ZAVERBHAI AMAIDAS versus THE STATE OF BOMBAY
Supreme Court of India | Decided 8 October 1954 | [1955] 1 S.C.R. 799 | 1954 INSC 85
Key facts
- Decided
- 8 October 1954
- Bench
- MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*, BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA, B. JAGANNADHADAS, T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR, ANIRUDDHA BOSE
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 31/1953
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1955] 1 S.C.R. 799
- Neutral citation
- 1954 INSC 85
Text of the judgment
799
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
S.C.R.
ZAVERBHAI AMAIDAS
v.
THE STATE OF BOMBAY
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J., MuKHERJEA,
VIVIAN BosE, JAGANNADHADAS and
VENKATARAMA AYYAR J J.]
1954
""·
Constitution of India, Art. 254(2), Government of India Act,
1935, s. 107(2)-Principle embodied therein-Essential Supplies
(Temporary Powers) Act (XXIV of 1946) s. 7 as amended by Act Lil
of 1950-Bombay Act XXXVI of 1947-S.2-Subiect matter of
legislation identical-Repugnancy-Repeal by necessary intendment.
_.,
Article 254(2) of the Constitution is, in substance, a reproduction of s. 107(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935, the concluding portion whereof is incorporated . in a proviso with further
additions. The principle embodied therein is that when there is
legislation covering the same ground both by the Centre and by
the State, both of them being competent to enact the same, the law
of the Centre should prevail over that of the State.
Section 7 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act,
1946, was amended in 1948 and 1949 and thereafter by Act
LII of 1950.
-.
-
Held, that Act LII of 1950 is a legislation in respect of the
same matter as Bombay Act (XXXVI of 1947) within the meaning
of Art. 254(2) of t~e Constitution and therefore s. 2 of Bombay Act
XXXVI of 1947 cannot prevail as against s. 7 of the Essential
Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act as amended by Act LII of 1950.
It is a well-settled rule of construction that if a later statute
again describes an offence created by a previous one and imposes a
different punishment or varies the procedure, the earlier statute
is repealed by the later statute.
Attorney-Genernl for Ontario v. Attorney-General for the
Dominion [1896] A.C. 348, Smith v. Benabo [1937] 1 K.B. 518, and
Michell v. Brown (1 El. & EL 267, 274) referred to.
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
Appeal No. 31 of 1953.
JURISDICTION :
Criminal
Under article 132(1) of the Constitution of India
from the Judgment and Order dated 21-1-1953 of the
High Court of Judicature at Bombay m Criminal
Revision Application No. 642 of 1952.
13-88 SCindia/59.
Oct1ber 8.
800
1954
z-bhai
Amaidas
v.
The Stale of
Bombay.
Venkatarama
Ayyar].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
I. C. Dalal and P. K. Chatterjee for the appellant.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India (P. A.
Mehta and P. G. Gokhale, with him) for the respondent.
1954. October 8. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
VENKATARAMA AYYAR J.-This is an appeal against
the judgment of the High Court of Bombay dismissing
a rev1s10n petition filed
by the appellant against his
conviction under sect10n 7 of the Essential Supplies
(Temporary Powers) Act No. XXIV of 1946.
The charge against the appellant was that on 6th
April, 1951, he had transported 15 maunds of juwar
from his villag.: of Khanjroli to Mandvi without a
permit, and had thereby contravened section 5(1) of
the Bombay Food Grains (Regulation of Movement and
Sale) Order, 1949. The Resident First Class Magistrate
of Bardoli who tried the case found him guilty, and
sentenced him to imprisonment till the rising of the
Court and a fine of Rs. 500. The conviction and sentence
were both affirmed by the Sessions Judge, Surat, on
appeal. The appellant thereafter took up the matter
in revision to the High Court of Bombay, and there for
the first time, took the objection that the Resident
First Class Magistrate had no jurisdiction to try the
case, because under section 2 of the
Bombay Act
No. XXXVI of 1947 the offence was punishable with
imprisonment, which might extend to seven years,
and under the Second Schedule to the Criminal
Procedure Code, it was only the Sessions Court that
had jurisdiction to try such offence. The answer of the
State to this contention was that subsequent to the
enactment of the Bombay Act No. XXXVI of 1947, the
Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act had undergone substantial alterations, and was finally re-cast by
the Central Act No. LU of 1950 ; that the effect of
these amendments was that Act No. XXXVI of 1947
had become inoperative, that the governing Act was
Act No. LII of 1950, and that as under that Act
the maximum sentence for the offence in question was
three years, the Resident First Class Magistrate had
jurisdiction over the offence.
