BEHRAM KHURSHED PESIKAKA versus THE STATE OF BOMBAY.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 24 September 1954 | [1955] 1 S.C.R. 613 | 1954 INSC 80
Key facts
- Decided
- 24 September 1954
- Bench
- MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, VIVIAN BOSE, GHULAM HASAN
- Bench size
- 6
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 42/1953
- Disposal
- Disposed off
- Citation
- [1955] 1 S.C.R. 613
- Neutral citation
- 1954 INSC 80
Text of the judgment
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
613
BEHRAM KHURSHED PESIKAK.A
ti.
,
THE STATE OF BOMBAY.
REFERENCE UNDER ARTICLE 145(3) OF THE
CoNSTITUTION OF INDIA.•
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J., MuKHERJEA, MAsAN
S. R. DAs, VIVIAN BosE and GHULAM HASAN
JJ.J
JJ.]
Constitution of India, Arts. 13 and 141-Statute declared
unconstitutional-Effect of-Declaration in Balsara's case-Effect
of-If the decision throws onus on the accused-Bombay Prohibition
Act, 1949 (Bombay Act XXV of 1949), ss. 2 (24), 13 (b), 66 (b).
Held (Per MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J., MuKHERJEA, VIVIAN
.; EosE and GHULAM HASAN JJ. S. R. DAs J. dissenting) that the
effect of the declaration in the case of The State of Bombt>y and
Another v. F. N. Balsara( 1 ) that clause (b) of s. 13 of the Bombay
Prohibition Act (XXV of 1949) is void under Art. 13(1) of the
Constitution in so far as it affects the consumption or use of liquid
medicinal or toilet preparations containing alcohol, is to render
part of s. 13(b) of the Bombay Prohibition Act inoperative, ineffective and ineffectual and thus unenforceable.
In view of the constitutional invalidity of a part of s. 13(b) of
the Bombay Prohibition Act having been declared void by · the
Supreme Court, that part of the section ceased to have legal effect
in judging cases of citizens and must be regarded as null and void
in determining whether a citizen was guilty of an offence.
The clear enactment of Art. 141 of the Constitution leaves no
scope in India for the application of the American doctrine that
"the declaration by a court of unconstitutionality of a statute
which is in conflict wjth the Constitution affects the parties only
and there is no judgment against the statute and it does not strike
the statute from the statute book."
In India, on the other hand, once a law has been struck down
as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, no notice can be taken
of it by any Court because aft_!:'r it is declared as unconstitutional
it is no longer law and is null and void.
The bare circumstance that a citizen accused of an offence
under s. 66(b) of the Bombay Prohibition Act is smelling of alcohol
is compatible both with his innocence as well as his guilt. The smell
of alcohol may J?e due to the fact that the accused had contravened
the enforceable part of s. 13(b) of the Bombay Prohibition Act or
it may well be due to the fact that he had taken alcohol which fell
under the unenforceable and inoperative part of the section.
Therefore the onus was laid on the prosecution to prove that the
(1) [1951] S.C.R. 682.
614
1954
B1hram lflwrs1114
PtsikoJ:a
v.
Till Stall ef
Bombay.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
...
alcohol of which he was smelling came under the category of
prohibited alcohol within the meaning of the enforceable part of
s. !3(b).
Per S. R. DAs J. :-The declaration in the case of The State of
Bombay and Another v. F. N. Balsara gives a citizen who has consumed or used liquid medicinal or toilet preparations a defence to
a charge under s. 66(b) read with s. 13(b) of the Bombay Prohibition
Act and it is for the accused person to prove the facts on which
that declaration of law is based.
The State of Bombay and Another v. F. N. Balsara ([1951]
S.C.R. 682) explained.
•
Kesava Madhova Menon v. The State of Bombay ([1951] S.C.R.
228) followed.
Rangarao Bala Mane v. The State ((1951] 54 Born. L. R. 325),
In re Kanakasabai Pillai (A.I.R. 1940 Mad. l) and Norton v. Shelby
County (118 U. S. 425) referred to.
> ..
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION :
Criminal
Appeal No. 42 of 1953.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and
Order dated the 5th February, 1953, of the High Court
of Judicature at Bombay in Criminal Appeal No. 1149
of 1952 arising out of the Judgment and Order dated
the 22nd April, 1952, of the Court of the Presidency
Magistrate 19th Court, Bombay, in Case No. 933/P of
1951.
B. M. Mistry, J. B. Dadachanji, Rajinder Narain
and R. D. Chadda for the appellant.
M. C.
Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (R.
Ganapathy Iyer and P. G. Gokhale, with him) for the
respondent.
1954. February 19, April 28, September 23, and • ""'
September 24.
[The present Criminal Appeal (No. 42 of 1953)
came up for hearing in the first instance before a Bench
of Hon'ble Judges composed of Bhagwati, Jagannadhadas and Venkatarama Ayyar JJ. who delivered the
following Judgments dated 19th February, 1954].
BHAGWATI J.-This is an appeal by special leave
from a judgment of the High Court of Judicature at
,..
Bombay reversing the order of acquittal passed in
favour of the appellant by the Court of the Presidency
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S.C.R
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
615
Magistrate, 19th Court, Bombay, and convicting him of
an offence under section 66(b) of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949, and sentencing him to one month's
rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 500.
The appellant, who was the Officiating Regional
Transport Officer, Bombay Region, was on the 29th
May, 1951, at about 9.30 P.M., proceeding in his jeep car
towards the Colaba Bus Stand when he knocked down
three persons, Mrs. Savitribai Motwani, her husband
and Miss Parvatibai Abhichandani. Tht police arrested the appellant and took him to the police station.
From the police station he was taken to St. George's
Hospital in order to be examined by the doctor for
alleged consumption of liquor. The doctor found his
breath smelling of alcohol. He however found the
conjunctiva were congested, the pupils were semi-dilated and reacting to light. The speech was coherent and
he could behave himself and walk along a straight line.
The doctor was therefore of opinion that he did not
seem to be under the influence of alcohol though he
had taken alcohol in some forl)l or the other.
The appellant was put up before the Presidency
Magistrate for his trial under two offences, one under
section 338 of the Indian Penal Code on three counts
for causing grievous hurt to the three injured persons
by doing a rash and negligent act, i.e., driving his
motor car in a rash and negligent manner, and the other
under section 66(b) of the Bombay Prohibition Act.
The appellant cross-examined the doctor and suggested
that he had taken a medicinal preparation, B. G. Phos,
and also stated in answer to the Magistrate on the 20th
December, 1951, that he had not consumed any liquor
but had taken medicinal preparation containing a small
percentage of alcohol. He also filed a written statement on the 13th March, 1952, setting out in detail the
whole history of his case. He stated there that owing
to his ill health he had been recommended to take
tonics, specially those containing vitamin B Complex
~nd Phosphates and had regularly taken tonics, such as
· Wampole's Phospho Lecitin, B. G. Phos, and Huxley's
Nerve Vigour. He further stated that on the night in
question he had at about 9 or 9 .15 P.M. after dinner
1954
Behram Khurshld
Pesikaka
v.
The State of
Bamba;·
BhagwatiJ.
616
1954
Bthram Khur$htd
Pesikaka
v.
Tht Statt ef
Bombay.
Bhagwati].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19551
taken a dose of B. G. Phos and was proceeding in his
jeep car for a drive via Cuffee Parade and Marine
Drive when the accident took place. He produced his
driving licence and registration certificate and a copy
of the agenda of the Regional Transport Authority's
meeting to be held next day and a carton of B. G. Phos
on which it was stated that it contained 17 per cent
alcohol according to its formula.
The learned Presidency Magistrate acquitted the
appellant of both these offences. In reg;ird to the
offence under section 66(b) of the Bombay Prohibition
Act he observed that the evidence did not go to show
conclusively that the appellant had consumed alcohol
without a permit, that there were certain medicinal
preparations which were allowed to be used by law and
there was no satisfactory evidence to show that the
appellant had not consumed those tonics but only
liquor for which he ought to have a permit.
The respondent, the State of Bombay, took two
appeals before the High Court against each of these
two cases. The High Court confirmed the acquittal
in regard to the charge under section 338 of the Indian
Penal Code but reversed the order acquitting him of
the charge under section 66(b) of the Bombay Prohibition Act. The High Court followed a decision of its
own Division Bench in Rangarao Bala Mane v. St.ate(')
where it had been held that-"Once it is proved by the
prosecution that a person has drunk or consumed liquor
without a permit, it is for that person to show that the
liquor drunk by him was not prohibited liquor, but
was alcohol or liquor which he is permitted by law to
take, e.g., medicated alcohol. The prosecution is not to
discharge the burden of the accused, and if in answer
to a charge of drinking liquor without a permit the
accused suggests that the liquor which was drunk by
him was not liquor in a prohibited form or was alcohol
in a medicated form, he must show it." The High
Court observed that the Magistrate had misdirected
himself on a point of law and it was therefore open to
it to examine the evidence and come to its own conclusion whether the appellant had shown that he had
(•) (195•) 54 Born. L. R. 325.
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S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
617
taken B. G. Phos that night after dinner and that the
alcoholic smell which was still found in his mouth as
late as 11.30 P.M. when he was• examined by the doctor
was the smell of the alcoholic contents of B. G. Phos.
It came to the conclusion that the appellant had failed
to prove the existance of circumstances from which the
Court could come to the conclusion that the liquor
which was consumed by the appellant was not prohibited liquor but liquor which was excepted by the ~ombay
Prohibition Act from its operation and set aside the
order of acquittal passed by the learned Presidency
Magistrate in his favour convicting him of the offence
and sentencing him as above.
It was contended on behalf of the appellant before
us that the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949, was impugµed after the advent of the• Constitution and this Court
by its decision in The State of Bombay and Another v.
F. N. Balsara(1) inter alia declared the provisions of
clal:lse (b) of section 13 to be invalid so far as it affects
the consumption or use of liquid medicinal and toilet
preparations containing alcohol, that the effect of
that declaration was to lift the consumption or
use of liquid medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol from the prohibition enacted in section 13 (b) and that section 66 (b) was inoperative and
unenforceable so far as such medicinal and toilet
preparations contammg alcohol were concerned. It
was therefore incumbent on the prosecution, if a charge
under section 66(b) was framed against an accused, to
orove that the accused had consumed or used an
intoxicant in contravention of the provisions of the
Act, which provision so far as section 13 (b) was concerned was to be read as prohibiting the consumption
O! use of liquor, i.e., spirits of wine, methylated spirits,
wine, beer, toddy and all non-medicinal and non-toilet
liquid preparations consisting of or containing alcohol,
which were the only categories of validly prohibited
liquor. On this interpretation of the effect of the
judgment in The State of Bombay and Another v. F. N.
Balsara (supra) there was no question whatever of the
applicability of section 105 or of section 106 of the
(1) [1951] S. C.R. 682.
1954
Beflt"am KlumhtrJ
Pesikaka
v.
The State of
Bomba.v.
Bhagwati]•.
618
1954
Behram Khursh'd
Pesikaka
v.
Thl State ef
Bombay.
BhagwatiJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
Evidence Act as was sought to be done by the High
Court. It was further urged that even if an onus was
cast on the accused to prove that he had consumed a
liquid
medicinal or toilet preparation
containing
alcohol that onus was lighter in burden than the onus
on the prosecution and the moment the accused indicated his defence the onus again shifted on the prosecution to negative such defence.
It was urged on the other hand on behalf of the
respondent that the effect of the declaration in T lie
State of Bombay and Another v. F. N. Balsara (supra)
was to graft an exception or a proviso to S"._ction 13 (b)
and that the onus and the burden of proving the
existence of circumstances bringing his case within the
exception or proviso lay on the accused and the Court
was to presume the absence of such circumstances.
(Vide section 105 of the Evidence Act). It was further
urged that the prosecution could not possibly prove
that no form of liquid medicinal or toilet prepara,tion
containing alcohol was taken by the accused, that the
fact of the consumption of such medicinal or toilet
preparation containing alcohol was especial! y within
the knowledge of the accused and that therefore the
burden of proving such fact was upon him, and that
once the prosecution had discharged the onus which
lay upon it to prove that the accused had consumei;I
liquor it would be for the accused to show that the
liquor which was taken by him was a liquid medicinal
or toilet preparation containing alcohol. ( Vide section 106 of the Evidence Act).
The relevant provisions of the Bombay Prohibition
Act, 1949, may be here set out. The Act was passed
inter alia to amend and consolidate the law relating to
the promotion and enforcement of and carrying into
effect the policy of prohibition in the Province of
Bombay. Section 2(22) defined an "intoxicant" to
mean any liquor ................ Section 2(24) defined
"liquor" to include (a) spirits of wine, methylated
spjrits, wine, beer, toddy and all liquids consisting
of or containing alcohol. Chapter III enacted the
prohibitions,
and
section
13(b)
provided :-No
person shall. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (b) consume or use
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
liquor ............ Section
and provided :-
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66(b)
1s
the
619
penal section
"Whoever in contravention of the provisions of this
Act, or of any rule, regulation or order made, or of any
licence, permit, pass or authorisation issued, thereunder ................ (b) consumes, uses, possesses or
transports any intoxicant or hemp .................. shall,
on conviction, be punished."
It may be noted that the Act as it stood before the
amendment by Bombay Act XXVI of 1952 which came
into operation on the 22nd October, 1952, enacted in
section 103 the only presumption as to the commission
of offences in certain cases which cases had nothing to
do with the question before us.
This Court in The State of Bombay and Another v.
