors
in the shape of rapacious landlords who thrived on the
misery of those who could find no decent roof over
their heads sprang into being. Even the efficiency of
the administration was threatened because Government servants could not find proper accommodation.
Milder efforts to cope with the evil proved ineffective.
It was necessary therefore for Government take more
drastic steps and in doing so they acted for the public
weal. There was consequently a clear public purpose
and an undoubted oublic benefit.
An attempt was made in argument to view the matter
nanowly by concentrating on the individual and picking holes in isolated passages in the affidavit in reply.
The argument was as follows. The facts are taken
from· the affidavit.
In the year 1947 the Government of Bombay passed
the Bombay Land Requisition Ordinance and invited
applications for the allotment of vacancies from the
general public. So far a general public purpose for the
public good may be inferred. But the proper working
of this scheme depended on the co-operation of the
" • landlords and tenants who were required by the law to
give notice of vacancies in occupation as they arose.
It was found that in a very large number of cases this
was not done with the result that much of the accommodation which should have been available for
distribution was suppressed. Government accordingly
• introduced
another class of beneficiaries, namely, those
who gave information about what it called "suppressed
vacancies" and "Nominal occupation". It was decided
to allot premises thus discovered to be vacant to
{') [19i;5] I s. c. R. 92.
12-88 S. C. India/59
1954
The State of
Bombay
v.
Bhanji Mun.ii
and .Another.
Bost J.
784
1954
The Stale of
Bomb'!J
v.
Bhanji Munji
and Anothn.
Bose].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
the first informant provided he genuinely needed
accommodation. The allottees in the present appeals
are from that class.
Despite this it was found that the number of applications so far exceeded the number of vacancies that
'
there was not
enough accommodation even for
Government
servants
and
Government purposes.
Accordingly, in 1949, and again in 1950, Government
declared that it would not consider further applications from the public as it had decided to restrict
the
allotments to Government and other public
purposes. The result is that at the time of the
present allotments there was no intention to benefit
the public at large but to keep a privileged preserve
for Government servants, and in order to put
pressure on landlords and tenants to disclose vacancies
which could be added to this privileged pool rewards
were handed out to houseless first informers by giving
them the vacancies they were instrumental in discovering. This, it was hoped, would show landlords
and tenants that suppression did not pay and so they
might as well obey the law, and that, in turn, would
enable Government to benefit the only privileged class
.of persons it had any
real intention of benefiting,
namely its own officers and servants. This conclusion
is strengthened by the fact that when the decision
.about suppressed vacancies and first informers was
made in 1947, and again when the Bombay Land
Requisition Act was passed in 1948, there was no need
for a public purpose. So runs the argument.
Another argument was that in the affidavit in reply
·the State of llombay says that the purpose of the • •
legislation was to effect an equitable distribution.
"The policy of the Government was that having
•
regard to the fact that but for such intimation a
vacancy would not have come to light at all, it was
fair and just and conducive to an equitable distribution
'
.of accommodation that the premises should be allotted
to the first informant provided he genuinely needs
.accommodation."
It was contended, and the contention prevailed in
the High Court, that a decision to set apart a section
-
S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
785
of the much needed vacancies for the use of spies and
informers as a reward for their services, whether
their need was as great as that of other houseless persons
Qr not, was not equitable, and as the purpose of the
legislation was said to be the equitable distribution of
vacant accommodation this fell outside its scope.
In our opinion, this is not a proper approach to the
problem. The Constitution authorises requisitions for
a public purpose. The purpose here is finding accommodation for the homeless. If therefore a vacancy 1s
allotted to a person who 1s m fact houseless, the
purpose is fulfilled. It might be possible to attack a
given allottment on other grounds, such as fraud,
invidious discrimination, nepotism, bribery or corruption, but none of that is alleged here. All that is said
is that there was no public purpose.
A wide discretion must be left to Government to
carry out the policy of the Act. If the number of
vacancies is small and the number of the homeless
large, it is evident that there must be some picking
and choosing. So long as this is done on broad lines of
principle and reasonably, the Courts cannot interfere
simply because other methods are also possible, even
if the Courts think they are better, for in the end
Government must be left to determine which of
many possible schemes is the best.
