SURAJ MALL MORTA AND CO. versus A. V. VISVANA THA SASTRI AND ANOTHER.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 28 May 1954 | [1955] 1 S.C.R. 448 | 1954 INSC 78
Key facts
- Decided
- 28 May 1954
- Bench
- MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, VIVIAN BOSE, NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI, T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 196/1954
- Citation
- [1955] 1 S.C.R. 448
- Neutral citation
- 1954 INSC 78
Text of the judgment
448
1954
Kishan !Al and
Anotht1
v.
iBJianwar Lal.
Mr1/du:~ita
J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19551
of the notification. The result is that we set aside the
judgments of the Courts below and send the. case back
to the Original Court of Jodhpur in order that it may
be tried on all the other issues raised in the suit after
giving opportunity to the parties to adduce such
evidence as they want ,to adduce. The plaintiffs appellants will have their costs up to this stage. Further
costs will abide the resu It.
•
Order accordingly.
•954
Atay 28.
-
SURAJ MALL MORTA AND CO.
ti.
A. V. VISVANATHA SASTRI AND ANOTHER.
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J., s. R. DAS, VIVIAN
BosE, BHAGWA11 and VENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.]
Taxation on l11r.rnne (Investigation Cotnmission) Act (XXX
of 1947) ss. 5(1), 5( 4)~Extent aad range different-S. 5( 4) and
s. 34 of Indian Income-tax Act (XI of 1922)-Deal tvith same class
of persons-Properties and characteristics the san1e-Procedure
under the ttvo Acts diffi:rent-Section 5( 4)-lf1 hether ultra vires
Art. 14 of the Constitution.
Sub~section ( 4)
of section 5 of the Taxation on Income
(Investigation Com1nission) Act, 1947, does not deal 'vith the same
class of persons as are said to have been grouped together in subsection ( l) of ~section 5 of the Act as persons \Vho to a substantial
extent eyaded payment of taxation on income. On a plain reading
of the section it is clear that sub-section ( 4) of section 5 is not
limited only to persons \\'ho made extraordinary profits and to all
persons who 1nay have evaded payment of taxation on income
irrespective of \Vhethcr the evaded profits are substantial or
insubstantial and therefore the scope of sub-section ( 4) of section 5 .A.
is different from the scope of sub-section ( 1) of section 5 both in
extent and range ..
Sub-section ( 4) of section 5 of the Act, obviously deals \Vi th
the same class of persons who fall within the arnbit of section 34
of the Indian Incotne-tax Act an<l are de.1lt with in sub-section (1)
of that section and \Vhose inco1ne can be caught by the proceeding
under that section.
It is not possible to hold that all such pc·rsons \Vho evaded
payment of income-tax and do not truly disclose all particulars A
or material facts necessary for their assessment an<l against whom
a report is made undef sub-section ( 4) of section 5 of the impugned
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S.C.R.
•
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>
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
449
1 954
Act by themselves form a class distinct from those who evade payment of income-tax and come. within the ambit of section 34 of the
Suraj Mall Mahliz
Indian Income-tax Act.
and Ca.
v•
Both section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, and subVisvanatha.
section (4) of section 5 of the Taxation on Income (Investigation A. V.
Sastri and
Commission) Act, 1947, deal with all persons who have similar
Analhe~.
characteristics and similar properties, the common characteristics
being that they are persons who have not truly disclosed their
income and have evaded payment of taxation on incqipe.
The procedure prescribed by the Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947, is substantially more prejudicial
an.cl more drastic to the assessee than the procedure under the
Indian Income-tax Act (XI of 1922).
ll eid, therefore that sub-section ( 4) of section 5 and the procedure prescribed by the impugned Act in so far as it affects the
persons proceeded against under that sub-section being a piece of
discriminatory legislation offends against the provisions of article
14 of the Constitution and is thus void and unenforceable.
ORIGINAL JuRisDICTION : Petition No. 196 of 1954.
Under article 32 of the Constitution of India for
the enforcement of fundamental rights.
P. R. Das and K. P. Khaitan, (B. Sen, A. K.
Mukherjea and B. P. Maheswari, with them) for the
petitioner.
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India, (Porus
A. Mehta and P. G. Gokhale, with him) for the respondents.
1954. May 28. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J.-The prin~ipal q~es
tion canvassed in this case is whether certam sections
of the Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission)
Act, 1947, i.e., Act XXX of 1947, have become void
from the date of the commencement of the Constitution of India by reason of article 14 of the
Constitution.
The petitioner, Suraj Mall Mohta & Co. Ltd., is a
company registered under the Indian Companies Act.