+
•
S.C.R.
y
-+
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
801
The revision petition was heard by a Bench consisting
of Bavdekar and Chainani JJ. Bavdekar J. was of the
opm10n that the amendments to the Essential Supplies
(Temporary Powers) · Act including the re-enactment
of section 7 in Act No. LII of 1950 did not trench
on the field covered by the Bombay Act No. XXXVI
of 1947, which accordingly remained unaffected by
them. Chainani J., on the other hand, held that both
Act No. XXXVI of 1947 and Act No. LII of 1950
related to the same subject-matter, and that as Act
No. LII of 1950 was a Central legislation of a later
date, it prevailed over the Bombay Act No. XXXVI of
1947. On this difference of opinion, the matter came
up under section 429, Criminal Procedure Code, for
hearing before Chagla C. J., who agreed with Chainani J.
that there was repugnancy between section 7 of Act
No. LII of 1950 and section 2 of the Bombay Act
No. XXXVI of 1947, and that under article 254(2),
the former prevailed ; and the revision petition was
accordingly dismissed. Against this judgment, the
present appeal has been preferred on a certificate under
article 132(1), and the point for determination 1s
whether contravention of section 5(1) of the Bombay
Food Grains (Regulation of Movement and Sale) Order,
1949, is punishable under section 2 of the Bombay Act
No. XXXVI of 1947, in which case the trial by the
Resident First Class Magistrate would be without
jurisdiction ; or whether it is punishable under section
7 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, as
amended by Act No. LII of 1950, m which case,
the trial and conv1ct10n of the appellant by that
Magistrate would be perfectly legal.
It is now necessary to refer in chronological sequence
to the statutes bearing on the question. We start with
Act
the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers)
No. XXIV of 1946 enacted by the Central Legislature
by virtue of the powers conferred on it by 9 and 10,
George VI, Chapter 39. It applied to the whole of
British India. Section 3 of the Act conferred power on
the Central Government to issue orders for regulating
the production, supply and distribution of essential
commodities and under section 4, this power could be
1 954
Zav<rbhai
Amaidas
v.
Tkt State of
Bombay.
Venkatarama
A,vyar J.
802
1954
Zaverhhai
Amaidas
v.
The Stale of
Bombay.
Venkatarama
AyyarJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
11955]
delegated to the Provincial Government. Section 7(1)
provided for punishment for contravention of orders
issued under the Act, and ran as follows :
"If any person contravenes any order made under
section 3, he sha 11 be punishable with imprisonment
for a term which may extend to three years or with fine
or with both, and if the order so provides any Court
trying such contravention may direct that any property
in respect of which the Court is satisfied that the order
has been contravened shall be forfeited to His Majesty :
Provided that where the contravention is of an order
relating to foodstuffs which contains an express provision in this behalf, the Court shall make such direction,
unless for reasons to be recorded in writing it is of
op1111on that the direction should not be made m
respect of the whole or as the case may be, a part of
the property."
