RANANJAYA SINGH versus BAIJNATH SINGH AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 29 September 1954 | [1955] 1 S.C.R. 671 | 1954 INSC 82
Key facts
- Decided
- 29 September 1954
- Bench
- MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, VIVIAN BOSE, GHULAM HASAN
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 73/1954
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1955] 1 S.C.R. 671
- Neutral citation
- 1954 INSC 82
Text of the judgment
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
671
RANANJAYA SINGH
ti.
BAIJNATH SINGH AND OTHERS.
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J., MuKHERJEA, S. R. DAs,
VIVIAN BosE, and GHULAM HASAN JJ.]
Representation of the People Act, 1951 (XLlll of 1951), ss. 77,
123(7), 124( 4)-Gist of corrupt practice as defined in s. 123(7).
Section 123(7) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951,
shows clearly that in order to amount to a corrupt practice the
excess expenditure must be incurred or authorised by a candidate
or his agent and the employment of extra persons must likewise be
by a candidate or his agent.
The charge against the appellant was, inter alia, that the
Assistant Manager, 20 Ziladars of Amethi and their peons
and orderlies had worked for the appellant in connection with the
election. The view taken by the Election Tribunal that though
the estate belonged to the father of the appellant, nevertheless as
the appellant was the heir appearent and actually looked after the
estate on behalf of the old and infirm proprietor, these servants of
the estate were "virtually" his "own" servants and could properly
be regarded as having been employed for payment by the appellant,
was untenable because though s. 77 of the Act uses the words "who
may be employed for payment", without indicating by whom
employed or paid, the gist of a corrupt practice as defined in s. 123
(7) of the Act is that the employment of extra persons and the
incurring or authorising of extra expenditure must be by the candidate or his agent.
Manag~r,
-
The appellant accordingly, could not in the circumstances
of the present case, be held to be guilty of any corrupt practice
under s. 123(7) as alleged against him and therefore could not be
held to have been guilty of any minor practice under s. 124( 4) of
the Act.
..
Joseph Forster Wilson and Another v. Sir Christopher Furness
( 6 O'Mally & Hardcastle's Report of Election Cases, p. 1},
referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JuRISDICTroN : Civil Appeal No. 73
of 1954.
Appeal by Spe_cial Leave against the Judgment and
Order dated the 11th day of February, 1954, of the
Election Tribunal, Allahabad, in Election Petition
No. 252 of 1952.
5-88 S. C. India/59
672
1954
Rananjoya Singh
, v.
Bajjnath Singh
and Otlllrs.
D01 J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
N. C. Chatterjee and G. N. Kunzru, (Rameshwar Nath
and Rajinder Narain, with them) for the appellant.
Veda Vyasa (G. C. Mathur, with him) for respondent No. 1.
1954. September 29. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
DAs J.-Kunwar Rananjaya Singh, the appellant
before us, is the son of Raja Bhagwan Bux Singh of
Amethi. He was the successful candidate at an election
to the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly from Amethi
(Central) constituencl': the polling in respect of which
took place on the 31st January, 1952, and the result
whereof was announced on the 6th February, 1952, and
finally published in the Uttar Pradesh State Gazette on
the 26th February, 1952. The respondent, Baijnath
Singh, who was one of the unsuccessful candidates filed
an election petition calling in question the election of
the appellant.
Three other unsuccessful candidates
were also impleaded as respondents. The grounds on
which the election was challenged were that the appellant himself, together with his own and his father's
servants and other dependents and agents, committed
various corrupt practices of bribery, exercise of undue
influence, publication of false and defamatory statements and concealment of election expenses as. per
particulars set forth in the petition and the schedules
thereto. He prayed that the election of the appellant
'be set aside and that he, the said respondent, be
.declared to have been duly elected. The appellant
.alone contested the petition. In his written statement
he denied each and every one of the charges of corrupt
practices levelled against him and he also filed a petition of recrimination challenging the conduct of the
said respondent at the election. The said respondent
.denied the charges imputed to him. Altogether 15 issues
were raised, namely, eight on the election petition and
·7 on the petition of recrimination. All the 7 issues
·arising out of the petition of recrimination were found
by the tribunal constituted for hearing of the election
petition against the appellant and the petition of
:recrimination was dismissed. The appellant has not
•
S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
673
contested the correctness of those findings before us
and nothing further need be said about them. As
regards the issues arising on the main election petition
the election tribunal found in favour of the appellant
on issues Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 but decided issue No. 3
against the appellant. That issue was as follows :"3. Did respondent No. 1 employ for election
more persons than authorised by law ?