F. N. Balsara (supra) held that the definition of liquor
contained in section 2(24) was not ultra vires inasmuch
as the word liquor as understood in India at the time of
the Government of India Act, 1935, covered not only
those alcoholic liquids which are generally used as beverages and produce intoxication but also all liquids
containing alcohol. It however considered the restrictions imposed by sections 12 and 13 of the Act on the
possession, sale, use and consumption of liquor not reasonable restrictions on the fundamental right guaranteed by article 19(1) (b) of the Constitution to "acquire,
hold and dispose of property" so far as medicinal and
toilet preparations containing alcohol were concerned
and declared the said sections invalid so far as they
prohibited the possession, sale, use and consumption of
these articles. The sections were however not wholly
declared void on this ground as the earlier categories
mentioned in the definition of liquor, viz., spirits of
wine, methylated spirits, wine, beer and toddy,
were distinctly separable items which were easily
severable from the last
category, . viz., all liquids
containing alcohol, and the restrictions on the possession, sale, use and consumption of these earlier
categories were not unreasonable restrictions. It therefore declared section 13(b) invalid to the extent
of the inconsistency, i.e., so far as it affected the
1 954'
Behram Khurshetl.
P•sikaka
v.
The Stale of
Bombay.
Bhagwati]•.
620
1954
Behram KhursMd
Pesikaka
v.
Tht State ef
Bombay.
BhoguntiJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
consumption or use of liquid medicinal and toilet
preparations containing alcohol.
The question that falls to be determined is what was
the effect of this declaration.
The effect of the declaration of a statute as unconstitutional has been thus set out by Cooley on
Conrtitutional Limitations, Vol. I, page 382 :"Where a Statute is adjudged to be unconstitutional,
it is as if it had never been. Rights cannot be built
up under it; contracts which depend upon it for their
consideration are void; it constitutes a protection to
no one who has acted under it and no one can be
punished for having refused obedience to it before the
decision was made. And what is true of an Act void in
toto is true also as to any part of an Act which is found
to be unconstitutional and which consequently has to be
regarded as having never at any time been possessed of
any legal force . ... "
See also the dictum of Field J. in Norton v. Shelby
County( 1) :
"An unconstitutional Act is not law, it confers no
rights, it imposes no duties, if affords no protection, it
creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as
inoperative as though it had never been passed."
To the same effect are the passages from Rottschaefer
on Constitutional Law, at page 34 :
"The legal status of a legislative provision in so far
as its application involves violation of constitutional
provisions, must however be determined in the light
of the theory on which Courts ignore it as law in the
decision of cases in which its application produces
unconstitutional results. That theory implies that the
legislative provision never had legal force as applied to
'Cases within that class."
Willoughby on Constitution of the United States,
Second Edition, Vol. I, page JO :"The Court does not annul or repeal the statute if it
finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply
refuses to recognise it and determines the rights of the
\1) n8 U.S. 425: 30 L. Ed. 178.
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J.
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
621
parties just as if such statute had no application. The
Court may give its reasons for ignoring or disregarding
the statute, but the decision affects the parties only,
and there is no judgment against the statute. The
opinion or reasons of the Court may operate as a precec
dent for the determination of other similar cases, but
it does not strike the statute from the statute book; it
does not repeal. ..... the statute. The parties to that
suit are concluded by the judgment, but no one else is
bound. A new litigant may bring a new suit, based
on the very same statute, and the former decision can
be relied on only as a precedent,. ....... "
"It simply refuses to recognise it and determines the
rights of the parties just as if such statute had no
application. , .............. ".
And Willis on Constitutional Law, at page 89 :"A judicial declaration of the unconstitutionality of
a statute neither annuls nor repeals the statute but
has the effect of ignoring or disregarding it so far as the
determination of the rights of private parties is concerned. The courts generally say that the effect of an
unconstitutional statute is nothing. It is as though it
had never been passed ........ ".
The declaration was a judicial pronouncement and
even though under article 141 of the Constitution the
law declared by this Court is binding on all the Courts
within the territory of India and is to be the law of
the land the effect of that declaration was not to enact
a statutory provision or to alter or amend section 13 (b)
of the Act. No exception or proviso was also grafted
in terms on section 13(b ). The only effect of the
declaration was that the prohibition enacted in sec• • tion 13 (b) was to be enforceable in regard to the consumption or use of validly prohibited liquor, i.e., spirits
of wine, methylated spirits, wine, beer, toddy and all
non-medicinal and non-toilet liquid preparations consist.mg of or containing alcohol. The prohibition which
was enacted in section 13 (b) against the consumption or
use of liquor could in the light of the declaration made
by this Court only refer to the consumption or use of
validly prohibited liquor, i.e., spirits of wine, m~thylated
spirits, wine, beer, toddy and all non-medicinal and
1954
B1hram Klwrshtd
Pesikaka
v.
The Stat•of
Bombay.
Bhagwati].
622
1
954
Bthram Khurihtd
Pesikaka
v.
Th• SUJie ef
Bombay.
Bhagwati J.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
non-toilet liquid preparations consisting of or containing
alcohol, and that was the only prohibition which could
be enforced under section B(b) and the penal section
66(b ). The consumption or use of liquid medicinal
or toilet preparations containing alcohol could not be
validly prohibited and any person consuming or using
such medicinal or toilet preparations containing alcohol
could not be hauled up for having contravened the
provisions of the Act. No offence could be committed
by the consumpti~n. of liquid medicinal or toilet
preparations
contammg alcohol and the provision
enacted in section 13(b) read in the light of the definitions of intoxicant and liquor contained in sections 2
(22) and 2(24) of the Act in so far as it prohibited the
consumption or use of liquor including liquid medicinal
or toilet preparations containing alcohol was rendered
inoperative and unenforceable bv the declaration to
the extent of the inconsistency and liquid medicinal or
toilet preparations containing alcohol were lifted out
of the category of validly prohibited liquor. Whatever
may be the implications or the consequences of the
unconstitutionality of section 13 (b) to the extent of
the inconsistency in other respects, here was the State
enforcing the penal provisions of section 66(b) and
encroaching upon the liberties of the subject.
Penal
statutes should be strictly construed and the State could
only penalise the consumption or use of validly prohibited liquor which only could constitute an offence under
section 66 ( b). The consumption or use of any intoxicant
meaning any liquor in contravention of the provisions
of this Act was to be punished and unless and until the
prosecution proved that the accused had consumed or
used liquor in contravention of the enforceable provisions of the Act the accused could not be held guilty
and punished under section 66(b). The accused could
be held guilty only if he had contravened the enforceable provisions of the Act and for the purpose of the
present enquiry the only provision of the Act which he
could be charged with having contravened was section 13 (b), the prohibition contained in which was by
reason of the declaration made by this Court enforceable only in regard to the consumption or use of validly
prohibited liquor, i.e., spirits of wine, methylated spirits,
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S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
623
wine, beer, toddy and all non-medicinal and non-toilet
liquid preparations consisting of or containing alcohol.
It was strenuously urged before us on behalf of the
respondent that the declaration in effect, though not
:in terms, enacted an exception or proviso to section 13(b) and that therefore the onus lay upon the
appellant to prove the existence of circumstances
bringing his case within the exception or proviso. (Vide
section 105 of the Evidence Act.) It cannot be disputed that no exception or proviso was in terms enacted
by this declaration. It had the effect of rendering the
prohibition of consumption or use of liquid medicinal
and toilet preparations containing alcohol as having
never at any time been possessed of any legal force and
so not to be enforceable wherever any accused person
was charged with having contravened the provisions
of section 13 (b) of the Act. The effect of the declaration. on the provisions of section 13(b) could be worked
out in any of the following modes :
No person shall consume or use spirits of wine,
methylated spirits, wine, beer, toddy and all liquids
consisting of or containing alcohol as are not or which
are not or other than or save or except or provided they
are not or but shall not include liquid medicinal or toilet
preparations containing alcohol or all non-medicinal
and non-toilet liquid preparations consisting of or containing alcohol.
When these several interpretations were possible in
regard to the effect of the declaration on the provisions of section 13 (b), where would be the justification
for interpreting the effect of the declaration to be that
of grafting an exception or proviso on section 13(b) so·
as to attract the operation of the provisions of section
105 of the Evidence Act? It is clear that where several
interpretations are possible, the Court should adopt an
interpretation favourable to the accused, rather than
one which casts an extra or special burden upon him,
which if at all should be done by clear and unequivocal
provision in that behalf rather than in this indirect
manner. (See also In re Kanakasabai Pillai(1) ) . It
would be more in consonance with the principles of
(r) A. I. R. 1940 Mad. r.
2-88 S. C. India/59
1954
Behram Khurshld
Pesikaka
v
The Stale of
Bomlug.
BkagwatiJ.
...
624
1 954
/khram Kharshed
Puikalra
v.
T h4 Stak ef
BombaJ.
Bha1:"'4'i J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1955]
criminal jurisprudence to interpret the effect of this
declaration to be that the prohibition enacted in section 13(b) where it came to be enforced against any
accused person after the declaration should be enforceable as regards the consumption or use of validly prohibited liquor, i.e., spirits of wine, methylated spirits,
wine, beer, toddy and all non-medicinal and non-toilet
liquid preparations consisting of or containing alcohol,
as above stated.
If this is the effect of the declaration made by that
Court there is no room for holding that the only duty
of the prosecution was to prove that the accused had
taken liquor in some form or the other and that the
burden lay on the accused to prove that he had taken
a liquid medicinal or toilet preparation containing
alcohol. When an accused person is charged with
having committed an offence it is for the prosecution
to prove all the ingredients of the offence with which
he has been charged and the ingredients of the offence
under section 13 (b) as stated above were that he had
consumed or used liquor validly prohibited, i.e. spirits
of wine, methylated spirits, wine, beer, toddy and all
non-medicinal and non-toilet liquid preparations consisting of or containing alcohol. There was no presumption enacted in the Act as it stood which would throw
the burden of proof on the accused to show that he had
consumed or used liquid medicinal or toilet preparation
containing alcohol. There was no exception or proviso
enacted either in terms or in effect in section B(b)
which attracted the operation of section 105 of the
Evidence Act and cast upon the accused the burden of
proving the existence of circumstances bringing his
.case within such exception or proviso. The mere
.circumstance that the fact in regard to his consumption or use of liquid medicinal or toilet preparation
·containing alcohol was specially within the knowledge
.of the accused also could not shift the burden of proving the ingredients of the offence from the prosecution
to the accused, because it is a cardinal principle of
·criminal jurisprudence as administered in this country
·that it · is for the prosecution and prosecution alone to
;prove all the ingredients of the offence with which the
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S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
625
accused has been charged. The accused is not bound to
open his lips or to enter upon his defence unless and
until the prosecution has discharged the burden which
lies upon it and satisfactorily proved the guilt of the
accused. Section 106 of the Evidence Act cannot be
construed to mean that the accused has by reason of
the circumstance that the facts are especially within
his own knowledge to prove that he has not committed
the offence. (See Attygalle v. The King (1), also In re
Kanakasabai Pillai (2) ). It is for the prosecution to prove
that he has committed the offence and that burden is
not in any manner whatsoever displaced by section 106
of the Evidence Act.
The High Court in arriving at its decision in Rangarao
• • Bala Mane v. State (supra) above referred to was impressed with the circumstance that the prosecution
<iould not possibly prove that no form of medicated
alcohol was taken by the accused, that there were
evidently numerous forms of medicated
alcohol and
that it was impossible for the prosecution on the very
face of things to exclude all those forms. The difficulty
was illustrated by the High Court in the manner
following :"For instance, if the prosecution were to lead evidence
to show that the accused had not taken medicated
alcohol in the form of B. G. Phos, the accused would
contend that he had taken it in some other form. If
the prosecution were to lead evidence that the accused
had not taken it in the form of Winedex. the accused
would say that he had taken it in the form of Water• , bury's Compound or Hall's Wine. These are only two
instances to show how, it is impossible for the prosecution to exclude all forms of medicated alcohol."
It therefore came to the conclusion that once the
prosecution had discharged the onus which was upon
it to prove that the accused person had consumed
liquor, it would be for the accused to show that the
liquor which was taken bv him was liquor in the form
of medicated alcohol in other words, not prohibited
liquor. The difficulty thus envisaged by the High
Court was, in my opinion, imaginary. Where an accused
(1) A. I. R. 1936 P. C. 16g.
{2) A. I. R. 1940 Madras 1.
1 954
Behram Klumllld
Pesikaka
v.
The Stau of
Bombay •
Bhagwati].
626
1954
Behratn Khursi1'd
Pesikaka
v.
TM State qf
. Bombqv.
.BhagwatiJ.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955J
person is suspected of having .committed the .prohibition offence, it would be for the police to investigate the offence and while investigating the offence,
it would be for the police to find out whether the
accused has consumed liquor which falls within 'the
enforceable prohibition enacted in section 13(b). As
there are a number of preparations which come within
the category of liquid medicinal and toilet preparations
consisting of or containing alcohol, there are a number
of preparations which come within the category of nonmedicinal or non-toilet liquid preparations consisting
of or containing alcohol and it would be really for the
police investigating the alleged offence to find out
which out of the latter category of preparations the
accused had consumed and bring him to book for the •
same. The circumstance that the accused person was
smelling of alcohol and that he had consumed liquor in
some form or the other would not be an unequivocal
circumstance pointing to the guilt of the accused. The
smell of alcohol could as well be the result of his having
consumed medicinal or toilet preparations consisting
of or containing alcohol as his having consumed validly
prohibited liquor, i.e., spirits of wine, methylated
spirits, wine, beer, toddy and all non-medicinal and
non-toilet liquid preparations consisting of or containing alcohol. To hold the accused guilty under these
circumstances would be to convict him merely because
he was smelling of alcohol and depriving him of the
benefit of doubt which an accused person is always
entitled to in the event of the facts and circumstances
being consistent either with his guilt or his innocence.
To adopt the reasoning which appealed to the High
Court would further be tantamount to laying down
that once an accused person was shown to have consumed liquor in some form or the other the presumption
was that he had consumed validly prohibited liquor
and the onus would be upon him to rebut that presumption by showing that he had consumed medicinal or
toilet preparation containing alcohol.
