SETH JAGJIVAN MAVJI VITHLANI versus MESSRS RANCHHODDAS MEGHJI.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 28 May 1954 | [1955] 1 S.C.R. 503 | 1954 INSC 79
Key facts
- Decided
- 28 May 1954
- Bench
- MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, VIVIAN BOSE, NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI, T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 31/1954
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1955] 1 S.C.R. 503
- Neutral citation
- 1954 INSC 79
Text of the judgment
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
503
of these letters an<l so was aware of the fact that orders
had been issued. As a matter of fact, we have ' seen
the originals of the High Court's office files and find
that the names of the three members of the Tribunal
are in the Chief Justice's handwriting with his initials
underneath. That is an additional record of the making
of the order. We hold that an order recorded in the
manner set out above is sufficient for the purposes of
sections 10(2) and 11(2) of the Bar Councils Act and
hold that the Tribunal was validly appointed.
Mr. G's next point is that there was no "complaint"
to the High Court and so it had no jurisdiction to refer
the matter to the Tribunal. This ignores the fact that
the High Court can refer a matter of this kind "of its
own motion" under section 10(2) of the Bar Councils
Act.
We have dealt with the merits in the connected case.
This petition is dismissed but, here again, we make
no order about costs.
·~.54
Mr. 'G', a Senior
Advocate of tic<
Supreme Court.
v.
The Hon'ble Chief
Justice and Judges
of the Higle Court
of Judicature al
Bombay.
Bose J.
Petition dismissed.
SETH JAGJIVAN MA VJI VITHLANI
'>
ti.
1 954
MESSRS RANCHHODDAS MEGHJI.
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J., S. R. Di1.s, V1v1AN BosE,
BHAGWATI and VENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.]
May 2&.
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (XXV/ of 1881) ss. 7, 32,
61, 64, 78-Drawu, liability of-Acceptance-Bill payable at sight
-Prese1ltment-Acceptance-Oral-Whether valid.
Under section 32 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the
liability of the drawee arises only when he accepts the bill. There
is no provision in the Act that the drawee is as such liable on the
instrument, the only exception being under section 31 in the case
of a drawee of a cheque having sufficient funds of the customer in
his lands ; an<l even then, the liability is only towards the drawer
im<l not the payee.
There is no substance in the contention that section 61 of
0e :'-ct provides for presentmen~ for acceptance only when the
bill is payable after sight, and not when it is payable on demand.
In a bill payable after sight, there are two distinct stages,
504
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955J
1-irstly \.vhen it is presented
for acceptance, and later when it is
presented tor payi,ncnt. Section 61 deals 'v1th the former,
Seth Jag;ivan
and section 64 'vith the latter. Presentment for acceptance must
Afaiji Fithlani
ahvays and in every case precede presentment for payment. But
v.
Jvlessrs. Ra11chhod- \vhen the bill is payable on demand both the stages synchroni.se
rlas Meghji
and there is only one presentment, which is both for acceptance
und for pay1ncnt and therefore the person who is entitled to recci\ c
the payment under section 78 of the Act is the person who is
entitled to present it for acceptance.
' ....
1954
Section 7 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,
1881, follo\ving
the
English L::nv, provides that the drawee becomes an acceptor
\vhen he has signed his assent on the bill. J\ccordingly there c3n~
not be, apart from any mercantile usage, an oral acceptance of the
hundi, much less an acceptance by conduct, where at least JJO
question of cstoppel arises.
What is requisite for fixing the drawees with liability under
section 32 is the acceptance by them of the instrun1Cnt and not an
ackno\vlcdg1nent of liability. As the law prescribes no particular
form for acceptance, there should be no difficulty in construing an
acknowledgment as an acceptance ; but then, it must satisfy the
requirements of section 7, and inust appear on the bill and be
signed by the dra\vee.
Seth Khandas Narandas v. Dahibai (I.'-..R. 3 Born. 182), Ram
Ravji /anibhekar v. Prahladdas Subhakaran (I.I..•.R. 20 Born. 133),
Bank of England v. Archer ((1843) 11 M. & W. 383) :ind Harvey,..
Martin ((1808) I Camp. 425) referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE
JuRISDICTION : Civil
Appeal
No. 31 of 1954.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and
Decree dated the 9th September, 1952, of the High
Court of Judicature at Bombay in Appeal No. 811 of
1951 from the Original Decree arising from the Judgement and Decree dated the 24th July, 1951, of the
Bombay City Civil Court at Bombay in Suit No. 2310
of 1950.
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India (f. B.
Dadachanji and Rajinder Narain, with him) for the
appellant.
S. C. Isaacs (S. S. Shukla, with him) for the
respondent.
1954. May 28. The Judgment of the Court was
.delivered by
VENKATARAMA AYYAR J.-The suit out of which this
appeal arises was instituted by the appellant on a
hundi for Rs. 10,000 dated 4th December, 1947, drawn
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S.C.R.