The State of Bombay considered that the maximum
punishment of three years' imprisonment provided m
the above section was not adequate for offences under
the Act, and with the object of enhancing the punishment provided therein, enacted
Act No. XXXVI of
1947. Section 2 of the said Act provided (omitting what
is not material for the present purpose) that "Notwithstanding anything contained m the Essential Supplies
(Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, whoever contravenes
an order made or deemed to be made under section 3
of the said Act shall be punished with imprisonment
which may extend to seven years, but shall not, except
for reasons to be recorded in writing, be less than six
months, and shall also be liable to fine." This section
is avowedly repugnant to section 7(1) of the Essential
Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act. Section 107(2) of
the Government of India Act, which was the Constitution Act then in force, enacted that,
"Where a Provincial law with respect to one of
the matters enumerated in the Concurrent Legislative
List contains any provision repugnant to the provisions
of an earlier Dominion law or an existing law with
respect to that matter, then, if the Provincial law having
been reserved for the consideration of the GovernorGeneral has received the assent of the Governor-General,
+
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S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
803
the Provincial law shall in that Province prevail,
but nevertheless the Dominion Legislature may at
any time enact further legislation with respect to
the same matter."
On the footing that the subject-matter of Act No.
XXXVI of 1947 fell within the Concurrent List, the
Bombay Government obtained the assent of the
Governor-General therefor, and thereafter it came into
force on 25th November, 1947. The position therefore
was that by reason of section 107(2) of the G9vernment
of India Act, Act No. XXXVI of 1947 prevailed m
Bombay over section 7 of the Essential Supplies
(Temporary Powers) Act; but at the same time, it was
subject under that section to all and any "further
legislation with respect to the same matter", that
might be enacted by the Central Legislature.
The contention of the State is that there was such
further legislation by the Central Legislature in 1948,
in 1949 and again in 1950, :me! that as a result of such
legislation, section 2 of the Bombay Act No. XXXVI
of 1947 had become inoperative. In 1948 there was an
amendment of the Essential Supplies (Temporary
Powers) Act, whereby the proviso to section 7 ( 1) was
repealed and a new proviso substituted, which provided
inter alia that,
"Where the contravention 1s of an order relating
to foodstuffs which contains an express provision m
this behalf, the Court shall direct that any property in
respect of which the order has been contravened shall
be forfeited to His Majesty, unless for reasons to be
recorded in writing it is of opinion that the direction
should be made not in respect of the whole, or as the
case may be, a part of the property."
The Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act was
. agam amended in 1949. Under this amendment, the
proviso to section 7(i) was repealed, and a new clause
substituted in the following terms :
"(b) Where the contravention 1s of an order
relating to foodstuffs, the Court shall (i) sentence any
person convicted of such contravention to imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and
may, in addition, impose a sentence of fine, unless for
1954
,(averbhai
Amaidas
v.
The State of
Bomhqy.
V enkatarama
Ayyar].
804
1954
.<;averbhai
Amai.das
v.
The State of
BombqJ.
Yenkatarama
4lY•• J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19551
reasons to be recorded, it is of opinion that a sentence
of fine only will meet the ends of justice ; and
(ii) direct that any property in respect of which
the order has been contravened or a part thereof shall
be forfeited to His Majesty, unless for reasons to be
recorded it is of opinion that such direction is not
necessary to be made· in respect of the whole, or, as the
case may be, a part of the property."
Then came Central Act No. Lil of 1950, under which
the old section 7 was repealed and a new section
enacted in the following terms :
"(l) If any person contravenes any order under
section 3 relating to cotton textiles he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend
to three years and shall also be liable to fine ; and any
property in respect of which the order has been
contravened or such part thereof as to the Court may
seem fit shall be forfeited to the Government.
(2) If any person contravenes any order under
section 3 relating to foodstuffs,( a) he shall be punishable with imprisonment for
a term which may extend to three years and shall also
be liable to fine, unless for reasons to be recorded the
Court is of opinion that a sentence of fine only will
meet the ends of justice ; and
(b) any property in respect of which the order has
been contravened or such part thereof as to the Court
may seem fit shall be forfeited to the Government,
unless for reasons to be recorded the Court is of opinion
that it is not necessary to direct forfeiture in respect of
the whole or, as the case may be, any part of the
property:
Provided that where the contravention is of an
order prescribing the maximum quantity of any foo<lgrain that may lawfully be possessed by any person or
class of persons, and the person contravening the order
is found to have been in possession of foodgrains
execeeding twice the maximum quantity so prescribed,
the Court shall( a) sentence him to imprisonment for a term which
may extend to seven years and to a fine not less than
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
805
twenty times the value of the foodgrain found in his
possession, and
(b) direct that the whole of such food grain in
excess of the prescribed quantity shall be forfeited to
the Government.