The difficulty in the way of the prosecution proving
its case need not deflect the Court from arriving at
a correct conclusion. If these difficulties are genuinely
•
•
-
-
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
627
felt it would be for the Legislature to step in and
amend the law. It would not be the function of the
Court to read something in the provisions of the law
which is not there or to find out a way of obviating the
difficulties in enforcing the law howsoever meritorious
the intentions of the Legislature might be. If these
difficulties were felt in the matter of enforcing the
policy of prohibition by the State of Bombay the only
remedy was to effect the necessary amendments when
the Bombay Act XXVI of 1952 was enacted on the
22nd October, 1952, after this Court made the declaration in The State of Bombay and Another v. F. N.
Balsara (supra).
In my opinion it was not enough for the prosecution in the present case merely to prove that the
appellant had taken alcohol in some form or the other.
The prosecution ought to have proved that, the appellant had in contravention of the provisions of the Act
consumed an intoxicant meaning any liquor which
having regard to the declaration made by this Court
could only be validly prohibited liquor, i.e., spirits of
wine, methylated spirits, wine, beer, toddy and all
non-medicinal and non-toilet liquid preparations consisting of or containing alcohol. The evidence of the
doctor only went to show that the appellant had consumed alcohol in some form or the other. That was
not enough and I have therefore come to the conclusion
that the prosecution failed to prove that the appellant
had committed the offence with which he was charged.
In view of the conclusion reached above it is unnecessary to go into the interesting question which was
canvassed before us at some length as to the burden of
proof on the prosecution as well as the defence in a
criminal trial having regard to the provisions of section 105 of the Evidence Act as also the applicability
in India of the principles enunciated in W oolmington v.
The Director of Public Prosecutions (1).
J would therefore allow the appeal, and quash the
conyiction and sentence passed upon the appellant by
the High Court.
(1) [1935] A. C:. 462.
1954
Be/iram Khurs!.lil
Pesikaka
v.
The State of
Bombay
Bhagwati
628
1954
Bemam K!wshed
Ptsikaka
v,
Tb Staie of
Bombay
Jagannadhadas J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955}
JAGANNADHADAS J.-1 have had the benefit of
perusing the judgments of both my learned brothers.
But, with great regret, I feel unable to agree with the
view taken by my learned brother Justice Bhagwati.
Two questions of law have been raised in this case,
viz., (1) on whom does the burden of proof lie to make
out that the "liquor" consumed by the appellant was or
was not medicinal or toilet preparations though containing alcohol, and (2) what is the nature and quantum
of proof required if the burden is upon the appellant.
The answer to question No. 1 depends upon the effect
of the decision of this Court in The State of Bombay
and Another v. F. N. Balsara (supra) which, while
holding that the definition ot liquor in sub-section (24)
of section 2 of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 (Act
XXV of 1949) is valid, has declared that clause (b) of
section 13 in so far as it affects the consumption or use
of medicinal or toilet preparations containing alcohol,
is invalid. My learned brother Justice Bhagwati,
while holding that the effect of the declaration was not
to alter and amend section 13 (b) of the Act, is of the
opinion that in the light thereof the prohibition under
section 13 (b) is to be understood to relate (so far as is
relevant for the present purpose) to consumption or
use of "non-medicinal or non-toilet liquid preparation
containing alcohol" and that, therefore, the burden
lies on the prosecution to make out all the ingredients
of the prohibition so understood with the negative
thereof. On the other hand, my learned brother Justice
Venkatarama Ayyar is of the opinion that the effect of
the decision in The State of Bombay and Another v.
F. N. Balsara (supra) is not to amend or alter section
13(b) but only to render it partly unenforceable, and
hence to provide a defence to the accused, on the
ground of unconstitutionality in so far as that section
is sought to be applied to medicinal or toilet preparations containing alcohol and that, therefore. the burden
of making out the facts required for this plea is on the
accused.
I agree that no legislative function can be attributed
to a judicial decision and that the decision in The State of
Bombay and Another v. F. N. Balsara (supra) does not,
-
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
-
-
629
proprio vigore amend the Act. The effect of a judicial
declaration of the unconstitutionality of a statute has
been stated at page 10 of Vol. I of Willoughby on the
Constitution of the United States, Second Edition, as
follows:
"The Court does not annul or repeal the statute
if it finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply
refuses to recognize it, and determines the rights of the
parties just as if such statute had no application. The
Court may give its reasons for ignoring cir disregarding
the statute, but the decision affects the parties only,
and there is no judgment against the statute. The
op1mon or reasons for the court may operate as a
precedent for the determination of other similar cases,
but it does not strike the statute from the statute book;
it does not repeal .............. the statute. The parties
to that suit are concluded by the judgment, but no
one else is bound. A new litigant may bring a new
suit, based on the very same statute, and the former
decision ........ can be relied on only as a precedent."
This and other similar passages from other treatises
relate, however, to cases where the entire legislation is
unconstitutional from the very commenceme11t of the
Act, a situation which falls within the scope of article
13(2) of our Constitution. They do not directly cover a
situation which falls within article 13(1). In the present
case, though the decision in The State of Bombay
and Another v. F. N. Balsara (supra) does not by
itself bring about a change in the Act, the declarations
made therein are founded on article 13(1) and it is with
the effect thereof we are concerned. The question is
what is the effect of article 13(1) on a pre-existing
valid statute, which in respect of a severable part thereof violates fundamental rights. Under article 13 (I)
such part is "void" from the date of the commencement of tl1e Constitution, while the other part continues
to be yalid. Two views of the result brought about by
this voidness are possible, viz., (1) the said severable
part becomes unenforceable, while it remains part of
the Act, or (2) the said part goes out of the Act and
the Act stands appropriately amended pro tanto. The
first is the view which appears to have been adopted
1954
B1hram Kiuirsherl
Puikaka
The State of
·Bobmll!J
Jagnnadhadas J.
630
195+
Behram K/a11shtil
PesiJUJka
v.
The Stal< ef
Bombtg•
]aganwadiwdtJ>].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
by my learned brother, Justice Venkatarama Ayyar, on
the basis of certain American decisions. I feel inclined
to agree with it. This aspect, however, was not fully
presented by either side and was only suggested from
the Bench in the course of argume_nts. We have not
had the benefit of all the relevant material being placed
before us by the learned advocates on either side. The
second view was the basis of the arguments before us.
It is, therefore, necessary and desirable to deal with
this case on that assumption.
The question, then, for consideration is what is the
notional amendment which must be imported into the
Act consistently with the decision in The State of
Bombay and Another v. F. N. Balsara (supra). The
relevant portions thereof are as follows : (1) The • ~
definition of "liquor" in the Act to its full extent continues to be valid, (2) section 13(b) of the Act in so fa(
as it relates to liquid toilet or medicinal preparations
containing alcohol is invalid, and (3) this portion of the
content of section 13 (b) is severable. The argument of
the appellant's learned counsel is that the essence of
the valid prohibition under section 13(b) now is the
consumption or use of liquor other than liquid medicinal
or toilet preparations containing alcohol. He urges,
...
tl1erefore, that section B(b) must be taken to stal)d
amended accordingly. The argument, if I understood
it aright, was that the word "liquor" stands amended
as "prohibited liquor" or that it must be understood
with this limited connotation. I am unable to see how
this can be done. The definition of the word "liquor"
with its inclusive content remaining intact and valid,
that content has to be imported wholesale into the - 4meaning of the word "liquor" in section 13 (b) and it
appears to me that it is not permissible to read it or
understand it in a different sense. So to read it or
understand it would be to import a new definition of
"prohibited liquor" into the Act and to make the
consumption or use of "prohibited liquor'', the offence.
What, however, tl1e Balsara decision has done is not to
authorise the importation of a new definitiqn and the
rewriting of section B(b). It ke,eps section B(b) intact
-
..
S.C.R.
A.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
631
but treats the consumtion or use of liquid toilet or
medicinal preparations containing alcohol as severable
and takes such consumption or use out of the ambit of
the section itself as the prohibition thereof is unconstitutional. This can be done and only done, in my
opinion, by grafting an appropriate exception or proviso
into section 13(b).
My learned brother, Justice Bhagwati, has in his
judgment suggested that, if it is a question of treating
section 13(b) as amended, the amendment can be made
in one of many modes and that there is no reason to
choose between them and that it is not fair to an
.accused person to read it in a manner throwing the
burden on him, when a more favourable mode is open.
The various modes of amendment are indicated in the
following suggested reading of section 13 (b).
"No person shall consume or use spirits of
wine, methylated spirits, wine, beer, toddy
and all liquids consisting of or containing
'A' I alcohol as are not or which are not or other
~1 than or save or except or provided they are
I not or but shall include liquid medicinal or
l toilet preparations containing alcohol.
r
-
'B'
or
r all non-medicinal
and non-toilet liquid
~
preparations
L alcohol."
consisting
of
or
containing
(The underlinings and markings are mine).
Now, if the relevant portion of the section is recast
·in the manner above indicated, in any of the alternative
modes in the portion marked 'A' above, I have no
-doubt that every one of these modes is only an exception or a proviso which falls within the specific terms
·of section 105 of the Evidence Act, i.e., an exception or
proviso "in the law defining the offence." If, on the
. other hand, the section is treated as amended by
incorporating the portion marked 'B' omitting the
. portion marked 'A', it appears to me, with great
respect, that it is to alter the very content of the word
''liquor" in the section, for which I can find no legal
~justification. What the decision in The State of Bombay
1954
Behram Khurshed
Pesikaka
v.
The Stat.
Bomh'!1
Jagannadhadas J.
632
1954
Behram Khu.rshed
Ptsikaka
Y.
Tiu State of
Bombay.
JagannadhadaJ ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19551
and Another v. F. N. Balsara (supra) authorises is, as
I have already explained above, to keep the word
"liquor" intact with its full content and sever from the
provision taken as a whole (not merely from the word
"liquor") medicinal or toilet preparations.
I feel
accordingly confirmed in the view that I have taken,
viz., that this can only be done by engrafting
exception or a proviso.
As regards the other view suggested by my learned
brother, Justice Bhagwati, that without importing any
alteration or amendment in the section itself, the same·
is to be understood a~ having referenc_e to what may becalled "prohibited liquor", understanding that word
with reference to the decision in The State of Bombayand Another v. F. N. Balsara (supra), here again, with
great respect, I feel difficulty in imputing into a specific
statutory provision a meaning different from what its.
plain words, in the light of the definition, indicate ..
The decision in The State of Bombay and Another v.
F. N. Balsara (supra), if it does not bring about an
amendment in the provision, does not also provide any
mere aid to interpretation.
The question is not one of insisting on a merely
technical view of the matter. I feel unable to impute to the decision in The State of Bombay and Another v.
F. N. Balsara (supra), taken with article 13(1), the
effect of rendering section 13 (b) unworkable, which
certainly was not intended. In this view, therefore,.
(and on the basis put forward by learned counsel on
both sides), the effect of article 13(1) on section 13(b)
of the Act in ·the light of the decision in The State of
Bombay and Another v. F. N. Balsara (supra) is that it
stands amended pro tanto hy means of an appropriate
exception or proviso. It follows that section 105 of
the Evidence Act would in terms apply to such a
situation. Thus in either view of the effect of article·
13(1) of the Constitution on section 13(b) of the
Bombay Act in the light of the judgment in The State·
of Bombay and Another v. F. N. Balsara (supra) the·
opinion expressed by the learned Judges of the Bombay
High Court that the burden of proof in a case like this.
lies on the accused is correct.
an
...
,_
S.C.R.
-
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
633
As regards the second question that has been raised
namely as to the - nature and quantum of the evidence
required to discharge this burden of proof, considerable
arguments have been advanced before us. Our attention has been drawn to the existence of conflicting
decisions in the High Courts on this topic. On the one
side there is the decision of the Full Bench of the
Allahabad High Court in .Prabhoo v. Emperor( 1 ) and on
the other, there is a later Special Bench decision of the
Bombay High Court in Government of Bombay v.
Sakur( 2 ). In my opinion it is unnecessary for us to
resolve that conflict in this case, since, on either view,
the finding of the appellate Court that the burden has
not been discharged on the available material seems to
me to be correct. In particular it is to be noticed that
.'f • the appellant put forward a specific
defence in paragraph 8 of the written statement filed by him inta
Court in answer to the charge. In support of this
defence he has given no proof of any circumstances:,,
which must be within his knowledge, to render the
defence reasonably probable even if he may not have
been able to prove the same strictly to the hilt.
I am, therefore, of the opinion that the conviction of
the appellant under section 66 (b) of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949, is correct. But in the circumstances,
it is not necessary to send him back to jail. I would,
therefore, reduce the sentence of imprisonment to theperiod already undergone. In the result, the appeal
has to be dismissed subject to this modification.
VENKATARAMA AYYAR J.-I regret that I am unable
to agree with the view taken by my learned brother.
_.
Bhagwati J. The facts giving rise to this appeal have
'been stated in his Judgment which I have had the
advantage of reading and it is unnecessary to restate
them. The point for decision shortly is whether in a
prosecution under section 66 (b) of the Bombay Prohibition Act, XXV of 1949, for contravention of section
13(b ) .. the prosecution has to establish not merely that
liquor had been taken in some form but that further
what was taken was not a medicinal preparation. The
(1) I. L. R. 1941 All. 843.
(2) •8 Born. L.R. 746; A. I. R. 1947 Born. 38.
1 954
Behram Khurshetl
Pesikaka.
v.
The State of
Bombay.
Jagannadhadas ].
634
1954
JJehram Khu.rs/zed
Pesikako
v.
T 11' Staie of
Bomh'!-"·
·Vl!lkataroma
Ayyar :J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
learned Judges of the Bombay High Court held following an earlier decision of that Court in Rangrao Bala
Mane v. State (supra) that once the prosecution had
established that the accused had taken alcohol in some
form it was for him to establish that he had taken a
medicinal preparation, both on the ground that it was
in the nature of an exception which it was for the party
pleading it to establish under section 105 of the
Evidence Act and that it was a matter specially within
his know ledge and that therefore the burden of proving
it lay on him under section 106 of the Evidence Act.