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505
in his favour by Haji Jethabhai Gokul and Co., of
Basra on the respondents, who are merchants and
commission agents in Bombay. The hundi was sent
by registered post to the appellant in Bombay, and
was acmally received by one Parikh Vrajlal Narandas,
who presented it to the respondents on 10th December,
1947, and received payment therefor. It may be mentioned that the appellant had been doing business in
forward contracts through Vrajlal as his commission
agent, and was acmally residing at his Pedhi. On 12th
January, 1948, the appellant sent a notice to the
respondents repudiating the authority of Vrajlal to act
for him and demanding the return of the hundi, ro
which they sent a reply on 10th February, 1948, denying their liability and stating that Vrajlal was the
agent of the appellant, and that the amount was paid
to him bona fide on his representation that he was
authorised to receive the payment.
On 9th December, 1950, the appellant instituted the
present suit in the Court of the City Civil Judge,
Bombay. In the plaint he merely alleged that the
payment to Vrajlal was not binding on him, and that
"the defendant-drawee" remained liable on the hundi.
The defendants, apart from relying on the authority
of Vrajlal to grant discharge, also pleaded that the
plaint did not disclose a cause of action against them,
as there was no avcrment therein that the hundi had
been accepted by them.
At the trial, the appellant gave evidence that Vrajlal
had received the registered cover containing the hundi
in his absence, and collected the amount due thereunder
without his knowledge or authority. The learned City
Civil Judge accepted this evidence, and held that
Vrajlal had not been authorised to receive the amount
of the hundi. He also held that the plea of discharge
put forward by the respondents implied that the hundi
had been accepted by them. In the result, he decreed
the suit.
The defendants took up the matter in appeal to the
High Court of Bombay, and that was heard by Chagla
C.J. and Shah J. who held that the appellant would
1 954
Seth Jagjivan
Mavji Vit!ilani
v.
llfessrs. Ranchhoddas 1lfegl!ji.
Ve11katarama
A_!'yar
J.
506
1954
Sdh Ja.gjiunn
Mar;ji Vithlani
v.
Messrs. Ranchhod·
das 1-\1eghji.
Venkatarama
Ayyar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
have a right of action on the hundi against the respondents only if it had been accepted by them, and that
as the plaint did not allege that it had been accepted
by them, there was no cause of action against them.
They accordingly allowed the appeal, and dismissed
the suit. The plaintiff prefers this appeal on special
leave granted under article 136 of the Constitution.
There has been no serious attempt before us to challenge the correctness of the legal position on which the
judgment of the High Court is based, that the drawee
of a negotiable instrument is not liable on it to the
payee, unless he has accepted it. On the provisions of
the Negotiable Instruments Act, no other conclusion
is possible. Chapter III of that Act defines the obligations of parties to negotiable instruments. Section 32
provides that,
"In the absence of a contract to the contrary, the
maker of a promissory note and the acceptor before
maturity of a bill of exchange are bound to pay the
amount thereof at maturity according to the apparent
tenor of the note or acceptance respectively, and the
acceptor of a bill of exchange at or after maturity 1s
bound to pay the amount thereof to the holder on
demand."
Under this section, the liability of the drawee arises
only when he accepts the bill. There is no provision
in the Act that the drawee is as such liable on the instrument, the only exception being under section 31 in
the case of a drawee of a cheque having sufficient funds
of the customer in his hands ; and even then, the ·
liability is only towards the drawer and not the payee.
This is elementary law, and was laid down by West ).
in Seth Khandas Narandas v. Dahibai(1 ) in the following
-'
terms :
•
"Where there is no acceptance, no cause of action
can have arisen to the payee against the drawee."
Nor is there any substance in the contention that
section 61 of the Act provides for presentment for
acceptance only when the bill is payable after sight,
and not when it is payable on demand, as is the suit
(•) I.L.R. 3 Born. •8• at p. 183.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
5('fl
1954
hundi. In a bill payable after sight, there are two
distinct stages, firstly when it is presented for acceptSeth ]agjivtlJI
Mavji V ilhfani
ance, and later when it is presented for payment.
v.
Section 61 deals with the former, and section 64 with Mm« Ranchhotidas Meghji.
the latter. As observed in Ram Ravji Jambhekar v.
Pralhaddas Subkarn (1), "presentment for acceptance
Venkataroma
A»ar J.
must always and in every case precede presentment
for payment." But when the bill is payable on demand,
both the stages synchronise, and there is only one presentment, which is both for acceptance and for payment. When the bill is paid, it involves an acceptance ;
but when it is not paid, it is really dishonoured for
non-acceptance. But whether the bill is payable after
signt or at sight or on demand, acceptance by the
drawee is necessary before he can be fixed with liability on it. It is acceptance that establishes privity on
the instrument between the payee and the drawee, and
we agree with the learned Judges of the High Court
that unless there is such acceptance, no action on the
bill in maintainable by the payee against the drawees.