Suraj Mall Mohta is also the managing· director -0£
another company Messrs. Jute and Gunny Brokers Ltd.
A reference had been made by the Central Government
under the provisions of section 5 ( 1) of the Act before
450
1954
Surqj Mall Mohta
and Co.
v.
A. V. Visvanatha
· Sastri and
Another~
Mehr Chand
Mahajan C. J.
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955)
1st September, 1948, of the case of Messrs. Jute and
Gunny )3rokers Ltd. to the Investigation Commission
appointed under Act XXX of 1947. During the
investigation of that case which was numbered 831/30
in the records of the Commission, and during the
investigation of some other cases similarly referred to
the Commission, it was said to have been discovered
that the petitioner company had made secret profits
which it 'had not disclosed and had thus evaded taxation. On the 28th August, 1953, a report to this effect
was made by the Commission to the Central Government under the provisions of section 5 (4) of the Act
requesting .that the case of the petitioner along with
the cases of Suraj Mall Mohta and other members of
his family may be referred to the Commission for
investigation.
.
On the 9th September, 1953, the Central Government
referred these cases to the Investigation Commission
under the provisions of section 5( 4) of the Act and
these were numbered 831/64-69 on the records of the
Commission. On the 15th of September, 1953, the
Commission notified the petitioners that their cases had
been referred for investigation and they were called
upon to furnish certain material, as detailed tn
Annexure "B" of the petition, to the Commission.
On the 12th April, 1954, the present petition under
article 32 of the Constitution was filed for the issue of
appropriate writs restraining the Commission from
taking any action against the petitioner under the
provisions of Act XXX of 1947, on the ground that the
provisions of sections 5(1), 5(4), 6, 7 and 8 of Act XXX
of 1947, had become void, being discriminatory in
character after the coming into force of the Constitution
of India.
In order to appreciate the respective contentions
raised and canvassed before us on behalf of the
petitioner company and the State, it is necessary to
set ·out some of the relevant provisions of the Act. The
object of die Act as stated in its Preamble was to
ascertain whether the actual incidence of taxation on
income in recent years had been in accordance with
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
j
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451
prov1S1ons of law and whether the procedure for assessment and recovery of tax was adequate to prevent
evas10n th~reof. Section 3 authorizes the Central
Government to constitute a Commission, to be called
the Income-tax Investigation Commission, its duty
being (a) to investigate and report to the Central
Government on all matters relating to taxation on
mcome, with particular reference to the extent to which
the existing law relating to, and. procedure for, the
assessment and collection of such taxation is adequate
to prevent the evasion thereof ; (b) to investigate in
accordance with the provisions of this Act any case or
points m a case referred to it under section 5. The
composition of the Commission is set out in section 4.
Section 5 of the Act reads as follows :"5 ( 1)-The Central Government may at any time
before the first day of September, 1948, refer to the
Commission for investigation and report any case or
points in a case in which the Central Government has
prim a facie reasons for believing that a person has to
a substantial extent evaded payment of taxation on
mcome, together with such material as may be available m support of such belief, and may at any time
before the 1st day of September, 1948, apply to the
Commission for the withdrawal of any case or points in
a case thus referred ........... .
(2) .. -. ............................. .
(3) No reference made by the Central Government
under sub-section (1), at any time before the first day
of September, 1948, shall be called 111 question, nor
shall the sufficiency of the material on which such a
reference has been made be investigated in any manner
by any Court.
( 4) If in the course of investigation into any case
or points m a case referred to it under sub-section ( 1),
the Commission has reason to believe( a) that some person other than the person
whose case is being investigated has evaded payment
of taxation on income, or
(b) that some points other than those referred
to it by the Central Government in respect of any case
1954
Suraj Mall Mohta
and Co.
v.
A. V. Visoanatha
Sastri and
An•ther.
Mehr Chand
Mahajan C. J. ,
452
1 954
Suraj Mall Mohla
and Co.
v.
A. V. Visvanatha
Sastri awl
A11uther.
MehrC/ltllld
Mahajan C. J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
also require investigation, it may make a report to the
Central Government stating its reasons for such belief
and, on receipt of such report; the Central Government
shall, notwithstanding anything . contained in subsection (1), forthwith refer to the Commission for investigation the case of such other person or such additional
points as may be indicated in that report."
The powers possessed by the Commission while
conducting an investigation are provided for in section
6 which is in these terms :
"6(1)-The Commission shall have power to
reqmre any person or banking or other company to
prepare and furnish on or before a specified date
written statements of accounts and affairs verified in
such manner as may be prescribed by the Commission
and, if so required by the Commission, also duly
verified by a qualified auditor, giving information on
such points or matters as 111 the opinion of the
Commission may, directly or indirectly, be useful for,
or relevant to, any case referred to it, and any person
or banking or other company so required shall be
bound, notwithstanding any law to the contrary, to'
comply with such requirement.