Explanation :-A person m possession of foodgrain
which does not exceed by more than five maunds the
maximum quantity so prescribed shall not be deemed
to be guilty of an offence punishable under the proviso
to this sub-section.
(3) If any person contravenes any order under
section 3 relating to any essential commodity other
than cotton textiles and foodstuffs, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend
to three years, or with fine or with both, and if the
order so provides, any property in respect of which the
Court is satisfied that the order has been contravened
may be forfeited to the Government.
( 4) If any person to whom a direction is given
under sub-section ( 4) of section 3 fails to comply with
the direction, he shall be punishable with imprisonment
for a term which may extend to three years, or with
fine, or with both."
It must be mentioned that while the amendments of
1948 and 1949 were made when section 107(2) of the
Government of India Act was in force, the Constitution of India Act had come into operation, when Act
No. LII of 1950 was enacted. Article 254(2) of the
Constitution is as follows :
"Where a law made by the Legislature of a State
specified in Part A or Part B of the First Schedule with
respect to one of the matters enumerated m the
Concurrent List contains any provision repugnant to
the provisions of an earlier law made by Parliament or
an existing law with respect td that matter, then, the
law so made by the Legislature of such State shall, if
it has been reserved for the consideration of the
President and has received his assent, prevail 111 that
State :
Provided that nothing in this clause shall prevent
Parliament from enacting at any time any law with
1954
Zaverbhai
Amaidas
v.
The State of
Bo,,.b07
Venkatrama
Ayyar J.
806
1954
Zavtrbhai
Amaidas
v.
The SJatt of
Bombay,
Venkatarama
Avor J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
fl955]
respect to the same matter including a law adding to,
amending, varying or repealing the law so made by the
Legislature of the State."
This is, in substance, a reproduction of section 107(2)
of the Government of India Act, the concluding portion
thereof being incorporated in a proviso with further
additions. Discussing the nature of the power of the
Dominion Legislature, Canada, in relation to that of
the Provincial Legislature, in a situation similar to
that under section 107 (2) of the Government of India
Act, it was observed by Lord Waston in AttorneyGeneral for Ontario v. Attorney-General for the
Dominion('), that though a law enacted by the Parliament of Canada and within its competence would override Provincial legislation covering the same field, the
Dominion Parliament had no. authority conferred upon
it under the Constitution to enact a statute repealing
directly any Provincial statute. That would appear to
have been the position under section 107 (2) of the
Government of India Act with reference to the subjects
mentioned in the Concurrent List. Now, by the proviso
to article 254(2) the Constitution has enlarged the
powers of Parliament, and w1der that proviso, Parliament can do what the Central Legislature could not
under section 107 (2) of the Government of India Act,
and enact a law adding to, amending, varymg or
repealing a law of the State, when it relates to a matter
mentioned in the Concurrent List. The position then
is that under the Constitution Parliament can, acting
under the proviso to article 254(2), repeal a State
law. But where it does not expressly do so, even
then, the State law will be void under that prov1s10n if it conflicts with a later "law with respect
to the same
matter" that may be enacted by
Parliament.
In the present case, there was no express repeal of
the Bombay Act by Act No. Lii of 1950 in terms of the
proviso to article 254(2). Then the only question to be
decided is whether the amendments made to the
Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act by the
Central Legislature in 1948, 1949 and 1950 are "further
•
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•
(1) [•896) A.G. 348.