The appellant challenges the correctness of this decision and contends that it is opposed to the decision of
this Court in T lie State of Bombav and Another v.
F. N. Balsara (supra).
It will be convenient first to refer to the statutorv '
provisions bearing on the question and ascertain what
the position is thereunder, and then consider how it is
affected bv the decision of this Court 111 The State of
Bombay dnd Another v. F. N. Ralsara (supra). The
relevant prov1S1ons of the Bombay Prohibition Act are
sections 2(24), 13(b) and 66(b). Section 2(24) defines
"liquor" as including all liquids consisting of or containing alcohol. Section 13(b) enacts that no person shall
use or consume liquor and a contravention of this
provision is made punishable under section 66(b ). As
medicinal preparations containing alcohol are .liquor as
defined in section 2(24) the consumption thereof will
be an offence punishable under the Act and it will be
no answer to a prosecution for contravention of section
13(b) that what was consumed was a medicinal
preparation and a question of the kind now presented . .<
to us therefore could not possibly arise under the Act
prior to the Constitution.
I may next consider the effect of the decision of this
Court in T lie State of Bombay and Another v. F. N. Balsara (supra) on the legal position under the Act. It was
there held inter alia that section 13(b) in so far as it
prohibited the consumption of medicinal preparations
was an unreasonable restriction on the rights of an
owner to hold and enjoy property and was therefore
void as being repugnant to article 19 (1) (f) of the
..
-
S,C.R.
-
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
635
Constitution. The appellant contends that the effect
of this declaration was to remove medicinal preparations from out of the purview of section 13 (b) ; that
that section should therefore be read as if it had been
amended to the effect that no person shall use or
consume liquor other than medicinal preparations or
toilets ; that in that view no question of the accused
having to rely on an exception arose and no question
of the burden being thrown on him under section 105 ;
and that as the offence itself consisted in consuming a
liquor which was not a medicinal preparation, the
burden would lie on the prosecution to establish that
what was consumed was a prohibited liquor. On the
other hand, the respondent contends that the definition
' of liquor in section 2(24) includes not only beverages
but also medicinal preparations, that the extended
definition would apply to section 13(b) as well, that the
immunity of medicinal preparations containing alcohol
from the operation of the section by reason of the
decision in The State of Bombay and Another v.
F. N. Balsara (supra) must in consequence be treated
as an exception to it and that the section should be
read as containing a saving in favour of those preparations, in the nature of an exception or proviso, the
burden of establishing which under section 105 of the
Evidence Act would be on the accused. I agree with
the appellant that section 105 has no application. We
are not here concerned with any exception, general or
special, under the Penal Code or any other law defining
the offence. The exception or proviso, if it may be so
called, arises as a result of the decision of this Court
and not under any statute and section 105 cannot
therefore in terms apply. At the same time it is difficult
to see how the decision' in The State of Bombay and
Another v. F. N. Balsara (supra) can be considered to
effect an amendment of section 13 (b) so as to exclude
medicinal preparations from out of its ambit. The
rival contentions which have been presented to us on
the effect of the decision in The State of Bombay and
Another v. F. N. Balsara (supra) proceed both of them
on the basis that section 13 (b) has in some manner
been amended by it ; according to the appellant, the
1954
Behram Khurshtd:
Pesikaka '
v.
The State of
Bomb~.
V enkatarama,
AyyarJ.
636
1954
IJehram Khursktd
.Pesikaka
v.
'The StaU of
IJomh1J7.
.Venkatarama
AY.)'ar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
section must be taken to have been amended by
excluding medicinal preparations from the word
"liquor" and according to the respondent, by inserting
an exception or proviso to the section in favour of
such preparations. That, however, is not the correct
position. Decisions of Court do not amend or add to a
statute. That is a purely legislative function. They
merely interpret the law and declare whether it is valid
or not and the result of a declaration that it is not
valid is that no effect could be given to it in a Court of
law. If therefore section 13(b) cannot be construed as
itself amended or modified by reason of the decision in
The State of Bombay and Another v. F. N. Balsara
(supra), there is no reason to hold that medicinal
preparations containing alcohol, which fell within its '
scope before, have gone out of it after that decision.
This argument therefore does not furnish any ground
for throwing the burden on the prosection under
•ection 13(b) to establish not merely that what was
consumed was liquor but that it was not a medicinal
preparation.
The question of burden of proof must therefore be
decided not on the basis of a suppositions amendment
of the section or addition of an exception or proviso to
it but on the language of the section as it stands and
with reference to well established principles of law.
Under that section it is an offence to use or consume
liquor and that under the definition in section 2(?.4)
includes medicinal preparations containing alcohol.
One of the points raised in The State of Bombay and
Another v. F. N. Balsara (supra) was that the State
Legislature which was competent to legislate on intoxicating liquor could not under that head of legislation
enact a law in respect of medicinal preparations
·containing alcohol because the words "intoxicating
liouor" meant beverages and not medicines but this
contention was negatived by this Court on the ground
that the words "intoxicating liquor" had acquired an
extended sense as including medicinal preparations
contammg alcohol and that the Legislature was
competent while enacting a law with reference to intoxi·cating liquors to legislate on medicinal preparations
-
-
S.C.R.
-
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
637
contammg alcohol. The definition of "liquor" in
section 2(24) in its extended sense having thus been
held to be valid, it follows that unless there is some
thing in the particular provision to the contrary, the
word "liquor" must wherever it occurs in the statute
include medicinal preparations and that is the meaning
which it must bear in section 13 (b). In The State of
Bombay and Another v. F. N. Balsara (supra), it is on
the footing that medicinal preparations are included in
section 13 that the entire discussion on its validity with
reference to article 19(1) (f) proceeds. We therefore
start with this that under section 13 (b), the Legislature
has made it an offence to take alcohol in any form,
whether as beverages or as medicinal preparations.
-1 That being the position and
it having been decided
that the section in so far as it relates to medicinal
preparatfons is void as repugnant to article 19(1) (f),
the question as to who should prove whether what was
consumed was alcohol or medicinal preparation containing alcohol appears to me to admit of a simple answer.
There is a strong presumption in favour of the constitutionalitv of a statute and it is for those who assail it
as unconstitutional to establish it. The contention of
the appellant is, when analyzed, that section 13 (b) is
bad in so far as it hits medicinal preparations containing alcohol as it contravenes article 19(1) (f) of the
O:mstitution, and the decision of this Court in The
State of Bombay and Another v. F. N. Balsara (supra) is
relied on as supporting it. But before the appellant
can bring himself within that decision, he must establish
that what he consumed was a medicinal preparation.
The plea of unconstitutionality is not established unless
all the elements necessary to sustain such a plea are
established ; and as observed by this Court in Rao Shiv
Bahadur Singh v. The State of Vindhya Pradesh(1), "the
burden of making out facts requisite for the constitutional
invalidity
of the convictions" is on the
appellant. He has therefore to make out as a fact that
what he consumed was a medicinal preparation and as
a matter of law, that section 13(b) is bad in so far as it
prohibits it. The decision of this Court concludes the
(1) [1953] S. C. R. 1188, 1202.
1954
Bekram Khurshetl
Pesikaka
v.
The State of
Bombf!1.
V enkatarama
AY.)'ar ].
638
1954
Behram Khurshed
Pesikaka
v.
The Stat''!/
Bomb'f!.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
119551
question in his favour so far as the second point is
concerned. But the burden of establishing the first
point, that in fact what ·he consumed was a medicinal
preparation, still remains on him.
It was argued for the appellant that this Court had
declared that section 13 (b) was void under article 13 ( 1)
of the Constitution in so far as it related to medicinal
preparations ; that that meant that it was to that
extent a nullity and that it should in consequence be
read as if it did not include medicinal preparations.
The question is, what is the legal effect of a statute
being declared unconstitutional. The answer to it depends on two considerations,-firstly, does the constitutional prohibition which has been infringed affect the
competence of the Legislature to enact the law or does >
it merely operate as a check on the exercise of a power
which is within its competence ; and secondly, if it is
merely a check, whether it is enacted for t11e benefit of
individuals or whether it is imposed for the benefit of
the general public on grounds of public policy. If the
statute is beyond the competence of the Legislature, as
for example, when a State enacts a law which is within
the exclusive competence of the Union, it would be a
nullity. That would also be the position when a limitation is imposed on the legislative power in the interests
of the public, as, for instance, the provisions in Chapter
XIII of the Constitution relating to inter-State trade
and commerce. But when the law is within the competence of the Legislature and the unconstitutionality
arises by reason of its repugnancy to provisions enacted
for the benefit of individuals, it is not a nullity but is
merely unenforceable. Such an unconstitutionality can
be waived and in that case the law becomes enforceable.
In America this principle is well settled. ( Vide Cooley
on Constitutional Limitations, Volume I, pages 368 to
371; Willis on Constitutional Law, at pages 524, 531,
542 and 558 ; Rottschaefer on Constitutional Law, at
pages 28 and 29-30). In Shepard v. Barron('), it was
observed that "provisions of a constitutional nature,
intended for the protection of the property owner, may
be waived by him." In Pierce v. Somerset Railway( 2 ),
(1) 194 U.S ..153• 48 L. Ed. m5.
(2) 171 U.S. 641, 43 L. Ed. 316.
-
-
S.C.R.
;i.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
the position was thus stated : "A person may by his
acts or omission to act waive a right which he might
otherwise have under the Constitution of the United
States, as well as under a statute." In Pierce Oil
Corporation v. Phoenix Refining Co. (1), where a statute
was impugned on the ground that it imposed unreasonable restrictions on the rights ·of a corporation to <;arry
on business and thereby violated the rights guaranteed
under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court observed
"There is nothing in the nature of such a constitutional
right as is here asserted to prevent its being waived or
the right to claim it barred, as other rights may be, by
deliberate election or by conduct inconsistent with the
assertion of such a right." The position must be the
same under our Constitution when a law contravenes a
' prescription intended for the benefit of individuals.
The rights guaranteed under article 19(1) (f) are
enacted for the benefit of owners of properties and when
a law is found to infringe that provision, it is open to
any person whose rights have been infringed to waive
it and when there is waiver there is no legal impediment
to the enforcement of the law. It would be otherwise
if the statute was a nullity ; in which case it can neither
be waived not enforced. . If then the law is merely
unenforceable and can take effect when waived it cannot be treated as non est and as effaced out of the
statute book. It is scarcely necessary to add that the
question of waiver is relevant to the present controversy not as bearing on any issue of fact arising for
determination in this case but as showing the nature
of the right declared under article 19(1) (f) and the
effect in law of a statute contravening it.
·
Another point of distinction noticed by American
jurists between unconstitutionality arising by reason
of lack of legislative competence and that arising by
reason of a check imposed on a competent Legislature
may also be mentioned. While a statute passed by a
Legislature which had no competence cannot acquire
validity when the Legislature subsequently acquires
competence, a statute which was within the competence
of the Legislature at the time of its enactment but
(1) 259 U. S. 125, 66 L. Ed. 855.
3-88 S.C. India/59
•
639
1954
Behram Khurshed
Pesikaka '
v.
The State of
Bombay.
Venkatarama:
Ay)' a
640
1954
Brhram Khurshrd
Pesikaka
v.
The Stair of
Bombqy.
Venkatarama
Ayyar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955)
which infringes a constitutional prohibition could be _...
enforced proprio vigore when once the prohibition is
removed. The law is thus stated in Willoughby on
the Constitution of the United States, Volume I, at
page 11 :"The validity of a statute is to be tested by the
constitutional power of a legislature at the time of its
enactment by that legislature, and, if thus tested it
is beyond the legislative power, it is not rendered valid,
without re-enactment, if later, by constitutional amendment, the necessary legislative power is granted.
However, it has been held that where an act is
within the general legislative power of the enacting
body, but is rendered unconstitutional by reason of
some adventitious circumstance, as for example, when
a State legislature is prevented from regulating a ' I>
matter by reason of the fact that the Federal Congress
has already legislated upon that matter, or, by reason
of its silence, is to be construed as indicating that there
should be no regulation, the act does not need to be
re-enacted in order to be enforced, if this cause of its
unconstitutionalitv is removed."
The authority cited in support of this observation is
the decision in Wilkerson v. Rahrer('). There the State
of Kansas enacted a law in i889 forbidding the sale of
intoxicating liquors in the State. Though it was valid
with reference to intra-State sales, it was unconstitutional in so far as it related to inter-State sales. In
1890 the Congress passed a legislation conferring
'authority on the States to enact prohibition laws with
reference to inter-State trade. A prosecution having
been instituted under the 1889 Act in respect of sales _ <I.
. ·effected after the Congress legislation of 1890, one of
the contentions urged was that as the State law was
•
unconstitutional when it was enacted it was void and
it could not be enforced even though the bar had been
removed by the Congress legislation of 1890. In
repelling this contention the Court observed :"This is not the case of a law enacted in the
nnauthorized exercise of a power exclusively confided
to Congress, but of a law which it was competent for
(1) 140 U.S. 545; 35 L. Ed . .572·
•
-
-
S.C.R.
-
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
641
the State to pass, but which could not operate upon
articles occupying a certain situation until the passage
of the Act of Congress. That Act in terms removed
the obstacle, and we perceive no adequate ground for
adjudging that a re-enactment of the State law was
required before it could have the effect upon imported
which it had always had upon domestic property."
The position is thus stated by Cooley in his work on
Constitutional Law, at page 201 :"A court's decision merely decides the case that
is then under adjudication, and a finding of unconstitutionality does not destroy the statute but merely
involves a refusal to enforce it."
Rottschaefer, after referring to the conflict of
authorities on the point in the States refers to the
decision in Wilkerson v. Rahrer( 1 ), as embodying the
better view. This question again, it may ·be noted,
does not arise as such for determination in this case
and is material only as showing that an infringement
of a constitutional prohibition which does not affect
the competence of a Legislature but is merely a check
on its exercise does not render the law a nullity.