(2) The Commission shall also have power to
administer oaths, and shall have all the powers of a
civil ,court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908,
for the purposes . of taking evidence .on oath, enforcing
the attendance of witnesses and of persons whose cases
are being investigated, compelling the production of
documents and issuing comm1ss10ns for the examination of witnesses.
(3) If in the course of any investigation it appears
to the Commission to be necessary to examine any
accounts or documents or to interrogate any person or
obtain any statements from ~ny person, the Commiss10n may authorize any mcome-tax authority not
below the rank of Income-tax Officer in that behalf ....
( 4) The authorized official shall subject to the .
direction of the Commission have the same powers as;
the Commission under sub-sections (1) and (2), andl
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•
,i.
S.C.R.
453
any person having charge or custody of accounts or
documents required to be examined shall notwithstanding anything in any law to the contrary be bound
to produce them ...... ,, ...... .
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(5) If any person whose case or the points ip
whose case is or are being investigated by the Commission refuses or fails to attend in person in compliance
with a notice in that behalf duly served upon him or
to give any evidence or to answer questions or to
produce documents or to prepare and furnish statements when called upon to do so, the Commission
may, if satisfied that the refusal or failure was wilful,
close the investigation of the case and proceed to draw
up its report on the case or on the points to the best
of its judgment and may in its discretion also direct
that such sum as it may specify in the direction shall
be recovered from the person by way of penalty for
the refusal or failure, without prejudice to any penalty
under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 ................. .
(6) .......................................... .
(7) Where in the opinion of the Commission any
person or banking or other company is likely to be in
possession of any information or document which
may, directly or indirectly, be useful for, or relevant
to, any case referred to it or any case likely to he
reported by the Commission to the Central Government under the provisions of sub-section ( 4) of section
5, the Commission and subject to the direction of the
Commission any authorized official, may make enquiries in such manner as it or he may deem fit and
obtain from such person or banking or other company
statements on oath or otherwise on such points or
matters as may be specified ; and for the purpose of
any such enquiry, the Commission and the authorized
official shall have all the powers conferred on them by
sub-sections (1), (2), (2A), (3) and (4).
(8) All materials gathered by the Commission or
the authorised official and materials accompanying
the reference under sub-section (1) of section 5 may be
brought on record at such stage as the Commission
may think fit."
1954
Suraj Mall Mohta
and Co.
v•
A. V'. Visvanath11<
Sastri and
Anothtr.
MehrCh4nd
Mahajan G. ].
454
Suraj Mall Mohta
and Co.
v.
A. V. Visvanatha
Sastri and
Another.
Mt:hrChand
Mahajan C.J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
The procedure to be followed by the Commission is
contained in section 7 which provides that subject to
the provisions of this Act the Commission shall have
power to regulate its own procedure and that the
powers of the Commission under sub-sections (1), (2),
(3), (7) and (8) of section 6 and sub-sections (2), (4) and
( 6) of this section, i.e., section 7 may be exercised by
any member thereof authorised by the Commission m
this behalf. Sub-section (2) of section 7 provides as
follows:"7(2)-In making an investigation under clause
(b) of section 3, the Commission shall act in accordance
with the principles of natural justice, shall follow as
far as practicable the principles of the Indian Evidence
Act, 1872, and shall give the person whose case is
being investigated, a reasonable opportunity of rebutting any evidence adduced against him : and the
power of the Commission to compel production of
documents shall not be subject to the limitation
imposed by section 130 of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872, and the Commission shall be deemed to, be a
Court and its proceedings legal proceedings for the
purposes of .sections 5 and 6 of the Bankers' Books
Evidence Act, 1891."
Sub-section (3) of section 7 is in these terms :"7(3)-Any person whose case is being investigated
by the Commission may be represented by a pleader.
a registered accountant or an employee duly authorised
to act, on his behalf, provided that no person shall be
entitled to be present or to be represented in the
course of an enquiry under sub-sections (3) and (7) of
section 6."