Did respondent No. 1 incur the expenditure shown
in the list as "Heads of other concealed expenditures?"
Did he exceed the prescribed limit of expenditure for
election ?"
The above issue related to charges made out in
paragraph 6 of the election petition and the list of
particulars set out in Part III of the schedule thereto.
The particulars in that part were grouped under two
main heads, each containing several items. The first head
referred to persons alleged to have been employed on
payment far in excess of the prescribed number and not
shown in the return of election expenses. The second
head of particulars contained other alleged concealed
expenditures. The election tribunal held in favour of the
appellant on all items of charges under both heads in
Part III, except items (ii) and (iii) of the first head.
Item (ii l charged that ·all the paid Ziladars of Amethi
estate who were about 20 in number assisted by their
peons and orderlies worked for the appellant and item
No. (iii) complained that the Manager and the Assistant
Manager of that estate also worked for him. The
tribunal held that the number of all these persons
coming within these two categories far exceeded the
prescribed number of persons who could be employed
in an election and their salary for the period they
worked for the appellant in connection with the election, if added to the admitted election expenses, would
exceed the maximum expenditure permissible for
contesting a single-member constituency. The tribunal,
therefore, held that the appellant was guilty, under
both these heads, of corrupt practice as defined in
section 123(7) of the Representation of the People Act,
1951, and was consequently liable to be dealt with
under section 100(2) (b) and secrion 145 of that Act.
1.954
Rananjaya Sinth
Vil
Baijnath Singh
and Others.
Das J.
674
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19551
-
1954
These findings as to employment of extra persons on
payment and the expenditure of money in excess of
v.
the permissible maximum election expenses necessarily
/Jaijnath Singh
led to the further finding that inasmuch as these
and Othtrs.
expenses had not been shown in the appellant's return
Das J.
- of election expenses the appellant was also guilty of a
minor corrupt practice as defined in section 124(4) of
the Act and was liable to be dealt with under section
100(2) (a) and section 145 of the Act. In the result,
the tribunal under the general issue No. 8 only declared
the election of the appellant to be void. Hence this
appeal filed by the unseated candidate with the special
leave of this Court.
Section 77 of the Representation of the People Act,
1951, provides that the maximum scales of election
expenses at elections and the numbers and descriptions of persons who may be employed for payment
in connection with election shall be as may be
prescribed.
As regards
the maximum expense,
rule 117 lays down that no expense shall be incurred
or authorised by a candidate or his election agent on
account of or in respect of the conduct and management of an election in any one constituency in a State
in excess of the maximum amount specified in respect
of that constituency in Schedule V. The maximum
amount specified in that schedule in respect of a singlemember constituency in the Uttar Pradesh is only
Rs. 8,(IQO. Rule 118 prescribes that no person other
than or in addition to those specified in Schedule VI
shall be employed for payment by a candidate or
his election agent in connection with an election.
Schedule VI allows 1 election agent, 1 counting agent,
1 clerk and 1 messenger at all elections. It also allows,
in addition to these. 1 clerk and 1 messenger for every
75,000 electors and 1 polling agent and 2 relief agents
for each polling booth and 1 messenger at each polling
both. The contravention of the provisions of section
77, read with rules 117 and 118 and Schedules V and VI,
is made a corrupt practice by section 123(7). Section
123(7) clearly shows that in order to amount to a
corrupt practice the excess expenditure must be
incurred or authorised hy a candidate or his agent and
Rananjaya Singh
-
•
S.C.R.
-
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
675
the employment of extra persons must likewise be
hy a candidate or his agent.
The charge against the appellant was, inter alia, that
the Manager, Assistant Manager, 20 Ziladars of Amethi
estate and their peons and orderlies had worked for the
appellant in connection with the election. The tribunal
quite erroneously-that
took the view-we think
although the estate belonged to the father of the appellant, nevertheless, as the appellant was the heir
apparent and actually looked after the estate on behalf
of the old and infirm proprietor, these servants of the
estate were "virtually'~ his "own" servants and could
properly be regarded as having been employed for payment by the appellant. The learned advocate appearing for the respondent frankly and properly conceded
that he could not support this part of the finding of
the tribunal. He, however, contended, relying on the
language used in section 77, that if the number of
persons who worked for payment in connection with
the election exceeded the maximum number specified
in Schedule VI, the case fell within the mischief of the
relevant sections and the rules, no matter who employed
them or who made payments to them. It is true that
section 77 uses the words "who may be employed for
payment" without indicating by whom employed or
paid but it must be borne in mind that the gist of a
corrupt practice as defined in section 123(7) is that the
employment of extra persons and the incurring or
authorising of excess expenditure must be by the candidate or his agent. The provisions of rules 117 and
118 are to be read in the light of this definition of a
corrupt practice.
