MR. 'G', A SENIOR ADVOCATE OF THE SUPREME COURT versus THE HONBLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND JUDGES OF THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Supreme Court of India | Decided 27 May 1954 | [1955] 1 S.C.R. 501 | 1954 INSC 76
Key facts
- Decided
- 27 May 1954
- Bench
- BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA*, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, VIVIAN BOSE, GHULAM HASAN, B. JAGANNADHADAS
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 254/1954
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1955] 1 S.C.R. 501
- Neutral citation
- 1954 INSC 76
Text of the judgment
s.c.R:
501
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1954
Mr. 'G', A SENIOR ADVOCATE OF THE
SUPREME COURT
Ma; 27
v.
\
THE HON'BLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND JUDGES
OF THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT
BOMBAY.
[MuKHERJEA, S. R. DAs, VIVIAN BosE,
GHULAM HASAN, and JAGANNADHADAS n:i
~_._
Indian Bar Councils Act, (XXXV/Il of 1926), s. 10(2)-Whether ordei· under s. 10(2) may be oral-If High Court can act "on its
otvn motion."
The order under section 10(2) of the Indian Bar Councils Act,
1926, given to a proper officer of the Court may be an oral order
and nee<l not be a written one.
The High Court can under section 10(2), refer a case on its.
own motion.
ORIGINAL
JURISDICTION :
Petition
No.
254
of
1954.
Under article 32 of the Constitution for the
enforcement of fundamental rights.
The petitioner in Person.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, ( G. N.
Joshi and P. G. Gokhale, with him) for the respondents.
1954. May 27· The Judgment of the Court wa~
(felivered by
BosE J.-This is a petition under article 32 of
Constitution and raises the same question on the merits
as in the connected summons case in which we have
just delivered judgment. The facts will be found there.
In the present matter it is enough to say that no question arises about the breach of a fundamental right.
Rut as a matter touching the jurisdiction of the Bar
Council Tribunal and that of the Bombay High Court
was argued, we will deal with it shortly.
Mr. G's first objection is that the proceedings before
th.e Tribunal were ultra vires because there was no proper order of appointment. At a very early stage he
applied to the Registrar and also to the Prothonotary
for a copy of the order of the Chief Justice constituting
'
502
Mr. 'G', a Senior
.Ad1,1ocate of th1
Supreme Court
,V
Thi Hon'ble Chief
Justice and judges
.of the High Court
of J·udicature at
Bombay.
Bose].
,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
r195sJ
the Tribunal. He was told by the Prothonotary that
the order was oral.
Mr. 'G' put in two written statements before the
Tribunal and did not challenge this statement of fact
in either. He contented himself with saying that the
order was not "judicial" and so was not valid. He took
up the same attitude in the High Court. The learned
Judges said"The record dearly shows that when it came to
the notice of this Court .... it was decided to refer this
case to the Bar Council under section 10(2) and accordingly a Tribunal was appointed under section 11(1)
by the learned Chief Justice of this Court."
In his petition to this Court he did not challenge this
statement of fact but again confined his attack to the
question of the validity of the order. It is evident
from all this that the fact that an ora \ order was made
was not challenged. We cannot allow Mr. 'G' to go
behind that.
The next question is whether an oral order is enough :
Bar Councils Act does not lay dowf'. any procedure.
All it says isSection 10(2) :
" ........ the High Court .......... may of its own
motion so refer any case in which it ·has otherwise
reason to believe that any such advocate has been
so guilty."
and section 11 (2) says"The Tribunal shall consist of not less than three
........ members of the Bar Council appointed for the
purpose of the inquiry by the Chief Justice."
We agree it is necessary that there should De some
record of the order on the files but, in our opinion, the
order itself need not be a written one ; it can be an oral
order given to a proper officer of the Court. In the
present case, the letter No. G-1003 dated 29th April,
1953, of the Prothonotary to the Registrar and the
letter No. E. 41-09/53 dated the 1st May, 1953, of the
Registrar to the Bar Council (office copies of which
were retained on the files) are a sufficient record of the
making of the order. Mr. 'G' was supplied with copies
> .....
j
-
-
S.C.R.
~..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
503
of these letters an<l so was aware of the fact that orders
had been issued. As a matter of fact, we have ' seen
the originals of the High Court's office files and find
that the names of the three members of the Tribunal
are in the Chief Justice's handwriting with his initials
underneath. That is an additional record of the making
of the order. We hold that an order recorded in the
manner set out above is sufficient for the purposes of
sections 10(2) and 11(2) of the Bar Councils Act and
hold that the Tribunal was validly appointed.
Mr. G's next point is that there was no "complaint"
to the High Court and so it had no jurisdiction to refer
the matter to the Tribunal. This ignores the fact that
the High Court can refer a matter of this kind "of its
own motion" under section 10(2) of the Bar Councils
Act.
We have dealt with the merits in the connected case.
This petition is dismissed but, here again, we make
no order about costs.
·~.54
Mr. 'G', a Senior
Advocate of tic<
Supreme Court.
v.
The Hon'ble Chief
Justice and Judges
of the Higle Court
of Judicature al
Bombay.
Bose J.
Petition dismissed.
SETH JAGJIVAN MA VJI VITHLANI
'>
ti.
1 954
MESSRS RANCHHODDAS MEGHJI.
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J., S. R. Di1.s, V1v1AN BosE,
BHAGWATI and VENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.]
May 2&.
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (XXV/ of 1881) ss. 7, 32,
61, 64, 78-Drawu, liability of-Acceptance-Bill payable at sight
-Prese1ltment-Acceptance-Oral-Whether valid.
Under section 32 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the
liability of the drawee arises only when he accepts the bill. There
is no provision in the Act that the drawee is as such liable on the
instrument, the only exception being under section 31 in the case
of a drawee of a cheque having sufficient funds of the customer in
his lands ; an<l even then, the liability is only towards the drawer
im<l not the payee.
There is no substance in the contention that section 61 of
0e :'-ct provides for presentmen~ for acceptance only when the
bill is payable after sight, and not when it is payable on demand.
In a bill payable after sight, there are two distinct stages,
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