The result of these provisions is that when the
Commission is collecting the materials from different
sources again'st the assessee he is not entitled to be
present at those stages and take part in the enquiry,
but after the material is ready and is placed on the
record then he can be present and has to be given a
reasonable opportunity of rebutting any evidence that
may . have been .collected against him. Sub-section ( 4)
of section 7 which came in for considerable criticism
provides as follows :-
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
455
"7(4)-No person shall be entitled to inspect, call
for, or obtain copies of, any documents, statement or
papers or materials furnished to, obtained by or produced before, the Commission or any authorized
official in any proceedings under this Act ; but the
Commission and after the Commission has ceased to
exist such authority as the Central Government may
in this behalf appoint, may, in its discretion, allow
such inspection and furnish such copies to any person :
Provided that, for the purpose of enabling the
person whose case or points in whose case is or are
being investigated to rebut any evidence brought on
the record against him, he shall, on application made
in this behalf and on payment of such fees as may be
prescribed by rules made under this Act, be furnished
with certified copies of documents, st~tements, papers
and materials brought on the record by the Commission."
Sub-section (5) of section 7 is in these terms :"7 (5)-Save in cases in which the Commission
may exercise its powers under section 195 and Chapter
XXXV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898,
(a) no suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding
shall be instituted against any person in any civil or
criminal Court for any evidence given or produced by
him in any proceedings before the Commission, and
(b) no evidence so given or produced shall be
admissible in evidence against such person in any suit,.
prosecution or other proceeding before such Court,
except with the previous sanction of the Central
Government."
The last section that .came in for objection is section 8 which is in these terms :
"8(1)-Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the
materials brought on record shall be considered by all
the three members of the Commission sitting together
and the report of the Commission shall be in accordance with the opinion of the majority.
(2) After considering the report, the Central
Government shall by order in writing direct that such
1 954
Sut'aj Mal I Mohta
and Co.
v.
A. V. Visvanatha,
Sastri and
Another.
Mehr Chand
Mahajan C. ].
456
~954
.Surai Mall Mohla
· and Co.
v.
A. V. Vi.svanatha
Sa.rtri and
.Another.
M1h< Chand
Mllh•j•• C. J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19551
proceedings as it thinks fit under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940, or
any other law, shall be taken against the person to
whose case the report relates in respect of the income
of any period commencing after the 31st day of
December, 1938 ; and upon such a direction being
given, such proceedings may be taken and completed
under the appropriate law notwithstanding the restrictions contained in section 34 of the Indian Incometax Act, 1922, or section 15 of the Excess Profits Tax
Act, 1940, or any other law and notwithstanding any
lapse of time or any decision to a different effect given
in the case by any Income-tax authority or Income-tax
Appellate Tribunal.
(3) ............................. .
( 4) In all assessment or reassessment proceedings
taken in pursuance of a direction under sub-section (2),
the findings recorded by the Commission on the ease
or on the points referred to it shall, subject to the
provisions of sub-sections (5) and (6), be final ; but no
proceedings taken in pursuance of such direction shall
be a bar to the initiation of proceedings under section
34 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922.
(5) In respect of any order made in the course of
proceedings taken in pursuance of a direction issued
under sub-section. (2) the provisions of sections 30, 31,
33 and 33-A of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, and
the corresponding provisions of the Excess Profits Tax
Act, 1940, shall not apply so far as matters declared
final by sub-section ( 4) are concerned ; but the person
concerned may, within 60 days of the date upon which
he is served with a copy of such order, by application
in the prescribed form accompanied by a fee of Rs. 100
require the appropriate Commissioner of Income-tax
to refer to the High Court any question of law arising
-Out of such order, and thereupon the provisions of
sections 66 and 66-A of the Indian Income-tax Act,
1922, shall as far as may be apply, with the modification that the. reference shall be heard by a Bench of
not less than three Judges of the High Court.
(6) ............................. .
1
,
S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
457
1954
(7). Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being suraj Mall Mohta
in force, any evidence in the case admitted before the
and Co.
Commission or an authorized official shall be admissible
A. v. i;~vanatha
in evidence in any proceedings directed to be taken
Sastri and
Another.
under sub-section ( 2)."
Mehr Chand
It was not and .could not be denied that the powers
Mahaja.1 C. J.
vested in the Commission and the procedure prescribed
by the impugned Act is more comprehensive and
drastic than those contained in the Indian Income-tax
Act. · At the time when the impugned statute was
passed there could possibly be taken no exception to
its contents on the ground of constitutionality of its
provisions, and the powers conferred on the Commission
and the procedure it was authorized to follow were well
within the ambit of the Legislative power of the Central
Legislature. The impugned statute admittedly was
good law till the coming into force of the Constitution.
When India' became a sovereign democratic Republic
on 26th January, 1950, the validity of all laws had to be
tested on the touchstone. of the new Constitution and
all laws made before the coming into force of the
Constitmion have to stand the test for their validity
on the provisions of Part III of the Constitution.