In view of the principles discussed above, the use of
the word "void" in article 13(1) is not decisive on the
question as to the precise effect of a law being repugnant
to article 19(1) (£). Reference may be made in this
connection to the statement of the law in Corpus Juris,
Volume 67, page 263 et seq., to which counsel for the
respondent invited our attention. It is there pointed
out that the word "void" in statutes and decisions
might mean either that is "absolutely void" or
"relatively void" ; that "that is 'absolutely void' which
the law or the nature of things forbids to be enforced
at all. and that is 'relatively void' which the law
condemns as a wrong to individuals and refuses to
enforce as against them"; that what is absolutely void
is incapable of confirmation and ratification ; and that
what is relatively void could be waived.
The true scope of article t3(1) was considered by
this Court in Kesavan Madhava Menon v. State of
(1) 140 U. S. 545; 35 L. Ed. 572.
1954
Behram Khurshetl
Pesikaka
v.
The State of
Bombtg.
Venkatarama
Ayyar J.
642
1954
Bthram Khurshed
Pesikaka
v.
TheStat<0f
Bomb(fl.
Venkatarama
·A'Jar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955)
Bombay('). There the point for determination was
whether the Constitution was retrospective in its
operation. In the course of his judgment Das J.
observed:"It should further be seen that article 13 ( 1) does
not in terms make the existing laws which are
inconsistent with the fundamental rights void ab initio
or for all purposes. On the contrary, it provides that
all existing laws, in so far as they are inconsistent with
the fundamental rights, shall be void to the extent of
their inconsistency. They are not void for all purposes
but they are void only to the extent they come into
conflict with the fundamental rights ............ Article
13(1) cannot be read as obliterating the entire operation of the inconsistent laws, or to wipe them out
altogether from the statute book .............. The
effect of article 13(1) is quite different from the effect
of the expiry of a temporary statute or the repeal of a
statute by a subsequent statute. As already explained,
article 13(1) only has the effect of nullifying or rendering
all inconsistent existing laws ineffectual or nugatory
and devoid of any legal force or binding effect only
with respect to the exercise of fundamental rights
on and after the date of commencement of the
Constitution."
It is true that the question which the Court was
considering there was different from the one which we
have now to decide in this appeal. But those observations embody a principle which is applicable to the
present case as well. In effect, "void" in article 13 (1)
was construed as meaning, in the language of American
jurists, "relatively void." Therefore both on the
ground that a judicial determination does not operate
as an amendment of the statute and on the ground that
a declaration that the impugned law is void under
article 13(1) as repugnant to article 19(1) (f) merely
renders it unenforceable, I am of the opinion that the
decision in The State of Bombay and Another v.
F. N. Balsara (supra) cannot be held to remove
medicinal preparations from out of the purview of
section 13(b ). I therefore agree with the learned Judges
(1) [1951] s. c. R. 228.
-
-
-
-
..
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
643
of the Bombay High Court, though not for the reasons
given by them, that the burden of establishing that
what was consumed was a medicinal preparation lies
on the appellant.
It was next contended that even if the burden lay on
the appellant to prove that he had taken a medicinal
preparation, he must be held on the evidence to have
discharged it because the doctor who examined him
at 11-30 p.m., on the day of the occurrence stated in
his evidence that he was coherent in his speech and
could walk along a straight line, that the smelling of
alcohol could be caused by oxidation and that the
congestiori of the conjunctiva in the eyes could result
from street dust. It was argued that if the prosecution
evidence did not exclude the possibility of the defence
being true, then notwithstanding section 105 of the
Evidence Act the burden which lay on the posecution
of establishing the offence had not been discharged and
reliance was placed on the decision in W oolmington v.
Director of Public Prosecutions (1 ), and on Indian
authorities wherein it was followed : Emperor v.
U. Damapala(2) ; Parbhoo v. Emperor(3). In opposition
to these authorities counsel for the respondent relied
on the decision in Government of Bombay v. Sakur( 4 ).
The question is whether if the burden lay upon the
appellant the conclusion of the learned. Judges that it
had not been discharged is on the evidence a reasonable
one. If it is, this Court cannot interfere with it in an
appeal under article 136. It must be noted that the
appellant himself led no evidence in support of the plea.
If at least the evidence which the prosecution adduced
disclosed facts which would lend support to the defence,
it might then have been open to the appellant to rely
on them without himself having to adduce independen,t
evidence but none such were elicited. The learned
Judges in the Court below have approached the case
from the correct standpoint and have discussed the
entire evidence with a view to find whether on that the
(1) [1935) A. C. 462.
(2) I. L. R. 14 Rang. 666.
(3) I. L. R. 1941 All. 843.
(4) A. I. R. 1947 Born. 38,
48 Born. L. R. 6!6.
195+
Behram Khurshti
P1sikaka
••
The Stat1 of
Bombay.
Vmkatarama
..(1yar J.
-
J
644
1954
Beltram Khurshed
Pesikaka
v:"
The State of
Bom6ay.
V1nkatarama
A.1.1••
lf·
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955}
defence was reasonably probable. They held that the
giving of coherent answers or walking in a straight line
would only show that the appellant was not drunk at
that time but would not show that he had not consumed
liquor. They also remarked that the appellant could
have informed both the sub-inspector and the doctor
who examined him that he had taken medicine in which
case the police might have been in a position to find
out whether there was a medicine bottle at his residence
at that time. If the learned· Judges were right in their
view that the burden lay on the appellant, their finding
that it had not been discharged is not one which is open
to attack.
It was also contended that the trial magistrate
having acquitted the appellant, the presumption of 1
innocence which the law raises in favour of the accused
became reinforced and that there were no compelling
reasons for the appellate Court to have reversed the .
order of acquittal. But the judgment of the trial Court
was based on the view that the burden was on the
prosecution to establish that the accused had not taken
a medicinal preparation and when the learned Judges
differed from that view, they had to review the evidence
afresh· and decide whether the appellant had discharged
the burden and their finding on the question is not
vitiated by any misdirection.
In the result the conviction of the appellant under
section 66 (b) of the Bombay Prohibition Act must be
· confirmed. As regards the sentence of one month's
imprisonment passed on him, it appears that he has
already served 22 days out of it. The justice of the
case does not require that he should be agam sent to
jail. I would, therefore, reduce the sentence of imprisonment to the period already undergone. Subject to this
modification, I am of the opinion that this appeal
should be dismissed.
BY THE CouRT.-Having regard to the judgments
of the majority, the appeal will be dismissed subject to
the modification that the sentence imposed upon the
appellant will be reduced to that already undergone.
Bail bond will be cancelled.
Appeal dismissed and sentence reduced.
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'
•
S.C.R.
-
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
645
[There was an application for review of the aforesaid
Judgments under article 137 of the Constitution and
the Hon'ble Judges of the original Bench (Bhagwati,
Jagannadhadas and Venkatarama Ayyar JJ.) passed
the following order dated 28th April, 1954, referring the
case for the opinion of the Constitution Bench.]
The Order of the Court was pronounced by
BHAGWATI J.--We grant the review and reopen
the case to enable us to obtain the opinion of a larger
Bench on the constitutional question raised in the
judgments previously delivered by us. Under proviso
to article 145 of the Constitution, we refer the following
question for the opinion of the Constitution Bench of
the Court.
"What is the effect of the declaration in The State of
Bombay and Another v. F. N. Balsara(1) that clause (b)
of section 13 of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949, is
void, under article 13(1) of the Constitution, in so far
as it affects the consumption or use of liquid medicinal
or toilet preparations containing alcohol, on the ground
that it infringes articles 19(1) (£) of the Constitution ?"
On receipt of the opinion the case will be taken up
for further consideration.
fIn pursuance of the above reference under the
proviso to article 145(3) of the Constitution their
Lordships of the Constitution Bench (Mehr Chand
Mahajan C. J., Mukherjea, S. R. Das, Vivian Bose and
Ghulam Hasan JJ.) gave the following Opinion dated
23rd September, 1954. l
MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J.-(Mukherjea, Vivian
· Bose and Ghulam Hasan JJ. concurring) A Bench of
this Court hearing an appeal under the provisions of
Chapter IV of the Constitution has referred, under
article 145(3) of the Constitution, for the opinion of the
Constitution Bench the following point :"What is the effect of the declaration in The State
of Bombay and Another v. F. N. Balsara(1) that clause
(b) of section 13 of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949,
is void, under article 13(1) of the Constitution, m s<>
far as it affects the consumption or use of liquid
(1) [1951] S. C.R. 682.
1954
Behram Khurshe!I
Pesikaka
v.
The State of
Bombay.
BhagwatiJ.
646
1954
B1hram Khurshed
Pesikaka
v.
The State of
Bombay.
MthrChand
MahaJan C. J.
SUPREME COURT REPOR:TS
[19551
medicinal or toilet preparations containing alcohol, on
the ground that it infringes article 19 ( 1) ( f) of the
Constitution?"
The facts giving rise to the reference are these :
Shri Pesikaka, the appellant in the case, was at the
relevant period, officiating Regional Transport Officer,
Bombay Region. On the 29th May, 1951, at about
9-30 P.M., while proceeding in his jeep towards Colaba
Bus Stand, he knocked down three persons. He was
arrested by the police and taken to the police station
and then to St. George's Hospital. The doctor found
his breath smelling of alcohol, conjunctiva congested,
pupils semi-dilated and reacting to light, and speech
coherent. He could behave himself and walk along a
straight line. In the opinion of the doctor the appellant '
did not seem to be under the influence of alcohol,
though he had taken alcohol in some form or ·other.
On these facts the appellant was prosecuted for
having committed offences under section 338, Indian
Penal Code (rash driving), as well as under section 66(b)
of the Bombay Prohibition Act. In defence it was suggested that he had taken a medicinal preparation, B.G.
Phos, and had not consumed any liquor, and that on the
night in question he had. taken at about 9 or 9-15 P.M.
after dinner a dose of B. G. Phos which contained 17
per cent. of alcohol according to its formula.
The learned Presidency Magistrate acquitted the
appellant on the finding that the prosecution had failed
to establish his guilt under either of the sections under
which he was charged. With regard to the offence
under section 66(b) of the Bombay Prohibition Act,
it was observed that there were certain medicinal ·
preparations which were allowed to be used by law,
and there was no satisfactory evidence to show that
the appellant had not consumed those tonics but only
liquor for which he ought to have a permit. The State
of Bombay appealed against the acquittal order to the
High Court. The High Court confirmed the acquittal
in regard to the charge under section 338, Indian
Penal Code, but reversed the order acquitting him of
the charge under section 66(b) of the Bombay ProhibiIt followed a decision of its own Division
tion Act.
-
'·
•
S.C.R.
•·
-
>
l
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
647
Bench in Rangrao Bala Mane v. The State (supra)
where it had been held that once "it was proved by the
prosecution that a person had drunk or consumed liquor
· without a permit, it was for that person to show that
the liquor drunk by him was not prohibited liquor, but
was alcohol or liquor which he was permitted by law
to take, e.g., medicated alcohol. On this view of the
law, on the merits of the case it was held that the
appellant had failed to prove the existence of circumstances from which the Court could come to the
conclusion that the liquor which was consumed by the
appellant was not prohibited liquor but liquor which
was excepted by the Bombay Prohibition Act from its
operation. In the result the appellant was sentenced
, to one month's rigorous imprisonment and a fine of
Rs. 500. Against this order an appeal was admitted
in this Court by special leave and was heard by a Bench
of. the Court consisting of Bhagwati, Jagannadhadas
and Venkatarama Ayyar JJ. on the 19th February,
1954. The learned Judges could not reach an unanimous decision and expressed different and divergent
opinions. Bhagwati J. wanted to allow the appeal
and quash the conviction. He was of the opinion that
the onus rested on the prosecution to prove that the
liquor consumed by the appellant was prohibited liquor
under section 13(b) of the Act and that the prosecution
had failed to prove this. This, in the opinion of the
learned Judge, was the consequence of the declaration
of unconstitutionality of a portion of section 13 (b) by
this Court in The State of Bombay and Another v. F. N.
Balsara (supra).
Venkatarama Ayyar J. dissented from this view.
He was of the opinion that the decision in The State of
Bombay and Another v. F. N. Balsara (supra) could not
be held to have the effect of taking out medicinal
preparations from the purview of section 13(b) and that
its effect was merely to render that part of the section
unenforceable and that the onus rested on the accused
to establish the plea of unconstitutionality, and it could
not be held established unless all the elements necessary
to sustain such a plea were proved and the accused had
therefore to make out as . a fact that what he had
1954
B1hram Ehursh1d
P1sikaka.
v.
The State of
BombtfJ.
M1hrChand
JLQhajan C. J.
648
1954
Behram lihurshtd
Pesikaka
v.
The State of
Bomb<J1.
Mehr Chand
Mah,,jan C. J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
consumed was a medicinal preparation. On the
merits of the case it •was held that the accused had
failed to discharge the burden that rested on him. In
the result the conviction of the appellant by the High
Court was upheld.
Jagannadhadas J. agreed in the result reached by
Venkatarama Ayyar J. but on different grounds. He
was of the opinion that the only way to give full effect
to the judgment in The State Bombay and Another v.
F. N. Balsara (supra) was to en graft an appropriate
exception or proviso upon secrjon 13 (b) in the light of
that decision. He considered that The State of Bombay
and Another v. F. N. Balsara (supra) did not import a
new difinition or re-write section 13(b ). It kept the
section intact but treated the consumption of liquid or ,
medicinal preparations containing alcohol as beyond
its ambit and thus engrafted an exception or proviso on
to section 13(b ). On this view of the effect of Balsara's
decision it was held that the onus rested on the accused
to establish that his case fell within the exception
and he had failed to discharge that · onus. In accordance with the opinion of the majority the conviction of
the appellant under section 66(b) of the Bombay'
Prohibition Act was confirmed and the appeal was dismissed but the sentence was reduced to that already
undergone.
On a petition for review being presented, the learned
Judges granted the review on the 26th April, 1954 and
reopened the case, to enable them to obtain the opinion
of the Constitution Bench of this (',ourt on the constitutional question formulated and mentioned above.
