DHIRUBHA DEVISINGH GOHIL versus THE STATE OF BOMBAY.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 11 October 1954 | [1955] 1 S.C.R. 691 | 1954 INSC 87
Key facts
- Decided
- 11 October 1954
- Bench
- MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*, BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA, VIVIAN BOSE, B. JAGANNADHADAS, T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 188/1952
- Citation
- [1955] 1 S.C.R. 691
- Neutral citation
- 1954 INSC 87
Text of the judgment
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
691
that condition 4(a) and special condition 3 expressed
as they are at present are void and have 110 legal effect
as against the fundamental right of the appellant under
article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.
We express no opinion upon the first contention
advanced by the appellant. The appellant will get
his costs from the respondent in this Court and in the
Court below.
1954
R, M. Seshadri
v •.,
District
Magistrat•
Tanjore
Ghulam Hasan :J.
Appeal allowed.
DHIRUBHA DEVISINGH GOHIL
v.
THE STATE OF BOMBAY.
('NITH CONNECTED APPEALS]
[MEHAR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J., MuKHERJEA, VIVIAN BosE.
JAGANNADHADAS and VENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.]
-
Constitution of India (Fiw Amendment) Act, 1951, Art. 31-B
-Government of lndia Act, 1935 (25 and 26 Geo. 5 CH. 42),
s. 299-Bombay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act, 1949-(Bombay
Act LXII of 1949)-Whether ultra vires the Constitution.
Held, that the validity of the Bombay T;;iluqdari Tenure
Abolition Act, 1949 (Bombay Act LXII of 1949) cannot be
questioned on the ground that it takes away or abridges the
fundamental rights conferred by the Constitution of
India
in view of enactment of art. 31-B which has been inserted
in the Constitution by the First Amendment thereof in 1951 and
in view of the . Act having been specifically enumerated as item
No. 4 in the Ninth Schedule.
On the language used in art. 31-B of the Constitution of India
the validity of Bombay Act LXII of 1949 cannot also be challenged
under s. 299 of the Government of India Act, 1935.
The State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh
of Darbhanga and Others ( [ 1952] S.C.R. 889) distinguished.
CIVIL APPELLATE JuRISDICTION : Civil Appeals
Nos. 188, 188(A), 188(B) and 188(E) of 1952.
Appeals under article 133(1)(c) of the Con:ititution
of India from the Judgment and Order dated the 6th
December, 1951. of the High Court of Judicature at
Bombay in Civil Applications Nos. 409, 410, 411 and
780 of 1951.
Octob.r 11.
692
1954
DhUubha
Devisingh Go'kil
·v.
The State ef
Bombay.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955J
C. G. Shastri and Naunit Lal for the appellant in
Civil Appeal No. 188 of 1952.
N. C. Chatterjee (Onkar Nath Srivastva and
Rajinder Narain, with him) for appellants in Civil
Appeals Nos. 188(A), 188(B) and 188(E) of 1952.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, and
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India (Porus
A. Mehta and P. G. Gokhale, with them) for the
respondents in all the appeals.
1954. October IL The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
JAGANNADHADAS J.-These are appeals by leave
granted by the High Court of Bombay under article
133(1)(c) of the Constitution against its common judgment disposing of certain applications under article 226.
The short point involved in these appeals 1s whether
the Bombay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act, 1949,
(hereinafter referred to as the Act) is valid in law.
The impugned Act, as its very name indicates, was for
the purpose of ~bolishing Taluqdari tenures in Bombay.
Section 3 of the Act enacts that with effect from the
date on which the Act was to come into force the
taluqdari tenure wherever it prFailed shall be deemed
to have beeri abolished. Under section 5(I)(a) all
taluqdari lands are and shall be liable to the payment of
land revenue in accordance with the provisions of the
Bombay Land Revenue Code and the rules made thereunder. Under section 6, broadly stated, all the items
of property which are comprised within the taluqdari
and belong to the talqudar vest in the Government as
its property and all rights held by the taluqdar in such
property shall be deemed to have been extinguished.
Section 7 provides for payment of compensation in
respect of the property so vested and rights
so
extinguished. It also specifies the principles for and the
manner of assessing and granting that
compensation.
Section 14 provides for compensation with reference
to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act being
payable in respect of any of the rights extinguished
but not covered by the provisions of section 7 or
any other section of the Act. These broadly are the
.....
(
..
..
S.C.R.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
693
main features of the impugned Act relevant for the
present purpose.