The points that require consideration in the case are
whether the provisions of section 5(1), sections 5(4),
6, 7 and 8 or any parts thereof contravene the guarantee
of equal protection of the laws and of the..., equality
before the law, or whether the impugned provisions of
the Act are based on a valid classification which is
rational in view of the objects of the Act. A further
point is whether section 6(5) of the Act offends against
article 20( 3) of the Constitution.
Mr. P. R. Das for the petitioner attacked the provisions of section 5(1) of the Act on a two-fold ground :
(1) That the section was not based on any valid
classification ; the word "substantial" being vague and
uncertain and having no fixed meaning, could furnish
no basis for any classification at all ; (2) That the Central '
Government was entitled by the provisions of the
section to discriminate between one person and another
in the same class and it was authorized to pick and
458
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
I
1 954
Suraj Mall Molda
and Co.
v.
A. V. Visuanatha
Sastri and
Another.
MthrChand
Mahajan C. J.
'
[1955]
.
choose the cases of persons who fell within the group
of those who had substantial1y evaded taxation. It
could, if it chose, send the case of one person to the
Commission and show favouritism to another person
by not sending his case to the Commission though both
of these persons be within the group of those who have
evaded the payment of tax to a substantial extent.
As regards sub-section ( 4) of section 5 the learned
counsel contended that this section had no independent
existence and wa< bound to fall with sub-section (1) of
section S, if his contention regarding the invalidity of
that section prevailed. In the alternative, he contended that assuming that sub-se,ction ( 1) was valid even
then sub-section (4) had to be declared void because it
gave arbitrary power to the Commission to pick and
choose and secondly because the clause was highly
discriminatory in character inasmuch as an evasion,
whether substantial or insubstantial, came within its
ambit as well as within the ambit of section 34 of the
Indian Income-tax •Act.
The learned Solicitor-General combated all these
arguments and contended that the Act was based on a
broad and rational classification, that it only dealt with
a group of persons who had evaded income-tax from
the beginning of the war, 1st January, 1939, to the period
ending with 1st September, 1948, as a consequence of
war controls resulting in black-marketing activities
and huge profits. In other words, it was said that
the Act only dealt with that group of persons who
came within the class of war-profiteers. This was a
class by itself and needed special treatment and therefore the law did not offend against the equal protection
of the laws clause of the Constitution. It was suggested that persons coming under sub-section (4) of
section S also belonged to the same class and therefore
on the same grounds that section also could not be
declared void. It was further said that there was no
substantial
difference in the procedure prescribed
under section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act and the
impugned Act and that in any case the procedure
prescribed by the Act was a good substitute for that
prescribed by the Indian Income-tax Act.
S.C.R.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
459
In our judgment, it is not necessary in this case to
deal with all the contentions raised by Mr. P. R. Das
and combated by the learned Solicitor-General. It will
be sufficient for the decision of this case to examine the
respective contentions raised about the validity of subsection ( 4) of section 5 of the Act bec:mse the case of
the petitioner was referred to the Commission under
the provisions of this section and was not referred to
the Commission by the Central Government under the
provisions of section 5(1) and that being so, an enquiry
into the validity of that section is really outside the
scope of the present case. On the assumption therefore that section 5 ( 1) of the Act is based on a valid
classification and deals with a group of persons who
came within the class of war-profiteers which required
special treatment and that the classification is rational
and that reasonable grounds existed for making distinction between those who fell within that class and
others who did not come within it, but without in any
way deciding or even expressing any opinion on that
question, we proceed to examine the question whether
sub-section ( 4) of section 5 under which proceedings
had been initiated against the petitioner offends against
the guarantee of equal protection of the laws given in
article 14 of the Constitution.
The first question that requires consideration is
whether sub-section ( 4) of section 5 deals with the same
class of persons as are said to have been grouped
together in sub-section (1) of section 5, as persons who
to a substantial extent evaded payment of taxation on
income :_in other words, does sub-section ( 4) of section 5
confer on the Commission the power merely to add to·
the number of persons included in section 5(1) by the
Central Government or does it confer larger power
on the Commission. On the phraseology employed
in the sub-section it is difficult to read therein the
limitations contained in sub-section ( 1) of section 5
as contended for by the learned Solicitor-General.
Sub-section (4) which has been set out above in clear
and
unambiguous terms provided that where the
Commission "has reason to believe that some person
other than the person whose case is being investigated
has evaded payment of taxation on income, ...... it may
11-87 S. C. India/59.
1 954
Suraj Mall Mohta
anc!Co.
v.
A. V. Visvanatha
Sastri and
Another.
Mehr Chant!
Mahajan C. J.