I
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
807
legislation" falling within section 107 (2) of the Government of India Act or "law with respect to the same
matter" falling within article 254(2). The important
thing to consider with reference to this provision is
whether the legislation is "in respect of the same
matter." If the later legislation deals not with the
matters which formed the subject of the earlier legislation but with other and distinct matters though of a
cognate and allied character, then article 254(2) will
have no application. The principle embodied in section
107(2) and article 254(2) is that when there is legislation covering the same ground both by the Centre and
by the Province, both of them being competent to
enact the same, the law of the Centre should prevail
over that of the State.
-·
,.
.
Considering the matter from this standpoint, the
first question to be asked is, what is the subject-matter
-Of the Bombay
Act No. XXXVI of 1947 ? The
preamble recites that it was "to provide for the
enhancement of penalties for contravention of orders
made under the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers)
Act, 1946." Then the next question is, what is the
scope of the subsequent legislation in 1948, 1949 and
1950 ? As the offence for which the appellant has been
rnnvicted was committed on 6th April, 1951, it would
be· sufficient for the purpose of the present appeal to
consider the: effect of Act No. LII of 1950, which was
in force on that date. By that Act, section 7(1) of the
Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act as passed
in 1946 and as amended in 1948 and 1949 was repealed,
and in its place, a new section was substituted. The
scheme of that section is that for purposes of punishment, offences under the Act are grouped under three
categories-those relating to cotton textiles, those:
relating to foodstuffs, and those relating to essential
commodities other than textiles or foodstuffs. The:
punishments to be imposed in the several categories
are separately specified. With reference to foodstuffs,
the punishment that could be awarded when the offence:
consists in possession of foodgrains exceeding twice
the maximum prescribed is imprisonment for a term
1954
.<::averbhai
Amaidas.
v.
The State of
Bombay.
Venkatarama
Ayyar J.
808
1 954
,Zaverbhai
Amaidas
v.
Tm Seot, of
Bombay.
Venkatwama
AJ!Y" J·
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
which may extend to seven years, with further provisions for fine and forfeiture of the commodities. In
other cases, there is the lesser punishment of imP,risonment, which may extend to three years.
Section 7 is
thus a comprehensive code covering the entire field of
punishmen~ for offences under the Act, graded according to the commodities and to the character of the
offence. The subject of enhanced punishment that is
dealt with in Act No. XXXVI of 1947 is also comprised
in Act No. Lil of 1950, the same being limited to the
case of hoarding of foodgrains. We ~re, therefore,
entirely in agreement with the opinion of Chagla C. J.
and Chainani J. that Act No. LII of 1950 is a legislation
in respect of the same matter as Act No. XXXVI of
1947.
Bavdekar J. who came to the contrary conclusion
observed, and quite correctly, that to establish
repugnancy under section 107 (2) of the Government of
India Act, it was not necessary that one legislation
should say "do" what the other legislation says "don't",
and that repugnancy might result when both the
legislations covered the same field. But he took the
view that the question of enhanced penalty under Act
No. XXXVI of 1947 was a matter different from
that of punishment under the Essential Supplies
(Temporary Powers) Act, and as there was legislation
in respect of enhanced penalty only when the offellce
was possession of foodstuffs in excess of twice the·
prescribed quantity, the subject-matter
of
Act
No. XXXVI of 1947 remained untouched by Act
No. LII of 1950 in respect of other matters. In other
words, he considered that the question of enhanced
punishment under Act No. XXXVI of 1947 was a
matter different from that of mere punishment under
the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act :ind its
amendments ; and in this, with respect, he fell into an
error. The question of punishment for contravention
of orders under the Essential Supplies (Temporary
Powers) Act both under Act No. XXXVI of 1947 and
under Act No. LII of 1950 constitutes a single subjectmatter and cannot be split up in the manner suggested
by the learned Judge. On this principle rests the rule
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
809
of construction relating to statutes that "when the
punishment or penal~y. is altered in degree but not in
kind, the later provmon would be considered as
superseding the earlier one." (Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edition, pages 187 and 188). "It
is a well settled rule of construction", observed
Gocldard J. in Smith v. Benabo(1), "that if a later statute
again describes an offence created by a previous one,
and imposes a different punishment, or varies the
procedure, the earlier statute is repealed by the later
statute : see Michell v. Brown(2), per Lord Campbell."