The attack on the validity of the Act with reference
to these provisions is that the Act is expropriatory,
that it is not for any ,public purpose and that the compensation with it provides is illusory. Now so far as
the requirement of a public purpose is concerned it is
too late in the day to maintain the contention that the
abolition of the kind affected by the Act is not for a
public purpose. The only serious argument, therefore,
is as to the alleged illusory character of the compensations provided by the Act. The Act, it may be noticed,
was one passed by the Bombay Legislature in the year
1949. It received the assent of the Governor-General
on the 18th January, 1950, and was gazetted on the
24th January, 1950. The attack in the High Court
was accordingly based on the alleged violation of the
provisions of sect.ion 299 of the Government of India
Act, 1935, which is as follows :
"(I) No person shall be deprived of his property
in British India save by authority of law.
(2) Neither the Federal nor a Provincial Legislature shall have power to make any law authorising
the
compulsory
acquisition for public purposes
of any land, or any commercial or industrial
undertaking or any interest in, or in any company
owning, any commercial or industrial undertaking,
unless the law provides for the payment of compensation for the property acquired and either fixes the
amount of the compensation, or specifies the principles
on which and the manner in which, it is to be
determined."
It was contended before the High Court that this
was an Act in respect of which a certificate could have
been obtained from the President under clause ( 6) of
article 31 of the Constitution in order to secure
immunity from the challenge of unconstitutionality
but since that has not been done, the liability to its
challenge with reference to the alleged violation of
section 299 of the Government of India Act remains.
The learned Judges of the High Court without going
into the question whether or not under any of the
1954
Dhirubha
Devisingh Gohil
••
Till State qf
Bombay.
Jagannadhadas J.
694
1954
Dhirubha ·
Dtvisingh, Gohil
v.
Tiu State of
Bomb9.
Jo:omwdhal/a.J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
prov1s10ns of the present
Constitution this piece of
legislation was immune from attack of the kind put
forward, dealt with the merits of the challenge and
held that the Act was for a public purpose and that
the compensation provided was neither illusory nor
unfair and that accordingly there was no violation of
the provisions· of Section 299 of the Government of
India Act.
It is true that this is an Act which could have been
submitted to the President for ·his certification under
clause (6) of article 31 and that no such course has
been adopted. But this Act 1s one of the Acts specified
in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution being item
( 4) thereof and article 31-B which has been inserted in
the Constitution by the First Amendment thereof m
1951 is as follows :
"Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in article 31-A, none of the· Acts and
Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule nor any of
the prov1S1ons thereof shall be deemed to be void, or
ever to have become void, on the ground that such Act,
Regulation or provision is inconsistent with, or takes
away or abridges any of the rights conferred by, any
provisions of this Part, and notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court or tribunal to the
contrary, each of the said Acts and Regulations shall,
subject to the power of any competent Legislature to
repeal or amend it, continue in force."
By the above amendment therefore and by specifically enumerating this Act in the Ninth Schedule, it
appears to us to have been clearly and unequivocally
intended that the prov1S1ons of this Act should be
immune from attack of the kind put forward. Learned
counsel for the appellants, however, strenuously contends before us to the contrary. He points out that
the validity of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950
(Bihar Act XXX of 1950) which is the very first item
in the Ninth Schedule was allowed to be challenged 111
this Court after the enactment of the First Amendment
of the Constitution and that this Court has in fact held
certain of the prov1s10ns thereof to be invalid. The
judgment of this Court doubtless shows that the
•
-
S.C.R.
•
•
-
•
...
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
695
challenge was allowed and given effect to notwithstanding the protection given by article 31-B in respect of the
alleged violation of the fundamental rights under the
Constitution. A careful perusal of the judgment however shows that the challenge allowed was as to the
competency of the Legislature to enact certain provisions of the impugned Act which, in the opinion of the
majority of the Court, were in the nature of fraud on
the exercise of the legislative power ( vide The State
of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of
Darbhanga and Others(1) ) : Learned counsel accordingly
urges that the protection under article 31-B is confined
to a challenge based on the provisions of the Constitution and that it is therefore open to him to put forward
a challenge based on a distinct ground, viz., in this
instance violation of the provisions of section 299 of
the Government of India Act. He relies on the difference in language between article 31-B and clause (6) of
article 31, which in terms refers to contravention also
of the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 299 of the
Government of India Act. It appears to us that takes
too narrow a view of article 31-B. What article 31-B
protects is not a mere "contravention of the provisions"
of Part III of the Constitution but an attack on the
grounds that the impugned Act is "inconsistent with
or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by
any provisions of this Part." One of the rights secured
to a person by Part III of the Constitution is a right
that his property shall be acquired only for public
purposes and under a law authorising such acquisition
and providing for compensation which is either fixed
by the law itself or regulated by principles specified by
the law. That is also the very right which was
previously secured to the person under section 299 of
the Government of India Act. The challenge now
made to the validity of the impugned Act is based on
the alleged violation of that right. Nor does this challenge cease to be in substance anything other than a
challenge in respect of the violation of the said right
notwithstanding that under section 299 of the Government of India Act the right is secured in terms which
(1) [1952) S. C. R. 889.