460
1954
Suraj Mall Mohta
and Co.
v.
A. V. Visvanatha
Saslri and
Another.
Mehr Chand
Mahajan C. J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955)
make a report to the Central Government." It does
not repeat the phraseology used in section 5 ( 1) that
some person other than the person whose case is being
investigated "have to a substantial extent evaded payment of taxation on income." On no principle of construction of statutes can the words to a "substantial
extent" be read in sub-clause (a) of section 5(4). On
a plain reading of the section it is clear that the subsection is not limited only to persons who made
extraordinary profits and to a substantial extent evaded
payment of taxation on income, but applies to all persons who may have evaded payment of taxation on
income, irrespective of whether the evaded profits are
substantial or insubstantial. In other respects also the
phraseology of the section is different from that employed in sub-section ( 1) of section 5. Sub-section ( 1)
of section 5 provided that where the Centr:al Government "has prima facie reasons for believing that a person has to a substantial extent evaded payment of
taxation on income'', while clause (a) of section 5(4)
says that if the Commission "has reason to believe that
some person other that the preson whose case is being
investigated
has
evaded payment of taxation on
income''. The prima facie belief of the Central Government is substituted by the expression "The Commission
has reason to believe''. The scope of the section is thus
different from the scope of section 5 ( 1) of the Act, both
in its extent and range. It is not necessarily limited
to profits made within any particular period and brings
within its range all persons, whether traders, businessmen, professional people, whoever they may be, who
may have at any time evaded payment of taxation on
income for whatever cause.
That being the true scope or construction of subsection (4), it obviously deals with the same class of
persons who fall within the ambit of section 34 of the
Indian Income-tax Act and are dealt with in subsection (1) of that section and whose incq_µie can be
caught by proceeding under that section. Assessees
who have failed to disclose fully and truly all material
facts necessary for the assessment under section 34 can
be equated with. persons who are discovered in the
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~ course
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
461
of the investigation conducted under section
5(1) to have evaded payment of income-tax on their
incoµies. The result is that some of these persons can
be dealt with under the provisions of Act XXX of
1947, at ·the choice of the Commission, though they
could also be proceeded with under the provisions of
section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act.- It is not
' ~ possible to hold that all such persons who evade pay·. ment of income-tax and do not truly disclose all
particulars or material facts necessary for their assessment and against whom a report is made under
sub-section ( 4) of section 5 of the impugned Act by'
themselves form a class distinct from those who evade
payment of income-tax and come within the ambit of
section 34 of the 'Indian Income-tax Act. It is well
~settled that in its application to legal pro.ceedings
article 14 assures to everyone the same rules of evidence
and modes of procedure ; in other words, the same rule
must exist for all in similar circumstances. It is also
well settled that this principle does not mean that every
law must have universal application for all persons
who are not by nature, attainment or circumstance, in
the same position. The State can by classification
.-. determine who should be regarded as a class for
purposes of legislation and in relation to a law enacted
on a particular subject, but the classification permissible must be based on some real and substantial distinction bearing a just and reasonable relation to the
objects sought to be attained and cannot be made
arbitrarily and without any substantial basis. Classification means segregation in classes which have a
systematic relation, usually found in common proper.. ties and characteristics. There is nothing uncommon
either in properties
or in characteristics between
persons who are discovered as evaders of income-tax
during an investigation conducted under section 5(1)
and those who are discovered by the Income-tax
Officer to have evaded payment of income-tax. Both
these
kinds of persons have common properties and
•
have common characteristics and therefore require
j. equal treatment. We thus hold that both section 34
$.
of the Indian Income-tax Act and sub-section ( 4) of
1954
Suraj Mall M ohta
and Co.
v.
A. V. Visvanatha
Sastri and
Another.
Mehr Chand
Mahajan C. J.
462
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19551
,section 5 of the impugned Act <lea! with all persons'~
who have similar characteristics and similar properties,
Suraj Mall Mofda
and Co.
the common characteristics · being that they are
v.
;
persons
who have not truly disclosed their income an<l
A. V. Visvanatha
Sastri and
have evaded payment of taxation on income.
Another.