Government
had to weigh many conflicting factors : the urgency
of the situation, the need of reasonable dispatch,
the expenditure of public funds which would be
inevitable on long and protracted enqumes about
the private affairs of thousands of applicants for
accommodation, the maintenance of public morale by
ensuring that the honest landlord who did his duty did
not suffer as against the dishonest person who suppressed his vacancies and made large and illicit profits
under his "puggree"; and in addition the equitable
maxim that "equity helps the vigilant". We hold that
neither the order of requisition nor the order of allotment in Civil Appeals Nos. 145 and 146 of 1952 is
ultra vires.
In Civil Appeal No. 146 of 1952 a further question
.anses. Under the Act only premises (to which a special
1 954
The State of
Bomhig
v.
Bhanji Munji
and Another,
Bose].
786
1954
The State of
Bombay
v.
Bkanji Mwiji
and Anothtr.
Bose].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
meaning is given) within the meaning of section 4(3)
can be requisitioned. It was urged that the premises
in this case were not premises within the meaning of
that definition, so it was said they could not be
requisitioned. The question turns on whether the
premises were "let" or "intended to be let". The
learned trial Judge threw the burden of proof on the
State Government and told its learned counsel that he
should proceed to prove this fact if he so desired. He
replied that he did not intend to lead any evidence. It
was explained to, us that Government took up this
attitude as it wanted a decision about where. the burden
lay as the question arises continually and cannot be
decided when both parties adduce evidence. The
learned Attorney-General gave an assurance that the
possession of the petitioners in this case would not be
disturbed ; all he wanted was a decision on the point.
In the absence of any counter evidence the learned trial
Judge accepted the facts proved by the petitioners'
affidavit and decided the matter in their favour.
On appeal the learned Chief Justice of the Bombay
High Court and Bhagwati J. upheld the view of the
learned trial Judge Tendolkar J. In our opinion, the
burden was wrongly placed. Th<; petitioners came to
Court with the allegation that Government had passed
an illegal order against them. On the face of it, the
order is not illegal.
Government has authority under
the law to make such orders, and prima facie the order
complies with the provisions of the statute. It was
therefore the duty of the petitioners to show that the
order was illegal. This is particularly so here as the
question whether the petitioners had let or had intended
to let the building or a part of it was a matter on which
they had special means of knowledge. However, m
view of the learned Attorney-General's assurance, there
is no need to go into this matter any further. This
appeal will accordingly be dismissed because of the
assurance given and there will be no order about costs
throughout.
In Civil Appeal No. 147 of 1952, the order of requisition was under section 5 ( 1) but the same questions
anse. As in the other two cases, no public purpose is
J
•
'
-
-
S.C.R.
787
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
mentioned and, as before, a second order setting out
the purpose, housing a person without accommodation,
was made in August, 1951. For the reasons already
given, we hold that there was a public purpose and
that the orders here were valid.
The only other question, namely whether a
mandamus can issue now, becomes unnecessary. Civil
Appeals Nos. 145 and 147 of 1952 are allowed and
the petitions in these two cases will be dismissed
but here also there will be no order about costs
throughout.
Civil Appeal No. 146 of 1952 will be dismissed because
of the undertaking given by the learned AttorneyGeneral, and the order of the High Court will stand.
In view of this we need not decide. whether a mandamus
can or should have been issued. As we have said, this
appeal will be dismissed but there will be no order
about costs throughout.
j
1954
The State of
Bombay
v.
Bhanji Munji
and Anothn-.
Bose].
Appeal dismissed.
SHREE
MEENAKSHI
MILLS LTD.,
MADURAI
v.
»
•
SRI A. V. VISVANATHA SASTRI
AND ANOTHER.
(With Connected Petitions.)
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J., s. R. DAS,
GHULAM HASAN, BHAGWATI
and VENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.]
Constitution of India, Art. 14-Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947 (XXX of 1947), s. 5(1)-Whether ultra
vires the Constitution-S. 5(1) of Act XXX of 1947 and Indian
Income-tax Act (XI of 1922), s. 34 as amended by Indian Incometax (Amendment) Act, 1954-Whether cover the same field-Discriminatory procedure before the date of Constitution and after the
date of Constitution-Validity thereof.
Parliament by amending s. 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act,
1922, by passing the Indian Income-tax (Amendment) Act (XXXIII
of 1954) has now provided that cases of those very persons who
originally fell within the ambit of s. 5(1) of Taxation on Income
(Investigation Commission) Act, 1947 (XXX of 1947) and who, it
1954
October 21.
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