For a proper appreciation of the question referred to
us, it is necessary to set out what this Court decided in
The State of Bombay and Another v. F. N. Balsara
(supra).
In that case the constitutional validity of the
Bombay Prohibition Act (XXV of 1949) was challenged
on different grounds. This attack substantially failed
and the Act was maintained as it was passed, with the
exception of a few provisions that were declared
invalid. Inter alia, clause (b) of section 13 so far as it
affected the consumption or use of such medicinal and
toilet preparations containing alcohol was held invalid.
-
·j
S.C.R.
-
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
649
Section 2(24) of the Act defined a "liquor" to include
spirits of wine, met~y!ated spirits, wine, beer, toddy
and all liquids cons1stmg of or containing alcohol.
Section 13 (b) prohibits the use or consumption of liquot
without a permit. Section 66(b) which is the penal
section provides that "whoever in contravention of the
provmons of this Act. ....... consumes, uses,. ..... .
any intoxicant ........ shall, on conviction, be punished."
The appellant was charged under section 66(b) of the
Act for having used or consumed liquor the use of
which was prohibited by section 13 (b). In The State
of Bombay and Another v. F. N. Balsara (supra), the
part of the section that brought all liquids containing
alcohol within its ambit was declared invalid and the
, section therefore, though it stood intact as enacted in
respect of prohibited liquor up to the date of the coming
into force of the Constitution and qua non-citizens
subsequently, a part of it was declared invalid, and so
far as it concerned citizens, qua them that part of the
section ceased to have legal effect.
The problem now raised is ; what is the effect of this
partial declaration of the invalidity of section 13(b) on
the case of a citizen prosecuted under section 66 (b) for
committing a breach of the provisions of the section
after the coming into force of the Constitution. Our
opinion on this question is that the effect of the declaration in The State of Bombay and Another v. F. N. Balsara (supra), that clause (b) of section 13 of the
Bombay Prohibition Act is void under article 13(1) of
the Constitution in so far as it affects the consumption
or use of liquid medicinal or toilet preparations contain. ing alcohol, is to render part of section 13(b) of the
Bombay Prohibition Act, inoperative, ineffective and
ineffectual and thus unenforceable. The part of the
section which has been declared void has no legal force
so far as citizens are concerned and it cannot be
recognized as valid law for determining the rights of
citizens. In other words, the ambit of the section
stands narrowed down so far as its enforceability
against citizens is concerned and no notice can be taken
of the part of the section struck down in a prosecution
for contravention of the provisions of that section, with.
1954
Behram Khurshea
Pesikaka
v.
The State of
Bombay.
Mehr Chand
Mahajan C. ].
650
'954
.Behram Khurjhld
Pesikaka
v.
The Stat1 ef
Bombay.
Mehr Chand
Mahajan C. J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19551
the consequence that in prosecutions against c1t1zens
of India under section 13(b ), the offence of contravention of the section can only be proved if it is established
that they have used or conwmed liquor or an intoxicant
which is prohibited by that part of the section which
has been declared valid and enforceable and without
reference to its unenforceable part. No notice at all
should be taken of that other part as it has no relevance
in such an enquiry, having no legal effect. In a criminal
case unless the prosecution proves a contravention of
a provision that is legally enforceable and valid, it
cannot succeed. No onus is cast on the accused to
prove that his case falls under that part of the section
which has been ·held unenforceable. The High Court
was in error in placing the onus on the accused to prove ,
that he had consumed alcohol that could be consumed
without a permit merely on proof that he was smelling
of alcohol. In· our judgment, that was not the correct
approach to the question. The bare circumstance that
a citizen accused of an offence under section 66(b) is
smelling of alcohol is compatible both with his innocence
as well as his guilt. It is a neutral circumstance. The
smell of alcohol may be due to the fact that the accused
had contravened the enforceable part of section 13(b)
of the Prohibition Act. It may well be due also to the
fact that he had taken alcohol which fell under the
unenforceable and inoperative part 'of the section. That
being so, it is the duty of the prosecution to prove that
the alcohol of which he was smelling was such that it
came within the category of prohibited alcohols and
. the onus was not discharged or shifted by merely.
proving a smell of alcohol.
The onus thus cast on the . i
prosecution may be light or heavy according to the
circumstances of each case. The intensity of the smell
itself may be such that it may !:legative its being of a
permissible variety. Expert evidence may prove that
consumption in small doses of medicinal or other
preparations permitted cannot produce the smell or a
state of body or mind amounting to drunkenness. Be
that as it may, the question is one of fact to be decided
according to the circumstance of each case. It is
open to the' accused to prove in defence that what he
...
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S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
651
consumed was not prohibited alcohol, but failure of the
defence to prove it cannot lead to his conviction unless
it is established to the satisfaction of the Judge by the
prosecution that the case comes within the enforceable
part of section 13(b), contravention of which alone is
made an offence under the provisions of section 66 of
the Bombay Prohibition Act. Our reasons for this
opinion are these.
The meaning to be given to the expression "void" in
article 13(1) is no longer res integra. It stands concluded
by the majority decision in Kesava Madhava Menon v.
The State of Bombay(1). The minority view there was
that the word "void" had the same meaning as
"repeal" and therefore a statute which came into clash
· with fundamental rights stood obliterated from the
statute book altogether, and that such a statute was
void ab initio. The. majority however held that the
word "void" in article 13 ( 1), so far as existing laws
were concerned, could not be held to obliterate them
from the statute book, and could not make such laws
void altogether, because in its opinion, article 13 had
not been given any retrospective effect. The majority
however held that after the coming into force of the
Constitution the effect of article 13(1) on such repugnant laws was that it nullified them, and made them
ineffectual and nugatory and devoid of any legal force
or bindiug 'effect. It was further pointed out in one of
the judgments representing the majority view, that the
American rule that if a statute is repugnant to the
Constitution the statute is void from its birth, has no
· application to cases concerning obligations incurred or
rights accrued in accordance with an existing law that
was constitutional in its inception, but that if any law
was made after the 26th January, 1950, which was
repugnant to the Constitution, then the same rule shall
have to be followed in India as followed in America.
The result therefore of this pronouncement is that the
part of the section of an existing law which is unconstitutional is not law, and is null and void. For
determining the rights and obligations of citizens the
part declared void should be notionally taken to be
(1) {1951] S. C.R. 228.
1954
B•hram Khurshett·
Pesikaka
v·.
The State of
Bombay.
Mehr Chand
Mahajan C. J.
652
1954
JJehram Khur!hed
Pesikaka
v.
The State of
Bombay.
Mehr Chafuf
Mahajan C. J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19551
obliterated from the section for all intents and purposes,
though it may remain written on the statute book and
be a good law' when a question arises for determination
of rights and obligations incurred prior to 26th January,
1950, and also for the determination of rights of persons
who have not been given fundamental rights by the
Constitution. Thus, in this situation. there is no scope
for introducing terms like "relatively void" coined by
American Judges in construing a Constitntion which is
not drawn up in similar language and the implications
of which are not quite familiar in this country.
We are also not able to endorse the opinion expressed
by our learned brother, Venkatarama Ayyar, that a
declaration of unconstitutionality brought about by
lack of legislative power stands on a different footing ,
from a declaration of unconstitntionality brought about
by reason of abridgement of fundamental rights. We
think that it is not a correct proposition that constitntional provisions in Part III of our Constitution merely
operate as a check on the exercise of legislative power.
It is axiomatic that when the law-making power of a
State is restricted by a written fundamental law, then
any law enacted and opposed to the fundamental law
is in excess of the legislative authority and is thus a
nullity. Both these declarations of unconstitutionality
go to the root of the power itself and there is no real
distinction between them. They represeni but two
aspects of want of legislative power. The legislative
power of
Parliament and the State Legislatures as
conferred by articles 245 and 246 of the Constitution
stands curtailed by the fundamental rights chapter of
Constitution. A mere reference to the provisions of
article 13 (2) and articles 245 and 246 is sufficient to
indicate that there is no competency in Parliament or
a State Legislature to make a law which comes into
clash with Part III of the Constitution after the coming
into force of the Constitution. Article 13(2) is in these
terms:
"The State shall not make any law which takes
away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and
anv law made in contravention of this clause shall, to
the extent of the contravention, be void."
-
.,
..
y
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
653
This is a clear and unequivocal mandate of the fundamental law prohibiting the State from making any
laws which come into conflict with Part III of the
Constitution. The authority thus conferred by articles
245 and 246 to make laws subjectwise in the different
Legislatures is qualified by the declaration made in
article 13(2). That power can only be exercised subject
to the prohibition contained in article 13(2). On the
construction of article 13(2) there was no divergence of
opinion between the majority and the minority in
-
Kesava Madhava Menon v. The State of Bombay
(supra). It was only on the construction of article 13(1)
•
that the difference arose because it was felt that
that article could not retrospectively invalidate laws
which when made were constitutional according to the
' Constitution then in force.
Again, we are not able to subscribe to the view that
in a criminal prosecution it is open to an accused person to waive his constitutional right and get convicted.
A reference to Cooley's Constitutional Limitations,
Vol. I, p. 371, make the proposition clear. Therein
the
learned professor says that a party may
consent to waive rights of property, but the trial and
punishment for public offences are not within the province of individual consent or agreement. In our
opinion, the doctrine of waiver enunciated by some
American Judges in construing the American Constitution cannot be introduced in our Constitution without
a fuller discussion of the matter. No inference in
deciding the case should have been raised on the basis
of such a theory. The learned Attorney-General when
questioned about the doctrine did not seem to be very
enthusiastic about it. Without finally expressing an
opinion on this question we are not for the moment
convinced that this theory has any relevancy in construing the fundamental rights conferred by Part III
l>f our Constitution. We think that the rights described as fundamental rights are a necessary consequence of the declaration in the preamble that the
people of India have solemnly resolved to constitute
India into a sovereign democratic republic and. to secure
to all its citizens justice, social, economic and political ;
1954
Behram KhursheJ
Pesikaka
v.
The State ef
Bom6qy.
Mehr Chand
Mahajan C. J.
654
1954
Behram Khurshed
P1sikaka
v.
The State of
Bombay.
Mehr Chand
Mahajan C. J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship;
equality of status and of opportunity. These fundamental rights have not been put in the Constitution
merely for individual benefit, though ultimately they
come into operation in considering individual rights,
They have been put there as a matter of public policy
and the doctrine of waiver can have no application to
provisions of law which have been enacted as a matter
of constitutional policy. Reference to some of the
articles, inter alia, articles 15 ( 1), 20, 21 makes the
proposition quite plain. A citizen cannot get discrimination by telling the State "You can discrimi-·
nate", or get convicted by waiving the protection given
under articles 20 and 21.
The learned Attorney-General contended that the
correct approach to the question was . that there being
a strong presumption in favour of the constitutionality
of a statute, it is for those who assail it as unconstitutional to establish it, and therefore it was for the appellant to establish that the statute was unconstitutional, and that unless he proved facts requisite for the
constitutional invalidity of the conviction he could
not succeed. We cannot agree that that is a correct
way of judging criminal cases. The constitutional
invalidity of a part of section 13(b) of the Bombay
Prohibition Act having been declared by this Court,
that part of the section ceased to have any legal effect in
judging cases of citizens and had to be regarded as null
and void in determining whether a citizen was guilty
of an offence. Article 141 of the Constitution declares
that the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be
binding on all Courts within the territory of India.
In view of this clear enactment there is no scope in
India for the application of the American doctrine
enunciated by Willoughby ("The Constitution of the
United States" Vol. I, p. 10), wherein the learned
author states, "the declaration by a court of unconstitutionality of a statute which is in conflict with
the Constitution affects the parties only and there is
no judgment against the statute ; that the. opinion or
reasons o~ the court may operate . as a precedent for
the determination of other similar cases, but it does
r
-
...
'
S.C.R.
..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
655
not strike the statute from the statute book; the parties
to that suit are concluded by the judgment, but no
one else is bound; a new litigant may bring a new suit,
based on the very same statute, and the former decision cannot be pleaded as an estoppel, but can be
relied on only as a precedent." Once a statute is
declared void under article 13(1) or 13(2) by this Court,
that declaration has the force of law, and the statute
so declared void is no longer law .qua persons whose
fundamental rights are thus infringed. In America
there is no similar statutory provision and that being
so, the doctrine enunciated by the learned author can
have no application here. In this country once a law
has been struck down as unconstitutional law by a
, Court, no notice can be taken of that law by any Court,
and in every case an accused person need l}Ot start
proving that the law is unconstitutional. The Court
is not empowered to look at that part of the law which
has been declared as void, and therefore there is no
onus resting on the accused person to prove that the
law that has already been declared unconstitutional is
unconstitutional in that particular case as well. The
Court has to take notice only of what the law of the
land is, and convict the accused only if he contravenes
the law of the land.
Our learned brother, Jagannadhadas J., took the
view that the only appropriate way of giving effect to the
judgment in The State of Bombay and Another v. F. N.
Balsara (supra) was by engrafting an exception or
proviso to section 13(b) in the light of that decision
and that the onus of proving the exception was on the
accused person. This, in our judgment, is again not a
true approach to the question. As pointed out by the
learned Judge himself, the Court has no power to
re-write the section. It has to be kept intact. The
Court therefore has no power to engraft an exception
or a proviso on section B(b) of the Bombay Prohibition
Act. Apart from this circumstance it seems plain that
unless there is a power to make a law inconsistent with
the provisions of Part III of the Constitution, there
can be no power to engraft an. exception of the nature
suggested by our brother. An exception or proviso
4-88 S.C. India[59
1954
Behram Khurshltl
Pesikaka
v.
Th4,Sta11 of
Bombay.
Mehr CluwJ
Mahajan C. J.
656
J954
&htam Khursheti
Ptsikaka
v.
Tiu: Stott of
Bomo<!)'.