The main contention on behalf of the appellant was
that such acceptance must be implied when the respondents received the bill and made payment therefor.
The argument was that the very act of the payment of
the hundi to Vrajlal was an acknowledgment thar the
defendants were liable on the hundi to whosoever might
be the lawful holder thereof. The answer to this contention is, firstly, that there was no valid presentment
of the hundi for acceptance ; and secondly, that there
was no acceptance of the same as required by law.
On the question of the presentment of the hundi
for acceptance, the position stands thus : The person
who presented it to the defendants was Vrajlal ; and if
he had no authority to act in the matter, it is difficult
to see how he could be held to have acted on behalf of
the plaintiff in presenting the hundi. There was only
one single act, and that was the presentment of the
hundi by Vrajlal and the receipt of the amount due
thereunder. If he had no authority to receive the
payment, he had no authority to present the bill for
acceptance. It was argued that there was no provision
•
-
(I) I.L.R. 20 Bom. i33 at p. 14r.
14-878. C. India/59
508
1954
Seth Jagjivan
MavJi Vithlani
v.
Messrs. Ranchhoddas Meghji.
Vtnkatarama
AyyarJ.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
in the Act requiring that bills payable at sight should
be presented for acceptance by the holder or on his
behalf, as there was, for bills payable after sight, in
section 61. But, as already pointed out, in the case of
a bill payable at sight, both the stages for presentment
for acceptance and for payment are rolled up into one,
and, therefore, the person who is entitled to receive
the payment under section 78 of the Act is the person,
who is entitled to present it for acceptance. Under
section 78, the payment must be to the holder of the
instrument; and if Vrajlal had no authority to receive
the amount on behalf of the plaintiff, there was no
valid presentment of the hundi by him for acceptance
either.
It has next to be considered whether, assuming that
there was a proper presentment of the hundi for
acceptance, there was a valid acceptance thereof. The
argument of the appellant was that as the hundi had
got into the hands of the defendants and was produced
by them, the very fact of its possession would be
sufficient to constitute acceptance. Under the common
law of England, even a verbal acceptance was valid.
Vide the observations of Baron Parke in Bank of
England v. Archer ('). It was accordingly held that such
acceptance could be implied when there was undue
retention of the bill by the drawee. ( Vide Note to
Harvey v. Martin (•). But the law was altered in
England by section 17(2) of the Bills of Exchange Act,
1882, which enacted that an acceptance was invalid,
unless it was written on the bill and signed by the
drawee. Section 7 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,
following the English law, provides that the drawee
becomes an acceptor, when he has signed his assent
upon the bill. In view of these provisions, there cannot
be, apart from any mercantile usage, an oral acceptance of the hundi, much less an ac.ceptance by conduct,
where at least no question of estoppel arises.
But then, it was argued that the possession of the
hundi was not the only circumstance from which
acceptance could be inferred ; that there was the plea
(1) (1843) II M. & W. 383 at PP• 389, 390; 150 E.R. 850, 855.
(2) (1808) I Camp. 425; 170 E.R. 1009.
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[1955]
,
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of the defendants that they had discharged the hundi ;
and that that clearly imported an acknowledgment
of liability on the bill, and was sufficient to clothe the
plaintiff with a right of action thereon. Assume that
the plea of discharge of a hundi implies an acknowledgment of liability thereunder-an assumption which
we find it difficult to accept. The question still remains
whether that is sufficient in law to fasten a liability on
the defendants on the hundi. What is requisite for
fixing the drawees with liability under section 32 is the
acceptance by them of the instrument and not an
acknowledgment of liability. As the law prescribes no
particular form for acceptance, there sltould be no
difficulty in construing an acknowledgment as an
acceptance ; but then, it must satisfy the requirements
of section 7, and must appear on the bill and be signed
by the drawees. In the present case, the acknowledgment is neither in writing; nor is it signed by the
defendants. It is a matter of implication arising from
the discharge of the instrument. That is not sufficient
to fix a liability on the defendants under section 32.
In conclusion, we must hold that there was neither a
valid presentment of the hundi for acceptance, nor a
valid acceptance thereof.
In the result, the appeal fails, and is dismissed with
costs.
Appeal dismissed.
1954
Seth Jagjivan
Mardi Vithlani
v.
Messrs. Ra11ehhod·
das Meghji.
Venkatarama
Ayyar].
VASHIT NARAIN SHARMA
1954
v.
May20
DEV CHANDRA AND OTHERS.
[S. R. DAs, GHULAM HASAN and JAGANNADHADAS JJ.]
Representation of the People Act, 1951 (Act XL/II of 1951),
s. 100(1) (c)-Words "the result of the election has been materially
affected"-lnterpretation of-Improper acceptance or rejection of a
nomination paper-Election-Validity of-Onus of proving that the
result has been materially affected-Finding of Election Tribunal
based on speculation and conjecture-Misdirection in law.
The words "the result of the election has been materially
affected" in section 100(1) (c) of the Representation of the People
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