Indeed, these rules
follow the
language of section 123(7) in that they prohibit the
employment of persons other than . or in addition to
those specified in Schedule VI, and the incurring or
authorising of expenditure in excess of the amount
specified in Schedule V, and in both cases by a candidate or his agent. Section 77 must, therefore, be read
in a manner consonant with section 123(7) and rules 117
and l18. In this view of the matter the observation
made by Phillimore J. in Joseph Forster Wilson and
19$4
...........
Rananjaya Singh
••
Baijnath Singh
and OtMrs.
.........
DaJ J,
676
•954
~
!'ananjaya S}ngh
v,
Baijnalh Singh
and Othtrs.
=
pasJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955}
Another v. Sir Christopher Furness('), relied on by the
appellant and referred to in the judgment of the
tribunal are quite apposite. There can be no doubt
that in the eye of the law these extra persons were in
the employment of the father of the appellant and paid
by the father and they were neither employed nor paid
by the appellant. The case, therefore, does not fall
within section 123 (7) at all and if that be so, it cannot
come within section 124(4). It obviously was a case
where a father assisted the son in the matter of the
election. These persons were the employees of the
father and paid by him for working in the estate. At
the request of the father they assisted the son in
connection with the election which strictly speaking
they were not obliged to do. Was the position in law
at all different from the position that the father had
given these employees . a holiday on full pay and they
voluntarily rendered assistance to the appellant in
connection with his election ? We think not. It is clear
to us that qua the appellant these persons were neither
employed nor paid by him. So far as the appellant was
concerned they were mere volunteers and the learned
advocate for the respondent admits that employment
of volunteers does not bring the candidate within the
mischief of the definition of corrupt practice. as given in
in section 123(7). The learned advocate, however,
contended that such a construction would be against
the spirit of the election laws in that candidates who
have rich friends or relations would have an unfair
advantage over a poor rival, The spirit of the law may
well be an elusive and unsafe guide and the supposed
spirit can certainly not be given effect to in opposition
to the plain language of the sections of the Act and the
rules made thereunder. If all that can be said of these
statutory provisions is that construed according to
the ordinary, grammatical and natural meaning of their
language they work injustice by placing the poorer
candidates· at a disadvantage the appeal must be to
Parliament and not to this Court.
l 6 O' Mally
page 6. ·
?.nd Hardcastle's Report of Election Cases, page 1 at
•
•
'
1'
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
677
On a consideration of the relevant provisions of the
Act and the rules and the arguments advanced before
us we are of opinion that the appellant cannot in the
circumstances of this case be held to be guilty of any
corrupt practice under section 123(7) as alleged against
him. It follows from this that pot having incurred any
expenditure over and above what was shown by him in
his return of election expenses he cannot be said to
have concealed such expenditure and, therefore, he
cannot be held to have been guilty of any minor corrupt
practice under section 124(4) of the Act. In the view
we have ·taken, namely, that these extra men were not
employed or paid by the appellant, it is unnecessary,
for the purpose of this appeal, to discuss the question
whether, if one's own servants are also utilised or
employed in the conduct of the election, their salary
for the. period they are so utilised or employed should
be regarded as election expenses and shown in the
return. On that we prefer not to express any opm1on
on this occasion. No other point having been raised we
allow this appeal with costs.
1954
RanJJnjaya Singh
v.
Baijnath Singh
and Others.
Das].
Appeal allowed.
In re HIRA LAL DIXIT AND TWO OTHERS
[MEHR CHAND
S. R. DAs, VIVIAN
MAHAJAN C. J.,
MuKHERJEA,
BosE and GHULAM
HASAN JJ.]
Cont-;mpt of Court-Court hearing a case-Leaflet distributed
by a party in Court premises during hearing-Language usedAtfecting the fudges-Time and place of distribution-Hindering
or obstructing due administration of justice.
The petitioner was an applicant in one of the writ petitions
which had been filed in the Supreme Court challenging the validity
of U. P. Road J'ransport Act, 1951. During the hearing of the
writ petitions a leaflet printed in the Hindi language and intituled
"Our Transport Department" purporting to be written by the
petitioner was distributed in the Court premises.
The leaflet
contained a graphic account of the harassment and indignity said
to have been meted out to the writer by the State officers and the
then State Minister of Transport in connection with the cancellation and eventual restoration of his license in respect of a
passenger bus.
1954
Octob1r 1.
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