It is true, as already pointed out, that on a question
under article 254 ( 1) whether an Act of Parliament
prevails against a law of the State, no question of
repeal arises ; but the principle on which the rule of
implied repeal rests, namely, that if the subject-matter
of tl1e later legislation is identical with that of the
earlier, so iliat they cannot both stand togeilier, then
the earlier is repealed by the later enactment, will be
equally applicable to a question under article 254(2)
whether the further legislation by Parliament is in
respect of the same matter as that of the State law.
We must accordingly hold that section 2 of Bombay
Act No. XXXVI of 1947 cannot prevail as against
section 7 Qf the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers)
Act No. XXIV of 1946 as amended by Act No. LII of
1950.
The appellant also sought to argue that the subjectmatter of the legislation in Act No. XXXVI of 1947
was exclusively in the Provincial List, and that section
107(2) of the Government of India Act and article
254(2) of the Constitution which apply only with
reference to legislation on subjects which are in the
Concurrent List, have no application. The
very
legislation on which the appellant relies, viz., Act
No. XXXVI of 1947, proceeds, as already stated, on
the basis that the subject-matter is in the Concurrent
List. The appellant raised this question before the
learned Judges of the Bombay High Court, and they
rejected it. In the application for leave to appeal to
( 1)
(1937] I K.B. 518.
El. and El. 267, 27 4.
(') I
1954
.{.1J1Jerbhai
Amaidas
v.
Tiu State of
Bombay.
Venkatarama:
Ayyar J.
810
Z,avtrbhai
..
.Amoid0,1
Tht State of
Bombay.
V tnkatarama
AJ'1a1 J.
1954
•October28.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
this Court which was presented under article 132(1),
the only ground that was put forward as involving a
substantial question as to the interpretation of the
Constitution was, whether the Bombay Act No. XXXVI
of 1947 was repugnant and void nnder article 254 of
the Constitution. No other question having been raised
in the petition, we must decline to permit the appellant
to raise this point.
In the resnlt, -the appeal fails and is dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
INDIA UNITED MILLS LTD.
v.
COMMISSIONER OF EXCESS PROFITS
TAX, BOMBAY.
l_JvlEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J., S. R. DAs
GHULAM HASAN, BHAGWATI and
VENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.]
Excw P,.ofits Tax Act (XV of 1940), s.<. 15, 26(3)-Meaning
and i111port of the tvord 'discovers'-Allotvance granted to assessec on
his rcprese11tatio11-Sttbsequent facts shotv that representation as
untrue, Effect of.
-
The \Vord ·'discovers' in s. 15 of the Excess Profits Tax Act,
1940, is not limited to facts discovered, which existed during the
relevant chargeable accounting period for which assessment is reopened under the section but also includes facts so discovered
which came into existence subsequent to such accounting period.
Allo\vance \Vas granted to an assessee by the Central Board of
Revenue under s. 26(3) of the 1\ct for the chargeable accounting
period during the \var on the ground that certain buildings, plant
and n1achinery provided for production of war materials will not
be required for the purposes of assessee's business after the terrn.i.nation of the war. But it \Vas discovered that even after the
termination of \Var the buildings, plant and machinery in question
\Vere actually used by the assessee for his business.
•
Held, that the Excess Profits Tax Officer had ample power to
proceed against the assessee to reassess him under s. 15 of the Act.
Dodwarth v. Dale ([1936] 2 K.B. 503: 20 Tax Cases 285);
Anderton and Halstead Ltd. v. Birrell ([1932] 1 K.B. 271: 16 Tax
Cases 200) ; Gray (H.M. Inspector of Taxes) v. Lord Penrhyn (21
·~
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