1954
Dhirubha
Devisingh Gohil
. v.
Th< State of
Bombay.
Jagannadhada> J.
696
1954
Dhirobha
Dtvisingh Gohil
v.
Ti1' Stat, of
Bombay.
Jogannadhadas j.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19551
restricts the power of the Legislature and operates as a
restrain on its competency. What under the Government of India Act was a provision relating to the competency of the Legislature, was also clearly in the
nature of a fundamental right of the person affected.
This appears from the Report of the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform,
Vol. I, Part I, paragraphs 366 and 369. But it is
. 31-B protects only the
urged, ' that even so, article
violation of the fundamental right in so far as "it was
conferred by Part III of the Constitution" and that this
right cannot be said to have been "conferred" by the
Constitution. We cannot agree with this contention.
This is clearly a case where the concerned right which
was secured under section 299 of the Government of
India Act in the form of a fetter on the competency of
the Legislature and which in substance was a fundamental right, was lifted into the formal category of a
fundamental right ~long with other fundamental rights
recognised in the present Constitution. There is therefore nothing inappropriate in referring to this right
which was pre-existing, along with the other fundamental rights for the first time secured by this Constitution, when grouping them together, as fundamental
rights "conferred" by the Constitution. What is
important to notice in the phraseology of article 31-B.
is that the protection is not merely against the
contravention of certain provisions but an attack on
the ground of unconstitutional abridgement of certaiw
rights. It will be illogical to construe article 31-B as.
affording protection only so far as these rights are·
taken away by an Act in violation of the provisions of
the new Constitution but not when they are taken away
by an Act in violation of section 299 of the Govern. ment of India Act which has been repealed. The
intention of the Constitution to protect each and every
one of the Acts specified in the Ninth Schedule from
any challenge on the ground of violation of any of the
fundamental rights secured under Part III of the
Constitution, irrespective of whether they are preexisting or new rights, is placed beyond any doubt or
question by the very emphatic language of a-rticle 31-&
•
-
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
697
which declares that none of the provlSlons of the
specified Acts shall be deemed to be void or ever to have
become void on the ground of the alleged violation of
the rights indicated and "notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court or tribunal." That
intention is also . emphasised by the positive declaration
that "each of the said Acts or Regulations shall, subject
to the power of any competent Legislature to repeal or
amend it, continue in force."
Vve are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that the
challenge to the validity of the Bombay Taluqdari
Tenure Abolition Act, 1949 on the ground put forward
was not open. The appeals must, therefore, be
dismissed with costs. Costs one set.
Appeals dismissed.
1954
Dhirubha
Devsingh Gohil'
v.
The State of
Bomb/!Y.
Jagannadhodasj..
CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA
1954
v.
October 12'
RAM NARAIN.
MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J., MuKHERJEA,
V1v1AN BosE, JAGANNADHADAS
and VENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.]
Offence committed by a person in Pakistan-Migration to India
and acquiring domicil therein-Courts in lndia-/urisdictionTrial-Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860) s. 4-Criminal
Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 188-Whether apply under the
circumstances-Domicil, definition of.
A person accused of an offence under the Indian Penal Code
and committed in a district which after the partition of India
became part of Pakistan cannot be tried for that offence by a
Criminal Court in India after his migration to India and acquiring
thereafter the status of a citizen of India.
The fact that after the comm1ss10n of an offence a person
becomes domiciled in another country, or acquires citizenship of
time when that person was neither the national of that country
retrospectively for trying offences committed and completed at a
time when that person was neither the national of that country
nor was he domiciled there.
According to section 4 of the Indian Penal Code and section
J 88 of the Code of Criminal Procedure if at the time of the commission of the offence the person committing it is a citizen of India
then even if the offence is committed outside India he is subject to.
Report an error or ask for masking: grievance@lawgrids.org