MthrChand
Mahajan C. J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1955]
can only be engrafted for the purpose of excluding from
the substantive part of the section certain matters
which but for the proviso would be within it. But when
there is no power to enact at all what is proposed to
be embodied m the exception, there is no power to
enact an exception by enacting a law which the Legislature is not competent to make. The State has no
power to make a law abridging fundamental rights and
therefore there is no power to engraft an exception by
taking something out of a law which cannot he enacted. It is therefore difficult to treat what was declared
void in The State of Bombay and Another v. F. N. Balsara
(supra) as an exception to section B(b) of the Bombay
Prohibition Act and apply the rule enunciated in section 105 of the Evidence Act to the case of the appellant. The only correct approach to the subject is to
ignore the part of the section declared void by this
Court in The State of Bombay and A11other v. F. N.
Balsara (supra) and see if the prosecution has succeeded
in bringing the offence home to the accused on the
part of the section that remains good law.
With the observations made above the opm10n m
this case is returned to the Bench which originally
heard the appeal.
DAs J.-I respectfully beg to differ from the opinion
of the majority of this Court just delivered by my Lord
the Chief Justice. It is, therefore, incumbent on me
to formulate my answer to the question referred to
this Constitution Bench and state shortly the reasons
in support thereof.
It is necessary at the outset to refer to the relevant
statutory provmons bearing on the question. The
appellant before us was prosecuted on a charge under
section 13 read with section 66(b) of the Bombay
Prohibition Act, 1949 (Act XXV of 1949). The rele-..ant
part of section 66(b) of the Act which is the penal section reads as follows:
"66. Whoever m contravention of the provisions
of this Act
(a) ............. .
(b) consumes, uses, possesses or transports any
intoxicant or hemp,
•
•
•
-
-
S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
657
(c) ............. .
(d) ............. .
shall, on conviction, be punisheed .......... "
By section 2(22) "intoxicant" is defined as meaning
"any liquor, intoxicating drug, opium or any other
substance which the State Government may, by
notification in the Official Gazette, declare to be an
intoxicant." Read in the light of this definition consumption, use, etc., of "liquor"' is. within the mischief
of this section. Further, it will be noticed that what
is made punishable is not consumption, use, etc. Qf
liquor simpliciter but consumption, use, etc., of liquor
"in contravention of the provisions of this Act." The
prosecution, as the charge shows, relied on section 13
, as being the provision of the Act in contravention of
which the consumption, use, etc., was alleged to have
been made by the appellant who was the accused person. That section is to be found in Chapter III headed
"Prohibitions". So far as it is material for our purpose, it runs thus :
"13. No person shall(a) ............. .
(b) consume or use liquor ; or
(c) ............. .
By section 2(24) "liquor" is defined as including-" (a) spirits of wine; denatured spirits, wine, beer,
toddy and all liquids consisting of or containing
alcohol; and
(b) any other intoxicating substance which the
State Government may, by notification in the Official
Gazette, declare to be liquor for the purposes of this
Act."
T11erefore the prohibition of section 13 (b) extends
to the consumption or use of each and everyone of the
above enumerated items which are included in the
definition of "liquor". It follows that whoever consumes or uses any of these enumerated substances
contravenes the provisions of section 13 (b) and consumption or use of any of these substances in contravention of this provision is an offence punishable under
section 66 (b).
1954
Behram Klwrshd
Pesikaka
v.
The State of
Bombqy.
Dtu J.
6>58
'954
Bthram Khurshed
Pesikaka
v.
The Stall of
Bombay.
pasJ,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
I 1955]
The Bombay Prohibition .Act containing the above
prov1S1ons came into force on the 20th May, 1949. It
is conceded .on. all hands that it was a perfectly valid
piece of legislation enacted well within its legi,Jative
competency by the tl1en Bombay Legislative Assembly.
Then came tl1e Constitution of India on the 26th
January, 1950. Article 19(1) (f) gives to all citizens the
fundamental right to acquire, hold and dispose of prc>perty. By sub-article (5), however, it is provided that
nothing in clause (f) shall affect the operation of any
existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the
State from making any law imposing, reasonable · restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by subclause ( f) either in the interests of the general public
or for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled
Tribe. The Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949, was an
existing law. By virtue of sub-article (5) the right
conferred by sub-clause (f) cannot affect the operation
of the Act in so far as it imposes reasonable restrictions
of the kind mentioned in that sub-article. If, however,
this existing law imposes restrictions which are unreasonable then it becomes inconsistent with the right
guaranteed to the citizens by article 19(1)(£) and consequently under article 13 ( l) "shall, to the extent of
such inconsistency, be void". It is beyond all dispute
that it is for the Court to judge whether the restrictions
imposed by any existing law or any part thereof on the
fundamental rights of citizens are reasonable or unreasonable in the interest of the general public or for
the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe.
If the Court holds that the restrictions are unreasonable then the Act or the part thereof which imposes
such unreasonable restrictions comes into conflict and
becomes inconsistent with the fundamental right conferred on the citizens by article 19(l)(f) and is by
article 13(1) rendered void, not in toto or for all purposes or for all persons but "to the extent of such
inconsistency", i.e., to the extent it 1s inconsistent with
the exercise of that fundamental right by the citizens.
This is plainly the position, as I see it.
Shortly after the commencement of the Constitution
the validity of the Bombay Prohibition Act was
"
-
S.C.R .
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
659
.·~
-
•
challenged in its entirety. One F. N. Balsara, claiming to be an Indian citizen, prayed to the High Court
at Bombay, inter alia, for a writ of mandamus against
the State of Bombay and the Prohibition Commissioner
ordering them (i) to forbear from enforcing against him
the provisions of the Prohibition Act and (ii) to allow
him to exercise his right to possess, consume and use
certain articles, namely, whisky, brandy, wine, beer,
medicated wine, eau-de-cologne, lavender water and
medicinal preparations containing alcohol. The High
Court, agreeing with some of the petitioner's contentions and disagreeing with others, declared some of the
provisions of the Act to be invalid and the rest to be
valid. Both the State of Bombay and the petitioner
Balsara, appealed to this Court after obtaining a certificate from the High Court under article 132(1) of the
Constitution. The Judgment of this Court in those
appeals was pronounced on the 25th May, 1951. See
The State of Bombay and Another v. F. N. Balsara
(supra). So far as it is material for our present purpose this Court held( 1) that under entry 31 of List II of the Seventh
Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935, the
Provincial Legislatu.res had the power to make laws
with respect to "intoxicating liquors, that is to say,
the production, manufacture, possession, transport,
purchase and sale of intoxicating liquors" and there
was, therefore, no legislative incompetency in the
Bombay Legislature to enact the Bombay Prohibition
Act, 1949;
(2) that the word "liquor" as understood in India
at the time of the Government of India Act, 1935,
covered not only those alcoholic liquids which are
generally used as beverages and produce intoxication,
but also liquids containing alcohol and, therefore, the
definition of "liquor" contained in section 2(24) of the
Act was not ultra vires, and
(3) that the restrictions imposed by sections 12
and 13 of the Act on the possession, sale, use and consumption of liquor were not reasonable restrictions on
the fundamental right guaranteed by article 19(1)(f), so
far as medicinal and toilet preparations containing
1954
Behram Khurshed
Penkaka
v.
The State ef
Bombay.
DasJ.
660
1954
Behram Khurshtd
Pesikoka
v.
The State of
Bombay.
DGJJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955J
alcohol were conceroed and that the said sections were
inv;ilid so far as they prohibited the possession, sale,
use and consumption of these articles, but that those
sections were not wholly voitl on this ground as the
earlier categories mentioned in the definition of liquor,
-namely, spirits of wine, methylated spirit, wine, beer
and toddy were distinctly separable items which were
easily severable from the last category, namely, all
liquors containing als_ohol and further that the last
category of "all liquids consisting of or containing
alcohol" were again capable of being split up in several
sub-categories, e.g., liquid medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol and the restrictions on the
possession, sale, use and consumption of the earlier
categories and all liquids containing alcohol other than
medicinal and toilet preparations were not unreasonable.
In the result this Court declared certain provisions
0£ the Act invalid. Amongst the provisions declared
innlid was section 13(b ), but it was so declared only
"so far as it affects the consumption or use of such
medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol."
This declaration, no doubt, was made pursuant to article 13(1) of the Coqstitntion. The very foundation of
this declaration was that the prohibition imposed by
this section against the consumption or use 0£ liquid
medicinal or toilet preparations was an unreasonable
restriction on the exercise of the fumlamental right of
citizens to acquire, hold and dispose of property which
in that case was liquid medicinal or toilet preparations
containing alcohol. The law thus declared by this
Court is, bv virtue of article 141 of the Constitution,
binding on· all Courts within the territory of India.
The offence with which the appellant was charged
was alleged to have been committed on the 29th May,
1951, that is to say, four days after this Court pronounced its judgment in The State of Bombay and Another v.
F. N. Balsam (supra). On the 22nd April, 1952, the
learned Presidency Magistrate acquitted the appellant
of that charge with the following remark :
"The evidence also does not go to show conclusively
tl1at the accused had consumed alcohol without a permit.
There are certain medicinal preparations which are
-
-
S.C.R.
-
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
661
allowed to be used by law and there must be satisfactory evidence to show that the accused has not consumed those tonics but only liquor for which he ought
to have a permit."
The State appealed to the High Court against this
order of acquittal. The High Court following its own
earlier decision in Rangrao Bala Mane v. State (supra)
reversed the order of the Presidency Magistrate.
Neither in the judgment of the Presidency Magistrate
nor in the iudgment of the Court was any reference
made to the decision of this Court in The State of
Bombay and Another v. F. N. Balsam (supra). The
appellant came up to this Court in appeal after having
obtained special leave from this Court.
The appeal came up for hearing before a Division
Bench of "ti1is Court consisting of Bhagwati, Jagannadhadas and Venkatarama Ayyar JJ. Bhagwati J.
clearly and, if I way respectfully say so, correctly
accepted the position that the declaration made by this
Court in T lze State of Bombay and Another v. F. N.
Balsam ( Stt/Jra) "was a judicial pronouncement and that
even though under article 141 of the Constitution the
law declared by this Court was binding on all Courts in
India and is to be the law of the land the effect of that
declaration was not to enact a statutory provision or
to alter or amend section 13(b) of the Act." Having
accepted this position the learned Judge logically and,
again I say with respect, correctly repelled the argument that th<: result of the decision in The State of
Bombay and Another v. F. N. Balsara (supra) was to
introduce. not in terms but in effect, an exception or
proviso to section 13(b) and that consequently the
onus !av on the appellant to prove the existence of
circumstances bringing his case within the exception
or proviso as laid down in section 105 of the Evidence
Act. The learned Judge, however, observed :"The only effect of the declaration was that the
prohibition enacted in section 13 (b) was to be enforceable in regard to the consumption or use of validly
prohibited liquor, i.e., spirits of wine, methylated
spirits, wine, beer, toddy and all non-medicinal and
1 954
Bi/tram KhurJhei/
Posikaka
"·
Tit• Stal• of
Bombay.
Das J.
662
1954
&J,,am K!mtsi1'd
Pesikaka
"·
TM .State of
Bombqy.
Das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
non-toilet liquid preparations consisting of or containing alcohol. The prohibition which was enacted in
section B(b) against the consumption or use of liquor
could in the light of the declaration made by this Court
only refer to the consumption or use of validly prohibited liquor, i.e., spirits of wine, methylated spirits, wine,
beer, toddy and all non-medicinal and non-toilet liquid
preparations consisting of or containing alcohol, and
that was the only prohibition which could be enforced
under the section B(b) and the penal section 66(b)."
The learned Judge proceeded to illustrate how the
effect of the declaration could be worked out :
"The effect of the declaration on the provisions of
section B(b) could be worked out in any of the following modes:
No person shall consume or use spirits of wine,
methylated spirits, wine, beer, toddy and all liquids
consisting of or containing alcohol as are not or which
are not or other than or save or except or provided
they are not or but shall not include liquid medicinal or
toilet preparations containing alcohol or all nonmedicinal and non-toilet liquid preparations consisting
of or containing alcohol.
When these several interpretations were possible in
regard to the effect of the declaration on the provisions
of section B(b ), where would be the justification for
interpreting the effect of the declaration to be that of
grafting an exception or proviso on section 13 (b) so as
to attract the operation of the provisions of section 105
of the Evidence Act? It is clear that where several
interpretations are possible, the Court should adopt an
interpretation favourable to the accused, rather than
one which casts an extra or special burden upon him,
which if at all should be done by clear and unequivocal
provision in that behalf rather than in this indirect
manner. (See also In re Kanakasabai Pillai) (') ."
With the utmost respect to the learned Judge, the
modes of working out the effect of the declaration
indicated by him clearly involve the acceptance of one
or other of the different forms of amendment of the
section, although according to his views expressed
(1) A. I. R. 1940 Mad. I.
-
-,
-
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
663
earlier in his judgment the effect of the declaration
was not to alter or amend section 13 (b) of the Act.
Venkatarama Ayyar J., however, took the view that
.as"the Court had no legislative function and as judicial
decisions did not amend or add to a statute but merely
interpreted the law and declared whether it was ·valid
·or not, the result of a judicial declaration that a statute
·or any part thereof was not valid was only that no effect
could be given to it in a Court of law but that it did
not mean that the statute or the part thereof declared
void had gone out of the statute book after the Court's
·decision. He also held that section 105 of the Evidence
Act would not in terms apply as article 19(1) (f) could not
be said to form an exception to section 13(b ). He rested
his decision on the ground that the inclusive definition
·of "liquor" adopted in section 2(24) of the Act having
been held to be within entry 31 in List II of the
Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act,
1935, and, therefore, valid, that meaning should be its
·connotation in section 13(b) as well and that under the
section so read the offence would be established as soon
.as consumption or use of "liquor" so defined was
·established and that the plea that what was consumed
was medicinal preparation containing alcohol was really
.a plea that the section, in so far as it prohibits consumption or use of liquid medicinal or toilet preparations
·containing alcohol, ~nfringed the citizens' fundamental
right under article 19 ( 1) (f) and was, therefore,
unconstitutional as declared by this Court. His view
was that it was for those who pleaded unconstitutionality to establish all the elements which would go to
establish that plea. Jagannadhadas J. felt inclined
·to agree with the view of Venkatarama Ayyar J. but
as that aspect of the matter had not been fully argued
he passed on to the argument canvassed before them;
namely, that the part of the section declared invalid
went out of the Act and the Act stood appropriately
:amended pro tanto. This, according to the learned
Judge, involved, that the word "liquor" stood amend-ed as "prohibited liquor" or that it was to be
·understood with this limited connotation. This argument he could not accept. His view was that what
'.the decision in The State of Bombay and Another v.