The next question that requires determination is
Mehr Chand
whether
the procedure prescribed by Act XXX of 1947 •
Mahajan C. J. ~
for discovering the concealed profits of those who have.~
evaded payment of taxation on their income is substantially different and prejudicial to the assessees
than the · procedure prescribed in the Indian Incomelearned Solicitor-General
tax Act by section 34. The
contended
that the
procedure prescribed by the
impugned Act was a fair and good substitute for the
procedure prescribed by the Indian Income-tax Act
and that there was really no substantial difference-'
between the two procedures. He urged that justice
could be fully done to those persons by following the
new procedure and as a matter of fact, it would be
more truly done by following the procedure under the
impugned Act than following the procedure under the
Indian Income-tax Act. This argument, in our opinion,
begs the question to be decided in all such cases. It
is clear that if persons dealt with by the im_pugned Act /
are deprived of the substantial and valuable privileges
which they would otherwise have if they were dealt with
under the Indian Income-tax Act, in that situation it is
no defence to say that the discriminatory procedure
also advances the course of justice. The matter has
to be judged from the point of view of the ordinary
reasonable man and not from the point of view of the
Government. The ordinary reasonable man would say,_.
when the stakes are heavy and serious charge of evasion
of income-tax are
made against him, why one
person similarly placed should have the advantage
substantially of the procedure prescribed by the Indian
Income-tax Act, while another person similarly situated
be deprived of it. It is from this aspect that the
application of article 14 to the facts of this case has to '
be considered.
The next question for consideration is whether the..l.1
procedure prescribed by the impugned Act in regard to
1954
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
463
1954
persons similarly situate with those who are proceeded
- . with under section 34, is substantially different than Suraj Mall Mohta
and Co.
under the Act, and operates to the prejudice of those
v.
persons. So far as we can see these assessees have
A. V. Visvanatha
Sastri and
been given discriminatory treatment even from those
Another.
whose cases are referred to under section 5(1) of the
Mehr Chand
Act to the Commission inasmuch as in the case of
Mahajan C. J.
" persons whose cases are referred to under section 5(1) of
~, the Act it is the prim a f acie belief of the Government
that enables the reference to be made to the Commission and the Commission has after investigation to
form an opinion ; while in the case of persons coming
within the ambit of sub-section ( 4) of section 5 the
Commission itself finds and gathers reason to believe
that these persons have evaded income-tax and on its
report the Government is bound to refer their cases to
+the same Commission who has already arrived at the
prim a facie conclusion that they have evadc;d paymenJ
of income-tax. The investigator and the judge in this
situation are rolled into one. That is not so in cases
coming under section 5(1). Apart from this circumstance, there are substantial differences between the two
procedures, inter alia, in the following matters :1. Under the provisions of section 8 of the impugned
""" Act, the findings of fact given by the Commission as to
factum and extent of the evasion are final and con- •
dusive and thus the persons against whom proceedings
are taken under section 5( 4) are deprived of the rights
Qf appeal, second appeal and revision conferred by
sections 31, 32 and 33 of the Indian Income-tax Act on
assessees whose .cases are dealt with under the procedure
of section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act. ,A person
~.who has evaded payment of income-tax and is proceeded with under section 34 and is held to have escaped
income-tax has a right of appeal to the Appellate
Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax and
can
challenge all the findings of fact given by the Incometax Officer. If he does not get relief from the Appellate
Assistant Commissioner, he is entitled to go before the
Appellate Tribunal under section 33 and can challenge
all the findings of fact given by tbe Income-tax Officer.
), On the other hand, a person dealt with under section
5 ( 4) of the impugned Act has no such right. The learned Solicitor-General contended that the constitution
464
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
qf the Commission was such that it was a good
substitute for the rights of appeal, second appeal and
revision conferred by the Income-tax Act inasmuch as
the Commission is comprised of a High Court Judge
A. V., Visvanatha
Sastri and
and two other responsible persons and these sitting
Another.
together were as good a tribunal as the totality of
Mehr Chand
persons comprising the Income-tax Officer, Appellate
MahaJan C. J.
Assistant Commissioner and the Appellate TJibunaL
'
In our opinion, the constitution of the Commission by _~
itself cannot be held to be a sufficient safeguard and a
good substitute for the rights of appeal and second
appeal and revision given by !he Indian Income-tax
Act and there can thus be no doubt that the procedure
prescribed by the impugned Act deprives a person who
is dealt with under that Act of these valuable rights of
appeal, second appeal and revision to challenge questions of fact decided by the Judge of first instance. -'"
There is thus a material and substantial difference
between the two procedures, one prescribed by the
impugned Act and the other prescribed by the Indian
Income-tax Act.