1954
Beltram Khurshed
Pesikaka
v.
The Stale of
Bombay.
Dal].
664
1 954
Bd1ram KhurJhed
Pesikaka
v.
T!ir Statt of
Bnmbay.
Das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
119551
F. N. Balsam (supra) had done was not to authorise
the importation of a new definition or to rewrite the
section but, leaving the section intact, to treat the
consumption or use of liquid medicinal or toilet preparations containing alcohol as taken out of the ambit
of the section itself as the prohibition thereof was.
unconstitutional. This, according to
the learned
JuJge, could only be done by grafting an appropriate·
exception or proviso into section 13(b ).
The result of the hearing before that Bench was
that Bhagwati j. held that the appeal should be
allowed but Jagannadhadas and Venkatarama Ayyar·
JJ. were for dismissing the appeal. An application for
review was, however, made on the ground that the·
judgments of the learned Judges involved a decision on
constitutional
matters which that Bench had
no.
jurisdiction to decide but which could only be dealt
with by a Constitution Bench. By an order made on
the 26th Aoril. 1954. under the oroviso to sub-article (3)
of article l45 that Bench ac~ordingly referred the·
following question for the opinion of the Constitution
Bench, namely :
"What is the effect of the declaration in The State·
of Bombav and Another v. F. N. Balsara (supra)
that clause (b) of section 13 of the Bombay Prohibition Act. 1949, _is void, under article 13(1) of the
Constitution, in so far as it affects the consumption or·
use of liquid medicinal or toilet preparations containin.g
alcohol. on the ground that it infringes article 19(1) ('f)
of the Constitution?"
The effect of a jndicial declaration of a statute as
unconstitutional has been stated by Field J. in Norton·
v. Shelby County(') to be that the statute is no law
and that. in legal contemplation, it is to be treated as
inoperative as though it had never been passed. Cooley,.
in his Constitutional Limitations. Volume I, page 382,
has adopted this dictum of Field J. and expressed the·
view that where a statute is adjudged to be unconstitutional it is as if it had never been. I am unable to.
accept the proposition so widely stated. Even American
text book writers have felt that the stat~ment of
(1) 118 U.S. ,r25, 30 L .Ed. 178.
•
•
S.C.R.
..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
665
Field T. needs to be somewhat
qualified. (See
Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States,
Volume I, page 11 and Willis on Constitutional Law,
page 890). The dictum. it will be observed, related to
a statute which was made after the commencement of
the Constitution and which was in violation of the
prov1S1ons of the Constitution. It cannot obviously
appiy to a case where a statute which was enacted
before the commencement of the Constitution is
declared to have become unconstitutional and void. In
such a situation it cannot be said that the judicial
declaration means that such a statute is void for all
purposes including past transactions that took place
before the commencement of the Constitution. The
Bombay Act was an existing law and the declaration
in The State of Bombay and Another v. F. N. Balsara
(supra) cannot and does not affect anything done under
the Act prior to the commencement of the Constitution.
It will be further noticed that the decision in The State
of Bombay and Another v. F. N. Balsara (supra) does
not declare the entire Act or even the entire section
13(b) to be void. It onlv declares void a part of section
13(b), that is to say only that part of it which prohibit~
a citizen from consuming or using only liquid medicinal
or toilet preparations containing alcohol. The section,
in its entirety, is still enforceable against all nonc1t1zens. Even as against citizens the prohibition of
the section with respect to the consumDtion or use of
the earlier categories of liquor, nam~ly, "spirits of
wine, denatured spirits, wine, beer, toddy" is fully
operative. Moreover, even
the prohibition against
consumption or use of the bst category of liquor,
namely, "all liquids consisting of or containi;ig alcohol"
remains operative even as against citizens except in so
far as it prohibits them from consuming or using liquid
medicinal or toilet preparations containing alcohol. In
such a situation the passages from Cooley on Constitutional Limitations and the dictum of Field J. can
have no application. This is put beyond controversy
by the'. decision of this Court in Keshava Madhava
Menon v. The State of Bombay (supra). The Bombav
Act being an existing law, the declaration made by
1934
Behram Khurshet!
Pesikaka
"·
T/,, St(lft of
Bombay.
Das].
666
1954
Behram Khurshtd
Ptsikaka
....
The State ef
, B®ibay.
Das J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
this Court in The State of Bombay and Another v.
F. N. Balsara (supra) must be taken to have been
made under article 13(1). The article does not in
terms make the existing laws which are inconsistent
with the fundamental ri.ghts void ab initio or for all
purposes. The declaration in The State of Bombay and
Another v. F. N. Balsara !supra), as I understand it, is
that the prohibition contained in section 13(b) against
the consumption or use of one particular variety of
liquid consisting of or containing alcohol, namely,
liquid medicinal or toilet preparations contammg
alcohol imposes an unreasonable restriction on the
exercise of a citizen's fundamental right under arti.:le
19(1) (f) and is. therefore, unconstitutional and as such
void to that extent. The result of it is that the prohibition of that part of section 13(b) will be ineffective
against and inapplicable to a citizen who consumes or
uses liquid medicinal or toilet preparations contammg
alcohol. No part of the section is obliterated or
scratched out from the statute book or in any way
altered or amended, for that is not the function of the
that a part of the
Court. The judicial declaration
section is unconstitutional and void only nullifies that
offending part in the sense that it renders that part
ineffective against and inapplicable to a citizen who
consumes or uses liquid medicinal or toilet preparations
containing alcohol in exercise of his fund amen ta! right.
.In other words. when a citizen is charged with an
offence under section 66(h) read with section 13(b) he
India.
will be entitled to say-"I am a citizen of
I have consumed or used liquid medicinal or toilet
preparations contammg alcohol. I am entitled to do
so under article 19(1) (f). The Supreme Court has in
The State of Bombay and Another v. F. N. Balsara
(supra) declared the law, namely, that in such circumstances the prohibition of section 13(h) is void as
against me with respect to such consumption or use of
liquid medicinal or toilet
preparations containing
alcohol." This plea, if substantiated, will be a complete
answer to the charge. In short, the judicial declaration serves to provide a defence to a citizen who has
consumed or used liquid medicinal or toilet preparations
•
S.C.R.
.....
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
667
containing alcohol.
Test the matter in this way.
Suppose after the declaration a person is charged with
an offence under section 66(b) read with section 13(b)
and in such a case the prosecution proves that the
accused has taken alcohol in some form or other, as 1s
the evidence of the doctor in the present case. What
is to happen if nothing further is proved by either
party ? Surely, in such a situation a conviction must
follow. If the accused person desires to avail himself
of the benefit of the declaration in The State of Bombay
and Another v. F. N. Balsara (supra), surely he must
prove first of all that he is a citizen. The onus of this
clearlv lies on the accused. The next question 1s
whether that is the only onus that lies on the accused.
To my mind he has to allege and prove not only that
he is a citizen but that he has consumed or used liquid
medicinal or toilet preparations containing alcohol and
it is only on such proof that he can claim the benefit
of the declaration of !_aw made in The State of Bombay
and Another v. F. N. Balsara (supra) and establish bis
defence. The very basis of that declaration is that
a citizen has the fundamental right to consume or use
liquid
medicinal or toilet preparations
containing
alcohol and section 13 (b) in so far as it prohibits such
consumption or use imposes an unreasonable restriction
on his fundam~ntal right under article 19(1) (f). In
other words, the onus is on him to establish the
situation or circumstances in which that part of the
section which has been declared to be void should not
be applicable to him. If he establishes the fact that he
is a citizen and that he has consumed or used such
liquid, then the declaration in The State of Bombay and
Another v. F. N. Balsara (supra) will establish the law,
namely, that the prohibition of section 13(b) and the
penalty under section 66(b) are not applicable to him
being inconsistent with his fundamental right. To say
that after the judicial pronouncement the section should
be read qua a citizen as if liquid medicinal or toilet
preparations are not there or that the ambit of the
offence has narrowed down to a prohibition against
the consumption or 1 use of only the earlier categories
of liquor set forth in the difinition is, to my mind,
1954
Behram Khurshe4
Pesikaka
v.
The State of
Bombay.
Das].
668
-·-
$thram Khurshed
Pesikaka
v.
Tht Statt of
Bombay.
Das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
tantamount to saying, covertly if not openly, that the
judicial pronouncement has to that extent amended the
section. To say that after the declaration the offence
has become limited to the consumption or use of prohibited liquor is to alter .or amend the definition of liquor
although it has been held to be valid. I repeat that it
is not within the competence of a Court to alter or
amend a statute and that the effect of the declaration
made by this Court in The State of Bombay and Another
v. F. N. Balsara (supra) is not to lift or take away or
add a11ything out of or to the section at all. What it
Joes is to declare, as a matter of law, that in a certain
situation, namely, when liquid medicinal or toilet
preparations containing alcohol are consumed or used,
" certain part of section 13(b ), that is to say, that part
of it which prohibits the consumption or use of liquid
medicinal or toilet preparations containing alcohol,
·shall be void qua a particular class of persons, name! y,
citizens. In other words, the declaration in The State
·of Bombay and Another v. F. N. Balsara (supra) serves
to provide a defence only to a citizen who has consumed
It
or used liquid medicinal or toilet preparations.
is for the accused person, who seeks to ward off the
applicability of the section to him by having resort to
the declaration macle in The State of Bombay and Another
v. F. N. Balsara (supra), to establish the situations or
-circumstances on which tl1at declaration is founded. In
short a person who challenges the validity of the section
'On the ground of its unconstitutionality has the
advantage of the declaration as a matter of law hut the
facts on which that declaration is based have nevertheless to be established in each particular case where
the declaration is sought to be availed of. I answer
the question referred to us accordingly.
It has been strenuously urged before us, as before the
Division Bench, that such a view as to the effect of
this Court's declaration will run counter to the well
established principle of criminal jurisprudence that the
onus of establishing the charge is always on the prosecution, for it will throw the burden of proof on the
accused person.
This argument has considerably
'impressed Bhagwati J. and has also weighed with my
-
(
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S.C.R.
.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
669
learned colleagues on the present Bench. It is, however,
not unusual in certain classes of cases or in certain
circumstances to throw the onus of proof of a defence
on the accused person. Section 105 of the Evidence
Act is an instance in point. Section 114, ill. (a) of the
same Act is another provision to which reference may
be made. Section 103 of this very Bombay Prohibition
Act raises a very strong presumption of guilt and
accused to prove his
throws the burden on the
innocence in certain cases. Take section 96 of the
Indian Penal Code which says"Nothing is an offence which is done in the
exercise of the right of private defence."
Nobody will contend that this section requires
prosecution to prove that the acts constituting the
offence charged against the accused were not done in
the. exercise of the right of private defence. It is
obvious that this section serves to provide the accused
person with a defence and if the accused person can
prove that he did the acts complained of in defence of
his person or property and if the ~cts were reasonable
in the circumstances of the case he establishes his
defence. It is not necessary to multiply instances. It
seems to me that the declaration in The State of Bombay
and Another v. F. N. Balsara (supra) gives a citizen who
has consumed or used liquid medicinal or toilet preparations containing alcohol a defence to a charge under
section 66(b) read with section 13(b) of the Bombay
Prohibition Act, but it is for the accused person to
prove the facts on which that declaration of law is
founded. I see no hardship whatever in this, for the
requisite facts are within his special knowledge. To
adopt the contrary view will be to ignore the sound
principle well established in law that a judicial declaration of invalidity does not repeal, alter or amend a
statute.
As I hold that the declaration does not operate as an
amendment of the section, I must logically hold, with
respect to the view of Jagannadhadas J. that the
declaration cannot be treated as having grafted an
exception or proviso to section 13(b ).
1954
Behram KhJJrshed
Pesikafca
v.
The Stale of
Bombay,
Das].
670
1954
Bthram Khurshed
Pesikaka
v.
The State of
Bombay.
DQJ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
In coming to the conclusion that I have, I have in a
large measure found myself in agreement with the
views of Venkatarama Ayyar J. on that part of the
case. I, however, desire to guard myself against being
understood to agree with the rest of the observations
to be found in his judgment, particularly those relating
to waiver
of unconstitutionality, the fundamental
rights being a mere check on legislative power or the
effect of the declaration under article 13(1) being
"relatively void." On those topics I prefer to express
no opinion on this occasion.
BY THE CouRT. ..:_The reference is answered 111
accordance with the opinion of the majority.
[After the opinion of the Constitution Bench the
following Order, dated 24th September, 1954, was
pronounced by a Bench composed of Bhagwati,
Jagannadhadas and Venkatarama Ayyar JJ. who had
originally heard the appeal. I
The Order of the Court was pronounced by
BHAGWATI J.-We have received
the op1mon
expressed by the Constitution Bench. According to
that opinion, which is expressed 'in the majority
Judgment, the onus lay on the prosecution to prove
that the alcohol of which the accused was smelling was
such that it came within the category of prohibited
alcohols.
We have heard the learned Attorney-General on the
question whether that onus has been discharged a.nd
he has frankly conceded that on the material placed
before us it cannot be urged that that onus has been
discharged by the prosecution.
The result, therefore, is that the conviction of the
appellant will be quashed and the fine, if paid, will be
refunded.
Conviction set aside.
,._
-
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