2. When an assessment on escaped or evaded income
is made under the provisions of section 34 of the Indian
Income-tax Act, all the provisions for arriving at the
assessment provided under section 23(3) come into
• operation and the assessment has to be made on all
relevant materials and on evidence and the assessee
ordinarily has the fullest right to inspect the record
and all documents and materials that are to be used
against him. Under the provisions of section 37 of the
Indian Income-tax Act the proceedings before the
Income-tax Officer are judicial proceedings and all the
incidents of such judicial proceedings have to be
observed before the result is arrived at. In other words, ,4
the assessee would have a right to inspect the record
and all relevant documents before he is called upon to
•
lead evidence in rebuttal. This right has not been taken
away by any express provisions of the Income-tax Act
but the impugned Act contains a mandate in sub-section
( 4) of section 7 to the effect that "no person shall be
entitled to inspect, call for, or obtain copies of, any
documents, statement or papers or materials furnished
to, obtained by or produced before the Commission or
any authorized official in any proceedings under this
'954
Surqj Mall Mohta
and Co.
v.
-
S.C.R..
•
-
....
"
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
465
Act." There is a proviso to sub-section ( 4) which says
that for the purpose of enabling the person whose case
or points in whose case is or are being investigated to
rebut any· evidence brought on the record against him,
he shall, on application made in this behalf and on
payment of such fees as may be prescribed by rules, be
furnished with certified copies of documents, statements, papers and materials brought on the record by
the Commission. This little mer.cy shown to the person
whose case is being investigated by the Commission is
no substitute for the fullest right of inspection which
under ordinary law and the Code of Civil Procedure.
and in a judicial proceeding a person would have in
order to meet the case made against him. He is entitled
only to get copies of that portion of the materials
which is brought on the record and which is going to
be used against him and it is clear that portions of the
material which are in his favour and which have not
been brought on the record may not be available to
him at all. He is not even entitled to see all the books
of account which may have been impounded under the
Act and taken possession of by the Commission. It
may well happen that there are entries in those books
which contain the rebuttal evidence, but the assessee is
not entitled to have their copies. The assessee is not
even entitled to see his own books which are in the
possession of the Commission and take copies of those
entries which are favourable to him and which would
completely demolish the case made against the assessee
by the Commission. The procedure thus prescribed in
this matter by the impugned Act is substantially
prejudicial to the assessee than the procedure prescribed under the Indian Income-tax Act. It was not
disputed by the learned Solicitor-General that the
procedure prescribed by the impugned Act in sections
6 and 7 was more drastic than the prqcedure prescribed
in sections 37 and 38 of the Indian Income-tax Act.
Again, so far as the procedure for reference under subsection ( 4) of section 5 is concerned, it is also to a
certain extent prejudicial to the assessee. There is no
doubt that there is in this matter in the first stages
some similarity in the procedure to be followed for
catching evaded income both under section 34 of the
Indian Income-tax Act and under the provisions of
1954
Suraj Mall Mohta
and Co.
v.
A. V. Visuanatha
Sastri and
Another.
Mehr Chand
Mahajan C. J.
1
466
1954
SuraJ Mall Mohta
and c~.
v.
A. V. Vi.n1anatha
Sastri and
Anottf.r.
Mehr Chand
Mahajan C. ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19551
sub-section ( 4) of section 5 of the impugned Act ; but
the overall picture is that though under the Indian
Income-tax Act the same officer who first arrives at a
tentative conclusion hears and decides the case, , his
decision is not final but is subject to appeal, while under
the provisions of sub-section (4) of section 5 the
decision of the Commission tentatively arrived at in
the absence of the assessee. becomes final when taken
in his presence, and that makes all the difference
between the two procedures. If there was a provision
for
reviewing the conclusions of the Investigation
.Commission when acting both as investigators and
judges, there might not have been such substantial
discrimination in the two procedures as would bring
the case within article 14; but as pointed out above,
there is no provision of that kind in the impugned Act.
It may also be pointed out that under the provisions
of section 34 investigation into escaped income or
evaded income is limited to a maximum period of eight
years, while under the provisions of sub-section ( 4) of
section 5 it is not limited to any period and this certainly operates · to the detriment of those dealt with
under sub-section ( 4) of section 5 of the impugned Act,
and those dealt with under section 34 of the Indian
Income-tax Act.
For the reasons given above we are of the opmton
that sub-section ( 4) of section 5 and the procedure prescribed by the · impugned Act in so far as it affects the
persons proceeded against under that sub-section being
a piece of discriminatory legislation offends against the
provisions of article 14 of the Constitution and is thus
void and unenforceable. In reaching this decision we
refrain from expressing any opinion, as above pointed
out, on the validity- of section 5 (1) of the Act or on the
question whether section 6(5) of the impugned Act
offends against the provisions of article 20 sub-clause
(3) of the Constitution. We accordingly direct that an
appropriate writ be issued against the Investigation
Commission prohibiting it from taking any proceedings
under the provisions of the impugned Act against the
petitioner. The petitioner will have his costs of these
proceedings.
Writ issued.
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